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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
18
SUBJECT: SNTE THE SITUATION IN PANAMA
THE rROBLEM
To assess the character and the short-term prospects of the nllitary regime.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Military rule of Panama is likely to continue for acne tlroe,ear* The provisional governccnt, headed by two former colcuelo, loront for tho leaders of the coup, who are now in ccnarand of the Guardia Noclonol. But the situation i3 fluid, and relationships among the new leaders af the Guardia and between the Guardia and the provisional government are subjectariety of strains.
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Guardia staged the coup ofctober lu order toits ovn position rather than to carry out any specificPanama. The new regime haseturn tovia elections, but has not specified any tice-tableprocedures it has outlined couldonsiderable delay.
ia unlikely that any effective opposition to thowill develop over the short term from supporters ofextreme leftists, or tho oligarchy. Wa expect the regimeof the oligarchs to adjust gradually to each other.
it is eager to secure recognition hy the US,that the regime vould he very responsive to pressureUS, particularly vith respectine-table for elections. delay in recognition vould bruise tbe feelings ofof the new regime, but they wculd not be likely. Into encourage blatant anti-Amorlcaniem.
doubt that the military regime will act upon thetreaties which were widely criticized In Panama. Themight move to open discussions looking towardvhlch vould be signed and ratified only aftergovernment had been restored.
DISCUSSION
Onctober the Guardia Haclonal overthrow theof Arnulfo Arias, vho had taken officectober and was attempting to establish presidential control over Pan ana.'a only security force. TMs marks the third tine the Gusxdia haa thrown Arias out of office. Starting with the second depositionnd continuing until the past year, the Guardia had abstained fron direct and forceful intervention In national politics. Its leadera had served as the loyal supporters of successive administrations representing the oligarchy, and had concentrated on using OSto improve the professional skills of their forces. eries of crises preceding and following the presidential election ofowever, the Giiardia made it clear once more that it is the final political arbiter ln Panama.
The coup ofctober was swift and effective: Arias, the leader of Panama's largest political movement, was not able to rally his supporters and at this point appeare to have little or no chance to regain office. So far, no serious threat to the control of the nev government has developed from any direction, though in the lamediate wake of the coup several protest demonstrations, sporadic minor violence, and some ill-organized resistance by armed
bands along the Costa Rlcan border did occur. Bonetheless, the situation in Panama rwaoint unsettled. The leaders of the coup probably are themselves uncertain how long they wish to stay La power and what policies they should pursue. And while there is now little overt or organized resistance to the new regime, most groups. Including the traditional business and political elites, are unsure as to the best Deans to protect their Interests.
3. After the tuo previous coups against Arias, the Guardia had quickly turned the reins of government hack to the politlcisns. There is evidence that such was the original intention this time. But the desire of the leaders of the coup to prolong militaryof the government has dearly grown stronger over the past couple of weeks. Their announced intention to bold elections and return to civilian rule seems largely motivatedesire to speed diplomatic recognition fron the US and other foreign, and to discourage active resistance. They have been vague on the timing of the elections, perhaps because they have not thought the matter through or are divided In their opinions. Of late, their private statementseriod of military rule of atear. In any case, their plan to undertaketudied revision of electoral procedures would require adelay before elections were held.
k. The principal architects of the coup. Colonel Torrljos and Lt. Colonels Martinez and Boyd, have established themselves, ln effect, as the new leaders of the Guardia; they have also setovernment directedunta composed of tvo former colonels, Plnllla and Urrutla.* The Junta hasivilian cabinet composed mostly of men vho had not previously been politically prominent. The provisional government isront for military control. The exact relationship between the Junta and the nev leaders of the Guardia apparently la not yet settled to the satisfaction of all the men Involved. Both Plnllla and Urrutla have probablyost of prestige vlthln the Guardia because of their indeciaiveness during the periodpreceding the coup. At this point the nev leadership of the
* At Arias' insistence. General Vallarino, longtime commanding officer of the Guardia, reluctantly retired onctober and appears to have lost most if not all of his influence over the officer corps he once firmly controlled. Plnllla, vho had been second ln command, vaa also pushed Into retirement from active military duty onctober. Urrutla, who had been elevated to commanding officer by Arias on the day of ths coup, has retired from the Guardia since assuming his position on the Junta.
