8
'DATE:5
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Southeast Asia After Vietnam
SufamnW by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by (he UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
A* indicated
8
"SECRET,
mm
ii
it-
following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organization! of theof State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Direcior of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Vice Adm.owrance, for the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
Mr. Howard C. Brown, tho Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission
Abstaining:
Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of hb jurisdiction.
SOUTHEAST
AUSTRALIA
f>68
SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER VIETNAM
the problem
In this estimate we consider two possible outcomes of the war:olitical settlement which, for one reason or another, would permit the communist to take control of the government in South Vietnam, not immediately butear or two; the second, acceptance by Hanoiolution that falls well short of its objectives while preserving important elements of its political-military apparatus in the South.
the estimate
I. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Whatever the outcome in Vietnam, there are several constant factors in Southeast Asia which will serve to condition developments there. Stability in the region is jeopardized by the internal weaknesses of states still seeking the right muiture of traditional practices and modern institutionsong period of colonial rule. In most states, the central government has littlelo mobilize national resources; and in several countries, border provinces arc remote and neglected, and there is widespread alienation among etfinic and religious minorities. Other broad social problems and poorly functioningadd further to the burdens of tlie frequently taefflcient civilian and military leadership. While these conditions offer opportuiu'ties for communist subversion, they are partially offsetrowing sense of nationalism, traditional fear of China, and distrust of communism as an antmaUonalist and pro-Chinese movement.
Obviously, there arc significant differences in the inherent stability of the nations of the region and in the strength of internal factors resistant toThe military regimes of Burma and Indonesia, for example, have still notirm popular consensus in support of their policies and programs, nor is it clear that the existing political institutions are viable. In both countries, however, the sense of nationalism is strong enough to hold the basic political framework together. In Malaysia and Singapore, on the other hand, the ethnic loyalties of the Malay and Chinese communities conflict with their national feelings, but representative government and the electoral
process have taken hold, and there is positive support (or the nationalbased on its commitment to economic betterment.
Thailand and Cambodiaiddle position. The Thai regime still searches for mechanisms to ensure and legitimate its predominance; while in Cambodia, Sihanouks highly personalized rule bas forestalled any real test of political institutions. But both regimes are reasonably acceptable to theof the people and neither appears to have domestic political opposition with sufficient strength or cohesion to threaten its position. In both countries, too, political stability is reinforced by widespread respect for the royal family. Though Laos isuddhist monarchy, it lacks the homogeneity ofand the sense of history whichrrn basis for Thai andnationhood. In any event, Laospecial case; Ftmdamcntally, the Souvanna regime depends for its survival on the external forces which created and sustain it
Economicutilization of resources, capitallow exportalso conspicuous among the problems of South-cast Asia, but the impact of such deficiencies on pobtical stability should not be overstated. In general, the region's predominantly agricultural economysufficient food to adequately feed the population despite continuing high birth rates. In this situation, sophisticated economic analyses often have little application to the life of the mass of the citizens, much less to their political attitudes. It is apparent, however, that the reasonably well-managed and rapidly growing economies of Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore have enhanced the political stability of their governments, while economic stagnation contributes to the uncertainty of prospects for the regimes in Burma, Indonesia,ategory apart is the Philippinesairly good growth rate tends to mask ever-widening disparities between rich and poor.
The leaders of Southeast Asia are further distracted by the rivalries and frictions which frequently characterize their relations with one another. Prince Sihanouk views Cambodian history astruggle to forestallextinction at the hands of more aggressive Thai and Vietnamese.esult, Cambodia'sthose of Thailand and South Vietnam asoften diverted by border incidents, propaganda wars, and diplomaticThe burgeoning dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over tlie ownership of Sabah threatens to disrupt efforts to achieve greater regional cooperation. Thailand's longstanding doubts about the loyalty of its ethnic Malay peoples causes Bangkok to deny full cooperation to Kuala Lumpur in joint efforts to deal with security problems along their common border. For their part, the Malaysians remain suspicious of Indonesian ambitions in Borneo despite Sukarno's departure from the scene. And Singapore is persistentlyof absorption by its Malay and Indonesian neighbors.
