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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The Short-Term Outlook in Communist China
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CofKvrrvd in by Ww UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
8
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ufel Torlc. Deputy OtncfOr, Cr-iNoi
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eaaph F. Carroll,rnaaTejaacar. loot. W. Tc.rj.lla. fore-vrtr, Aaarey
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Dr.or tha AraareM OoMroiwgyaad Air. WJIrarn Q. Crraar, forulifom Director,v*Uwtgof[uhdicMfl.
CONTENTS
tag*
THE PROBLEM1
CONCLUSIONSi
DISCUSSION3
L BACKCfbOUND>
IL FACTORS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION 4
to
a The Nature of Ibe
C Tholruixuineirbd
D. Soda! Clrirsr
e. Th. r,
P. Mfttary Cipab;btifi10
IILM
A ' .
IS
IV. AFTERM
the short-term outlook in communist china
THe PHOBLHM
To estimate tho main trench nnd outlook in China over the next
A The dtaatJon inside Cksmmunist China is still highly fruid acd the outlook uncertain. Disorder, confusion, and unrest continue buten reduced since the high water mark last summer.the ranks of those alienated by the Great Proletarian Culturali have grown; the costs in political control, social discipline, and economic progress havetwdghed the gains. Though Mao was successful in breaking high-level opposition in the old party ap-ptuatist, in its broader aspects hb Cultural RevolutJou hasailure and we believe it will be gradually phased oat
still appears to be the central figure and soon* ofMao and the regime are offi dally commirted toew fraxnework im .nunLimitative and politicalbalance, we believe that tin trend wfll be toward regainingIn part because of the Increased influence of thein Peking. But therewill be sharp twists andcrises, and disorder and turmoil at various levelsreflect strong differences among factions and leaden overbuMa
military wi" remain Peking's most reliable mstrumentcoming year. As tbe only cohesive lore*sattcaawideof command and control, the military will have to serve aadministrative and control functions. Tbe scope of theeconomic, andrequire the heavy support
SECRET^
of ihe People's Liberation Army (PLA) for some years to come.dominance in political life may liecnme institutiorialized.if political reconstruction bogs down in vioience andrequiring the repressive, force of tbe PLA. The corollary to this Increased political role Is the diversion of the PLA from normal military routineonsequent reduction in Its military readiness.
darnage to the economyirect result of themcludea depressed industrialelay inand economic growth, aggravated labor problems,the training of technical specialists,eneral hiatus In tbetkm of new economic policies and plans. Tbe cumulativethe econorny of prolonged political toxmoil will not be easilyrepaired. Whatever the political courseoutput is not likely to repeat last year's very good harvests,from exceptionally good weather. At best, China canto restore stability aod balance tn the econornyprospect of espensiuo. Indeed, thereossibility- that ain food output, combined with problems of collectioncoulderious food shortagehich inhave serious pohOcal repercussions.
Guard diplomacy" cost Peking last year in relationsas well as oon-Communlst regimes. Since lastthe regime hn* taken steps to reduce the violent andinfluence of mtexruJ affairs on foreign relations. Intbe Cultural Revolution has not altered tbe general linepolicy abroad; Itremains revolutionary in toneand prudent ineoccupation with internallikely to relegate foreign coooernsecondary role.
major uncertainty in any estimate of China's future Isof Mao's passing. Tbe events of tbo past two yearsit more likely that Mao's departure will ushertormyprotracted period In which policy differences andwill continue toeadership straggle. Mao'slikely to be an enfeebledonfused bureaucicy. andand harried leadership. In our view the ultimate resultto accelerate the rejection of Mao's doctrineti and policies.
ACKGROUND
ha Cnal Proletarian Culwral Rovolotion is catodng tn third year. It hai alreadyrofound affect oa every aspect of Ufa bt China, on the country! external and asternal pcfictes. and on id probable future. The afcrae of the leeckacton hat been bjrhJy errtbie. Horeover. tha reaacau behind the various errant ami tarn* have oftrn barn chtoara and ccrafaatar,1
t DtapBa ftsctuatiota tn rxacyr/olsstsotaty acdvtty. the generallait iiunmer leaned to be one of jocrea.ing vtoleince and rurrnoi]tradtnonal forces for maintaining order were wcak-aticd By August a
of torts wai reached. Plgbttag arnong various revolution try groupeak. CMl disorder rea-ched cUngcsout proportions. The Peoples Libmtfon Army (PLA) came under sharp po Hi leal attack, and polilical mareuit-ringa iiwHJtln the top leadership over the future of tho tidtural Revolution.
