Created: 11/9/1967

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible









A Forces Through 6

Air Surveillance 6


Surface-to-Air Missiles 8

apabilities Through 9

Against the Medium- and High-Altitude Threat 9

Against the Low-Altitude Threat10

Against tho Standoff Threat 11

Against an Electronic Countermeasure Environment12

C Capabilities Through

D. Forces Through 13


and Capabilities Throughhe MoscowIS

and Capabilities Through


ABM Deployment 18







To estimate trie strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces throughnd general trends in these forces


estimate that the Soviet strategic defense effort isin absolute terms andhare of the total military budget,of the US. Resources allocated to strategic defense in theabout equal to those devoted to strategic attack. Thiseffort can be attributed primarily to the size and diversitystrategic attack forces.

Soviets haveormidable system of airin depth, which would be very effective under allagainst subsonic and low-supersonic aircraftpenetrate at medium and high altitudes. The system is lesshigher performance aircraft and standoff weapons, andno capability against low-altitude penetrationshe Soviets recognize these shortcomings and arenew interceptors, surface-to-air missilesndan effort to improve their air defense capabilities.

received during the past year hasprevious estimate that the mission of the Tallinn missiledefense against thc airborne threat, particularly against highaircraft and standoff weapons. It has liccn designatedhe firstnitscamo operational

ear Adm. B. n. FioeU-y. live AnkbrntJ Natal (hienillnnaip.ii-ni nt ilie Nt-y. ice lib fuuliuih- i" ax-Wmi mi tmv.uliHtiik- kiiuIiiUltra.

j>.il> III.

and deployment was stepped up. We can now identify more thanomplexes, which are being deployed in barrier defenses across likely avenues of attack and in point defense of key targets. Theystem probably has capabilities against strategic ballisticonly in the limited self-defense role inherentigh performance SAM system.*

planners undoubtedly recognize that US bombersmissiles (ASMs) will continue toajorthend have programed forces against them.that by thehe Soviets will haveomplexes. They have begun toewinterceptor with better capabilities against the standoffhaveew airborne surveillance system, whichused for warning and control. They are also developingimproved capabilities at low altitudes and may introduce asystem for this type of defense. The primary limitation ondefense, however, is su veillancc and control. WeSoviet development of ground-based radars anddesigned to handle low-altitude penetration inbut we expect little adva ce in ground-based continuouscapability at low altitudes for the USSRhole duringof this estimate.

of antiball stic missile (ABM) defenseshas continued during the past year, and we believe thatbecome partially operational sometimeullfor theaui chers apparently planned for thewill probablyeachedur analysisthis ABM system will funimited defense of thebut tbat it has some apparent weaknesses. It docs not coverthc multidirectional US miss le threat to Moscow; it is subjectand exliaustion, and, in our judgment, none of theare hardeneduclear burets.

ilp- (liediltltlri of

M.I.i* K. Carroll, ihocft-tiM loUfllRoncc Aj^iicy, Irliivoi that llw iiixnv Mnl.-mc.tb.uchlcj-rtv of nmlUfcnor tn ihoIw-inj: irmtVrntan- mpi"by the avallnlJc cvhlworUal thnwi (todtlc<qnM<-ly

C.. tingOne* ofl--Oaf

Tallinn mlrtii. Six lib ntahwnt fntbiwrnft ll-i'- Vltoarv

UlT Um liA-flicymv.of ' Atlin. K. B. KhivL-y.f( old ii II--

ui-alalilir* nt tin-hul-n.viw. iv,yj- 21



Wc have no evidence of ABM deployment outside the Moscownd it seems unlikely that the Soviets have yet decidedomprehensive system fur national missile defense. We havo no evidence of any wholly new ADM system in development, and think it more likely that the Soviets will develop an improved version of the Moscow system, which could probably begin to enter operational service as early. We believe that when an improved system is available, the Soviets will fill out the Moscow defenses to cope more adequately with the US threat, and that they will extend their ABM defenses to other areas uf thehe extent to which they undertake to do so will be affected by their consideration of economic and technological constraints.

"U. Oilanutl.arrie.hitftrf ennfiuente Inrtril byibbk evklour ami thatB" pneilbfllllr. of tlx-em.ion of Ihotuulr- mr,wr. iMp- %> Fee

C KraiilHn, the Artine.l Oliki* of suitf ih.-Maj. Cen.laW oft>ililic* it lln- TallinnlHliitM'uli 'hIWI.j; it.jMbulc

Ihe view of It.-ar. Il.nkcy. Um AnUUM GftMvmi. ,,

Xpartmrnt nf Iln> Knvy, onnuinn ami mialalitlf* of ll* fiahmMKu lk-nm Mini- IM.w,

nfm. K. It. (ln-

hwhjanir).of U.. iajlD.

C. During the past year several large Soviet radars which have very good capabilities for finding and tracking objects in space have begun partial operation; they will probably all be fully operational-within theears. Although we have no evidencentisatellite weapons piogiam, it would be technically possible for the Soviets now toimited capability against satellites in near earth orbit based on existing radars and missiles, employing nuclear warheads, Nonnuclear kill wouldround-guided missilo system of high precisionoming missile capable of exoatmospheric maneuver, either of which could be developed inearsecision to do so; such development could be well underwayour knowledge. Soviet ability to cope with satellites in higher orbits (aboveppears verye believe that the Soviets would seek to destroy or neutralize US satellites only if they believed general war were imminent. They might, however, use antisatellite systems in peacetime if they believed they were retaliating against US interference with their own satellites.



We estimate Hut tlic Soviet stt.ili.jjn. defensergc-r. both intcndhare ol the total milnary-iMidgel. than that of the US. Tht Sovieti allocate about equal resources lo their strategic attack and ttteir strategic defense forces- This considerable effort tan bo attributed primarily to the size nnd diversity of US strategic attack force*.

Tlic development of Soviet strategic defense forces since World War II has gone through several stages of reaction to the changing US threat. Through the inid-lOSO'i the Soviets attempted lo counter thc Ijrge US strategic bomber Force In being with large numbers of air surveillance radars and Interceptor aircraft, reinforced at Moscow with large numbers of surface-to-air missiless tlic US force obtained higher pcrforniaiice intercontinental bombers, the Soviets in thes developed nnd deployednterccptori and extended SAM defenses througliout the country. When the US. In the face of thistaten-Slvo defense, began practicing low-altitude penetration tatties, the Sovietsin thei deploying the Firebar interceptor and theoth possessing better capabilities for low-altitude intercept than earlier systems.US developmenttandoff capability with air-to-surface missilesas followed by Soviet development and the current deployment of the Fiddler Interceptor and the Tallinn defensive system, which have greater ranges than earlier systems.

In their efforts toefense In being against an Immediate threat, the Soviets have generallyystem quite early, using available technology, rather thnn wait For the development of more advanced but unproven techniques. These systems hjve then generally been modified and improved during the period of deployment. In some cases, however, deployment has been canceled early in the program, either because the system proved relatively ineffective ora better one was fn the offing. When an Improved system has beenolder ones ttfti not rapidly retired or replaced. Tho Soviets tend to havo extensive defenses deployed in depth, usually with considerable'redundoDcy. Thb redundancy often gives the defensesreater capability than uikilysn of each %vcjports system alone would indicate. On OSc other hand, some cletnetils of tho defenses are always sorncwhat out of dale, and do not represent tlic most effective Soviet counter to new US systems or concepts of operation.