Subversion. More than any other part of the world, theof Southeast Asia have been hampered in their quest for stabilitysubversion. Each of them, except Singapore, has had to contend
ommunist insurtection on some scale, and communist bands are still active in most countries. So far, however, the communists have gained complete control of only the northern half of Vietnam and adjacent portions of Laos. Moreover, although Malaysia, Vietnam. Laos, and Cambodia have, at one time or another, required the assistance of foreign combat troops to meet thethreat, theThailand, Indonesia, and theneeded only the Input of materiel, technical aid and, in some cases, advisory personnel.
Communist parties in Southeast Asia have fared poorly, not becauseand Socialism are unpopular, but because the communists acted inanner as to alienate nationalist sentiment in the various countries., just as newly independent, nationalist and socialist oriented regimes were appearing in the region, Moscow and Pekingeneral line of armed liberation for Southeast Asia. This gave the communist parties an anti-nationalist image which alienated most students, intellectuals, and workers.ajor exception, of course, was in Vietnam where the communists managed toredominant position in the nationalist movement after World Warfter the failure of these premature insurrections, communists in sometried to operate at the legal and parliamentary level under the slogan of peaceful coexistence. But popular support, except in Indonesia, could not be developed, and most of the parties had no alternative but to continue with the effort to develop peasant-based insurrections. In several cases, this has meant operating in remote areas populated by relatively primitive minority peoples.
Communist prospects in Southeast Asia reflect these inadequacies.insurgency is much lesshreat today in Malaysia, Singapore,and the Philippines thanears ago. The once fonnidablo Malayan Communist Party force is down to lessen and is holed up just north of the Thai-Malaysian border.r so guerrillas from Sarawak roam the highland jungles south of the Sarawak frontier. Both groups arc comprised mainly of ethnic Chinese residents of Malaysia, but neither maintains any substantial foothold on Malaysian soil The Huk movement in the Philippines consists of an armed nucleus ofen and appears to have degeneratedommunist guerrilla movement into moreilipinongaged in murder and extortionivelihood. In central and easternew hundred Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) activists have taken to the hills in hopes of developing the sort of guerrilla force the party so obviously lacked during the crucial weeks ofhe PKI effort has been severely set back by recent government operations against its bases; many top communist leaders have been killed. Despite this setback and the party debacle, tbe communist movement in Indonesia remains tlie most potentially significant subversive force in Southeast Asia aside from thecommunists.
While Communist insurgency has declined in the insular and peninsular states of Southeast Asia, activity furtherBurma, Thailand, and Cam-
been stepped up in recent years, partly because of the war inand partly because of the stimulus of Peking and Hanoi. Fundamentally, the present significance of the communist parties in these countries b'es in their role as instruments of external forces rather than in their own internal appeal or strength.
In Burma, the long-simmering insurgency ofr so Peking-oriented White Flags (Communist Party of Burma/White Flag) wasewabout two years ago when theyull-blown Maoist line. This was followed shortlyrisis in Sino-Burmese relations generated by Peking's Cultural Revolution. Although the Chinese have since moderated their overt hostility toward the Ne Win regime, they persist in an effort to weaken it; they supply guns and training in adjacent Yunnan Province to the relatively few members of dissident ethnic groups willing to cooperate with White Flag elements in attacks against government units in northeastern Burma. Whatever the communist strategy in Burma, Peking and die White Flags probably have little hope of implementing it without substantial cooperation from the Kachin, Shan, Karen, and other ethnic insurgent forces. In the past, the lack of common objectives and cohesion among these rebel groups has been theiris the Rangoon government, and there are few signs that this defect will soon he remedied. Moreover, most ethnic insurgent leaders appear to be anti-Chinese and to oppose communismhreat to their ancient modes of living.