uddenly, in early Srnyrrtrnbcr. Peking shifted tha line, demanding once again that rnodoratn directive* actua-Ty be Irnplatnantad. The attach on tha PLA wot repudiated. The array was finally trnpowertd to aae Hound force torapctu tetsed daring the luaatnrr. Revohstdoaasty tat esterliaf ul Sotne of tha political kaoart were purged oa charges of uUialeftism, Stabui-loticn become tha official program: Pitting lavivad Ita call for tdhsaxM of Bed Guards. PLA leaders, and truned party cadres as the prereoulsne for eonsjtruet-tog the new "re-vrJuticetaryinch would sasume adminUtro-nr resporuihllitlei In the provinces. It reaffirmed Its policies that party cadres were to be; facHoral struggle was to bo halted; students wens to resume claute; nationwide coordination by resohitlonoiy groups was to be restricted Dy the and of the year Peking wai cUuTdng 'decisive' victory for the Cultural Revolution. There were indicationsarty congress would be convened to legiiitat tixe th* cbangra. In ihort. it appoorrd that the "dotrue Bva" phase and endedccasltracttva" pbant fend begun.
4rat th* rtadtty hat bean far ctteraat. Th* "alattteoa" have frrqcnuywourstb rather than healed tbetn.olotionary youth rraent rhetr ocUps* and, at tbey remain infavor. Meolatile force an an unstable situation. Violence hat not ended; savant ightlng eoisdrsucs to erupt tn scattered ottiea. The army remains the only etlretire control fnatrernont In
most of tho country. The new revolutionnry corntnltteei have been formed
the greatest difficulty. The new order Is being builteries of unliable
comprornJts*.
'Tie dbiuaUn of aw wtclns af th* Cultural BssoluUw -onUlned InTho Chines* OilflntlM-tiBET.ut io be Kill solid.
skui
II. FACTORS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION
A. moo ond He. Adherents
ny estimate of China'i future course must begin with the potation and altttudea of Mso tit-tang. Despite uncerlainoei over lii, health ande mil appears to be the central figure and the tource of basic policy. The Cultural Revolution hu reflected Mao's concern over party bureaucratlirn and growing problems wlihln tbe society. He hai also been concerned In reassert hai authority as tha party end to rvtoeuji le^earDOaary fervor rn tha lOenUy at large.
ft Mao apwenrty fait that the party could not be remolded, but had lo ba terrorised and demoltihedow order could be constructed. Tho record thus Ear suggests that Mao remains firmly dedicated to the notion that the Oilni Sjsjeaaaaafl can only be Vent eave by atvoMng Iha tnasees" in direct parttcipoSoo ta "revcJubonaryrom Mao's atandpoeul, rrwrtover. ihr put twoave brought lome rxtfablo giWs He and hie coterie hava broken tha too level resistance that ccofrooted ban as theCs. And he Sas
brought the younger generanoa Into direct pankipation In political life and levohition But these gains have yet to be coosollOated in the creationew nrvotoOonary order, whack ti cow the paramount task.
far. Mao has da-ployed csmakkarabla bsrsteal oentanly asCultural IWvcVutioa but his room for rneneuvar has been graduallyseveral reasons. Neither the social order nor the economy can longpolitical vacuum and chaotic direction, and their requirements imposeon tlie Cultural Revolution Moreover, Moo tiai not hud the wholnof all of hi* colleagues. While few have dared to confronl himmust havelo dr*ect hen been Wi more rmdxal oUnihave tried lo lanB tha power aad Influence of those kaooi whorapidly to Iha Upesult ef the Cejnrral Revolution. Meei ovaprobably not been Brmty Rind,ajor concept of thebeen to Wimulate thehus, at various points, new andhava doveloped which have die*sledas well as advances.radical phase has brought mote damage, tha ranks of those alienatedtactics and polsctca have growu.
long tan power.groopwith hu more rwixallikely totrong postnon within tha top leadership. Suchalrnoet certainly continue to encourage Mao lo posh bis moreThey will abo work against the more moderate elements andlean to threaten their positions, and they may also turn agaimt eachhas happened lo the past. Such compel!ban ta likely In be undertakenwtCae new toward tbe ewcerssion to Mac.
ft The peaktoa of Lin Flee ta one of the greet myoetfes of the CakunlHe issues mstroctions in the name of Mao, and on the record, ha Is Mao'spupil" and selected heir. ult of sorts has developed around Lin, and
be teems to behave In the Mao tradition of rare public appearance*pparently,stands above tha fray of daily struggle In luch dftrunutancaai diScuH to dtrtanaiiie wtth any certainty hn actual roie or the aataol of hii political tnHoanca.
