approved fob release date: 4
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The USSR and China
DIRECTOR Of CENTRA! maugence
, mm UNITED STATESboard
The fallowing Malligenca oigatuiaikms participattd in ih* pteporolfov) of rWi tallmala,
Th* Central InlelHaeMe Agency and iho Tmlignncaol th*ofnd Orfxae, ond the NSA.
Dr. R. J. Srri'h. lor the Deputy Director ol Central Intelligence
Mr. Theoiai I.he Diced or ol Intelligence end Betearch, Department of
Vice Acw.owronce, Acting Dheclor, Defeme InwlBgence Agency Vice Adm. Noeloftonol Security Aoency
Dr.. taidWdt, lor (he Aulitonl General Manager, Atonic Enemy Com-mbelon and Mr.uCrran, rh. AnaMnt Mrecror, Federalof'be rubied being ouhide of their Kefadtdlon.
<naterkil conioin. within th* meaning ol Ih*million a*
in any manner to an
the Unitednd 7M, th* tront-ureurdfanad.
L POLITICAL BACTCROUND
II. THE MILITARY DIMENSION
IMPACT OF THE DISPUTE ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD
A.oward SotdbFail AM.
ft TW US and it* Wart
C Otha CFanwi
ANNEX: TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
THE USSR AND CHINA
To estimate Ihe general course of Sino-Sovlel relations over ibe next three years.
relations, which have been tens* and hostileyears, have deteriorated even further since the armedthe Ussurf River last March. There is Utile or no prospect forin tbe relatkinship, and partly for this reason, nothe fragments of the world Communist movement will be
the first time, it is reasonable to askajorwar couH break out in tbe near future. Tbe potential forwar dearly exists. Moreover, the Soviets have reasons, chieflyChinese nuclear threat to the USSR, to argue that thetime for an attack Is soon, rather than several yearsthe same time, tbe attendant military and politicalalso weigh heavily upon the collective leadership in Moscow.
C We do not lookeliberate Chinese attack on the USSR. Nor do we believe the Soviets would wish to become involvedrolonged, large-scale conflict While we cannot say it is likely, we see some chance that Moscow might think it couldtrike against China's nuclear and missile facilities without getting involved inonflict. In anylimate of high tension, marked by periodic clashes along the border, is likely to obtain. The scale of fighting may occasionally be greater than heretofore, and might even involvecross-border raids by the Soviets. Under such circumstances, escalation is an ever present possibility.
D. In ihe light of ihe dispute, each side appears to be reassessing its foreign policy. The Soviets seem intent on attracting new allies, or at least benevolent neutrals, in order to "contain" tbe Chinese. To that end Moscow has signified some desire to improve the atmosphere of ib. relations with the West. The Cliiiitie, who now appear to regard the USSR as their most immediate enemy, will face stiff competition from the Soviets iu attemptingxpand their inffiteuce in Asia.
I. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The causes of (be Sino-Sovtet dispute ore eompJet and. by now. inter taEgled. Some re&ect primarily tho dash of important national interests, compounded by historical and racial enrolBes, and the distrust of one great powercigbbcr-mg power. These coo file ting interests include, tor example, the USSR'* refusal in Ihe5 to satisfy China'1 demands forouclear weapons capability, diverging foreign policies and international priorities, Chinese dissatisfaction with the terms of Soviet eooootroc aid and Soviet ectticenic saao-oora. Sino-Russian coenpetiUoo for Influence ebewhere in East and Sooth Aria. China') claims to For Eastern and Central Asian territory ceded to Russia duringho some extent tbese issues would have arisen to complicate relations between Russians andoost regardless of the political systems In Moscow nnd Peking.
