DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
This Annex supplies the bulk of detailed informal, ion and analysis upon which tho Intelligence Report entitled, "The Stalin Issue and tho Soviet Leadershipas based. It is being circulatedeference for the benefit of those who follow Sovlot internal affairs in detail.
The Annex is divided Into three chronologicalwith three further sub-divisions in each. Tho first sub-division deals with tho use of the Stalin issue in the Soviet leadership strugRle. The second considers thoeffects on intellectual freedom resultinga policy of greater restrictions and central controls. The third sub-division traces the treataont of the Stalin issue in Soviet communications media.
The Annex isoordinated document. The research analyst responsible for preparing the study is I
Chief, DDlSpecial Research Staff
POINT COUNTERPOINT Khrushchev's Fall to Shelepin's Set-Back:5
The Sides Are
Shelepin's Drive for Powor 4
Press For More
Tbe Veo-Stal inistfl Push;
Criticise oi* Stalin
Drive to Restore Stalin's Image Begins . . .
Anti-Stalinists Continue to
CREEPING CONSERVATISMd Congress--Before and After: November6
Build-up To the
A Shift In
The Congress and
Exceptions to Rule; Nekrich Bookost-Congress: Pro-Stalin Lino. .
Revolt of Old
Leadership Shift Reflected in Stalin Issue .
NEO-STALINIST LINE ADOPTEDh Anniversary Year;7
Hard-Lino Dominates; Dissension Continues. -
Shelepin's Defeat and Reaction To
Year End Atmosphere
Prossure Increases: Protests
Campaign Against Noviy Mir . .
Year Ends With Harsh Policy. .
Collectivization Smoothed Over100
Stalin's Revolutionary Role
From Khrushchev's Fall to Shelepin's Set-Back
The Sides Are Formed
After tho ouster of Khrushchev, the Soviet leaders were preoccupied with the taskwarding those who had cooperated in overthrowing Khrushchev and reversing some of Khrushchev's more unpopular measures. The man who scorned to benoflt the most from tbe early appointments was Aleksandr Sholopln, former Komsomol and KGDe was promoted to full membership In the CPSU Presidium in November and several of his associates and^groteges received promotions within .the party apparatus. Shelcpin also appeared to benefit from changes made in tbeof the press and propaganda
PodKornyy's position also seemed to be fairly strong at this time. Aleksey Rumyantsev, who had been secretary for propaganda and agitation In Khar'kov Oblast', probably when Podgornyy was there, became chief editor of Pravda.
*At this time Shelepinarty Secretary, Deputy Chairman of tho Council of Ministers, and Chnlrman of the Party State Control Committee.
**Petrormer First Secretary of Moscow City,andidate member of the Presidium. He isa good friend of Shelepin and owes his position to him. Vladimir Somlchastnyy, KGB Chiefhelepin protege, was promoted from candidate to full membership on the central committee.
ladimir Stepakov, who had come up in Moscow City under Demichcv, became editor of Izyestlya and Nikolay Hcsyatsev, who had served under Shelepin in the Komsomol, became Chairman of the State Committee for Radio and Another subordinate of Shelepin's In the Komsomol, Mikhail Khaldeyov, became Chief of the RSFSR Propaganda and Agitation Section in
Podgornyy gave the main report at the November party plenum, and at the November anniversary celebrations, the toast to the party was given by Podgornyy rather than Brezhnev, who followedoast to the military. More importantly, moderate trends with which Podgornyy was subsequently to associate himself seemed to prevnil throughout this period. 5 budget included ain the overt military budget and concessions to the consumer,^both of which Podgornyy favored.
Condemnation of Khrushchev began almost immediately after his ouster; this was necessary if the new leaders were to Justify their own action in getting rid of him. However, these attacks were frequently accompanied by support of collective leadership and occasionallyby condemnation of the cult of personality as well.
The approach to the Stalin issue by members of the hierarchy remained essentially as before. ovember an article by Latvian First Secretary Arvid Pelshe, who has been associated with Suslov, appeared in Pravda; in it he discussed the cult:
The Ideology and practice of the personality cult, alien to Marxism-Leninism, has done considerable harm to our party and the Soviet state. The personality cult reduced the role of the masses and of the party, minimized collective leadership, undermined intra-party democracy, and suppressed the activity, initiative, and independent action of tbe party.
For example, a November Koreraunist Bel oruss ii cdltorlnl stated that where the cult or personality takes root, collectivity of leadership is impossible. 5 article in Kommunist Sovetskoye Latvil, probablyby Pelshe, attacked trie" cuiT of Stalin's personality in harsh terms and stated that it had done serious damage to party and state luudurship, adding, however, thai this could not and did not change the nature of the socialist system.
h CPSU Congress put an end to this. It wasurning point in the party's history . .he Congress recommended to the Party Central Committee 'not to relax the struggle against the remnants of the personality cult'.
Similarly, in December, First Secretary of Kazakhstan,rezhnev protege, spokeommemorative meeting for Sakenriter who had died in the purges. trong attack on Stalin was carriedrayda article, which also strongly praisedhd Party Congresses.
In5 the journal Partiynaya Zhizn' (Partycoffed at the suggestion that criticism of the cult would cease:
Some people abroad have begun to speculate and even assert that after tho October plenum of the Central Committee the CPSU will give up criticizing the cult of Stalin'sand revise its general line, elaborated athd Party Congresses. Vain hopes! . .he process begun ath Party Congress is an irreversible process. There is no return to the old ways, and there will be none. It isatter merely of somebody not wanting this return, but of the objective conditions of life of Soviet society and of the Communist Party at the present stage.
That some party figures felt the need to reassure tho party and public that there would be no return to the past may well have reflected the fact that there was indeed pressure being exerted to do just that.
D. A. Kunayev was reappointed First Secretary in He had held this post02 and had then been named Chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers.
Shelepin's Drive For Power
The expression of the neo-Stallnlst views that Stalin should not be criticized and that Intellectuals should be made to conform began somowhat sporadically, but seemed clearly to comehelepln-oriented group. The first, andumber of months, the only, favorableto Stalin appearedovember in Komsomolskaya Pravda, the organ of the Young Communist Leaguehe Komsomol had been headed previously by Shelepin ond Semichostnyy, and9 its chairman had been their protege, Sergey Pavlov. In this article Stalin was roferred to as one of Lenin's "comrades-in-arms."
In February Kommunist published an article by Moscow City First Secretary Nlkolayho has been one of tho most violent spokesmen for the neo-Stalinists. This may well have been the opening salvo in Shelepin's attack on Brezhnev's position, Yegorychevumber of themes which were subsequently to be stressed by the After paying lip servico to the important measures taken to root out the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality, he concentrated his attacks on the sins of the Khrushchev era. He stated that "events of recent years" had caused doubts among ideologically unstable youths, and he criticized those who take what hene-sided view of tho past and stress only shortcomings.
In connection with this, we mustomplaint against those of our creativewho sometimes are too attracted by describing the willfulness of the period of the cult of personality and the moraland physical deprivation of innocently condemned people.
He coupled this criticismall for more patriotic and ideological training. This represented precisely the sort of statement which Pnrtiynaya Uhlzn*, in the snmi* month, had indicated was impossible.
'Yegorychev rose to his position through the Moscow Komsomol and party apparatuses; he succeeded Demichev as first secretary there.
Yegorychov continued to press his point at tho Second Congress of RSFSR Writers early in March. Heumber of articles which had appeared Injournals, as well as Solzhenitsyn's One Day In the Life of Ivanensational novel published during" "the Khrushchov period which graphically described lifetalin labor camp. He condemned those who permit criticism of shortcomings to degenerate into blackening the "glorious history" of party and people. He called on writers to instill In youth pride in the great achievements of their history, and said that
The instilling of such views is hardlyby the excessive enthusiasm of part of our creativo intelligentsia for depicting the cruelties and willfulness of the period of the cult of.
Komsomol Chief Pavlov,holepin protege who also spokethis congress, scorod pessimistic works which, he said,ule are "connected with the cult theme. The opening statement to the congress by Party Secretary and Presidium member Andrey Kirllonko* had boon somewhat less harsh than these speeches; whllo he had stressed the party's demands on writers, he had not criticized writers for dwelling on the cult nor had ho condemnod criticism of shortcomings.
*Kirllenko served In the Ukraine under Brezhnev, but at times has seemed closer to Podgornyy in his policy views,
was First Secretary of the Belorussian Komsomol during the lateShelepin was all-union Komsomol secretary for cadres.
rose through the Belorussian Komsomol and Party organizations after Mazurov.
Fromhrougharch an agricultural plenum of the CPSU Central Committoo was held. The main order of business was the agricultural report delivered by Brezhnev and the adoption of his proposed five-year program designed to bolster tho agricultural sector of theeconomy. umber of personnel changes wero also made at the plenum. Demichev,helepin supporter, became party secretaryfor ideological matters. Kirillasull member of tho Presidium and was succeeded as Belorussian First Secretary by Petrho also
andidate member of tho Presidium. Both Mazurov and Masherov had served in the Belorussian Komsomol and may well have become aligned with Shelepin. Masherov's subsequent statements would Indicate his clear support for Shelepin's neo-Stalinists; Nazurov's views have not been made as clear.
5 there wore Indications ofwithin the leadership. Evidently,ajor, if not the major, source ofnumber of reports were received in the West in thesummer, all asserting that the leadership wasrehabilitate Stalin.* Thehowever, in
their analysis of who was promoting triothat Brezhnev favored lt but that Suslov
felt nimseif too Committed to de-Stalinlzation to change. Another said that Mikoyan was violently opposed to making any concessions to the Chineso and was supported in this by technologists likeut that under pressure from ideologues who look back nostalgically to the days when Moscow was undisputed leader of orthodoxy, thoy might havo to succumb to the point of finding Justification for Stalin's actions, Ono
included both Brezhnev and
Kosyglniddle-of-the-road grouping being pushedilitary hierarchy composed of Stalinists.
Although none of those reports mentioned Shelepinajor proponent of re-Stallnization, othor indicators discuHHed below, suggested that he and his faction wore strongly backing tho drive to restore Stalin's name. Onprilooting of contral committee ideological specialists, Demlchev, In his new role as Ideological spokesman, reportedly proposed changes in policy toward tho Intellectuals and called for "more balanced treatment" of Stalin.
*H'lth the exception of ono Reuters report in May which indicated that the Soviets wanted to abolish the system under which political losers became unpersons and that Stalin would be mentioned in an historicalnot rehabilitated.
In May Brezhnev became tho first member of the new leadership to mention Stalin's name in public. The occasion
wash anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II. In his speech Brezhnev stated that as was well known the war had begun under unfavorable conditions for the Soviet Union and that great efforts had boon made to strengthen tho country:
he State Defense Committee was for mod with the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, Josif Visarionovich Stalin, at its head to exercise leadership over all action in tho matter of organizing the repulse of the enemy.
Brozhnev went on to pay tribute to the armed forces and the Intellectuals for their wartime performance, but did not mention either of Shelepin's organizations, the KGB or tho Komsomol. Thus, while supporting the neo-Stalinlst position on the Stalin issue, Brezhnev was clearly shying away from nny support, implied or oxpllcit, of Shelepin. Brezhnev had thus made clear his supportolicy of at least partial rehabilitation of Stalin. His reasons for doing ho probably include tho fact that as party first secretary he had the most to gain from such a rehabilitation. If he could establish that much of Stalin's power position was both legitimate and desirable, he could hope to acquire at least some of this power.
Rumors concerning impending changes in thein the summer5 and onded somewhat abruptly The common thread of all these reports waswould replace Brezhnev, who was portrayed asincompetent. Thereumber ofsubsidiary themes. According to
was the most prominent member of the leaagrgrup but did not want the top position. Scvoral reports indicated lhat Mikoyan would retire, that Brozhnev would take his place, and that Shelopin would take Brezhnev's position. Somo claimed that Kosygin would also be relieved.
One of the issues causing disagreement among the loaders at this time was that of politics versus economics. Support for the dogmatic position which views the partyolitical and ideological body was indicated by Suslov,
Sholest, and, most strongly, by Georgian First Secretary Hzhavanadze, who, in June, invoked Stalin's words to support his position. After expressing his hostility to the influx into the partyarge number of people with production expertise, he stated:
Proceeding from the Leninist principle of building our. Stalin, acutely and figuratively, said at one time, 'Our partyortress the doors of which open only to the tested.'
Indications of controversy within the leadership also came in the form of several strong statements on the need for collective leadership. efense appeared in
npril and an even stronger one appeared in the Uzbek paper Pravda Yostoka onpril. The latter article praisedd Party Congress, which had stronglythe cult of personality, and attacked the cult as well as the methods of personal dictatorship, suggesting that its targeteo-Stalinist individual or faction. Thus it would appear that the First Secretary in Uzbekistan, Rashidov, was at this time giving some supportoderate faction which felt itself losing ground, probably to Brezhnev.
*The Izvestiya post was to remain vacant until October, an indication that the leaders could not agree on the appointment.
During tho spring and summer Podgornyy seemed to be losing strength, while Shelepin was acquring it. In April party secretaryodgornyy associate, was sent to Kazakhstan as second secretary; ho was removed from the secretariat the following Soptember. In May ShelepinStcpakov was promoted from chief editor of Izvestiya to head of the central committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department.* That same month all Moscow-resident Presidium members with the exception of Podgornyy received medals for their wartime contributions. And in May andarge number of articles extolling the virtues of tho KGB appeared in the press.
In July the central committoo reprimanded Kharkov Oblast, with which Podgornyy had been associated, for serious shortcomings in the work of party admissions. Anugust Pravda editorial reported this and alsothe oblast" for emphasizing numerical over qualltativ growth. This marked the climaxampaign of criticism of Podgornyy's oblast' which had begun in February with an article by Brezhnev protege Shcherbltskiy. This suggests that Brezhnev was pushing the campaign, probably with the concurrence of neo-Stallnlst and orthodox elements.
In August and September, on the eve of the economic
plenum, forceful articles appeared from both tho neo-
Stalanlst and liberal camps. Onugust Pravda published
an article by Komsomol Chiefhelepin protege,
who again attacked those who look at history through the
"prism of tho negative results of the personality cult."
He urged that the great achievements ofs be streamed.
Pavlov's theme was picked upecretary of the traditionally hard-line Leningrad city party committee, Tu. Lavrikov, in aeptember speech. He tooone-sided" approach to the complexities of the cult. And, oneptember, First Secretary of Leningrad Oblast' V. Tolstikov came down strongly on the side of orthodoxy with an article criticizing the lack of positive heroes and Ideology In literature and art. The Azerbaydzhan first secretary, V. Akhundnv, alsoard line in his speech in Septemberlenum of tho republic's creative unions. Interestingly, KGB Chiefholepin protege, had served briefly as Second Secretary under Akhundov in thes, an indication that Akhundov might be in league with the neo-Stalinists.
eptember tho liberalsounterattack with the publication of Rumyantsev's second liberal defense of tho intellectuals In Pravda.* In this article he criticized the call for positive heroes as theork and said that shortcomings should not bo ignored. Sometime beforeeptember, when the official
*See page IS for further discussion of this article.
announcement was made, Rumyantsev was relieved as Prayda's editor and succeeded by M.hiseal blow to the aodoratcs, andajor defeat for Podgornyy. Rumyantsev's Identification several months laterairly responsible position indicated, however, that Podgornyy still retained considerable strength.
Sholopin may have made his major push for power in September. About this time several articles woro published defending the Party-State Controlhosuggesting either that the organization was under nttack, that Sholopin was trying to strengthen this organization, or both. This committee had been established Its function was to find and punish1 party and governmentguilty of misconduct. The existenco of such an extra-party organization had boon controvorslal and Shelepin's position as head of the committee gaveairlybase from which to operate. Sovetskaya Belorusslya, the Belorusslan paper,3 August editorial, doseribod party stato control as an "inherent, integral part of party organizational work." This was an indication of the support being given Sholopin by tbe Belorusslan party and its leader Hasherov. Also, in mid-September the writers Andrey Sinyav-skiy and Yuriy Daniel were arrested by the KGB for publishing works in the West under pseudonyms. The timing of these arrests may have represented an attempt by the neo-Stallnists to seize the initiative on the eve of the September plenum. But tho Presidium must have agreed to the action, indicating that Brozhnev approved and hadumber of key votes with him.
before tho September plenum to proposals to reform the economic structure through de-centralization and an emphasis
rose to prominence throughliho Belorusslun Komsomol and Party; he also served as deputy minister of foreign affairs.
"Rumyantsev's identification in November as Acting Academician Secretary of the Department of Economicsthat he still had support.
on profits, came from Shelepin and Suslov, who feared the increased freedom for plant managers would weaken central control of the economy. The reform adopted at thoparty plenumompromise with the economicPacked by Kosygln. achievingortion of
Reported that while reform political issue before
the plenum was theproposal to partially rehabilitate Stalin. There were those,f [reported, who favored political as well as It was decided, however, to loave the rehabilitation at the level ofhof tho end of thereference to Stalin's existence as an historical figure when obviously called for. Thus, on botheconomy andcompromise position seems to have prevailed. At tbe Suprome Soviet session which followod the plenum, Brezhnev wasembor of tho Supreme Soviet'sargelypost, but still indicative of his growing strength. Polyanskly wasirst deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby becoming Shelepln's senior in the government. Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygln mentioned Sholopln's Party-Stato Control Committoo in hisnirly obvious omission.
hnev Undermines Shelepin
Brezhnev's support for the noo-Sf.alinisl position both on re-Stalinizing and cultural policy was revealed shortly after tbe plenum. rotege of his, Sorgey Trapeznikov who in June had been appointed Chief of the central committee's Section for Scientific and Educational Institutions, wrote an article which appeared in Pravdactober, in which he strongly assorted the supremacy of theory over practice. Trapeznikov said that no party is guaranteed against tactical errors, but that the main question is the depth of these mistakes and the timely correction of them. He condemned ono-slded approaches to industrialization, collectivization, and, of course, the war. Thus, several specific policies were added to the subject of Stalin's wartime leadership as being no longer suitable topics lor criticism. The official, and clearly
Brezhnev-supported, line on the cult of the personality was made clear:
. . ertainly tho cult of personality brought significant harm to tho cause of socialist construction in certain spheres of the life of society. neither the cult of personality itself Sior its consequences flowed in any way from the socialist system and did not change and could not change its character. Therefore, it cannot be recognized as either theoretically or factually correct when in some of our scientific or artisticlife is portrayed only from the viewpoint of the manifestations of the cult of personality and they thereby cloud tho heroic struggles of the Soviet people who are building.
This article by Trapeznikov was followed onctober with an instructional letter, sent out by Trapoznikov's department to schools, calling for changes in the treatment of the Stalin and Khrushchev periods in history courses. It called for increased emphasis on the role of the central leadership in mobilizing economic resources for defense during the war and for restoration after it. The letter also stressed the need to revoal the harm of subjectivism. Theso two Trapeznikov statements clearly demonstratedolicy had been adopted, that Brezhnev had endorsed that policy, and that the line was orthodox.
Thus, tho major protagonists in the struggle taking place within the leadorship at this time both seemed to be supporters of the neo-Stalinist line. That Shelepin, leadereo-Stalinist faction, was involved was clearlyin the ongoing dispute over the future of tho Party-State Control Committee. ndctober respectively Izvestiya and Pravda asserted that the role of the commit-tee would" rise under the new ministry system set up at
tho September plenum. Onh Krasnaya Zvczdathe rolo Of the control groups in the armed forcos and demanded that persecution of them stop. However, Partlynaya Zhlzn followed the line taken by Kosygin and Brezhnev at tho September plenum, and completely ignored the role of party-state control organs, referring to party organs as the checking bodlos. And Soviet State and Law criticized party-state control groups quito strongly. This sharp divergence ovor an organization closely connectedresidium member, Shelepin, clearly revoalod tho intensity of the struggle.
Shelepin's neo-Stalinists continued to push their position. Demlchev addressed members of the RSFSR Writers Union in Moscow and reportedly called for an end to "camp" lltoratureiterature concerning Stalin's crimes) and for an emphasis on the "heroic" aspects of Soviet history. In early September he had reportedly apologized to the writers for excessive attacks on them; now he was pushing the attack again. On 2flravda article by RSFSR Agitprop Chiefhelepin associate, alsoard-line approach. Hene-sided approach in literature and called for improvement in tho ideological and political indoctrination of youth. Ho particularly called upon the Komsomol to do more in this area. Deputy Chief of the central committee's cultural section, G. Kunltsyn, in November's Kommunist, threatened nonconformist artists with expulsion from creative unions.
A central committee plenum was heldecember and was followedwo-day session of the Supromo Soviet. umber of high-level personnel changOH wero made, thus vindicating to some extent the flood of rumors of the previous summer. Mlkoyan, who had undoubtedly opposed any rehabilitation of Stalin and would continue to push the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims, "resigned" as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and was succeeded by Podgornyy. Podgornyy probably simultaneously left his position on the CPSU Secretariat, although this could not be announced until the next central committeecongross in This action marked
a real set-back for the moderates. However, it was matchedlow to Shelepin. The Party-State Control Committee
was abolished and Shelepin lost his position as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In his speech to the plenum Brezhnev said that there had been shortcomings in the work of thelear slap atrotege of Brezhnev's; Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, was"andidate member of the Presidium. Thus, Brezhnev seemed to have emerged the victor from this particular skirmish. He hadecisive rebuff to the moderates and had also managed to stave off Shelepin's challenge, dealingevere defeat in the process.
Press For More Freedom
The unsettled nature of the leadership and the lack of an agreed position during the first few months aftor Khrushchev's ouster was reflected in relatively more freedom for the intellectuals. Liberal articles were published and attacks on conservative views were commonplace. Liter-aturnaya Gazeta'sovember criticismonservative novel, for example, recalled the harsh methods of the Stalin years. Tho book being reviewed had calledilitant struggle for party-mlndedncss in art; the review stated that the struggle for socialist realism had boonby the'subjective approach of Stalin" and by attempts at administrative solutions to complicated problems.*
On. Bocharov in Izvcstiyaloaiberal artistic policy, stating that criticism should persuade and educate, not suppress. His closing statement was quite pointed;
In order to beritic must bo guided by the highest Interests of the people and not by group predilections, not by the 'literary policy' of tho moment, which too often resembles literary confusion.
application of the term subjective to Stalin is unusual, for at this time the term was being applied primarily to Khrushchev.