B. The Nature of tho OppotJnon
ppotitIon to Mao and the Cultural Revolution is ffi-deflned and lacking In cohtoton or oenttal direction. Despite charges of plots against lum, there has bean no Uraightforvmd eflort to depoa* Mao lhat we am aware of. The leadership has responded lo Mao's purges, not by overt crpooraiton, bal rather by rnarwuverfag for surrivaL This haa involved evasion, passive reiistaeca. hmnt-fag of JheUliia. end asalownaa protecnon of vested mteeMi This defeemve reaction has been moot naky in die upper etfaetaro where purges have heen severe. But at the level of provincial ottcUls and below, deapitees, thb form of oppcaltion has been relatively efiw-tivn, in Urge port due ro the chaos that hu grown aa (he Cultural Revolution has mote and moio disrupted the social order.
ne ol the prfadpol rceults of the rn3 tanca to the Cottund Ravolutfcn has been tbe devaioeanenl of two Brings fa Use top ktndetsarp Oo tha one hand there are thcee vested Interest groups aad leaders whcee primaiy concern Is wKh moiDtainlrig order, stability, and national security, and on the other those charged with tha conduct of tbe re ro hi non Among the more moderate force* ore the PLA, Ihe government bureaucracy, and most of (ha "old guard" of the party. Probably they do notnrnr ent faction, butooae coalition Id ccrraprOtlon with tbe Cultural RevofaOoo Croup under Chan Po-ta. sjog Some, and Ms-It* Mao.
s ournber three In (he Peking hierarchy. Chou Kn-lal basrsoor roie in (he Cultural Revohition. He continues to maneuver adroitly through compliceted political conflicts, remaining lo (he fray but somehowerving Mso buttha
of Maoist policies. As premier of (hu State Council Chou has for many years had rssapcnslbiltty for adntmiseartrag Chita's ecaaansnr, rmhtary. andbureaucracy. He has thus been thefor what we have eoaaa to view aa the more moderate interests fa Chfaa. As snch, we Bee ban as the
symbolic if not actual lender of this group.
onsiderable evidence that there an Important rliiferences in the leadership over policy, obiectlves and tactics though there ore probably also areas of oarnmon concern. These chiTerrnce* reelect the division of osapeong internet tyoape as well as pobbcol fafigbbog for personal gain. Purusrasnare, cooshets era lauvoadable In tha bizarre ritinnoeegime in power trying toevolution without at the seme time destroying the country and itself These conflict* haw bean responsible for ibe twists and turns la policy and tor the air af uncertainty reevailiag at various times fa Peking, Sincehe forces working for moderation appear to haveien-
gaJos in power and in their Irsfhtenoa ovrrr tha course of the revolution, lseeanlly. hovn-war. the ctrnpaign against right dcvieikxi has shown that the Cohural Ravchrdon Croup ta be no snrrana out of fcOoa.
n turn, wo bealevn tbotvided on policy mattersrjdined by the cdsteooa of hv*ons with competing aspirations for power. It willuperficial unity as ktng ai Mao presides over tt, but tho divisions wfl ba an element of rjotnrseksuv great Instability In ibt snort term and ttspc-rsssDy daring iha poat-Uao porsod
C. Tht Insttinnorrrs of Powtr
Lvviuui ^ - ^
seriously weakened. So longer t> it clear that Peking speak with oi no longer am it* inMitutloni immutable and unassailable. Aulliortty Opllno have suffered tccordlngiy. By endorsirig the slognn "to rebelao has gone far to undermine tbe mechaniirnj of control.
IS. Tha mstltutlonal i'merine of China has been hatvuy damaged. Tbe effective control frxroaarly esttrridsad by tha regime ihrough the party has been
- om voice;
andhntf-lB. Tht Party AptsstrrriUf, Tht Communist Party of China has not beanand the Maoists rntaa it anV be reccoseructed and pwiissedceyarssaaQonal rnsscttrr* hat barn dtrrstptcd. fti prestige hadh/ts atrrhraity virtually densoltdvtd, tad its future therefeeo Uefc-oded. Tbe party elite at nil loveai from Peking to the counties had been drawn from tha oldr those two millionpercent of thebad kstned tha party by lMfk Thai elite tuatsaed ks status on the groundi of ssarueeity, lha rharfog of pralWB rasrebhipt, and sts rassaakabit kryakyMao and the party, lot tins alto bat beeotne oWfcrtttd and arsahaa toroots,y Mao'i oVarlal of its worth and, second, by Mao's nrpoort of young rovcbri^nariei who dispute lha cjualijlcoturns andof the "old r. -ifor rahng China.