.U>imt ofMutemAh-arjIK

1t. SKCnET.

milittiry phmtvers probably see Iho US strategic threat in the* as consisting ofajor farves:and ASMs. intercontinental

hallUtic miwilcsand submarine-launched ballistic missileshey mi aware that the threat will become vastly more sophisticatedc uicorjKir.ition of programedaids, multiple independently-targeted reentry vehiclesnd new aircraft andhey prolofcl* Ul.evc that the massive air defense forces they have built and are building will provide an effective couiiler to thc- medium and high altitudethreat, although they realise the problem of low-altItudois not vol snUtf.ictortly solved. The most critical rerpiirtment of Soviet strategic defense, andne most difficult lo meet despite moreecade of effort, is defense against US ballistic missiles. The Soviets arc deploying antiltallistic mesne (ABM) defenses around Moscow. Wc continue to have no evidence of ABM deployment elsewhere in theurther ABMits nature and extent, is almoit certainly one of tlic major questions of Soviet mditary policy.

Soviet decisions as to how best to meet the strategic threat of theill lie affected not only by the Soviet view of the threat and the pace of technological development, but also by the constraints-ofhe Soviet leadership luteneral disposition to accommodate militaryund military expenditures are clearly rising. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaden will continue to face difficult choices in allocating resourcesariety of competing claimants, both civilian and military. Their decisions as to whether, and lo what extent, to extend ABMthe moil costly single military program on thehe made In the con-teat nf these competing claimants.

Soviet strategic defense is the responsibility of the PVO Strany (Antiair Defense of thehose commander in chiefeputy Minister of Defense ranking with ihr heads of the naval air, and strategic missue forces. The Soviets have stated that the destruction of aerodynamic, ballistic, and space targets in flight will beformcd by the PVO Strany. We have no knowledge of the way In which the antimissile nnd antisatellite functions are organised in PVO.


' Lt. On. Jnaqth F. Carroll, the Director. DrtVnsr saaaflfepM *een.y. IWaVsw that. nnH I, higher Arprt af I-te-to awl that ihk .uwm Am notnV Tallin- nUiiem

ami sefestaaasni <rfaHhu. ryitem follnwlns: the mtiulnf thr arvOnn noMof Maf. tkm wVsiryhjdnVf ofuh-fli^nav.f AaWlmil Oik-f itrttpnttn! IT-At. onulonofIIhu


if. tKl.'Waiv?

PVO air defense is composed of three major force elements,functions of air surveillance, interceptor, nnd SAM operations. These forces


.itc deployed throughout thc USSRierarchy of geographical divisions and subdivisions linked by multiple communications channels. The major divisions areir defense districtsltidi arc. in turn, divided into someir defense zona.ost of the latter arc further divided into sectors for air surveillance purposes. Integrated control over all three fiiiictiutial elements of tho air defense forces is exercised primarily at thc ADZ level.

n addition to thc forces directly assigned to it. (he PVO Stmuv can call on the services of the air defense elements of the Soviet general purpose forces. Moreover, each of the Eastern European countries of tlie Warsaw Pacteparate national system equipped almost exclusively with Soviet materiel and organized in much the same manner as on ADD. For all practical purposes these systems constitute an extension of thc Soviet system.lieve thnt during the past several years the USSR has assisted the People's Republic of Mongolia In netting up an air defense system, and that it is closely coordinated with thc PVO. Although the Soviet and Chinese Communist air surveillance authorities still maintain contact, cooperation between thorn Is minimal.

orces Throughit Survei/lonce

oviet air defenses are based onperational radar sites,along the boundaries of the country, along barriers within the country, ami around major defended areas. These are supplemented byites in the Eastern European countries of the Warsaw Pact. Each of these sitesultiplicity of radars. All have several air surveillance radars; practically all also have radars which can provide information to ground-controlled intercept (CCI) controllers. We believe that Ihe density of coverage.increases theof detection, and frequency diversification among thc sets provides some defense against electronic countermeasurese expect the numbers of radar sites to remain relatively stable in the near term.

Air situation information from the radar sites is reported to filter centers nnd control tentersommunication* network whichighof redundancy, flexibility, and reliability. We estimate that the Soviets continue to use older high frequency) radio and open wire communications systems. Imt they probably are superimposing newer high capacity cable nnd microwave systems, which9 may accountajor part of circuit cnpiicity. We believe tluit they arc alsoroposcnttcr system in tho northern part of thc USSR which will probably Ik- used by PVO ami will be liyn addition. PVO will >lv use coniimmic-itimis satellites in the near future, if they arc not doing so already.

During ihe last decade the Soviets have been graduallyinutomnlic data transmission system into their air surveillance network,ill increase the speed and volume ufi id ling.cMiuuttc tills system is now used extensively innitc-third of Ihe ADZs in tin:


USS It, liy Soviet th<oices in Ciutmil by thu national ait ilcfciiso

sy>,tcilt< (if Several Elist il ini'inl-'ti of tlie War SOW Plltt. Conventional

systemsill employed in large measure in all MM Wc believe that with iIk in trod net ion of son (automatic data reporting, centralized control in tbe ADZ in improved, leading to K'. dcl.iv and more efficient Ojier.itions. Tlie continuing iin|ii(iw mini of PVO lommuuicMlioui ii directed primarily toward improving timeliness and reducing (lie possibility of saturation of tlie air surveillance nnd control system.


We estimate that, as ofhere werenterceptors in Figlitcr Aviation of Airess than last year. In addition,ighters of Soviet Tactical Aviation arc available as an auxiliary force for strategic air defense if required, as are an equal number of fighters in thc nir forces of tlic Euiopcnn Communist countries of tlic Wnisjw Pact. Nearly nil ofighters in Tactical AvLition nnd the EastWarsaw Pact air forcesdesigned as interceptors;faic in regiments whichrimary rule of air defensc.

About two-thirds of tlic Soviet interceptor force in IAPVO ir still made up of lulisonlc or low supersonic models introduced7 or earlier, which have little capability0ost ofmodels are day fighters and are armed svith guns or rockets limiting them to attack rangesatf-milc or less. Most of tlic oilier third of thc force Is composed ofll-weather interceptors intioduced. which aru armed with air-to-air missiles (AAMs) having ninge*i. New deployment of thc models character! tod nbove has ceased. Some of thcodcli have Iscen rctrofitcd witharmament.

