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China's Cultural Revolution8
Special Report
WEEKLY REVIE
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CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION8
Last sumi&erew turning point in thecourse of the Cultural Revolution,rive to restore order is now in progress. This turnaboutpring and early summer when violence in Chinarescendo nearly equal to that of the bloody summer Armed clashes and political infighting were particularly intense in southern China. In one province bordering Vietnam, the four principal cities were gutted by fire, and during one period the vital rail line to Hanoi was disrupted.
The new turn came at the end of July, when word went out from Peking that violence by Red Guards or anyone else was tomilitary intervention if necessary. In most places, the array has carried out these ordersill. The Red Guard organizations the shock troops ofbeen badly mauled, and many have been destroyed. The more "radical" Red Guard groups responsive to extremists in Peking have bcrne the brunt of the attack.
Vigilante croups organized by provincialauthorities cracked student headsnd many old scores were settled by officials previously under Red Guard attack- These vigilante croups are composed of workers and are led by army troops. They have been told that they will occupy schools and universities "permanently" to see that students never get out of line again.
The older students, who tended to be leaders o: the Red Guard -ovement, are being summarilyven though they have had nointhan two years. Many are being sent to army-run state farms in remote areas. According to one credible report, political prisonersrison mine to make way for these so-called graduates. It is evident from all this that students--the backbone of the Redno longer being treated as the apple of Mao's eye and are not getting his protection.
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"Mew Look" in the Revolution
The change in the political climate in late July made it to resume the restoration of administrative machinery in the provinces. The process of forming new governments waa started in butrepeated setbacks. Slow, however, all provinces have new "revolutionary committees" to replace the old provincial party secretaries and government councils. Most of the provincial revolutionary committees, those set up, are dominated by military officials who were under radical attackch of the Cultural Revolution.
Now that th* fornalapparatus has beenwork is going forward on the difficult Job of rebuilding the tarty machine, virtuallyin the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. This zask has hardly started,ig first step was taken inwhen the centralhe first in two /aars--to announce that the long ov^rius ninth party congress vould ba convened at sometime.
This decision, however, has by no means settled the touchy russiicn of rebuilding tha party apparatus* Radicals in the Peking leadership appear to be engagedolemic with the storefares* that are workingstabilization. They have
been expressing themselvos through Shanghai newspapers, which have frequently served as anfor the views cf ths Maoist radicals. Since September, Shanghai media have beenthe radical position, which callsurther house-cleaning within the partyarge infusion of new blood from the Red Guard organizations. By contrast, the Peking press has been taking an ambiguous line. This difference in emphasismore evident while the plenum was meeting in secret in October. Ignoring seme points andothers, the Shanghai media expanded on official Pekingto warn of the dangers of allowing experienced party cadres to dominate the new party structure.
The plenum clearly failed to end the debate. Two weeks after the final comr.uniquf washanghai paper went far beyond Peking commentary ina new purge of partymaking it clear that it had in mind individuals who still held important posts. The editorial accused these unnamed individuals of using theirto excluderom influential posts in the nascent party organization and ofold colleagues who have been "proved" guilty of political crimes.
Provincial congresses of party members are meeting now toraft charter for the revived party organization,by the plenum, apparently
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in preparation for the upcoming partly congress. As if sensing tha- this congress may be stacked against theneShanghai editorial went to the extraordinary length ofthat members "have the right to go over the heads of their superiors to report to the central authorities and the Chairman," Division on this issue runs very deep. Comment-ing on the problem to foreign visitors, Foreign Minister Chen Yi recently remarked thatdisagreements could again force postponement of the party congress.
The first task of thebarring new and more serious disputes, is likely to be convened nextbeew central, Less than one third ofull and alternate members of ths previous committee are still active. In the light of recent developments, it seems likely that the new central con-nittse vill be dominated by the military and will haveonrevolutionary case
Origins of the "Revolution"
These developments follow tvealf years of the most violent kind of politicalwhich at times has brought China to the brink of anarchy. I- hasizarre situation in which the regime has, inbeen conducting revolution against itself.
The Cultural Revolution had its originide range of
complex factors, but Mao Tse-tung unquestionablyentral role in setting off the upheaval* In the early and, Mao apparently believed himself to be increasingly at odds with many leading members of the Chinese regime, This belief was partly paranoia, partly Mao also believed the Chinese revolution--hisrunning into the sands. Revolutionary enthusiasm and elan had been lost* Bureaucratic buck-passing and inertia were growing; technical experts were vying with "revolutionary" generalists for authority in making
Mao's answer to thesewas an attempt to rekindle the "revolutionary* fervor that had helped bring him to power. He had apparently developed an almost mystical faith in the power of "permanent revolution" con* ducted by mobilized andmasses, and sought by this means to counteract growingand prevent Soviet-style revisionism from infecting China. Many officials and probably some important members of the regime, however, distrusted the kind of unrsalisric mass enthusiasm that had led to the disasters of the Great Leao Forward in the. These men resisted by dragging their feet andMao's wishes in the light of what they themselves regarded as sound policy,
This apparently convinced Mao that some of the men in linesucceed him were selling out the revolution, and he moved against then in the fall and
secret
S. Mao's initial attack centered on the propaganda apparatus of the party, which he apparently believed had failed in the task of maintainingfervorigh pitch. The attack on the propaganda machinery culminated in the purge of Pengull manner of che politburo and party boss of Peking, in the spring
This not only upset the balance of political power at the apex of authority, but almost certainly aroused tha fears of other top leaders. It seems likely that some of them plotted against the others in an effort to exploit the situation for their own advantage.