Ideology ha* alio contribtited to the devolopsnent of the dispute. From its early stages. Pelting has challenged die USSR's ideological supremacy andMao has rejected the Soviet model for internal socialist cseveJoptnent; has also has rejected Soviet strategies foe encouraging Ihe spread of Communism, and he has niter ted that his own doctrines must bo treated with the same respect as those oftruggle for leadership of the world's Communist Parties continues, waged in great port wilh ideological arguments. These ideological arguments have compounded economic and political rivalries. The ideological perspective limits the ability of the two titles lo compromise their own quarrels, to agree to disagree. Miscooceptinat of each other's motives and behavior tend to become encapsulated in doctrinal formulae, and are thereby made rigid
Personalities havo played some role in the quarrel. Khrushchev and Mao found each other particularly aetipirhetlc After the fall of Khrushchev, probe* by both govemrrsnrrtt during visit* by Chou En-laf to Moscow and Kosygineking ns the winteronvinced both tides that their differences were besond compromise, the Chinese interpreted sOirushchev't removaliitoaca-tion of their own ideological positions, while tbe new Soviet leadenhip would not go beyond certain limit* in modifying the basic course set by Khrushchev.
And whil. ihe Sovieti now publicly nnni ihrn hope that Mao'a passing might leadeu anil-Soviet pohcy lo Peking, their privateell as their aots indie* to that they eapect the Cheaean prohLn to be with then for thel* (uftra
BytB tbt Ohtoen rerueaed Ihc* pobhc artacki oa hfoerow aad ibe new Sovietovedohcy that rMgbt be described aa the "coo-tainmcot" of China. This pohcy haj several aspects: ideoke^cnl Itoletlon ot" Chin* within (he world Communist move menl, political Isolation of China by strengthen-Jag, Soviet Ilea wfth Asian countries, economic isolation by rbaaltcnlry reducing Slno-Sovket trade, propaganda designed lo warn the Soviet people and their allies ol the perlli of Maoism, end an bnpreaalve Increase in Soviet mlalary strength at bay points 'long the Chinese frontier. The Chinese have fried to counter these moves by reeking support of other Ccaneuuntst itefes and Parties, by frying to eatabhsh proOuneee tacnans within Ccenanunutnd by propaganoa even more viru Jmt lhan that of the Soviet*
In launching ibe Cultural tlevotatlon, one ofirns was to rid tbe Chinese Communist lenders hip of elernerti inclined towarda nsvlnorrlit pontics attributed lo Moscow. The Cultural Revolution movement war accompanied by an upsurge of anti-Soviet rxopaaanda and ntaltrearinent of Soviet personnel by the Chineseudging from official Soviethe Cultural rurvolntlon coovtoced rhe Ererchn tbat the Chinese had virtue Ih/ abandonedLetunlem. had eBDatnaled atodanc* cadres, and badersonal Maoistr* oe uvxraung Ki Miliary strength. The fact that Chen* was beginning tooclear capabOty added tow* Thus tbe "coo tacasurei begun la latB ueie conrinnod and even intensified.
5lno-Sovlet state and econcenlc nswunns clecrined steadily. Each country recalled in aml>*indornd during (he following year each unilaterally cancellednUnor agreement! Cultural contacts, oncnnbl* regulated by annual protocols, are InTbe0 Treaty of Friendship. AlHince and Mutnal AssHaac* is terhxoceJy vabd uncfl ISoO, bat Peking has tnebceted that it doe* not count oa or neceeearUy wont Soviet aiustary SaaaSsaana, nd the Soviets have keeplked that tbey woold not feel hound to provide I. In the WsBaeafc sphere, the total BDnoal trade turwee* Aa two countries, whinheak ofilliono IrasD5
s relations deteriorated, propaganda attacks increased. Inor example, when the Soviet embassy in Peking was under siege, tbe Stoo-Soviet conflict accounted lor aboutercent of all Soviet propaganda, rereigr ard domestic, and aboutercent of all Chinese propegeiia. The Chinese were eoualfy bury attacking the Soviets duringh aisaaverasry of the BoiuVei* rkveeurJon. Nearly as vocable was their deeancsatice of the Sovietrechcelcwaklahe Soviet use of forceetgh-boriug Soctalist stale was clearly dictuiblag to Peking, The Chin we chose this moment to protest publicly against Soviet hitrurions into Chinose airspace, and
to renew charges rrtne Sortoli were Wildlag up troop*Iho border nod la Mongolia.
