THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Created: 5/23/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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TVnh^oc Aflency andnMiaanea wnorJxoitoni of the Otpgrf. of State ondnd rhe NSA.

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U. Gen. JoMpn F. Carroll, A* Director. Defense Intelligence Agency Dr. leub W. TordeOo, far tha Otmsor, Notional Saeurrr, Agency

Dr. Charles H.or the Auirfont General Manager, Atomic Energy Conv mjwlon. and Mr. WIHlam O. Cragar, for tha Aubtont Director, fod.ro! Bureau of Investigation, ihe ucV being outride oftiiltiHiiM_ -

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CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS

I.

H. FACTORS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION .

and His

Nature of the

Instruments of

Order

Economy

Capabilities

10

Policy 10

Policy13

14

THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK IN COMMUNIST CHINA

the problem

To estimate rhe main trends and outlook in China over the next year or so.

conclusions

situation inside Communist China is still highly fluidoutlook uncertain. Disorder, confusion, and unrest continuebeen reduced since the high water mark last summer.the ranks of those alienated by the Great Proletarianhave grown; the costs in political control, socialeconomic progress have far outweighed the gains. Though'successful in breaking high-level opposition in the old partyin its broader aspects his Cultural Revolution has been awe believe it will be gradually phased out.

still appears to be the central 6gure and source ofMao and the regime are officially committed toew framework for administrative and politicalbalance, we believe that the trend will he toward regainingin part because of the increased influence of thein Peking. But there still will be sharp twists andcrises, and disorder and turmoil at various levelsreflect strong differences among factions and leaders overtactics.

military will remain Peking's most reliable instrumentcoming year. As the only cohesive forceationwideof command and control, the military will have to serve aadministrative and control functions. The scope of theeconomic, andrequire the heavy support

of (lie People's Liberation Army {PIJi) for some years to come.dominance in political life may become institutionalized,if political reconstruction bogs down in violence andrequiring lhe repressive force of the PLA. The corollary to this increased political role is the diversion of the PLA from normal military routineonsequent reduction in its military readiness.

damage to the economyirect result of theincludes depressed industrialelay inand economic growth, aggravated labor problems,the training of technical specialists,eneral hiatus in theof new economic policies and plans. The cumulativethe economy of prolonged political turmoil will not be easilyrepaired. Whatever the political courseoutput is not likely to repeat last year's very good harvests,from exceptionally good weather. At best, China canto restore stability and balance to the economyprospect of expansion. Indeed, thereossibility that ain food output, combined with problems of collectioncoulderious food shortagehich inhave serious political repercussions.

Guard diplomacy" cost Peking last year in relationsas well as non-Communist regimes. Since lastthe regime has taken steps to reduce the violent andinfluence of internal affairs on foreign relations. Inthe Cultural Revolution has noi altered the general linepolicy abroad; it still remains revolutionary in toneand prudent in deeds. Preoccupation with internallikely to relegate foreign concernsecondary role.

major uncertainty in any estimate of China's future isof Mao's passing. The events of the past two yearsit more likely that Mao's departure will ushertormyprotracted period in which policy differences andwill continue toeadership struggle. Mao'slikely to be an enfeebledonfused bureaucracy, andand harried leadership. In our view the ultimate resultto accelerate the rejection of Mao's doctrines and policies.

discussion i. background

L The Croat Proletarian Cultural Resolution ii entering its third year. It hai alreadyrofound effect on every aspect of Etc in China, on the country's internal and external policies, and on its probable future. The course of the revolution has been highly erratic. Moreover, tbe reason* behind (he various twists and turns have often been obscure and confusing.1

fluctuations in policy and revolutionary activity, the generallast summer seemed to be on* of increasing violence and tunnoiltraditional forces for maintaining order were weakened. By August asorts was reached. Fighting among vanous revolutionary groups reachedCivil disorder reached dangerous proportions. The People's(PLA) came under sharp political attack, and political maneuveringa crisis within the top leadership over the future of the Cultural Revolution.

