Created: 4/9/1968

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Section II: South and Southeast Asia (Reference Title: POLO XXVII)


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the seige of the Indian embassy in Peking onh further strained relations. Sporadic demonstrations against the rr.dian embassy occurred, butctober following the border clash, they were United in scope.

The prospect seems to be for sporadicclashes at various points on tha border, forpolitical abuse, and forsupport for Nag* guerrillas and the newthe Indian Communist aoveaent. They will Insistsupport froa any Indian Co=unist who Isbe pro-Peking. By their action inr. the Slkkim-Titet border, thodiscarded the earlier policy contained in thehad made to "first of all inform all thecountries" before taking militaryIndian forces. (People'sy article of

B. Old Enemies

1. Thailand

Chou En-lai had invited Thailand'sthe Bandung conference in5 to visitin this way he initiated the effort to move

to loosen its ties with SEATO and Washington. (Chou's invitation is referred to in his foreign policy report of At the same conference, Chon Yi worked with him and tried to mollify Foreign Minister Prince

.Van (Chen interview of esult,

Thais visited Peking and some trade developed, until

it was restricted by Tha tTTiTp"osed import controls in Chou and Chen attained very little in all their efforts, the main difficulty for them having been the fact that Bangkok, with no experience of Western colonial doaination to make its leaders anti-Western in attitude, trong assartive alignment with. and an assertive opposition to Coamunisa inAsia. They openlyolicy ofwith Peking and Hanoi.

NO FOREIGN DISSGl'NO disses abroad only



a or in Thailand.

Failure to move the Thais away tvcm their closo relationship with. andeutral foreign policy position and the increased presence of. in Thailand impelled tha Chinese leaders to drop their restraint and to begin to <ieROur.ce Bangkok for Itsof supporting anti-Communist efforts ir. the area. Inhen Yi referred to the authorities inasnd .stated that the countrybridgehead for invading Lios" (speech of. Regarding the war in Vietnam, they viewed Tha; support of the South Vietnamese and American effort as sufficiently important to require warnings to Bangkok to cease th's support or accept the consequences,ubversive movement of insurgents in the Thai countryside. At some tine between the central coaoittee work conference of4 and. airstrikes against North Vietnam inhe Chinese leaders apparently decided to create'trouble for Bangkok by organizing allThais, including prominent non-Commun'-.sts, nited front of political and military opponents. This action probablyecision to discardolicy of non-supporc, or low-key support, forinternal enemies. According to Thai security services reports, in late summerommunist-led insurgent activities (assasinations of police informants andattacks on the government) had increased As organizational activities moved forward among Thai insurgents, the Chinese leaders began to enlist the active support of prominent political figures, the etost prominent having been sheltered in Canton. the son of Pridi Banonmyong, the former Prime Minister, reported that "recently" the Chinese had permitted (or encouraged) leaders of the "patriotic movement" in Thailand to visit Pridi in his Canton sanctuary. These loaders apparently tried to induce Pridi to directlyhis name with their group in an effort to gain some support among non-Communist Thai political figures. Pridi apparently did not agree; further, he did not agree ny association with Thai Communists on the mainland

Nevertheless, the Chinese continued on their course onCNAanifesto issued





by the Independence' Thailand (said to have been foundedovember and originally reported in the clandestine radio broadcast of the Voice of the People of Thailandeclaring as policy. personnel from Thailand and theof the Thanom government. The manifesto stated Chat the Independence groupilling "to cooperate" with "any" individuals or organization who werehis usage it was similar to the greetings sent toCctober by theParty of Thailand <CPT) . . officials in Hong Kong noted this similarity and also commented that Thai was among tho first three languages to be studied in Peking's neworeign Language Institute. By the Thai Patriotic Front was launched as the anti-governmentwhich was "willing to cooperate with all compatriots who love peace and democracy." (Voice of the People of Thailand broadcast of5 reporting theof the Frontanuary) Both organizations *ero given wide and unprecedented coverage by Peking and Hanoi media, suggesting the primary role of these Communist capitols in organizing and supporting the subversives.

