NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE^fp^
Bonn's Policies Under the Kiesinger Government
DlSECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred io byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai Indicated ovo'teal7
Tho following inlefftgence organizations participated in the preparation
. Tho Cenirol Intelligence Agency and the intelligence orgoniwiioos of the Depart-of'Stale ond Defense, ond the
vice ad-'. rufus l. taylor, deputy director oi central intelligence mr. . j in- direc'or of intelligence and research, depa-ii-eii o'
ll gen. joseph f. carroll, director, defense intelligence agency
ti. gen. marshall s. carter, the director, national security agency
oward c. brown,he assistant general monomer. atomic energy com-
tho national defense of the united statessc,, the irani-monner lo an unouthoriied person is prohibited.
this moterio' contoinsithin the meaning of tho csp mission or re-elation of which
mr. william o. cregor, for the assistant director, foderal bureau of investigation, she subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
I. THE NEW COALITION
II. MAIN FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS
with the US and NATO
and Limits of Rapprochement with France
BONN'S POLICIES UNDER THE KIESINGER GOVERNMENT
To assess the cohesiveness of the grand coalition government in West Germany and to estimate the development of West Cerman foreign policy over the next two or three years.
coalition headed by Chancellor Kiesinger has gainedsupport in West Germany and will probably remain uniteduntil die federal election of9 draws near.
extreme rightist National Democratic Party (NPD)to make further gains in the next year, but we believeairly small minority of the German electorateperiod of this estimate.
maintaining its defense ties with the US and NATO,government will be more assertive of nationalprevious governments in Bonn. Recently emerginghave ledradual increase in German criticismUS policies and the present dispute over the proposedtreaty will intensify this development. Nevertheless,that if the principal other nonnuclear nations sign, thewill feel compelled to go along.
will continue his efforts to improvebut the practical results will probably be limited, andGerman Government is not likely to accept FrenchWestern Europe.
present emphasis on improving relations withalready successful in Rumania, will probably have some
success in Hungary, Bulgaria,We think it unlikely that the West German initiatives will bring about any major change in Soviet policy toward Germany.
F. Bonn will seek to expand contacts with East Germany, even high-level contacts which might eventually approximate de' facto recognition, but will almost certainly not grant de jure recognition to
the Pankow regime.
I. THE NEW COALITION
hancellorgrand coalition" of Christian Democrats (CDU/ CSU)Socialists (SPD) came lo powerime of growing political ferment in West Germany. Former Chancellor Erhard was forcedittleear after his election victoryy general dbsntisfaction with hismounting domestic economic difficulties, and rising criticism of Bonn's foreign policies- Kiesinger appears capable of more effective leadership than Erhard. and tbe new government can take new initiatives in both foreign and domestic affairs with more assurance because it enjoys the broad parliamentary backing of tho (wo major parties.
The new coalitionumber of powerful and articulate political rivals, but we believe that It will probably hold together at least until the federal elections of9 draw near. Kiesinger has demonstratedleadership in handling the most immediate domestic problem facing hisfairly severe economic slump. His government has introduced various measures to stimulate growth, and diverse elements of the Cabinet such as CSU Finance Minister Strauss and SPD Economics Minister Schiller have cooperated closely in carrying them out. The coalition has given theof both determination and cohesion and has gained broad public support. Partly in response to the government's measures, an economic upturn willbecome evident toward the endn that event, prospects would be good that Bonn will achieve its goalour percent annual economic growth rateuccess in the economic area would enhance Kicsinger's ability to hold the grand coalition together.
are several domestic issues which could disrupt the coalition.the longstanding problem of "emergencyaws definingpowers to be given the government in time of war or nationalAlthough many elements of theunionists lncritical of emergency legislation, fts supporters have long believed thatchance of passage would come when, as now. Bonnajority large enough to make constitutionalthe Kiesinger government has Initiated action on this subject, ft Isto force the issue to the point ofplit tn the coalition.