ft With tlie Uuuri River'ba tdrcedy tense aad hoe til* relationship between the two countriesritical phise. Too dozen or to knowniishes have involved imDonned toroe* aa weS a* dviaaco, and appear to bare produced reveral hundred latahtkn. During March, the level" of propaganda ran to crrspwssdrwtcd0 percent of afl broadetit* for tha SovMti and aboutercent for the Chsaae* and the tone bacarrta notably haraher Both sides began stressing rnghiy *tssorjoa*jhearacntitooc letten stained wtth blood, and the Ihe. Since March, the level of pruraaaauda haa tnctuaaed at generally lower leveb. Dot ixninoui new thernea hare epeteared. Soviet cornrnraatatera, who fornarlytocrrlot attitude of calm and rortralnt In deahng with Red Guard extrembm, bow itrcij that Maoism,riminal racistchauvlBl*tio IniosrsfaHon" that hasaint ofailttaiy dtrcat* to the Soviet Union. In In* June ipeecb to thn Intrrrnatlonal Coosmcmlst Con-ference, Breihnev denounced the Chinese ConummUti at great length and alleged that Peking was preparing for naetear war against tha USSR. Andplaying upon rrrnophobia and the threat of "Imr'gn dovih" laacvr both: tor Fearing, th*sjjfp tn China,ng that the Caaaaaasa aunt not show "the dightost trmidityiMccent to be arsons ratracii than th then Ptao bw warned that Casino assay have to cope withagmm eartytsarvaratkaaalra-caenr war."
Peking and Moscow bare pebetclyoborderach tide ha* adopted rigid positionsmade deHberatety annoying statements. The Chtnese deny they Intendthousand* of square rata* of present Soviet territory, but they insistacknowledge lint the treaties whereby Russian tsars gained titleland* arehe Soviet sale has shown inflexibility byan urunhalaleil and Irwrueotly flooded Island la the Utouriad It baaprovocatively that Maacrnaria andnot historically part of China. The talks on navljaitSoD and headerrtrtisrttcd bt Khabarovskid-June have yielded tease retails laof an agreement oo navtgr&an regirlctioai forrat no date huforalk* on tamtortal snarters, and tha outlook tor such taJb tt poor.
gotstaed pore the ktrger payajaj of how farpohcy of each rasoasre wil bo stffecrad by tbe crmtsntungtha roattioauaap Tha Ninth CCP Cossgrrss* did not torrnalry dotnocefrcm Ui ias ostrrny raroher one, but thettrtoi waafor the Scwiots. Chlneae athis year tosuggaet that Peking hat becorrw note flicdble in purnitng aforeign policy. There is good reason to believe ttnrt (bo Soviettee China as their roost pressing intrmalioisal problem, and aretailor their policies on other issues occcadiiigty. Brcihnevt niggertlon for
an Aulas collective security syXtm, and Foreign Minister Cromyko's address to ffie USSR Si pie we Soviet In July. Inoderate tone toward the West was juxtaposed with harsh words for the Chinese, both suggest that Moscow Is welcing allies, or at least benevolent neutrals, against China.
II. THE MILITARY DIMENSION
Untiloviet theater forces near the Chinese herder were very thin, though some steps were taken to improve their capability lo handle border sklrmhhcs. The Chinese abo saw lo Ibeir own border security rccpnrcments during ihoeriod.ersistent and impressive Sovietbuildup began int that time there were many possible reasons for Ihe bufldup: the Chinese challenge to Soviet hegemony. Chinos successful nuclear tests, and Chinas growing rote in Asia. At any rale, it appears (but tbe present Soviet force structurehe East reflects decisions takenMoscow may recently have raited its original military force goals.
As ofhe Soviets bad someround force divisions along the Slrn>Sovtet border and in Mongolia, double the figure ofbout half the ilivisions were at combat strength, end others were gradually being raised to lhal status. These divisions were backed up by an unusually large complement of ranvenbanal artillery and of tactical surface-to-aurfaco mitsiles. The increase hi Soviet tactical nir strength hai kept pace with the ground force Increase.
1 here has been no corresponding buildup on the Chinese side. Tbe Chinese have only about nine ground force divinooj In Ibe border areas of Saruuane, Inner Mongolia, aad tho Hdlungkiang-sarin regions of Manchuria. AndIhe Chinese have mote thanivisions behind them In the Shenyang-Peacmg-Lanchou Military Regions, Ihese are no match tor Soviet divisions in firepower and mobtJity.