The decision to commence active insurgency in Thailand in5 was probably made by Peking in concert with Hanoi; the former has always dominated the Thai communist movement. While preparation for guerrilla war in Thailand began at least as earlylans were accelerated5 probably to assist Hanoi by generating concern in US official circlesossible communist "second front" in Southeast Asia and by stimulating fear in Thailand over further extending its military commitments to the US. So far, the communist insurgents have made little headway, but their actions have alerted the regime to its vulnerabilities in remote sectors of the country and led it to institute various remedies in the fields of security, administration, anddevelopment. In the Northeast, across the Mekong fromr so insurgents are on the defensive, despite occasional forays. In the densejungles of the North, several hundred tribesmen, with grievances against the government, have been armed and trained by communists and are harassing government forces and outposts near the Lao border. On the other hand, the communists are not likely to exert any significant influence away from remote tribal districts so long as their appeal is geared mainly to hill-tribe grievances. Efforts to penetrate the ethnic Thai in the North have not progressed far but do pose some threat for the future. Communist terrorismuch smaller scaleontinuing problem in other regions of the country.
Over the past year or two, guerrilla activity has revived in Cambodia anderious internal problem for the Sihanouk regime. Its origins and
nature are vague, but activity is centered iu two areas. In the remotepart of the country, where the Vietnamese communists operate inof the war effort in Vietnam, some dissident tribesmen have apparently accepted arms from Hanoi to oppose the increasing government presence in the region. Of greater potential significance are the disruptive activities of the ethnic Cambodian insurgents, styled "Khmer Rouge" by Sihanouk, who operate sporadically in small armed bands throughout western Cambodia. There have been incidents elsewhere, however, and the Khmer Rouge appear to have links to subversive elements in Phnom Penh itself.
In Laos, of course, the communistsajor threat. They control about half the countryhird of its people, and the indigenousPathetan internationally recognized claimhare in the national government The backbone of the insurgency is, however, provided by regular North Vietnamese forces.
In sum, the nations of Southeast Asia exhibit serious social, political, and economic weaknesses. But they are generally buttressedense of nationalismetermination to preserve their independence. They have had considerable experience in dealing with communist subversion, and they have learned over the centuries to survive in the shadowowerful China. None of the countries in the region, with the possible exceptionos, is so weak that communist movements are likely to increase their strength greatly over the next several years without major and direct foreign assistance.
The US Role. How the US views its role and commitment in the region, and how this is perceived by both communist and noncommunist elements, will continue to be crucial factors in the Southeast Asian political equation. There is no realistic prospect that over the next several years another poweregional system will appear to relieve the US of the security function it has been undertaking in the area. In fact, the expected withdrawal of UK forces from Malaysia and Singapore will inevitably pose new problems for the US in this regard.
ettlement favorable to the communists'
discussing an outcome favorable to the communists, we rule outassumptions as the military collapse of Allied forces in Southprecipitate and unilateral withdrawal of these forces,egotiationpolitical concessions so sweeping as to be tantamount to grantingachievement of its aims in the South. The contingency herea political settlement of the war which, for one reason or another,the communists to take control of the government in South Vietnam.
' Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, for the Assistant chief of Staff forartrnent of the Army, and Maj. Gen. Jarnm* M. Philpott. for the Assistant Chkf of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. dissent from the argument in this section. For their views, see their footnote to
j
Insular as the lest of Southeast Asia is concerned, an important variable would be the time required for the communist takeover. If ftrears, the repercussions elsewhere would tend to be muted or even lost among oilierduring the period. For purposes of this estimate, therefore, weuch shorter period, say no moreear or two, during the course of which the Southeast Asians would come to the conclusion that the settlement accepted by the USommunist success virtually inevitable.
Communistettlement in Vietnam favorable to thewouldsychological lift lo leftist elements everywhere in Southeast Asia, but it would not necessarily lead them to rely more heavily on armed violence than at present. Some local parties are already doing all they can in the field of "peoples'thers would require considerable time and outside assistancearge-scale campaign of violence could be initiated. And the decision to attempt this course would depend not only on the local party and its view of the opportunities but also on the policies of itsNorth Vietnam, or the USSR as the case might be. Only in Laos, and perhaps in Cambodia, isapability in being to increase the level of armed pressure and violence quickly and significantly.