broad majority enjoyed by the grand coalition has given rise toin modifying federal election laws so asto encourage changewo-
ostwar cwwlitutlon, or Basic Law. does not give the federal government eroereency powen which almost all other wvereign nations have. In addition, certain emerijency powenad and telephone iurvcllJanw) ore Mil reserved to thevesUea of occupation Wnei which most Ceimans would like to see eliminated. An "emefMney law-changing this would have loonstitutional amendment, and wouldwo-thiidi vote of the Bundestag.
party system. Essentially tbe proposals would make it more difficult (or small parties lo obtain representation in the Bundestag.otentially more divisive issue than emergency legislation; election reforms are opposed not only
by the small parlies themselves but by important forces within the coalition. Tbe
Kiesinger government probably will not abandon the proportional representation system before9 federal elections- But it might, if the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) bat furthertate elections, seek to amend
tbe present electoral laws so as to minimize tne NPD'* chances of winning seats
in the Bundestag.
he NPD. The growing strength of the NPD willreoccupation of the coalition parties in the next year or two. The NPD attracts former Nazis, but in seeking to gain acceptance has so far avoided the more extreme aspects of Nazi Ideology. It nevertheless features chauvinistic appeals and antiforcign slogans.ally of the discontented, the NPD. by gainingin the slate legislatures in Hesse and Bavaria, has demoastrated some appeal among conservative youth and the middle class. The NPD will probably win seats in two or diree more state legislatures during the next few months, thereby Intensifying concern both within Germany and abroad about this challenge from die right. Foreign criticism will tend to stimulate responsible German politicians to consider measures to combat this extremism while, at the same time,ationalistic defensive reaction on the part ol others. If the major parties, the CDU/CSU in particular, are faced with growing NPD strength, they may be constrained toore national attitudeariety of issues.
NPDercent of the votes in recent state electionsprobably do about as wellational bails. The growth potentialparty above this level appears to be limited, however, at least for theDiscord among the leaders of the NPD may also sap its strength. Onwe think that the party will remain fairly small,everedownturn or some other political development which discreditedgovernment leadershipajor way. Nevertheless, unless theis changed, thereood chance that the NPD willmallthe Bundestag In9 election.
II, MAIN FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS
grand coalition will be more assertive of German nationalits conduct of foreign affairs. There is mounting sentiment withinthe Federal Republic must act more effectively in its own behalf if it isthe cause of national reunification or exert an influence in worldwith its sire and power. One of the reasons for the downfallChancellor Erhardairly widespread belief tha! his governmenteffective in its dealings with other nations, particularly the US. Wethe present Cennan leaders will pursue policies of moderate rathernationalism, but their new approaches to relationi both withAllies and with Eastern Europe and the USSR may be only the beginning
eriod of uncertainty and change in German foreign policy going well beyond tbe period of this estimate.
A. Relations with the US and NATO
Under Erhard. West Germany was willing to follow US leadership inaffairs and to endorse US policiei throughout the world. The Kiesinger government recognizes that the FRCs ultimate security rests on the US. But as fear of Soviet aggression in Europe has receded. West Germans of all political leanings have increasingly questioned the need for soelationship to the US as Bonn has had in the past. Political differences have emerged which were played down when the Soviet threat seemed more imminent, and there hasradual increase in German criticism of various US policies. Previously, most of (his criticism came from the press and from political loaders outside the government. To an increasing degree, such attitudes are now reflected in government policy.
NATO end Defense Questions The Kiesinger government willseek to maintain dose defease ties with the US. For at least the next two or three years, it will continue generally to support the present integratedcommand structure in NATO It will, however, be somewhat more sympathetic to de Gaulle's views about NATO than was the Erhardand it will be less cooperative with the US and olher members on many of the details of reorganizing NATO without France. Over the longer run, the Federal Republic probably intends to review its whole role iniew toward loosening defense ties with the US and tightening its links with other continental countries. Rut we believe that movement In this direction will be slow.
