SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War
CiA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
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DEPurYJ^MCTOR OF GCNTRAI INlFJlrGENCE Concf/ed in by Ih* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD At indicated7
Iht Wowingo'yonitctioni poilKipa'ed in ihe p'epotalian ef
lhi| fOimol*:
TIio Control tritence Agency ond tha inlolligance organ notion- ot Iheof Sioie ord Defense, endNSA.
Concurring)
Dr. ft. i. Smifi. lor lhai'.ol liretbgence
Mr. Thomas t. Hughes, rha Director oi Intelligence and ft*-earth, Depot intent of Stare
or the Director. Defense IMerftgenta Agency Mr. Olivot R. Ktrby, for tho Director. Motionol Security Afloncy
Ab-Joining.-
Dr. Charles H. Reichordl. for th*eneral Maisogei.ergy Com-mriwori and Mr. WXo* O. Crogar, far the AtMUanl Dwecsor. Federal Bvieau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their juilidicHon.
SNIEOVIET ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONSVIETNAM
EXPLANATORY NOTE
SOVIET ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS TOWARD THE VIETNAM WAR
THE PROBLEM
To examine the USSR's policies toward lhe Vielnam war and ils views of relevant US policies, and to estimate Soviet intentions into that conflict.
CONCLUSIONS
thc Soviel leaders sec thc war as advantageous to themways, ihey also see disadvantages which make theirand hazardous. They probably believe lhat there isof movementolitical solution for several monthsand appear to have concluded that for thc time being theyalternative but to help Hanoi to carry on the war. hopingof attitude in either Hanoi or Washington, or both, willpolitical solution possible later.
Soviet leaders fear lhat the US. in its impatience to getover, will escalate the conflictay which will increaseand costs for the USSR; in an effort to forestall this theystressing their intention to move to more vigorous supportVietnam. We believe that during thc coming monthscontinue to supply equipment designed to strengthen airdefenses in North Vietnam and to increase the firepowerthe regular North Vietnamese forces and the Communistin the South.
or not there are formal arrangements coveringof Soviet supplies across China, wc believe that Peking willserious obstacles to such transit. But the relations between
Moscow aiid Pcki rig am still finiclftiticntfilly hostile, and (lieu attitudes loward major issues of wat and peace in Vietnam will continue tn differ piofoundly.
North Vietnamese al sonic point will prohabiy pressfor more sophisticated equipment than those types nowon lhe scene or in the pipeline. These might include cruisetactical rockets which could he used tu support Norlhin thc DMZ area and against US warships. Thebelieve it had to respond to such pressure, allhough it wouldthat ihe use of such weapons wouldtillUS response.
the intensity of the conflict were to be increased by thcbelieve lhat at some point the USSR would create an atmospheretension wiih the US. The Soviets might take certaindesigned to bolster North Vietnam and to warn the US,the provision of limited numbers of volunteers oi crews foror possibly aircraft. They mighl also break offihe US on various subjects and suspend certain agreementseffect. The mining or the blockade of the North Vietnamesebe most likely to provoke these responses, since this woulda direct challenge to the Soviets, and there would be litdedo on the scene. We do not think the Soviets are preparedto strong and direct threats of general wareans toVietnam or to preserve Soviet face.
would alsoood chance that at some juncturewould exert strong effortsolitical solution, butprobably not make Hanoi's acceptance of talks an explicit con-
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SLtWlT
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET POUCY
The USSH'* milul poM Khrudschev commit incnt lo Notlh Vietnam in talc I'Oljlmml certainly IvJvd on wlul jnovsd loiicalcul.ition: in .ill proluhility. lhc Soviet leader* did not then expect llie US lo Step up it* niMiK.in'tiiie inn Hid and theyiicL and easy Com imimvtin- Southtcd lo be associated wiih lhat victoryconcerned lhan Khiushclicv with the |woblcms nnd issues o( lhe Communistespecially anxious to disprove Chinese charges that they svere soil on Imperialism. Initialiou ol the US air campaign in5 caughl ihem by surprise (and Kosygin innd iheir actions ever since have reflected their determination to maintain Ibeir commitment Io Hanoi, but at the vime time to control the risks of doing so, especiallyis the US.