The present top-ranlcing officer, Colonel Hassan, faces earlyTorrijos, now chief of staff, Is In effective control of the Guardia. Martinez and Boyd serve as deputy chief of staff and executive secretary, respectively. All three coup leaders are expected to move up the command ladder with the retirement of Hassan.
Guardia la the dominant voice ln all important matters,with respect to appolntoents to government positions, and ia couaulted regularly on many day-to-day decisions. But vesome tensions between the Guardia and the junta as the latter attempts to exert increased jpdependence in government matters.
least for the rsoment. Colonel Torrijos appears tostrongest figure in the new regime. We believe him to beforceful, intelligent, and effective officer. Heopposed to Arias and worked tenaciously bo keep himoffice. He has also expressed antipathy toward those heArias' victory and for Panama's overallVallarino, most professional politicians, and mostof the oligarchy. Sis attitudes are strongly influenced by
a middle class background which sets him apart from the oligarchy.
has longaithful follower oftoo, comesiddle class background, but iswell educated. ember of one of Panama's mostfamilies, is also apparently close to Torrljos. see no Immediate challenge to Torrijoo within the nevertheless, Martinez hasenchant forand irrational actions, power relationships in Panama are
stillluid state, and trouble acme and dlvlBive issues are bound to emerge. In consequence, ve cannot rule out 'the posoi-bility of serious dissension among the military leaders.
7. What style of rule do the new leaders intend? The original impetus for the coup probably vas entirely defensive: to preserve the perquisites of the officers of the Guardia and its position as final political arbiter. Thus, ve doubt that the key conspirators started out vith any positive program In mind. The junta has sinceeries of policy objectives. These, though vague and general, sound reformist and anti-oligarchical, even though for manyhe Guardia cooperated closely vith the civilian elite. The various public and private statements of the new regime could indicate possible moves against the influence and corrupt practices of oligarchs and old-linea strengthening of the integrity of the constitutional system through political reform, and an Improvement ln the welfare of the peasant and laborer. The charges of corruption andagainst the Panamanian elite ring true, but are nonetheless remarkable considering that most officers of the Guardiain some of the same practices to the extent they could.
Ue think it is too eerly toira Judgment on the regime's Intentions regarding policy. Ve doubt that the oev leaders sre themselves radicals, or particularly bus cop tibia to radical Influence.* Indeed, the provisional government haapronounced Itself to ha anti-Ccrnmunist and has kopt underr eo radicals of various stripes, let vethereenuine antipathy vithin the Guardia, especially among ita lover middle class officers, against many among the Panamanian elite, particularly the political warriorses, whose In-eptness and venality the Guardia blames for the series of erlM* over the past year. The oligarchs and politicians vho backed Arias (cynically in tha Guardla'a view) are probably special targets for tho hard feelings of the leaders of the new regime.
We think, however, that the junta's proclaimed objectives were initially put forward for largely tactical reasons: that is, they were Intended to mollify the masses, and perhaps to frighten the political and business elite into cooperating with thoregime on its own terms. Some Individual oligarchs closely
* Torrijos* younger brother is an extreme leftist. Theirrelationship ia close, but ve doubt that Torrijos la much influenced by his brother's radical views.
Identified with Arias may be harassed, by measures directed against them, and thoro may even bo some largely cosmetic "socialrice controls on consumer Items and some stodest new tax levieo against the wealthy. What the now rogimo will do about constitutional and political changes is unclear. In any case, Panamanians have demonstrated an ability to ccorrupt and abuse any set of institutions; that Is, tbe fault lies mainly with the men, not with tbe mechanisms.
balance, ve believe that tha dominant impulse ofregime will ba to make peace with key figures in theand not to try to destroy it. Tha military leadersrealize that they need the supportood part of theto help run government affairs, settle theand ease the financial difficulties brought oo byof business ln tbo wako of tho coup. Thoy areovertures to some leaders of the business community andold political parties.
thooo groups, however, are exercisingany accommodation. Most members of the elite holdof the Guardia in some disdain and would like thedirect military rule to bo as brief as possible. Tbey may
also be alarmed by tbe anti-oligarchical tone of junta propaganda. In any case, they are not yet resigned to possibly having their affairs and their books audited by colonels and majors. Yetthe new regime is demonstrating its will and probable ability to stay in power, we think most members of the elite who are invited to participate in the regime will eventually accept. At least some will conclude that they can best protect their interests through cooperation with the new government rather than resistance to it.
