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Communist Party Moves to the Right
Special Report
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POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVKS TO THfc RIGHT
Poland's fifth parly congruwi will open onovember, with First Secretaryyear-old system of rule throughchecks and balance*hambles. Intellectual turmoil, student demonstrations, and the cumulative grievancesecade have given factions within the party the opportunity to mount the most serious chailenge to Gomulka since he regained power
Tbe party's hard-line, nationalistic forces no longer seek only participation in the system, but want to remold it in their own image. Gcmulka brought these forces back from Umbo in tbeo restore economic and administrative order and abo to use in destroying his liberal opponents. In the process, however, hehis moderate friends-After the congreaa, Gomulka probably will still play anbut noominant role. The country is likely to be run in his Dameombination of right-wing forces, ranging in outlook from semi fascists to re foe mists, who will continue to contend for power among themselves Domestic and foreign policy guidelines are unlikely to change, but policy implementation may move off dead center. The conflict within the party between the trends toward authontarianlsm and reform will leave the system basically unstable.
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The Party Congress
On the surface, the main task of the congress, which normally lasts four days, will be to prom*rogram charting the party's course in all spheres ofo over the next four years. Its most important act, however, will bo tho electionew central comittee, which willew politburo and secretariat at its first session, usually held inanedlately after adjournment of the congress.
When the congress opens, Gomulka willullena newly critical party rank and file,eadership more divided than ever before. Moreover, tho opening date of
ovember ishof tho modern Polish state, which will evokeovertones.
The first national conclave over which Gomulka presided, the third congress ofarked the consolidation of his power and saw tho flowering of his new system basedactional consensus. To stabilise this consensus, Gomulka had to rely increasingly on the servicesombination of nationalist hard liners and former Stalin* ists. By tho fourth congress, inomulka had to puthallenge from these He succeeded because his opponents were at odds, andhe was the only leaderto all wings of the party.
Since then, Gomulka'sto maintain the status quo have generated increasing Factional crises have sapped the energy of Gonulka's old guard, isolated from theof the party, and have heightened its hostility to criticism and change. As athe party's policies have been characterized bybureaucratization, and stagnation.
The Challenge of tha "Right"
The struggle that has shaken the Polish party during the past year was set off by the "right" wing of the party. It has fought against Gomulka'a leadership not by direct assault, but bythe remnants of thoseon the "left" who are liberals or "revisionists."
The attack on these elements was useful to tho right, but the real targets were those who formed the early core of Gomulka's
system of rulei the moderates, former Social Democrats, and
Jews, as well as party hacks of
various political hues.
In their call for aof the party and nation, Goaulka's challengers of the right have implicitly criticized his leadership. At tho same time, they have vigorously supported Gomulka's campaign againstdissenters. At first,welcomed this but now he knows that their excesses have redounded against him. Like
Approximate Communist Party Membership Density by Province
it or not, Gomulka has seemed to be their creature,
Gomulka himself isfor the dual challenge he now faces. e has assumed that the main danger to his leadership came from the"revisionist* wing of the party. He firmly suppressed these elementsnd has tended to answer every problem since thenwingore dogmatic position. Soon, there were no reformers left in the leadership, nor in the echelons immediately below it. In their place were aging, noncontroversial
hacks, often men discredited by both policy and performance in the pre-Gontulka period.
The right wing of the party moved into this vacuum. Gocauika tried to appease them with small concessions without giving them the opportunity to influenceor to wield power. But over the years, the hard-line elements have gradually changed theof the Polish party and its power base.
The most vociferous of the two major groups of rightist challengers is the hard-line nationalistic, and anti-Semitic group led by former interiorHiecsyslaw Moczar. Moczar'e faction has strong links to Gomulka. Itfrom the "native"or "partisans" who, under Gomulka's leadership, formed the core of the party in Poland during World War II.
Like the early Gomulka, Moczarationalistic party and was an early opponent of the party's "Muscovite* wing. It was Gomulka's cooiproicise with the pro-Soviet elements6 that led the two to part company. Moczar and his allies remained in obscurityhen Gomulka, believing he could control them on the basis of old loyalties, brought them into his regime to help with seriousand administrative problems.
Another rival of Gomulka is politburo member Edward Gierek. He draws his strength from his
dynamic and efficientof Poland's majorcenter, the province of Katowice. Gierek has grouped around him discontentedyoung party bureaucrats, and Ideologically unassailable elements seeking economic and social reform. Gierek is the only party leader who seems to be aware of the demands of modern society.
Both Moczar and Gierek are trying to wrest control of tho partyeadership thoy consider anachronistic. Each has used the recent anti-Semitic purges to his own advantage. Tho two seem also to stand for many of the same thingsi clearing doadwood from party ranks, better communication between the rulers and tho ruled, recognition of public opinion by the authorities, more decisiveness and consistency in policy, and strong partyof all spheres of national life.
