APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 7
CS Historical Paper
S8 ib)
CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY
ami otTIIE SECRKT HAH IN KOREA
0 to2
DO NOT DESTROY
published:8 Copyf 3
Controlled by . FE Division Dote prepared . 4 Written by i.
access to North Korea in the last year of the war. Air Operations
For the first ten months of the war, CIA. Far East Air Force (FEAF) aircraft to drop agents and materiel into North Korea. CIA first began dropping agents in the twelfth woek of the war. etachment oft Troop Carrier Squadron eventually redesignated as Flight "B" of the Fifth Air Force provided most of the support. FEAF also provided photo intelligence support to Agency operations.
U.S. Army unconventional warfare air operations began when an airborne ranger first lieutenant with the Theater Intelligence Liaison Group in Korea asked an Air Force captain to dropArmy Intelligence) agents into North Korea. That flight was the genesis of Flight "B" which made hundreds7 night flights over North Korea in the first two years of tbe war. Despite frequent adverse weather conditons and fog in the valleys, thereinimum of abortive flights. The Flight "B" aircrews alwaysine Job and with no loss of aircraft. One pilot made moreight flights over North Korea, dropping agents, propaganda leaflets, and supplies.
When the enemy retaliated against CIA guerrillas in the winter, drop zones and drop times had to be laid on and changed on short notice. Simultaneously the Air Force
increased its air support to the more vital conventional warfare making aircraft difficult to get. ivilian Cessna5 were obtained by the Agency. Two of the best pilots were transferred to CIA from Flight Cargo aircraftIA-controlled civilian airline were used to support the guerrilla forces. . Air Force-CIA relationship throughout the war was particularly profitable, close, and cordial.
Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) Guerrillas InIA andighth United States Army Koreaorking in harmony, divided North Korea into two parts for guerrilla warfare action and control. The Agency already had established tho nucleusrained guerrilla movement in the mountains in tho extreme northeaslj. The Army took the western portionpontaneous. guerrilla movement developed after. offensive crossedh parallely1USAK program haduerrillas on the west coast aboveh parallelinto sixteen units of varying capabilities depending on how they were recruited and their state of training. However, no safe bases were established on the flat, muddy mainland estuaries and indentations as the effort was dependent upon island bases lying off the west coast, protected by the
U.S. Navy which controlled tho sea. This failure to establish secure bases on the coastal mainland was disastrous. During the Panmunjomks in tho winter, the Communists mopped up the area. ^jdA advisors worked with the EUSAK west coast guerrillas from January to Competition between the CIA and Army guerrilla warfare efforts was keen but wholesome, with no real problems at the operating level. The over-all CIA/Army relationship at that level was eminently satisfactory and mutually advantageous.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE (FI)
In the early stages of the war, there was confusionfield of Intelligence collection. Military unitsprepared for the Communist invasion and,no plans for collecting tactical intelligence inof war. Budgets had been slashed, and trainednot available. Generalf tho Farasked CIA to step into this tacticalfrom which there was no pulling out until tho war
An Early Air Infiltration
One of tbe first missions assigned to the Agency was tho placement of Jteams in L jseparate aro as along the northern border of North Koroa. The objectives were to
establish observation posts in mountainous areaslines, ports, and major highways used by theArmy, and to give early warning of support byor Soviets. After ton weeks of training | dropped close to their target areasar f the | [teams came on tho air withbut within four days reported that thoy wereon the run. Ofdroppoderiod
of ten months,
were returned to CIA after working tholr way back. Army. Marine Divisions. The operation demonstrated that properly motivated and trained Korean agents could survive in the North and produce results if tbey could be put in place without boing detected. Support to Inchon Landings
In early0 at the time of the Pusan Perinetor,
y
Qulnn ond tho OSO (CIA Intelligence) ChiefJ
Colonel William Quiho had served with tbe Central Intelligence Group,ember of the Task Force then preparing to land at Inchon on Colonel
planned
the placing of | [CIA case officers on an island off Inchon harbor to collect pre-invasion intelligence. The case officersimple control technique
The intelligence produced supported General MacArthur's doclsioo to proceed with tho Inchon Landings despite active opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, CIAmall contribution to the most brilliant tactical stroke of the Korean War.
Armed Reconnaissance of North Korean Coast In the late summern armed CIA-Koreanteam began making regular night landings on tho enemy east coast. The team operating. destroyor took Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams, the Surgeon General of the Far East Command, into an enemy fishing village at night; outposted the area, mado contact with the villago chiefs, and returnod the Surgeon Goneral to the destroyor. The General's foray into tho village was To counter Communist claims that. was ongagod in germ warfare and earned General Sams the Distinguished Sorvice Cross for his part ln the night's operations.