Activation of the Thai insurgent and subversive movement was one of thea Chinese had decided to react to. involvement in Vietnam. Chen Yi had stated to the French ambassador in5 that guerrilla warfare might "spread' to Thailandnd Chen apparently wastatement of intent. Prime Minister Thanom declared onanuary that the Chinese had already sent agents into Thailand and were financing them partly through funds made available in Thai currency in Hong Xong banks. Byommunist insurgent activity in northeastern Thailand was reported to be well organized and in the same month. Communist-led Independent Movement personnel were circulating propaganda tracts in Bangkok. The "liaison representative" of the Independencehai, reported that he had arrived in Peking onarch, had been provided broadcasting facilities, and then denounced the Thai government for permitting the country to be usedase for attacks on Northeighboring countries"). Peking broadcasts in the Thai





language Intensified5 and the People's Daily on5 attacked Bangkok authorities for "playing the role of an accomplice cf

Direct Chinese participation has centered onof Thai cadres and financing political and military operations. Thai cadres captured5 told Thai authorities that they nid received two monthsIn Peking sponsored by the Thai front organization but conducted by Chinese instructors. ourse in subversion and guerrilla warfare was conducted in Pakingingle Thai student inhe reported route for trainees to travel to and from tno rainianQ was either through Laos or by way of Hong Kong-Macio. ino-Thai, who had received training in Peking for one month in the spring5tutorial" course conducted by three PLA officers, reported thatpeople's array in Thailand" was one of the main subjects; mother was the strategy and tactics'of Uao's guerrilla warfare doctrine. Another student reportedetter fromhat he was being instructed on the natter of accelerating the process of "worldnd he affirmed in this context that "An army capable of carrying out thestruggle has been lormed in Thailand." Byommunist-led insurgents and "patriotic" figures in Thailand were working actively along the lines of Hao's proscriptionevolutionary seizure of power, namely the building of an army in isolated territorial base areas and the organization of Communistsroad united front in order torotracted military and political war against the central government.*

Front leaders in Peking indicatedhai trainee in the fall5 that the Insurgency plan forstablish bases in the mam mountain ranges which separate the country into throeguerrilla training centers, one near Laos close to the route connecting Muong Sing with Yunnanend for PLA instructors while using Thai trainees from Peking for political indoctrination work,ain control of as many remote villages as possible before the (footnote continued on)





Mao hinscif participated in tho effort to exploit Peking-based opponents of the Bangkok government wiien, on the aorninga received and hadordial, friendly conversation" in Peking with Pridi (with the help of Liao Cheng-chin and tfu Kslu-chuan). Pridi's son is reliably reported to have viewed thisove by the Chinese leaders to publicly associate his father with the two Peking-sponsored Thai front movementsj he said that his father refused to lend his name to either front group. He also stated that tha leader of theMovement wasember of tha Coanunist Party of Thailand." He also said thatfather wasopposed to the Chinese strategy, namely, that the best way to support the North Vietnamese was to extend the armed struggle to "Laos and Thailand."" While he referred to

(footnote continued from)

government can establish strategic hamlets,expand into the urban areas, using troops recruited "from the people."

The leader of the Thailand Patriotic Front indirectly confirmed that part of this plan was being implemented: "Our compatriots' armed uprisings, which were staged in the northeastern and southern regions of Thailand and which will be followed by our compatriots in other regions, are aimed solely at waging the struggle for self-defense and at. imperialists and the reactionary traitors." (Peking Radio Broadcast in Thai to Thailand (emphasis supplied/

claiaed that Chou En-lai and Phaa Van Dong werelan "to warn" the Thai Prise Minister against involvement. operations in Vietnam, but were unable to do so only because the Thai leader did not stay in Djakarta (at the5 anniversary of the Bandung conference) long enough for the olan to bo (Sihanouk speech of Peking and Hanoi support for the insurgents suggests some degree of cooperation between the two Co-s: regimes. Reliable reports indicate that not only the Chinese and Vietnaaese but also the Patnet Lao have infiltrated instructors into northeast Thailand froa Laos to assist and train Thai the latter appearing in September and5 in the northeast.


..ii/no dissem abroad

j only

Cliree PRC organizations as responsible for SLicversion in the Prime Minister's Office, thend

the Thai section of the Foreignseems that Jlao has engaged his own prestige in support of the effort

to use Pndi's name to attract ncr.-Communist recruits to

the front movements, which ara led by CPT members.*

By tne fall the Chinese leaders wareengaged in reviving the armed struggle policyo had permitted Choui to discard."* Thai CoKsun-lsts, who submergednd who Had mace their way to Canton and Peking, were reported in September 5 to be back in Thailand actively organizing youth fr^nt groups. According to several sources, some Thai cadres resent the Peking-oriented leadership (which includes ethnic Chinese) for national reasons and because they do not agree with the Maoist emphasis on arraad struggle. In any case, Mao's personal intervention in early October 5 seems to have resultedonsiderable step up in Peking's public

igh-level CPT members captured in the summer of7 have provided more precise information on the Chinesedepartments which have been responsible0 for maintainingh Thai subversives. to their accounts, the CCP's International Liaison Department had handled relations with the CPT; within this liaison department, the Afro-Asian and Latin Americanhas handled relations with Communist frontsuch as the Thai Patriotic Front. The Staff Office for Foreign Affairs of China's State Councilan office responsive to Chou En-lai and Chen Yi--has dealt with non-Communist groups (used for Communist recruiting andpurposes) such "as that of Pridi Panomyong.

