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(NSSM-3: General Purpose Forces)
I. Soviet Policy Objectives for General
Purpose . 5
II. Representative Soviet General
Purpose . . . 6
III. Reactions toand Forces
Representative Soviet General Purpose Forces Opposing Proposed US Strategies and Forces . . 25
Foreign Military and Political Reactionsof US Strategic andForce 33
Foreign Military and Political Reactions to ' Combinations of US Strategic and General Purpose Force Postures
The earlier Study GroupPolitical and Military Reactions to US Strategies and Forces (Strategic9 and the main body of this report provide the detailed background and much of the basis for the judgments presented in thison foreign reactions to US strategic and general purpose forces considered in combination. An attempt has been made to avoid unnecessary repetition of the discussions already presented (and no attempt has been made here to summarize our earlierhis annex.concentrates on those combinations of US forces that probably would engender foreign responsesdifferent from those judged likely when strategic forces and general purpose forces areseparately.
In the report assessing foreign reactions to the various US strategic forces, it was assumed that US general purpose force programs and deployment would proceed as currently planned. Similarly, in thison foreign reactions to the various US general purpose forces, it was assumed that US strategic force programs and deployment would proceed as currently planned.
When the various US strategic force and general purpose force options are considered in combination, the task of assessing foreign reactions becomesmore complicated. The impact of this final stage in the analysis on our earlier judgments isin the next section of this annex.
In the case of the USSR, we believe that likely reactions depend not only on how the Soviets view the combination of US forces but also upon the interaction between Soviet strategic and general purpose forces
policies. The final section of this annex discusses the general nature of this Soviet internal interaction process.
Reactions to Alternative Combinations of US Strategic and General Purpose Forces
Host of the conclusions previously drawn about the Soviet reactions to alternative US strategic force and general purpose force postures considered separately do not change when the various combinations of US forces are considered. The only important exceptions are in combinations involving the very high or the very low levels of US forces. In brief:
of the high US posturesstrategic and general purpose forceslead to an increasing military orientationpolitical and economic policy.
of lower US posturesto reduce the military orientation ofover the long run but almost certainly notproportion to the cutback in US militaryincluded in the lowest US alternatives. as the influence of theon Soviet political decisions, thewith Communist China, and possibleSoviet views of the potential utility ofif the US were unilaterally to select anlow militarybelieve would act
to prevent the combinations of Soviet force postures from becoming much lower than wo postulated for the individual reaction forces.
Because the strategic force balance is of such overriding importance to the Soviets, we believe their reactions to alternative US strategic forces, asin the earlier report, would be largelyregardless of the particular general purpose force strategy the US adopted. Ke qualify thisconclusion in tthe one case where the US adopts Strategic Forcer II in conjunction with General Purpose Forcer 4. In this case,
the Soviets would almost certainly conclude that the possibility of direct military confrontation with the US had risen sharply. They would feel compelled to expand both their strategic and general purpose forces as rapidly as possible.*
US choices of the various strategic forcecoupled with the resulting Soviet strategic force reactions, might stimulate Soviet generalforce reactions somewhat different from thosein the report on general purpose forces.
Although the Soviets clearlyery high priority on their military programs in general, it is clear that the resources made available for military purposes are not unlimited and that within the total defenseystem of priorities must operate. Trends in Soviet defense spending since the earlyindicate that first priority has been given to strategic force programs designed totrong nuclear deterrent, and it seems likely that strategic force programs designed to maintain this capability will continue to receive first priority. Thus, the amount of resources available for general purposeprobably will be affected by the level ofon strategic forces even though there is not an absolutely fixed ceiling on total defense spending. If pressures to expand the Soviet strategic forces were reduced in reaction to US Strategic ForceIVr an arms limitation agreement,for the Soviet general purpose forces could be expected to be slightly higher than previously Conversely, if the Soviet strategic forces were increased in reaction to US Strategic Forcesr II, expenditures for the Soviet general purpose forces would probably be somewhat less than previouslyas noteq, above, for the combinations with US General Purpose Forcer 4.
* The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the judgments in the last two sentences of this paragraph vould not apply to the combinations of US forces vkich included Strategic Force Package II. They believe that thebetween Strategic Forcend II are
large enough toubstantially lower level of Soviet reaction than indicated.