The net effect, in this atmosphere, was to persuade Mao chat many of the men close around hir. were not to be trusted, and that the entire party apparatus was suspect. lenum of the central committee inhe axe fail on Liu Shao-chi-head of state and number-two man in the party. Other veteranware soon cut down as wall. Following tha plenum, Mao and Lin Piao unleashed tha newly formed aei Guards against the entire party.
The Course of the Conflict
Events began to generate
their own momentum as thesurged back and forth. in the provinces sought to defend thtmaeives againstrd activists sent out iron Ptking co being them down. Theyzei local "Red Guards* of
their own and pitted then against the interlopers. These efforts proved fruitless, however, when the amy waa ordered to restore order at tha end ofsuppressing both the Maoist Red Guards and local groupsthe provincial leaders. The party leaders wareby military officials who had leading roles in provisional governing bodies set up at that time.
in the spring,rief respite from violentstruggle, Mao and tha radicals grouped around him launched new attacks on "power holders taking the capitalistarmy men andwho had replaced the purged party officials. Amy leaders in particular were accused of acting in February to suppress the Redinstrument of the extremists in theRevolution Group in Peking. Covert resistance on the part of those under attack merely fed the flames. By early summer, armed clashes between opposing Red Guard groups had spread across the country and were growing in intensity.
More open defiance of tha radical leaders in Peking on the part of the Wuhan Military Region commander in July ledajor crisis. In response to thechallenge, radicals in the capital opened an across-the-board attack on the entireestablishment inhis move nay have nearly cost the Maoists tho support of the military leadership" By the end
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tho month, tensions had reached the breaking point and troubles were counting.
More Doderate elements, with substantial militaryhango of course in early September. Rampaging Red Guards were curbed and aof other steps wereemblance of These moves were fitful at best, however, and frequently were the result of painful Although partly curbed, the Red Guards still enjoyed many special privileges and clearly remainedrotective
This lull was also The wintereriod of confusion andpolitical statements, with rodest steps toward restoration of administrative orderwith bouts of renewedand political savagery.
In lateew purge of theincluded the political demise of the army's acting chiefew surge of radical ferment. Political divisions sharpened and the new provincialorgans appeared on the verge of being undercut byagitation. Fightingspread, particularly in south China. This open conflict was halted only by the policy turnabout of late July.
The Forces at work
Struggle between Peking and the provinces has been the most
visiblo aspect of the political civil war that has been tearing China. There is also resistance to Maoist policies at the center-conductedacade of unity. 'Revolutionary* policies have been resisted and at times blockedoose coalition of leaders in the ailitaryand in the government machinery, for whom Premier Chou En-lai is the symbolic leader and primary spokesman.
These men would like to limit the damage done to the economy, administrative and cohesiveness of the state by the excesses of the 'revolution.* Many have then-selves been under poster attack by radical Red Guard factions aligned with the extremist,Cultural Revolution Group, and thus would like to damp down the "revolution" totheir positions. Their basic motivation is primarily nationalistic. It seers likely that more and more people have swung over to this "opposition* with each destructive lurch to the *left" in the course of the Cultural Revolution.
At the moment, roup of men in Peking who have almost certainly been at odds amongfor much of the past two years iselatively "conservative" program ofviolence, dismantling the Red Guardsolitical force, andorkable administrative apparatus. The degree to which this program has been forced on Mao and his associates by the more
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opposition, and the to which Mao himself, the cost of continueds nowirtue of necessity, is still unclear.
Moreover, tha presentis by noercent "conservative.* Radical and typically Maoist programs are being pushedumber of fields with apparent vigor. rive to
"simplify administration,"the wholesaleof administrative personnelegment of the urbanforce, is now ln full swing. Large numbers of people have been sent to the countryside to work in agriculture on what is intended toemipermanent basis. This drive has already caused severe dislocations in administrative work, as Foreign Minister Chen Yi admitted tovisitors recently.
At ths same time,are being introduced in the educational system. State-run primary schools in theformerly attended mainly by children of local cadres, are being abandoned in favor of schools run and paid for by local farm brigades; the new schools presumably will be sore egalitarian. Indeed, theseems on the way tothe main administrative unit in the countryside, displacing the smaller work team. In some areas, the same results areachieved by merging the work teams, on which major emphasis
has been placed since the Great Leap Forward.
In south and east China,communes are announcinghastilyconfiscate or reduce peasants1 private plots,pigs, and abandon or modify the work-point wagepresent basis offor nonsalaried workthe country.
