NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
9
(Supersedes
The USSR and' China
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PRjM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEUIGENCE
Concurred in by tha UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD At9
"*SwSfltt-
The following inlotligonce organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:
The Centre! Inielligence Agency ond Ihe mleltgeoee orgonirotions of die Deport-merits of Stole, Defense, ond NSA.
Concurring!
Mi. Richard Helms, Oepvly Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. George C. Denney, Jr. lor The Director of IntelUgonce ond Hesooreh, Deport-ment of Stole
lieufenont General Joseph F. Carroll,irector, Defense IntolCgence Agency lieutenant General Morsholl S. Carter, USA, Director of Hie Nerrronol Security Agency
Abstaining:
horles H. Relchardi for Assislont General Manager for Administration, AEC ond Mr. William O. Cregor for Assistant Dsrodor, Federal Bureau af fnvesrv-gotion, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
JffT*
CONTENTS
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
II. THE MILITARY DIMENSION
PROSPECTS
IMPACT OF THE DISPUTE ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD
Toward South and East Asia
US and (he West
Communist Parties
ANNEX: TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
THE USSR AND CHINA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the genera! course of Sino-Soviet relations over thc next three years.
CONCLUSIONS
relations, which have been tense and hostileyears, have deteriorated even further since the armedthe Ussuri River last March. There is little or no prospect forin the relationship, and partly for this reason, nothe fragments of the world Communist movement will be
the first time, it is reasonable to askajorwar could break out in the near future. The potential forwar clearly exists. Moreover, the Soviets have reasons, chieflyChinese nuclear threat to the USSR, to argue that thetime for an attack is soon, rather than several yearsthe same lime, the attendant military and politicalalso weigh heavily upon the collective leadership in Moscow.
do not lookeliberate Chinese attack on thedo we believe thc Soviets would wish to become involved inlarge-scale conflict. While wc cannot say it is likely, wcchance that Moscow might think it couldtrikenuclear and missile facilities without getting involved inconflict. In anylimate of high tension, marked byalong the border, is likely to obtain. The scale ol lightingbe greater than heretofore, and might even involvecross-border raids by the Soviets. Under suchis an ever present possibility.
D. In lhc light of the dispute, each side appears to be reassessing its foreign policy. The Soviets seem intent on attracting new allies, or al least benevolent neutrals, in order to "contain" the Chinese. To that end Moscow has signified some desire to improve the atmosphere of its relations with the West. The Chinese, who now appear to regard the USSR as their most irnmediale enemy, will face sliS competition from the Soviets in attempting to expand their influence In Asia.
DISCUSSION
I. POUTrCAl BACKGROUND
he causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute are complex and, by now. mtcrtangied. Some reflect primarily the clash of important national interests, compounded by historical and racial comities, and the distrust of one great power for apower. Those corulicbng interests include, for example, the USSR's refusal in theo satisfy China's demands for the wherewithal touclear weapons capability, diverging foreign policies and intcrriatiooal priorities, Chinese dissatisfaction with the terms of Soviet ecooomic aid and Soviet economicSino-Russian competition for influence elsewhere in East and South Asia, China's ciairns to Far Eastern and Central Asian territory ceded to Russia duringho some extent these issues would have arisen to complicate relations between Russians and Chinese almost regardless of the political rysirms In Moscow and Peking.
Ideology has also contributed to the development of tbe dispute From its early stages. Peking has challenged (he USSR's ideological supremacy andMao has rejected the Soviet model for internal socialist development; has also has rejected Soviet strategies for encouraging the spread of Communism, and he has asserted (hat his own doctrines must be treated with the same respect as those oftruggle for leadership of tho world's Communist Parties continues, waged in great port with ideological arguments. These ideological arguments have compounded economic and political rivalries. The ideological perspective limits the ability of (he two sides tu compromise their own quarrels, to agree to disagree. Misconceptions of each other's motives and behavior tend to become encapsulated in doctrinal foimulae. and are thereby made rigid.