PROTAGONISTSOLISH PARTY STRUGGLE
MOCZAR Politburo Car.didattParty SBcrsUry.
EDWARD GIEREK Politburo MembBf, Party Laadtr in Katowice Province.
is one of tho basic ingredients of Moczar*sbut is less prominent In Gierek's movement. Kocsar has led tho way in appealing to Polish pride in wartime resistance,to the full his role in it. Though more subtly, Giorok too has evoked tho pride ofachievement in tha postwar period. The implications of this veilod chauvinism forrelations are not clear.
Both men have tried totheir credentials with Moscow. Moczar, however,attacks thewing of tho party, which returned to Poland on the heels of tho
Red Army, although he also pledget loyalty to the alliance with the USSR. They both espouse athat realistically accepts tho alliance with Moscow, but at the same time they try tothat Gomulka'a fawningfor Soviet foreign policy needlessly demeans Poland abroad and causes unnecessary problems at homo.
Despite those commonGomulka's rivals areat odds in their visionuture Poland. Kocsar,support from tho securityand the rising militancy of disaffected local partywould rely on simple
Page 5 SPECIALNov 6
coercion* Moreover, he has courted and won florae of the same elements that would be moreallied with Gierek if they were Inheanagers, and even the youth and intellectuals. But his call for changeiscernible program, and it appoals mainly to those who cannot see beyond their own frustrated ambitions.
By contrast, Gierek histhe authoritarian approach. Implicitly pointing to theof strife within his own organiaatlon, Gierek stresses that he relios on "humaninstead ofor police methods* More importantly, however, Gierekecord of positiveent. By Polish standards, Katowice odel of manage-rial responsibility,nited party
"Zionism" and Student Rebellion
Mocsar's forces acquired their anti-Semitic image bythe role of Jews In the Polish Coonunist movement and the latent anti-Semitism of the Polish people* The campaign they unleashed in the fall7 was not aimed at all of0 Jews, the remnant of the prewar Jewish population ofillion* Rather, it was aimed at removing from party, state, and cultural organisations those influential Jews who wereduring the Stalinist period and had managed to survive by supporting Gomulka's return
After they raised the issue ofdisloyalty, the hard liners played on Gomulka's fears of "alien revisionistic" elements* Be has been susceptible to this canard, although anti-Semitism as such is not part of Gomulka'swife is Jewish.
Over the years,action became more cohesive and managed to remove Jews from the public security apparatus and, more recently, from the public media* Mocsar's control of these sectors, and Gomulka's reliance on him as the regime's watchdog, enabled the hard-line faction to exploit and often deliberately concoct anti-Semitic overtones to various problems, incidents, and crises*
Until last year'swar, however, the role of anti-Semitismeapon in the party's factional struggle had been kept out of public view, primarily because Gomulka realized that his supporters wereto any open discussion of the issue* Thearked impact on both the Polish party and people, and provided Moczar's forces with an opportunity to maneuver Gomulka
himself into sanctioning aof the issue* Convinced by fabricated information that disloyal Jews were to blame for the magnitude of the pro-Israeli sentiment in Poland, Gomulka made an ill-fated referencepeech on7ewish "fifth column." The concerted campaign to remove Gomulkaps Jewish and non-Jewish supporters from the party and state apparatus then got under way.
Moczar called into question the loyalty of one of the key sectors of Gomulka's system, the military establishment. Hethe widespread dissent among the military caused by the party leader's strongly pro-Soviet and pro-Arab policies. Many officers apparently questioned the value of the Polish-Soviet militaryin the light of thedefeat of Moscow's clients in the Middle East. Moczar's campaign, at that time conducted strictly out of public view,resulted in the removal from key positions of severalmainly Jews, and in reported shifts of scores of lesserofficers.
Moczar probably estimated that conditions were not yet ripeajor onslaught on Gomulka, who soon realized his mistake. Although the hard-line faction gained some significant posts in the months to follow, especially that of ambassador to Moscow, the removal of Jews and Gomulkafrom the bureaucracy was generally limited to those in the middle and lower echelons.
By the beginning of the year, Moczar was stalemated and the spontaneoushrougharch must have comeodsend, The students, who initially sought redress of genuine academicwere emboldened to widen their demands into the political sphere by events in Czechoslovakia and by the stalwart resistance of dissident intellectualsonth earlier.
There is abundant evidence that Moczar's use of excessive police force as well asamong the students was the key to the rapid widening ofresistance. By the end of March, the party was faced with student calls to divest itself of its monopoly of power. The quick end of the demonstrations appears to have been less the result of Moczar's repression than of the student leaders'that their movement lacked worker support and wasexploited in the intraparty struggle.