opo dart had been pureedul tha ful assault on the party rsrsrat fa7 when the Red Case da were ordrrrd to "wire power" tad "to drag oat thasrsoh. In each organ and unit one or more of "old guard" oraciala wert wlteted for severe criticism, pillory, and, in many esses, purging. This ritual symbol]red the subnrrlinstlon of the party and tfca "cad guard" to Mao aad the levokitijosres. but tt aha parah/nd party opetattons The party trottta/tot hat ceased timrriiwrhrt. tha party's ab n> gfonal bureaus are being by-pasted and rsresurnnbly have been deactivated; provincial party commuters are being replaced by tho new revolutionary
IS. The attack on the party has ekrric-ruiiwd and confused tho cadre. Their lies with deposed party leaders, no matter how routine, have been grounds for ruipicion and attack during llw witeh-honls of the levolotiontsies.actions on Iheir part have been defined as eprotitioo Io Maoganire thetr own Rod Guards have contributed sigrrlfkanlry to tbe
spread liiii'fiiilnngtiipding working relationships between parry workers and Ihdr counterparts In die load military eetoblUheienli hava occa-ilooally led to mulue) efforti at mining Red Coord intmsoni Among ibe lower leveleroute ba ve bra ocstnanon ai ibe coofmcd daw Avar andedicles nave Wt tbem an tunniid and dangetrnn poaUktna.
htracture. Many of Ihe cnwrumced boraaimati have alao been dltCTcdited and removed. The formerly efficient bureaucracy Itclear slgni of strainesponds indecisively Io what ore, al best, coo-fusing orders. At the provincial and local levels, governmental operations have bean leverely hampered by (be adirinLrtraliie confusion. At iha center, go-rrnmcntal mirastrfces contbaoe to hmction bat Red Cuard disruptions have dearly aaarfnul wilh normal business. Gownnvsoral rniuuters havecriticism and many have been lost to the purges, even Cboa Cn lai bas not been able to protect all ot the key personmol In Ihe governmentesult, sdminlstralive chaos has occurred, especially at the provincial level, which has required the intervention of the army.
he Military. Initially it seemed as If tha PLA might ba only lightly involved with tbe Cultural Revoiauon. The aulltery leadership, however, haa not eacaped theven dtough the fall dieruptfve farce of tha Cultural Revcduhoa has bean generally kept oat of the Inner wontnsgs of the PLA. Most of ihe losses have heon within the pootxal coraminar system, but ccan-manders have bra removed as well. As the authority of the party and the governmeni declined, tha PLA, as the only cohesive forceationwide system of command and control, was drawn in to maintain stability and order. It waaide variety of adtnfeistrative and control function*China.
Civen this central roie, the PLA has found itself heavily rnvceVed to local politics en wai as in top level disposer. Its proMeens with these unfamiliar task* hava been severely complicated by vague and often contradictory direc-tivei from the center. In many Instances, tha PLA encouraged and supported "cool rev altvo* Red Guards. However, ibe most oomtnon reaction was toeutral tola in tha political disputes and tn concentrate oo restraining ihe violence. Even hare, however, the PLA often was on able to remain neutral ar to arteacemaker lil'mau warring factions.esult of these coo-Irasong reaponsea, there hava been spbks at various levels in the PLA at various times- Although usually estohed by thr Peking leadership, the army* difficult rote haa brought it under attack oo several occaaions by tho rnflitant* of the Cultural Revolution Croup.
The Revolutionaries. The role of Iha Red Cuards and mora adultgroups, which ware organized later, has fluctuated with (he ebb and now of (ha Cultural Revotolloo. As shock-steeps In die initio] assault on the party, the young rcvceutJcesrorta* were esctei to Moo. The aaossree Red Coord ralliesad demonstrated (he potency of Moo's unique ability to(hehe prompt and enthusiastic response to Mao's charierna was an arningctualpposition. More recently, ideological
fervor hoi declined1 among (ha revolutionaries it It hai among tbo population at lorgn.ccumulating that the continuing factional violence owes leu to id rological motivation than to struggle between ceganiatloni representing the *havta" andfor power, status, and rxiatrrtnl advantages.
tX Ai tha top level control tostrusneot of the Red Guards and other rwciu-Uonary ceginiralions, the Cultural Revcahsttoo Croup has also hcen unstable. The originalember group has been hugely purged, llowavar, the topPo-ta, Kong Sheng, and Madamsthetr prominent rank; with the possible eicopikm of Hang, thou- rba and their turvlval la hugely doe to tbalr dose Oct to Mao. Thetr vested intent at tn continuing "resolution" ia no doubt reflected in tbrtr advice to Mao ar well as theirf the Red Guard rrvoiuttcraartee.