An article by Novly Mir's chief odltor, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, commemorating theh anniversary appeared in the January issue of that journal. Tvardovskiy defended tbe need to present the whole truth, arguing that thore is no such thing as truth of life versus truth ofthere is only truth.* He continued his attack on orthodox cultural viewpoints by stating that each work cannot present the wholeonly literaturehole can dothat no hero is able to represent all things. He stated that at one timender Stalin) tho exaltation of the hero had taken the place of reality.
Tvardovskiy was answeredanuaryravda editorial which argued that the artist must present life in full historical perspective and criticized works which concentrate on tho negative aspocts of lifo. Theseviews, as expressed by the most liberal journal published in the Soviet Union and the party paper, recur repeatedly in the dialogue between liberal intellectuals and the conservatives.
In February Pravda published two contrasting articles on cultural policy. The paper's editor Rumyantsev, an apparent Podgornyy supporter, was the author of the first, which appeared onebruary and was moderate. Rumyantsev made the necessary bows toward the need for party spirit in all forms of creative work, but ho concentrated hison support for the "highest humanistho free all-around development of every individual in conformity with the general interest. Rumyontsev thontrong defense of collective leadership with the concept of the freedom to create, thus reflecting the knowledge
particular issueomewhat frightening resemblance to the basic question in tho purge trials in the lateit matter in fact whether or not the accused person had conspired ngaTns't Stalin; or was it enough that he had the potential to do so? The facts in other words are irrelevant. The argument for the truth of Life is that any fact which does not support the official view is out of tune with the truth of lifo, is therefore wrong, and should not be expressed. It is an attempt to suppress by the use of jargon any honest and objective attempt to describe and assess history and life.
and fear of the intellectuals that the emergenceingle man, be he Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev, greatly increases the chances of arbitrary interference.
Neither the right of leadership in and of itself nor the post occupied gives grounds for intervening in tho course of life; only competence in one or another sphere of knowledge and practice entails this right.
The second Pravda article appeared onebruary and was written byarabash, who was not further Identified. Barabash strongly defended socialist realism and thehero." He presented the basic arguments for the truth of life, stating that the good artist ovon if he depicts ugly and alien phenomena does so in the context of anof what is wonderful. Writers fail, he stated, when they do not rise above superficial, empirical observations to the great generalizations. Barabash ended his articletatement concerning tbe world-wide struggle for the minds of men, stating that the question of the goals of art concerns the place of the artist In the struggle of ideologies. Thin somewhat vague linking of the Issues of creative froodom and alien ideology was toasic tenet of the noo-Stallnlsts attacks, and is very reminiscent of Stalin's attacks on intellectuals, accusing them of internationalism and cosmopolitanism. Tho publication of these two, conflicting articles in Praydn suggests that at this point the official position on culture was still being sharply disputed, reflecting the unsettled nature of the leadership struggle. Podgornyy may have backed the first, moderate article; the quick appearance of an orthodox article revealed that the backersard line would not be defeated easily.
The Neo-StallnistH Push; The Moderates Counter
The pressure of the neo-Stallnlsts in the leadership began to be reflected in cultural trends in tho spring Onpril an article appeared In Literaturnaya Gazela which ril led lor tho restoration y
of tho literature of the Stalin period, and theof subjectivismhrushchevianism) in the study of the history of Soviet literature. The article stated that although the cult of personality had inflicted losses on the development of Soviet literature, it never cut short its progressive movement. An article in that same paper two days later appealed to writors to seek historical truth "in all its entirety."
For this it must bo kept in mind that genuine penetration into the truth of life of those years is the thorough investigation of many objective factors and not merely the dopic-tion of Stalin's errors and miscalculations.
Arrests and demonstrations apparently began at least as early as April. In that month the two young intellec-uals, A. Amalrik and A. Zverev, were reportedly arrested; one was sentenced to twoalf years in exile forother apparently was released. There iseport that in April leaders of the central executive committee of SMOG*emonstration. This was held onpril and resulted in several arrests and several university expulsions.
The hard-line view taken by the Leningrad organiza-tion.particularly its oblast* first secretary, Tolstikov, was reflected0 June Leniugradskaya Pravda article which reportedeeting ot party members from the Leningrad writers organization had acknowledged that "justifiable criticism" had been leveled at Leningrad writerslenum of the city party committee.
oose, illegal organization of young dissidents taking its name from the first letters of the Russian words for word, thought, form, and profundity.
However, tho liberal intellectuals were far from cowed. In July the theatrical journal Tcatr published an article by A- Anikst, criticizing the theater of the Stalin era and praising the theater of thes. The
liberal journal Yunost' in Julyimilar line on films and defended the portrayal of diversified types of heroes. And,ugust, Pravda published an article by Tvardovskiy defending against an attack on his poem "Terkin in the Other World" made0 July letter to Pravda. Tvardovskiy stated that "anyone who reads the poem without prejudice" would see that is presents apicture of those aspects ofbureaucracy,hamper Soviet progress.
In September there were several important articles representing the liberal point of view. Noviy Mir published an editorial which again denied the validity of counter-posing small and large truth, arguing that truth is truth. Andeptember Pravda carried the previously mentioned liberal editorial by its chief editor Rumyantsev, in which heiberal defense of the arts. He stated that positive heroes are certainly important but should not be the only criterion of the artistic valueork. He argued that socialist realism should not be oversimplified and that criticizing faults is not alien to socialist realism; on the contrary, ignoring shortcomings may load to nihilism. He also supported the Noviy Mir position that no writer, let alone in onoan' "do that which is possible only to literaturehole. Rumyantsev criticized those who try to set the intelligentsia against party spirit, stating that this amountsemagogic attack on culture. He supported party guidance of the arts, but explained why some people question this guidance:
One can see in such questions the legitimate alarm caused by recollections of the fact that not so long ago words about party guidance sometimes masked crude rule by decree in thc sphere of artistic life, and categorical, dilotantist judgments about certain artists and their works.
Furthermore, Rumyantsev's concept of party guidance differed somewhat from the conservative view; ho emphasized that the party should defend the artist's right to select his own theme: and style.
On eptember Pravda, in another editorial,onservative version of Rumyantsev's article, suggesting that the decision to fire Rumyantsev had already been made, and another article onh was even more conservative. Radio Moscow, however, continued to carry Rumyantsev's editorial in broadcasts for twoertain inability to decide just what the offical line was at this time was displayed by Izvestiya which published two contradictory articleshree-day period. Oneptember F. Kuznetsovlea that works be judged by their artistic merit, not their ideological content. Three days later V. Shchorbina stated that these two concepts are inseparable.
According to one report, in Octoberh birthday of the poetarked and the poet Yevtushenko read an unpublished poem "Letter to Yesenin" which was clearly an attack on Komsomol chief Pavlov:
osy-cheeked Komsomol chief
Bangs his fist at us poets
And wants to knead our souls like wax
And wants to fashion them in his own image.
His words, Ycscnin, do not terrify us.
Although it is hard to be happy . . .
You were more party-orionted than all the scoundrels
Who tried to teach you to think like the party.
ovember Kommunistan named V. Ivanov attacked the "so-called theory ofndthe Noviy Mir editorials on "the truth of life versus the truth of facTT77 He quoted Lenin to the effect that facts in totality are definitely conclusive, but taken out of context and totality are fragmentary and arbitrary.
The arrests of Daniel and Sinyavskiy in mid-Scptcmbor frightened the intellectual community, andemonstration was held in Moscow to protest theseumber of persons were arrested, some of whom weretried. Also in December the first of what was loeries of written protests was sent by Sinyavskiy's wife to Brezhnev, the USSR Procurator General, and various
Soviet newspapers. In it she recalled the trials7 and termed her husband's arrest an example of lawlessness.
Thus,hile the liberals andmanaged to score occasional points, the clear trend was toward an increasingly more orthodox line. By the end of the year Noviy Mir stood virtually alone in its defense of the liberal position. In its November editorial it again quoted Lenin to support its view that ideological persuasion is only effective when acceptedlea that there be no clamp down on the intellectuals.
Criticism of Stalin Continues
The unsettled nature of the struggle for power in the Soviet union opened the wayush by theto attain greater freedom. It also permitted the continuation of harsh criticism of Stalineader and continued rehabilitation of those who suffered and diede purges.
The liberal journal Noviy Mirumber of articles in the months after Khrushchev's fall which were highly critical of Stalin's handling of the pre-war Ivann memoirs published in that journal in December, attackod Stalin for failing to heed warnings about an impending attack and for failing to strengthen defenses. The writer Ilya Erenburg,anuary article, attacked Stalin's extermination of army commanders before the war. These have been the main criticisms of Stalin's pre-war leadership.
Voprosy Istorii KPSS, the organ of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism,umber of anti-Stalin articles during this period; in November it carried several such articles. One deprecated Stalin's revolutionary theories and charged lhat he had in fact conspired with Kamenev and Zinovyev against Lenin7 on the question of whether
was Ambassador to London before the war, In6 ho was to be one of the signers of an appeal to Brezhnev not to rehabilitate Stalin.
the time was ripe for armed revolution. AnotherStalin's theory of disproportionate rates of development, claiming this had, in fact,ecline in production.* hird article attacked Stalin for issuing contradictory directives, for indulging in wishful planning, and for making decisions alone. In February Voprosy Istorii KPSS carried an article attacking the cult of personality, stating that lt had delayed the modernization of Soviet armed forces; the article charged that the most dangerous consequence of the cult was the destruction on the eve of the war of many talented military leaders.
Various other anti-Stalin articles were alsoin the months following the coup. In December Kommunist carried an article concerning tho signerseace treaty with Germany Lenin favored the treaty, but Stalin, according to the article, vacillated andthe unpardonable error of siding with Trotskiy in the dispute. After Lenin sharply criticized Stalin, he reportedly admitted his mistake and supported Lenin.
The rehabilitation program continued uninterrupted in the first months after Khrushchev's fall, with Pravda carrying particularly strongly-worded articles. In November an inkling of things to come appeared, however.h birthday of purged Ukrainian leader S. Kosior was marked by praise from most papers. However, Pravda Ukrainy pointed out that Kosior had erred in joining the "left communists" on the issue of signing tho Brost-Litovsk Treaty. This paper would prove to be one of the most outspoken of the neo-Stalinist organs, probably reflecting the position of Ukrainian party leader Shelest.
f the Soylet Historical Encyc1opedia, which was presumably an official publication, was signed to the press inlthough it did not appear
question of disproportionate rates of development between heavy and light industry continues to be explosive. Thc dogmatists think heavy industry should developaster rate; the liberals argue that tho gap between the two rates should close.
until the following October. The toneumber of issues was clearly anti-Stalin, indicating that as of March the official line on the Stalin question had not been changed. An article on collectivization by V. Danilov praised the policy itself, but criticized Stalin's role:
Starting in the fall9 the tendency toward excessive forcing of collectivization, which reflected the position. Stalin, sharply increased. This policy was basedcornful attitude toward the opinions of the peasant, ignoring his attachment to his individual farm, ignoring the instructions of Engols and Lenin, the party decisions on the impermissibility and harmfulness of haste and force in cooporatizing small. The theoretical justification of the forcing of collectivization was Stalin's article published9 in Pravda entitled 'The Year of the Greathich asserted that the basic masses of the peasantry had already joined the kolkhozes and that 'the deciding victory' had already boon attained.
Danilov stated that in0 directives were issuedetreat, but,that Stalin's article "Dizzy Kithn blaming local officials for the chaos, had caused even greater mistakes.
The volume also used very strong language inStalin's crimes:
Stalin began to misuse power and crudely violate the Party Statute and Soviet. The cult of personality engendered careerlsm and servility, suspicion and distrust, and in the field of theory it engendered dogmatism and alienation of theory from practice. Having established his own porsonal control over organs of the NKVD, Stalin dealt summarily withwhom he did not like. talin advanced the harmful and theoretically mistaken thesis that as socialism becomes
stronger and the Soviet state moves further ahead, the class struggle in tho country will become sharper and sharper. This thesis served as justification for mass illegal repressions against prominent leaders of the party and state, members and candidateof the central committee, important military leaders, and many other people who were guilty of. Thebegan at first against ideological opponents, the majority of which were represented as agents of imperialism and foreign intelligence, and then the very same false accusations were made against other Communists who had never taken part in any.
The language used in this article is very reminiscent of Khrushchev's secret speoch denunciation of Stalin. As stated above, the fact that this was signed to the press in March indicated that no decision to totally restore Stalinosition of respectability had yet been made.
Drive to Restore Stalin's Image Begins
Meanwhile, the neo-Stalinist drive for power which began in5 was quickly reflected in articles relating to tho Stalin issue. harp reduction in rehabilitations of Stalin's victims began in February and tho first indications of an organized effort to restore Stalin to respectability appeared about the same time; this first concerted effort was concentrated on Stalin's wartime image.
Soviet military figures have generally boon in the forefront of the shifting linos on the Stalin issue, but always pushing the same point. Their main interest is increased control of military matters by the military. When the party line was anti-Stalinist, the military argued that Stalin had been an incompetent wartime leader because he had failed to listen to the professionals. Now, with
the start of ro-Stalinizing, military figures were to argue that Stalin had been an effective wartimo loader precisely because he had listened to his military ebruary article in Krasnaya Zvczdn by Marshal Bagramyan credited Stalin with participation in successful militaryhe had listened to military advice.
Inccordingouters report, Soviet historians wore ordered to stop picturing Stalin onlymuddle-headed military failure"during the war. In the future. It said, history books would show him neitherilitary genius noromplete imbecile in matters of strategy. This order was reflectedoported Interview of several Sovlot historians with journalists In April. The spokesman for the group stated that Stalin hadistake in thinking that Hitler would not attack and In not taking moro precautions. However, ho warnod that Stalin's merits should not be ignored and quoted Stalin himself to prove that ho had consulted others and had admitted his own mistakes.
Articles commemoratingh anniversary of victory over tho Germans in World War II began appearing in April; thoso roflectedithe new "balanced" approach to Stalin and the war. irst step was simply to Identify Stalin in his wartime positions without furtherechnique used by Brezhnev inay speech. econd approach was to Ignore the deplorable state of Soviet defenses at the start of the var, dismissing all discussion of miscalculations, purges, and defeats as subjective and one-sided. hird method was tohe state of Sovlot defenses on the evo of tho war. For0 April Pravda article defended military-industrial preparations for the war. The author, Vasilly Ryabikov, then First Deputy Chairman of USSR Sovnarkhoz and later First Deputy Chairman of USSR Gosplan,pecial axo to grind as he had become Deputy Peoples Commissar tor Armaments in however, thc publication of the article In Pravda indicated that his argument had high-level support"! In this article Ryabikov dated the drive to prepare for the war from and claimed that tho
powerful Industry established in the Soviet Union before the war ensured tbe Soviet army's uninterrupted supply of everything necessary for the rout of the enemy.
The vehicle used most widely toavorable portrait of Stalin was the memoirs of military figures who simply reported their wartime contacts with Stalin, presenting himeasonable, if fallible, leader. Marshalormer First Deputy Minister of Defense, performed this functioneries of interviews and articles published during the spring in one article Konev described his success in persuading Stalin to change his mindilitary plan, and in another he credited him with participating in the forming of plans to capture Berlin. In his memoirs in Noviy Mir in May, he stated that Stalinise leader who was "particularly alert to the political and economic overtones of his military decisions." Andress conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs onpril, Konevthe new "balanced" formulation of Stalin's wartime role:
Stalinertain positive role in the cause of insuring victory over the enemy, but in tho first period of tho war and before its beginning, there were miscalculations and shortcomings in Stalin's activities and these have already been mentioned.
A similar approach was taken by Marshal Bagramyan
by Marshal Sokolovskiyay interview'Unita
correspondent. Bagramyan did criticize the
military figures on the eve of the war and stated that there had been strategic miscalculations before the war. However, he stated that measures had been taken to prepare the country. Sokolovskiy went further than this, stating that tho "main" reason for early defeats was that the young Soviet state had not had time to build the necessary military-technical base, and that for this reasun Stalin had tried to delay.the war.
ay various celebrations were held in honor ofh anniversary of the victory in World War II, and numerous speeches were given. The most important Of these was one by Brezhnev, in which he identified
Stalin in his wartime role; he also glossed over tho errors made in the early stages of tbe war:
It is well known that the first stage of the war took place in conditions that wereto us, and advantageous to tho enemy. On tho side of the fascists who committed this insidious and treacherous attack was tho factor of.
Ho thus ignored the numerous warnings of impending attack, and made no roference to failure to propare defenses.
Tho start of re-Stalinizing was reflected in various
articles on othor Stalin-related issues, although there was not tho same uniformity as in the articles relating to his wartime role. An April articleurkmen journal discussed the rise of the cult of personality andh congressbalanced" manner. The article stated that the cult had been the result of exceptional conditions, and that various factors, including imperialisthad demanded strict centrallzod leadership and certain limitations on democracy. The article went on to stato that Stalin's personal shortcomings had, however, caused the cult of personality to emergo. While the article stated thath congress had criticized the cult, it emphasized that the6 central committee decree on the cult had analyzed the cult profoundly and had rebuffed attompts to use criticism of the cult to undermine the socialist system. The call to use the6 decreeuideline for statements on the Stalin issue would be made with increasing frequency In the months ahead. This decree hodharp modification of Khrushchev's6 denunciation of Stalin. The decroo had praised Stalinarxist-Leninist and lender, but said that he hod had certain negative character traits which had lent themselves to the development of tho cult. The decree's sharpest criticism was reserved for enemies who tried to use the issue to sow confusion and undermine socialism. Thus, the attempts to restore this decree as the basic guidolino on the Stalin issuelear step toward re-Stallnlzing.
During the summer and early fall5 thereumber of instances in which Stalin was mentioned without comment. uly Voprosy Istorii KPSS article included Stalinist of persons who had played an important role in the struggle against the Trotskiyites. The film The Aurora Salvo which was released in5 contained one scene ofa pipe and voting in favor of Lenin's call for armed action. Oneptember Pravda carried an excerptook on the Brost-Litovsk Treaty, in which Stalin is simply includedist of those who voted "correctly"or the treaty.)
Whereasf the Soviet Historical Encyclo-pedia, signed to the press inad dealt harshly with Stalin on the subject of the repressions, volumeigned to the press inore "balanced" approach, similar to the line of the6 decree. This volume emphasized that iron discipline and some restrictions on democracy had been necossary under the complex conditions oftthe times, but that these had always been considered temporary. The article praised Stalin for fighting deviation, organizing the building of socialism, and protecting Lenin's attitudes on theof building socialism in one country. It then went on to criticize the cult and tho use of administrative methods. The article closed by stating that the party had liquidated the violations of socialist legality.
Anti-Stalinists Continue to Resist
During this period articles attacking Stalinist positions continued to appear, indicating that those who wished toehabilitation of Stalin had not been subdued. Onpril Kommunist Ukrainy published anon the contributions of the Ukrainians to the defeat of the Germans, and Included Khrushchevist of those who had hold responsible posts. The moderate position taken by this paper suggests that it was under theof Podgornyy, rather than the more orthodox Shelest. The journal Voprosy Istorii KPSS, while acceding to the
apparent directive to identify Stalin in his wartime positions, also blamed early military reverses on various factors, tracing many of these to violations of collectivity under Stalin's cult of personality.
From February throughhe journal Noviy
Mir published the memoirs of Soviet writer Il'ya Erenburg. Erenburg was highly critical of Stalin and the cult; ho attacked Stalinilitary leader.
. .itvinov and Mayskiy told me that the pact with Hitler had beenhad succeeded thereby in frustrating the plans of the Western aMies . .ut Stalin did not use the two-year respite to strengthenmen and diplomats alike have told me this. ave written that Stalin was extraordinarily suspicious and saw in his closest collaborators potential "enemies of theut for some reason he trusted Ribbentrop's signature. The Hitlerites' attack caught us by surprise. At first Stalin lost his head. He did not dare to announce the attack himself; he charged Molotov with doing .
Erenburg also denounced at some length the purges. He discussed the "deification of Stalin and Stalin'sfor all that occurred, ridiculing the attempt to shift blame elsewhere.
A group of writers was invited to the central committee where one of the secretariesto us the reasons for Beria's arrest . . .hc comrade who spoke with us said: 'Unfortunately, in the last years of his life Comrade Stalin was strongly influenced by Beria.' ater thought about these words,ecalled the Would someone then say that at that time Yezhov had influenced Stalin? It was obvious to everyone that such insignificant people could not have prompted Stalin's political course.
Another voice of moderation came from the journal Soviet State and Law in an article by Deputy Procurator General Zhogln, attacking Vyshlnskly and Stalin. Zbogin charged that Vzshlnskiy had cooperated with the NKvn. had suppressed attempts to enforce legality at the purge trials, and had engineered the purges of those who protested. He said that all of this was the fruit of the cult ofand that Vyshinskiy had carried out Stalin's ordors. Vyshinskly's words had servod as "theoretical justification of tyranny and coercion and of the mass persecution of entiroly innocent poople." Zbogin called for the exposure of these distortions in order to strengthen socialist legalltyy.
In May thereudden upsurge of rehabilitations in tho press which lasted through June. Voprosy Istorii KPSS resumed its publication of rehabilitation items with no apparent change In formulation. Izvcstlya and Sovetskaya Rossiya carried rehabilitation Items as did Krasnava ZvezdaT Kommunlsttrongly worded article on tho suffering of the Estonian party in tho purges.
Noviy Mir persisted in Its resistance to re-Stallnizing trends. In September it published an article by V. Kaverln in which heumber of writers who had hadIns. He stated thath party congress had put an end to arbitrariness, and, in discussing the trials ofs, said that it had turned out that those convicted had been right and the accusers had been devoid of any moral values. And in October, Noviy Mir publishod an article reviewing the book The Last Two 'Weeks by A. Rozen.* Tho author of theondratovieh, sharplyASS statoment which had beeneek before thc outbreak of World War II, denying the possibility of war. He said that It would have been one thing if it had comean who was excessively"but we all know that Stalin was distinguished by completely different qualities." He then attacked those who argue for the "truth of life" as opposed to the "truth of fact:"
" "This book was published In5 and criticized the handling of thc two weeks before the war.
Sometimes the attempt is made to link1 defeatsetty "truth of fact" which it is saidar cry from what "trulyhose writers whothat threatening summer1 in an attempt to understand how ithave been called "narrow-minded writers." But in those months we lost hundreds of thousands. If not millions of people, and we surrendered to the enemy, even if onlyuge territory, and to call this petty,"truth of fact" islasphemy. To "dissuaae" writers from" theme means at the very least toack of interest in historical truth . .uch of what A. Rozen writes about looks unbelievable. During the reading one often asks the question how could such things happen? But even this astonishmentlessing; that means we haveong way from those.