A new generation of aircraft started to enter operational unitsnd Is currently being deployed. Tlic deployment4 of the low-altitude interceptor Firebar, using AAMsangejn, started this series of improvedighters.s followed in8 by dieof thc long-range intrrivptrir Fiddlerorn! .at radius of up louil Wc estimate tliat Fiddler ix thc firvt Soviet all-Mvuthcr iiitiTvrpt'* capable of attacking from any direct inti and that It will have nil-weather missile* wltll nil eHectivu range of up tot. We lielli-vc lliatiinf nutiMiiatie data link mot ml. allowing it to Ih- diri-ttid frinti llw ground until It in within firing range of the target. Tin* kiliM Kmiet nite Flagon A, waa first depkijixl In; its speed of alin.itAXI rangei.iii. and combat wiling ofHI fret indit-nte llial it will pioluihly supersede the Flshpnt as the priimiry Soviet higli-allttudcinlerwplor. We hellrvi-

uirt ;IIH|it.-rtviitiin.

thcill ik* equippedlomntie system, allowing theto be controlled from the ground.

e estimate that models currently being deployed will continue to cuter tlic iapvo forces over the next few years, and that older model* will ik- plvascd out. as indicated below. These olderay be retained as reserve aircraft.


Models No Longer Being Produced



Flashlight (Yah-tS)

Fitter (SU-7)

FJslipot (SU-9)

Models Currently)

FaWlcr (TU-?)




five widespread deployment of of Soviet SAMcp" thc end We estimate that In the USSR occupied by operationites which are not to provide alternate or supplement

hc lew-altitudeystem around Moscow. Leningrad, and aboutercent ofites aro

tlx: IAPVO are supplemented in Ibe USSRAM which makes up live greatf theas essentially complete by areites of six Uunehers eachattalions, and that there are also dy occupied and are probably intended positions during periods of emergency. In addition, there areites in the Eastern European countries of thc Warsaw Pact, and anattalions In die ground forces. Since its initial deployment, theas undergone several model changes, which have progressively Increased its maximum effective rangeo aboutmproved its maximum and minimum intercept altitude cnpabilitics, and given it better trackingctronic counter-counttTmeasuro (ECCM) capabilities."

amillitk4 ofSAMs. in the USStt;urlicrrom soivice In the USSR.

Table II at AniM for -Tin- bleatVI is nullNortl. Vhl..smUrnlr.-ly

is now deployed Inites border approaches. We estimate tluttoccupied. Further deployment


ystem, deployed moreecade agoouble ting around Moscow, is mill operational, although only about one-fifth ofaintainedtate of readiness. Wc believe thc Soviets have made improvements in this system which giveapability against high performance alrcra approaching tliat of tliec expect nochange in the forelevels in thc USSH of Iherhrough

IS. TouVnnn the basis of information obtained during the past year wc can now cstimat with high confidence that thc Tallinn defensive missile system has significant capabilities against high-speed aerodynamic vehicles flying at medium nnd high altitude, and that Its mission is defense against thc airborne threat. Wc have design ted thc system thce believe that theent radar at each site probablyevelopment from earlier Sosiot SAMradars, and that ihe missile was designed to operate wilhin thc atmosphere

believeloyment of Iheas stepped up in the postthat there arere thanomplexes, twice the numberear apparently stilleployedarrier defense around theand for point defense of selected targets. We believe severalnow operational. Construction to date suggests that some SO complexesin operation by

B. Capabilities Throug

Agoinsf tbe Medium- and High-Altitude Threat

air defensesormidable capability against subsonic{less thanircsaft attempting to penetrate athigh altitudes to principal target areas under all weather conditions.conditions, the range at which the Soviet early warning (EW)detect and track is limited only by the radar horizon, and extends opn.m. from Sovie borders. Detection and (racking at medium oris virtually assured nt. The detection range of theIs progressively educed against aircraft penetrating at lowerbecause of lino-of-slght range limitations.



Soviei interceptor force hai good capabililies against sonic and low-kupcrionic aircraft at altitudes0 mi Hi capabilities are degradednight or in adverse weatherit altitudes, byndolf attacks, and by attacks using decoys and ECM. Against maneuvering supersonic targets flying at speeds of over Mach IS and at altitudes0 feet, the Soviet manned intercept capability is probably marginal. The recently initiated deployment of tbe Flagon A. with rapid climb va pa lullnd aautomated control system will greatly improve high-altitude capabilities. Thc probable shoot-up capability of the AAM on thc Fiddler will also contribute to improving thc high-altitude, highspeed capability of Soviet air defense*.

Soviet SAM systems provide good medium- and high-altitude defense against aircraft under all weatherowover, thendshort-range systems and are considerably less effective against small, high-speed ASMs. Wc believe that theay alreadyuclear capability, and that theay soon havo one, if it does not already. Selective additionuclear capability to theould greatly increase its ViU isrcOjability.

TheTallinn) systemonsiderable improvement over these older systems In terms of range, velocity, and firepower, which combine touch higher probability of kill. We estimate that it is capable ofaircraft and ASMs traveling at speeds of up to olioutnd atof up toeet. Its maximum range is probably aboutut would vary with target speed and altitude. Considering its range, we believe the system wouldonventional warhead with homing guidance,uclear warhead with or without homing guidance.

Aooinsl (hei'ude Thra-ol"

capabilities of Soviet nir defenses to intercept aircraft or ASMslow altitudes decline with thc attitude. largely because of ground clutterliiic-of-sight limitations of the radan. The approaches to the majorcenters have dense radar coverage. In these areas of denseair sun-citlance network probably is capable of maintaining aon iiircruft flying as loweet; in practice, however, thelargely on tho training and alertness ol individual rndur operators,weather, terrain, and other factors. In areas of lex* dense coverage.are unlikely to be able to accomplish eonttmious tracking below The Soviets have virtually no contmuoiis tracking capability

" hear ail. d. rlmtry, the asafelaiil chief of navel<hif-ihv).of itic navy. believes dial (his snlton conveys lha tuio'i-nionliaiuleof so-trt air .pace could bel viaf*r. thai ihr total wrsght afil.ili:,-

itm-^tlfhiile pwtiauon thanhallcatctl hi lbs lot,linl'u sin no'iia<rl<os-


caecpt where iiWallattum. utilising new nuLvt oilracking capability downee*.

Ihem some capability to no signifieaiit improven

older model Interceptor* still operational In large nnmhers. could also he used for low-altltude area Int

reept under visual conditions.

lic Firclwr iivtcreep!or. which caa Operate at night or in advene weatherrobablyapability down toeH owr land and somewhat lower over sealer. 'IV ability tn inti-rsTpt at Ilu-H- altitude* would depend on tlie pnifieiciicyjIcthikv of Ihe ground contiuller and the pilot. Wo hcHcvc tlie Soviet* have during the post year made *ome marginal improvement in (he radar employed bv the Fishpot *C" and Firelwr. giving distinguish moving target against ground clutter, hut (fat in IW-nlliiitde capability. In clear daylight tho


vim deployed at some locutions on tho periphery of the USSR and around Moscow and Leningrad to furnish an all-weather Intercept capability down toeel within Hi limited circle of fire. An improveds te tlic range of thend deployed more widely, piohuhlyapability down to0 feet. Evidcncejo date docs not allow us confidently to assess the low-altiiudc capability of thcut weit Is not better than that of earlier SAM systems; its current deployment it nut indicativeow -altitude SAM system.

ntiaircraft artilleryidely employed for low-altitude defense Iry Soviet theuter field forces, but is no longern PVO for defense of Used strategic targets.