Hanoi's first reaction to its success hi South Vietnam might be an early move to unleash the armed forces it controls in Laos and to provide large-scale assistanceambodian resistance movement. There is, after all, no doubt that Hanoi's objectives are to establish its control over Laos and attain pre-dominent influence in Cambodia. But we believe the Vietnamese communists would be somewhat more cautious. They might fear that there was some riskew US military response and, more important at this stage, this level of military action would probably seem unnecessary to the North Vietnamese; they would expect tlie regimes in both countries to be amenable to Hanoi's influence without further resort to war. Moreover, Hanoi would be preoccupied,ime at least, with the formidable task of consolidating communist rule in South Vietnam.
Initially, therefore, Hanoi would probably apply pressures in Laos, hoping in this way toew coalition government dominated by the Pathet Lbd. (Hanoi might indeed have embarked on this course in advance of the Vietnamese settlement if it were convinced during lhe negotiations that the US was in the processajor reduction in its commitments in Southeastf pressure tactics failed in Laos, the North Vietnamese might undertake new military action to strengthen the communist bargaining position or to effect an outright military takeover of the country. In Cambodia, Hanoi would probably move moresettling initiallyovernment reasonably responsive to its influence. If Sihanouk proved uncooperative, Hanoi would apply additional pressures,assistance to procommunist elements in Cambodia.
Hanoi sees both Laos and Cambodia as falling primarily within its sphere of influence and, in the aftermathuccessful settlement, would resist efforts
ontrolling voice in either country.in Southeast Asia. Hanoi is not likely toredominant role in the communist effort. Activities In laws and Cambodia would have first call on Its capabilities. In Thailand, the North Vietnamese are currently providingto the guerrilla forces though they recognize that the Chineseajor interest and may beetter position, over the longer term, to influence the communist movement there. Hanoi will probably be reluctant to leave the field entirelv lo tlie Chinese, however, and will do what it can to maintain anrole in the communist insurgency in Thailand With regard to Burma,and Singapore, on the other hand, the North Vietnamese will probably be more intent on cultivating friendly relations in the postwar years.
s for Peking, it is difficult to estimate the extent and nature of itsin Southeast Asia after Vietnam, especially because of the uncertainties engendered by China's domestic situation. Recurrent internal crises, for example, could limit China's ability toonsistent policy lino toward the region. On tlir- other bund, if internal order is maintained, China's aspirations for great-power dominance in the region would lead ru increased efforts to limit orUS influence, particularly in those states close to China's borders. But this will he true no matter what the outcome in Vietnam. In anv event. China would almost certainly claim some credit for any communist success in Vietnam and exploit it at the diplomatic and political level throughout Southeast Asia as part of the continuing effort to advance its nationalommunist success in Vietnam would encourage Peking to support subversive movements, but the scale of its efforts would be influenced by the degree to which local conditions provided promising opportunities. Current Chinese strategy does not appear to call for overt aggression and we do nothange in this strategy.
lie impact of communist success in Vietnam on relations between Peking and Hanoi could have substantial implications for Southeast Asia, particularly over the longer term. It is possible, for example, thai the Iwo countries would draw closer together and undertake joint political, propaganda, and subversive efforts in tlie urea. It seems more likely, however, that Hanoi would wish to take the opportunity to establish quite clearly its independence of tho Chinese, relaying on continued Soviet and available Free World sources for the material and technical avsistance essential to its postwar reconstruction. Followingourse would require that Hanoi soft-pedal support for subversive activities outside Indochina at least. It would also increase the chances that the age-old Vietnamese dlstniit of China would combine with current conflicts of interests to produce serious strains in Hanoi-Peking relations.
he Soviet Union is not likely toajor supporter of communist subversion In Southeast Asia after Vietnam. The Soviets will U- disposed to defer to Hanoi's wishes on Laos and Cambodia and will probably attempt to increase their own influence in the outlawed Indonesian (ommunitt movement. In general, however, the end of the war and of its Self-imposed obligation to support Hanoi, would lead the USSR toore important political position
"Secret
in thein Thaflantl. Malaysia. Indonesia, and tlieby developing further its diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties. The Soviets would oppose increased Chinese influence everywhere in the region.