Re-Stal inizing Dminat.es
The strength of the conservative position was reflected in the fall5 in the reduction in the number of rehabilitations appearing in the centralnd the modification of the language used in those that did appear. For example,eptember Pravda carried
provincial papers continued to publish some rehabilitations, particularly the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Armenian papers.
an article about V. Knosin, former Comintern Secretary, but failed to mention his death in the purges, simply7 as the last date in his career. In general, this was the new format to be followed in the months ahead.*
In October tboreeportumber of military leaders were beginning to speak favorably about Stalin in private. Marshal Chuykov was reportedly one of these as was one of Marshal Rotmistrov's deputies. They argued that Stalin had made mistakes during the war, as had Churchill and Roosevelt, but that he had led the nation to victory. Although he was guilty of excesses before and after the war, these had been necessitated to an extent by the need for harsh measures to Insure the build-up of the armed forces.
In September, October, and November, the memoirs of Admiral N. Kuznetsov wore published; these carried on the process ofbalanced" view of Stalin. While somewhat critical of Stalin's behavior on the eve of the war, Kuznetsov's emphasis was on Stalin's positive He indicated that Stalin hadompetent and reasonable leader and ho denied the "malicious" story that Stalin had planned strategylobe (Khrushchev's story) and said that he could vouch for numerous cases where Stalin was engrossed in pinpoint dotail and "knewright up to tho position of each regiment." He stated that more and more during the war Stalin had listened to his front commanders, and he added that every man made mistakes and that wartime errors should not always be blamed on an "incorrect evaluation of the situation by Stalin,"
Inairly clear step toward rehabilitation of Stalinevolutionary was taken in the pages of Pravda Ukrainy. The article concerned7 Sixth Party Congress arid the question of whether nr not Lenin should
*There were of course exceptions to this. On ovember,h birthday of Kosior, Radio Moscow stated that8 Kosior was defamed and arrested. . Kosior perished .ictim of arbitrariness."
appear before the court of the Provisional Government. This article glided gently over Stalin's position, stating that
in the past few years contradictory data have been presented on the position of individual delogates concerning the problem. Lenin's appearance before the court . .ome delegates considered it possible for the leader of the party to appear before the authorities under certain. Stalin made the solution of this problem contingent upon guarantees for Lenin's safety. Since there were no guarantees he was against an appearance before the court at the given momentn. . . .
The appearance of this positive appraisal of Stalin's revolutionary role in the Ukrainian paper suggests once again the neo-Stalinist position of Ukrainian leader Shelest.
For the first several months after Khrushchev's ouster, the new leaders were busy undoing some of Khrushchev's policies and making personnel appointments. Shelepin, leadereo-Stalinist faction, emerged with considerable strength after the November plenum, andinstalled many of his proteges in the party and state apparatuses, particularly in thc cultural and informa tion media. He also maintained his previous strength in the KGB and Komsomol.
oderate, also appeared to have gained some strength after the ouster, and for severaloderate policy prevailed, more in keeping with Podgor-nyy's views than Shelepin's. This line was reflected in ihe publication of numerous liberal articles on cultural matters and by the continued criticism of Stalin and rehabilitation of has victims. If anything, more freedom
to write existed in the first few months after the coup than had previously been the case, possibly reflecting the fact that the leadership situation wastate of flux and that no agreed upon position existed.
In5 the paper Partiynaya Zhizn* (Party Life) published an article stating that there would be no return to theiew of Stalin. While this article was reassuring on the surface, it indicated that there were those who fearedevival and therefore probably also those who supported it. Support for re-Stallnizlng was revealed almost immediately. Kommunist, in February, published an article by Moscow city chief Yegorychev which raised for the firstumber of neo-Stalinistthe idea that many people had gone overboard in criticizing events of the period of the cult of personality. This line was picked up by various individuals and journals quite quickly; in February Voprosy Istorii KPSS, which had beenumber of" "anti-Stalin articles, suddenly stopped itsehabilitating Stalin's victims.
A party decision must have been made early 5 on the question of mentioning Stalin in his wartime The uniform nature of the campaign and the public approval given it by Brezhnev in May, as well as the importance of the issue, indicated that this decision had been made at the highest level. Given the split between moderates and hard-linors existing in the presidium at this time, it seems clear that Brozhnev must have supported the rehabilitation, along with the neo-Stalinist and orthodox members of the presidium. Rehabilitation of Stalinartime leader was the most logical place tootal rehabilitation; for the issuear from which tho Soviet Union emerged victorious and in which Stalin, at leastnifying symbol, played an important part.
However, Brozhnev must have been awareotal rehabilitation of Stalin wouldeal shock and he was prepared only to move gradually. This was Indicated by several equivocal statements made by him as well as by the fact that persons closely associated with him, such
as the First Secretary of Kazahkstan Kunayev, were not pushing the noo-Stallnist line. Thus, while the decision to restore Stalin's wartime Image was being carried out fairly consistently during this poriod, uniformof Stalin in other areas did not occur. Both praise and criticism of his general role continued to be expressed.
The nco-Stalinlsts used various other Issues in their assault on tho liberals in the spring In April articles wore published urging tho restoration of Stalin-era literature to respectability and stronglythe argument supporting "truth of lifo," Also in April arrests of dissident intellectuals began, althoughelatively small scale compared with what would come later. In Juno tho Leningrad newspaper indicated that the intellectuals In that area had been criticized by the city party committee, rovoaling the hard-line posture being taken by that party organization. In tho spring theofogtalln's victims, was also halted for several
During the summer tho liberalsrief but not unchallenged resurgence an reflected in the resumption of the rehabilitation program and the publication of various liberal articles; these articles were subjected to sharp criticism, however. In September the liberals apparently attempted to defend their position with the publicationery bold article by Pravda editor Rumyantsev, who may well have been speaking for Podgornyy. This liberal push was quickly repulsed. Rumyantsev was fired and at almost the same time Daniel and Sinyavskiy wero arrested,eal clamp-down on tho liberal intellectuals.
Signs that the neo-Stallnlsts were pushing hard at this time could be soen In the various defeases made of Shelcpin's Party-State Control Committee. Defense of the committee came from the Belorussian paper, suggesting that Shelopin had the support of that republic'sheaded by Mazurov and Masherov. The new Pravda editor Zimyanin, who had replaced Rumyantsev. had risen in Belorussia, and Pravda from now on wouldairiy consistent hard-line, another indication of the Belorussian
orientation. Pravda expressed its support for party-statehelepin) inthat committee had been abolished.
Shelepinebuff at the September central committeo plenum; neither Kosygin nor Brezhnev mentioned party-state control, an obvious omission. Polyanskly wasirst deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby becoming senior to Shelepin in that organization.ompromise economic reform program, reportedly opposed by Shelepin, was passed.
The appearance in the beginning of Octoborogmatic artlclo by Sergey Trapcznikov, Brezhnev's protege who had boon appointed chairman of the department of Scientific and Educational Institutions the previous June, revealed Brezhnev's support for the hard-lino, ro-Stalinizing policy. Tills article exempted from criticism various new aspects of Stalin'sprimacy of heavy industry, politics over economics; In addition, Trapeznikov criticized "some" rehabilitations. Brezhnev's pre-emptionajor portion of tho neo-Stalinistserved to woakun Shelepin's basis for arguing that he (Shelepin) deserved to be the party's leader.
At the December party plenum, the Party-State Control Committee was abolished and Shelepin was removed from his position as deputy chairman of the council of ministers. At the sane tine the moderates were weakened by Podgornyy's appointment as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which also meant that he had lost his moro powerful position on tho party secretariat. Furthermore, he replaced Mikoyan, suggesting that this moderate was finishedolitical force.
Build-Up To The Congress
Following the December plenum an orthodox, hard-line
approach to cultural matters as well as to the Stalin issue seemed to prevail in the leadership. At the same time, however, the neo-Stalinist members of the Shelepin faction expressed less extreme views than had previously been the case, suggesting that they were reacting cautiously to Shelepln's set-back in December. For example,5 December speech Demichev retreated somewhat; although he called for approval of all that is new and trulyand criticized lack of principles and ideals, he closed by stating
The partyautious and careful regard for the intelligentsia, trusting it, being concerned for the future of talent, and tho directing of it so that it is socially useful, and about the healthy, normal development of it. 'Talentareaid Lenin, *it must beand cautiously encouraged . . . .'
In6 reports that two volumos of Stalin's works were to be published appeared. The first secretary at the Italian Embassy in Moscow expressed surprise at this because another report which had come into the embassy in December indicated that Shelepin hadetback when the majority in thc leadership blocked distribution of two works of Stalin which had already boon printed. The source of this report stated that the Stalin issue was being used as the touchstone of the opposition in the
hierarchy and that favorable evaluation of certain aspects of Stalin's works waseflection of political struggle.
The fact that Shelepin's set-back in December had notorresponding set-back for neo-Stalinist views was quickly demonstrated, however. Onanuary Pravda published an article by three historians which urged that the use of the term "period of the cult of personality" be discontinued, and called for more positive portrayals of the Stalin era. They argued that emphasis should be put on the enormous successes of the period and that the cost in human suffering should be minimized. They attacked those who pay tribute to "unprinciple'deference to Khrushchev's use of de-Stalinization. Also in January the Moldavian paper Soyetskaya MoIdavivaan articleember of the council of the House of Political Education of the Moldavian Central Committee, analyzing the cult and its exposure. The article instructed propagandists to rofer to the6 decree; it attacked those who turn criticism of the cultampaign and told propagandists to emphasize that the party had dealt with all that had conflicted with the lines of h Congress. Both of these articles reflect the carrying out of the instructions issued by Trapoznikov in5 andurther step in the road to re-Stalinization.
The clearest expression of the prevailing orthodox approach was the trial in February of the writers Daniel and Sinyavskiy, an action which must have been approved by the Presidium. According to the writer Valentin Katayev, Kosygin had opposed tho trial and "the whole damned thing" but had been outvoted. It seems likely that Mikoyan would have opposed it and probable that Podgornyy, too, would not have supported it. It seems clear that Brezhnev, in league with the neo-Stalinists and other orthodox members of the hierarchy, supported thehe two men received five and seven years respectively for their "crime" of publishing so-called anti-Soviet works under pseudonyms in the West.
Inetter was reportedly circulated in party meetings on the subject of the upcoming party congress. imilar, perhaps identical, letter which was
sent to the Soviet Embassy in Athens, stated that Stalinism
had not been bad except for the cult of personality and
that many Stalinists would be rehabilitated during the
congress. It was explained f
that the change on the issue of Stalinism would neutralize
the Chinese ideological grounds for attacking the Soviet Union.
Stalin would be
Numerous reports circulated during the months before the congress to the effect that Stalin would be rehabilitated, and Eastern European countries apparently received some warning. For example. In mid-January the Soviets reportedly
partially rehabilitated at tne congress. These reports caused some anxiety in these countries. Onebruary the Polish party organ Trybuna Ludutrongly worded editorial in commemoration ofh anniversary ofh CPSU Congress. This editorial could be readarning to the Soviet Union, linking as it did thed Congress with the heritage ofh, which it said had becomeommon gain for the entire Communistn contrast, the anniversary received only muted attention in the Soviet press.
On the eve ofdumber of republic and regional party meetings were held, at which partyexpressed for tho most part hard-line sentiments. The most strident voice came, not surprisingly, from Mzhavanadze's bailiwick, Georgia, where party secretary Sturua spoke of the "costs" of de-Stallnizing, saying it had brought nihilism and cosmopolitanism (an old Stalinist term with anti-Semitics well as attempts by some authors to bring back Trotskiyism and other deviations. He condemned the term period of the cult of personality, claiming that iteriod of heroic victories and enormous And, finally, he attacked those who undervalue ideological work and write about shortcomings. He stated lhat this docs not help thc building of communism. And
he closedall for party coordination of ideological work.*
"The Italians reacted quickly to Sturua's speech. Onarch Unita warned that if d congress re-evaluated Stalin and minimized the negative judgment ofh congress, "wo cannot accept it."
At the Belorusslan congress first secretary Masherov stated that de-Stalinlzation had brought into disrepute "an entire historical era" in the country's life. He also criticized those who distort certain events of the war and emasculate the class content of history. FirstBodyul, in Moldavia, implied that the uncrowning of Stalin had ledistortion of the historicof tho party in its struggle for socialism. In Latvia Pelshe emphasized tho importance of party education and criticized those writers and artists who are disposed to fault finding and exaggerating existing shortcomings and difficulties. In the Ukraine Shelest used Sholokhov's formulation that when the heart of each artist belonged to the party, he would be free to write as his heart dictates. And, at the Leningrad Oblast* Party conference, Tolstikov presented his neo-Stalinist solution to tho problem of non-conforming intellectuals:
Under present conditions, we are faced with having to strengthen the party'sn the creative intelligentsia, and to help it, by its creative works to strengthen Communist ideals.
At the>ffind of March several warnings were sounded about the proposed rehabilitation of Stalin. One came from the journal Voprosy Fllosofii (Questions of Philosophy) which warned that reversion to one-man rule wasossibility:
In the conditions of the application of socialism there exists the possibility that while taking part in collective work, definite personalities may pursue aims which are their own or which arc aimsaction. Moved by ambition, they have personal aims ond cause harm to the common cause, particularly if thosehave leading positions.
The article then proposed that reforms be adnpted to "prevent the repetition of past mistakes."
The second, and most spectacular, warning came fromoviet intellectuals. These individuals sent an urgent appeal and warning against the rehabilitation tohe letter stated that the authors saw nothing to indicate that condemnation of the personality cult had beenon the contrary, they said, many horrifying facts remained to be revealed. They said that any attempt at rehabilitation would cause great dissension within Soviet society, and would be interpreted by the world as capitulation to the Chinese.
The Congress Opens
d Congress opened onarch and proved to be much less interesting than the build-up to it. The reported rehabilitation of Stalin amounted only to the restoration of the terms "Politburo" and "Generalthese were perhaps the symbolic vestiges of an abandoned plan. Whether the proposed rehabilitation was abandoned because of opposition in Eastern Europe, internal protest, or power shifts in the Presidium is not clear; it seems most likely that the leaders were startled by the vehemence of the reaction, both at home and abroad, and decided that it would be wise to move cautiously.
In his speech to the congress, Brezhnev mentioned neither Stalin nor Khrushchev by name, but he did refer to the miscalculations, undue haste, and subjectivism of recent yearslear slap at Khrushchev). He called for party-mindednesslass approach, although he rejected arbitrary influence (an apparent rejection of the more neo-Stalinist recommendations of Tolstikov). Brezhnev's speech was less extreme in tone than many of tho pre-congress speeches had been,eflection of the leadership's decision to pull back; nonetheless, the tone of his speech was orthodox:
The party will always support art and literature which confirm beliefs in our ideals and will wage an uncompromising struggle against all manifestations of ideology which is alien to us.
Appendixnd page 49 for further discussion.
Socialist art is deeply optimistic and. This, of course, does not mean that one must write only about what is good. As everyone knows, we have many difficulties and shortcomings and the truthful criticism of them in works of art is useful and necessary; it helps the Soviet people to eliminate the Unfortunately, one also encounters those hacks in art who, instead of assistance to the people, choose as their specialty the blackening of our system and the slander of our heroic people. Of course, we haveew such people. They do not to any extent reflect the feelings and mind of our creative intelligentsia who are linked inseparably with the people and with the.
After Brezhnevumber of speeches* were given which were more hard-line than his. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, warned against relaxing ideological work, and
under the pretence of struggling against the consequences of the cult of personality and others under the guise of advocating historical truth, run down the heroic history and struggle of party and people, and try to blacken Soviet reality and minimize the grandeur of our triumphs over fascism.
The series of neo-Stalinist reports was begun by Yegorychev, that stalwart supporter of the Soviet Union's heroic past, who started by reassuring those who had been frightened by the spectre of Stalinism:
The personality cult, tho violation of Leninist norms and principles of party life and socialistthat has hindered our movementbeen decisively rejected by our party, and there will nevereturn to this past!
Ho then proceeded, howovor, to attack once again those who write off the heroic history of the Soviet people, and to condenn insufficiently party-minded approaches lo history and individuals. He closed by stating that tho sensational instances whon direct ideological saboteurs ponetrate the ranks of the workers of art can be explainod only by political carelessness. Yegorychev's attack seemed toargo portion of tho intelligentsia in its scope. The liberals had demonstrated their apprehension about this sort of approachanuary Noviy Mir article which criticized Stalin's statement ath party congress that tbe main bulk of the Intelligentsia had opposed the revolution, and thereforo had to be broken and dispersed.
First Socrotaryrezhnev man,
for stricter literary controls. He urgedecisive rebuff be given to the falsifiers of history and to those who slander tho Soviet people. He described thc nature of freedom in the Soviet Union, stating that artists are free to create but.
in the some dogree the party and state organs enjoy the right of free choice of what to. In our opinion, the weak side of leadership of this sector of ideological work is insufficient party demandingness toward selection and publication of works of literature, art, and cinema.
Moscow Oblast' First Secretary Konotop was more explicit and more harsh in hlu recommendation than Bodyul had been:
Each person is froe to write and to speak everything which pleases him, without the slightest restrictions. But every free union (including tho party) is also free to dismiss those members who use the party for preaching anti-party opinions.
Thus the threat had been raised of expulsion from party and creative unions; expulsion from the latter would mean the end of the right to publish. Other hard-line speechos
were given on this occasion by Masherov, Mzhavanadze, Pelshe, and Rostov party chief, M. Solomentsev.
On tho other side of the fence, the more moderate Podgornyy statod that the party had done much to strengthen law and order and to eliminate harmful elements connected with the cult of personality. He said that economic and cultural issues present new questions, requiring legislation. In his speech Podgornyy also appealed for groator domocracy in the party. In general those leaders whooderate approach havo been silent on the Stalin issuo and related subjects such as cultural freedom. In this particular speech Podgornyy dealt only briefly with the topic but his treatment was cloarly moderate, as he implied that these Issues should be dealt with throughadministrative flat.
At the congress Mikoyan and Shvernik wore dropped from tho Politburo and Pelshe was added; formerly First Secretary of Latvia, Pelshe is reportedly close to Suslov. Polsho also took over Shvernik's function as chairman of the party's Control Commission. These actions marked another setback for the moderates on the Politburo. rezhnev follower, and the Belorusslan First Socrotnry Mashcrov, an apparent Shelepin supporter and probably Mazuo-rov's protego, became candidate members of tho Politburo.
Before tho cong"ress, Tn February, the moderates had suffered anothor setback when A. Kochinyan replaced Ya. Zarobyan as First Secretary in Armenia. ubsequent speech by Kochinyan revealed that Zarobyan had been demoted for opening party membership to the masses and recruitingrather than political workers, as well as for poor ideological leadership. Zarobyan had come froa Khar'kov Oblast', Podgornyy's bailiwick, as had N. Sobol, dismissed in March from his position as Ukrainian Second Secretary. Both of those actions thereforeefeat for Podgornyy, and tho Armenian shake-up may also haveefeat for Mikoyan, an Armenian who probably had hndinfluence in personnel appointments in that republic over the years.
In other personnel actions during this period, Shelepin's associate Khaldeyev was shifted from his position as RSFSR Agitprop Chief to become the new editor of Partiynaya Zhizn and G.ong-time Brezhnev associate was named" Chairman of the RSFSR People's Control Commissions. After the congress, thereumber of indications that Shelepin had been assigned responsibility for lightmatters, andeeting he attended the following September, lt appeared that Domichev had assumed Shelepin's responsibility for supervising the Soviet security apparatus. From these actions it would appear that the moderates hadurther setback as had Shelepin, but Shelepin still had considerable strength juding from his ability to keep his supporters in high-level posts.
Following theumber of speeches given by party leaders indicated that the orthodox re-Stalinizing line continued to prevail. eningrad Oblast* meeting early in April, Tolstikov delivered an only thinly veiled warning:
The congress devoted attention also to->the negative phenomena in the development of literature and art. We also have been having cases of lowered domandingness toward the results of creative work here in Leningrad. Such lack of demandingness appears especially often in evaluating the creative work of the young writers and thisegative effect on their creative growth. Our creative organs should think seriously about these facts.
And Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev, who had previously been quite moderate,ogmatic speech in Mayongress of Kazakh writers. He called on writers to be in theof thc ideological struggle and to combat the challenge of bourgeois propaganda, and he affirmed party leadership of the arts. He did make several concessions to the
moderate view, stating that writers could depict negative aspectsommunistthat demands should not bo made on writers to write on specific subjects.
Demichev, in his May election speech. Condemned ideologically harmful works and linked them to foreign propaganda which seeks to subvert Soviet society. This line by now had become almost standard and is reminiscent of the Stalinist conceptharpening class struggle. There can be no dissent within the structure as envisioned; therefore, any dissonance must be attributed to analien Ideology. In the logical continuum of this line, Demichev condemned brige building between East and Vest. Subsequent extension of the line would lead to the charge that dissident writers were in fact agents of the West and should be tried for treasonous activity.
Onay Yepishev, head of the armed forces'administration,ogmatic speechonference on tho indoctrination of youth. He reportedly called on writers to show the greatness of the timos instead of questioning herioc legends. He praised the literature of the Stalin era, and said that Stalin's reasons for sending people to death or prison camps should be understood. He then criticized both Noviy Mir and Yunos t' for publishing articles describing setbacks during the war and for paying tribute to abstract humanism and pacifism.
Differences within the leadership on the Stalin issue were reflected in the publication of contradictory articles by the two highest-ranking military figures in the Soviet Union in Defense Minister Malinovskiy wrote an article in Izvest.iya onune in which heneither the purge of military leaders before the war nor mistakes on the part of Stalin. He attributed the initial defeats to the enormous size of tho attacking forces which he said had been built up with the help of Western imperialists. He emphasized tho pre-war buildup by the Soviet regime which, he said, saw the danger long before the war, and he praised the party for strengthening
the moral-political unity of the country.
In an article inthejuie issue of the MilitaryJournal Marshal Andrey Grechko, First Deputy Minister of Defense, bucked the prevailing line and returned to the historiography of the Khrushchev era. He criticized Stalin and charged ineptitude by "the highest military and political leadership" on the eve of tho war. He accused the regime of underestimating the immediacy of the Nazi threats, and stated that Stalin and his closestat the head of the Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff (Timoshenko and Zhukov) "grossly miscalculated" the strategic situation. He further asserted that decisions on major defense problems were made by one man while responsibleleaders "often enough supported and encouraged these erroneous views." The use of this issue by Grechko may have demonstrated his dissatisfaction with what he considered the lack of .'consideration being given strategic military problems, and the willingness of some military men, for example Malinovskiy, to go along with it. Grechko was to change his emphasis on the Stalin issue considerably before being named Defense Minister the following year.