in early September. Peking shifted the line, demanding oncemoderate directives actually be implemented. The attack on the PLAThe army was finally empowered to use limited force toseized during the summer. Revolutionary excesses wereof the political leaders were purged on charges of ultraleftism.became the official program: Peking revived its call for alliances ofPLA leaders, and trusted party cadres as the prerequisite forthe new "revolutionary.hich would assumein the provinces. It reaffirmed its policies that partyto be rehabilitated; factional struggle was to be halted, students wereclasses; nationwide coordination by revolutionary groups was toBy the end of the year Peking was claiming "deexn're" victoryCultural Revolution. There were indicationsarty congressconvened lo legitimatize the changes. In short, it appeared that the "destruc-

ive" phase had endedconstructive" phase bad begun.

the reality has been far different. The "alliances" havewounds rather than healed them. The revolutionary youtheclipse and, as they remain in official favor, areolatile force insituation. Violence has not endedj severe fighting continues toscattered cities, lhe army remains the only effective control instrumentof the country. Tbe new revolutionary committees have been formedgreatest difficulty. The new order is being builteries of

' The. diPoanM of the ariga* ol tbe Cultural Revolution contained In,ultural Revolution/ datedECRET,, appear to be still

II. FACTORS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

A. Moo and His Adherents

5 Any estimate of Chinas future course must begin with (he position and attitudes of Mao Tse-tuog. Despite uncertainties over hb health and mental capacities, he still appears to be the central figure and the source of basic pobcy. The Cultural Revolution has leflectrd Mao's concern over party bureaucratism and growing problems within the society. He has also been concerned to reassert bis authority in the party and lo reinstill revolutionary (crvor in the country at large.

o. Moo apparently felt that the party could not be remolded, but had to be terrorized and demolishedew order could be constructed. The record thus far suggests that Mao remains firmly dedicated to the notion that die Chinese revolution can only be kept alive by involving the "masses" in direct participation in "revolutionaryrom Mao's standpoint, moreover, the past two years have brought some notable gains. He and his coterie have broken the top level resistance that confronted him in the. And he has brought the younger generation into direct participation in political life and revolution, But these gains have yet to be consolidated in the creationew revolutionary order, which is now the paramount task.

Thus far, Mao has displayed considerable tacbeat flexibility in pushing tbe Cultural Revolution, but his room for maneuver has been gradually narrowed for several reasons. Neither the social order nor tbe economy can longolitical vacuum and chaotic direction, and their requirementsime limit on (he Cultural Revolution. Moreover, Mao has not had the whole hearted support of all of his colleagues. While few have dared to confiont him directly, attempts must have been made to deflect him from his more radical plans. Others probably have tried to limit the power and influence of those lenders who have risen rapidly to the topesult of the Cultural Revolution. Mao's own plans have probably not been firmly fired,ajor concept of the revolution has been to stimulate thehus, at various points, new and unforeseen situations have developed which have dictated retreats as well as advances. As each radical phase has brought more damage, the ranks of those alienated by Mao's tactics and policies have grown.

As long as Mao is inroup associated with his more radical policies is likely totrong position within the top leadership. Such elements will almost certainly continue to encourage Mao to push his more revolutionary ideas. They will also work against the more moderate elements and policies that seem to threaten their positions, end they may also turn against each other as has happened in the past. Such competition is likely to beiew toward the tu kfnk

The position of Lin Piao is one of the great mysteries of the CulturalHe issues instructions in the name of Mao, and on the record, he is Mao's "best pupil" and selected heir.ult of sorts has developed around Lin, and

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be seems to behave in the Mao tradition of rare public appearance* andApparently, he standsthe fray of daily struggle. In such circumstances it is difficult to determine with any certainty bis actual role or tbe extent of his political influence.

ii. The Nature of the Opposition

Opposition to Mao and the Cultural Revolution is ill-defined and lacking in cohesion or central direction. Despite charges of plots against him, there has been no straightforward effort to depose Mao that we are aware of. The leadership hai responded to Mao's purges, not by overt opposition, but rather by maneuvering for survival. This has involved evasion, passive resistance,of directives, and assiduous protection of vested interests. ThU defensive reaction has been most risky in the upper echelons where purges have been severe. But at the level of provincial officials and below, despite numerous purges, this form of opposition has been relatively effective, in large part due to the chaos that has grown as the Cultural Revolution has more and more disrupted the social order.