Personahties have played some role in (he quarrel. Klirushchev and Mao found each other particularly antipathetic After (he fall of Khrushchev, probes byovernments during visits by Chou En-lat lo Moscow and Kosygin lo Peking in the winter5 convinced both sides lhal their differences were beyond cornpromisc. Thc Chinese interpreted Khrushchev's removal as aof iheir own ideological positions, while the new Soviet leadership would noi go beyond certain limits in modifying the basic course vet by Klirushchev.
' Sre Artnux.
And while the Sovieu now publicly express their hope that Man's pasting might leadess anti-Soviet policy in Peking, their private statements asas dn-ir acts indicate that they expect the Chinese problem to be with them tor thefuture.
yhe Chinese resumed their public attacks on Moscce* and llic new Soviet leaders movedolicy that might be described as thcof China. This policy has several aspects: ideological Uolatioo of China within tbe world Communist movement, rjohheal isolation of China by strengllieii-ing Soviet tics with Asian countries, economic isolation by drastically reducing Sino Soviet trade, propaganda designed to warn the Soviet people and their allies of the perils of Maoism, and an impressive increase in Soviet military strength at key points along the Chinese frontier. The Chinese have tried to counter these moves by seeking support of otlier Communist states and Parties, by trying to establish pro-Chinese factions within Communist Parties, and by propaganda even mote virulent lhan that of the Soviets.
5 In launching the Cultural Revolution, one of Mao's aims was to rid the Chinese Communist leadership of elements ioclined towards revisionist policies attributed to Moscow. Tbe Cultural Revolution movement was accompanied by an upsurge of anti-Soviet propaganda and maltreatment of Soviel personnel Iry the Chineseudging from official Soviet propaganda, thc Cultural Revolution convinced the Kremlin that the Chinese had virtually abandoned Ma:xiun Leninism, had diminated moderate cadres, and hadersonal Maoist dictatorship intent on increasing its military strength. The fact that China was beginning touclear capability added to Moscow's fears. Thus Ihe "containment" measures begun5 wore continued and even intensified.
a>
fl.5ino-Soviet state and economic relations declined steadily. Each country recalled IB ambassadornd during the following year each unilaterally cancelled several minor agreements. Cultural contacts, ostensibly regulated by annual protocols, are in limbo. The0 Treaty of Friendship. Alliance and Mutual Assistance is technically validut Peking has Indicated that it does not count on or necessarily want Soviet military assistance, and the Soviets have implied that they would not feel boundrovide it. In the ecooomic sphere, the total annual trade between thc two countries, whicheak of overilbonank to less0 million
s relations deteriorated, propaganda allacks increased Inor example, when the Soviet embassy in Peking was under siege, the fico Soviet conflict accounted for aboutercent of all Soviet propaganda, fxreign and domestic, and about SO percent of all Chinese propaganda. The Chnese wore equally busy attacking the Soviets duringhe SOlh mnivctunry of the Bolshevik Revolution. Nearly as voluble was theirof (ho Soviet invasion of5 Thc Soviel use of force agana< aSocialist slate, was dearly disturbing lo PekUig. The Choiesr Jv>vc tins moment lo protest publicly agaiml Soviet intrusions into Chinese aroatc, and
3
enew charger thai thc Soviet* were building up troops along the border and in Mongolia.
ith tho Ussuri River episodes ofhe already tense and hostile relationship between the two countriesritical phase. The dozen or so known border clashes have involved undormed forces as well at civilians, and appear to have produced several huudred fatalities. During March, the levels of propaganda rose toercent of all broadcasts for the Soviets and aboutercent for thethe tone became notably harsher. Both sides began stressing highly emotionalheroic deaths, funerals, patriotic letters stained with blood, and the like. Since March, the level of propaganda has fluctuated at generally lower levels, but ominous new themes have appeared. Soviet commentators, who formerly sought tooviet attitude of cafcn and restraint in dealing with Red Guard extremism, now stress that Maoism,riminal racistchauvinistic intoxication" that hasoint ofilitary threat" to the Soviet Union. In his June speech to the International CommunistBrezhnev denounced the Chinese Communists at great length and alleged that Peking was preparing for nuclear war against tbe USSR. Andplaying upon xenophobia and the threat of "foreign devils' isew tactic for Peking, the current campaign In China, emphasizing that the Chinese must not show "the slightest timidityildeems to be more ertrerne than in the part tin Piao has warned that China may have to cope
withigt an earlyconventionalr awar."