A Shift In Positions
A debate on thc subject of collectivity of leadership versus Individual responsiblity was carried on in the press during thc summer and fall Onravda article by F. Petrenko reaffirmed the principle of collec-tive leadership and warned against the imposition of individual power. ravda editorial appeared to respond to this by citing the need both to strengthen party democracy and at the same time toense
rayo version of this article had apparently been tailored"to take Into account bloc sensitivities. In this version, Malinovskiy referrederies of grave mistakes committed during tho early stages of the war, assorted that thc USSRery limited time in which to prepare, and cited shortages of planes, tanks, and artillery at the start of thc war.
of responsibility and discipline. The editorial quoted Lenin to the effect that "irresponsibility taking shelter under references to collectiveness of work, ost dangerous evil."
An article by Brozhnev-supporter Kunayev in Partiynaya Zhizn'ctober supported the Pravda editorial. Kunayev stressed the primacy of individual leadership, and he too used tho Lenin quotation. However, Georgian Second Secretary P. Rodionov, oprosy 1storii KPSS article reasserted Petrenko's view and emphasized that individual leaders must subordinate themselves to the collective. In this debate the neo-Stalinists, represented by Potrenko and Rodionov, demonstrated their fear that Brezhnev was acquiring too much power. They resorted to the same argument usedby thethere are dangers inherent in tho imposition of one-man rule and that the collectivity of leadership must bo preserved. The neo-Stalinists were answered by the Brezhnev forces in the Pravda editorial and Kunayev's article. The argument used by them was that while collectivity is fine, it must not be used to cover upnd that there must be individualand discipline.
In August and September Izvestiya published twowhich strongly attacked Stalin and the personality cult. The first article stated that Stalin had departed from the norms of party life and had destroyed collectivity of The second was even stronger in its denunciation of Stalin; it accused him of overestimating his own services and crudely violating collectivity. It charged that his thesis that the class struggle was growing more and more aggravated had led to crude violations of socialist legality. These articles seem to have come from the moderate side as they condemn the Stalinist theory of intensifying classerm which was beingby the neo-Stalinists. The Izvestiya articles do, however, agree with the neo-stalinisF defenses ofleadership mentioned above, and for good reason. The moderates had been on the defensiveong time and they, too, feared Brezhnev's increasing strength. Thus, the nco-stalinists and the liberalsommon interest in stopping Brezhnev.
An indication that Shelepin's faction had cause to be concerned about the strength of its position was the identification of Shelepin inas secretary in charge of consumereal come-down for him. In September Shelepin lost another foothold in the security forces. ew Ministry for the Protection of Public Order waswith N.ong-time Brezhnev associate, appointed to head it. The logical appointee had been V.helepin associate, who had been serving as chief of the RSFSR militia. On the eve of the August plenum of the central committee thereumber of reports that there would be numerous personnelparticularly that Kosygin would be fired. This did not occur.
In November Brezhnev indicated his supporteneral rehabilitation of Stalin;peech in Tbilisi, he again mentioned Stalin's name, this time including himroup of "ardent revolutionaries" who had led the struggle for the revolution in Georgia. Thus, while the neo-Stalinists were siding with the moderates on the question of collective leadership, Brezhnev took the Stalin issue an additional step. By further restoring Stalin he could also restore the concept of one-man rule to respectability and thereby legitimize his own drive for increased power.
Pre-Congress C1 amp-Down
The general shift to an increasingly hard-line policy was reflectedlamp-down on the intellectuals in the first few months In addition to the trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and their sentencing to five and seven years at hard labor respectively for the publication of "anti-Soviet" works in the West, thereumber of other arrests and trials. In early January, diplomatic sources reportedoviet student had been sentenced to seven years in prison as the alleged leader of
eningrad students who had secretly published the magazine Kolokol (Thehe magazine of "free thought." Eight others reportedly received sentences ranging from two to five years. The groupclaimed that it was not anti-Communist, but was opposed to Communism as practiced in the Soviet Union, and was against what they considered the remnants of Stalinism. Once again Leningrad was acting as the leader Inard-line policy. In February the young poet Vladimir Batshev was sentenced to five years exile in Siberia. Accused ofarasite, he was condemned forinecember demonstration protesting the arrests of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and for carrying on literarywithoutember of the Union of Writers. Also In February the writer Valeriy Tarsis was deprived of his Soviet citizenship while traveling abroad.
The Soviet intellectuals reacted to the increasing pressure with fear and courage. Just befored con-gross convened onarch,embers of the USSR Union of Writersetter to the presidiums of the congress, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Supremehey asked permission to stand surety for Daniel and Sinyavskiy, While criticizing the publication of works abroad without authorization, the signers stated that the trial of the two writers hadangerous precedent and threatened thc progress of Soviet culture. They called for more freedom, not its condemnation.
*See Appendix Itemee Appendix Item A.
Also on the eve of theroupigned letter to Brezhnev, arguing againsl any rehabilitation of Stalin at thehey mentioned tendencies in speeches and articles directed atehabilitation and stated that this caused them deep apprehension. They said they had seen nothing which would warrant thinking the original condemnation of the personality cult was wrong; on the contrary, they maintained
that many of the most horrifying; facts about Stalin's crimes had not yet been made public. They said that there were many dangers involved in any rohabilitation of Stalin, including serious dissensions in Soviet society.
. .talin is responsible not only for the destruction of countless Innocent people, for our unpreparedness for the war,eparture from the Leninist norms of party and state life. His crimes and unjust deeds also distorted the idea of Communism to such an extent that our peoplo will never forgive him for this. Our people will not understand and will not acceptartial departure from the decisions on the personality cult. No one will be able to obliterate thesefrom its consciousness andny attempt to do so will lead only toand disarray in the broadest circles
.o explanations or articles will make people believe in Stalin again; on the contrary, they will simply create disorder and anger. To undertake anything like this is dangerous, taking into account the complex economic and political situation of our country.
The letter went on to describe anothera rehabilitation wouldhreatew split in the world communistthe Soviet Union and the Communists in the West who would see this as ato the Chinese. The letter closed by saying thatecision by the Central Committee could not be regarded asit would have historic importance for the destiny of the county.
In its March editorial Noviy Mir again defended truth in literature and usedFebruary article on thed Congress to support its position. It said that Pravda, which had in fact given limited attention toh Congress, had praised that congress forthe personality cult and for restoring Leninist norms of party and state life, the observance of collectivity
of leadership and intra-party democracy. Noviy Mir asserted, optimistically, that the party was constantly strengthening these things and was doing everything toepetition of the violations of legality connected with the cult. In obvious disfavor, Noviy Mir's editor-ln-chlef,was the only candidate or full member of tho central committee notelegate to the congress.
The Congress and After
As noted abovo,d Congress did not formally rehabilitate Stalin and, in fact, skirted tho issue almost entirely. However, most of the speeches which dealt with culture wero hard-line. This was true not only of the leaders who spoko, but also of those members of thcitsolf who spoke. Mikhail Sholokhov gave one of the most vicious speeches of all, stating that if Daniel and Sinyavskiy had been caught Ins they would have received harsher judgment and that if anything the sentences they received were too mild. One exception to the general trendpeech given by USSR Cultural Minister Yekaterina Furtseva. While admitting that there were shortcomings in the arts, she named no names and called for friendly guidance. She said that the4 plenum had gotton rid of the last vestiges of adraln-istrativeness in the arts and that In the new atmosphere intellectuals could work calmly and assurodly.
The sycophants and hacks immediately picked up the basically tough line projected at the congress. Both Pravda, in an article by Llteraturnaya Gazcta editor Chakovskiy, and Llteraturnaya Rosslya, In an editorial, attacked foreign propagandists for trying to frighten the creative intelligentsia with the "spectre ofccording to thc latter paper
Our Ideological opponents are trying again to put an equal sign between the basicol Soviet literature of socialist realism and its party spirit and closeness to the people, and tho shortcomings connected with the cult of persona lily . . . .
editorial also described as slanderous, claims that Sholokbov's views on Daniel and Sinyavskly were not shared by other writers.
In April the literary Journal Yunost' (Youth)ery self-critical editorial^ According to one report the Komsomol was trying to take over the journal ond tho editorial represented the attempt to forestall this Yunost' had boon sharply criticized at the congress. The editorial recited conservative views on such topics as positive horoos and the ideological contont of writing, but closedefiant statement:
Nobody and nothing hinders or can hinder all the young and truly talented in tho Soviot Union from growing and developing. It is not for nothing that the young in Soviet literature blossomed particularly well in rccont years.
Thus the editorial closed by implying that there had been an upsurge in Soviet literature during the Khrushchev years and that the writers were aware of this and would notrepressive measures aimed at cutting off this growth.
In April,lenum of the Board of tho RSFSR Writersecretary of the union, it. Alekseyev, defended the literature of the Stalin years and condemned the "devastating terra 'cult literature.*" He stated that some people had gone too far in condemning tho cult:
. .ecause of certainood little bit of confusion was brought into thoof history and the present day during thoears. The word 'great' related not to the whole history of tho Soviet state but only to the decade which began approximately lt was suggested that this period should define the concept of the present day while events which happened earlier were not history. . . inceertain part of this history there developed an ugly phenomenon, which was unnatural for our society and which ath Party Congress was named the 'cult of personality', our ideological opponents did not (all to use this to blacken our revolution
and to cast aspersions on Soviet real lifehole. As regards Soviet literature, despite the obvious facts which we cited abovo, it was simply doclared non-existent.
Alekseyev praised soveral of Konstantln Simonov's war novols, but stated that he could not accept everything in them, specifically tho Idea that some heroes operated during the war with doubts which they could not possibly havo had until afterh Party Congress. In other words Alekseyev was claiming that nobody knew of Stalin's crimes until they were revealed by Khrushchev
Various articles published in the spring demonstrated tho prevalenceonservative trend. For example, in its lead editorial in May, VoprosyPSS criticized false portrayals of the cult period, and cited""the influence of subjectivism and voluntarlstic mistakes. It said that there were still instances whore "undor the guise ofof tho cult of personality, the work of our party and people In the construction of socialism wasravda article concedod that the period of tho cult of personality had been linked with serious perversions and mistakes in the work of state security, but claimed that this did not change the socialist nature of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence.
Pressure also continued to be exerted on the In May the writer Igor Galamchok wasuspended sentence for having refused to testify at the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trial. In0 Ukrainian intellectuals had reportedly been arrested foractivities. Open trials for some of these were held in January and but because of protestopen trials were discontinued. Inlosed trial was hold, but three intellectuals managed to attend. Two of them, Ivan Dv.yuba and Ivan Uracil, laterampaign to obtain signatures etition, pleading for the release of those tried. This was thc beginningeries of arrests and trials in the Ukraine which would increase In number and intensity in the next few years.
A Frightened Response
Clearly frightened by the prevailing trend, and possibly encouraged by what they may have considered to be the success of their previous letter pleading that Stalin not bo rehabilitated, liberal Intellectuals continued to protest. Lidiya Chukovskayaetter to Mikhail Sholokhov, which was subsequently smuggled to the West, condemning him for his congress speech. umber of other letters protesting the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trial were also written during this period and smuggled out. In one of these, written by A. Yakobson, the statement appears that tho works of the two men were not anti-Soviet, but were "against Stalinism, its survivals and all attempts to revive it in our society."
Several articles appeared during the summer which revealed continued intransigeance on the part of evenwriters. In the Armenian paper Kommunist, Bagish Ovsepyan wrote an article in which he reported glowingly ond congress, saying it had guaranteed once again that there would be no return to lawlessness and that itorthy successor tohd congresses. His description bore little resemblance to the real thing. In an Izvestiya article onuly, Konstantin Simonov stated that it was worth repeating that had it not been for the purges, the USSR would have faced Hitler with many more commanders. Onuly Llteraturnaya Rossiya carried another Simonov article which contained" implicit criticism of Zhdanov, Onuly Tvardovskiyetter to Llteraturnaya Gazeta in which he rejectedof tne staging of his play "Terkin in the Other World" at the Satire Theater which had been closed at the end of June. The editors of the paper accompanied Tvardovskiy's letter with tho statement that his evaluation was one-sided. The play was performed oncemid-August, butdisappeared from the theator's repertoire.
In August Noviy Mir published an article which was to cause considerable controversy in Hie months ahead. The article was by V. Lakshin, an editor of the journal, and
was entitled, "Writer, Reader, Critic." In it Lakshin praised works by Solzhenltsyn ond Semln which hadbeen criticized, and again presented Noviy Mir's case for truth in literature. This article wasattacked by both Llteraturnaya Gazeta and Li ternturnaya Rosslya; botli and journal Itself wero criticized^ This was tho start of an intenso campaign against Noviy Mir which would continue Into the following year.
Re-Stalinizing Is Pushed
Tho prevalence of an orthodox line during and after the5 plenum was reflected in the appearance in6 of numerous articles glossing over Stalin's errors and crimes. The focus of attention had shifted, however, from Stalin's wartime role to more general policies and achievements of tho Stalin years, with the policy of collectivization receiving the most attention. This that Trapeznikov's October 5 instructions wore being followed.
Scl'skaya Zhizn', 95 article attacked those who assert that conditions were not right for collectivization ins and who concentrate on tbe negative features of collectivization, ignoring all that was progressive. The article admitted that errors had been committed early in the process of collectivization, but minimized their seriousness; it spread the responsibility among local, oblast, and central organs, and failed toStalin at all. In fact, the article praised as "courageous fighters for the triumph of Lenin's cause" those who stood "at the source of the construction of thehis can certainly bo read as indirect praise of Stalin.
This theme was further advanced by F. Vaganovebruary Kommunist article, and by S. Kaplan in Pravda
Ukralny onebruary. Kaplan eventalinist argument to oxplain early difficulties in He said that the policy had been accompaniedharpening of the class struggleountry encircled by capitalist states. He did mildly criticize Stalin's "Inclination" to be hasty and "overly decretory" but clearly minimized the importance of this factor.
Kvldonce that the January article In Pravda, in which the three historians urged that the term "period of the personality cult" bo renounced, was being taken seriously can bo seen in two articles which appeared in In late February Sel'skaya Zhlzn stated that criticism of collectivization could not be Justified by reforoncos to the subjectivist term "period of thecult." 2 March Pravda Ukralny article criticized the use of this term, stating that its use had lod to the detraction of Soviet achievements.
Anothor indication of the prevalence of aline was the halt in the rehabilitation program. From January through April Voprosy Istorii KPSS againIts rehabilitations and on the eve of the congress the section of tho Journal which had included such articles was ollminated. In December. Embassy in Moscowrend in Soviet writing to concede that the Stalin cult had been regrettable, but had been an aberration unrelated to the system's basic structure. The ombassy cited several poems emphasizing the need to stress the positive, including one stating that youths who have heard about special camps, the Kirov murder, and so forth, should balancemomentary bit of offal" against the stride of the contury.
A somewhat ominous indicator of the trend was Oklynhr's publication in March of an arliclr rn.-rrinr. :Boris Kcdrovon and brother of "enemies of theedrov's father had been one of the first rehabilitations after Stalin's death, and Stalin's term "enemies of the people" had been specifically condemned by Khrushchev in his secret speech.
There were exceptions to the generally hard-line emphasis inut for the most part these came from the most intranslgoant and liberal journals. Noviy Mir, for example, continued to publish anti-Stalinist Items. In January itoview of A. Nekrich's bookhich had been published5 and by now was very controversial. The book had boon highly critical of Stalin for his handling of the prowar situation, and tho review also charged Stalin with grnvo orrors, and stated that those who arrested and persecuted Marshal Tukhachevskiy and hlB comrades must have known that thoy were innocent.
Ineeting was held to discuss tho Nekrich book and to determine the propriety of the book's condemnation of Stalin.* Participants in the conference included people from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Institute of History of tho Academy of Sciences, the foreign ministry and the armed forces. G. Dcborin, later identified as head of the editorial board at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, opened tho meeting by criticizing the book for what heumber of incorrect evaluations and facts. He argued that Sovlot unpreparedness at the start of the war was not primarily due to Stalin'sbut was the result of various factors including misinformation. He attacked Nekrich's Implication that Stalin, Voroshilov, Budonnyy, Blyukher, and others had known of the innocence of the Tukhachevskiy-Yakir group, but had condemned them nonetheless. Throughout this talk, there were numerous shouts from the floor, and when Deborln attempted to pay trlbuto to the honor and conscience of Budennyy and Voroshilov, he was shouted off the rostrum.
a number of peoplo thon spoke and disputed Deborln's statements, putting the blame for military unpreparedness
a similar transcript was published by Posev.
Stalin bearsmain responsibility Cor the tragedy. He created the situation in tho country. Stalin's biggest crime was usurpation of power and destruction of our best military and Party. Now there aro still people who say that Stalin must not be spoken of badly. They say he was not. Stalin assumed the boldness of independently leading the country and his guilt is tremendous. It is necessary to speak of this so that lt not be repeated.
This speaker then went on to discuss the trial of the Tukhachovskly-Yakir group, stating that the "fraud was prepared by the Gestapo, but the idea came from Stalin."
Another speaker provided an example of the kind of statement probably most feared by the hierarchy; hethose around Stalin, who had not stopped him.
Each is guilty, but the degree of guilt varies. One is guilty in that he decided not to say what he was thinking. The further and the higher, the greater the responsibility. At oach level rejection of truth for the sake of personal well-beingrime, and the higher the level, the more serious the crime. The main culprit is Stalin.
At the end of this meeting there was an exchange betwen Deborinan named Snegov, who said that Stalin should have been shot, not exonerated. Snegov charged that Stalin had helped Hitler in every way, especially in the invasion of Poland, because he had shot all the Polish Communists in the Soviet Union and had declared the Polish Communist Party illegal; he then stated that Stalin had betrayed all communists in all countries. At that point Deborin accused Snegov of saying things that "come from a
camp hostile tond he asked Snegov to what camp he belonged. Snegov's reply was,m fromnegov closed by stating that
you can't frighten us with camps. We will not be intimidated. The time is different, and tho past will not.
Snegov's optimism was not supported by subsequent events. Inekrich, the author of the book underwas to be expelled from the party as an example to those who do not Conform with the party line.
There were several other instances of intransigeance on the part of the liberals in In February Noviy Mir carried an article by V. Kardin which was to have repercussions for months to come. Kardin stated that sinceh. congress there hadtrong desire to "drink from the river namedut that historians and memolrealists faced numerousthe opposition of those who disagree with the restoration of historical truth. The other major liberal journal Yunost', in January, published for the first time in the Soviet Onion, the textetter of Lenin's which was written In3 and in which he upbraided Stalin for the latter's rude treatment of Nadezhda Krupskaya, and demanded either an apology from Stalin or the "severance of relations between us." The existence and contents of this letter as well as the quarrel itself had been described in an article in Pravdaut the text itself had never been published before.
There were several other anti-Stalinist articles before the congress. In March, for example, Voprosy Istorii KPSS published an article by A. Solov'yev which was very critical of2 position on the nationalities issue (which had amounted to forced incorporation). stated that this concept had "conflicted with the ideas of equality and independence of fraternal Soviet republics."
of the forced labor camps under Stalin.
He described Lenin's oppostion to this proposal, and stated that Lenin had favored strengthening both the union of republics and the sovereignty of each republic, and had warned of the dangers of extreme centralism.
Post-Congress: Pro-Stalin Line Dominates
The conservative impression given by the congress was picked up and reinforced in various articles and speeches in the spring At the Writers Union Congress inn April, union secretary Alekseyev scoffed at those who refer to the battle of Stalingrad as the battle of Volgograd, stating that there was no such battle. Similarly, he scoffed at those who try to Ignore the fact that Stalin was the supremo commander during the whole war. And Kalashnik, deputy to Yepishev at the armed forcesadministration, criticized those who somotimes place the blame for the failures and difficulties at the start of the war on one While he admitted that the lawlessness and some errorsertain negative role, he emphasized other factors such as the military and economic superiority of fascism which at that time had the benefit of tho resources of almost the entire continent, and tho fact that many Soviet troops had to be maintained in the East in case Japan entered the war.
ay an^article by Deborin, who had participated in the attack on Nekrich's book in February, appeared in Pravda. In this reviewistory of Soviet foreign poTTcy, Deborin stated that despite the desire of the Soviet Union toollectivepact with Britain and Francehe Soviet Union "was forced to accept the German proposal foron-aggression pact." He blamed this situation on the British and Americans who, he said, preferred toeal with the fascists.
In addition to articles glossing over wartimearticles restoring Stalin's image in other areas also appeared. In May Oktyabr' attacked Zalygin's Na Irtyshe for portraying collectivization one-sidedly and for exag^ gerating the influence of the cult of personality on this
great historical event. In June Izvestlya included Stalinist of those whoajor role in speeding up industrialization. In July an article in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'avorable picture of Stalin at the Potsdam negotiations in July
In July Oktyabr' carried several very hard-line articles. In one of these Strokov, in typical fashion, launched an attack on that great Khrushcheviandescribed how that insidious quality manifests itself:
ubjectivism may appear in the modernization of history andan, let us say froms, begins to thinkprophet', anticipating the party in condemning the cult of. Subjectivism can incidentally 'reappraise' crucial historicalthen it turns out that kolkhoz construction from the very beginning even to this dayfatal mistake.* Yielding to the widespread fashion"to portray mainly our failures in the first stages of the Great Patrioticwill dismally concentrate on the 'horrors' of ourvenradiose attack by the Soviet armies is undor way, and ardently will expose the commanders as 'fools* and the sinister 'osobisty* (KGB).
In the same issue, A. Dymshits attacked the concept of abstracttating that it is impossible to approach in terms of abstract humanism such policies as war communism and collectivization, because it must not be forgotten that despite hard times progress was always being made.
a favorite target of the Chinese.
Onuly Kazakhstanskaya Pravda attempted to shift blame for the excesses in "collectivization to local officials, stating that the central committee hadlocal organization against artificially forcing th rate of collectivization. This article, coming from the republic headed by Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev suggested that he probably sanctioned this approach and, therefore, felt that Brezhnev approved. 7 August Pravda article also criticized those who argue that collectivization had to bo imposed from above. It said that while the party did not wait for the developmentaterial-technical base, this base had been developed simultaneously.