M. The Ntto Pocor*eking hat been trying since7 to putew power apparatus incorporating ihe partyha PLA, and the 'revolutionary music. Tha center has olBeially proclaimed thnt each province and dty is to be ginctnedevolutionary committee busedrJsrea>wiylienor" of (beta elements. The first rtnoiiitlcasary crsrnrolrtoB was firmed In Hrlhsngkung Province onrcareas was alow and erratic last year, bat tbe pace bra quickened In recent rncattbt, andew tratfor administrative treat have yetet ip th* new eortarasBrco.
ho future role and powers erf these revolittlorttiy eeanrrdtteea ar* quite iiiicertaln, especially fn lightolicy to rebuild (ho party. The cumtnlttces have been described as only "provinooaL" Nothing his been laid, however, of rreslabhshtng the proviiseialIn any cose, the regime hotit hope* tt ooavplat* th* reorgsusarattoa pnnnai
h* process ofow adsssnaatratfv* tpparatu* for the provinces has sharpened the wry toctJonaasni Itoaded to hart Rival Red Guard organiittioni have resisted mar gars with old encTalat, tho reiadonihip between fearner party cache* and tlie Rtd Cuards ft still greatly strained, and (he PLAm hard pressed to carry out its ambiguou* orders. Even though violence has abated ta the gecarslierce political infighting and tenstom eotstlnoe. In efleef, there mmequirement for th* PLA to rrnstob in control ursCd th*t-voluticoary crxtnureet develop isnrty aad adariosstrariv* rsfectrveness or until th* party is itself suaTcieotJy reconstructed lo reassert authority.
ocial Cvd*f
n addition to the vlolcmw directly related io the politics of the Cultural tvevolulion, than hasoner al clcchne in social order and discipline in* cannot detrarrrln* how rteevonvc tha present(block-rnarkettng, bribery, proa tecs tng, petty crime, and the violent settling of oldat become. But the regime's former elect! rent as in suppreasUig Rich activity bat il early deteriorated Moreover, th* surplus urban population, which had been moved into the rural areas, has flowed hack into the cities where It survival as best it can, often Illegally. Sirallarly. (bo student* have resisted
B
regime cardan to return to their schools, and hove doc* so to the hum of Mao. For the*ha worker* haw taken tcSaotage of tha confusion to push for greater material baawhts aad better working crtvdOinm Union thee*toward unaamtloaad bdividuot and group action can rood bo contained, they ootid have lar-rcarchtog Implkanoas (or the fatoro of tha Coaxnunirt tptemhina.
sycttologlcal coercion through propaganda and tho aJLpcrvnnva party axe no looger edectlve tuntroU, and the PLA bets tho numbm and thoto control lorrlety ai the party did. Until on equivalent of the party'srnechanbm can ba rebuilt, which may take years, the regime has littletoeduced presence in many areas Hmoaunooary ricmscs nave created unrest and the iniVatJoo to seua authority haa ericouraged forceful attempts at wiving prehlanra. Sporadic violence ir therefort hluafy toS. Even with clear and precise ordars, the PLA will need Hese to control tha attoataon, and wfll certainly ba enable to remove the tarnsar tying tenant ITttrnataly, PeldBg may hava to caooaceavier eaa of miliary power to mamtsin orderora Arable approach to social ceotroa, such astaoantivaa.
C Tha Economy
espite Mao's radical views on economic development, economic policy has not been subjected to the esfrrenes of the Cultural Ilevolutioti Even though many of tbo esloting poaKiei ere being attributed to the dagraced Liu Shao-chi, we have seen no slemificant departure* from use relatively permissive lane on private plots and free markets Hi the rural areas orlilively conservative pciiOae In industry Thus, despite tha unceasing rhetoric endorsing Mao's new. tod -eiuttog thcaa atrrsbuted to Lia. the actaal policial hava been relatively ocaJtcted Asan tog, tbe Third Five-Yearoterred tnlmostead lour,
he disorder and turmoil had as advene rrflact oa tha economyroductionndustry have been reflected In redoced construction, in declining inventories, and in deprossed foreign trade. Dlmiptlora In transport and coal ihortagm in particular oKccted the entka rctioooiy. Agriculture, on ihe other hand,right ipot due to unusually ravraiible wealher, and this has sustained oontnmptlnn, thus precluding severe peraontl hardship.