One of the principal results of the resistance to the Cultural Revolution has been the development of two wings in the top leadership. On the one hand there are those vested interest groups and leaden whose primary concern is with maintaining order, stability, and national security, and on the other those charged with the conduct of the revolution Among the more moderate forces are the PLA, the government bureaucracy, and most of the "old guard" of the party. Probably they do notermanent faction, butoose coalition in competition with the Cultural Revolution Croup under Chen Po-tn, Kong Shcng, and Madame Mao.

As number three in the Peking hierarchy. Chou En-lai hasajor role in the Cultural Revolution. He oootinuej to maneuver adroitly through compbeated political conflicts, remaining in the fray but somehow above it, serving Mao but at the same time moderating the more extreme consequences of Maoist policies. As premier of the State Council, Chou has fur many years had responsibility for administering Chinas economic, military, andbureaucracy. He has thus been the spokesman for what we have come to view as the more moderate interests in China. As such, we see him as the symbolic if not actual leader of this group.

There is considerable evidence that (here are important differences in the leadersliip over policy, objectives and tactics though there are probably also areas of common concern. These differences reflect the division of competing interest groups as well as political mfighting for personal gain. Furthermore, conflicts are unavoidable In the bizarre situationegime in power trying toevolution without at the same time destroying the country and itself. These conflicts have been responsible for the twists and rurni in policy and for the air of uncertainty prevailing at various times In Peking. Sincehe forces working for moderation appear to have made im-

portant gain, in power and in their influence over the course of the revolution. Recently, however, the campaign againrt right deviation has shown that the Cultural Revolution Group is by no means oui of action,

n sum. we believe the leadership ii divided on policy matters and is strained by the existence of factions with competing aspirations for power. It willuperficial unity as long as Mao presides over it but the divinons will be an clement of potentially great instability in the short term andduring the post-Mao period.

C. Tho Instruments of Power

he institutional structure of China has been heavily damaged. The effective control formerly exercised by the regime through the party has been seriously weakened. No longer is it clear that Peking speaks with one voice; no longer are its institutions immutable and unassailable. Authority andhave suffered accordingly. By endorsing the slogan "to rebel IsMao has gone far to undermine the mechantsrns of control.

he Parly Apparatus. The Communist Party of China has not beenand the Maoists claim it will be reconstructed and purified.its organr/atlunal structure has been disrupted, its prestige badlyits authority virtually demolished, and its future therefore beclouded. The party elite at all levels from Peking to the counties had been drawn from the "oldr those two millionpercent of the mem herbad joined tbe partyhis elite justified its status on the grounds of seniority, the during ofardships, and its unshakable loyalty lo Mao and theut this elite has become disoriented and shaken to Its roots, first, by Mao's denial of its worth and, second, by Mao's support of young revolutionaries who dispute the qualifications and relevance of the "old guard" for ruling China.

Top party leaders had been purgedut the full assault on the party7 when the Red Guards were ordered to "seize power" and "lo drag out theesult, in each organ and unit one or more of "old guard" officials were selected for severe criticism, pillory, and, in many cases, purging This ritual symbolized the subordination of the party and the "old guard" to Mao and the revolutionaries, but it also paralyzed party operations. The party secretariat has ceased functioning; the party's sixbureaus are being by-passed and presumably have been deactivated; provincial party committees are being replaced by the new revolutionary committees.

The attack on the party has demoralized and confused the cadre. Their ties with deposed party leaders, no matter how routine, have been grounds for suspicion and attack during tbe witch-hunts of the revolutionaries.actions on their purt have been defined as opposition to Mao Attempts to organize their own Red Guards have contributed significantly to the wlde-

spread factional struggles. Longstanding working relationships between party workers and their counterparts in the local military establishments haveled to mutual efforts at resisting Red Guard intrusions. Among the lower level cadres, dropouts have been common as tbe confused directives and contradictory policies have left them hi exposed and dangerous positions.

The Governmental Structure. Many of the experienced bureaucrHts have also been discredited and removed. The formerly efficient bureaucracy isclear signs of strain at it responds indecisively to what are, at best,orders. At the provincial and local levels, girvernmenta] operations have been severely hampered by the administrative confusion. Al the center, governmental ministries continue to function but Red Cuard disruptions have clearly interfered with normal business. Governmental ministers havecriticism and many have been lost to the purges, even Chou En-lai has not been able to protect all of the key personnel in the government.esult, administrative chaoi has occurred, especially at the provincial level which has required the intervention of the army.