S
T
Ai"its and Munitions: nemy weapons andwere issued to CIA guerrillasaptured weapons dump near Pusan. CIA armed guorrillas with. iniantry weapons: ifles, tommyguns, carbines,aliber light machine6 rocket launchers (bazookas) and no weapon heavier than them mortar.
agent teams along
wo-Way Street: Sensible two-wayevolved through necessity andthe tenth week of the war, CIA was
by tho Far East Air Force to drop
wm mm
Manchurian-Soviet border of North Korea. 1 agents of the Army Far East Command Liaison Group were dropped with CIA parachutes when all military airborne materiel in the theater was frozen for use byth Parachute Infantry. No reimbursement was required in either case. Thewarfare operators were "poor relations" compared to the conventional forces; consequently, they helped each other In every way they could.
The predecessor to the present CIA foller conveyor air cargo drop system was developed by an Air Force officer assigned to the Agency Mission in Korea. Concerned with tho time delays civilian parachute dispatch officers took to get cargo out over the drop zone, he borrowed some rollerrails from an Air Forco storage warehouse and made an
effective and faster exit mechanism. CIA providedthe Far East Air Force
(FEAF) for Escape and Evasion kits. CIA declined asa FEAF reimbursement offer, . radios ofwere too bulky and heavy for guerrilla warfare. lindustry andmaller,
lighter radio placed in production. Sets were given to the Armed Forces for their agent operations. Agent Authentication
A major problem was that of trying to keep up with North Korean changes in document control.
In North Korea.
CIA and military agents collected travel control, identity, and ration documents which were then sent
lor
reproduction. Another major source for authenticationthe Advanced Allied Translator and Interpreter
Finances
The Mission finance officer from1 torecalls that the Agency was funded in cash inofdollars per month or
annually. With few exceptions, funds were con-
verted to Koreanhrough an Army Disbursing
authority to do whatever was necessary to see that the covert and clandestine activities of all American units in
were coordinated.
1
exploratory discussions with the ActingUSAK, other CIA officers the Far East Air Force and the 7th Fleet, thesection arbitrarily acted to's statedpurposes. learly understood GeneralSmith's position that CIA being placed underEast Theater Commander was predicated on Arraywould turn back clandestine and covert activities to the
Agency as soon as combat ceased. "Peaco talks" were resumed
at Panmunjom on1 and the "cease firo" line was aurccd upon. For the first time since the war began it
appearod that an end to the fighting was in sight. OnECOM orderew organization by giving FEC/LD the euphonious short titlo: CCRAK.
FEC/LD, theetachment ln Korea, responded byign in ten-inch letters in front of their offlco in Seoul announcing FEC/LD was tho American Headquarters for "COVERT, CLANDESTINE, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, KOREA."
19/
CIA staffers in Korea appreciating the humor
situation, holped their old friend the FEC/LD Commander, now the new Commander CCRAK, to improvise the euphemistic
title "Combined Command Reconnaissance Activitiesith the issuance of theovember FECOM order, the Chiof, CIA Mission Korea became Deputy Commander ot CCRAK in addition to his CIA duties. CIA personnel in Korea pitched in and tried to make CCRAK work as thoy were much too busy with operations to havo the time or inclination to fight tho command problem. Withone, the CIA Chiefs while skeptically remembering that not long ago '
General Willoughby put CIA activities undor surveillance [
cautiously agreed not to fight "city hall."
The Effect of CCRAK
2 the Acting Senior CIAeviewed CCRAK activities for CIA Headquarters.
The
dispatch attached, described what ithocking desire for controltheater staff officers' attempts to circumvent the Acting Senior CIA Representative/FEC at theater level and unwarranted attempts to gain operational information not neededon-operating agency. Tho dispatch also said CIA officers in Korea held the firm belieT* that General Ridgway, the FE Commander; General Van Fleet, Commander EUSAK; General Everest, FEAFnd Admiral Martin, Commanding the 7th Fleet, were all of the opinion that CIA could bost render support to the Theater Commander by attempting to carry out its own national missions rather than by becoming a
S
low-level tactical organization. The long and detailed dispatch is of special interest in the light of present day CIA relations with the JCS/Special Assistant for Counter-insurgency and Special Activities (JCS/SACSA), the Defense Intelligence Agencynd the increasing involvement of CIA in joint covert activities with the Armed Forces.