Moczar's purposes, however, were fully realized. Laying blame for the disturbances on the "Zionists" ande not only brought his reinvig-orated anti-Semitic campaign into public view for the first time, but virtually ensured Gomulka's support, no matter how reluctant.
The disturbances demonstrated how badly Gomulka's hold had been shaken. His major speech onarch was tardy, weak, and He appealed for calm and absolved the students of blame, but he endorsed the line thatwere responsible for the outbursts. Characteristically, he sought to temper Moczar's anti-Zionist" drive by drawingbetween loyal and disloyal Jews and by cautioning against anti-Semitic excesses.
The speech demonstrated in
many ways, the erosion of Gomulka's
authority. The Moczar-controlled press characterized itreport
of the politburo delivered bynslighting referencelear indication that one-man rule had already been transformed intoleadership. Morehowever, Gomulka failed to prevent the subsequentpurges of prominent Jews and liberals from nearly all the major spheres of national life.
Gomulka's display ofmust have boon the decisive factor that galvanized Gierek into entering the struggle. Tounconcealed dismay, his speech onarch was interrupted by chants of Gierek's name from an audience made up of selected party activists.
The "pogrom" atmosphereGierek's decision to take the plunge into the factional struggle probably accounts for his strong speech in late March when he appeared to endorse Moczar's extreme positions,the attack onn retrospect, however, it is clear that the speech was anto tap many of the same forces of frustrated ambition within the party that had answared Moczar's call. In all of his subsequent public statements, Gierek has ignored the "Zionist" issue and has cautioned against excesses.
Whether Gierek's moderation is evidence of an uneasy alliance between him and Gomulka is not
PARTIA
Hand-picked party audiensa hears Gomulka'! speech onlacards read "Cleana (he parly ofAct quicklynond "We believe In you, comrade Wieslaw" IGomulkel.
Page Nov 68
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entirely clear, but both men know that onlyombinedcan Moczar's challenge be checked, what is clear is that Gierek's influence on the national level has significantly increased since the "Marchnd that, in braking Moczar's drive to power, Gomulka has had to make major compromises withorces.
The Political Chess Game
Although Moczar was able to force the removal of many of Gomulka's followers, he wasprevented by Gomulka and Gierek from placing his own men in the vacated positions. In mid-April, Gomulka's closeformer defense minister Spychalski, was shifted to the ceremonial post of head of state, but the other governmental changes neither enhanced Moczar's position nor adversely affected Gomulka's. In the Foreign Ministry, where an entrenched group of Jewish moderates was susceptible to hard-linethe situation is yetbut Moczar's forces have been so farecisive voice in the implementation of policy.
These stalemates apparently impelled Moczar to try for the first time to force changes in the party leadership. Drawing on his strength in the middle and lower echelons of the party organization, he evidently attempted to convene an early central corm-ittee plenum. Gomulka, who could still rely on his politburo colleagues but was less confident of his support in the central committee, reportedly
resisted these efforts in order to consolidate his forces. When the plenum was finally held in early July, Moczar's gains were substantial but not yet enough to give him control of the party.
Moczar was appointed to the junior (nonvoting) policy making post of candidate politburobut the pro-Gocnulka majority was maintained by the simultaneous promotion of candidate politburo nenber Jaszczuk to full membership in place of ailing former head of state Ochab. Similarly, the luster was taken off Moczar's appointment to the party secretariat, where he assumed outgoing partyWicha's security functions, by the dilution of his control over the Interior Ministry, where he was replaced by the deputy minister who reportedly was the least responsive to him. the new interior minister is said to be related by marriage to Gierek. If true, this suggests that once again, in return for support, Gomulka had struck awith Gierek's followers.
Gomulka was also able to prevent the resignations ofcentral coroittee members under fire from the hard liners and to get unanimous approvalraft party program thathis views throughout. The program, which is to be approved at the party congress, makes no mention of the anti-Semitic it stresses. Instead, Gomulka's claim thatxploited by tho West, is the main danger faced by the party.
Nevertheless, Gomulkafor the first time that there were "differences within the leadership" over scone of the provisions of the draft party program. Moreover, he clearly did not have his usual control over the plenum, and could not prevent open clashes between his supporters on the politburo and those of Moczar on the central committee. Finally, despite Gomulka's call to "remove the Zionist question from the party'soczar's forces have continued their anti-Semitic campaign, albeit without thelevel of publicity.
Soviet Support and the Impact Of chos-Ov^V CrTs^ r>
Throughout the partyMoscow has made it clear that it supports Gomulka. As early as April, the Sovietin Warsaw publicly stressed Moscow's noninterference in the internal affairs of the Polish party, but he eulogized Gomulka. Moreover, the Soviet party press reprinted verbatim Gomulka's two roost important statements this year on party policy.