The Military. Initially it seemed as if tlie PLA might be only Itghdy involved with the Cultural Revolution The military leadership, however, has not escaped the purges, even though the full disruptive force of the Cultural Revolution has been generally kept out of the inner workings of the PLA. Most of the losses have been within lhe political commissar system, buthave been removed as well. As the authority of the party and the government declined, the PLA, as the only cohesive forceationwide system of command and control, was drawn in to maintain stability and order. It waside variety of administrative and control functionsChina.

Civen this central role, the PLA has found itself heavily involved in local politics as well as in top level disputes. Its problems with these unfamiliar tasks have been severely complicated by vague and often contradictoryfrom the center. In many instances, the PLA encouraged and supported "conservative" Red Cuards. However, the most common reaction was toeutral role In the political disputes and to concentrate on restraining the violence. Even here, however, the PLA often was unable to remain neutral or to act as peacemaker between wining factions.esult of theseresponses, there have been splits at various levels in tbe PLA at various times. Although usually extolled by the Peking leadership, the army's difficult role has'brought it undei attack on several occasions by the militants of the

he Revolutionaries. The role of the Red Guards and more adultgroups, which were organized later, has fluctuated with the ebb and flow of the Cultural Revolution. As shock-troops in the initial assault on the party, the young revolutionaries were useful to Mao. The massive Red Guard ralliesad demonstrated the potency of Mao's unique ability tothehe prompt and enthusiastic response to Mao's charisma was an effective warning to actual or potential Opposition. More recently, ideological

fervor has declined among the revolutionaries as it has among the population at large. Evidence is accumulating that the continuing factional violence owes leas to ideological rnorivation than to struggle between organizations representing the "haves" and "have-nots" for power, status, and material advantages,

Aj the top level control instrument of the Red Guards and other revohi-tion.ii) ur^aru^sidOH tbe Cultural Revolution Group liasbeen uMtatt The originalember group has been largely purged. However. Die topPo-ta, Kang Sheng, and Madametheir prominent rank, with the possible exception of Kang, their rise and their survival Is largely due to their close ties to Mao Their vested interest In continuing "revolution" Is no doubt niBected in their advice to Mao as welt as their guidance of the Red Guard revolutionaries.

The Sew Power Structure. Peking has been trying since7 to putew power apparatus incorporating the party cadres, the PLA, and the "revolutionaryhe center has officially proclaimed that each province and city Is to be governedevolutionary committee basedthree-way alliance" of these elements. The first revolutionary committee was formed in Heilungkiang Province on7 Progress was slow and erratic last year, but the pace has quickened in recent months, andew major administrative areas have yet to set up the new committees

he future role and powers of these revolutionary commatiees are quite uncertain, especially in lightolicy to rebuild the party. The committees have been described as onlyothing has been said, however, of reesublishing the provincsa! governments. In any ease, the regime hasit hones to complete the reorganization process

ho process ofew adrninistrative apparatus for the provinces has sharpened the very factionalism it was intended to halt. Rival Red Guard organizations have resisted mergers with old enemies, the relationship between former party cadres and the Red Guards is still greatly strained, and the PLA has been hard pressed to carry out its ambiguous orders. Even though violence has abated in the general sense, fierce political infighting and tensions continue. In effect, there willequirement for the PLA to remain in control until the new revolutionary committees develop unity and administrative effectiveness or until the party is itself sufficiendy reconstructed to reassert authority.

D. Social Order

n addition to the violence directly related to tho politics of the Cultural Revolution, there haseneral decline In social order and discipline In China. We cannot determine how pervasive the present lawlessness (black-marketing, bribery, profiteering, petty crime, and the violent settling of old scores) has become. But the regimes former effectiveness in suppressing such activity has clearly deteriorated Moreover, the surplus urban population, which had been moved into the rural areas, has lowed back koto the cities where it survive* as best It can. often illegally. Similarly, the students have resisted

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regime orders lo return to iheir schools, and have done so in the name of Mao. For their part, the workers have taken advantage of the confusion to push for greater material benefits and better working conditions. Unless thesetoward unsanctioned individual and group action can soon be contained, they could have far-reaching implications tor the future of tbe Communist system in China.

coercion through propaganda and the all-pervasiveno longer effective controls, and the PLA lacks lhe numbers and theto control society as the party did. Until an equivalent of the party'smechanism can be rebuilt, which may take years, the regime has litUetoeduced presence in many areas. Revolutionary excessesunrest and the invitation to seize authority has encouragedat solving problems. Sporadic violence ts therefore likelyven with clear and precise orders, the PLA will need time tosituation, and will certainly be unable to remove the underlyingPeking may have to chooseeavier use of militarymaintain orderore flexible approach to social controls, such asincentives.