The effect ofreation wasontrol over CIA, weighting the Agency with demands for direct tactical support, thereby proliferating CIA's long-term strategic responsibilities with local low-level order-of-battle type tasks- These tasks inevitably diverted tho small CIA Mission from its primary job of getting high-level strategic information
and fromoncentrated effort to establish viable covert action cells in
North Korea. The diversion of long-range assets to tactical operations exposed agents and operations not only to the enemy but to the local population and to many United Nations agencies as well.
The centralized coordinating mechanism adopted in Korea was ill advised. As the Agency on-duty strength increased afterore man-hours were devoted to lateral liaison than had been previously possible. When CCRAK was formalized inIA had good working relations
76
se t
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with all the. military commanders in Korea. Liaison was also maintained with their subordinate units whore thereeed for mutual cooperation, support, or special scrvicos. Hosteeling of mutual trust and understanding had grown up among the individuals of the various subordinate units engaged in clandestine and covert operations ln Koroa.
Additionally, the CCRAK organization with unquestioned over-control of CIA activities as of2 still had not unraveled tho more vexing problem of coordinating agent activities. Thore were the problems of false confirmation of reports caused by lateral contacts between Korean agents, of fabricators, and of double agents. Penetrations. and foreign intelligence services did not get the prompt damage assessments required to bring them quickly under control. In fairness to CCRAK officers, the CIA Mission Korea admittedly complicated the agent coordinating issue by refusing to reveal Identities of sensitivo agents. This was done because CIA is requlrod by law to protoct its sources, and tho Korean Mission had been directod by its Washington Headquarters to preserve Its assets for the long haul regardless of the outcome of the war.
The lack of coordination of agent activities was most noticeable ln. counterintelligence effort against the
i
mammoth Communist covert action machine. USAK would not permit the Eighth Army Counterintelligence Corps to bo placed under joint CCRAK coordination. Clearly, CCRAK was sauce to cook the CIA goose. It was not intonded that tho Job should be divided up with the Armed Forcos toombined counterintelligence offensive.
It is fruitless to speculate on what might have been,egrettable side effect of the control exercised by CCRAK is that the Agoncy did not put its boat foot forward in Korea in the last year of the war. Quite frankly, with tbe exceptionard core cadre, green and untried casewero substituted for qualified, experienced officers because tbe latter were in short supply. By the fallIA Headquarters recognized there wero groat opportunities if more experienced CIA offlcors were in Korea. Accordingly, three of the most competent senior clandestine services officers in the Agency were selected: one to be full-time CIA representative and Deputy of CCRAK, another as head of CCRAK's counterintelligence section and doubling as Chief of CIA's counterespionage staff, and the third as Chief of foreign intelligence activities. When it became clear the CCRAK coordination meant that the cease-fire restrictions on tactical activities of the rogular forces would also apply to strategic, covert, and clandestine operations, the three
78
e t
officers were reassigned olsewhero.
2 CCRAK began to stifle new operations. CIA lost the covert action initiative in Korea to the Communists. The earlier CIA concept of an aggressive clandestine offensive, or at least covert counter-attack to the north, never materialized. By2 the handwriting on tho wall clearlyeturnefensive covert and clandestine position.
So ends our memoirsimited war which caused more than four million casualties. The armistice talks bogged down over the POW issue. Men continued to die, but it becamear of words than of guns. Stalomate fighting alongh parallel battlefrontear later with the Panmunjom cease-fire on At great price communism was contained, over twenty million souls remained free, and the world gained time and experience. Is the time well used by the West? What did the experience teach?
79
S ESC RET
Secret War In Korea Appendix
62
Chief, FE
Operational
Review of Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK)*
Reference: WASH
I. STATUS OF THE CIA MISSION KOREA, 1 A. Mission
1 the mission of the CIAhad been defined by Washington as thend NSC2 in Korea,
ine via Mission Korea was aiso directed to support 8th Army, Korea 5th Air Force, and 7th U. S. Fleet Navy. The CIAKoreaoint Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) -Office of Special Operations(OSO) Mission and was assigned personnel from both offices.
There were in the CIA Mission Korea files many National Intelligence Directives and Guides, as well asEssential Elements of Information. In existence was the beginningood effort in Guerrilla Warfare inKoreaplendid black Psychological Warfare Program effected in cooperationsywar, EUSAK. An Evasion and Escape Program was being carried out on an advisory basis withh Armyection, EUSAK. North Korea had been divided into two parts for purposes of Guerrilla Warfare concentration: OPC having the eastern portion, andh Army Unit having tbe western portion. There was no geographical division established for psychological At that time the CIA Mission Korea did notrogram in political, resistance, or economic warfare.