Even before thein Czechoslovakia, thethustrongto support the known quantity of Gomulka and some awareness of the morecharacter of his rivals. Moscow probably is now mostin stability in Eastern Europe and, most particularly, in Poland.
Since mid-August, Moscow's demonstrated willingness to use force in order to ensure the fidelity of Eastern Europeanhasactor toparty factionalism absent Then as now, Gomulka has used the specter of direct Soviet intervention in Polishto try to unify the He appears to have achieved public solidarity by his colleagues and rivals on the Czechoslovak issue, but only at the cost of his increasedwithin the leadership and of deepened factional splits.
Probably neither Moczar nor Gierek favored Polishin the intervention. Others within the top levels of the party were reportedly against the move, possibly including former defense minister Spychalski and hisGeneral Jaruzelski. other middle-echeIonofficials have privatelythat the Warsawhese officials especially deplore the impact that Polishhas had on Warsaw'swith the non-Communist world. Significantly, the party'scommittee has yet to endorse formally Poland's participation in the intervention.
Moczar has leaked rumors of his opposition to Poland's He has also used the Czechoslovak crisis to revive discussion of the "Zionist" danger, while Gomulka and the rest of the leadership have been flailing
away at "revisionism" as the basic cause of Czechoslovakia's "errors."
intervention in Czech-
oslovakia may have strengthened Gomulka's positionis Moscow, but it has weakened him at home. It has also created, on the eve of theopular mood of depression, shame, and apprehension.
The powerful Roman Catholic Church has remained silent on the Czechoslovak events, as it generally has on the domesticcrisishole. The party has reciprocated the church's restraint, and hasthe uneasy truce that has prevailed for the past two years. Cardinal Wyszynski reportedly has been rewardedocument he has been seeking for several years.
Outlook
In terms of policy* no new departures can be expected from the congress. It will put its stamp of approvalartyanti-intellectual, andhas been formed during the struggle of the past months. Nominalin effectbe made to those social groups that have been and will be most involved in the party crisis. Thefor example, are once again being courted by thefaction*
The party will probably tread water on other domestic policies, paying only lipto an expanded role inaffairs for the people inand youth in particular. Improvements in economicand management will be stressed, but no major in the country's lagging economic reform programs are,
The regime's support of the Warsaw Pact and of increased East European economic cooperation will remain inviolate, on paper at least. The congress is also likely to be the forum for arestatement of Poland's anti-West German position, which will figure prominently in theof its role in the Czech-oslovak intervention. Warsaw's standing proposals forand European security are likely to be stressed as evidenceontinuing devotion to East-West detente.
The most important business before the congress, however, will be the endorsement of the
new power relationship between Gomulka and the new, younger forces of the party represented by his challengers, Gierek and Moczar. Moczar mayull seat onmember politburo. Gierek. who reportedly has been loathe to come to Warsaw except as party leader, nevertheless mayajor governmentpossibly the premiership.
Premier Cyrankiewicz has long been rumored in line for the post of foreign minister to replace the prestigious Rapacki. The future of Rapacki, who has been inactive since April, will have
to be resolved by the congress. Accordingariety of sources, he may lose his politburo job as well as his ministry. Others whose politburo positions have been shaky include planning chief Jedrychowski, trade union head Loga-Sowinski, and the deputy premier in charge of investment,ew who is particularly vulnerable*
All of these men belong to Gomulka's old guard, and theof their successors in the politburo may reveal the strength of the contending Apart from Moczar himself, however, there are few among his faction eligibleolitburo post. Gierek,ull politburo member, may seek an ally by promoting Defense Minister Jaruzelski's appointment to the politburo.
The secretariat and the central committee are likely to be the real battlegrounds between Gierek's and Moczar's forces* Jewish party secretary Starewicz, responsible for the general area of propaganda and culture, has been rumored to be ripe for ouster Ineat central committee, whose apparatus has already been infiltrated by Moczar's forces.
changes are likely to be decidedly anti-Semitic in nature, although its Jewish members now form no more than ten percent of the total. It still remains unclear to what extent Moczar will be able to fill vacancies with his own.
With Gomulka's powerparceled out amongforces, the issue of his formal position within the party is no longer central* Whether or not he remains as nominal head of the party, his future will be largely out of his hands,in part on his rivals, and in part on developments inand in Prague* Gomulka, however, is temperamentally Clearly under strain, he might well retire from the scene while he can do so with grace.
Communism in Poland has neverore narrow range
of alternatives than it doeswith its future probably lying somewhere betweenchallengers Gierek and Moczar. It may be Poland's misfortune that rigid authoritarianism might once again be imposed upon this nation of stubborn individualists.
Yrs
Original document.
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