The disparity between the Soviets and Chinese lo other types of forces l> even more pronounced. Chinese air defenses have been ieAproved in recant years, but remain Ihln, whereas Soviet air defenses arc heavy and have been strengthenedhe Soviet) have continually maintainededium and heavy bombers in the area, and could quickly add to tfdt force from other parts of the USSR: the Chinese medium bomber forceozen or so is largely obsolete. Thereonriderablc Dumber of strategic missiles in Soviet Central Asia and the Far East which couH be targeted against Clans. Finally, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is moreatch for tho en ihe Chinese Navy.
i tilery confrontation, the factor of space aSects each country, though in dfflerect ways. The great length of tbe border makes linear defense along ttt whole eatent viri aally Impossible, The USSR's vital Trurauahceianruns dose to tho Mencburian border, thus defense In depth la not feasible for tbe Soviet* In tbat sector. Hence, Soviet strategyoncentration of theater forces for rapid attack or tounter-at*ack along traditional Invasion routes inio China. What wo know of Soviet troop dispositions seems to bear cut this analysis. In contrast, the Chinese military planner might feel lhat he could yield
part of Sinkiang ant) northern Manchuria lo mi at tucking (orce. Not only docstrategy accord with Mao'i orjnrapu of "protractedat thalarge Chinese theater forces In Ihote salients prior tooffer Soviet ccearaandari the opportunity to encircle aad trap these units.
he Soviets also face prrablrana of date.ar wtlh China should achieve Ss alros quickly, lo avoid the dWarca of ptotiaotrd coweobcewlagainst the meahaastuhfet ratancer af Claueai manpower Tbe Soviets could sirnpllry this nuirtary prchtent by eeaaaj nodaarat thb would etaor-naausfy canp&catr thetr pobOcal probatau- Moreover,nne*'soretfct with the Chen eat, ifo occur at all. should be anM-ated fatrty soon. annaej the Chissta drptoy aa MUM farce,
It at abaoat certain lhat there will be no significant aeang of terrBons during the neat two or three years. Conflicting national Interests, canpetiboai for leadership of the Communist naovspumt, end genuine fear of each other'swillapprrxnenseot. Even the border problems are not likely to bo resolved. While both aides may be willing to reach tome temporary eccoov mods Boo, neither Is likely to CompramMr any fundamental positions.
The caupaganda baa fn both tho USSR and hi China Is very sharp. Each country now n. aiders the other Its oxnt immediate enemy; each country accuses the cither of pitting with the imperialists to enclitic and destroy il. In ibis kind of atmosphere any act by the other tide It viewed with suspicion; any military preparations appear menacing. For the first time, II Is reasonable to awun-Soviet war could break out during tbe neat two or three yean.
The fact lhatuestion can be seriouslyeasure of the gravity of tbe Sino-Soviet corduot. The potentialar sorts; to the Soviets, at least, early roihlary action might seam to have many advantages. But ato attackcabcal set said we have no Bran evidence about the iatrrations of Chinese and Sovwt leaden
3D. We behave tbat aaV major attack by CaBsm hnto Soviet tet-ratory at highly aasaVafi. Thatased prleaarflv oa the tact oi Chbsa't disadvantage In military power, and tts basic unpreceaedoesa for large-scale war beyond tts oeethers borders. Moreover, taoce the Korean War, (hn has avoided rnejor military cose'irmranon with the two greett Is also bard to see what advantages China could gala from an attack. Propaganda about the Soviet threat may of course be designed lo foster the national entryebuild the power structure shattered by the Cuoaaas latsakatBna, but aa actual war could imperil any garni achieved. At present the Chinese probably have twotooviet attack which they believe has grown more Lkeiy with the Soviet military buildup, aad lo prranote national preparedness to meet the throat, Peking apparently has chosen to signal Sta determinationtrategy of small-scale confrotf atluos in border arras where the Chinese legal claim is good.