Agoinjf the Standoff Thrtot

kill probability butuch improved rapab at.

2S. We bclicsc tliat the capability of older Soviet Interceptor and SAMis degraded by llio standoff threat. Tlicnd tlic Fiddler however, were probably designed tu tsipe svith thiss notedI heonsiderable improvement over older systems in range, altitude, and

ve believe. In low-altitude capability. It probably has ity against small, highspeed ASMs and aircraft flying

iddleratcly doulile those of

combat radius, armament, null attack rangerevions Sovietreep tors, making pouiblu repeated attack* onore they tan knmch their ASMt. To In- cffcciivv in (hi* role,- Fiddler "illurvellbncn and control system that will ritond further to sea from tlie Soviet border than presentmv Altlmngh tha USSK has some radar pickethese are limited In mimlier ami capability. Wc IkIIvvc.lut the Soviets haveewin- surveil.

-For- ar

J.W of

I..I.SAK. on ll*f

mwmM-n-m jt.


radar system, prubahly using the TU-IU' adopted fur airliomc warning ami cniitrnl.ould improve theapability, particularlyiw-kvelU *cand|trovitIe the airborne control required lor long range intercept*.

Agaimi on Electronic Counlermeoture Environment

mc of ECM appreciably degrades thc performance of airthc Sovietsreat deal in nn ECM environment in orderthe operation of air defemo systems. Furthermore, thc newbeing deployed arc equipped with Infrared missiles and data links forimprove their capability in an ECM environment. All Soviet SAMare designed to operateo be jamming environment, and thcdeployed widely in the USSR can probably counter angle deceptionand iclrxt moving targets in an ECM environment; this model isin Eastern Europe, bait not in Vietnam. Considering Sovietupon overcoming ECM, wc would expect theo be givenits ability to operate in the presence of ECM.

C Capabilities Through

We believe that the Soviet nir defense system will stillequirement inor adequate defenseseet, and that major efforts will be caerted in an attempt to meet this requirement. One limitation on anlow-altitude capability is Ihe Soviet reliance on dose CCI control, which would require many closely spaced ground radars, even when elevated. The Soviets appear to be trying out such an approach with thc developmentew small ntdnr having an elevated antenna. Another approach to the problem could bo thc use of an ovcr-the-horizon detection (OHD) radar system, but we have no evidenceoviet OHD system for detection of aircraft, and wetell when or even if thc Soviets couldufTiciently reliable system to warrant deployment. Although we anticipate further Soviet development of radars and techniques specifically designed to handle low-altitude penetration in specific areas, we expect little advance In ground-based continuous tracking capability at low altitude for thc USSRhole during the period of this estimate.

Interceptorsow-altitude capability require some technique ofrejection mi their air intercept (AI) radars, suchoving target indicatoruring the past few yenn now Interceptorsimited MTIhave appeared, and wo licliove thnt Improved fire control radars giving better low-altitude capability willit ailed on interceptors In the. Thc first such Interceptor may lie thcew Mikoyan design, which could be operational in IAPVO. It would probably also have AAMwfth ihitter rejection, enabling litem to dtoot down toward tlic ground, as well as automatic data link control.

lite Sovietsist" requirement for long-niugc intercept or? as extending into. They may develop an advanced all-weather Mach 3



cruise intcrcciHor with tho range of (he Fiddlerook-down.capability. It could be available.

mprovements to (he low-altltudo capabilities ofndaveapproached tlic limits of these systems; therobably has no lietlcr capability in this respect at present. To further improve low-altitude SAM capa-Iritlties. the Soviets would luve toew system specifically tailored to this purpose, and deploy it widely. We have no evidence of the developmentew system cptimbwd for low-altitude defense, and would not eipectystem to be operational lieforeurely low-altitude system would probably be deployed only in defense of relatively limited areas; its short range would make deployment for continuous effective defense extremelyInstead ofurely lose-altitude SAM system, therefore, the-Sovlota may elect toollow-on SAM system for thendncorporating some of the mora advanced concepts such ru phascd-array radars coupled svith infrared and coherent radar homing systems.ystem mightow-medium altitude intercept capability against high performance .icrodyrcmic vehicles at longer rangesystem designedjiurcly forltitude intercept. It would be used lo replace thendystems and -to complement thcystem; it couldready for deployment in thes.

Tlie continued introduction of higher performance interceptors and SAMs, together with tbe rapid data transmission rerpiiremcnts of low-altitude intercept, will impose increasing burdens on Soviet air defense communications nndWe believe that the Soviets will meet their challenge by extending their semiautomatic data system to all ADZs. and making it available to SAMas svell as CCI controllers. They will probably also Improve the capacity of communications systems through multichannel cable and microwave systems living multiplexing techniques, and through greater use of Iroposcalter and satellite communications systems. Wc believe that thc trend toward moretn assimilation and transmission will continue to be paralleled by concentration of control at the ADZ level. Thc greater ranges of new Intercept systems may lend to the combining of some rone*.

As the newer fighters continue to enter thc Interceptor force, we liclieveontrol system sufficiently sophisticated toegree of "hands off" computerized control will fx- deployed on thend later Irrti-rccptors and will he the liasisecond gene rai ion fighter control environment in the USSK.ystem would permit these interceptors to operate in aenvironment, allowing close coordination of interceptor and SAM operations.

D. forces Through

Ihr capability of new air defense radars will Increase, Coverage will conlinuc to require much overlapping, and (he

number of radar silos will probably decline only slightly. As new radars with greater reliability and frequency diversification are introduced, however, the need for redundancy at each site will decline. Older radars will probably be phased out faster than newer ones introduced, and the numbers of radars will gradually decrease over the next decade.

Largely to offset thc lack of high performance interceptors, the Soviets in thc past have kept large numbers of the older models in service longer than we expected. However, now that new Interceptors are being deployed in increasing numbers, thc need forgc numbers of aircraft for strategic defense will diminish. Thc overall capability of tho interceptor force will probablysignificantly during thc next decade even though thereecline In the number of aircraft. We estimate that the numbers of interceptors in IAPVO will decline to about three-fourths of thc present levelnd to about two-thirds the present levelhe trend in the force level will depend largely on the rate at which the Soviets phase out the aircraft over IS years old.

We believe that thc Soviets will continue to deploy theo as toforward defenses on the likely approaches to the industrial heartland of

thc European USSR,ities throughout the USSR, separating existing adjacent cornp]a. we now estimatef Deployment may be extended to

in, the Soviets will

defense of key targets and selected major on this deployment concept, the distance and thc rate of starts over the past year.complexes will be operational by0 or so complexestarting ily phase out thes additionalomplexes are built around Moscow. We would expect dial deployment levels olould be reduced somewhat in those areas covered by thcystem.'* Wc do not believe thnt the system will be phased out during the period of this estimate. If the Soviets shouldew system with Improved low-altitude capabilities, numbers ofould probably decline further, and theould be phased out


JO. For tlie past decade the Soviets have carried on an extensive, varied, and costly ItotD program toenses against ballistic,missiles. They have developed radars to detect and track ballistic missiles!"

