CONCLUSION OF PRIME MINISTER'S COMMITTEE THAT NUCLEAR BASES ON OKINAWA NOT MILI

Created: 11/14/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIOINCE AOENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

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CONCLUSION OF PRIME MINISTER'S COMMITTEE THAT NUCLEAR BASES ON OKINAWA NOT MIL IT ARi Lf NECESSARY FOR UNITED STATES DEFENSE IN THE FAR EAST

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1. BY EARLY NOVEMBER 3 PRIME MINISTER SATO EISAKU'SOFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON OKINAWA HAD REVIEWED THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA AND HAD CONCLUDED IT WAS NOTFROM THE STANDPOINT QF MILITARY STRATEGY, FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN t" BASES ON OKINAWA. THE FINOINSS OP

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NAVYUSUMI TADAO,HEAVILYHIS DECISION.

AS CHAIRMAN OF THISHICH IS ONE OF THE TWOUSUHI IS THFLl)ENT iAL IN THE COMMITTEE'SHE COMMITTEErtERSFOtE,EARLVOF OKINAWA TO JAPAN, WITH flMER ICAN RIGHTS TO BASES UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS NOW APPLY TO THOSE EN JaPftM, IS NOT ONLY DESIRABLE POLITICALLY, BUT FEASIBLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF Jul HI JAPAN-AMERICAN DEFENSE NEEDS,

OST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WERE ALSOTHIS CONCLUSION BECAUSE THEY ARE CONVINCED THATIS RETURNED TO JAPANESE SOVEREIGN'* AT AN EARLY DATEEFFECTELAY IS LIKELY TO BE HOUE' CN

AMERICAS RELATIONS..GROWING

"StL^-CWISCINONii JAPANESE VEflLOOKES, FACTOR CUMULATING IHiS DEMAND FOR REVERSION, AS WELL AS LEFTIST AGS.> JrtfY FEEL II :S INCREASINGLY DIFFICULI TO FORESEE ALL THE UNFAVORABLE CONSEQUENCES OR THItfK OF KOW THESE CONSEQUENCES NIGHT BE FORESTALLED. MOST OF

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THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS, WHO REALIZE THAT JAPAN NEEDS THE UNITED STATES AS MUCH OR MORE THAN THE UNITED STATES NEEDS JAPAN, ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE OKINAWA PROBLEM. THEY BELIEVE THAT, IF THIS PROBLEM REMAINS UNSETTLED, IT COULD POLARIZE PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN JAPAN SO STRONGLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES THA" EVEN RENEWAL OF THE SECURITY TREATY IN 3 COULD BE JEOPARDIZED. THEY FEEL THATINIMUM THIS PROBLEM WOULD STIMULATE GREATER

AND MORE WIDESPREAD OPPQSiTiCW f0 THE UNITED STATES

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THE COMMITTEE'S CONCLUSION'S

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ON NUCLEAR BASES HAVE BEEN MADE KNOWN TO PRIME MINISTER SATO, AND THEY PROBABLY WILL CARRY GREATUT SATO'S REACTION IN TERMS OF FORMING ANY NEW POLICY ON OKINAWA REVERSION IS NOT KNOWN. THE RESULTS OF THE OK IN AW AN ELECTION WILL INTENSIFY PRESSURE ON THE PRIME MINISTER TO PUSH BOTH FOR EARLY REVERSION AND FOR LIMITED BASE RIGHTS. IN EFFECT THERE IS NO CHOICE FOR EITHER THE PRIME MINISTER OR THE UNITED STATES, SINCE SHOULD THE UNITED STATESIGID POSTURE ON THE NUCLEAR BASE QUESTION, IT WOULD RISK LOSING JAPANOOPERATIVE PARTNER IN DEFENSE MATTERS.)

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Original document.

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