By contrast, we tee reasons why Ibe Soviet* might now, or in the near future, consider major offensive actions against theoviet planners,Uiyoeid minor borderust fee! that the real danger is yet touring (be tenure of Mao, or that of his immediate successor, tlie Chinese wilt probablyuclear missile force,ore substantial medium bomber force dim they now possess. The Soviet leaders might feel thatmall number of Chinese missiles would aher the strategic situation, and that as the force grew, tho Chinese would be under fewer inhibitions in using their ground forests. The Soviets might hope to prtrvent this de^ejopntent by using their air su period ty to knock out Chinese nuclear and missile rrutoEatioos, while blocking Chinese retaliatory attacks on the ground with their own theater forces, Tbe optimum period for eacrdstDg this option is beginning to slip away.
The Soviet leaders might see other Important benefits in militaryajor defeat of dunes* forces would demonstrate tlte might of the Soviet armed forces throughout the world, and help the prestige of the Soviet leadership at boroa. The Soviets might even hope for the downfall of tha Moo-Lin regime, or If It survived, the detachment of Slnldnng. Inner Mongolia, andfrom China. They might thus be able touffer zone like that In Eastern Europe. In fact, protection of national mlnoriUee in the Sinkiong and loner Mongolian regions against Chi nose oppression might be the excuse forar.
A body of recent evidence concerning Soviet military activity suggests that Moscow may be preparing to take action against China in the near future. Lately, there lias beenilitary vetivity on tho Soviet side, of the Chinese herder, including tin unusually large exercise in which China was apparently theenemy. Some air units were temporarily deployed from parts of the Western USSR normally considered the base for reiuforcemeret agsrtmt NATO. Abo, tbe Trrtnasdbertan Railroad has beenolomc of nahtary traffic apparently large enough to interfere with norma) civilian traffic This tra'alary activity seems dispropottiorralo to any visible Osiocse oerensivo threat Mcsnsvhlle the Chinese, whose military force deployment had remained virtually static during tho earlier Soviet buildup, have recently mode minor atthirtmcnts in their air drtrrnes which suggest hut they may beore serious view of the situation.
here oro also political indicators that suggest that the Soviets may be preparinghowdown with China. The Kremlin is clearly trying to ease friction with the West; ono purpose is almost certainly to expand ils freedotn of action in the East. Soviet propaganda repeals the themes that Maohat he thinks that war it the only solution to his problems, that like all warmongers, be falsely accuses the Kremlin of pkuarung on attack on him In order to excuse his own evil plans. Finally, recent articles nnd broadcasts deplore the oppression of Uigurs, tazskhe, and Mongolians in China, and suggest that rebel Kan by these peoples would be justified.
SS. On the other hand, the Soviets must recognize tbe formidable risks ofy action.itltnry potnt of view, this rests mainly on the uncertainty
of tho oatooove. Even If iho Soviet leaders behoveonventional air strike would knock out Cluoose raicleat end tnf&slte install* tiara, they mint surety realise thai they would berocess which they could not be litre of controlling, and whose course would be determined as much by the Chinese aa byhey must also ask tbernselves whether, later if not sooner, it might be necessary lo use nuclear weapons agat rat Chinese troops or tratalta-tioos, with al the political costs ofourse, sad whether the Chinese, though at it greet disadvantage In modern weaponry, might still manage deliver nuclear weapon* on Vladivnnok or
e il the Soviet* succeeded cornpletely in drsstnn/lng nnd missile capabilities, and were. In addition, aMe to establish viablen the frontier, tbe test of Chins would remain uncoocjuered. The Soviets hava no assurance ihat the Moo-Lin regime would fall, or that, In any case, tbe Chinese weald stop fighting. Regardless of the type of regime In China, It would bo even more bitterly hostile to the OSSB than it is at and It would bo oven snore determined touclear capability.
oreover certain political factors militateoviet attack on The nature of collective leadership ii such that the men in tha Kremlin find it easier toolicy of ins proving mffitary and political against Ihe Chinese heresy than toecision tooviet-initialed war would certainly csanrpteete Moscow's relations with Hanoi and mightreduce Russian influence there. Both Communist god non-Communist atttes in Europe might take advantage of Soviet involvement in Asia, particularly Fi the war werear would make reootscsltatlon with China tnrpcasihle for many years, and It Is by no means certain that the Soviets have given up all hope of some improvement in their rctoticus with China after the period of Mao and Lin. Bnrdioev's article in the August issue of Prececal of Peace and SoctaUmi reaffirmed Soviet friendship for the Chinese people and suggested that bea long period of tension rather than as early outbreak of hostilities. The same note has been struck in other recent statements.