J Tbey have tried various ABM techniques, interceptor missiles, and concepts of system Integration. Early suc-

ktnj. Cm. Wester CI. Franklin, the partmcnt of theoes not believe

Aitine Assistant ChiefSUIT fnric. IX-that this sentence Is eorrot sinceites have

been latert at leastllnn eooiplcx.

the view* of IJ. Cen. Joseph K

nf thc Army; Maj. Cn. Jaefc K.

of the Navy, on tlx- morion and vaiul-ilil iiig Um- (ritualf this section

Can-oil. (heWcorjy,,-

thc Chief ofntetltgomr. ciSAf; ami

ki nf Ihr TallinnHat.ii.enU foll.iw-



ccsics in solving iomc of the technical problems of ABM defense apparently led the Soviets to start deploymentrototype system at Moscowefine tbe system had been tested. We have detected no ABM deployment elsewhere in the USSR in thche apparent decision not tofurther probably reflects Soviet concern for the economic andproblems in countering thc developing US ballistic missile threat.

A. Forces ond Capabilities Throughho Moscow System

warning. Identification, and initial backing for the Moscowprobably to be provided by large phased array dual Hen Home radarson the Kola Peninsula and_at Skmnda in Latvia."

"jthey will probably sconbecome fully operational. The capabilities, location, and orientation of these radars indicate that their primary concerns are ICBM* launched from the US toward targets In Western USSR; some limited Polaris missile coverage Is abo obtained. We have located no radars which could provide coverage against ICBMs launched toward central and eastern USSR and against the full Polaris threat.

Hen Ilouw-corporate features which provide them with ancapability for detecting and trackuig reentry vehicles


e believe that long-ronge acquisition, early target tracking, and target sorting are to be provided by another large phascd-array radar (which sve call Dogocated aboutjn. southwest ofhe largend physical configuration of the Dog House lead us to believe thai it willracking capabilityarget handling capacity somtwhat greater than thc Hen House. The northuest.-ni face of the Dog House now appears to lie complete.

" for the views. Gen. Jose-Ji F. fen nil, lit* Diieetor, Defense li.IellijreneeCen. Weiley C. Kra-Llhi. thewlf Staff foriheaj.f SusT..hel Naval Ofrralknithe Naw. onaf ihr TjJU. rfsaran, an


tfoVeSaaSBvantlion IV.

"Sn- TiMe HIAnne* for estaw-asslatte*v ofiIBr,nl. AIM system.



oilier majorhe Moscow system include Ihe Icrminal target tracking and missile guidance radar installations sailed Triads, andlaunch positions for thc Calosh interceptor missile.Triads and associated launch positions arc located al severalites on the outer ring nbuut. from the ccnlcr of Moscow. Construction of these components has continuedoderate pace during the past year. Although wc have not detectedof the Dog House orriad radar, sec Iselievc that the system will become partially operational sometimec believe lire deployment now planned, with several Triads andaunchers, sull pmlsably not Income fully operational

We believe that the Moscow ABM defenses arc intended to intercept {rKOmingjnissiles at slant ranges out lom. from the launch

The srrt.Il number of interceptors apparently to be employed by thc system agd its estimated intercept altitude suggest that each warhead Is expected toarge lethal radius In order to be useful against dispersed target threats outside the atmosphere. On the other band the high accuracy of thc Men House, that svill probably be duplicated by the Dog House, and thc apparent great precision of the Triad radarsapability for precise target tracking and interceptor guidance, more compatibleystem that does not relyarge volume kill mechanism.

We believe thc chances nrc even thnt tho Cnlosh missilepecially constructed nuclear warheadill capability on the orderepending on thc specific RV involved. On thc other hand, if thc Calosh did not havepecially constnictcd nuclear warhead, it seould probably be ableestroy the incoming BV only at di stance* on the order of


his analysis of the Moscow ABM system indicates that, as presently deployed, it willimited defense of the Moscow area, but that it has some apparent weaknesses. Apparent limitations on thc Triad tracking and guidance radars and on thc numbers cf launchers indicate that tho system Is subject lo saturation and exhaustion. Thc launchers probablyeload

-en..'>r. Aoulant Chief of Staff lorlieemv. Ihiinrl. inenl of Iheievr. llulf^



ery large tl House docs notarticular, thc northern

capability; wc estimate lhat] would require on tho order olinutes. Its capability to deal with punclralion aid* and precursor bursts is probably not high. Tlic Triads prnlxibty have soirtc ability to (unction autonomously if the Hen House and Dog House arc lost, but tltey probably would not be able

rent. The present deployment of Hen House andf the multidirectional Polaris threat to Moscow; in Hen Houses are blind tu Polaris attack from thc rear.

iffects of nuclear bursts;

Finally, none of the systemappear to be hardened to withstand the

the IIlu Houses are partictdarly vulnerable.

orces and Capabilities Through

any wholly new ABM system in development! but in fled capabilities of the Moscow ABM defenses, we be->te substantial efforts to upgrading their present hard-system concepts. Continued development of the is at Sary Shagan could lead to an improved variant'ystem could probably be operational starting 'c think that thc Soviets arc more likely to Improve thea wholly new long-range system.

Tallinn system was designed nnd deployedAM ly has the limited self-defense capability againsts inherentigh performance SAM system. e developedtrategic ABM system. re acquisition inputs from otherew fire control system nnd radar,ew missile"

We have no evidence that tlic Soviets are developing an ABM system that utilizes atmospheric discrimination. Wc believe, however, that US programs for penetration aids and advanced warheads will cause them to reassess their ABM program, and thatonsequence Ihey mayhort-range, high-acceleration missile. The estimated acceleration of lite Calosh precludes its use inole. Tlic time needed to develop and deployystem indicates that IOC probably could not Ik. Wc would probably leam of nnd identify such development and deployment atears before IOC.

Wc expect the Soviets to continue their efforts to develop improvedand tracking systems, lliere isdirect evidence that thc Soviets have tested ABM components against penetration aids. Although thc Hen House

" For ihe vltwa.ti K. Carnal, lite IMrorhw, IX-fenaeitey; Mij. Cen,ranklin, tltc Aetiuj; Act blunt Chief of Staff for, LVitartntcut of tl* Army; andn.a- (JiiefStall'. li.tcllliy.iee. USAK. mi the moitm. ami ea jot "lilies of the TilKin. tyjgrm, srv theirlie.hts

inayreater curability tbnn we miniated last year, wc- expecteyond tlial undertaken by tlicouse in an attempt lo counter US programed capabilities.

