CONCLUSION OF PRIME MINISTER'S COMMITTEE THAT NUCLEAR BASES ON OKINAWA NOT MILI

Created: 11/14/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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JAPAN RYUKYU ISLANDS DOI

OF PRIME MINISTER'S COMMITTEE THAT NUCLEAR

BASES ON OKINAWA NOT MILITARILY NECESSARY FORDEFENSE IN THE FAR

SOURCE

TRI5 GROUP

"BASESNDER FORMER JAPANESE NAVY CAPTAIN KUSUMI TADAO, WEIGHED HEAVILY IN THIS DECISION,

AS CHAIRMAN OF THIS UNIT, WHICH IS ONE OF THE

TWO SUB-COMMITTEES, KUSUMI IS INFLUENTIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'SHE COMMITTEE BELIEVES, THEREFORE, THAT EARLYOF OKINAWA TOITH AMERICAN RIGHTS TO BA'SES UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS NOW APPLY TO THOSE IN JAPAN, IS NOT ONLY DESIRABLE POLITICALLY, BUT MILITARY, FEASIBLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF JOINT JAPAN-AMERICAN DEFENSE NEEDS.

OST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WERE ALSO PLEASED WITH THIS CONCLUSION BECAUSE THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT UNLESS OKINAWA IS RETURNED TO JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY AT AN EARLY DATE, THE EFFECTELAY IS LIKELY TO BE "DISASTROUS" ON JAPAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS,THE GROWING NATIONAL

"SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS" AMONG JAPANESERINCIPAL, AND USUALLY OVERLOOKED, FACTOR STIMULATING THIS DEMAND FOR REVERSION, AS WELL AS LEFTISTHEY FEEL IT IS INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FORESEE ALL THE UNFAVORABLE CONSEQUENCES OR THINK OF HCW THESE CONSEQUENCES MIGHT BE FORESTALLED. MOST OF

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THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS, WHO REALIZE THAT JAPAN NEEDS THE UNITED STATES AS MUCH OR MORE THAN THE UNITED STATES NEEDSRE WORRIED ABOUT THE OKINAWA PROBLEM. THEY BELIEVE THAT, IF THIS PROBLEM REMAINS UNSETTLED, IT COULD POLARIZE PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN JAPAN SO STRONGLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES THAT EVENRENEWAL OF THE SECURITY TREATY0 COULD BE JEOPARDIZED. THEY FEEL THATINIMUM THIS PROBLEM WOULD STIMULATE GREATER

AND MORE WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION TO THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

INCOMMITTEE'S CONCLUSIONS )

ON NUCLEAR BASES HAVE BEEN MADE KNOWN TO PRTME MINISTER SATO,

AND THEY PROBABLY WILL CARRY GREAT WEIGHT, BUT SATO'S REACTION

IN TERMS OF FORMING ANY NEW POLICY ON OKINAWA REVERSION IS NOT

KNOWN. THE RESULTS OF THE OKINAWAN ELECTION WILL INTENSIFY

PRESSURE ON THE PRIME MINISTER TO PUSH BOTH FOR EARLY REVERSION

AND FOR LIMITED BASE RIGHTS. IN EFFECT THERE IS NO CHOICE FOR

EITHER THE PRIME MINISTER OR THE UNITED STATES, SINCE SHOULD THE

UNIIED STATESIGID POSTURE ON THE NUCLEAR BASE

QUESTION, IT WOULD RISK LOSING JAPANOOPERATIVE PARTNER

IN DEFENSE MATTERS.)

Original document.

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