In1 the staff of the CIA Mission Korea was busily engaged and planningossible post-armistice in which, it was believed, the CIA Mission Korea
- Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea: Cover name for FEC/Unconventional Warfare Coordination Office in Korea.
would bear sole responsibility for the accomplishment of covert and clandestine missions in North Korea. The tentative planesistance prograa in North Korea had been made, and annexes to tbat plan covering psychological, economic, guor-rila, and resistance warfare were being prepared.
A long-range plan was being prepared for theof our National Intelligence mission in tho areas of Mission responsibility. Inhe penetration of North Korean Communist Party,be UGB of North Korea) and governmental offices was well under way. ood groundwork had been laid for the receipt of high-levelfrom all of those offices, as is shown by therecord achieved by those nets during the months of November, December and January. (For instance, intelligence production of Ihe CIA Mission Korea increaseduring December over the production of the previous month, and the record for January was almost equally significant. Forty percent of that production was military intelligence in direct support of tbe Armed Forces of the United States in Korea, the remaining sixty percent being divided between political,social, and counterespionage reportingore long-range nature. In January, two specific reports covering the entire Order of Battle of the NK and CCF armies in North Korea were received.)
On tbe OPC side, contacts with the ROK Army andilitant Buddhist organization had been made andplans were in process for the use of those organizationsigorous resistance and guerrilla program.
Other intelligence organizations operating In Korea: FEC/LD; Special Activities Unit, 5th Air Force; ROK HID were operating low-level line crossing nets givingcoverage of activities on the ground. ercent of their reports were of the low-level type, tbe major exception bolng the reporting of tho EUSAK CIC which interestingly enough has been excepted from the control of CCRAK. The guerrilla warfare programEUSAK includeduerrillas on the west coast, but no safe base bad been established on tbe mainland of North Korea, and that effort was almost entirely dependent upon island bases lying off the west coast. This fact later proved disastrous.
Covert and clandestine activities in Korea were coordinated In1 by FEC/LD, whichull privilege of doing whatever tbe situation required to see that these activities wero coordinated.
B. Organization of Covert and Clandestine Activities in Korea during October lffBT^
SECfiET
These activities, as before stated, were under the coordination of Col. Russell, Commanding Officer, FEC/LD who was under the command of Col. Blakeney, Commanding Officerection. GHQ. In addition to the units mentioned above. United States Army CIC Units were operating in Korea both in the field of Counterintelligence and in the gathering of Positive Intelligence. The ROK Navy was engaged In the collection of positive information under the supervision of Commander Lousey, USN.
Fifth Air Force requirements were being met bv the Special Activities Unit under Mr. Donald Nicholls.
The tactical OB requirements of EUSAK were being met by several units under the command of FEC/LD and by the ROK HID. The CIA Mission Korea was attempting to accomplish both its national requirements and its requirements in support of armed forces in Korea. (For instance, during the month of2 the CIA Mission Korea furnished more reports in support of 5th Air Force than did any other organization in Korea.;
IX. INTRODUCTION OF CCRAK PROPOSALS DURING1 A. Background
1. During thegreement was reached between Walter Bedell Smith and officers within theof the Army to place both covert and clandestineunder ClnCFE while actual combat continued in Korea No agreement was reached concerning the way CinCFE would exercise that command authority.
_ 2- 8raft paper was preparedection, GHQ, subject- Organization of Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in the Far East Command.
3' TnisBUBgestcd an organization called CCRAFEC, which would command those activities-throughout the Far East Command, including Korea. It was arrived at afteramonEIntelligence, GHQUSAK officers. Upon itstudy dated1 was made by the staff of the CIA Mission Korea. (See Annex No 2) ooting was called in Seoul, Korea, to discuss that
1 and Also, onhe Central Intelligence Agency national positionpaper wasfrom WASH-AH. (See Annex No 4)
A complete report of tne Seoui conferences was prepared and submitted to Washington. (See Annex No. 6)
Washington position, Centralrests upon thef WASH
"Assumed that Ear East Command proposal is in part outgrowth and within the framework of reference ofWillard G. Wyman series of conferences with Lt. Gen. Hickey, Chief of Staff, FEC, and others, and is intended to facilitate transfer of total responsibility for covert, clandestine and related activities to Central Intelligence Agency at early date. Guidance which follows hereinafter based this premise. At this instant we must depend for protection Central Intelligence Agency Interest upon your assurance of continued validity this assumption."
This basic premise was Included in the final paper of thea* initialed
Colonel Blakency,
addition to including that basic premise,conferees also initialed the following points
organizational integrity of Army,and CIA units shall be maintained.