There is within ihis broadvidc area of uncertainty in the USSIl's attitude toward the war. Tlie Soviets surely sec the svar as advantageous to them in many ways It diverts US political and strategic attention away from areas of primary interest to lhe USSR, it imposes burdens on US resources, and ilubstanti.il portion of US military forces-in-being. Moreover, it has deeply troubled many US allies and Associates, especially in Europe, and itivisive factor within the US ilself. Finally, theiheirrole inthe Soviets to score further gains against the Chinese, both in Hanoi and in the Communist movementhole.
On the other hand, llie conflict, as seen from Moscow, has its adverse aspects as welL The bombing of North Vietnamontinuing re-ptoaeh lo the Soviet Union, unable as it is Iomall ally. The war is taking place far from thc USSR and is being wagedtate which is unwilling lo aeeepl Soviet political guidance On the conduct of thc war and is suspicious even of Soviet counsel. The buildup of US forces, and their engagement in oombnt. Increases pressures on tho Soviet leadors Io expand thoir osvn forces, and Ihis. in lum, may impose some additional strains on the economy and fuither complicate long-range economic planning. Perhaps mostIhe US may undertake new courses of action which would force the Soviets to choose between confronting the US or backing down. Moscow is abo almost certainly concernedorean-type war could develop, leading to Chinese involvement and all the complications and dangers which the USSR desires to avoid.
Thc pro's and con's of this situation tend lo make alternative Soviet options unpromising or hatardous. If they attempted to force Hanoiy threatening to stopmight fail, for Hanoi, even without Soviet aid. could fight on if il wished, though tbe nature and Ihe level of the conflict would necessarily change. ailure would effectively end Soviet
SECRET
jiillui'im- in ll.uioi, limns- Ninth Viilii.mi entirely luck on China, and diminish Nus id picligc In tlit* Communist woilil ,i* wdl a*tiy "uncommitted" cu.miiH' Tin*sLtinilscx would follow if UmcQHf simply wit|kdicwf llamM inlitiln-pci innilniiscn* On thc other li.iml. Muncosv cillitot fc.mhly msdirl.ikf .my inKHiirhcipa lion in tin- svar. ss'ilh it* iissii ionih.itur from lhc sources ol Soviet power, nnd .it the iml of lines of coniimmicitlion passing lluough thc dubiously friendly territory ol Ohiiu or risking USt mm Finally, if Mi. .iua triedfhirncc the US Iry hcjvy pevwucsin thc world, it would risk provokingjiti.il US inohsh/aiionajor mtenutioo.il crisis.
5 As forr llsvlf. llie Soviet Ic.ulers have piobably concluded lhatiliiaryIvy thc Viet Cong .iml tlic North Vietnamese is not possible. They probablybelieveear-cut mditary victory by theforces is also impossible, unless the US steps up its war against North Vietnamery substantial degree or is prepared lo engageong and costly struggle. In addition, lhc Soviet lenders have probably concluded,onsequence of Ihe events of the pasto three months, thai there is no prospect of movementolitical solution, at least by negcrfUtion. for several months at best. Especially since Kosygin's visit to London in February, it must appear to the Soviets that both sides are determined not to accept the other's terms for the opening of negotiations. The Soviet lcadeis thus appear to have concluded thatime <hcy have no alternative but to help Hanoi to cany on the war. hoping that changes of attitude in either Hanoi or Washington, or both, willolitical solution possible later.
fl. The Soviet leaders piobably recognizeubstantial majority in the US support* the President in his wiih to terminate Ihe warolilical settlement and lhat US withdrawal svithout meaningful concessions from the Communists in Vietnam is an unrealistic hope. But they fear that, in its anxiety to get the war over and finished, the US will escalate the conflictay svhicli would pose those serious dangers wc have noted above.