"The CPT's Second Congress2 is said by the to have proclaimed armed struggle as "the only path" for seizing power in Thailand. However, byao was under pressure from Stalin's aides to drop the concept of his road as the model for Asian Communistand he complied, movingorepolicy centered on improving Peking's international image.


warnings to Thailand that closir Thai-'J.S. militarywould lead to an Intensification of the "patriotic struggle" in Tnailand. (People's Daily articleublished one day alter 4ao net with Pridi) PT cell was informed onctobc- that the party had "now" decided to shift from defensivi to offensive tactics, and by instructors from the mainland and North Vietnam were training Thai hill tribesmen at two centers in northern Laos under Thai Coimunist party direction.

Liao Cheng-chih, who ap>4arec with Uto during the Pridi interview, continued to ihepherd Thai frontin Peking, meeting with5 on the first anniversary of the founding ofndependenceand probablyow policy of higher level Chinese leaders to make thoore compactunit by uniting them.* theMovement announced :hat it had Joined the United Patriotic Front. The first Communist insurgent attackovernment installation, witch to more aggressive tactics, was conductedman raiding group onoctmber Llao tied tho subversive Thai political offorr (he remained silent on Insurgent activities) to pe:ice "in Indochina" and the world and appealed for "bigger contributions" from various political groups" (Jiao speech eople's PaKy article of6 did refer to the insurgents: the Thais have taken up arras and are determined to overthrow "the reactionary

*tn October theao charge in Peking, wno

had met with Tnai front leaders on the mainland, stated that the Chinese leadersied to induce Pridi tothe leader of the combined organization, but he is said to have refused.


rule of tho traitorous Th.tDOa Xittikacftorn government by means of people's war." his article also -isin official party knd government publicationsit had dropped the 4quivoeal euphemism, "Thaind had dis )arsged the Thanosi government specifically and in highly derogatory terr.s. Pekingits publicS. Peking Radiooice of the People of Thailand report that the Thailand Patriotic Youth Organization vas established onnpril, Liao referred publicly tohai "people's war" and the readiness of the Chinese >eoplelp "at anynd onrticle praisedlllrs foujrht by "tho pn.riotit* people's armed forces ol Thai land.

The Chinese leaders were careful to indicate that increased Thain the Vietnam war would be handled by others, iposte to be delivered by Thai insurgents and by the Vietnamese Communists and the Pathet Lao. For exaeple. followingn Bangkokhai troops would be sent to Vietnam, Peking (following Hanoi by an interval of five days) warned that "the peoples of Vietnam and other Indo-Chinese states will certainly deal you resoluteand the Thai people, too, will certainly rebel against you extensively and in enhanced unity." (PRC Foreignstatement of Peking's reaction to the announcementould use Thai bases was attackedBrief Commentary" in People's Daily on7 which warned that this action "wTTladd fuel to the flames of the armed struggle of the

-The Chinese had beer, helping at earlier "moments" in

subtler ways without usint; theirectly, that is, by training Thai insurgents over the years. For example interrogation reports indicate that all six of the high-ranking members of the CPT, captured in the summer had been trained in Communist China and that the party is dominated by its Chinese members.




Thai people." The Chinese leicers' reluctance to the PLA to any action, while hinting that the Northand the Pathet Lao might retaliate, was aof cautionource of embarrassment. But in subsequent comment, they stiil 2voided saving what Peking would do in response toiargemant. military bases in Thailand, committing the Vietnamese to "hit still harder." (People's Dally oditorial

The prospecte for greater Chineseof the Thai insurjents and Thai front groups.

This almost certainly will include military training and covert financing.

2. Malaysia

Malay's leaders inad refused toPeking while Communist insurgent activity continued in the countryside. Prime Minister Rahman had stated this position onight days prior to MaLayan independence, and this was repeated by his successor on Before they had granted the Malayans the British refussd to accept any Pekingin the country, as the CCP's guidance of the Communist Party of Malaya made Chinese Communista direct security thrsat. However, the Malayans viewed the early establishment of trade relationsecure form of contact with Paking, and thehadillion to Malaya and had0 in commodities. As .ioted earlier in the section of this paper discussing Indonesia, the Chinese Communist leaders were cautiouse establishment of Malaysia as an extended country ont first avoiding any direct commitment to support Sukarno'spolicy in the hop;elatively non-antagonistic attitude would sustain their trade relations with Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia's friends, the British.

However, the Chinese leaders significantly increased their support of Sukarno in the fall4 when theleader became more assertively anti-l'.S. and after. airstrikes of4 on North Vietnam. On the CCPessage greeting theParty of Malaya (CPM) onh anniversary (released

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