Reactions of the Southeast Asian Countries- Most of Southeast Asia would welcome an end to tbe war in Vietnam,ettlement favorable to thewouldrisis in Laos and severe anxiety in Camliodia androughout the area, the settlement would have an advene psycho-logical imp.Kt that wouldrestige ind credibility. In viev. nl the extent of US commitments to South Vietnam and the depth of US involvement in the war, serious doubts would be fell about the validity of US power and commitments, and there would be renewed concern over communist intentions and the longer run prospects of surviving in the shadow of Chinese power.
reatest danger in ihis situation WQOld DO* be thai llatlflUl ell mcnts in Southeast Asia would immediately take heart and make rapid progress in undermining the sfjihility of noncommurust governments. As indicated above, local communist CKgaxrizarjom generally lack the capability and the appeal for any such rapid growth. Rather, Ihe main danger would be tbe development of an atmosphere of defeatism and resignation in rxmcommunist countries in the area, with individual governments losing their hope of withstanding the political and psychological pressures of Hanoi and Peking. There couldeneral move to placate the communist powers by cutting military and political ties with the US. This process could begin before the communist takeover had beenparticularly if Hanoi moved quickly and successfully to upset the balance in Laos.
o cannot say that it would not work out this way in the end, for much would depend on continuing US actions. While some Southeast Asian leaden would probably entertain Increased doubts about the will of the US toecurity role in the area, we do not believe that they would be panicked into precipitate changes in policy or posture. They would probably suspend any definitive policy decision at least until there had been time and opportunity to study indications of future communist conduct and intent and, more critically, those of the US.
oncern over the communist threat In the aftermath of Hanoi's success would also lie conditioned by the circumstances of the time. Some countriessychologically preparedettlement which appears to be favorable to the communists. Moreover, if the settlement came in the next year or so, the atmosphere in Southeast Asia would be quite different from that which existed. At that tunc, there was the spectacle of unbroken Viet Congagainst South Vietnamese forces, rapid Chinese advances in the field of modern weapons, and an increasingly powerful Sukanto/PKI coalition taking charge in Indonesia and bullying the newly-organized and fragile Malaysian federation. In the intervening years, however, Southeast Asians have seen China bogged down in confusion and disorder. Sukarno ousted and the PKI suffer
bloody suppression, and the Vietnamese communistsearful price during long years of war.
A communist success in South Vietnam would have its sharpest and most immediate impact in Laos. The realization that North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao could quickly overrun government-held territory if they chose to do so, would generate sentiment among civilian politicians in Vientiane for reaching anwith Hanoi. Souvanna and other Lao politicians would be willing toeturn to2 Genevaoalition government withparticipation,ore truly neutral foreign policy. They would be reluctant, however, to agree to concessions that appeared to threaten acommunist takeover, The top Lao military figures would oppose any major concessions to the communists. Much would depend on how far and how quickly Hanoi pressed its advantage. Without increased US involvement, Laos could not long withstand the military and psychological pressures which Hanoi would in due course almost certainly apply.
Cambodia would also feel directly exposedesultommunist success in South Vietnam, especially if North Vietnamese Army units remained in Cambodia. Khmer Rouge and other insurgent elements might be emboldened to intensify their efforts, but they are not likely to develop quicklyajor threat to Silianouk's regime without considerable support from Hanoi. Sihanouk would probably try to suppress the insurgents, meanwhile caking steps toCambodia to the new situation in the Indochina area, Internally, for example, he would probably decide to bring procommunists into the government, tliough he wouldredominant role for them, Internationally, he would seek the good offices of Moscow and Peking to help secure Cambodianand might even proposeew Geneva Conference to this end. Sihanouk would do these things in hope of avoiding the completetakeover that he has long feared. If all such measures failed. Sihanouk would probably bow out rather than subject his countryietnam-type conflict origurehead status for himselfommunist-controlledew leadership that could carry on effective resistance to Hanoi would be unlikely to emerge.