otli Peking and Moscow have pubbclyeadiness to iiegotiale their border disputes. Neverthclesj, each side has adopted rigid positions.and has made deliberately annoying statements. The Chinese deny they intend to claim thousands of square miles of present Soviet territory, but they insist that Moscow acknowledge thai (hc treaties whereby Russian tsars gained title to those lands arcbe Soviel side has shown inflexibility by claiming thai an uninhablled and frequently flooded island in tho Ussuri River is "age-old Russiannd it lias suggested provocatively (hai Manchuria and Sinkiang are not historically part of China. Tbe talis on navigation and border rivers which resumed in Khabarovsk in mid-June have yielded some results In tho form of an agreement on navigation regulationsut no date lias been set for broader talks on territorial matters, and the outlook for such talks is poor.
hese developments outlined pose the largei question of how far the foreign policy of each regime wiU be affected Iry the continuing defeneration of the relationship. Thc Ninth COP Congress did not formally demotefrom its position as enemy numltcr one, but (lie choicest vitriol wasfor the Soviets. Chinese overture* this year to "uhraievnionist" Yugo slavia suggest Ihat Peking has become more flexible inasicallyoviet foreign policy There it good reason to believe that (he Soviet leaders now see China as iheir most pressing international problem, and arc beginningailor (heir policies on other issues accordingly. Brezhnev's suggestion for
4
an Aiiun collective security system, and Foreign Minister Cromyko's Address to the USSB Supreme Soviet In Jury, in whichmoderate tone toward thc West was juitaposed with harsh words for the Chinese, both suggest that Moscow is seeking allies, or at least benevolent neutrals, against China.
II. THE MILITARY DIMENSION
oviet theater forces near the Chinese border werethough some steps were taken to improve their capability to handleThe Chinese also saw lo their own border securitytheeriod.ersistent and impressive Sovietbuildup began Int that time there were many possiblethe buildup: the Chinese challenge to Soviet hegemony. Chinastests, and China's growing role in Asia. At any rate, it appears thatSoviet force structure tn the East reflects decisions takenMoscow may recently have raised its original military force goals.
ofhe Soviets had someround force divisions alongborder and in Mongolia, double the figure ofboutdivisions were at combat strength, and others were gradually being raisedstatus. These divisions were backed up by an unusually largeconventional artillery and of tactical surface-to-surface missiles. TheSoviet tactical air strength has kept pace with the ground force increase.
There has been no corresponding buildup on the Chinese side. The Chinese have only about nine ground force divisions in the border areas of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and the UeduogViang-Kirin regions of Manchuria. Andthc Chinese have more thanivisions behind them in tbechou Military Regions, these are no match for Soviet 'divisions in firepower and mobility.
The disparity between thc Soviets and Chinese in other types of forces is even more pronounced. Chinese air defenses have been improved in recent years, but remain thin, whereas Soviet air defenses are heavy and have been strengthenedhc Soviets have continually maintainededium and heavy bombers in the area, and could quickly add to this force from other parts of thc USSR; the Chinese medium bomber forceozen Or so is largely obsolete. Thereonsiderable number of strategic missiles in Soviel Central Asia and the Far East which could he targeted against China. Finally, thc Soviet Pacific Fleet is moreatch for the entire Chinese Navy.