The German Covemment probably will become increasingly willing to accept limited reductions of conventional US (and British) forces In West Cenriany. One reason foe this is that Bonn probably considers that it hasagor concession from the US on the offset question. But mote basically, the new government simply gives lower priority than have previous ones tothe US physical presence in Germany at present levels. The government would defend agreements reached on this issue, but would probably be unable to foieslall broad criticism of ony sfzablo drawdown from politicians and elements of tho Cerman press who wish to diminish public confidence In the US. But even If there were no troop cuts, these critics would find other issues to promote anti-US views.
The Nuclear Problem. The question of German access to nuclearand influence on Western nuclear policies has bedeviled Bonn's relations with the US for years past and will continue to do so. The latest chapter has been the intense public discussion in the Federal Republic of the proposed non-proliferation (reaty. Arguments odvanced by West Germans against the treaty have dwell on (he charge that it would impede the development of peaceful atomic energy programs. But the basic German opposition has stemmedeeling that the treaty would sentence Ihe Federal Republic to permanent
inferiority, and that the US, in arranging the treaty with the USSR, is neglecting German interests. In addition, many Cemians are upset because the treatyto them to foreclose not merely their independent acquisition of nuclear weapons but even the possibility of an eventual European nuclear force in which Germany could participate.
Bonn hopes for and has even encouraged other potential nuclear powers to seek modifications of certain features in the present draft which it regards as discriminatory. If this proves impossible and it becomes clear that the US, the USSB, and practically all the nonnudear powers will support tbe treaty, the Kiesinger government would probably also feel compelled to sign. Whatever happens, the existing resentment against the US will have beenhe process. Even if there is no agreementonproitferatios treaty, we believe thai West Germany will not actively seek lo develop or acquire nuclear weapons during the period cf this estimate.1
Other Issues. Other matters will also probably becloud US-Germanover the next few years. In West Cermany, as elsewhere in Europe, there will be occasional outbursts of resentment over the technological gap between the European and American economies, and over US investment in EuropeanGerman unofficial criticism of US policy in Asia will probably increase, as long as the US military involvement in Vietnam continues with no clear sign of resolution to the conflict. Closer to home, there may also be further criticism of the US (and the British and French) if they continue to refuse to allow Berlin representatives lo vote on subslantivo matters in the Bundestag. None of these issues is likely toajor impact, but all will contribute to the malaise In US-German relations.
B. Possibilities and Limits of Rapprochement with France
his ouster. Erhard came under heavy criticism for allowingwith Paris to deteriorate, and Kiesinger moved quickly to create ain Franco-German relations. There hasradual increasein recent years, especially in the Rhineland and south Cermany.of de Gaulle's concept of Europe's role. Moreover, German political
leaders appreciate the new mobility In European politics which tbe French
President has helped to bring about.
'See. "Wert Cennan Capabilities and Intention* to Produce and Deploy NuclearatedECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM.ualled diicuuton of Genu in capability! and the likelihood that we woulderman nuclear weapon! progiam.
mibal meeting between Kiesinger and de Caulle accomplishedsides havereanimation" of the Franco-Cerman alliance, butresults have been limited. Over the next few years, there willa modest expansion of technical cooperation and exchange programs, andwill probably continue their low-key diplomatic support of theInitiatives in Eastern Europe. Certain differences between Franceare likely to remain unresolved. Bonn will probably continue to resist
any de Gaulle effort to weaker, the EEC. but it will not itself give any strong support for progress toward European poiidcal unify. Bonn will also continue to favor Britain's entry into the Common Market, but not to the point of vigorous intervention with France. Within the EEC and during the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations, West German opposition to the more restrictive aspects of French trade policy almost certainly will not decrease, lo any event, Bonn is not likely to accept French hegemony in Western Europe.
The Kiesinger government will probably increase its cooperation with France in defense planning and arms development and production. Any sizable withdrawals of US forces from Germany would tend to encourage theof new bilateral defense arrangements between Paris and Bonn. For the near term, however, Westommitments to the US and NATO probably preclude major shifts in defense policy or procurement. In addition. Defense Minister Schroeder and some military leaden have reservations about French military policies and will want to move cautiously in this area.