SSJTItc Soviets have been investigating OHD techniques, possibly for

Wc believe tbat their level of tecli-nology is such that (hey may be able to delect ballistic missile lanncTics out to. We liave no evidence now of on operational OHD system for detection of missile launches, and wc cannot toll when or even if the Soviets couldufficiently reliable system to warrant deployment. Tlie Soviets may now also bo developing space-borne systems (such as infrared launchsensors) which could be used in upport of their strategic defense forces.


e believe thai AIIM deployment is tin- subject of continuing debate

e believe the most likely- filling Out of the existingforward radars so that they missile threat. In considering lite

ticul leadership. There are undoubtedlyon strategic nttnek forces for damage-limiting and oppose further expan ion of missile defenses, those svho'"wish to wailore effective system is dcvcloiwd. and those who wish toextend deployment of systems presently available. Tliere may also be those wlvo have concludedffective defense against the US missile threat is precluded on technological and economic grounds and that the USSU should seriously consider strategic arms control. Our evidence docs not indicate what decisions have or have not been made, but on balance wo believe that when problems of systems effectiv ;ncs* are solved to their satisfaction, thc Soviets will extend their ABM defenses to other areas of thec Isaso this belief largely on the traditionally great Soviet concern with strategic defense and on the general disposition of the present leadership lo accommodate military programs.

step in further AHM deployment would defenses with additional launch positions cope mere adequately with the entire US Is of an ABM program Iscyond Moscow.

. II. Kluckcy. the of theU-uVvc* that lira assured destructionwcanon* .Kike ami tlic center of command and lone for dcelxlon. retaliation. damac*ll,ouWIde world. SUouM tin- USavthul waniine,to They nay co.Hider tillsaul lo cover Mmvow with an AIIMeniu Irian oiliermis vrwikl Aj attained this. they might Axkm that AIIM'i"-

uf Navalein eouktoviet retaliatory Miwow.the huh ot allanil tonirfer iiarst avoid destnictha. lone.o prat-fuehe Swirl t'litmi. andufcalkma

trrf. theouldhortnmitni if ihe Soviet, strike fimL il ami uiilling In iiihikI nil-Initial funds tt imi.Ii asours(Mureviiij; iu|ulWlily Inlih' ami Ifuvtiic* nfISSII




Soviets will, of course, consider tlte feasibility of extensive deployment of ABM systems for the general defense of tho Soviet Union. The extent to which they undertake to deploy svill be affected by their consideration ofand technological restraints.

" Por tin- view*Maj. Cni.'rauLlin. tlicuhlaiX Chirf of SlatTi tell rrjri tie. (SrjmilUM-iil of ltn- Army, and Mnj. Cen. Jni* K. Ilwmtas. the Aabtnnl ChiefUtT. tolclliRerice. USAF. on iIm-annlitlilfcs of the TaUluit syitem. see tlielr .loLiiHiit. folloiviiis! tin- test alif tin*

Such considerations may cause thc Soviets to settleessdeployment that would provide protection,S threat, for major population centers and some significant portion of their strategiche Soviets may also consider that an ABM defense which would limit thc damage that could be donehird country, and be sufficient to deter the US through defense of Soviet strategic retaliatory ICBMs. would be an acceptable andlevel of defense. This extension of area defenses could begin toa Supplementation of this forcehort-range terminal defense system to defend the forward radan, the complexes of ICBM sftos, and specific urban areas protected by the long-nmge ABM defenses would bestartingeployment, even if started then, would probably continue



DlA Position on (he Tollinn System

Ceo. Joseph K. Carroll, the Di flbtiva iiiii mi nil on the Tallinnudgincitti being rendered than nie meitls do nol .iik-iiuofcly jiortray dia

(lut Onl of Jnfumijiniri otit.ii-

IU deployment, will consist of:evh trie. an engagement radar for ea*h

aorubiMoo. aad Oflxt't command n

InJtguration he brlirvca. defend agatnat iSr aerodynamic ihreal up loeel andeedi fly out range would be. He agrees that ihe Tallinn SAM and thai iu low altitude capol

However, reeogniring the uncertain!!

Dufciue Intelligent Agency. hebeves that theoifi higher ik-givc nf loiifldcnce la the by the svailaldc cAidcnce; aiul thai these|^nl,il;iici of the Tallinn lyitcm. lie believe*thc past year. Ihelcm. throughout Iton completes,aunchersnir defense radars For early warning, aial

high - i'-'eiii'. thai i'ilyitem has tht mLu'on to il llval il ran cngaga ae>oitynaioie vehicles ata X ium aad high altitudes the Al low ahaMelra the front rangeboat syitnuot indicativeow altitude are probably no betk* thaa those of the SA-L

lie lomidcrs (Hat tills lyitcm. If eirulppcdADM nuclear war headsand lire eonlrol, would have

a local and svlf-dclcnK capability ugainsl ICDMi (Local and (cl.-defeiue ii dcrtnrdapabdily lo defend agiLnil present US reentry vehicles targeted .ither against the aaDian site* Of lo painOd-ni up. from th* site.)

Further, il the Tallinn lystonahevc were arUMavially provided radaf data from long range actjunition and itfgct IrackmiT, mdsn such ai HEX HOUSE and DOCenlialiied command ami control system and ncci-tsary links lo the vompleses, then ihe ijitrni wouldimiled ADM area defciucly at aboutf ih* presently observed complain; and al thii lime only agaimt attacki from the north and noithiiett. Dated oa an assnintciil of ihe Hyout character nth* ef thendeniood. Ihr altitude capability would ba limiled lo acfaa. atf ahootrom the sAcs. and IO abouti al ranges efSOhe systrmwould be dependent on several factors such as warhead .haoctouuet. raiUi perform-anee ami missile performance.

If such an ABM capability didami the lung range radan were destroyed or denied, the capability of thc Tallinn complexes would Ireduced to DialAXI agniiut aerodynaaiic vehicles, and alo local and tcU-drteiiMjCDMs.

He note* the (WptoynHal ef long range aomtsitiOB and Im-timx radars itand at Uaen. andommand aidthr data from

thcie radars is esseot'al to thee*co- iviScm. Heote* that norang*s have been detectedthai thr- Tidliunmently

assessed, does ivot icem lo be opUiiiltcil for an ABM role.

He believe* that, despite the different nnd additionalthatliCiiivrt over ihe pnsl year on the Tallinn aytfrm, iIkic roiuni aignin>m( ansa of omiitainty, ootemlfig ihe dcxlopanrnl eiijcitiTs and utt far thr ayssn ami prrfaniasace capatfililiai ef iinportant imifawHL tte hetlevn that the stair ef aiaaahlc mtdrwe does

not pcnxM cnhidlagaa MM "dc fornatrin. Hawnrr, raa-

sidering the varioos adilitkmilhat- II havr lo he nut ami tlic lack ofvhtriav nf lla-ir .itUnnv. Ingellier withait that Hit mlulle a' prcn'iillyileal ma1 awlii In "ill Inor anlr-ie> il is niiliVi i) lhatsyrtunilly Iiein- diidinidani..'