Air, Navy, CIA units shall allsimultaneously under CCRAK.
channel is|
to the CIA Mission Korea": CIA operations of high sensitivity and/or with long-term characteristics which extend through area into adjacent areas and are not in direct support of EUSAK, shall befrom CCRAK control.
oint staff under one command.
5. The Washington position was maintained and agreed toepresentatives.
6. Fifth Air Force was Informed of the Seoulpaper and from that time on exchanged freely copies of Its attitude on this subject with CIA officers. Lt. Gen.Everest
took the position in several messages to Gen. Weyland that the only organization capable of accomplishing the Americanand covert mission was CIA, and that all other units in Korea should be placed under it.
However, Lt. Gen. Everest was not approached on this subjectection, GHQ officers until after the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Hickey, GHQ had approved the orderCCRAK. Lt. Gen. Everest was furious because he had not been consulted prior to the time the order was issued) and more significantly,fficers pretended to him when they first talked to him about the subject that the order was not yet approved. The tactics adopted by officersection, GHQ, therefore, seemed to be to win command control over CIA and then toait accompli to Air Force and Navy.
The basic order establishing CCRAK dated1 almost completely ignored the Seoul Agreement and threw out almost all of the points insisted upon by CIA in. The premise of our Washington position was that assets in Korea be turned over to CIA at an early date -obviously with an impending armistice in mind. The Washington position was changed in the implementing order to read "gradual transfer." (See Annex No. 7) The only Washington positionin the order was that CIA Mission Korea would retainintegrity. Sensitive and long-range operations were not specifically excluded from the CCRAK Charter.
order was announced without the concurrence
and without the knowledgeWeyland and was in
serious disagreement with the basic position taken by CIA and by Lt. Gen. Everest. It is believed that it was done without the knowledge of Gen. Ridgway.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORDER ESTABLISHING CCRAK
A. Difference between CIAection, GHQ in Mission Appreciation
1. Throughout the negotiations CIA pledged its cooperation to the notion that theater commanders must be served during time of combat. However, OPC-OSO officers also realized that they were enjoined by National Intelligence Directives to collect information on many extremely important intelligence targets in North Korea
(For instance, the Monozitc Mines in worth"
Koreaarget of urgent priority.
There were no Washington "iil'WctlVefi in TnlSreiievrng" the CIA Mission Korea (roc Its responsibility for procuring high-level, strategic information, and the CIA Mission Korea was the only hope in tho area from1 on, which might warn of large-scale attacks.
2. While, on tbe other band, the OPC Mission In Korea enjoyed equally good avenues of approach into North Korea The rugged mountainous terrain that crosses
Northeastern Koreaan excellent
opportunity for the establishmentafe guerrilla base. The North Korean labor party was composed of many different factions drawn from several places of the Far West. The Parly was still In the development stage known as tbeFront stage. Entrance into the NKLP seemed relatively easy and many North Korean boys were being recruited for training in the use of Soviet aircraft and their maintenance. The Army used by the Chinese Communists against the forces of the United Nations was very largely composed of men whowere members of the Chinese Nationalist Army. People of North Korea lost seventy percent of their rice, lt was reported, to the NKLP. In other words, the entire situation waa fluid from almost every point of view and the opportunity might exist for the creation by clandestine meanseep political resistance movement against the Communists. These opportunities still exist.
the same time, the CIA Mission Koreaa responsibility for supporting the Air Force,Navy engaged in combat in Korea. We believe that it is
at this point where confusion exists concerning tho mission of CIA during times of combat, for as soon as negotiations began concerning CCRAK. it became clear to CIA officers in this theater that the appreciation of Array negotiators of the mission, trade-craft, security devices, and potentialities of CIA was farfrom tbe appreciation held by CIA officers. MoreArmy negotiators felt the CIA's willingness to servo tbo Theater Commander meant that CIA should now become Just another extension ofection in Korea. They thought of the CIA Mission Korea in termsollection agency for tactical information andnit whose unconventionalprogram should be guerrillas used in close support of EUSAK.
must be remembered that the CIA Missionnot relieved of its national mission and, indeed,owards its accomplishment during the very few
SE&RET
m
of its organisational existence. CCRAK, therefore,reat question for CIA in this theater: Did its participation in CCRAK throw to the ground its national mission?
It sust be remembered that, later, the order establishing CCRAK limited its functions to those activities in direct support of armed forces in Korea. However, although CCRAK's mission was limited to those activities in direct support, there was no clarification of the question of how much effort the CIA Mission Korea should make in CCRAK and how much effort it should make in support of its national mission.