in other recent statement*.
s above noted, we do not lookeliberate Chinese attack on the USSB. We abo believe that Moscow will seek to avoid becoming engagedrolonged and hiD-teale war with China. But the Soviets have
eateusive series ofpolitical,ready the*
ions have i
for continuing or increasing level* of hostility. Their preparations have alreadyiege which would permitariety of military options. Of these, Ihe Soviet* might find the roost attractive toonventional air strike designed to destroy Chinas missile and no dear installations. The Soviets irughf calculate that they could accomplish this objective without getting involvedrolonged and Jd!-scik> war. Wt cannot say that they are likely to reach this conclusion bat we behave tbere is at leas* some cUrsce they wouht
q any case, It Is ciear that tendon between the two countries has become ncute- At the very least, polemics: will remain strident, and the dispute in It* present form wiU probably tatcosify snd grow.hange in Chinese
policy, armed deshcs will occur periodically. The tcate of fighting maygreater thanand might even Involve punitive crrjoa-border mida by Soviet ground and tactical air forces. Under suck ctrcunMtancea, escak-ttoa of the renter willasattaiang posainlhty.
IV.HE BMB aSCVrrfERE IN THE WORLD'
A Policies Toward South and East Alia
n those South and East Asian naOons whkh viewotential security threat, Moscow appeers hopeful of gaining poUtically from Ha quarrel with the Chinese. We see the recent Soviet suggestions oaxeniiog aof collective security ka Asia" as an ersdrt to capitahae on an anttctpated redactloo In the Western prassnca end. at the arose Bran, to prevewt any rignicant CWneee gains ha as wake. In trying to contain the Chwmo, tbe Soviets can ploy upon Asstn fear of Chtnn and Asian reaeotrneot of Chinese support ofhese literate will bo particularly pcrsoasivc in such mainland slates as India, Burma, nod Thailand. The Soviets may also try to exploitlocal animosity toward tbe large ethnic Chinese minorities ia Malaysia and IrKlcoeiea.
ha coaltssBatioa of lbs Sino-Sovict drrpese rrmpetd with tba Soviet effort to protect its JnaWevaon usto South and Eastwork to Ihrdt Chi-neeePeeing has clearly believed that the prolonged struggle In Vietnam would lead ultimatelyubstantial weakening of US power and influence la East Asia. The Chinese have foreseen opportunities fn iho port-Vietnam period for expansion of then* own Influence, pertiranvrry tn such nearby states as Burnia and Thailand; tbey may oho have hopedar mots hsfticrahal role la Hanoi and, by niiieliai. In laws aad Cambodia, once Soviet war materiel was no tooger neceatary Co tha North Vkfneencee. But vrilh large Soviet forces pottedense border. Peking will akraost certainty findm ebafaeuk to traJnudnia It* soothern neighbots by easing Its miktary rnuodei ot rattling its rnsclcai wenpotis The Chineee will face intensified Soviet cornperitlon fat deeding with estobksbed Asian govemmenti and la organising leftist
he conunutag Sino-Soviet conflict will be reflected In an important way In relations with japan. Tbe Sovieti see Japan as the emeeglng power canter fn Asia,erious mihury pceeranad aa well as an ability to provide the Chinese, vas trade and aid, with laa dauntooero tndasoial state. Moscow wants to forestall both Oevefeprresats, but Ms leverage hi Tokyo is not way great. It can get same small advantage from Japanese bopes for the eventual return of Hshe*nol and Shlkotan and can exploit Japanese Interest In Investment oppnr-mrlttes la Siberian resources. Moscow bat some trnluaaca In Japan's mamparty, the Socialists, and even ausong the IndependoU maided Japanese COrnmunBts, though Pel mg aba possesses aJbes among tbe kdtlst ofapotsUou.
'rah ilrKuuio i* -mlketro oa the asnmvitm that the -bSpnia between the USSH oral Cham reuaatni at about Iu pneeat lewd. Im^ abort of inojor war.
virwsiy relbhes in current burpi-unfamong thou China .nd (hewoeld rlroil certainly nutny al then, in order to gun some transitory advantage with tbe USSR or China.