ilitary confrontation, die factor of space aficcts each country, though in different ways. The great length of the border makes linear defense along its whole extent virtually impossible. Tlic USSR's vital Tiarissiberianruns close to tho Manchurian border thus defense in depth is not feasible for tlie Soviets in that sector. Hence, Soviet strategyoncentration of theater forces for rapid attack or soul iter attack along traditional invasion routes into China. What we know of Soviet troop dispositions seems to bear out this analysis In contrast, lhc Chinese military plunder might feel that he could yield
cccncT.
part of Slnkiang and northern Manchuria to an attacking force. Not only don*trategy accord with Mao's concept, of "protractedut tlielarge Chinese theater forces in those salients prior tooffer Soviet commanders the opportunity to encircle and trap these units.
he Soviets also face problems of time.ar with China should achieve its aims quickly, to avoid the dangers of protracted conventional war. fare against the inexhaustible reservoir of Chinese manpower. Tbe Soviets could simplify this military problem by using nuclear weapons, but this wouldcomplicate their political problems. Moreover,oviet planner'sonflict with the Chinese, If it is to occur at all, should befairly soon, before the Chinese deploy an MHBM force.
III. PROSPECTS
It is almost certain that there will be no significant easing of tensions during thc next two or three years. Conflicting national interests, competition for leadership of the Comrmimst nioverneot, and genuine fear of each other'swillapprochement. Even thc border problems are not likely to be resolved. While both sides may be willing to reach some temporaryneither is likely to compromise any fundamental positions
Tlie propaganda line In both thc USSH and in China is very sharp. Each country now considers the other Its most Immediate enemy; each country accuses the other of plotting with the imperialists to encircle and destroy it. In this land of atmosphere any act by tbe other side is viewed with suspicion; any military preparations appear menacing. For thc first time, it is reasonable to askino-Soviet war could break out during the next two or three years.
The fact thatuestion can be seriously posedeasure of the gravity of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Tbc potentialar exists: to the Soviets, at least, early military action might seem to have many advantages. But ato attackolitical act and wc have no firm evidence about the intentions of Chinese and Soviet leaders.
Wc believe that an unprovoked, major attack by China Into SovietIs highly unlikely. This judgment is based primarily on tho fact of China's disadvantage in military power, and its basic unpreparedness for large-scale war beyond its northern borders. Moreover, since tlie Korean War. China has avoided major military confrontation with Uie two great powers. It is also hard to sec wlut advantages China could gain from an attack. Propaganda about the Soviet threat may of course be designed to foster the national unity required to rebuild tlie power structure shattered by the Cultural Revolution, but an actual war could imperil any gains achieved. At present ihe Chinese probably have two oblooviel atiack which they believe lias grown more likely with the Soviet military buildup, and lo promote national preparedness to meet thc threat. Peking apparently has chosen to signal ils determinationtrategy of ivnutll-icnlti confrontations in border aicus where (he Chinese legal claim is good.
OCCRCT
contrast, wc sec reasons why thc Soviets might now, or in thcconsider major offensive actions against the Chinese. Soviet planners,beyond minor border clashes, must feel that the real danger is yet tothe tenure of Mao, or that of his immediate successor, theuclear missile force,ore substantial mediumthan they now possess. Tbc Soviet leaders might feel that even aof Chinese missiles would alter the strategic situation, and that asgrew, the Chinese would be under fewer inhibitions in using theirTito Soviets might hope to prevent thissing theirto knock out Chinese nuclear and missile installations, whileretaliatory attacks on tlie ground with their own theater forces.period for exercising this option is beginning to slip away.
The Soviet leaders might see other important benefits in militaryajor defeat of Chinese forces would demonstrate thc might of the Soviet armed forces throughout the world, and help the prestige of the Soviet leadership at home. The Soviets might even hope for the downfall of tlie Mao-Lin regime, or if it survived, tlie detachment of Slnkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria from China. They might thus be able touffer zono like (hat in Eastern Europe. In fact, protection of national minorities in tlie Slnkiang and Inner Mongolian regions against Chinese oppression might be the excuse forar.