These reports may beto another drivea wholesale re-exaaination of official "socialpeasant, poor peasant, landlord, and so forth--which is now under way inand perhaps other provinces in east and south China. job assignments, and official attitudes depend largely on such this drive has been causing considerable anxiety wherever it has been implemented.
The new experimentstrong family resemblance to those measures introduced in the period just preceding the Cultural Revolution, andthat Mao may be returning to his strategy of then the pursuit of hisinflexible aims,
Mao's Position and Character
The history of the Cultural Revolution thus car, however, dictates caution in announcing its impending conclusion. Mao Tse-tungis defense minister
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Piao, still ieer. to retain tho personal loyalty of many key military commanders. As Maois fond of saying, military support is the fundamental source of political power in China or anywhere else. The army has notesponsive or effective instrument for "revolution" in Mao's eyes but, with fewarmy commanders have not been willing to defy the Maoists openly. It is this asbivelent position of military leaders--they disagree with Mao'sbut are loyal to the man himself--that makes Mao dangerous and gives him the capability to renew the initiative in untried directions. Twice before, Mao has retreated in the face of stiff opposition in the army and the bureaucracy to hispolicies; each time he soon resumed the offensive with renewed vigor.
Both in Peking and in the provinces, the currentis everywhere split between those who had vigorously pushed the Cultural Revolution andmilitary men and old partyhadthe radicals. Although this coalition of opponents of revolution now seoms to have the upper hand, the extremists around Mao in Peking may still possess sufficient strength to frustrate some of the plans of moreelements within thegroup. Bitter political struggles between the two camps probably lie ahead.
Mao is still described as the "great helmsman" of theand he has thus far been able to protect his chiefeven in adversity. the latest policy changeover four months ago, no major figures associated withdiscredited extremisthave yet been disgraced and removed.
If old-line cadres now in positions of authority should sabotage the more irrationalof Mao's vision of aegalitarian andChina he may become frustrated again and attempt to lash out as he did
Mao has always been an apostle of violence andmass action. Anleader who recently talked with Mao found him amanangerous leader. He commented that Mao seemed to enjoy setting political fires and then watching with pleasure the efforts of others to put then out.
Thisorpiex personality. Mao does notathological love of disorder for its own sake. Hoigh tolerance for it, however, and probably will never be satisfied with stability achieved at the expense of his revolutionary programs. In his earlier career, Mao demonstrated the ability to change his strategy to meet new situations, but it seems likely he has now lost much of his flexibility. Mao isnd probably suffers fromcerebral arteriosclerosis, which in most instances is
by increasing mental rigidity. Mao's probableto persistourse alreadyontinuedalso be reinforced by the realization that his time is running out.
The chances for repairing the damage done by the Cultural Revolution and moving ahead with positive programs of long-range development thus seem inso long as Mao retains the capability of influencing the course of events. Those in the leadership seeking to end the Cultural Revolution probablythis and regard theof Mao as an activeforceecessary step. At this point, however, they are probably not sufficiently united tc remove him by force anddo not have the support forove from the militarywhich would becor success.
The immediate prospect is thuseriod of stalemate during which conservativeattempt to restrict Mao's freedom of action by means short of eliminating himolitical force. Such ais inherently unstable. Mao solves the problem by dying first, it seems likely zh-st forces in opposition to him will be under increasingto unite and encapsulate the old manalace prisoner.
Problems Ahead
The regime that follows the new at the top inll be beset with formidable
problems. The first of these will be to end the politicalthat has plagued the top leadership ever since the start of the Cultural Revolution three years ago. We do not know which men will play key rolesew regime but it seems clear that no candidate with anything like Mac's charisma is available to impose unityroup of ambitious leaders divided by old wounds and unsettled scores left from the Cultural Revolution. At best, the kind of coilegialthat seems likely to evolve will probably move uncertainly in its efforts to cope with the problems cf reconstruction.
The new leaders will be severely hampered, moreover, by the disarray in the machinery of government. The party has been virtually destroyed, and it will take long and patient work to rebuild it as an effective political ins trument. Thehas fared better than the party, but it, too, ^asserious carnage and is in need of extensive repair.
Burdened with these problems, the successors to the presentwill be attempting toemoralized andractious ration. The relaxation of central authority which hasy-product of the Culturalseens likely to causetrouble. Once thecf coercion are back in the people can probably be forced back into their pre-revolutionary subservience, but there will bc resistance. ore serious problem is theof regional andpower groups pursuing
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own ends at the expense of the center. regionalism,roblem in china, has received impetus and anto grow, although it is very much weaker thancentralizing forces.
ultimately, we wouldto see the emergenceeasonably effective, united group of leaders in peking. they will be communistsroad sense, but not maoist the forces of
nationalism that brought mao and the communist party to powerroowerfulcement. the newhoever they might be--willbe pragmatic men motivated strongly by nationalistic they will reject mao's revolutionary dogma bacause it has proved irrelevant to china's problems, but they nay well continue to treat the old manenin and georga washington rolled into one--while ignoring the content of hia programs . mt
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Original document.
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