n the urban Ubor force, with Industrial production down and theof working age copending, the number of rsnrnsployad and underemployed has hooped to the Vastt the same lane, tha regfeue has been preaching frugality and haa been atleiaptlug to cat wages aad fringe benefits. These daveioptnents, coupled wiih tbe general turmoil and facrlowahaaa of the Coltoral Bavohitkas. have led to serious casabas between grcajps of workers and widespread dbcontent wth hvtog standards and employment opncrrtunities. The regime has promised to rceraonDc the whole wage quest "joater stage
in the Cultural ftovotaiion. In tho ihort term, however, no relief can beand popular discontent probably will mount.
n tho longer run, the ceonnnv/'i nood for flighty troinod rfwctallslt hat been tetirwaly ornrrrtronusod by thotwo-year cloture of tbo universities The very virekstsce of the attark on mteDeetuab wfl)tstuiTsption of eflecnvv rugher education dilcssk. Irtderd. if tbe enrricsaa are changed tn theoo of elirai-iatug loretgn mJaroccr In favor of Maoist dogrm, then the miabty of educatlda coaldiatW serious dacttaa TVe ejeaure of Iowa and middle tchoob It lea sellout in terrnt of vocational tlilli because those rchoob bad aareody graduated rttare undents than could absorbed by the modem ecorsomy.
F. MIIIto^CosMblirtiet
he heavy ceanroBmcnl of troops to Cultural Revolution activities bat almost certainly disrupted the training minion of the PLA; thai It may aaro be disturbing tht morale and cfTecttvcness of the troops Is rssore chtscssk to prove, bat ntvrethttaai Uaefy. Tha toopa of tha retbofldntg trsTort polrrtcil. economic, andnow faces the regime seerns likely to require thepper; of the PLA tor toane time to cosne.sstult ft is unlikely that tha military can recoup itt kisses in cornbat readlntta. "he sheer weight of the politicalvl- (oiks will Inevitably oSoct the perfnrmance of Ua military duties. In the eventilitary threat to China, howei'cr, tho PLA probably couldood account of itself.'
J*r.rssik firings, end nudtar tearing have coadourd In thtweapons ftald Uirosrgbout tbo Gdrural rUvotatioo- Bat there tt Mod edd-oce that political (tensed has spread to cxganusrfsons darectirig and tanXrtMneksg the advanced weapons prcgrasn.peach ofhou Eh-tti depksntd the damage that (actional strife had earned in the milirary industries. Ha referred to prolonged pohnoal itrugglte and damage to equipment In the ministryor missiles. Wo rmvo bo solid information on how serious these disruption! might have been. Bat It teems likely that resource allocation and parfcy pndsuie* mutt have suffered duringcenes of the Cultural Revolution.
III. PROSPECTS A. hlernol Policy
htt* ate oftarssbar ef asefor unceetamoes airrtsng nay etUuians of Cbtna't furore coarrso. Then will ba ttsovaeassets events, ud as the Idd-ttappfasg at Wuhan Iaat year, or tha death of scene key figure rttrh as Mao, Un, or Chou. Ptooool anisnorarira and tension among competing Interett groups have to lens lied, rhrry may mcreose to the point where they will present orderly resolution of major Issues, Contlct will almost certainly continue over the
more deuiled dtscasikm of -nBllary readiness will ba oOeeo en la thttrria.anUtreal Purpon and Air Drnmse Featet."
10
process of reconstructho party and there will lie tension over tbo relative Inmience of military ind civilian leadership OutikV; events, such as the war In Vietnam, could alter Peking's atOtnclr. Popular dttllhitWonscnt es well at economic dlrruption may areetu't* any early iNuilkn of nodal etabOtty, per* lioilnf thereMechne tn forro outputurther dltcredliiag the present leadership
3ft II It imHkety that Moo wlU ever be snlUScdeneral stabilisation of political life at the cast of his revolutionary programs. He wll probably try to heap oo initiating such programs to achieve further changes in Chinese srsckty and potties, though won scene appreciation of the dangers of enerrhy and acuereanic chaos, lie la likely to be senpfctoue of retreab and to favor periodic opsurges in revolutionaryf be srras the responses as Incorrect or badequate, ha may attempt further purges. This basic attitude of Mao has been and will conttmio lo bo responsible,arge eitent, for the continuing turmoil. As long as there it room for doubt over Moo's altitude toward how to con tin oe thehere will be dements In the kadership and especially among young revolutionaries who will be encouraged lo persist in their disniptive action* In the name af Mao, They -iU do to partly In the belief thaictually what is wanted, regardlessool edicts to tha ccetnuy, and partly to protect or enhance their power pod dons
hus, the outsook for China is ai bert uncertain. On the basil of the record it would be prudent to allow for some sharp turns and surprises. But the trend -ppe.irs lo be running against the extremes of Maoism- Even though China has denwistiatcd rrrnaikable tolerance for prolonged chaos, there appears to be growmg recognition In Peking that It i* time to cut the looses of the Cultural aWwhiHrin and to conacJldate the orntted gains.