Liberals Fight Back
ad halted its rehabilitation articles after Rumyantsev was replaced in
was executed8 after hishe last of the big show trials. Only two other people who were involved in any of the three big trials, A Ikram and N. Krestinskiy, have been rehabilitated.
Coincidentrief upsurge in other areas of tho cultural community,ombination of fear at the prevailing hard-line and relief because Stalin had not been formallyumber of anti-Stalin articles wero published in tho spring and summerirst of all thereharp upsurge in the rehabilitat program in May. Most interesting were two articles in Izvestiya, which had not carried rehabilitation articles since* One article stated that tho historian V. Nevskly was arrested in5 on false charges and two years later was dead: the other was about tho Uztxik leader, F.nd mentioned only his "tragic" death Other articles appeared In Literaturnaya Rosslyn and Kommunist Rstonil on purge victims, and the MiTltary TH story"Journal carried an article which stated that the' personality cult had harmed strategic theory because of the unjust reprisals against many who were best trained in military theory, including Tukhachevskiy.
For tho first time since5 Voprosy Istoriiarried items on purge victims, although it nowery conservative format. It mentioned Nevskiy and Kirov, but mentioned neither the purge of the former nor tho assassination of the latter. Furthermore, the May issue carried an article which indirectly providedfor the purges, by stating that the struggle with the 'tenemies of Leninism" had been instrumental in preventing differences within the party during the war. The article also criticized subjective errors which led to the deprecation of the party and people under the guise of criticizing the cult of personality.
'Bakinskiy Rabochiyune carried an articleormer First Secretary of Azerbaydzhan, stating that his life was "tragically cut short" 4 July article In Kommunist Tadzhikistan carried thc same wording on Rakhinbayev. In August Kommunist Armenia published an article on Marshal Gay, calling him one of the outstanding Armenian officers "ruined by slander during the years of the personality cult." The same issue published an item on the poet Vartanyan, closing with
... 7 thc storm cloud, which was hanging over many persons also touched even the Communist poet Azasi Vartanyan.
After May the rehabilitations again dropped off, although the provincial press continued to behose articles which did appear carefully skirted anyof the purges. For example, an article noting the death of R. Katanyan and signed by Anastas Mikoyan gave Katanyan's career8 with no further elaboration. Onugust Izvestiya discussed the events5nd mentioned Stalin onlyhe was held responsible for "violations of socialist legality" which did not alter the nature of the system. Onuly Izvestiya had carried an article by Konstantin Simonov in which he cited the grave harm done the military by the purges. Throughout this period Izvestiya was consistently more moderate on the Stalin and cultural issues than was Pravda,eflection of the government-partyKosygln's relative moderation compared to Brezhnev's orthodox views.
In6 the Outline History of the Moscow Party Organization was signed to the press. While the history placed tho blame for excesses in collectivization on local officials and praised0 article "Dizzy With Succoss" for having stressed the Impermissibility of using force to carry out collectivization it came downhard on the crimes of Stalin. It criticized the
crude violations of Leninist norms and principles of party life and socialist legality, the willfulness and misuse of power, and tho mass repressions against completely Innocent Soviet people, engendered by tho cult of Stalin's personality.
According to tho history, Stalin deserved authority, but afterh congress he had begun to violate Leninist norms, and at the7 plenum advanced the mistaken thesis that as socialism strengthens the class struggle intensifies:
This was saidime when the exploiting classes wore already liquidated. This assertion servedheoretical basis for Illegal repressions; against honest Soviet people. Enormous harm was caused to the party and the whole people by tha political adventurists Yezhov and Bcria, who subjected many honest officials to unjust! Hod repressions.
This particular history also trented Khrushchev fairly kindly, quoting3 spoech by him in which he stated that there would have been oven worse repressions if everyone hndthat he and others had stood up to Stalin. The history stated that in general party organs were improved in Moscow9 plenum; it was at that plenum that Khrushchev became first secretary of tho oblast. It is not at all clear who was responsible for the publication of this history. Moscow city and oblast' leaders Yegorychev and Konotop were at this timeuch harder lino than that suggested in the history. For example, whilebalanced"
view in some respects, the history cited shortcomings in the party ins, stating that there was not the proper struggle against dogmatism.
Noviy Mir continued to resist the re-Slalinizing pressure, as did several other journals. In August, for example, Noviy Mir published an article criticizing8 decision of Stalin and Vyshinskiy to declare subsidiary activities of kolhkozes illegal. This particular issue is still vory much alive in the Soviet Union now, with the pragmatists supporting such activities. Several articles critical of Stalin's handling of collectivization were published in the spring and summer. The Ukrainian Historical Journal published two on the subject, one in April and one in" "July. The articles denied that Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success" had ended excesses in the countryside,this instead to the work of Ukrainian party Ono of the articles stated that excessive haste and violations of the principle of voluntariness were among the biggest errors in the beginning of collectivization.
Revolt Of The Old Bolsheviks
In the summereeting was held at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism to discuss the third volume of the History of the CPSU, which covered the period from The meeting was chaired by Pospelov, chairman of the institute and chief editor of the volume, and was attendedroup of Old Bolsheviks. Pospelov, in opening the meeting, doscrlbed the difficulties in compiling tho volume, stating that it had been necessary to overcome the "subjective layers which had been written in the previous ten years."
Following Pospelov'sumber of Old Bolsheviks rose to criticize the history and denounce Stalin. Several speakers attacked the praise given Stalin's official history, The Short Course, in the volume. One speaker claimed that he had spoken with Brezhnev protege Trapeznikov, head of the scientific and educationalabout this innd that Trapeznikov hod
said he did not agree with the editorial board on this and that he would give corresponding instructions. The speaker stated that he would like to know why this had not been done.
Several speakers then rose to challenge Stalin's performanceevolutionary. Numerous specific charges were made, including the statement that Stalin had been no better than Trotskiy. One speaker stated that Stalin and Voroshilov had wiped out many loyal military specialists, and another said that Stalin had fabricated charges againstlosest workers. an named Snegov, possibly the samo man who had participated in the debate on the Nekrich book, launched perhaps the strongest attack;
It is said that one man cannot change as much as an entire army. Stalin proved that more could be destroyed by one man thanhole army. He destroyed millions of. Affectionate mothers are defending the child Stalin is every way. The thing boils down to the fact that some counted on havingd Congress rehabilitate Stalin. That didn't happen and it won't happen'.d Congress confirmed once again the lines ofhd Congresses. There is no return to the times of Stalin.
An old Bolshevik named Zorin attacked the methods of the meeting, charging that the previous day some young historians had not been permitted in tho room. Ho charged that documents were hidden, and said that it must behow Leninist norms had been perverted by Stalin:
Your conception is tho conception of the Chinese leaders. You stand together with the bourgeois falsifiers. The history of the Party must not justify the perversions. You wrote that Trotskiy tried to replace Leninism with Trotskiyism, but you remain quiet about Stalin's having replaced Leninism with Stalinism. Now will the young people believe you; can they believe lies?
page 58 for further discussion.
At the end of the meeting there were variousfrom those who had helped frame thc history. Bugayev, the head of the commission, said that in writing the history it was necessary to bo guided by the decisions of thecommittee on At this there were shouts thatd Congress had declaredriminal and that this congress had not been abrogated. When Pospelov spoke and tried to maintain that Stalin's role had been mostly positive during this period, he was interrupted by shouts that he stop falsifying history.* Publication of this volume of the history was very slow; it finally appeared in7 and its publication was accompaniedravda article, whose ro-Stalinlzingtone indicated that the efforts of the Old Bolsheviks had failed.
Leadership Shift Reflected in Stalin Issue
September and October, Pravda Ukrainy, which for
*Thc original account of this meeting was carried in the underground journalhose publisher Yuriy Galanskov was sentencedearsabor camp in The shortened version of the meeting was carried in the April issue ofondon-based quarterly journal of Soviet and East European studies.
several years had published neo-Stalinist articles,wo-part article by G. Kikalov which evaluated the Stalin cult more critically than it had in the past. While he made the usual calls for emphasis on positive achievements and ignored the question of excesses in collectivization and the purges, Kikalov said that sometimes "arbitrary adrain-istrativeness wasrinciples of free exchange of opinion were violated, and objective truth sufferedesult. He said that while it was only natural that people respected Stalin, who had properly fought the Trotskiyites and rightists, Stalin had begun to manifest some negativo traits; he began to think of himself asmade theoretical errors, and ignored collective leadership. It would appear that publication of this article in this neo-Stalinist journal was part of the campaign being started at this time by the Shelepin
faction. Their target was Brezhnev, who they feared was gaining too much strength and their weapon was the Stalinout the consequences that can flow from the concentration of power in the hands of one man. In general, neo-Stalinist attacks on Stalin concentrate on the abuses of collective leadership through the accumulation of power in the handsingle man, whereas moderate anti-Stalin attacks include charges of repression and criticism of the purges.
ovember Brezhnev made his adoption of the re-Stalinizing policy complete when he referred to Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary. This line was echoed rapidly by various publications. ovember an Izvestiyaof Lenin's activities in7 listed Stalin among those consulted by Lenin during the critical days of armed uprising in Moscow. The November issue of Kkonoiaicheskaya Gazeta credited Stalin as well as Lenin with authoring the regimcls7 dcclaration-of the rights of nationalities. And Komsomolskaya Pravdaovember, published oxorpts from Theodore8 book Dreiser Looks at Russia, in which he treated Stalinedicated national leader andevolutionary figure concerned with the fate of humanity and the individual.
Indicationsurther step toward the neo-Stalinist position had been taken at the5 plenum were substantiated in anuary Pravda article instructed historians to stop referring to the term period of tho cult of personality and toositive view of the Stalin era. imilar article appoared shortly thereafteroldavian paper, propagandists of the correct view to take on the cult. The trial of Daniel ond Sinyavskiy in February, as well as the arrests of several other young intellectual indicated the start of an actively repressive policy toward dissident intellectuals.
The decision to proceed with the trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and to impose harsh sentences must have been made by the Presidium, as the implications of this decision were important enough to warrant high-level consideration. Of the twelve members of the Presidium, at least seven must have supported the measure. Kosygln reportedly opposed it, Hikoyan presumably opposed it, and Podgornyy, in this subsequent statement at the congress that cultural matters should be dealt with throughindicated that he would have opposed it. Suslov, Shelepin, Mazurov, and Shelest almost certainly supported the decision. Brezhnev must therefore have given his support and have taken with him the votes of at least two of thePolyanskiy, Voronov, and Shvernik.
In the months before the'congress there werereports that Stalin would be rehabilitated, as well as various indications that this might well be true. At several prc-congress regional party meetings, high-level spokesmen indicated their supportard-line. Among those who expressed neo-Stalinist viewpoints were Masherov of Belorussia, Shelest of the Ukraine, and the Firstof Moldavia, Bodjrul, who at one time may have served under Brezhnev in Moldavia. Leningrad chief Tolstikov urged that party influence on the creative intellectuals be strengthened. The most strident tones came from Georgia, where party secretary Sturua used the termwhich under Stalin had been an anti-Semitic charge used to justify repression of the intellectuals; Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze also gave aspeech.
In addition, many articles which were written during this period, particularly on the subject' collectivization,oordinated policy ofStalin and his policies. Particularly ominous were tho Stalinist terms which woro resurrected. In addition to Sturua's uso of the termebruary article on collectivization referred favorably to Stalin's long-discredited theory of the sharpening
of the class struggle ins. And in February, the neo-Stalinist journal Oktyabr' referred to two rehabilitated purge victims as enemies of the people. This term had been condemned by Khrushchev in his secret speech.
When it opened in lated Congress proved to be somewhat anticlimactic. Stalin was notand the only remaining vestigeehabilitation plan was the symbolic restoration of the terms Politburo and General Secretary, it seems likely that the decision not to proceed with public and formal rehabilitation was based on the violent reactions to the proposal, both at home and abroad. Various communist parties had indicated disagreement and the rumors hadrightened response from Sovietroup of whom bravelyetter of protest to Drezhnev urging that Stalin not be rehabilitated.
Brozhnev emerged fromd congress as clearly the first among equals; his acquisition of the title
lxsh him as Stalin's legitimate hoir. The fact that Brezhnev was the beneficiary of the policy of re-Stalinizing supports the view that he had supported the policy.umber of speakers at the congress, including Yegorychev and Moscow Oblast' First Secretary Konotop, gave much toughor speeches than that given by Brezhnev. Thus it would seem that in spite of Brezhnev's support of much of the neo-Stalinist position, prossure for oven more repressive measures was being exerted by members of the neo-Stalinist faction.
Personnel changes made at the congress Indicated that the moderates wore continuing to lose ground. Mikoyan _nd Shvcrnik were dropped from the Politburo and Suslov associate Pelshe, the First Secretary of Latvia, was added. In addition Brezhnov-protegc Kunayev, the First Secrotary of Kazakhstan, and neo-Stalinist Masherov,
the First Secretary of Belorussia, became candidate members of the Politburo. However, Shelepin was apparently assigned responsibility for light industry at theclear set-back for him also. Thus, the net gainer was Brozhnev.
In tho months immediately after theonservative line prevailed, but the more extreme neo-Stalinist statements virtually ceased. Furthermore, while the intellectuals continued to write lettersthe Daniel-Sinyavskiy trials and the generally orthodox line, they must haveertain amount of relief at tho failure of the congress to rehabilitate Stalin. In addition, they might have felt thatt retreat by the leadership on this issue had been brought about by theirelief which might havethem to draft further protests. Thus, still frightoned by the prevailing conservative line, but hopeful that things might change, the liberalsdocided to press ahead. In May thereesurgence of rehabilitations and during the spring andumber of articles were published criticizing Stalin for his role in collectivization.
This liberal push was soon halted, however; the rehabilitations ended by summer and articles critical of Stalin were quickly outnumbered by articleshim. Ash anniversary of tho Battle of Moscow approached, Stalin's military image was further improved, and prewar miscalculations and errors wore increasingly rationalized. One exception to thisune article by Marshal Grechko,rezhnev man, in which he attacked Stalin and charged the prowar leadership, both political and military, with ineptitude. Thoof this article may have been to stress the need for-;more emphasis on contemporary military defenses; he may well have been annoyed by the adoption at the May plenum of an emormous agricultural program. Grechkn's point may have been that the military should not be slighted and his method was to show the disastrous
results of ignoring military needs.
Friction in the leadership continuedsummer. This was most interestingly demonstrateddebate which took place in the press during thefall- Several articles were written bytho importance of collective leadershipagainst the dangers inherent in the impositionrule. An article in the neo-StalinistUkrainy criticized Stalin's tendency to thinkas infallible and to ignore collectivearticles revealed the concern felt by theover their leader's decline and Brezhnev's
The apprehension of the neo-Stalinists was shared by the liberals who alsoested interest inBrezhnev from acquiring further power. During the summer two articles in Izvestiya also dofendedleadership strongly. Izvestiya, the government paper, had been consistently moderate during the period, possibly reflecting Kosygin's views. These articlescollective leadership, which used the Stalin issue, suggested that Kosygln and the moderates were also verj uneasy about Brezhnev's growing strength.
These attacks by both moderates and neo-Stalinists on Brezhnev's position, were answered fairly quickly. r?_da editorial and an article by Brezhnev protege Kunayev both emphasized the need for responsibility and discipline, and quoted Lenin to the effect that irresponsibility must not be allowed to hide under references to collectivity; Kunayev also stressed the primacy of individual leadership. Furthermore,ovember, Brezhnev pushed even further the issue of Stalin. By referring to Stalin as an "ardento reinforced his own claim to be Stalin's heir and by implication defended the concept of one-man
CPSU SKC.'BKTARI VI
Dropped in April
2. Elected in December 4.
Septemberlected inied in July
NEO-STALINIST LINE ADOPTEDh Anniversary Year7
Hard Line Dominates; Dissension Continues
Following Brezhnev's Indication in early November that he favored further restoration of Stalin'sumber of leaders rushed to follow suit. Azerbaydzhan First Secretary Akhundov, Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan, and, of course, Georgian First Secretary Mzhavnnadze all mentioned Stalin favorably in In the last two months6 both Shelest and Yegorychev once again expressed their typically neo-Stalinist views, indicating that this neo-Stalinist faction continued to push. peech at the Fifth Ukrainian Writers Congress, Shelest called for more vigilance and mllitance toward the enemy. He stated that if the enemy praised you, you must haveolitical mistake. According to Pravda Ukralny, Shelest recalled5 central committee decree criticizing Khar'kov Oblast* (Podgornyy's old domain) and Indicated that there were still shortcomingslear slap at Podgornyy. ecember Yegorychev spoke on the occasion ofh anniversary of the Battle of Moscow; he had only praise for Stalin's role.
In7 taereumber of reportscontinued friction In the Soviet leadership.1' i
that thereroup within the leadership which Included Shelepin, Suslov, and Ponomarev, and which wished to return to Stalinism. He statedtruggle for power was going on and tliat numerous compromises were being reached, such as those atd congress, but that there was no firm cohesion within the leadership.
Reports of tension between Brezhnev and Kosygin were also received early According to one, Kosygin had lost some groundisagreement. In February four Soviet musicians who were visiting the United States reported that Kosygin was an emphatic supporter of the creativeheeep appreciation of culture and was sympathetic to the problems of thedemonstrating this both vocally and through policy influence. They said that Brezhnev was just the opposite. In June thereeport that Brezhnev wanted Kosygin's Job and that Kosygin was trying to subordinate political issues to economic ones.
During this period there continued to be articles on the subject of collective leadership and criticism within the party. The most significant of thesearch article by Petrenko in Voprosy Istorii KPSS. Petrenko argued that collective leadershipcientific approach help prevent but cannot exclude serious mistakes and that Lenin hadhonest acknowledgement and correction of mistakesign of the seriousness of the party, its moral strength, and its ability to implementreorganizations. For example:
The frank, bold statement on the serious mistakes and distortions, committedesult of the personality cult of Stalin, which was made by our party at its own initiative can serve as an example ofcriticism and self-criticism.h Party Congress resolutelythese mistakes to fundamental criticism. The party began step by step to correct.
Petrenko stated that every party member has the right to criticize any other Communist no matter what position he holds, and that persons guilty of suppressing criticism should beexpelled from the party. Petrenko seemed clearly to be indicating his strong support for current criticism of party members, at any level, implying that this was directed at high-rankingBrezhnev.
However, Petrenko's concept of criticism was limited. He quoted Lenin to the effect that "if freedom of criticism means freedom to defend capitalism, then we will crushnd he stated that it was necessary toritical look at the past, but that this look should not be negative:
or instance, many historians and writers are now striving to interpretritical manner the time during which the harmful consequences of the personality cult of Stalinegative influence on the development of Soviet society. Thisecessary step in the further development of historical science and artistic creativity. The task is not easy, but is of the highest degree of importance. Incompatible with its implementation, however, are the attempts to distort our pastne-sided manner,istorted mirror, asolid chain of mistakes and shortcomings.
Thus Petrenko's article, while using the Stalin issue to illustrate the need for criticism, was conservative in eaiphasis, suggesting that it came from the neo-Stalinist faction which must have considered Itself on the defensive at this time.
Onebruary First Deputy Defense Minister Grechko, in an Izvestiya article, completely exonerated the party leadership of blame for failing to prepare for World War II. Lessear before, ine had been quite critical of prewar preparations. Now he statod that
In connection with the growing threat ofattack the party and governmentnecessary measures to furtherSoviet Army- In the91 theof the armed forces increasedtimes. The formation of mechanizeddivisions, and new artillery andunits began, butthe outbreak of the war they had notfully supplied with new
In April Grechko became USSR Minister of Defense, reportedly
with Brezhnev's backing, anday article in Pravda
he completely explained away the initial setbacks of the war:
. .ncouraged by the reactionary circles of the Western powers, Hitler at the time of the attack on the Soviet Union had enslaved most European countries and had forced their manpower and industrial resources to serve his predatory plans. esult) fascist Germany invaded the territory of our country with an emormous already mobilized andarmy. ingle state could have resisted such pressure. tate born by the Great October andeople who had liberated themselves from the fetters of capitalism were strong enough to engageinglehanded struggle againstormidable enemy andrilliant victory.
In the spring several members of the hierarchy referred in speeches to the state of culture in the Soviet Union. In his March election speech, Brezhnev cited shortcomings in creative work and stated thatxriticisra of these shortcomings was directed solely at the fruitful development of culture and that thisoncern which the party manifests unfailingly and constantly. While still more moderate than statements by neo-Stalinists such as Shelest and Yegorychov, this was Brezhnev's strongest statement up to this time on the subject of party control of the arts.
In late April two somewhat different attitudes toward cultural matters wore expressed by Kirilenko ond Yegorychev. Kirilcnko in the past had expressed both moderate and pro-Brezhnev sentiments. In6 he hadpeech in which he strongly praised Brezhnev for his wartimo activities. Now, onpril, he stated simply that Soviet literature and art were flowering. Two days later, in Pravda, Yeogrychev warned against negative attitudes and called for the strengthening of ideological work- He stated that one cannotinute forget that
communism is being built in circumstancesharp struggle of two ideologies, and that malicious attacks on the revolution and falsification of historical events had intensified. He stated that Soviet history must be evaluated correctly and he casually dismissed the crimes of the Stalin era:
Of course, now everything is clear, as they say, looking back. Apparently some things could have been done better perhaps and with less expenditure of. At ono time in our country so much was said about errors and mistakes that some people . .ould get the impression that all we have done is make. We mustore exacting attitude than ever before toward everything that is put out in publications, that is presented in exhibits, that is put out on screens and on stages of theaters and is secured Inhalls. The role of Communist creative organs grows especially in this-
Thus, whereas Kirilenko had indicated that all was well, Yegorychev was full of accusations and warnings that the party would exert even more pressure upon the intellectual This difference between these two speeches suggests that while Brezhnev and his followers supported re-Stalinizingenerally orthodox position, they were being pushed to proceed still more rapidly toward moremeasures. This pressure still being exerted by the neo-Stalinists was apparently part of their ongoing effort to gain the initiative in their struggle for the leadership.