He hrltuvca ihrre are on-guiiig drvrle>|Nm-iiU in ABM rtiatolhrruet-atl MV



Sm-art UaMm. (uftiiuhwh alwlrith miv prmfatr "UM .

cither farallinn syiirm or for soaw mhrr appruarh. Wl-iV' wrat Utcsc dcvrlopinmtt are siircdieBlIy for the Tallinn ijBni. Iir hrllrvm liarl. of thli (ystem ihouldiil,ialed wilhn mind.

top ficcncr

Position on the Tallinn System

Maj On Welter C. Franklin. In*Aiiiitanl Chief of Staff for InUJIiftrnc.of ll*haiileo-i^alysi<nihe preieroly

Lolledt.llthe fullrstHaai of thelysacaa. hl-Uf * rhat tlx available

Joe*ihataruUlily aeainst iM lllrj IIhraat

However, he alio beiievr* -henhy (ha HEN HOUSE radar,ap! Wily"fatllilk missilesuliitiu.tiat porlion of the nrcicnt deployment area. Ho alio believes, tiowevcr, that (Hum> noi now covered fey ruth long-range ladan probably hava oo area ADM capability allho*|rh alleployed complexes dof and local de'eoto capol.iliry.. he believes thai ihe Tallinn ryitem has growth potential. Helop.nenl and deptoymc* withie* and potentiallliaaosW.

Novy Posilion on tha Tallinn System

Pear. Floe ley. thaI ef Naval Oreoliomepart-Metal of thu Navy,hai theensIi-.Me capabilities against ballistic missiles.

Air force Position on the Tallinn System

Maj. Con. Jack E. Thawini. the Chief ofntelligence. USAF. associates himself -iu. the footnote of U. Cen. CanoO.Ag.-nry. rieepl that I*hat rhe TaDhm system probablyo.n areaven -iihoul,rhe HEN HOUSE/DOC HOUSE

HeIhat live Tallinn ijMciii, at any ABMrequire) (inwly snd continuingiivfonnalien lo fun-lkm properly to thnt role. In cowMlerlng theavallabloilia Soviet Union loprovide ihU Information beside* ilia HEN HOUSE/DOC HOUSE radan, he notes tlsst thu present electronic environment In tlie Soviet Unionariety andr ol radars whoso pfnite eopabilily ami million hat* notn *tl*blldied. And lm( (leitrnvnient ol lliete, ai well as olilrr. radar* to aDial Ii notllUc with bla view of tha aerodjiumie throat

II* colder* Ihat the con*psratioo of nVnnsile. if In fat. this ttensent of the Tallin-assessed;ar-Uta.. iMc.cept*m.tai. altitudem. altitude

He reeoenbr* ihati-Hium! con.omul ami cent ml iiiinn and eoxixninkaliona link* lo thu Tallinn eouiplese*: essential to Uiu effoctnetof tho <iIn an ADM role but note* ihat torrent rvidcnw neither proves or disprove* thu eibteiMe ofyitem.

Ijittly. aeahul launched mk-flua. he ripvet* OTH radar* will lie devetopod

vihtch willuih li .Ic-lccOOiioi lit* Tdlii.n

On balance, he Wtcvci thai no new erideiav liai, would dispel hi* .eo-Sction ih.iloviet* are |MoUUyoy>-r; rhenslran both the

ratalhat ihetiftnificaot cupabditic Jl .Irfrnac amiDM role.


ince2 (he Soviets have been building Hen Houses, probably of ii slightly dillcrcnt type than the northern Hen lluuscs described above. These are located at Sary Shagan in Central Asia mid at Angarsk in East Siberia. Snim* IIei> House, at each location probably survey near space, andartial operational capability, Other Hen Houses at each location may he directed upward and would thus more likelyunction of surveying further out in space; these will probably not be operational for ivs-cral years.


ond Olcnegorsk dual Hen in space surveillance. The space so to detect and track satellitesec system utilising these ra

In addition to these radars, (he Houses and thc Dog House alsoole rveillnrrcc radars would enable the Soviets passes over the USSIt. pace sur-


information required by an antisatellite w'eapon system

e has'e no evidenceoviet antisatellite weapons program, nor of Soviet destropincnts of hardware useful primarily forurpose. It would ik* technically possible, however, for thc Soviets to haveimited antisatellite capability, based on existing radars and missiles anduclear weapon toill. Nonnuclear kill wouldroundmissile system of high precisionoming missile capable of esontmospheric maneuver, either of which could be developed inearsecision to do so; such development could be svell underway without our knosvlcdgc. If such ahas been successfully undertaken, thc ADM installations at Sary Shagan or Moscow could be used for nonnuclear kill of low-orbiting satellitesjn. of the firinge doubt, bouwer, their capability to do this on thc first orbit.

in higher orbits (abovet unlikely that the Soviets can develop satellites at synchronous


oviet ability to cope with satelliteppears s'cry limited- Wc believe systems capable of effectively uttackinguring the period of this

ti'n. Wesley C. Km nil in. thehief ot Stuff for liitt-HiynH-r.f mini of list* Army, believes mnmiiitear kill ii milllyat such ranees, evenjwtiil |hhi;(jiii iii ini|Hin'e the svnlcm Inwl ihvu1 woulJlilvlr lie tiiili-ssl If killilrrilf_

. llu> Aunlanl Chieft OjvrutluiBu't> im-ntif tin*t liliiy that |ih*iui -levi-lup iut-li ryiiiim iltprine. tlic ihiiixl iif lliln rttiuule.

tems to retaliation. We antisatellite systems only

i , ' nincnt

oil that neutralisation of our military support systems were consequentlyMimidcratiOii. Tlir-rruo,

* in

There might, however, be some other special circum-.could use antiiitlellite systems in peacetime, such as an occasion in which they believed they were retaliating against US interference with their own satellites.

Soviet technical capabilities arc such thai they coir Id develop and deployean any of several types of antisatellite systems if ihey iliovc to do so. Tliey could perfect nndround'based missile system similar lo the current Moscow system; in fact, any further deploymentong-range ABM system could be adapted (or usen antisatellite role. Tlicy might ciplore techniques ('neb as electronic interference) for the nondestructive ncnlraliffltion ofhese techniques might utilise mechanisms on the-ground, in missiles, or inanned coorbiting satellite Inspector could V' developed as an outgrowtharge near-earth manned space station Inrlv or. Although the costs ofystem would be high, the operational advantages.inspection, electronic intrusion,ight outweigh the cost considerations.

Wc Iwlteve, however, (hut the Sovieti would realize that any use of nntf-vatelliie systems In peacetime would risk opening their own militaryikely, therefore, that the Soviets would use

overriding consideration, stances in which they

if Ihey believed that war with thc US were Imminent


Tlie Soviets view their civil defence program as an Integral part of their strategic defense eRort. This program is controlled by lite Council of Ministers through the Chief of Civiloviet marshal, whoorps oftrained civil defense staff officers far the day-to-day opcrution andof the program. Staff officers areo all levels of thc Soviet Cov-ernment. Operational civil defense units are manned largely by civilians. The civil defense effort it mainly one of training civil defense jKrsonnel and the population In evacuation, disaster control, nnd shelter construction techniques; this Is done in close coordination with internal defense organizations and various civilian ageotice. This intiiiing Ix-somnidespread and more highly pultlici/cd each year. It emphasize* planned urban cvacu.ition in advance of list- outbreak of hostilities, and thus appears to assume days wanting. The civil defense staff alsu plnvs an active role in disseminating naming.

hc Soviet Union lias taken new steps over the past year in an effort to improve the cffi-ctiwnrss of its civil defense organisation. Iti-sponsibilitv for civilian Irniniiig has been liaiisferrcd largely to local managerial and government officials, and training for these echelons hasII tough live civil drfensc jimgrain lines notigh priority call on eillicr budgetary nresources, tlie programstr imply supported liy tin? government, and directly luenlves all segments of the population.

it unlikely that the USSR willollow-on heavy bomber into LRA during thc period ol this estimate."