a balance, too believe that the trend wDl be toward regaining natality.artly beeauae the resbtance to the revolution reached dangerous pro-pert) (mi last summer andonfrontation between the army and tha rovs-eutionories. It also icaect* Increased political Influence of tho more moder. ate elements tn Peking. Finally, Mao himself probably coocurred in ihe move toward mix! era ton, since he himself hopes toew order out of the disruption of Iha old party apparatus.
he Cokiaal RevohiQon a* aach will not be repudiated, just as the Great Leap Forward was never formally discredited, bul under the gulte of victory the ntore radical and destructive features will probably be act aside.
probably ba
This does not mean use situation will promptly return to oortneL There la hasty to be ceemdejaKe dlaarray and confasSoa for teana time. Fighting will probably break out from time lo time and become arvrre in some arras. PoIi'ks! nauteuvertng In Peking will continue.
o believeew organiuttioonl frnmowwk will gradually evolve, lis ultima I* composition and cocrelaOoo ofncertain. Mao al least iiaends that it should reflect the Influence of the new revohib'otuuy feneration; the Culture! Pevohidon Croup win seek to establish revolutionary bidaence over
the proccu of party buihling and vdthin the revolutionary cornralttoea. The ijcord thns far. however, suggest! that lhe PLA md lhe party cadres wiH nrorxbty he the predcenifiaot cletnents. Thus, (he rrrrxiMrucOon of the party and Ibe evolution of tho penvon of tbe revolutionary committees rvill rmbabty he the triorce* of continuing struggle, though perhaps not in asorm al In the past two years.
he rrrfaouy will remain Pttdngsoable instrurnaa! of control over at lent the corsnng year. Tho PLA wiH have the main inpoorthillty for currying
Instltutlonaliied, parttculnrly it political rteoiistruction bogs down In violence and disomy or ifand iocIbI problemi require the rrsaesuve force of the PLA.
effective
eset by many problems, China can at best hope otJy to restorebolanco to the economyoregoing any prospect of random.hope rests on the dubious ossuroptlon that China can restore effectivepriorities and disciplineime of continued political conflict. -V, Ml.rWV.iiHi"
of food, wages, and movements of the rsopuiation. In view of the Urnllcd progrnu towards economic stability so far this year, ecoromic peHeetnanco for the whole8 probably willontinued decline.
anyhrcfane tn agricultural rsrocluctJon It baefy lousparedyaari very good bars rsts. Weather cceieutiorrs orn unlikely to bebo supply of chemical feroTlret will be reduced, and the effects ofIn the inigilloo system wiD he felt. The lack of firmmay lead to serious nrobletns In proeurrancn! and distribution ofthornossibility that severe food shortages will develop bytnalor pot Col ccniexruCTtcee.sinirocun, forssi oalpute reduced enough ns Inhibit economic growth
an various Indications thai Mao considers the economicsince the colUpoe of the Croat Leap Forward to be revisionistiloo much on material incentltva and disdpatjvt and too little oncrrsttive force of Maoistao behoves that only bythe latent energies of the Chin to* masses can China's economicovercome. It may be that the Cultural Re volution waiart,rsreparing of the ground for sotne drastic ttfole by Mao In the field of rxonomlc
policy.
f so, the situation hardly seems ripe for any such move. To attempt another Leap Forward type of experiment in the midst of the current turmoil and without an effective management and control ar-paratus, would invite an economic and social crisis. Peking will hove its hands full In racoring order and balance to tbe economy and it lacks the investment resources loignificant long-term cspansion program We therefore conclude lhat major inifiativei in economic policy arc unlikely this year.
"SfeftSI
xternal Policy
Red Cuanl diplontacy" cost Peking heavilyhinese dinlomsti arrogantly propagandized Mao'i revoUilionary dogma abroad while xcnophoi-la wss eocou'agod al home This Oocnlcot approach created urlim prubletm tn neutral Asian countries such as Burma. Cambodia, Nepal, and Co/Ion v. here China had earlier built ap ir-asoenbly good resattone. Ihplotnatle reprcrcnia-tives Id Peking wore rsposcd to ihe fanaticism of the mob Bntiah, French, Cnrchs, Rasslans, Mongolians, Japanese. Ir-dians, and Indoncaaani mitred physi-cal abuse bi Peking, diplomatic presnises were invaded and in some coses sacked. For at least four days in August. Foreign Minister Chen Yi was displaced by one of the ultraWtirts thrown up by the Cultural fcvcaotlon.