In general and in contrast to the Soviet case, NATO attitudes and defense policies are more likely to be influenced by the way the US structures andits general purpose forces than by relatively minor variations in the us strategic force posture. The NATO allies believe that their security depends ultimately on the deterrent strength of US strategic forces, but they value US conventional forces inas an indication of the importance we attach to our commitments there andledge toward theof our strategic forces when and if needed. They are, therefore, highly sensitive to changes in the deployment of US forces in Europe.
A major reduction in the US strategic posture that casts doubt on its deterrentas adoption of Strategic Force Package IVithout an appropriate armscause the NATO countries great concern. imultaneous substantial buildup in US general purpose strength in Europe wouia not ease this concern but only reinforce it. Thewould fear thatombination of changes not only would weaken the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent, but also would leave the US capable only ofrolonged conventional war in Europe.
A major reduction in US general purpose forces-such as adoption of General Purpose Strategies, oronly wouldeakening of the USto Europe in general, but also, in particular, it would raise doubts about the willingness of the US to use its strategic nuclear forces to defend Europe. This would*cause the NATO countries great concern and, in our view, this concern could not be-allayedimultaneous increase in US strategic forces.
Simultaneous major reductions in strategic forces and general purpose forces would cause great consternation in NATO and would probably destroy the alliance or render it ineffective. On the other hand, concurrent increases of the magnitude of Strategic Forcend II and General Purpose Forceould cause some consternation, too. Many of the NATO nations would be afraid that
the US was intensifying the arms raceegree that would result in drastic reactions by the Soviet Union and increase the chances of war in Europe.*
Chinese reactions to alternative US strategic forces and general purpose forces can be considered independently as presented in the earlier reports. Under any of the US strategic force options underthe Chinese will be in such an inferiorduring the foreseeable future that variations in US strategic forces have little effect on Chinese actions. In contrast, their attitudes and military policies are much more influenced by US generalforce deployment. The degree of support that the Chinese give to -people's wars" or any otherpolicy moves will be influenced primarily by their perceptions of how and under what circumstances US general purpose forces might be used.
* The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the judgments in the last sentence of this paragraph vould not apply to the combinations of VS forces vhich includedForce Package II, They believe that thebetween Strategic Forcend II are large enough toubstantially lower level of Soviet reaction than indicated.
As with NATO, barring drastic changes in the US strategic force posture Japanese reaction depends primarily on how the US maintains and deploys its con-conventional forces. arked unilateral reduction in US strategic forces or US general purpose forces probably would stimulate greater supporttronger national defense effort and would add new weight to argumentsational nuclear weapons program. reductions of both types of forces wouldthese efforts. An acceleration of US strategic or general purpose programs probably would not greatly affect present Japanese military policy as long as it did not endanger the reversion of Okinawa or involve deployment of new forces to Japan or the establishment
of new bases there. Unless the US were respondingommunist threat, an acceleration of US generaldeployment in Asia would probably be seen by the Japanese as an unnecessary attempt to intimidate Peking, Pyongyang, and Hanoi.
Other Far Eastern Countries
The attitudes and defense policies of the other Asian countries are influenced by US general purpose force deployment, but are relatively unaffected by US strategic force policy. Their reactions to the two types of US forces, therefore, can be considered
Interaction Between Soviet Strategic Forces and Soviet General Purpose Forces
He believe that, in their reactions to US there is little interaction between Soviet strategic force programs and general purpose force programs in terms of substituting one type of force for the other. The Soviets have designed the two types of forces to fulfill fundamentally different kinds of missions and to counter completely different threats. On the other hand, it is prudent toas Soviet military doctrine does, the mutually supporting role of these forces, particularly in any likely conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.
Some significant interaction may be caused byfactors. How the expenditure implicationsmilitary programs might affect theSoviet strategic forces and generalis best viewed within the context of theeconomic
The Soviet economy has the capacity toarge and diversified military establishment. The strategic buildup since the mid-sixties, however, has been accompanied by economic policies which could cause trouble for Soviet planners during the next few years. Rates of growth in investment in heavy industry have been reduced to levels well below the average of early sixties, andesult, rates of growth in output of heavysource of both military and investmentdecline for the next few years.