Soviets have experienced difficulties in bringing the Blinder tostatus. Unless these problems have been resolved, the Sovietsollow-on medium bomber. One possibility is aperhaps with variable geometry wingi. having better speed,radius than the Blinder; it could be totroduced inalternate possibility, which could be introduced somewhat later thanmodel, wouldupersonic-cruise medium bomber based on thetransport development; It would probablyadius aboutas the Blinder.

F. New Air-to-Surface Missile Development

working on an ASMange of about 3. We trunk it unlikely, however, that it

The Soviets are continuing developmental work on ASMs for attack against both land and seaven though thcow carried by two models of the Bear, has been operationale believe that the Sovietsrying to improve thc weapon. Thc most likely component to be improved would be the guidance system. It is also possible that the Soviets willew ASM for use with the Bear.

We believe that the Soviets.ruise speed of Mach

has achieved IOC, but the program Is probably continuing.

G. Future force Levels

he LRA heavy bomber aircraft are on the averageears old and attrition is beginning to take effect. The strength of the Bear force has not changed appreciably during theears, but the number of Bisons has declined. We estimate that over theears or so thc number of Bear ASM carriers will remain relatively constant but that overall heavy bomber strength will decline, due to attrition of the older Bear and Bison free-fall bombers. We estimate that byhe heavy bomber force willear ASM curriers andisons. We estimate that byhis force will consist of no moreearsisons."

"en. Tlwmasew heavy strategic aircraft system is likely la be introduced to support the present force level Into the. This follow-on system could be an improved Dearew ASMupersonic aircraft baaed on research and development relating, in part at least, lo supersonic trumporls.

" Mir. Cen. Thomas notes that both Dear and Bison strength has remained unchanged in thc past year, snd he believes that the USSR wdl continue to maintaineavy bombers in operational units throughout the period of this estimate,ollow-on system to support thc force level in.



thcears the strength oi the medium bombers inbeen declining, the Badger force has been decreasing at an averageaboutircraft per year and Blinders have not been deployed into offset this decline. Since we do not believe that all theIn the force will be equipped to carry the ASM. we expect atn Badger strength. We estimate that byhe mediumwill compriseadgers andlinders. ByBadger force will probably have declined toircraft butof Blinders wiU probably have remained relatively constant. Ifew medium bomber in, wc believe that itsome of the older current types rather than being additional to


Supreme authority over the Soviet Armed Forces is probably vested In the Politburohole, or at leastommittee of the Politburo. In peacetime the political authorities exercise control through the Ministryense. Id the event of war the channel would probably runupreme Highwhich would include political as well as military leaders and would have wide powers in the direction of the war effort.

During thcears, some elements within thc military havethe critical Importance of fast reaction and surpriseodern nuclear environment and have stressed the needermanent political-militarysimilar to the wartime Supreme Highoperate in peacetime as well as In wartime. We do not know whether such an organ has in fact been created. We believe that arrangements exist for the quick assumption of command by the political leadership in the event ofbut we doubt that any one of tbe present collective leaders has been given the autfsority that Khrushchev exercised an "Supremee believe that the collective nature of the present leadership works to Inhibitentralization of command authority at this time.

We believe that within the military itself, however, the Soviets are movingighly integrated command structure for their strategic attack forces. Thero are various indications that during the past year there has been arefinement and improvement of operational controls within those fr.

ore gradual decline in the Badger fore*omewhat arge, Under force than this paragraph indicates. He2 mediuns-







Siler per Complex

Launcher) par Sit*

Ma.timum Slant

Minimum Altitude (It)'

Accuracy (CEP inarhead Weight (Ibt)













earlier wet Inn of thoj-rtem Is noUplojrd(het Ii Kill dcplmvd Ui fail Europe. North Vtatnaro, and eUewher*.

tlie paal tevernl year* no more thantrUtrl have been aeeii on launcher per rJIe.

- The original tvatra*tkiaimon. ilanl range ofn.aibiwn lotrrcapt .It.ludceet There arethat thea-pe and alt.tud* eapa. bihtio probably hava bora Improved. Theof thu lyitcm could approach iheaa of the SA-L

*TW* rangettmalrd for lite* npiipped with the Fanlre-conlrol radar whkhatandard in tlie USSR; for lm equipped with Fanadar, tlie rnaxfmuinam.

'Thevc elTretlvencii abova thli iRllude.

In locharget (peed and lire, radar location, and terrain feature* .mildInnuenco low-altitude capabilities

* Thiiwaa '2 Tin-umfir >a* fait

have mi evhUnco aa to the minlinutu effective altitude capabililtc* iif llili ayahim. lentDbahIy notto counter the US low altitude thnolfj

lyttvn may have tome capability again* tarecla alret .tpclmg than which are not known at the procnt line.

Smiets almont certainly will provide tome of iltrae uiudci with nwVarI may have largun to do to.




i stimatlo aiAiucrcnisrics and

Mtiimum Intercept Slant Pangs

Minimum Intercept Inicneptnm*

MlulUi on1

Additional* on Site rr

Launcher Reload Tina Aboutilo

Ma.imum Velocity

- Waifceed^lb* -*

0 Un

* U. On Jincph F. Carroll, lb* Director.trnigenc*n lulltH theha meter lit les ami perlomianc* for tbe Mc-fcow Ai rc-Bcitcd In Mi footnote onowever, heiat the possibility'of the Tulllnr. system imueulngBM capability cannot be rwinded. Although he believe* II uidiLcty, in tliethat the TallinnU being deployed la pedorm an ABM role. IIllmaled thai ithe folkr-Mg channterUlie* and prrfarmancn;

About 0 pa.

Uunchan pe. Site

Maaimum Slant Rang*ISO run



Minimum Altitude (ft)

T.tgat Handling CapaMity per Site

Pal* of Fire (per Site)

W.ihead Weight (IU)


en.ranUm, the Acting Asrislant Chiaf of Sufi for Intelligence.of Ih* Army, andCen. Jack E. Thomai. tha Assistant Chief of Stall for Intelligence, USAF. associate thomsrlve* with lhat part of Lt- Cen. Carrol I'i footnote which poilaln* to the ilurmirr.itami. .of the Tallinn system lit an ABM role. For llie-lrlt win an the in la Ion of Ihe Tallinn lyitcm. *cr their footnole* at th* end of Ih* section on Xlranle OrfetMr, iugr it.

-luyV hunchedS* US. baaed oaTrUd/CaUnh eorobmaUun.


Mel Cca.ra-iba, theuirUmt Chief af Staff.f the Army.inium Inknept slaat range lo bo itouthly In iieeunj gin* rtthit capability and teal range* may be optimum ranges and nol ricccunriTy moiiuuini

JA llaut rnngc of over tOO nm. wouldrounil range of up

Original document.

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