The Fourth All-Union Writers Congress finally opened in May, having been postponed several times The party's message to tho congress demanded of literature well-developed ideological criteria, emphasized party control of the arts, and warned against western influence. Podgornyy was the highest-ranking speaker at the congress and the tone of his speech was orthodox, although he did not call for further party control of the arts or do any threatening. Ho discussed the fierce
struggle taking place between tbe two social systems and said that ideological enemies try to disarm the Soviet people. He said that loyalty to the truth of life and the indelible principles of party-mindedness enable writers to write vivid history of the great deeds of the Soviet people. On the other hand, he had only praise for Soviet writers, and said that there was every reason to expect that the writers union would continue to champion party-mindedness and people-mindedness- Thus, he seemed to be saying that any control necessary should be exercized by the writerslear difference from Yegorychev's threat that the party should do more.
peech onune Hzhavanadze called for the purification of party ranks andtalin quotation to support his point. Whether or not he was callingurge of impure party members is not certain, butall is implied, makingery threatening speech:
ould .like to draw your attention to the needost decisive struggle for the purity of party. Theof the party by unworthy members has not yet beenill cite in this connection the words. Stalin, who said that there was nothing higher than the titleember of the party, the founder and leader of which was Comrade Lenin. He also said, "It is not given to everyone toarty" This means that the door of the party must not be open to all but only to worthy people, entirely dedicated to the cause of the party.
In7 the theses of the central committee
forh anniversary were published. They contained some criticism of the cult of Stalin, although theytheears of Soviet ruleeriod of unbroken progress. To the extent that they reintroduced some criticism of the cult, however, they differed from the January central committee decreeeon preparations for the anniversary. That decree had projected an overwhelmingly favorable image of the entire course of Soviet history.
There wasnno mention of Stalin or criticism of hisnoteference to difficulties at the start of the war. Thus the return of some criticismefinite shift.*
Shelepin's Defeat and Reaction To It
In the spring and early summer7 Shelepineries of defeats in the form of personnel shifts. Goryunov, the head of TASShelepin man, was replaced in April. In the same month Grechko became Minister of Defense, replacing Malinovskiy, who had died two weeks earlier. In the intervening twoumber of reports had circulated to the effect that Shelepin was backing Ustinov, party secretary in charge of the defense industry, while Brezhnev favored Grechko. In May Shelepin's protege Semichastnyy was replaced as KGB chief byhile the KGB had had several failures right beforetthisincluding the defection of Stalin'sseems clear that the firing of Seraichastnyyv.waslow at Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction. Also in May, Pospelov was relieved as Chairman of the Institute ofosition he had held While Pospelov'sare not clear, the timing of his removal and the fact that his journal had published Petrenko's March article which was apparently ant1-Brezhnev, suggests that he was considered sympathetic to Shelepin.
page 98 for further discussion.
**In June Andropov was token off the Secretariat, butandidate member of the Politburo, the highest position heldGB chief since Beriya's doath.
A crisis in the leadership occurred following the Middle East debacle in early June. At the end of thatarty plenum was held and Brezhnev apparently reported on the situation. umber of regional leaders (all republic first secretaries except Masherov who had previously indicated his noo-Stalinist tendencies) rose
to support Brozhnev. However, Yegorychev, in his speech, reportedly attacked the regime's handling of the situation, possibly arguing that the Soviet Union should havetronger position. Yegorychev's apparent supportarder foreign policy provides an example of thebetween these policies and the Stalin issue. Yegorychev, one of the most outspoken members of the neo-Stalinist faction, was alsoery hard foreign policy.
Several days after his attack, the Moscow cityrelieved Yegorychev of his positions and appointed Viktor Grishin, who had previously headed the Soviet trade union organization. The following month Shelepin replaced Grishin as head of Soviet trade unions,urther decline in his fortunes and strongly suggesting that he was being punished along with Yegorychev* for the latter's move at the congress. At the September plenum Shelepin was released from his position on the secretariat; however, he retained bis position on the Politburo.
Following Yegorychev's removal and Shelepin'sroup of articles appeared defending collective leadership and the right of party members to criticize. These seemed clearly to be roactions to the firing of Yegorychev and indicated the degree of .support for Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction within the party apparatus. They may also have represented the foar of various second-level officials that they might meet Yegorychev's fate. For example, the first article was by Gcorgiy Popov, Yegorychev's counterpart in Leningrad The Leningrad partyhad long been hard-line; now it was clearly siding with Yegorychev and, by implication, Shelepin. Popov emphasized the right to criticize and the dangers inherent in the tendency of some leaders to suppross criticism from below and to attempt one-man leadership.
was subsequently named Deputy Minister of Tractor-Agricultural Machine Building.
The second article was by Petrenko, who hadwritten several articles defending collective leadership and the right to criticize. Tho article was published in Partiynaya Zhlzn* in September and was particularly interesting as Petrenko again raised the personality cult spectre, even though he seemed to be defendingeo-Stalinist. Petrenko stated
that the party theses issued in June had resolutelythe cult of Stalin's personality which had expressed itself in the raising up of the role of one person which, ho said, is alien to Marxism-Leninismeviation from the principle of collective leadership. He went on to defend collective leadership, and to say that the party secretary must not misuse his position. In praisinghe stated that "cases where certain officialsncorrectly take criticism from beloware far from having been eliminated."
The third article in this series also appeared in Partiynaya Zhlzn' in the same month; this too is significant aslose Shelepin associate, had been appointed chief editor of that journal in tho spring In this article Masherov, the Belorussian First Secretary anda member of Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction, quoted from Brezhnev's speech atd Congress in support of criticism and self-criticism. According to Masherov, each party member should have an opportunity to express his judgments, expose shortcomings, and work to eliminate these shortcomings. He said that an important place in the development of criticism is occupied by central committee plenums
andorrect response to criticism is
necessary. Critics must be listened to and their criticism must be followed by the correction of errors. Masherov went on to say that critics tooesponsibility and should not bo impatient, and should not engage in criticism for tho sake of criticism or in order to achiove some personal egotistical goals. However, Masherov left little doubt of where his allegiance lay. He stated that tho desireeader to guard himself from Criticism could lead toof Leninist norms and he closedase study. Heureau headho was justifiably criticized for shortcomings. But the bureau head was offended and took revenge by accusing thef irresponsibility and having him transferredower paying job.
A fourth article dealing with this subject appeared oneptember in Sovctskaya Rossiya; this was written by Oorkiy First Secretary Katushev, who has been close to
Brozhnev, and its tone was quite different from that of the other three. Katushev did not emphasize collective leadership nor did he stress the right to criticize; rather he concentrated on the need to convince through argumentation and reasonable plenties. He stated that sometimes opponents act without restraint and hurlat eachituation which results in even greater divergence of viewpoints. He stated that in order to convince someone it is neceesary to use logic andno organizational measures or administrative threats can force him to change his mind. While these words might have been directed at Brezhnev, Katushev's closing statements supported the view that the main target was Yeg&rychev and the neo-Stalinists. Katushev stated that freedom of discussion is permitted only until ais adopted, and that then that decision must be carried out. He stated thatomplication arisesan who agreedecision and voted for it, subsequently does not implementossible reference to Yegorychev's criticism of Middle East policy after the fact. Katushev closed by stating that conviction and exactingness giust be joined, and he quoted Lenin to the effect that afterattempt to convince fails, then force may be used.
It is ironic that in the first three of thesewritten in defense of Yogorychev (and by implication Shelepin as well) by his neo-Stalinist allies, liberal arguments were used. Supporttalinist position carries with it implied approval of the right of the leader to get rid of his opponents, and the need of the Shelepin group was theemphasize the rights of those not in control to attack with impunity. omewhat bizarre situation arose in which supporters of Yegorychev, one of the most fanatic re-Stalinizers, were forced to resort to arguments for collective leadership, the right of criticism, and even outright condemnation of the cult of personality, in an effort to safeguard their
appointment as Gorkiy First Secretary had been personally supervised by Brezhnev inatushev had indicated strong support for Brezhnev atd Congress and Brezhnev personally defendod Gorkiy Oblast' in7 after it had been criticized in Pravda
own survival. In defense of Brezhnev, Katushev responded with an article stating in effect that the right to argue is limited to the periodecision is made, but that then there must be unity and compliance.
Year End Atmosphere Repressive
An insight into the atmosphere prevailing at high levels of the Soviet hierarchy was providedrivate speech given by Pravda editor Zimyanin in October. Zimyanin first attackedallingchizophrenic who was obsessed with his yearsoncentration camp and tho fact that he had been "justly or unjustly" repressed. He stated that Solzhenitsyn's works were anti-Soviet and that in the old days he would have been imprisoned forcertainly they could not have beene then turned on Voznosonskiy, condemning him for his behavior in June. Voznesenskiy had complained bitterly about the cancellation of his planned trip to the United Statesetter to Pravda which found its way to theimyanin stated that he had met with Voznesenskiy, who had denied having sent the letter to the West himself. Zimyanin reported that he had told the poet that while he might get offeprimand this time if it ever happened again
. . .old him . . hat he would be
crushed . . yself would see to
it that ho did not evenet.
h anniversary of Soviet rule was celebrated in November and was unsensational. As suggested by the January decree on preparations for the anniversary and the
'The December issue of Noviy Mir had reportedly planned to carry Solzhenitsyn's novel The'Cancor Ward; when this issue finally appeared inwas not included. According to several Soviet sources, thishad been made in high political circles and haditter struggle before Christmas.
page 91 for further discussion.
theses issued in June, the entire period of Soviet history was treated overwhelmingly favorably. Even the cult, which had been condemned in the theses, was not mentioned, Brezhnev gave the major speech on this occasion. He did not mention Stalin by name, but was favorable by implication. He praisedh Congress9 and stated that the party had foreseen the possibilityilitary clash with the forces of imperialism at this time and had prepared the country and the people for defense. He admitted that there had been miscalculations, but explained these away on thc basis of the pioneering role of the Soviet regime.
During December there were various rumors that more members of the Shelepin group would lose their positions. The reports involved the chairmen of the committees on broadcasting and televisionublishingnd cultural relations with foreign countriesnd indicated that these committees would eithor be abolished or absorbed by the council of ministers. These reports were partially vindicated3 December Izvestiya announcement that Romanovskiy's committee had boon abolished. Thus, at this time, Shelepin stillto be very much on the defensive.
Pressure Increases; Protosts Continue
Following Brezhnev's favorable mention of Stalin inressure on intellectuals to conform was to increase. However, liberal intellectuals continued to make their feelings and apprehensions known. Onecember Llteraturnaya Gazetaascinating article by A. Yanov, whichtrong liberal appealruthful examination of the past. Yanov calledlear interpretation of past and present, and stated that problems needindignation. Ho argued that an examination of thc pastrerequisite to obtaining freedom from the--consequences of those mistakes:
'A nation which has forgotten its past runs the risk of experiencing itaid some philosopher.
Yanov then attacked an Oktyabr' article by K. Bukovskiy.
K. Bukovskiy writes: 'Regardless of what weorregardless of the origin of thein those years we not only did not lie, but we had no doubts about anything.* And that is all! Black on white. Butinute, esteemed Konstantin Ivanovich, how about the investigation of the mechanism of that gigantic illusion, that unprecedentedmystification, and that "hypnosis" which you yourself were talkinghas it been completed, exhausted, signed and filed away in the archives? So what gives you the right to offer your personal opinion and your personal experiences as the final result of the investigationategorical imperative? How do you know that 'we' did not doubt?
In December Soviet intellectuals again expressed their apprehension at orthodox trends, this timeetter which warned against confirmation by the Supreme Sovietecree published inxtendingf the RSFSR Criminal Code to cover literary protests. The letter was signed by nine academicians, various mombers of the intellectual community,umber of Old Bolsheviks. It stated that the signers considered the adoption of the decree unjustified and that the decree raised the danger of "violations of socialist legality" and the "creation of an atmosphere of suspicion and donunciation"eturn to Stalinist methods).
The concern expressed both by Yanov, who was in effect staling that the refusal to continue In probe the crimes of the Stalin era could welleturn to Stalinist methods, and of the intellectuals, who were protesting what they considered lo be the sign of such
Appendixor text of decreeor text oi protest.
a return, was valid. The7 openedarsh clamp-down on the dissident Intellectuals, In mid-January Yurly Galanskov. editor of Feniksecret typewritten literary-publicis't"aa arrested, as were three of his co-workers. Onanuary aheld to protest these arrests resulted in tho arrests of more people, including art critic Igor Golomshtok, who had defended Sinyavskiy at his trial, and Viktor Khaustov, who was subsequently sentenced to four yearsabor camp. Khaustov was the first person convicted and sentenced under the new section off the RSFSH Criminal Code. Others arrested at this time were tried in
Onanuary it was reported from Moscow that Aleksandr Ginsburg had been arrested for compiling the Belaya Kniga (Whiteollection of documents on the Daniel Sinyavskiy case. Ginsburg hadopy to tho Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ininsburg and Galanskov wore tried in* In March, according toumber of young people were arrested in Leningrad on charges of havingircle connected with emigre groups under the coverhilosophical circle. Posev reportedrial wan being prepared for some of these people, and thatesult of preliminary investigations,f the 2fl had been sent to psychiatric hospitals or released under surveillance.
The general tightenlngof policy was also revealed in the cloying down of two art exhibits in January. One
the items published in Feniks wan the"Discussion of tho ThlrcTVolume of thethe CPSU."
page 93 for further discussion of theSec page 94 for further discussion of this trial.anti-Soviet emigre publishing organization In WoHt Germany.
was an unofficial, unsanctioned exhibit of unorthodox art and the secondisplay of Chagal paintings.* Onanuary the Fifth Plenum of the USSR Union of Artists was held and dogmatic speeches were given by the union's acting head, F. Belashova, and by USSR Minister of Culture, Yekatorina Furtseva. Furtseva had been quite moderate in previous speeches and stood out for her moderate statement atd congress. Her shift at this time suggests that she had been given clear instructions about prevailing policy.
Campaign Against Noviy Mir
During the first few months7 there wasevidence that the liberal journal Noviy Mir was in trouble. The first indication came7 Januaryfirst major oditorical on culture inear. ersonnel change in Januaryonsistent hard-liner and formerly deputy chief of the central committee's cultural section, became editor ofepartment of Art and Literature; he may have been responsible for this editorial which criticizedviy Mir and Oktyabr', but was much more harsh in its comments on the former.
.February Llteraturnaya Gaaeta published an article which followed the line ofeditorial. This journal had reportedly been taken overogmatic group in December, although Chakovskiy remained as chief editor; in January the paporew format. In this article Noviy Mir was sharply criticized. The journal was also attackedession of the Board of the Union of Writers during this period. At the meeting various speakers pointed out the "substantial ideological and artistic errors, over-simplification, and shortcomings in the journal's activities."
arch article by Tvardovskiy in Llteraturnaya Gazeta revealed, however, that he would not give In easily.
. Jin February three of the artists who had participated in tho exhibit were calledeeting of their combine and "condemned."
He stated that "fle are attentive and will be attentive in the future tout only if this criticism
proceeds from the lofty concepts of the literatureocialist society, worthy of the groat traditions of Russian realism bequeathed by $he classics.
His omission of the adjective "socialist" modifying "realism" indicated his continued opposition to the official line. In March, while in Italyriters meeting, Tvardovskiy stated that the concept of realism did not need to be explained by adjectives.
Publication of Noviy Mir was held up during the early parturing January there were reports that the central committee was trying to force changes in the editorial board by removing A. Dementyev and B. Zaks, two assistant editors upon whom Tvardovskiy reportedly relied heavily. Tho party central apparatus was said to be reluctant tocandal but determined to weaken Tvardovskiy. In March, when tho first issue of the journal finally appeared, Dementyev and Zaks had been removed from the board and three new members had been added. The two removed were definitely liberals; the leanings of the new three was less clear.
In May Yunost* published two poems by Tvardovskiy, both applicable to freedom and the attacks made against him. The first read
I myself inquire and find All my ownemember themiven libretto. There is norown man-In laughable self-defense. But please, don't hang on my soul. Don't breath down my neck.
In the second, more allegorical poem, Tvardovskiy described histhe fir trees in theit is
the legend that any baby born there will not be touched by the wolves [read censors],
Alas, ignoring that special birthright
Which the forest grants.
With what gusto.
With how much fury
The wolves do eat me.
All kinds of them eat,
till come from under the fir tree: They have not eaten me up.
In spite of Tvardovskiy's appeals and claims that he had not been "eatene had clearly been weakened during the early part
Liberal Efforts Rebuffed
In7 the Ukrainian Komsomol's literary, socio-political journal, Dnipro, published an article by its editor-in-chief Yuriy Mushketlk, He described the literary upsurge following7 revolution, and said that it was followed by
watchfulness, silence and decline, empty proclaiming, searching for deviations and isms, along with singlemindedness and vulgarization. There were fewer and fewer theoretical and debating articles. Prose was petty and poetry was shrieking. The lively spurt caused by the wave of general popular patriotism after tho war, and again the clogging up of the literary channel. And finally, the dethroning of the cult ofthe revival of certain earlier violated principles of Soviet and party life and tho further development of democracy, whichide road for the development of Soviet literature .
Dnlpro was quickly rebuffed for publishing such an article. Onebruary Molodoy Ukrainy attacked the journal and said that it had been criticized by the Ukrainian Komsomol central committee.
Another exampleepublic Journal being censured is that of Zvezda Yostoka. the organ of the Uzbek Union of Writers. Io its first four issues7 the Journalumber of vorks by semi-controversial authors. In one of these Konstantln Slinonov reviewed For Whom the Bell Tolls, and alluded to the purges. The TTTthissues of the Journal did not carry any such works in spite of promises that it would do so, and in August, the editor V. Kostyria, was reportedly dismissed.
In April and Uay# in the weeks preceding the Fourth Writers Congress, the efforts by the liberals, toomeback were overshadowed by the orthodox articlesublished. Onpril an editorial in Llteraturnaya Gazetatrong demand for unity and central control over the arts. It used as its referenceh anniversary of the party resolution whioh banned all independent literary organizations and forced writersingle, tightly-controlled writers union. Similarly, Pravda published two threatening articles on the eve of the congress. One implied that those who did not respond properly to criticism might well lose their jobs, and the other, one of whose authors was Kunitsyn, called for more aggressive criticism of incorrect concepts. This article proposed thc establishment of an institution of "readers*o help thosein publishing works to deepen the educational influence of literature and art; in other words theythe establishment of still another control organization to weed out "incorrect concepts."
Originally scheduled for the springhe Fourth Writers Congress had been postponed twice before it finally opened in late According to several reports the congress had been put off because of dissidence and "hundreds" of writers had been arrested in Leningrad and Kiev in the weeks before the congress. An orthodox line dominated at the congress and the most interesting
opxsode occurred behind the scenes. Aleksandr Solzhenitsynetter to the delegates strongly condemning censorship in the Soviet Onion and describing his own persecution at the hands of the authorities.* In addition,ntellectualsetition calling for discussion of Solzhenitsyn's letter.
Solzhenitsyn wasanui me impress
and threatened with expulsion from the union if he did not mend his ways. In7etter sent by an anonymous person in Moscow, stating that even Solzhenitsyn himself had given up hope of being published.
Solzhenitsyn's letter was followed In the early summer7umber of protests, concerning censorship. The intellectuals had undoubtedly boen frightened by increasing threats of tightened control as well as by the actual clamp-down on liberal journals and dissident intellectuals, it seems likely that they were encouraged to mount their attack when they did because of the defeat of Shelepin's noo-Stalinist faction in the spring and early summer.
Oncheduled trip to New York by the poet Andrey Voznesenskiy was suddenly cancelled. Voznesenskiy obviously angry,etter to Pravda in which hethe "atmosphere of blackmail, confusion, and provocation" in which he had been living. opy of this letter was sent to the West and printed in the New York Times, uly Voznesenskiy appeared atTheater andoem attacking censorship; two days later he was reportedly calledpecial meeting of the Board of the Union of Writers and put under pressure to withdraw tho comments in his letter and poom. He refused to do so even though ho was censured and threatened with expulsion from the
Appendixuarterly Journal of Posev.Appendixlso page 83 for Voznesenskiy's reportedwith Zimyanin, who reportedly threatened him if he did not conform.
Onune Komsomolskaya Pravda carried an article by Pravda correspondent Burlatsklyoner secretary of the Komsomol Karpinskly. These two men attackedin the theater and strongly Implied their support of freedom to criticize. Thoy attacked those who avoidcertain phenomena because It might put the system In an unfavorable light, stating that these pooplo sacrifice real politicalImprovement of Sovlotfor tho sake of Improperly understood propaganda interosts. Thoy argued that art is obligated to intrude into life and touch all its aspects. They said that Lenin's formula for guiding creative work
definitelyecret and narrow departmental approach which is never guaranteedubjective.
Publication of this liberal article in tho organ of tho Komsomol, an organization headed by Shelepin protege Sergey Pavlov indicates that the neo-Stalinist faction had allied itself with the liberals on the tesuo ofas woll as on tho subject of the right to criticize. The publication of this article coincided with the publication of three articles defending collective leadership and freedom to criticize which wore published following Yegorychev's dismissal and Shelepin's setback.
This particular article was decisively rebuffedeek after Its publication. uly Komsomolskaya Pravda Itself, in an editorial, rejected the article, calling lt erroneous and stating that it contradicted party principles.
The Komsomol Central Committee having examined tho articlo . . as found that the publication of the articlorude ideological mistake on the part of the Komsomolskaya Pravda editorial board.
Thu oditorial thon quoted Brezhnev's comments on party guidance of the arts, Bade atd Congress. Thus, this attempt to challenge Brezhnev, made in the form of
a liberal article but apparently sanctioned by the neo-Stalinists, was rejected immediately, undoubtedly at the bidding of high-level officials.
Year Ends With Harsh Policy
In the fall7 the ominous tendencies continuod. Onugust Vladimir Bukovskiy and two others arrested In January for protesting tho arrests of Galanskov and his co-workers wont on trial. Bukovskiy, who said he hadthe demonstration was sentenced to three years and tho two others to ono year each. Bukovskiy did not pload guilty at his trial, although the Soviet press indicated that ho had; on the contrary hepirited plea in his own behalf and attacked tho manner in which the whole trial had been conducted. The text of his plea was attachedetter sent by Pavel Lltvinov to four Soviet newspapers, as well as to the French and Italian party papers. In his letter Litvinov, the grandson of Maxim Litvinovhysicist,arning he had received from the KGB not to^become involved in any reporting on tho Bukovskiy trial. Litvinov defied this order and has subsequently participated in the drafting of several protests.
Evidence of further pressure being exerted on the intellectuals carao from several sources. Oneptember the head of Moscow City party's cultural section, Solovyeva, called for more control by theater party organizations over theater repertories;
There are cases whan it is necessary for all the members of the party bureau to convince one dlroctor or another that he must review his selection of plays or his outline and at times evenerformer.