U. The lack so far of serious resistance to the new regime is indicative, in our view, of the general apathy of the population, the poor preparations for an emergency by tbe Arias faction, the timidity of students and other groups traditionally opposed to military rule, and the skillful handling by the Guardia of the disorders that did occur. To discourage public protests, the new regimearge number of radicals, Arias stalwarts, and other potential troublemakers, and instituted stringent security measures including tight controls over Panama's often inflasKoatory news media* The Guardiainimum of force in controlling the protest demonstrations in the cities during the first week after the coup, and thus created no martyrs:
they vere considerably more forceful in discouraging armed resistance by pro-Arias peasants in aone outlying areaa,
of tbe special security measures havebut ve think rather tight controls overmedia will continue for some time. Most ofhave been released, though known radicals Even with somewhat less stringent securityregime vill probably not have much difficulty lnorder over the next several veeks. Wo doubtof Arias, radicals, or students can causelocal difficulties at this time, and these thobo able to handle. Members of the oligarchy vhoby the nev regime may also attempt to provoke Because of their financial resources and theirpreserving their privileged positions, they nightcome to be the main source of disaffection. Evenlonger term, vo anticipate that any lncidenta willand local, though we do not exclude suchas attempted assassination of members of the regime.
Arias forces might, over the coning months,
try to cause trouble for the regime through guerrilla actions.
The email groups of poorly armed peasants vho participated ln resistance along whe Costa Rican border right after the coup vere not trained for insurgency and dispersedew days. We doubt that any such group could seriously challenge theontrol of the countryside.
14. The military regime is obviously anxious to secure diplomatic recognition by the US as soon as possible, probably hoping thereby to rtnoed the cooperation of the elite and the normalization of political and economic conditions. It is probably confident that the US vill soon extend recognition, but it is probably concernedelay in recognitiononth or more might encourage an increase in at least passive resistanceariety of forces and exacerbate economic problems. Even so, vo doubt that tbe regime feels under any imediate or urgent necessity for acceding to pressure from the US on such matters as elections and security measures. Moreover, we are not confident that the regime, oncewas gained, vould honor any commitments made in response to US pressure, especiallyimetable for elections; it vould be too easy to devise esccunoo for postponement.
15* rolonged delay ln recognition would bruise tho feelings of the leaders of the nev regime. While Torrijos and company have always professed to be staunchly pro-American, ve do not know hov sincere and deep their feelings run. Mt feel that the younger officer* ln particular have becomenationalistic over the past fev years* Yet ve do not expect blatant antl-Americanism to become the Guardia's stock in trade, at leaat over the next year. The regime realizes that the anti-US issue is potentially the most volatile one in Panama, and probably vould not feel sure it could control an aroused populace. Finally, afterthe military leaders vill be anxious to renew not only tho flow of economic and military aid, but also the traditional close ties vith US armed forces.
16. We doubt that the military regime will act upon the Canal treaties- negotiated7 by tbe administration of President Roblea. The new leaders are aware that the treaties, for good reasons or bed, wero widely criticized ln Panama, and that the Guardia, generally considered to be under strong US influence, would bo accused of selling out if the treaties were nov accepted. Since the Junta haa
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suspended Panama's National Assembly, morecyver, the question of the legitimacy of any nev treaties vould prove embarrassing for both countries. The regime, on the other hand, might seek to activate through executive agreement some of the terms of the draft treaties vhlch are clearly favorable to Panama, such as Increased annual payments for the uae of the Canal, and might participate in opening negotiationsev set of treaties to be signed and ratified after the return to constitutionalism.
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