Here it must be frankly stated that CIA officers In this theater firmly believed that tbey could best render support to the Theater Commander by attempting to carry out its national missions rather thanow-level tactical organization. And it must be stated in equally frank terms that CIA officers felt that Gen. Rldgway, Gen. Van Fleet, Gen. Everest, and Adm. Martin were of the same opinion; while, on the other hand, the officersUSAKHQ woreifferent opinion. Both Gen. Ridgway and Gen. Van Fleet have said many times that they required high-level information concerning the intentions of the enemy and were content to accept tactical intelligence as provided byections.
5
Definition of CCRAK Responsibilities
1. Because of the vagueness concerning thetime CCRAK might operate after combatthe
HQ for his attitude on that question. (See Annex No.reply giventhls question we believe to be highly
indicative of the attitude, GHQ. The entire reply is quoted in Annex No.ut here are its most salient points:
a. Armistice or no armistice, there Isin the Far East, nor will there be infuture. The Redaone.
To essential.
this threat, FECs
Until all troops, drawn, CCRAK will remain.
CCF and UN, have with-
erious blunder, we feel, was made at this time, GHQ, In having the order establishing CCRAK
7
published before the Air Force had^the opportunity to go over the final draft. In response to queries from Gen. Everest ana Gen. Weyland on this subject, Lt. Gen. Doylelckey, Chief of Staff, replied that the Air Force's desires would receive thorough consideration prior to implementing the detailedand functional plan with CCRAK. Inasmuch as the Fifth Air Force had not been consulted prior to the order establishing CCRAK, Gen. Everest did not feel that the Army was acting in this case in good faith. (See Annex No. 9)
a paper defining the
responsibility and functions of CCRAK was sento Korea. (See Annex This paper continuedection, GHQ attitude of thinking of CCRAKommandover tbe CIA Mission Korea. Although the basic Charter of CCRAK had been published without including theinitialed in the Seoul Conference paper, and without any of the CIA points established inxcept for unit integrity, this implementation draft order now attempted to do away with the only Washington provision left ln tbenit integrity. We recommend strongly that you study this paper thoroughly because lt is tbe best statement we know of the attitudeection officers concerning the way they believe covert and clandestine activities should be organized in times of combat. Itosition exemplified, it is said, by Gen. McClure and others of that school of thought The principle upon which the paper rests is: Complete Command Control. In effect lt does away with CIA and places CIAand operations completely under the control For instance, this paper would give Chief, CCRAKauthority over the expenditure of funds allocated to units under his control. It would give Chief, CCRAK authority over all housekeeping and attendant duties as the situation may require. It would not permit tbe hiring of any Indigenous person without the approval. It would give Chief, CCRAK, authority to conduct intelligence operations for related activities within Korea or originating in Korea and directed into contiguous areas.
4. Note well that this paper wouldectionosition where it could direct anyto carry out the national missions of CIA, and itthe basic CCRAK order's limiting clause: CCRAK is in direct support of Armed Forces in Korea.
5. This paper was not published
and, so far, no implementation order exis
defining the duties of Chief, CCRAK. However, the basic atti-tude embodied in that paper still remains and has been expressed by the present Chief, CCRAK when he said that CCRAK does possess authority to carry out long*range missions beyond the Yalu and
8
into China. This stand is in flat contradiction to the CCRAK Charter.
his attitude concern-
ing the draft order, trol."
"Ithocking desire forwas also told byHQ that he didknowledge of the implementation draft
that time also reportedHQ his feelings thai must remain within its Chartertaff in direct support of armed forces in Korea, and that National Intelligence Directives should remain. (See Annex
7. This implementation order alsoeries of attempts by officersHQ to circumvent
by
sending orders directly to CCRAK whose contents involvodmi Korea. That practice has continued until the
date of thishen this circumvention is pointed out to these officers tbey admit their error, but persist in the practice.
next move madeHQ to defineof Chief, CCRAKE program for Koreaembodiedaper written by Col. Blakeney,FEC/LG. (See Annex This draft againIncluded an atteaptGHQ tofield oi controlled agents tor deception purposes. entered the field of monitoring clandestine enemy The roply to this paper (See Annexby Col. Ives pointing out to Col. Blakeney thatMission Korea would carry forward controlled agentinto enemy territory. After consultation withbe reserved controlled agent operations ln. He reserved theof enemyKorea to ASAPAC. No implementation order in this field
was issued, but the attitudefficers remains and will be carried out in tbe field.