Inoint plenum of tho boards of cultural unions and organizations of the USSR and RSFSR was held,ery dogmatic line dominated. Ye. Belashova stated that the artist mustide in the struggle for ideologies and that "even silence can be
"See Appendix Iten G.
h anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution came and went in November and there was no indication that the prevailing repressive line would lift. In fact, if there was any shift in policy line in the months after the anniversary, it wastill more orthodox line. In October and November Oktyabr'ovel by Kochetov in which Stalin was viewedery positive, though fairly minor, figure and the use of terror received implied approval.
Even more threatening than orthodox articles, however,
were tho continuing arrests and trials of intellectuals. In mid-December thereeport that four people were being tried in Leningrad on the serious charge of having participated in an armed terrorist network trying tothe Soviet state. This trial had reportedly grown out of the arrest in7 ofntellectualswith the philosophy department at the University of Leningrad. Many rumors circulated in Moscow, including the report that similar groups had been discovered in the Ukraine and another that the case was so serious that the central committee had met to consider it. Other reported trials included one involving six youths in Moscow charged with distributing anti-Soviet leaflets and onetudent charged with writing an allegedly anti-Soviet film script. eport smuggled to the West in8 contained charges madekrainian journalist, Vyacheslav Chornovil, that harsh repressions were taking placo in the Ukraine. Chornovil, who was sentenced toonthsabor camp inad addressed his lottor to Shelest. In it he described the KGBof harrassment and extracting confessions; he alsoumber of arrests and trials of intellectuals In the Ukraine during6 and
In8 the four individuals arrested the previousGalanskov, Dobrovolskiy, and Lashkova, went on trial. In connection with this particular case,several petitions were reportedly circulated. The first was said to be signed byembers of the intellectual community and was sont to the Procurator General; it requested assurances that the trial would be
public. second petition was reportedly signed byntellectuals and charged that the long imprisonment of the four persons without trial was in violation of the criminal code of the Soviet Union. In addition, Litvinov and the wife of the imprisoned author, Yuriy Daniel denounced the trialetter which was published in the West.* In what they termed an appeal to world opinion, they condemned the manner In which the trial had been held andew trial. Litvinov was subsequently fired from his positionhysics instructor. Two other petitions were reportedly circulated with respect to this trial; one was an appeal byntellectuals and theetition ofho wished to appear as defense witnesses. In December there were reports of another petition, this one signedoscow intellectuals who urgedaw be adopted which would implement the constitution's pledge of freedom of the press. All of these pleas were to no avail; the trial of the four was not public and heavy sentences were imposed. Ginzburg and Galanskov received seven and five year sentencesDobrovolskiy, who turned state's evidence,wo-year sentence, and Lashkova, who had merely typed for the group,ne-year sentence.
Thus, during tho early part8 there wasevidenceery harsh policyharshest policy since the death ofthat repression of intellectuals who dared to voice opinions which deviated from the party line would continue. Official sanction was put on this policy with the central committee resolution passed at the8 plenum; this resolution calledurther tightening of ideological pressure.
Stalin Era Whitewashed
The continued shift toward more and more orthodox views, revealod in the arrests of dissident intellectuals inas also reflected in tho now extremes reached in oxtolltng the Stalin era. In November and December, on tho eve of the anniversary of the Battle of Moscow, numerous articles and speeches wore published
praising Stalin for his leadership at this time of crisis.anuary article in Molodaya Gvardlya, N. Mikhaylov, possibly the chairman of the State Committee for Publishinghelepin protege, described Komsomol unity during the war and attributed this to Stalin's inspiring leadership. Mikhaylov stated that Stalin must have known of Hitler's designs, for with his experience and hatred of fascism he would not have treated reports of the planned attack But he also knew what Hitler's strength was, so he tried up until the last minute to ward off the approaching war and buy time for preparations. He stated that Stalin withstood all pressures because he had great ideological conviction, implicit faith inarty, and recognition of the party's authority.
Aanuary broadcast over Moscow Domestic Service on the years31 ignored any errors or problems of the period, and concentrated on praising industrial and agricultural growth. it paid tribute tos well as to7 elections which saw avictory" for the block of party and non-party candidates. It praisod h party congress9 for its approval of the war prevention policy of thelt totally ignored the purges.
In March Kommunist Moldavlya urged that the positive achievements of collectivization be stressed andest German authoruphemism for Soviet writers who make the same point) who
attempts to impose on the reader the current but absolutely groundless thesis prevalent in bourgools historiography concerning the forcible nature of collectivization .
Anday Pravda published an articleover the disagreement between Stalin and Lenin
the subject of nationalities
n the basis of the report. Stalin, the conferenceesolution signed by V. I. Lenin, on the nationalities
question. The Bolshevik Party came forth decisively in favor of meeting the demands of the working people of all oppressed nations, recognizing their right to self-dotermination, including separation and formation of an independent state.
Onay Krasnaya Zvezda criticized various World War II memoirs, and charged that personal memoirs should not contradict the "truth of history." It attacked those who criticize General Headquarters for its conduct of the war, stating that
The best evidence of the fact that the General Headquarters and its working organ, the General Staff, skillfully directed the operations of the Soviet troops is the victorious outcome of the war. The General Headquarters included prominent commanders and party and state leaders. The Supreme. Stalin, displayed groat firmness; his leadership of tho military operations was on the whole correct, and his merits in this field were numerous.
In this early parthereirtual suspension of any references to the purges andof purge victims. Even the provincial papers halted publication of such articles with very few exceptions. Interestingly, those references which did appear seemed to involve the military. For example, in February the Armenian paper Kommunisteries of articles on Marshal Gay and there was also apparently ameeting held for Gay in which Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan participated. Onarch Krasnaya Zvezdaan article by Marshal Vasilyevskiy in which'he referred to Tukhachevskiy as an outstanding theorist and leader. Both Tukhachevskiy and Gay had been proponents ofof Soviet forces before their purges, and it is possible that these particular rehabilitations were being pushed by those who wished more emphasis to be put on modernization of Soviet armed forces. *
In7 the central committee Issued its theses on the eve ofh annivorsary of the revolution. On the subject of war preparations, the theses gave official sanction to the complete ignoring of prewar miscalculations and errors. The theses stated that the Soviet Union had done all it could toystem of collectiveIn Europe, but that these efforts were rebuffed by the men of Munich who preferred an alliance with Hitler. In this vory complex situation the Soviet Union had been forced toonaggression pact with Hitler, thereby gaining time to prepare. Even though the party and govornmont took steps to strengthen defenses lt was impossible to prevent war. The theses also praisedh party congross resolution which it said had condomned the Stalin personality cult; the cult, according to the theses, had expressedin tbe glorification of tho role of one man, departures from tho Leninist princlplo of collective leadership,repression, and other violations of socialist legality. This reference is very low key, as tho resolution passed byh Congress was relatively mild; the strong anti-Stalin element at the congross was Khrushchev's "secret speech."
Wartime Errors Erased
Onuly tho now First Deputy Minister of Defonse, Yakubovskiy, wrote an article for Krasnaya Zvezda which successfully passed ovor whatever errors there might have been in prewar preparations. He praised measures taken to train military personnel and did not even make an oblique reference to tho purges. He then explained why the Soviet Union had suffered some dofoats in the early singes of the war:
It was not possible, however, to fully implement the planned program of preparing the armed forces for the war. Specifically, the rearmament of the ground forces with new military technical equipment and tbe formation of mochanized groups of units remained unfinished. This explains the
difficulties encountered by our troops in the first period of the Great Fatherland.
mid-July it was reported that Nekrich, author of the controversial bookhich had been published5 and discussedtormy meeting oarlyad been expelled from the party. Thus, Nekrich became the scapegoat for past "errors" in analysis of prewarand Stalin's wartime role, and an example to those who might wish to writeimilar vein. It was also reported that the editor who had approved the publication ofook had been fired. In September Voprosy Istorii KPSS followed this with an attack on Nekrich by Deborin,"who had also participated in the6 meeting held toNekrich's book.* Deborin claimed that the book had been written in the spirit of bourgeois historiography. He then proceeded to defend war preparations and the leadership of the party during the war; he asserted that the Soviet Union had signed tho Ribbentrop Pact only when it was clear that an anti-Nazi alliance was impossible. Deborin denied that preparations for an attack had not been made and that the soviet leadership had underestimated tho danger of war.
Union in the
Onrasnaya Zvezda article by Major General Zhilin calledew official wartime history to correct the "subjective" view of Stalin's leadership. He stated that bourgeois falsifiers must bethey try to discredit the foreign policy of tho Soviet
prewar years and conceal the fact that this
policy was directed at providing collective security in Europe and restraining aggressive forces. He called for criticism of subjective statements made by some memoirists who mistakenly evaluate the readiness of the Soviet Union to repulse aggression in thes and wronglyevents at the start of the war. '
ecember article in Krasnaya Zvezda completed the transitionositive view of Stalin as prewar and wartime leader:
Historical experience obviously confirms tho correctness of the military policy of the party at all stages of socialistand the decisive significance of the prewar five-year plans for the defense potential of the country. This experience rejects the formerly existing anti-historic views on alleged miscalculations of the Communist Party and Soviet government in the creation of military-economic potential. In any case, inhort time the military-industrial base of the USSR simply could not reach the volume of the military-industrial base of fascist Germany, which as early3 began to actively reorganize its economy for war purposes and laterIts military-economic potential by making use of the heavy industry of the European states it had occupied.
The treacherous attack on the Soviet Union by fascist Germany, which had previously mobilized its first-class equipped war machinery, as wellertainin the measures taken by our country to prepare itself to repel an aggression, allowed the Hitlerite army, despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, to rapidly penetrate into the USSR #J. . .
Thus all that remains of previous criticisms of the handling of the prewar situation, is the statement that thereertain incompleteness in the measures taken to repel aggression.
Collectivization Smoothed Over
In August several articles were published on the period of collectivization- The first was by Brezhnev-protege Trapeznikov and appeared in Pravdaugust,
Trapeznikov acknowledged that there were complications and difficulties in collectivization, which were the result of the fact that this policy was carried outulturally backward and widely dispersed peasant population. He stated that this had been one of tho "most brilliant periods" in Soviet history and that collectivization had been an historical necessity. However, he said that there had been no way of knowing exactly what stages had to be gone through, how fast to go, and exactly what economic forms the new type of enterprise would take.
It must be saidonsiderable mess and confusions prevailed in this respect. There were elements in the party which, engaging in haro-brained schemes for the selection of forms of collective economy, tried at first to create various types of giganticorder to propagate communes, or to design agro-cities without consideration for the objective conditions and the practical experience of the masses.
The agro-gorod concept described by Trapeznikov had been supported by Khrushchev; thus Trapeznikov had absolved Stalin and the party of any guilt and had shifted blame
for confusion in agriculture to Khrushchev, implicating at the same time those who also had supported such polici Podgornyy, Polyanskiy9 and, more recently the Belorussians.
August article in Pravda Ukralny by A. Yevdoki-mov continued the line found in Trapeznikov's article, and criticized the ideologists of anti-communism for treating collectivization as though it had been implemented contrary to Leninist principles. He then discussed the complexity of the development of socialist agriculture and some of the problems encountered. In particular, he stated that the defense of the country during the war had placed demands on heavy industry, thus retarding tho strength of the material-technical base of agriculture. There was no mention of Stalin, and no indication that incorrect orders from the center had created difficulties in collectivization.
Stalin's Revolutionary Role Praised
ugust several articles wereh anniversary of the Sixth Partyravda article by first deputy editor Zarodov stated that tbe report to the central committee, delivered by Stalin and Sverdlov, hadright, vigqrous picture of the development of the revolution. An article published in Belorussia also mentioned Stalin's report and noted that he wasember of the central committee. The article listed several delegates who had wavered on the subject of Lenin's court appearance, but Stalin was not included on the list. According to this article, Stalin did make one error, but the error is minimized. ime when Lenin was saying that the situation was fully defined and power was in the hands of the counter-revolutionary military, Stalin stated that "it was still not clear in whose hands the power is." The article makes it clear that the situation had, in fact, only been defined foronth. An October article in Pravda discussed the7 adoptionesolution on armed uprising, and listed Stalin among those who had supported Lenin.
In October the third volume of the History of the CPSU. which had causeduror in the summeras finally published. It was accompanied onctoberravda editorial which blasted previous one-sidedness and serious errors which had been made in theof the early struggle of the party; these errors had involved viewing these struggles in terms of the blunders made by people involved in them. While the editorial did not mention Stalin by name he was obviously tho person now being exonerated.
Onctober the Georgian paper Zarya Vostoka published an article on the uprisings in Georgia in thes. In discussing Or&zhonlkidze's handling of the uprising, the article referred constantly to telegrams sent to Lenin and Stalin; the two names are alwaystogether. Then, according to the article, in0 Stalin was sent to study and clean up the situation in Georgia. After establishing Communist power
in that state, the article stated, the party's Orgburoecree at Stalin's suggestion calling for the immediate dispatch of cadres to Georgia.
Several feeble efforts wore made by the moderates to combat the steadily increasing orthodox pressure, but these efforts were doomed to failure. The rehabilitation program was virtually ended, but there were several commemora tive meetings held. In Augusteeting was held for ran Rudzutak, who had died in the purgesikoyan spoke at this meeting as did various Latvian veterans of the revolution.' Inimilar meeting was held for another of Statlin's victims, Postyshev; press coverage of both these meetings was, however, minimal.
Inar film basedcenario by Kon-stantin Simonov opened in Moscow. Among the subjectsiscussed in the movie were the lack of preparedness for the war, Stalin's refusal to believe that the Germans would attack, and the catastrophic effect of the purges on the Soviet high command. According to one report this film had encountered fierce opposition before it was finally released; howovor, the fact that it was released indicated that there was still some supportoderate position in high places.
Another interesting deviation from the general trend was the passage in Septemberecroe exonerating the Tatars of tho charge of collaborating with the fascists. The decree stated that the accusation made4 had been without foundation and had groundlessly attributed this crlmo to the whole Tatar population. This decree
December Mikoyan again demonstrated his sympathy for the liberals when heerformance of the contro-vorsail piay "Bolsheviki" at the Sovremennik Theater andemonstrative show of approval. This play delivered the message that the start of Red Terror during the Olvil War hadangerous step.
was passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of which Podgornyy is chairman. However, in spite of this rehabilitation there was apparently little change in the situation of the Tatars. etition sent to the West in8 included the charge that although the Tatars had been officially rehabilitated, they still could not return to their homeland.
Onecember one of the most Interesting turn arounds of this period occurred. Pravda Ukrainy, which had been one of the most outspoken of the neo-Stalinist journals,ehabilitation. Onh. birthday of V.ormer member of the Military Council in Leningrad, the paper stated that he had been slanderedemoved from his Job,ear later was dead. The use by this paperehabilitation mighturther indication of the fear of the neo-Stalinists in the wake of the Yegdrychev purge, that they were now in danger of being repressed by Brezhnev.
A rigid, orthodox line dominated the first six monthsn spite of reports of dissension within the leadership. While there may well have beenonservative-orthodox faction, led by Brezhnev andstrongly influenced by Suslov, was strong enough to enforce its line. This line was demonstrated in the arrestsumber of intellectuals early in January and by largo-scale arrests in the Ukraine and Leningrad on the eve of the Fourth Writers Congress. The leaders in these two areas, Shelest and Tolstikov, had been among the most outspoken proponents of the neo-Stalinist line; theof Intellectuals in their regions demonstrates tho direct relationship between an expressod orthodox viewpoint and direct administrative action.
The few liberal articles which were published during this period were met with fairly swift punishment,tho orthodox solution of dealing withthrough administrative action. The most
notable oxample of this was the harrassmont of Noviy Mir which culminated in the replacement of two key members of that journal's editorial board. Another instance was the expulsion of Nekrich from the party for havingook5 critical of the handling of prewar His expulsionlear warning to othors who might bo tompted to indulge in historical objectivity.
Tho orthodox line was also reflected In thehalt in the rehabilitation program; tho only exception was the publication of several articles on purged military leadors Cay and Tukhachevskiy. Both of these men had been sqpportors of modernization of the Sovlot armed forces Ins, and these articles might have been backed by contemporary supporters of increased emphasisodernized military establishment. Articles which appeared during this period concerning Stalin's wartime rolo and his actionsevolutionary and loader seemed to exonorate him completely of any mistakes.
Signs of dissension within the leadership continued. Several more articles were published defending tho need for collective leadership. One of theso, by Petrenko, defonded collective leadership and also called for the right of criticism and self-criticism within tho party. Tho tone of Pctrenko's article was quite hard-line, however, suggesting that the was speaking for the neo-Stallnlsts rather than the liberals. He usod the cult of personality to illustrate the evils of one-manthe first time the neo-Stalinists had resortod to this device.
Having effectively beaten down tho modoratos, Brezhnev was now ready toajor campaign against Shelepin, and during the spring and summer the latter's strength was gradually whittled away. In April his protege Goryunov was relieved as head of TASS, and in May Semichastnyy was replaced as KGB chief. Following the Middle East crisis and his apparent chnllongo to the Uadership on its handling of that situation, Yegorychev, the most outspoken member of the neo-Stallnist ractlon, was fired as Moscow City boss. inal blow, Shelepin
was appointed bead of the Soviet trade union organization and removed from the party secretariat.
In the wake of these major setbacks for the neo-Stalinist faction, several articles appeared defending collective leadership and the right of party membetsegorychev) to express criticism of their superiorsrezhnev) even at the highest party levels. These articles seemed clearly aimed at Brezhnev, and came in at least two instances from members of the neo-Stalinist camp. The adoption by this faction of an anti-Stalin line suggested real desperation on their part; their use of this line was clearlyattempt to stave off further setbacks. Another apparent shift was the publication of aby the neo-Stalinist journal Pravda Ukrainy in late December. Having previously backed the halt in theprogram as parteneral re-Stalinizing, they now apparently feared that they themselves were in danger of being purged and therefore were now identifying with the purge victims rather than with Stalin,
That Shelepin's defeat and that of various of his neo-Stalinist backers did notorresponding defeat for their point of view was revealed almost Encouraged by Shelepin's defeat, the liberal intellectuals published several articles at the end of June in which they criticized censorship and seemed to urge its abolition. These articles wero quickly suppressed, The continuationarsh policy was also reflected in the continuation of the arrests and trials of dissident intellectuals and in the favorable treatment Stalin and his policies continued to receive. Thus, it was clear that an orthodox lino, favored by Brezhnev, still domina ted.
APPENDIX A: TEXT OF APPEAL AGAINST STALIN'S REHABILITATION
Respected Leonid Ilich:
Tendencies have appeared lately in some public speeches and articles in our press which are in fact directedartial or indirect rehabilitation of Stalin. We do not know how firmly these tendencies are grounded, but they manifest themselves ever more frequently as the XXIII Party Congress draws nearer. However, even if it isatterartial revision of the decisions of the XX and XXII Party Congresses, this causes deep apprehension. We think it our duty to inform you about our opinion in this matter.
Until now we have not been awareingle fact,ingle argument which would permit us to thinkondemnation of the personality cult was wrong in any of its respects. On the contrary, it is difficult to doubtarge part of striking, of truly horrifying facts about Stalin's crimes has not yet been made public. These facts would confirm the absolute correctness of the decisions of both Party Congresses.
There is something else as well. We believe that any attempt to whitewash Stalinanger of serious dissonsions within Soviet society. Stalin is responsible not only for the destruction of countless innocent people, for our unpreparedness for the war,eparture from the Leninist norms of party and state life. His crimes and unjust deeds also distorted the idea of Communism to such an extent that our people will never forgive him for this. Our people will notand will not acceptartial departure from the decisions on the personality cult. No one will be able to obliterate these decisions from its consciousness and memory. Any attempt to do so will lead only toand disarray in the broadest circles. We arefor instance, that this would cause great unrest among the intelligentsia and would seriously complicate the moods of our youth. Like the whole of the Soviet
public we are worried about the young people. Noor articles will make people believe in Stalin again on the contrary, they will simply create disorder and anger. To undertake anything like this is dangerous,into account the complex economic and politicalof our country.
We also see another danger as equally serious. The question of Stalin's rehabilitation concerns not only home, but also international politics. Any step towards his rehabilitation would undoubtedlyhreatew split in the ranks of the world Communist movement, this time between ourselves and the Communists of the West They would assess this stepurrender to the Chinese, to which they would never agree. Thisactor of exceptional importance which we cannot write off. In the time when we are threatened, on the one hand, by ever more active American imperialists and West German revanchists and, on the other, by the leaders of the Communist Party of China, it would be extromely unwise toift or even complications with the fraternal parties in the West.
So as not to claim your attention for too long we limit ourselves to mentioning only the most substantial arguments against any rehabilitation of Stalin, first and foremost concerning the danger of the two-way split. We do not even speak about the great complications which any departure from the decisions of tho XX Party Congress would bring upon the international contacts of ourother things upon its struggle for peace and international cooperation. All that has been achieved so far would be endangered.
We could not but write you about our thoughts. It is quite clearecision of the Central Committoo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on thiscannot be regardedoutine one, taken in the general course of work. In either case lt will haveimportance for the destinies of our country. Wc hope that this will be taken into account.
APPENDIX B: TEXT OF SOVIET WRITERS' PETITION TO KREMLIN
To the Presidium ofongress of the Soviet Communist
To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.
We, the undersigned group of Moscow writers,you to grant us permission to stand surety for the recently sentenced writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. We believe that this would be an act of both wisdom and humanity.
Although we do not approve the means by which these writers published their work abroad, we cannot accept the view that their motives were in any way anti-Soviet, which alone could have justified the severity of the sentence. The prosecution failed to prove tho existence ofotive.
At the same time, the condemnation of writers for the writing of satirical works creates an extremelyprecedent and threatens to hold up the progress of Soviet culture. Neither learning nor art can exist if neither paradoxical ideas can be expressed nor hyperbolic images be used as an artistic device. In our complex situation today, we need more freedom for artisticand certainly not its condemnation. From thisthe trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel has already caused us more harm than did any of their mistakes
Sinyavsky and Daniel are gifted men who should be given the chance to make up for their lack of political prudence and tact. If they were released on our surety and remained in touch with Soviet society, they would soon
realize their Mistakes and redeem thep by the artistic and ideological value of the new literary works thoy would create.
We beg you, therefore, to release Andrei Slnyavasky and Yuli Daniel on our surety.
This would be an act dictated by the interests of our country, the Interests of the world and those of the world Communist movement.