E. The Economy

Despite Mao's radical views on economic development, economic policy has not been subjected to the extremes of the Cultural Revolution. Even though many of the existing policies ore being attributed to the disgraced Liu Shao-chi, we have seen no significant departures from the relatively permissive line on private plots and free markets In the rural areas or from relatively conservative policies in industry. Thus, despite the unceasing rhetoric endorsing Mao's views and refuting those attributed to Lro, the actual policies have been relatively unaffected. As regards planning the Third Five-Years no longer referred tolmostead issue.

Tbe disorder and turmoil had an adverse effect on the economyroduction losses in industry have been reflected in reduced construction, in declining inventories, and in depressed foreign trade. Disruptions in transport and coal shortages in particular affected the entire economy. Agriculture, on the other hand,right spot due to unusually favorable weather, and this has sustained consumption, thus precluding severe personal hardship.

In the urban labor force, with industrial production down and theof working age expanding, the number of unemployed and underemployed has jumped lo the lastonths. At the same time, the regime has been preaching frugality and has been attempting to cut wages and fringe benefits. These developments, coupled with the general turmod and factionalism of the Cultural Revolution, have led to serious clashes between groups of workers and widespread discontent with Irving standards and employment opportunities. The regime has promised to reexamine the whole wage questionater stage

in Ihe Cultural Revolution. In the short term, however, no relief can beand popular discontent probably will mount.

the longer run. the economy's need (or highly trained specialistsseriously compromised by the nearly two-year closure of thevery virulence of the attack on intellectuals willesumptionhigher education difficult Indeed, if the curricula are changedproposed direction of eurrunaring foreign influences in favor of Maoistthe quality of education couldurther serious decline. Thelower and middle schools is less serious in terms of vocational skillsschools bad already graduated more students than could be absorbedmodern economy.

F. Military Capabilities

The heavy commitment of troops to Cultural Revolution activities has almost certainly disrupted the training mission of the PLA; that it may also be disturbing the morale and effectiveness of the troops is more difficult to prove, but nevertheless likely. The scope of the rebuildingeconomic, andnow faces the regime seems likely to require the heavy support of the PLA for some time to come.esult it Is unlikely that the military can recoup Its losses in combat readiness. The sheer weight of the political and administrative tasks will inevitably affect the performance of its military duties. In tbe eventilitary threat to China, however, the PLA probably couldood account of itself'

Construction, missile firings, and nuclear testing have continued in theweapons field throughout the Cultural Revolution. But there is good evidence that political turmod has spread to organizations directing and implementing the advanced weapons program.peech ofhou Enlai deplored the damage that factional strife had caused in the military industries. He referred to prolonged political struggles and damage to equipment in the ministry responsible for missiles. We have no solid information on how serious these disruptions might have been. But it seems likely that resource allocation and policy guidance must have suffered during the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

ROSPECTS A. Internal Polky

are ofumber of major uncertainties affecting anyChinas future course. There wiE be unforeseen events, such as theat Wuhan hut year, or the death of some key figure such as Mao,Chou. Personal animosities and tension among competing interestintensified, they may increase to the point where they wil] preventof major issues. Conflict will almost certainly continue over the

aUtd dlicusslon of military wadintis will be ukrn up Id the forthcomingCommunbt China's General Purpow ami Air Drhnse Korcm."

process of leconstxucting the party and there will he tension over Ihc relative Influence of military and civilian leadership. Outside events, such as the war In Vietnam, could alter Peking's attitude Popular disillusionment as well as economic disruption may preclude any carry restoration of social stability,If thereharp decline in farm outputurther discrediting the present leadership.