a meeting of officersallCCRAK2 s, Chief,thit CCRAK now bad far-rangingbeyond thethat FEC/LD bad been authorized to go deepofficers from other units told Ool. Ives that tbeyof carrying out that mission which, they felt,reserved for tho CIA Mission Korea. Lt. Col. GeorgeDeputy for Air, CCRAK, told Col. Ives that CCRAK would
be "going ln way over itsor CCRAK by Charter was limited to direct support of armed forces. CIA officers told Col. Ives that in tbelr opinion CCRAK should remain within its Charter.
the foregoing it should be clearCCRAK was established for direct support of armed
forces, lt now Isissidn comparablef not the sameIA. fficers have clearly Indicated tholr desire to take ovor CIA and its mission.
implementing CCRAKfficerslittle concern ovor the security of American ForUSAK has asked Chiefist of all operational safehouses in the cityincluding the names of all occupants, their duties,that require them to occupy safehouses. hat this housing was comoandoered by the Army inof its own regulations. It is believed that thisinasmuchtate of semi-martial law existsand no house can bo occupied without Army approval. In
a meeting with the Chief/CIA Mission Seoul Station Korea, an officer of CCRAK stated that after discussing this matter with Col. VanUSAK, he was convinced that Col. Van Natta did not need to know that operational information, but merely wanted to know these operational facts. The effoct of releasing that information to another American agoncy wouldevero security risk, and rather than conform, the CIA Mission Korea would have to protect its agents by moving them from Seoul.
unwarranted attempt to gainthat Is not required2HQeeklyfrom the CIA Mission Korea concerning the number ofand cxflltrated, number of reports In andof reports received from agent radio circuits. HQ desired this operational informationpurposes. Again the security risks involved inrequest are apparent, as well as the obviousgain further control and possible elimination of r
monthly briefing of Ridgway. Direct access to and periodic briefing of commanding generals are essential if CIAare to be known to those gentlemen, as witness Gen. Van Fleet's negative reply to the question: Had he ever received anything credited to CIA.
IV. PRESENT STATUS OF CCRAK
A. Organization of CCRAK
1. CCRAK is now headed by Col. Washington M. Ives, who was Deputy forHQ. Col. Ivesine gentlemen with no intelligence training or operational background who states that he isery difficult position because he does not know the business. Although under severe pressure from Col. Blakeney and Col. BrattonHQ, Col. Ives has recognized that if the covert and clandestine missions wero to be performed, they must be done under the CIA Mission
10
Korea officers. Whenifficult operational assignment Col. Ives invariably has turned to the CIA Mission Koreafor guidance. The reasons for this practice aro obvious, but their time-consuming effects upon the CIA's activities have been great. That time could very well have beon spent inon with tho CIA Mission Korea Mission, and the offects of CCRAK haveuplication of efforts by senior officers in the CIA Mission Korea.
The Deputy, CCRAK is the Chier/CIA Mission Korea, who already has been under severe pressure accomplishing his own duties. Inasmuch as tho desires of General Ridgway, General Van Fleet, General Everest, and Admiral Briscoe can only be met through long-range sensitive operations, the Chief/CIA Mission Korea must spend time within CCRAK and then go back to his own Mission whero the work must be performed.
Chief, Seoul Station CIA Mission Korea has acted as Operations Officer for Chief, CCRAK and has reported many times that tho only organization capable of providing what Senior Commanders desire is the CIA Mission Korea, and that invariably after long discussions with CCRAK, he must return to his own unit to plan and execute intelligence requirements.
the CIA Mission Koroa, was
assigned as the ce Olticer to CCRAK. and is tbe third officer committed to CCRAK by the CIA Mission Korea.
Lt. Col. George M. Budway, USAF, was assigned by 5th Air Force to CCRAK as Deputy for Air. Col. Budwmy has stated many times that there was no reason for the existence of CCRAK in the first place, and that's authority to coordinate, which it possessed prior to CCRAK, was all that the field required. He has stated to Col. Ives his fears that CCRAK was attempting to expand its Charter and that it was draining resources from the CIA Mission Korea which more appropriately should be employed in the accomplishment of the CJA Mission. At present. Col. Budway is the only officerto CCRAK by the Air Force.
Staff Sections of CCRAK are broken downectionsection, eeting of all of these Staff Sections duringt was agreed that representatives of operating units should meeteek in order to discuss which unit could carry out any givon requirement. It was clear to all present that the only way intelligent planning could be done was by those officers who were most familiar with operating indigenous personnel. Thisthe feelings of those officers who know the organization best concerning the way the covert and clandestine Job should be
EOHET^
done, nnd Indicates the fact thatot control -Is required.