The status of French forces in Cermany appears to have been resolvedanner which will not cause friction between Bonn and Paris in the next several years. Those in Cermany who favor closer ties with France were pleased to arrive at the present arrangement bilaterally and outside of NATO. Tbeof the relationship ol ihese forces to NATO is not likely to be reopened by the Germans.
C. Bonn's Eastern Policy
The main emphasis of West German foreign policy for the near future will be on the expansion of tics to Eastern Europe. The Kiesinger government is nor. optimistic that its initiatives will bring much progress toward theof Cermany in the next few years. But its objectives in fostering better relations with the East European States are to wean them away from their orientation toward East Germany and toympathetic attitude toward eventual German reunification. The hope is that some day such developments either may convince the USSR that maintenance of Ihe East Ccrman regime is no longer essential to the Soviet position in Europe, or may cause changes in the East German regime itself which would bring reunification nearer.
The grand coalition has accelerated earlier efforts to Improve relations with Eastern Europe. Inumania accepted diplomatic lies with Bonn, This developmenttate of high anxiety in the East German Government In consequence. East Berlin snd Warsaw have brought pressures, with Moscow's help, to rally the East European States against Bonn's diplomatic offensive,
This has delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Cermany on the one hand and Hungary and Bulgaria on the other. Nevertheless, we expect to see these ties come into being before the endonn's recent talks with Czechoslovakia have been brought almosttandstill, bat here also it is probable that diplomatic relations will be established within the period of this estimate.
Weal Cennan relations wilh Poland will probably develop moro slowly than with Czechoslovakia Chancellor Kiesinger has implied some flexibility in his approach to tbe Oder-Neisse border problem, and he may be able to find some partial concession on this issue which, while not fully satisfactory to the Poles, would be sufficient to bring about diplomatic ties.
Yugoslavia, observing tho West Cennan program for expansion of ties to Eastern Europe, hasesire to resume diplomatic relations. Bonn has shown Interest in the Yugoslav reaction and the logical thrust of the FBG effort to improve relations with Eastern Europe should lead the West Germans to establish diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia. Because of Yugoslavia's pastto the Ilallstein Doctrine, however, the outcome is uncertain.
The East Ceimans aro clearly alarmed by Bonn's Oltpolitik and willshy away from new contacts or understandings with the Federal Republic for the near future. For their part, the West German Government will seek to expand contacts with East Cermany, and may even propose discussionshigh officials of both governments. Such high-level contacts mightdevelop to tbe point of approximating de facto recognition, but Bonn will almost certainly not grant de Jure recognition to East Germany in the period of this estimate,
It is unlikely that the West Cennan initiatives in Eastern Europe will bring about any major change in Soviet policy toward Cermany. Soviet leaders have stated that they would be receptive to meaningful West German overtures, but they argue that the Kiesinger government has as yet made no substantial change in West Germany's basically "revanchist" foreign policy. Moscow is responding to West German moves by reiterating its old demands that Bonn abandon all claim to nuclear weapons, accept the present boundaries in Europe, andthe existence of two German states. In these circumstances, the Kiesinger government is apparently already exploring ways in which it might conciliate Moscow as well as Warsaw on these points. During this process. Bonn will probably try lo minimize public disputes with the USSB and to expand itsto Moscowariety of channels.
Inside West Germany, tho grand coalition's eastern initiatives may stimulate political discord. Conservative leaders, such as Strauss, are unenthusiaitic about many aspects or the new policies, and will probably bo ready to capitalize on any failure or embarrassment in order to better their own political positions.and refugee groups are already suspicious that the government may make concessions to Poland or to Czechoslovakia, and may be able to attract support for their views from other conservative elements in the Federal Republic The NPD and other nationalist groups would almost certainly benefit fromevelopment. Loss of momentum in the government's OstpoHtlk would create pressures at the otheramong elements of the FDP andin favor of the very concessions to the East which expellee groups, the NPD, and much of the CDU/CSU would oppose. On the whole, we believe that theparties will be able to contain pressures of this land.
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