nlikely that Mao vrifl ever be satisfiedeneral stabilization of political hie at the cost of his rworotionaxy programs, fie wdl probably try to keep on initiating such programs to achieve furtherhinese society and politics, though with some appreciation of the dangers of anarchy and economic chaos. He is likely to be suspicious of retreats and to favor periodic upsurges in revolutionaryf he sees the responses as Incorrect or inadequate, be may attempt further purges. This basic attitude of Mao has been and will continue to be responsible,arge extent, for the continuing turmoil. As long as there is room for doubt over Mao's attitude toward how to continue thethere will be elements in the leadership and especially among young revolutionaries who will be encouraged to persist in their disruptivehe name of Mao. They will do so partly in the belief that this is actuallyanted, regardless of officii] edicts to the contrary, and partly to protect or enhance their power poiitiom

the outlook for China is at best uncertain. On the basis ofIt would be prudent to allow for some sharp turns and surprises.trend appears to be running against the extremes of Maoism. Evenhas demonstrated remarkable tolerance for prolonged chaos, therebe growing recognition in Peking that it is time to cut the losses ofRevolution and to consolidate the limited gains.

balance, we believe that the trend will be toward regainingu partly because the resistance to the revolution reached dangerouslast summer andonfrontation between the army andIt also reflects increased political influence of the moreelements in Peking. Finally, Mao himself probably concurred in themoderation, since he himself hopes toew order out ofof the old party apparatus.

The Cultural Revolution as such will not be repudiated, just as the Creat Leap Forward was never formally discredited, but under the guise of victory statements, the more radical and destructive features will probably be set aside. This does not mean the situation will promptly return to normal.ikely to be considerable disarray and confusion for some time. Fighting will probably break out from time to time and become severe in some areas. Political maneuveringPeking will continue.

We believeew organizational framework will gradually evolve. Its ultimate composition and correlation of forces is uncertain. Mao at least intends that it should reflect the influence of the new revolutionary generation; lhe Cultural Revolution Croup will seek to establbh revolutionary Influence over

the process of party building and within the revolutionary committees. The record thus far. however, suggests that the PLA and the party cadres will probably ba tbe predominant elements. Thus, tbe reconstruction of the party and tbe evolution of the powers of the revolutionary committees will probably be the sources of continuing struggle, though perhaps not in asorm as in the put two years.

The military will remain Peking's most reliable instrument of control over at least the coming vear. 'Ihe PLA will have the main responsibility for carrying out the political reorganizations. Military dominance in political life may become institutionalized, particularly if political reionstruction bogs down in violence and disarray or if economic and social problems require the repressive force of the PLA.

Beset by many problems, China can at best hope only to restore stability and balance to the economyoregoing any prospect of expansion. Even this hope rests on the dubious assumption that China can restore effectivepriorities and disciplineime of continued political conflict. Kor example. Peking would have to reimpose effective controls over the distribution of food, wages, and movements of the population. In view of the limited progress towards economic stability so far this year, economic performance for the whole8 probably willontinued decline.

In anyecline in agricultural production is likely compared with last years very good harvests. Weather conditions are uriHkeh/ to be as favorable ashe supply of chemical fertilizer will bo reduced, and the effects of poor management in the irrigation system will be felt. The lack of firm administrative control may lead to serious problems in procurement and distribution of food. Thus, thereossibibty that severe food shortages win developith major political consequences.inimum, farm output8 will probably be reduced enough to inhibit economic growth

There are various Indications that Mao considers the economic policies followed since the collapse of the Great Loup Forward to be revisionist; they relied too much on material Incentives and discipline and too little on the inspirational, creative force of Maoist doctrine. Mao believes that only bythe latent energies of the Chinese masses can China's economic problems be overcome. It may be that the Cultural Revoluttoo was intended, in part,reparing of the ground for some drastic stroke by Mao in the field of economic policy.

If so. the situation hardly seems ripe for any such move. To attempt another Leap Forward type of experiment in the midst of the current turmoil and without an effective management and control apparatus, would Invite an economic and social crisis. Peking will have its hands full in restoring order and balance to the economy and it lacks the mvestrncnt resources topiificant long-term expansion program. We therefore conclude that major initiatives in economic policy are unlikely this year.