APPENDIX C: TEXTECREE ISSUED BY THE PRESIDIUM OK THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE RSFSR (RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC] ONEPTEMBER, ENTITLED "ON THE ENTRY OF ATO THE PENAL CODE OF THE6
Chapter IX "Crimes Against the Administrative Order" in the Penal Code of the RSFSR is herebybysub-sectionhich contain the following provisions:
Article Spreading scientificallyfabrications which discredit the Soviet system of government and social order: systematic dissemination, in verbal form, of scientifically slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet system of government and the Soviet social order, as well as preparation of writings or printed products of the same content and their dis-semination'in any form shall be punished with deprivation of freedom upears or with corrective labor terms up to one year orine upubles.
Article Defamation of the coat of arms of the state or of tho national flag: defamation of the government coat of arms or the flag of the USSR, the RSFSR, or any of the other Union Republics shall beby imprisonment of upears, corrective labor service up to one year,ine of up toubles.
Article Staging group actions which violate public order or active participation in such actions: the staging of group actions or active participation in such actions, which violate public ordererious manner or which are accompanied by open failure to comply with tho legal requests of agents [representatives] of the government, or which interfere with the activities of the transportation system, of government and community (social] agencies or enterprises, shall be punished with imprisonment of upears or corrective labor service up to one yearine of upubles.
APPENDIX D: PETITION AGAINST EXTENSION OF7
Copies to the Political Bureau of the CPSU; to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR; to the Attorney General of the USSR. Comrade Deputies:
roup of Soviet citizens, consider it to be our duty to express our attitude toward the6 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of tho RSFSR "On the Entryupplement to the Penal Code of the RSFSR."
In our opinion, the additions to1 andof the Penal Code of the RSFSR, have noin the political reality of our land. Tho passage of such laws, at this time, seems to us to be anact which conjures up the danger of false judicial verdicts, the violation of socialist Justice, and the creation of an atmosphere of suspicions and denunciations. Articlefacilitates subjective evaluations and arbitrary interpretations of statements as scientific slander against the Soviet system of government and social order.
We are convinced that Articleandare in conflict with the Leninist principles of socialist democracy. If the Plenum of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR should confirm these Articles, they might become an obstacle on the road to the Implementation of theguaranteed iin the USSR constitution.
The signers include the following: Academician Asturov, biologists; academician Zeldovich, physicist; academician Knunyants, chomist; academician Leontovich, physicist, Lenin Prize winner; academician Sakharov,academician Skazkin, historian; academician Tamm. physicist; academician Engelgardt, biochemist; author
Kaverln; author Nekrasov; author Dombrovskiy; author Voynovich; composer Shostakovich; movie director Romm.
This letter was also signedroup of old Bolsheviks and others, givingotalome of the signatures being Illegible. Tho document was received by the Supreme Sovietnd
APPENDIX E: TEXT OF SOLZHENITSYN LETTER PROTESTING CENSORSHIP, May7
To the presidium and the delegates of the congress to members of the Union of Soviet Writers, to the editors of literary newspapers and magazines:
The oppression, no longer tolerable, that our literature has been enduring froa censorship for decades and that the Union of Writers cannot accept any further.
This censorship under the obscuring label of Glavlit [Soviet censorshipot provided for by theand therefore illegal and nowhere publicly labeled as such, isoke on our literature and gives people who are unvorsed In literature arbitraryover writers.
A survival of tho Middle Ages, censorship managos in Methuselah-like fashion to drag out its existencetot century. Of fleeting significance, it attempts to appropriate unto itself the role of unfleet-ing time of separating the good books from the bad.
Our writers are not supposod to bave the right, they are not endowed with the right, to express their anticipatory judgments about the moral life of man and society, or to explain in their own way the social problems or the historical experience that has been so deeply felt in our country.
Works that might have expressed the matureof the people, that might have timely and salutary influence on the realm of the spirit or onocial conscience are prohibited or dlstortod by censorship on the basis of considerations that are petty, egotistic and, from tho national point of view, shortsighted.
Outstanding manuscripts by young authors, as yet entirely unknown, are nowadays rejected by editors solely on the ground that they "will not pass.11
Many union members and even delegates at thisknow how they themselves bowed to the pressure of censorship and made concessions in the structure andof their books, changing chapters, pages, paragraphs, sentences, giving them innocuous titles, only to see them finally in print, even if it meant distorting them
He have one decisive factor here, the death' roublesome writer, after which, sooner or later, he is returned to us, with an annotation "explaining his orrors." ong time, the name of Pasternak could not be pronounced out loud, but then he died, and his books appeared and his verses are even quoted at ceremonies.
Pushkin's words are really coming true: "They are capable of loving only the dead,"
But tardy publication of books and "authorization" of names do not make up for either tho social or the artistic losses suffered by our people from these monstrous delays, from the oppression of artistic conscience. (In fact there were writers in, Pilnyak, Platonov and Mandelshtam, who called attentionery early stage to the beginnings of tho cult and the particular traits of Stalin's character; however, they were destroyed and silenced instead of being listened to,)
Literature cannot develop between the categories "permitted" and "notyou can and this you can't." Literature that is not the air of itssociety, that dares not pass on to society its pains and fears; that does not warn in time against the threatening moral and social dangers, such literature does not deserve the name of literature; it isacade. Such literature loses the confidence of its own people, and itspublished works are used as waste paper instead of being read.
Our literature haa lost the leading rolo it played at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, and the brillance of experimentation thatlt In. To tho entire world the literary life of our country now appears as something Infinitely poorer, flatter and lower than It actually Is, then it would appear if it were not restricted, hemmod In.
Tho losers are both our country. In world public opinion, and world literature Itself. If tho world had access to all the uninhibited fruits of our literature, if it were enriched by our own spiritual experience, the whole artistic evolution of tho world would novo alongifferent way,ew stabilityew artistic threshold.
I propose that tho congressesolution that would demand and insure the abolition of all censorship, overt or hidden, of all fictional writing and release publishing houses from ths obligation of obtainingfor tho publication of every printed page.
The duties of the union toward its mombors:
Those duties are not clearly formulated in the statutes of the Union of Sovlot Writers (undorof copyright" and "Measures for the protection of other rights ofnd it is sad to find thathirdentury the union has defended neither the "other rights nor ovon tho copyright of persecuted writers.
Many writers were subjected during their lifetime to abuse and slander in tho press and from rostrumsbeing given the physical possibility of replying.they have been exposed to violence and personal(Bulgakov, Akhmatova, Tsvetayeva, Pasternak, Zoshchenko, Platonov, Aleksandr Grin, Vasily Grossman).
Tho Union of Writers not only did not makeits own publications for reply and justification, not only did not come out in defense of these writers, but through Its leadership was always first among the persecutors.
Names that adorned our poetry ofh century found themselvos on lists of those excluded from the union or not even admitted to the union In the first place.
The leadership of tbe union cowardly abandoned to their distress those for whom persecution ended in exile, camps and death (Pavel. Vasilyev, Mandelshtam, Artem Vesoly, Pilnyak, Babel, Tabidze, Zapolotsky and others).
The list must be cut off at "and others." We learned afterh congress of the party [on de-Stalinizationhat there were moreriters whom the union had obediently handed over to their fate in prisons and camps.
Howevor, tbe roll is even longer, and its curled-up end cannot be read and will never be read by our eyes. It contains the names of young prose writers and poets whom we may have known only accidentally through personal meetings, whoso talents were crushed in camps before being able to blossom, whoso writings never got further than the offices of tho state security sorvlce in the days of Yagoda, Yezhov, Berla and Abakumov [heads of the secret police under Stalin).
There is no historicalor the newly elected leadership of the union to share with preceding leaderships responsibility for the past.
I propose thai paragraphf the union statutes clearly formulate all the guarantees for the defense of union members who are subjected to slander and unjust persecutionsthat past illegalities will not be repeated.
If the congress will not ronaln indifferent toavolso ask that it consider the interdictions and persecutions to which I myself have been subjected.
My novel "In the First Circle" was taken away from me by the state security people, and this haslt from being submitted to publishers. Instead, in my lifetime, against my will and even without mythis novel has been "published" in an unnatural "closed" edition for readingelected unidentified circle. My novel has become available to literarybut is being concealed from most writers. ave been unable to insuro open discussion of the novel within writers associations and to prevent misuse and plagiarism.
Together with tho novel, my literary archives dating backndears, things that were not intended for publication, were taken away from mo. Now tendentious excerpts from these files have also been covertlyand are being circulated within the same circles. The play "Feast of therote down from memory in camp,igured under four serial numbersime when, condemned to die by starvation, wo wore forgotten by society and no one outside the camps came out against repressions), this play, now left far behind, is being ascribed to me as my very latest work.
For three years now an irresponsible campaign of slander is being conducted against me, who fought all through the warattery commander and receiveddecorations. It is being said thaterved riminal, or surrendered to tho enemy.as never
a prisoner of war), betrayed" my country, "served the Germans". That is the interpretation now being put on thepent in camps and exile for having criticized Stalin. This slander is being spread in secret Instructions and meetings by people holding official I vainly tried to stop the slander by appealing to tho board of tho Writers Union of. (Russiannd to the press. The board did not even
react, andingle paper printed iriy reply to the slanderers. On the contrary, slander against roe from rostrums has intensified and become more vicious within the last year, making use of distorted material from iny confiscated files,ave no way of replying.
My story "The Cancerhe first part of which was approved for publication by the proseof the Moscow writers organization, cannot beeither by chapters, rejected by five magazines, or in its entirety, rejected by Novy Mir, Zvezda and Prostor [literary journals],
The play "The Reindeer and the Littleccepted2 by the Theater Sovremennik [inas thus far not received permission to be performed.
The screen play, "The Tanks Know thehe stage play "The Light That Is inhort stories, "The Righthe series "Smallannot findroducerublisher.
My stories published in Novy Mir have never been reprinted In book form, having been rejectedthe Soviet Writer Publishers, the StatePublishing House, the Ogonyok Library. They thus remain inaccessible to the general reading public.
I have also been prevented from having any other contacts with readers, public readings of raynut ofcheduled meetings were canceled at the lastreadings over the radio. Evensimple act ofanuscript away forand copying" has nowriminal act, and the ancient Russian scribes were permitted to do.
My work has thus been finally smothered, gagged and slandered.
In view ofross infringement on myand "other" rights, will the fourth congress defend me, yes or no? It seems to me that the choice is also not without Importance for the literary future of several delegates.
NO FORK!ON DISSEK
I an, of course, confidentill fulfill my dutyriter under all circumstances, from the grave even more successfully and more unchallenged than in my lifetime. No one can bar the road to the truth, and to advance itsn prepared to accept even death. But, maybe, many lessons will finally teach us not to stop the writer's pen during his lifetime. At no time has this ennobled our history.
APPENDIX F: TEXT OF VOZNESENSKIY6
eekave been living in anof blackmail, confusion and provocation.
On Juneeceived an official notification from the Union of Writers that my trip to New York toeading at the Arts Festival there Junethis was tho only poetry reading at the festival and it had been allottedoviet poet) was "inadvisable."
I warned the leadership of the Union of Writers of the consequences of cancellation: the evening had been advertised for six months ahead, posters had been put up and tickets sold, and it Would have been too late to arrange an alternative program. Despite my conviction that the union's decision was extremoly unwise,mmediately, after talking with them,able to the United Statesould not come.
But whatoetry evening matter? That's not the main point. Let's also forget that at first (untilverybody was In favor of it, but that then they suddenly changed their minds. What is intolerable is the lying and total lack of scruples that went with all this.
ave been working, taking part in functions organized by the Union of Writers, going to the theater, receiving foreign writers at the request of the Novosti agency, only to learn thnt for three days now the Union of Writers has been tolling Journalistsm seriously ill. Of course, tho leaders of tho Union of Writers must know what they are talking about, but why haven't thoy at least informed mem sick? It's difficult toanything more idiotic. It's an insult to elementary human dignity.
ovietuman being made of flesh and blood,uppot to be pulled on string.
Why is it that 1 suddenly have to learn frombroadcasts thatho government of. has
allowed Voznosonukly to go to the festival. Tho ban has been lifted and he has receivod his visas. It now Isatter of hisicket * ,
But at this very same moment the union tells me:trip is off. In reply to questions we are saying you are ill." In other words they tell one lie to me and another to the world at large. What sort of position does that put me in? Whatupposed to tell people? Why. during all this, has nobody in the leadership of the Union of Writers bothered to call me and explain what was going on. or at least, tell me what tbe official reasons for my non-departure were? Why do they pull the wool overeyes by saying (variously)ll, that I've left lt too late toicket, or (now that everybody knows that it's too late for me to get to the poetry reading)m Just about to leave? Whyoviet poet in the eyes of thousands of lovers of Soviet poetry? Why lead people to think that the reading might take place after all? Why involve the organizers of the ovoning in further expenso? And why, in general, create all this fuss about my trip atrucial time as this in world affairs!
It isuestion of me personally, but of the fate of Soviet literature, its honor and prestige in the outside world. How much longer will we go on dragging ourselves through the mud? How much longer will the Union of Writers go on using methods like these?
Clearly tho leadership of the union does not regard writers as human beings. This lying, prevarication and knockingeads together, is standard practice. This is what they do to many of my comrades. Letters to us often do not reach us, and sometimes replies arc sent in our name. What boors, what chameleons they are! We areby lies, lies, lies, bad manners and lion.
I am ashumod toember of tho same union as these people
That ism writing to your nuwkpaper, which is called "Truth" (Pravda).
APPENDIX G: EXCERPTS FROM LITVINOV LETTER TO VARIOUS PAPERS
I regard it as my duty to make public the following:
Onas summoned by theof State Securityo appear before Gostev, an official of. Another officer ofho did not give his name, was present during our conversation.
After this talk was over,roto it down immediately and as fullyould remember. ouch for the accuracy of the substance of what was said between theof. and me.
Gostov: Pavol Mikhailovich, ^we) have knowledge .that you togetherroup of other people intend to reproduce and distribute the minutes of tbe recent criminal trial of Bukovsky and othors. We warn you that if you do that, you will be held criminally responsible.
I: Irrespective of myannotwhat tho criminal responsibility for such an action might be.
Gostev: The court will decide that, and wo wish only to warn you that ifecord should be spread through Moscow or other cities or appears abroad, you will be hold responsible for this.
I: now the laws wellannot imagine what particular law would be transgressed by the composition ofocument.
Gostev: There is such an articlo,. Take the criminal code nnd road it.
I: now this article very well and can recite it from memory. it deals with slanderous fabrications which would discredit the Soviet social system and regime. What
kind of slander could there be In recording the hearingaseoviet court?
Gostev: Well, your notes williased distortion of factslander of tho court's actions, and that would be provod by the agency conpetent to handle such cases.
I: How can you possibly know this? Instead ofow case, you yourself should publish the record of this criminal trial and in this way kill the rumors circulating in Moscow.
Gostev: And why do we need to publish it? It is an ordinary criminal case of disturbance of the peace.
I: If so, lt Is all the more important to give information about it, to let all the people soo that it is really an ordinary case.
Gostev: ycchornyaya Moskvaoscow newspaper) of September 4,ives all the information about the case. All that has to be known about that trial Is in thero.
I: In the first place, there is too little The roader who had hoard nothing previously about this case simply would not understand what lt Is all about. In the second place, lt Is false and slanderous. Rather, the editor of Vechernyaya Moskva or the porson who gave such information should be charged with slander.
Gostov: Pavel Mikha11ovlch, the news report is absolutely correct. Remember that.
I: It says there that Bukovsky pleaded guilty.ho was interested in this case, know perfectly well that he did not plead guilty.
Gostev: What does il matter whether he pleaded guilty or not? The court found him guilty. Consequently, ho is guilty.
I am not talking now about tho court's decision; nor did tho newspaper have it in Bind. And confession of guilt by the defendantompletely Independentconcept. In goneral, it wouldood idea to tell more about Bukovsky; for exanple, how he was arrested while reciting poetry on Mayakovsky Square, brought to the police station and beaten up.
Gostev: This is not true. It could not be.
I: nis mother said so.
Gostev: Who glares what she said?
I; Sho did not tell it todo not knowbut to tho court, and nobody interrupted her or accused her of slandor.
Gostev: She should rather have told you how she was summoned and warned about tho conduct of her son. Wc can summon your parents, too. And in general, Pavel Mlkhallovlch, have in mind: Vechernyaya Moskva has printod all that the Soviet people should know about this case and this information Is completely true and we warn you that If not only you, but your friends or anybody makes this rocord, you specifically will be held responsible for It. You understand very well thatocord can be used by our Ideological enemies, especially on the eve ofh anniversary of Soviet power.
I: o not know of any law that would prohibit tho disseminationon-secret documont only because it might be misused by somebody. Much critical matorial from Soviet nowspapors might also be misused by somebody.
Gostev: It should be clear to you what wo areabout. We are only warning you, and tho court will prove the guilt.
I: It will proveave no doubt. The trial of Bukovsky makes that clear. And how about my friend Aleksandr Ginzburg? Is he imprisoned for tho same kind of actions that you are warning me about?
Gostev: Well, you will learn what he did when he Is put on trial. He will bo acquitted if he is innocent. Could you possibly think that now, inh year of Sovietoviet court wouldrong decision?
I: Then why was Bukovsky's trial closed to the
Gostev: It was not.
I: Yet it was impossible to get in.
Gostev: Those who had to get in got in. There wore reprosentatives of the public and all seats in the hall were taken. We did not intend tolub (auditorium) because of this case.
I: In other words, tho public nature of legal proceedings was violated.
Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, we have no intention of arguing with you. We simply warn you. Just imagine if people would learn that the grandson of the great diplomat Litvinov (Maxim M. Litvinov, former Foreign Minister) is busy with such doings, this wouldlot on his memory.
I: o not think he would blame me. Can
am asking you to publish this letter so that in case of my arrest the public would be informed about the circumstances which preceded lt.
P. M. LITVINOV. Assistant in the Faculty
of Physics in Moscow, Institute of Precision Chemical Technology
APPENDIX H: TEXT OF LITVINOV-DANIEL APPEAL,7
To World Public Opinion:
The judicial trial of [Yuri) Galanskov, [Aleksandr] Ginzburg, [Aleksei] Dobrovolsky and [Vera] Lashkova, which is taking place at present in the Moscow City Court, is being carried out in violation of the most importantof Soviet law. The Judge and the prosecutor, with the participationpecial kind of audience have turned the trialild mockery of three of the accusedGinzburg andof the witnesscs--unthinkable inh century.
The case took on the character of thetrials" on its second day, when Galanskova year of preliminaryspite of pressure from thetogroundless accusations made against them bysought to prove their own innocence. Evidencein favor of Galanskov and Ginzburgcourt even.
The judge and the prosecutor throughout the trial have been helping Dobrovolsky to introduce false evidence against Galanskov and Ginzburg. The defense lawyers are constantly forbidden to ask questions, and tho witnesses are not being allowed to give evidence that unmasks the provocative role of Dobrovolsky in this case.
Judgeironov has not once stopped the prosecutor. But he is allowing people who represent the defense to say only that which fits in with the program already prepared by. (state secret police) Whenever any participant in the trialfrom the rehearsed spectacle, the judge cries, "Your question is out ofThis has no relation to theI will not allow you to speak." Thosehave been directed at the accused (apart fromo their lawyers and to the witnesses.
The witnesses leave the court after theiror rather they are pushed out of the court, epressed state almost in hysterics.
Witness Yelena Basllova was not allowed totatement to thewanted to record how. had prosecuted her mentally sick husband, whose evidence given during the investigation when be wasertifiable state, plays an important role In the prosecution case. Basllova was driven out of the court while the judge shouted and the audience, howled,her words.
P. Grigorenko (former MaJ. Gon. Pyotr Grigorenko of the Soviet Army)equest asking that he be examineditness because ho could explain the origin of the money found on Dobrovolsky. Galanskov gave him this money. Grigoronko's request was turned down on the pretext that he is allegedly montally ill. This is not true.
Witnesses Aida Topeshklna was not allowed totatement to the court In which she wanted to give facts showing the falsity of Dobrovolsky's evidence. Topeshklna, an expectant mother, was physically ejected from the courtroom, while tho audience howled at her.
The "commandant of the. Colonel Tslrkunenko, did not allow witness L. Katz back into the courtecess, and told her, "If you have given other evidence, you could have stayed."
None of the witnosses have been allowed to stay in tho court after giving evidence, although they aro obliged to stay under Sovlot law. Appeals by theon the basis olf the Code of Criminal Procedure [the relevant article) went unheeded, and the Judge said sharply to witness V. Vlnogradova. "You can Just leave the court under
The courtroom is filled with specially-selectedof. and volunteerwho give the appearance of an open public trial. These
peopleoise, laugh, and insult theiaccusod and the witnesses. Judge Mlronov had made no attempt tothese violations of order. Not one of the blatant offenders has been ejected from tho hall.
In this tense atmosphere there can be no pro tense that the trial is objective, that there is any justice or legality about lt. Tho sentence was decided rrom tho very start.
We appeal to world public opinion, and in tho first place to the Soviet public opinion. We appeal toin whom conscience is alive and who has sufficient courage:
Demand public condemnation of this Shameful trial and the punishment of those guilty of perpetrating It:
Demand the releaso of tho accused from arrost:
ew trial with the observance of all legal norms and with the presence of international observers!
Citizens Of our country! This trial tain on the honor of our state and on the conscience of overy-ono of us. You yourselvos elected this court and those that they bo deprived of the posts which they have abused. Today lt is not only the fate of the three accused which is intrial is no better than the celebrated trials of the nineteen-thirtlos, which Involved us in so much shame and so much blood that we have still not recovered from them.
We pass this appeal to the Westernand ask for it to bo published and broadcastas soon asnot sending this ro-
quost to Soviet newspapors because that is hopoloss. (signed)
I.AKTSA BOGORAZ-DANI EL Moscow, ,
LeninskyAVEL LITVINOV, Ulitsa Aloxei. Tolstoy 8, Flat
tn7 and dropped Irom Secretariat. Dropped inlected in December/
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BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, MIKOYAN,
POLYANSKIY, KIRILENKO, VORONOV, SHELEPIN, GRISHIN
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BRE2HNEV. KOSYGIN, PODGORNYY. SUSLOV, VORONOV
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POLYANSKIY, KIRILENKO, MAZUROV, SHELEPIN, PELSHE
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, MIKOYAN, SUSLOV PODGORNYY
PODGORNYY, KOSYGIN, BREZHNEV. SUSLOVOriginal document.