In Thailand, the will of the present nding group to maintain itself in power, to assert national independence, and to resist internal subversion would probably remain strong despite communist success in Vietnam. The present Ihai leaders would have limited options because of their longstanding and unequivocalto military alliance with the US. an alliance which they have regarded as indispensable in the faceontinuing armed threat from China. We do not believe that these leaders would view alignment with Hanoi or Peking as acceptable alternatives to continued reliance on the US.
In these circumstances, Thai counterinsurgency forces would persist in therr efforts against the communist guerrillas, and conunuiiist prospects for recruiting large numbers of local Thai for their forces would remain poor. But Thai
bilities could bo severely taxed if Hanoi were to emerge from ilie Vietnamese struggle prepared Inore aggressive and direct role in support of the Thaior example, by sending trained Vietnamese guerrilla cadres and more sophisticated hand weapons into northeasternrospect which Isourcei of great concern in Bangkok. The Thai leaders would besensitive to signs tluit Hanoi was movingompleten Laos, In view of the strategic importance they attach to Ituffer against direct cotnmmiist pressure. Indeed, we could expect that tlie Thai would press the US to take measures to prevent communist control of the Mekong Valley.
if Hanoi does not adopt this more aggressive posture towardanil leftist elernents on fhe Bangkok political scene would becomeBut their influence would probably not grow sufficfendy to sway tbeunless US support and US responses to Thai requests had made itthat the US was withdrawing from its commitments to Thailand. Thein any case, consider whether their relationsliip withS ought toin some way. Any recvaluatkm would proceed carefully andreflect Thai judgments of US statements and actions following ain Vietnam. Under the changing circumstances, the Thai might decideevolution of US policy left them no choice but toosture of
is the chief concern of Burma which is currently beingChinese-supported White Flags. Ne Win will bo sensitive to (huinrrcuso in such support in the wake of the Vietnamese War, hut it Is
doubtful that communist success in Vietnam would lead him to alter significantly Burma's domestic or foreign policies. Malaysia and Singapore are apprehensive of any substantial increase of interest by Peking in their ethnic Chinese leftists and guerrilla remnants. These groups have usually been responsive to Peking's direction and. in tbe event of communist success in Vietnam, might receivecovert support from legal leftist fronts which continually agitate in these countries for accommodation with tbe communist powers. Such activity could serve to hclghteu cxiiting tensions between the Chinese and Malay communities in bolh countries.
would feci less vulnerable than the others because of itsfrom China and the small proportion of ethnic Chinese in the country. Itunlikely thai the present leadership in Djakarta would falter in itsto cope with Indonesia's internal communist problems; indeed, tliewould attach considerable importance to the continuation of IISto sustain this determination. The psychological impact on the Philippines
'iank M. Murphy, for the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy, tallows thai the probable politicaloii Thailand of the assumed lotlkmivit would hu more severe than stated. Ho would have Ihe last sentence read; "Under Ihu changinghe US-Thailand relationship probably would change, with the Thais beginning lo move toward pragmatic adjustment lo lhe new political realities aftn the Cnniiiuuist take over."
would be somewhat greater than in Indonesia, if only because the Filipinos have been for so long wholly dependent on the US for their defense. While Filipino leftists and anti-US factions would derive new confidence and vigor from the US failure in Vietnam, the problem of communist subversion in the Philip-pines would probably not increase to any important extent. In any case, it would remain far lesshreat to Philippine stability than the chronic political corruption and economic malaise of the country.