n its efforts to prevent thc US from escalating thc conflict and to accept terms also acceptable to Hanoi for movingolitical settlement, the Soviet leaders have engagedariety of stratagems.eriod they sought to sVam the US of the harmful eflect upon US-Soviet relations of the continued rise in thc US commitment. Although they have continued to pursue this theme, they have since last summer also used another route; theyome tangible progress In US-Soviet lelalions. partly in order to persuade the US that such progress should not be jeopardized by new US actions in Vietnam. Finally, they took steps, which culminated in the Wilson.Kosygin talks, designed to convince the US leaders that thereeal prospect for political settlement. At the moment, because ol their fear of imminent(hey are trying to convince Ihc US of thc hazards of escalation, this time by stressing that they intend to meet US moves with even more vigorous support of North Vietnam
SE#ET
II. SOVIET REACTIONS TO ESCALATION
fi Wc belieit both Hanoi and Moscow haveigher level of US military iipciiilunis against Nmlh Vietnam, and it seems likely tint llie Soviets will icspimtl to tlie cniieiil expanded bombing |iiogram liy providing additional <piantil<et and pohaps new type* of weapons and equipment. Indeed, they maysv decided lo do so
bdlrarc that llw .itlilndc ofill notteiioiis obstacle*couliiiiicd ii.mimi ui Sovm1 military supplies. Ws- liavc nolie js.isI. despite Sovietlhe contrary andwmc degree of Chinese harassment Earlyal the height nf llie anil-Soviet demonstrations in Peking, lhe SovietsNorth Vietnamese apparently made some new arrangements underNorth Vietnamese would accept Soviet cargo at the Sino-Soviet horderresponsihility for its onwarduch an arrangementstill further llw chances of Chinese meddling with Soviet supplies,would seem to have little hearing on Sino-Soviel relations. Thesefuiidamentally hostile, ami Chinese and Soviet altitudes towardof war mid pence in Vietnam will continue to differ profoundly,
In general, wc believe that the types of weaponry Ihc Soviets are likely to supply during ihu coming months will be intended to strengthen the air and coastal defenses of North Vietnam and lo increase the firepower of both thc regular North Vietnamese forces and lhe Communist forces fighting in theo bolster air defense, tlse Soviets will probably supply more jet fighters with air-to-air missiles, more surface-to-air missiles, and improved antiaircraft artilleryhee think it somewhat less likely that they would introduce an improved surface-to-air missile systemomewhat better capability against low altitude attacks than the SA-2's now in North Vietnam-To meet US naval attacks on coastal shipping, (hereood chance that lhe Soviets will provide coastal defense missiles with conventional warheads (the Samlet and perhaps even the coastal defense version of thchey will also probably supply more patrol boats, perhaps even the Komar or OSA guided missile patrol boats. For the ground forces, the Soviets will probably provide additional multiple tocket launchers, heavier artillery and mortars, better antiaircraft and antitank weapons,ariety of antipersonnel devices. Some of the lighter, more mobile'equipment would be sent forward by Hanoi to South Vietnam for use against US personnel and bases. Indeed, some has already appeared there.
The North Vietnamese would probably at some point press the Soviets for more sophisticated equipment, and this woulderious problem for the Soviets. They might believe ihey had to respond to such pressure,
'A critical chnnee In Chines* Intents! affairs, should it come, could of course lignifksntly slier cxilting lisrult tiiincemeriU.