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B. External Policy

Tied Guard diplomacy" cost Peking heavilyhinese diplomats arrogantly propagandized Mao's revolutionary dogma abroad while xenophobia was encouraged at home. This truculent approach created serious problems in neutral Asian counlries such as Burma. Cambodia, Nepal, and Ceylon where China had earlier built up reasonably good relations. DiplomaticIn Peking were exposed to the fanaticism of the mob. British, French, Czechs, Russians. Mongolians, Japanese, Indians, and Indonesians sufferedabuse in Peking; diplomatic premises were invaded and in some cases sacked. For at least four days in August, Foreign Minister Chen Yi was displaced by one of the ultraleftists thrown up by the Cultural Revolution.

The violent phase was relatively short-lived,ore balanced approach has prevailed since the excesses of August. But the verbal assault on Burma, Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, India, and Indonesia has continued. This harsher revolutionary policy in support of insurgency, even in countries with which Peking has diplomatic relations, will probably continue at least so long as Mao and his general line dominate in China. Although domestic preoccupations will8 an unlikely time for Peking to mount any major subversive effort beyond its borders, wc expect Peking to continue its low-level assistance to the Thai, Burmese, and Indian insurgents. Such assistance would be consistent with Peking's past actions In those areas where the danger of confrontation with the US is slight.

Vietnam remains Peking's most immediate concern. Even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, China maintained its military and economic support of Hanoi, tolerated almost open political differences, and sought to portray Vietnamese developments as successes for Mao's strategy. But in Vietnam as elsewhere in the Far East, Peking has been cautious about risking military confrontation with the US.

In the near future, Peking's aim will be to keep Hanoi moving toward what Peking hopes willajor foreign policy success, the defeat orof the US from Vietnam. To this end Peking will continue to urge Hanoi to perservererotracted war without overt Chinese participation.

Peking strongly opposes the idea of serious negotiations over Vietnam at this stage in the war. It will probably press Hanoi to be as stiff andas possible in the discussions with the US. Even so, it will probably not take coercive measures such as cutting off aid to Hanoi. Peking lacks sufficient influence in Hanoi to block full-fledged negotiationettlement Should Hanoiease-fire, Peking would disapprove but would have to accept Hanoi's decision.

t the other focal point of China's foreign policy, relations with the Soviet Union remain frozen in bitterness. Peking's obsessive anti-Soviet line has ruled out "united action" by the Communist nations on behalf of Vietnam, and has cost China the support of formerly friendly Communist parties. The result

rr

bas been lo heighten China's isolation, and together with the radicalof the Cultural Revolution, has damaged Peking's prestige on almost all fronts.

o see no basis for compromise in Sino-Soviet relations so long as Mao is alive. The Soviet build-up of military forces along Cnina's northern border points up how far the jymftfaf has progressedhina must beto thu show of force, as well as the Soviet potential for subversion among the minority populations along the border. But we believe Peking will remain cautious about raising military tensions in border areas and will probably notomparable build-up on the Chinese side.

IV. AFTER MAO

Mao dies in the nest year or so, the succession will probably beand contentious. Lin Piao haslear mandate aswe believe his prospects of consolidating his position arc quiteLin might take over as Chairman of tbe Board, with Chou En-iaiChief Executive. Cbou's unique abilities might hold thingsransition period. But varying attitudes and approaches ofpartially repressed by Mao'stormy and possibly protracted period in which basicierce leadership struggle. Personalities will rise and fall ascontest for positions in the new power structure. At this stageunable to say how tbe leadership might sort itself out Much willthe balance of power which develops in tbe process of reconstructingorder. Present trends suggest the military might play the centralpost-Mao China.

Judgment on Maoism is already coming in. and it will beavdythe direction of future Chinese policy after Mao. Mao's legacy isbe an enfeebledonfused bureaucracy,ivided andFactionalism and strife have replaced the discipline and unitycharacterized the regime. Mao's drive to revive revolutionaryhas bad tbe opposite effect. It is possible that Mao maythat restore some of Chinese communisms old forwardwx doubt that his specific programs would long survive him. Histo break the hold of the past will probably have some limitedChina's, culture and traditions are already modifying Mao'sas Mao attempts to reshape old habits and customs. Mostof Mao's revolutionary dogma is proving irrelevant to China'sthe modern world. It is likely that the rejection of his doctrines,necessarily of communism in the broadest sense, will accelerate at his passing.

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