The US Posture. Over the longerreat deal would depend on the role the US decided to play in the region,on Its success in convincing leaders there of its will and capacity to continue hacking them. Initially, the Southeast Asian states wouldendency for the US to withdraw generally fromwith the security of the entire region, particularlyettlement was reached inrecipitate manner as toudden and basic cliange In US policy. This initial concern would probably be least in Burma which chooses not to rely on external support for its security and is unlikely to change in this regard. The self-reliant Indonesians would he somewhat less concerned than the Filipinosood deal less concerned than Malaysia and Singapore. The two latter have been accustomed to British protection and are disturbed by the prospect of its complete withdrawal.
These initial reappraisals of US capabilities and intentions would beto continuing review. We believe that governments with any sort of security arrangements with tlieLaos, Thailand, and thewish to retain them, at least until further evidence was available on the course of US policy in the region. All would urgently seek concrete reassurances of one sort Or anotlicr and, if these were forthcoming, they would over time tend to dilute the impact of the loss of South Vietnam. For the Thai, one of the lessons of Vietnam could be that US support is not likely to be effective without greater efforts of their own. They would, therefore, move to bolster their forces, including acquisition of all possible material aid from the US.
For the other nations of Southeast Asia, US actions in support ofwould be an important measure of its intentions throughout the region; few would expect any major US military effort in behalf of the more exposed Lao. No matter how the US performed in Thailand, however, there would inevitably he an increased search for alternatives to heavy reliance on US military power. There would, for example, be increasing interesttrong counterinsurgency role fur regional associations, though all member nations would realize that defense against external aggression could not be the province of such groupings. And there might be some interest tn having the Russiansreater role in Southeast Asia as an additional counterweight to Peking. Even the Thai,with their efforts to obtain new US security guarantees, would doubtless explore such foreign policy alternatives. Neutralist sentiment in Burma would tend to become even firmer, and neutralist voices would become louder, though hardly decisive, in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.
One factor of great importance would be tho appraisal made by US leaders and public opinion of the meaning of the Vietnam experience for the
future course of USraiimalic popular reaction in the US, revealed perhaps by recriminations over Vietnam and bitter debate over future use of US power in Southeast Asia would greatly intensify the impact of the loss of South Vietnam. Conversely, if American opinion seemed in the main toteady and sober line, echoes in Southeast Asia would be similarly moderated. In effect, US domestic interpretationsetback in Vietnam and theothers consequently formed as to the likely course of US policy in the region might ultimately prove as important as the event itself.8
ettlement unfavorable to the communists
In discussing an outcome unfavorable to the communists, we are notin our consideration any outright surrender on their part or theabandonment of their campaign to take over South Vietnam. We are assuming the acceptance by Hanoi of an outcome that falls well short of its objectives but which preserves some important elements of its poUdcal-military apparatus in the South. This situation might come aboutesult of aor it might become gradually apparent as the communists scaled down their attacks, disengaged their forces, and otherwiseillingness tothe shooting war. In either case, an increasingly confident regime, allied witb the US, would retain power in Saigon.
The principal initial reaction of the Southeast Asians to such an outcome In Vietnam wouldense of reliefelief that additional time had been won to bolster further their own political and economic stability. Few would conclude, however, that the future of the Saigon government had been assured, that tbe Vietnamese communists had been permanently stopped, or that Hanoi had abandoned its ambitions in Laos and Cambodia. Nor would an
' Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, for the Assistant Chief of StaffIntelligence, Department of the Army, and Maj. Cen. Jammle M. Fhilpott, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, dissent from Section II. They believe thai this section seriously underestimates the impactommunist success ia South Vietnam, and gives Inadequate co moderation to the attendant circumstances. The postulated settlement favorable to the communists would seriously damage US prestige and credibility And, la view of the expenditure of vast resources toommunist takeover In South Vietnam, the noncornniunut governments might be highly skeptical of any US commitment to their defense. Communist elements throughout Southeast Asia would be encouraged and would press liarder lo emulate the demonstrated success of "peoples'oth Laos and Cambodia would come under some form of communist domination fairly soon; even the Thai probably would change their relationship with the US.