B. Security Within CCRAK
1. It has been shown time ond tine again that persons who have not been trained in clandestine tradecraft cannotbe entrusted with total Information concerning CIA and its operations. Army Officers assigned to CCRAK have repeatedly violated basic tradecraft practices. /
/ Also,ocKtaiT
party Riven by officers of FEC/LD, the nares of operatingwithin CIA were openly announced by an Army officer present. Wounded guerrillas have been brought toaptured enemy agent was driveneep through Seoul to that Headquarters. Koreans are driven in daylightruck with FEC/LD bumper markingshere parachutes are placed upon them and where they are openly boardedSAF aircraft. The association of CIA officers with the CCRAK organization can blow them for all time, and their usefulness to CIA in the future be seriously reduced. The security situation within CCRAK tends to make penetration of thatather simple operation and CIA must appreciate that fact.
the CIA Mission
C. Command Channels
1. Command channels
coauuuiB.are openly circumvented, presumably in an effortall of the CIA Mission Korea's operationsfficers.
command channel from Chief, CCRAK, isdirectly to ClnCFE. However, in actual practicechannel is from Chief, CCRAK to Col.HQ. This is one reason why Generalnot known the true nature of the effect of his decisionCIA in Korea, GHQ.
D. Morale Within The CIA Mission Korea
1. Almost all of the personnel within the CIA Mission Korea aro volunteers who are highly motivated. They accepted assignment in Korea because they believed that the future of CIA could best be preserved byood recordheater of combat. The effects of the attemptfficers tothem and their operations is not the least importantflowing from the institution of CCRAK. They cannot
12
understand why command was given to an outfit with tactical line-crossing operations which is incapable of doing tbe real Job. They have been proud of tbe fact that General Van Fleet endorsed their approach when he said m glad to see that you are concentrating on your long-range strategic mission and leaving tactical OB collection to. That type of information can best be obtained bypressure along the front." In1 Admiral Perry, Carrier Tasktated, "Of the seemingly hundreds of D. S. Intelligence operations in Korea, the CIA Mission Korea has consistently provided us the most reliable and timely information of any organization here." Lt. Gen. Everest, Commanding General, 5th Air Force, hasetter of commendation for tbe CIA Mission Korea praising its contribution to his mission, and be has suggested that Far East Air Force do the same. In fact, General Everest has offered us his S. A. U. "bag andnd has repeatedly urged that CIA stand on its own feet and perform thefunction in Korea. At tbe sameUSAK, has publicly stated upon many occasions during the last month that the CIA Mission Korea work bas been of little or no value to him. This anomaly is difficult for the CIA Mission Korea to understand. tatement made by Col.Ives to Lt. Col. Budway in2 sheds light. Col. Ives statedUSAK, Col. Van Natta, desired to control CCRAK and its organizations.
E. CCRAK's Mission as Defined, GHQ
HQ officers are moving far afield from the original agreement initialed in Seoul on After initialing that agreement they caused to beharter for CCRAK whlcb established the principle of command control over the CIA Mission Korea, ignoring almost all of the basic points required in. Only the principle of unit Integrity remained after that basic order, and subsequent events have repeatedly shownfficers will move beyond that last restriction.
Col. Ives, Chief, CCRAK has indicated that he bas been privately authorized to direct operations outside of Korea.
In addition to the above,HQ bas written that his domination over the CIA Mission Korea will continue until all foreign troops have been removed from Korea, and until the threat of war no longer exists.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS A, Status
of the present situation ofCCRAK can lead to serious raaiiflcations in ourGeneral Ridgway. It is nowat officersGHQ will not keep their word as pledged to CSA, norsees an end to their appetites. Under presentCIA Representative, FKCOM, will have to continue tothe attention of General Rldgway breaches of agreementunder his command. Our relations with Generalhave been fully cooperative on both sides and he hasdisplayed the desire to do the right thing. However, it
is now clearfficers may wellift.
present close association with officersGHQ lead* to the waste of many man-hours whichprofitably be spent upon CIA matters.
Acceptance of tbe present andfficers will leadoss of organizational and operational CIA integrity.
Jt now seems apparentethods in Korea will be extended throughout the Far East Command.
Onceoot in thefficers have proven that they Intend to take over the entire covert and clandestine program of the United States. Once having done so in combat they have indicated that tbey do not intend to relinquish tbat controltate of absolute peace exists in the world.
it is recommended that:
a. The CIA Mission Korea be withdrawn from CCRAK, placed on its own feet, and^directed to continue the attackie enemy.
be removed from
HQ staff supervisory control and establishedimilar footing with the Department of State, keying General Ridgway fully informed where appropriate
Senior CIA Representative Far East Command
Original document.
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