ho violent phase was retailvcly thort-Hved,oto balanced approach has prevailed since the esxesses of August. Bul the verbal assault on Burma. Thailand. Malaya, tho Philippines. India, and Indonesiacontinued. Thil harsher revolutionary policy In support of Innirgency, even In countries with which Peking has diplomatic tela bona, will probably continue at leas! *t> long as Mao and his general line dominate in China. Although domestic prctrccupaiiooi will8 an unlikely time for Peking to mount any motor subversive effort beyond its borders, we expect Peking to continue USasilslance to the Thai, Burmese, and Indian anurgeuts. Such rtssistance would be consistent with Peking's past actionsae areas where the darigrr ofwiih the USnshghL
ietnam renauna Peking'saatrfiele concern. Even at the height of the Cultural Revolution. China maintained ts military and economic support of Hanoi, tolerated alrnost open political daBertnees, and sought to portray Vietnamese developments as successes for Mao's strategy. But la VVtnnm as elsewbera in tha Far East, Peking has been cautious about risking military confroolatlon with the US.
n the near future,im will be to koop Hanoi moving toward what Peking hopes willajor foreign policy lucceat, tho defeat orof the US from Vietnam- To thfs end Peking will continue to urge Hanoi to per*ervererotracted war without overt Chinese parHdpaOon.
eking itrongly opposes the idea of serious negotiation! over Vietnam at this stage an the war. Il will probably press Hanoi to be as stiff andas poasible In the dtscuaions with tha US- Evenill probably net take coerefve moaeuwo* such as cutting off aid to Hanoi Peking lacks aaflckfaat tol-mca ka Hanoi to brock full aVdgnd ncgotuttonettkenwsst Should Handease-fire. Peking woald disapprove bat would have to accept Hanoi's decision.
t tha other focal point of China's foreign pobcy. relations with Ihe Soviet Union remain frozen In bitterness. Peking's obsessive anilline has ruled ou' "jailed setton" by the Cutrimuntst nations on behalf of Vietnam, and has toil China the support of formerly friendly Communist parties. The result
13
lit* beeneighten China's bolntton. and together with the radicalof iho Cultural rWvoioban, ha* dameeyd Pstsng's praiiga oa abttost all fronts.
* tee no bosk tor csjrrsproertts* tn Sino-Soviet re1 to long aslive. Tho Soviet buUd-up of military forcei along Chfna'i northern border poinli up how far the conflict hat [wogresscdhina mullii iInn* of forte, as well as iha Soviet petrmtinl for subversion among the minority population* along tha border. Hat we believe Poking will remain cautious about rotting military leosloni tn border areas and will probably noiarnpnrable build-up on the Chines* side.
k AFTOt MAO
f Mao dies in the neat year or so. the succession wiD probably beand contentious. Lin Pino hailear rruwiito ai tuccenor but we believe his pri>spects of consolidating hii position are quite uncertain. Initially Lin might toko over oa Cliatrman of the Board, with Chou En-tai as tbe Chief Esacutive. Cbcm'i unkjue abilities might hold things together tenv pororilyransition period. But varying attitudes and aprsroaetsea of thepartially repeated by Moot dcfsnoticsoon ettipt Wa fee iitormy andtractrd period in which basicssues wUIore* leaoWrip struggle. PtTtooairies vrill rise and Its th* leaden contest for ptssiuooj In tba now power structure. At this stage wr> are una bit lo say how the leaderihip might sort itself out. Much will depend on the balance of power which develops in lhe process ofolitical otder. Present trends suggest the military might play tho central role sD pott-Mao China
ht jisckement on Maoism It already analog In, and li will heavuy io-Inenca the Cttorfsta of rater* Chtaiii polity after Mao. Mootkely to bf an asati thirdivided and homed leadership FactfatMsStn and strifeeplaced theand unity that formerly char set rrhrod th* regime Mao's drive lo revive lavolotkarsisryhat had lha opposite effect. Il Ii possible that Mao may intdtBte changei thai restore tome ef Chinese communism's old forward mcrnentirm, but we doubt that his specific programs would long survive him. Histobo hold of the past will probably have tons* llmlled success. But China's culture and traditions are already modifying Mao't cotnrrrurasrn even a* Mao aitarnpts to reshape old habits and csrstorns. Most SriportasrtJy. rrnteh of Mao't rtvoloticoary dogma is rsrovtog irrelevant to Chine's raoblrras tn the modem world.sksdy that the rejection of hts doctrinto. though not necejsaruy of comrasirusm In the broadest sense, will occelertta at his pasKog.
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