Whatever the reaction of the ooocommuoiit governments of Mainland Southeast Aria over ll* shoit term, fox lhe longer term, regardless of US assurances, they would probably seek some meansof accommodation to communist pressures. 'Some leaders in the urea almost certainly would view accommodabim as an acceptable alternative to the prospect of prolonged military action in conjunction with theonlyolution favorable to the communists.
The Army and Air Force members also believe that elsewhere in Southeast Asia. leaden would be greatly influenced by tlie outcome ond would, at the time of the settlement, view US support in the area as uncertain. In the US acceptance of an unfavorable settlement in Vietnam, they would sec US withdrawalongstanding and deep commitment, On that basis, Southeast Asian leaders would make those policy decisions then considered necessarv to national survival.
outcome unfavorable to lite communist* remove Southeast Asian doubtsthe willingness oi the American Government and people to engageubstantial scale in any new military conflict in the region.
US prestige would increase, however, and its allies in Southeast Asia would reaffirm their links to the US. Everywhere in the region, the morale of communist forces would sag while that of the noncommunists would improve. But the impact on the actual power relationships in each country would not be significant, except in Laos where the political position of the Souvannawould be greatly strengthened, and in Cambodia where the will of the regime to oppose domestic communists would be reinforced.
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence would be felt inside thecountries and within tho various communist movements. The success os of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions have no doubt been highly influential in the continued commitment of other communists in Southeast Asia to the concept of "peoples'efeat in Vietnam, even if rationalizedemporary setback, would bring the doctrines of Mao and Ho Chi Minh into question. "Revisionism" might begin to gain some adherents, and there would probably be some splits and degeneration in the various insurgencies. There mighteriod in which communist forces would place greater emphasis on working within tbe system through popular fronts and association with other leftwing movements. Ioase, Peking and perhaps Hanoi would lose some influence.
Because of the importance of Southeast Asia to China, it is conceivable that Hanoi's acceptance of an unfavorable outcome in Vietnam might provoke recriminations in Peking and resulteadership crisis. We think, however, thateaction is unlikely. For Peking at least, there alreadyationale for the defeat of the Viet Cong, namely that because of improper tactics they were unable to persistrotracted war. Chinese policy might become more threatening, but it is more likely that the failure of the communist campaign lo Vietnam would notajor eficct on Chinese policy elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
As for Hanoi, we believe that it would remain unreconciled to the division of Vietnam and to the presence of US power in Indochina. The Vietnamesewould try to preserve what assets they could in the form of cadres and organization in South Vietnam. They might well, however, refrain from instituting further violence while they rebuilt their potential and waited for the diminution of US power and interest in Viet nam.
A communist failure in South Vietnam might further strain Hanoi's rela-tionsPeking. There might be mutual recriminations and Hanoi. In its weakened position, might be more than ever concerned to retain Soviet support and avoid overd^pendence on Chin. Nonetheless, normal prudence, if nothing else, would suggest that Hanoi would uttempt to maintain good relations with Peking. Both Hanoi and Peking, of course, would want to prevent any further strengthening of the noneommunUt position in Laos, and Hanoi would try tn hold the areas of Laos bordering on North Vietnam.
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Defense and the organization af the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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Deportment of the Army
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Navy
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Force
of intelligence, AK, for the Atomic Energy Commission
Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
of NSA, for the National Security Agency
I. Director of Central Reference Service, CIA, for any other Department or Agency
r**Ws^documenl may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applkable JftSMtjIy regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement wHhntrol Reference Service, CIA
When thb document isTfistcminated overseas, the overseas recipients moy retain fteriod not In excessiBSom year. At tho end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returncoSjethe forwarding agency, orshould bo requested of the forwarding agency>esreialn it in accordance with2 June
The title of this document when used separately from the textv_
DISTRIBUTION: While House
Notional Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation
Original document.
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