B. The US ond eSe West
ew here, the Soviets have taken tho positionbecauM or the China problem, tbe USSR should generally seek lo ovoid provoking unnecessaryoverthe US in pertfcular and the West tn general Since one of Iheir greatesthai the US or tbo Federal Republic of Germany might be willing to put pressure on the USSR In coUnatonhey will try to preoerve aa atrnospbere of detente, and to be
Prcolerrn with China may haveit* Soviets to
C. Cahevheof the
wttb Yugoslaviaas beea accelerated by tbe Soviet quarrel The main document of thiscrence registers the decline of Soviet InAWc over other Parties bythat the Communist movement hu no siogle center, no kadmg Party. Peking will continue to have tome success In creating ana-Moscow factions In Communist Parties and various front organiaaUorrt. Beyond that, the Chimae will be able to attract tbo interest, if not always (he support, of youngrepelled by tbe USSffr statusociety. Yet the Maoist model hu jr.it much of Its previous lu.tre. bcomtso of Ihe self-Induced cloocvUc con-vulsbos of the last few years, which seamed soraehenslble and potrrtless to otrjcrs throughout the world, both Ccanmaust ando do not foresee any rigmbcanl nortowlag of the canting fissures in Ihe world Coov
ndeed, we rather eapect lo see mora Coenmnnist Parte* adopt which support neither Moscow norhis aaraarateaess easy parallel the neuerakry practiced ta various ways by ibe Brwwariero end the North aaaaa. Tha North bream aad aaaay Parties la the Third World rnay Castro's susraicsrm, expressed tome lime ego. that neither Meacow not Peking Is
Hifflcicntry cotrsrnltiod lu the strufgb xgaintfHU other: likely tn novo toward what both Peking and moat of the present CPSU leaden regard aa ravtroetvaam.arlies are akrly to dapreeate the use of violence br Corssmuisiatineana of csbtointngla the pcortion taken by the Itaaata and FtaraUfa Parties and the one toward whkh the Japa-aeoe fatty aecare to be heeoVd- Oner Parties anal tdvoceta bwaraag the rob of rcJmg Cirrnnnrilrt rwttoi ihta aaa been the poney aaaatUtd with Oraboeh and Tito. Temporary alliances imy eaten cut across ideoiogsval boursdaries mm-pkreely. as arserni to be tnrJicnted by Pekuigi recent lirtntum with Belgrade. And many ConarnunM Partial, regardless of their political compterSon, maym difficult to co-eslst wilh nun-Comrrtuntst groups than with each other.
L Nearly ill ol Iho UKbeaile Sno-Seviet border1rom lf*htreaties by which in espandiag Cjanit Empire acquired icmemiles o' ii" ii.(hai hail been coder the nomine! cOntrui orof Monehu Chose lo bolh ibe western and (he casters aectora, thetenseettOsOy Depopulated or in he betedby neither Ftusolan propa panda
both Peking aead Moaaow have tog agreed tbatea late should serve as tbe boats for daterrnaMrer il* ateement el* tbe border and lor lenhng; caber border hassea.
Western Sector (Sea Mop)
i Most ofIM irdle western sector was defined byO Treaty of Ming and was demarcated in acccrdaocs withISM Torbogetay (Ta-ch'eng)oundary modifications and territorial exchanges wire made by the loSl Treaty of III [or St.eJctng re fen to the bar ofquat* miles rhrough theaohum apparently based on the wcatrra-rncet eMenebm of esobile pickets scot to regulate use of peatiwm by aoreadic Karsbha In Central AHa (seefashcsa control In Ceearal Asm flectueted greatly thtcaagbout htalory, bewever. and theoarers of as oemoitty were vague aad usually rwcote Iran serosd areas of CMiaaai papula Bon. Warn the linibaj was ottssolry ibansirnailaMv catcuW lntarpteted0 Irmly to rrier to permanrui ChJaese ootpneti kvateri conaderat-ry east of the martmum CrUnase claim.1 treaty transferred0 adds-ikmalmi lea from the lake Toysan, Ih, aad eehar ataas to Rwaao.
ho acnUturnmasI sector of the border In tbe high Pamirs was determined, without direct Chinese participation, by an Artf-hr Russian treaty designed primarily to define the boundary between British India and Piiisla. Although fhineie maps depict the de facto boundary ha thiss labeledrauy sector of the entire border in detonated The Chinese claim ofquora rmiea to the Pamirs apparently Is based mainly on Mnochu Notaryctcd la this region duringh century.