1 See ANNEX fur the (hniicteiuucs of selected weapons iikI waipoiii lyitrmi.
i.illy if lunl jii>-vvil hy North Virtis.un .usj if no hrr.ik jppvjrcd on tlicliinight provide nOnniKlr.it weapons with .itlditmnjl..ud firepower, Imping (hat tlte new mjlit.ity liluation thus nciled would bring tilsoutb.ingr in llie US position. Butoviets tiould also Iht eon-tiiiHil thai llit* iiitrodiii-tioii oflype* ofmilii then hm* ill South ViiiiLimi-Lv futtlm US luf.ilulHni. which tiny would like lo iivoid. Of even cic.ils* i" situation which svouldS imMsiou of North Vietnam. Wc believe ncverlhvlew llmt timeood chance thai tiny would piovidc MHiH- ol ihen- wc.ipon* syslcnis
f thc Soviet* did dc-cidc to embark oo this course, some of tlie weapons involved might be (he Snlidi short-range ground support cruise missile or the Frog Helical rocket. Both aie road mobile, require little in (be way ol peima-nent support facilities, and svould noteady target for US bombing. Vietnamese eoiikl be trained to man themew moot lis Tbcy could be used from site* in North Vietnam against US forces in Use DMZ area, but probably would not lie Iranspoiled Soulh. Thc. Scud and. Shaddock would also meet these general criteria for mobility and Vietnamese manning. The latter however,elaiively new and complex system never deployed outside the USSR, and, in any case, both the Scud and Shaddock are too cumbersome and complicated for use in the South. If the Soviets weretoi-capon fot attacks upon the South Vietnamese population or US bases, they might consider MRBMs with conventional warheads- Such sveapons svould create logistical problems and have marginal military value; if provided, their use would lie primarily fot political and psychological reasons. In any event, the Soviets would probably believe that the emplacement of such weapons would provoke an unacceptable level of US retaliation, and we consider their provision unlikely
ns for
Beyond supplying equipment, tho Soviets could take certain other actio to bolster the North Vietnamese and warn the US. They mightxample, lhat the provision of limited numbers of volunteers, or of am fo defense equipment or possiblyuld servearning without lead ingerious confrontation.
In anyteady increase in the level of combat and especially in the level of US air attacks would make ihe Soviet leaders increasingly nervous, and each new step would bring them closer to responses which would seriouslv impair US-Soviet relations, They might, for example, break oH variousand contacts with thc US. and perhaps suspend certain agreements of recent months. We cannot say precisely what would be the Soviet response fo particular actions. Much would depend upon what had gone before and how dangerous the situation of North Vietnam had become. But we are persuaded that at some point the USSR would create an atmosphere of heightened tension with the US.
mining or the blockade of lhe North Vietnamese coast would beto produce this result, since such action wouldirectto the Soviets. inimum tliey would try to mobilize world opinion
itnstS on litis, issue,poiiting on (lit altitude nl North Vietnam, wouldiking the matter to the UN.
ittlv lluit the.id do un lhc tniw if confronted willikind of nl nation liny dn not knv (hi- 'Ircnglli in liteolockade or to confioiH llie USjnr millMiy challaiigc, and we do not liclievc ihey would wish lo run large lufcl xiinply in nedcr lo harass US forces nc gain temporary irtpite. In lhe case of mining, for example, llie Sovieis could Iry In reopen shipping route* Iry luinging in miueswicncts. other naval ships for protection, and air eowr from North Vietnam Bui tins wouldazardous venture, since llie US could contrwie to sow mines by air and Ihe Soviets cookl not prevent it unless ihey were prepared toajor naval and air war. We Iielk-vr lliey would notheir shipping in mined waters and would attempt the necessary supply liy other. through China or by lighter-age. Most important, we do not ihink that (Ik- Soviets aie pri-iuiied to resort In stnmg nnd direct threats of general wareans lo protect North Vietnam or to preserve Soviet face.
Rcgnidless of tho precise aciion taken by the US, the Soviets might at some point exert pressures on the US outside of Southeast Asia. Heightened tensions in Keen, new troubles in thc Middle East are possibilities. Hut Berlin is thc most plausible pressure point; US interests there arc directly engaged and vulnerable, and tlie USSR could be surer of controlling the action. They might consider that only minor pressure on access routes would be enough to create the Impression ol an impending crisis. Bui sve think il unlikely that the Soviets would want to take the risk of provoking by suchajor and generalized crisis which would not only undercut their policies in Western Europe but could also leadS-Soviet confrontation.