If the Soviets continue the policy of fairly high levels of investment in consumer goods industries and choose to restore rates of growth in investment in heavy industry, resources available for the military will be constrained, at least in the short run. On the other hand, if the Soviets do not increase the rates of growth in investment in heavy* either by constraining the consumer sector or militarygreatly improve the efficiency andof heavy industry, resources for themight be even more constrained in the long run.
In the absence of marked changes in US strategic forces and general purpose forces from those previously planned, the USSR is expected to continue to spend the equivalent ofear on itsforces andillion on its generalforces and command and support functions. (This does not include other significant Soviet military expenditures such as research and development and military aid to other countries.)
The expenditure implications off' Soviet strategic force and general purpose force reaction postures discussed in the basic studies are summarized in the table on As noted in the basic studies, the force postures and, therefore, the expenditure implications are illustrative only. Theyeneral level of effort that could be achieved with other force options. For the higher levels of reaction forces, average expenditures during the early part of thenew deployment is underconsiderably exceed the average for the entire period and would pose difficult resource allocation problems.
For some combinations of US forces, therefore, the Soviets probably would try to phase new programs so as to minimize the strain in the industrialand output goals. The extent to which this would affect Soviet decisions would depend, in the first instance, on the degree to which the leadership felt challenged by new US programs, and, secondly, onmilitary considerations that might operateof US programs.
Expenditure Implications of ations of Strategic and Ccncfal Purpose Force Packages: Average Annual Outlays: *
Case (present National Intelligence Projectionsevel intermediate between NIPP-Hi and NIPP-Lo)
A This tabic shews--for il lur tra tive purposest ations of combining the various Soviet strategic foroe and general purpose force reactions described in our earlier reports. Theis to show vhat the expenditure levels vould be if there vere no interaction between strategic force and general purpose foroe programs. As discussed in the text, ve believe that, for tome of the combinations, expenditures vould be influenced by suchbut because of the large number of variables involved ve are unable to quantify the effeet. The dollar values in the tablevhat the Soviet programs vould cost if purchased in the US--in terms6 purchasing power.
ncludes expenditures for command and support functions.
The combination of the high Soviet strategicforce (Forceith any one of the threepurpose reaction force postures would result in an average rate of growth of military expenditures in excessercent per year for the next few years. Thiswith an annual average rate of growth of 08 and an annual averago rate of growthercent58 forprograms. Strategic Reactionsombined with the high general purpose reaction force (Forceouldilitary expenditure growthercent per year, or about double the expected average growth rate in the economy.
We believe the Soviets will do whatever istotrong deterrent force and totheir claim to equal power status with thet the same time they will want to seek improvements in general purpose forces to meet the growing Chinese threat and to achieve greater airlift and sealift.
Because the requests of the Soviet military, if granted, probably would exceed the resources theleadership feels able to provide, we expect to see an intensification of competition for resources within the military, even with presently programed US"forces. Similarly, without an arms agreement the competition between the military and other sectors of the economy probably will also intensify. In the absence of an arms limitation agreement, it isthat the Soviets will be able toight lid on expenditures in the early Seventies, even
'J The Joint Chiefo of Staff and the Offioe ofof Defense (International Security that "deterrence" and "parity" are onlySoviet objectives. Clearly the Soviet rangeoptions is broader than one-for-oneto US choices and decisions. The Sovietsto fashion strategic forces that fullytheir advancing technology, support theirand related ambitions, and takeof US capabilities and force postures. record, they are likely to do so. and OSD (ISA) wish to emphasize that thestrategies identified herein must be used
though the Soviet leaders will endeavor to keep the growth in total military spending down;
Those programs intended to maintain theof the Soviet nuclear deterrent will be funded first and the general purpose forces will be forced to compete among themselves for the remainder. Thus, if the Soviets feel compelled to undertake major newprograms, resources available for generalforces could be constrained. If, on the other hand, the Soviets feel secure in theirby means of an arms limitationgeneral purpose forces probably would benefit, althoughwith civilian claimants would be sharp.
Tho footnote on pagef the basic report on general purpose forces, datedhould be changed to read as follows:
Representatives of the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affaire) believe that prudence on their part night oauce the Soviets to maintain theirlevel of military force in Central and Eastern Europe to pursue political objectives there--and quite possibly more long-range goals than they can new imagine at feasible.Original document.