Reader nsddanri anda rhe western aoctor hove arisen heeueaoy because ofm* mry brge popeiaBca araddhrajllar aiilsl) Terlrk-spesaing MuaBm groups aueb as Che Iiralhs. aTargtar, aad Ulahura kaereover, enovemeM by these karaefynwi aeara-nomndtc peopaai acrcai the frrmneet
'Tie aaajwaV Sn. Haitian bwm* UiwieeWlaawareatlnn*ie actual pLjwii aaaatng of aan Bw trjand,l'> hrftlan, a. In Iha eaaiater brunatat.rt line ennap.
has been ciatosnnry. Along tba northern half o( tbe border, several natnril cor-rkdors fadlltate such nwesnent
D. Tho moat pubhVbed beirdrt creasing incident of recent yean oceerrod tn April aad Mayhen ictnefLroakhs and Uigbun led from the lb" aad Ta-ch'atig areas of northwestern Sink sang into Kazakhstan, apparently lo hope of indare; better eeorwaafc eondakan tn the USSR Peirag ram ccaarpaurs of alkeged Soviet coercion, of these migrants aad oft-eecst refusal to return them art Chtnese CoatruL Chtheec concern is heijMersodhese frontier mm are cosily aeceaalhao from Koukhsttn and because tha USSR has In the pest fostered dissident sertti moots among their noo-Chinese Irdubttanti.1
cojfern Sector (Saw Mop)
he aVsDu-mlh eautero senior of tbe SLrw-Soviet border at formed primarily by the Amu and Usseai Rtven and, aicwptmall legmara* at the rratrrtne -estera and, waa antabttslted by the Tnastaas ofB) andhina ciatrni that these treaties resnhed kn the ka* ofquateigure derived from the amount of territory that had been acquired by Chins art the Treaty of hferchrMk (Nlpchu)hkhsrsundary that incorporated almoot all uf the Amor Basin within China. During theears of Chinese ownership, however, the vast forest lands of Ihe Amur-Ussur! territories had rernaincd unsettled by Chinese and were abnosl earhirivah/ ihe domain of scattered Tu neurit- tribe*.
Problem of she Ammr-VmrnHh century traatie*apecllo allocation of the numerous takutdi In the Amur and Ureuri. Inof the MarchlortVWs, tha Chinese base their claim to ownershipoo ibe fact thai tba sratta aardaesble ofaarrael he* to(Srwtot) ad* of that island Recent Sovkt cadtetctha Chineseof kxaUJon of the"
main channel ii
admowbdghvg Ihe principle of tntrr national law that the main dunneJ deter -truce* riverine boundaries, thei no Soviet statement cites ejunrttlou*U.trban*n etrect and etalms that0 Treaty ol PaMng is 'another luchhe Soviet version of the boundary, however, is based aet on tha vrordsag of the treaty, but cat an accompanying map. Tho Qsrseae claim that thetha Soviets bave not chorten tocale nnaJhrnd canrsof >ccuratrhy show rather the rtwanas* bound-ary or bland cr-roathtp.
USSR's evident uV*e* sanation to denifud theaa uriwdltngnen to see thi* principle appfted lo Other and moreapecmcatly Hd-biia-tzu Island at the Araut-Ussurt confluence nearRussian source, describe the boundaryiheir maps show
as following ihe Katakc-vichrve Chinaicl st the extreme we-Jnrn end of the bland. Chhtesc aupt locale thel the Arow-UtRni cccdauencc. directly oaaaajas Khabarovsk. Hei-rainow nod raanby hsand about tS nulea long ll wo* occvpaed by (he USSR at theollowing the }apouesc ooarpe-Itc* of Mendnirla. aad permanent he Intel lorn andwere constituted oa the bland. Akboogb Ihea dr facto occupation, rhe Chlnesa canowncrihlp appean to agree with die Inlnnl of ihe ISO) treat* asith tho main-channel prlnofpte.
order: western sector
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