There wouldood chance lhat the Sovieis would at tome juncture eieit strong effortsolitical solution of the Vietnam problem. They svould have to weigh lhe risks of some level of confrontation wiih Ihe US against their reluctance to put real pressure on Hanoi forolution. They would almost certainly urge lhe course of negotiation more vigorously lhan they have heretofore. But they would probably not be willing to make Hanoi's acceptance of talks an explicit condition of continued material support. If negotiations did get underway, they svould, of course, slill bend every effort to obtain terms which gave Hanoi hope of eventually achieving its alms.
ANNL-X
CHARACTERISTICS OF CERTAIN SOVIET WEAPONS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT
GROUND FORCESr c)
Type: single-stage, tactical ballistic with storable liquid piopclJant.bs. HE or CW (intended
primarily for nuclear option)
. CEP Refire time: I'A4 hours
Remarks: the Scud launcher is mountedodified
tank chassis; it has been deployed in the USSR and some East European countries
Salish (SSC-2a)
version of the Kennelturbo-jet cruise missile
n.m.
lbs. HE (nuclear possible)
feet CEP
Refire
Salish is transportedheeled
launcher; it is deployed in thc USSR, Cuba and with Soviet forces in East Cermany
Shaddock (SSC-la)
Type: tactical ground forces version of theaval cruise missile
.bs. HE (nuclear option) Accuracy:. CEP. range Refire time: unknown
Remarks: the Shaddock is transportedaunch tubeheeled vehicle; it has not been made available to non-Soviet forces
Frog
Type: .solid |iropctIanl, suiT.icivtO-surfacc. uit-gnided rocket available in several versions Range: o. withrhe.idbs. HE (nuclear option)eter CEP at *Jti maximum range Reactioninutes
Remarks: the Frog is mountedight tank chassis and can support ground forces in aof .climatic and terrain conditions; variants have been deployed in the USSR, East Europe and Cuba
II. COASTAL DEFENSE Samlet (SSC-2b)
Type: coastal defense version ol thc Kennelturbo jet cruise missile Range..bs. HE or CW Overall systemercent Retire time: IS minutes
Remarks: two, wheeled Samlet launchen suaper launch site, the system has been deployed in the USSR. Cuba,China. North Korea, and East Europe
Shaddock (SSOIb)
Type: coastal defense version of Ihe SSC-la ground forces cruise missile.bs. HE or CW (nuclear option}
Overall system reliability:ercent Refire time: no refire
Remarks: the Shaddock has not been made available to non-Soviet forces.
Sty.)
Type: liqjid-fuel. antiship cruise mtUile launched from Osa and Komar-dass guided missile patrol boats Range:bs. HE Overall system reliability:oercent depending on homing mode Refire time: no refire
i
SEWET
Rcmniks. carried by Komnraunchers) and Osa-classaunchers) guided missile patroleployed in (he USSR, Cuba. China. Notth Koica, Egypt. Indonesia, Algeria, and East Europe
ZU-23
Type:m twin antiaircraft gun mountedowed, two-wheel clumisards0 feeteet effective antiaircraft range Hate of fire:ounds per minute per gun Muzzle
bs. overall Remarks: thcual purpose weaponfor AA use as well as direct-fire ground use against personnel and light armor; it is standard issue in the USSR and has been delivered to several other countries
RANGE BALLISTIC(SS-3)
Type: single stage MRBM employingguidance and nonstorable liquid pro-pellantbs. nuclear (conventional possible). CEP Refireours
Remarks: thes now obsolete; it has never been deployed outside the USSR
Sandal (SS-4)
Type: single stage MRBM employing inertial guidance and storable liquid propellant.bs. nuclear (conventional
. CEP Refireours
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