A body of recent evidence concerning Soviet military activity suggests that Moscow may be preparing to take action against China in the near future. Lately, there has been unusual miliiary activity on use Soviet side of tbe Chinese border, including an unusually large eaercise in which China was apparently theenemy. Some air units were temporarily deployed from parti of lhe Western USSR normally considered the base for rcirdorcement against NATO. Also, the Transsibcrian Railroad has beenolume of military traffic apparently large enough lo interfere with norma] civilian traffic. This military activity seems disproportionate to any visible Chinese offensive threat. Meanwhile the Chinese, whose military force deployment had remained virtually static during the earlier Soviet buildup, have recently made minor adjustments in their air defenses which suggest that Ihey may beore serious view of (he situation.
There are also political indicatois (hat suggest that the Soviets may be preparinghowdown with China. Tlie Kremlin is clearly tryingase friction with thc West; one purpose is almost certainly to expand ils freedom of action In (ho East. Soviet propaganda rojwaU (he themes that Maohat he thinks that war is thc only solution to his problems, that like all warmongers, ho falsely accuses the Kremlin ol planning an attack on him in order to excuse hu own evil plans Finally, recent articles and broadcasts deplore the oppression of Uigurs, Kazakhs, and Mongolians in China, and suggest lhal rebellion by these peoples would be justified
On (be oilier hand, (he Soviets must recognize lhe formidable risks ofaction.ilitaiy point of view, this rests mainly on thr uncertainty
secret-
ofoutcome. Even if the Soviet leaders believeonventional air strike would knock out Chinese nuclear and missile installstioos. they must surely realize ilut they would berocess which they could not be sure of controlling, and whose course would be determined as much by thc Chinese as by themselves. They must also ask themselves whether, later if not sooner, it might be necessary to use nuclear weapons against Chinese troops orwith all the political costs ofourse, and whether the Chinese, thoughreat disadvantage in modern weaponry, might still manage to deliver nuclear weapons on Vladivostok or Khabarovsk.
if the Soviets succeeded completely in destroying Chinesemissile capabilities, and were, in addition, able to establish viable buffertlie frontier, the rest of China would remain uiiconquercd. The Sovietsassurance that the Mao-Lin regime would fall, or that, in any case,would stop fighting. Regardless of the type of regime init would be even more biHcrry hostile to the USSR lian it is atit would be even more determined touclear capability.
certain political factors militateoviet attack onnature of collective leadership is such that the men in the KremlinIt easier toolicy of improving military and poh'ticalthe Chinese heresy titan toecision toovietwould certainly complicate Moscow's relations with Hanoi and mightreduce Russian influence there. Both Communist and oonCommunistEurope might take advantage of Soviet involvement in Alia, particularlywar werear would make reconciliation with Chinamany years, and it is by no means certain that the Soviets have given upof some improvement in their relations with China alter the period ofIan.rticle in the August issue of Problems of Peace andSoviet friendship for the Cliinesc people and suggested that hea long period of tension rather than an early outbreak of hostilities.note has been struck ut other recent staterneots.
s above noled, we do not lookeliberate Chinese attack on the USSR. We also bebeve that Moscow will seek to avoid becoming engagedrolonged and full-scale war with China. But the Soviets have set in motion an extensive series ofpolitical,ready tlsemselves for continuing or increasing levels of hostiUty. Their preparations have alreadytage which would permitariety of military options. Of these, the Soviets might find the most attractive toonventional air strike designed to destroy China's missile and isacsear installations. The Soviets might calculate dial Ihey could accomplish (his objective without getting involvedrolonged and full-scale war. We cannot say that they are likely to reach this conclusion but we behove (here is at least some chance they would.
n any case, it is dear lhat tension between tht iwo countries has become acute. At the vciy least, polemics will remain strident, and the dispute In its present form will probably intensify and grow.hange in Chinese
SIXBCT
policy, .'in,id clashes willperiodically. The scale of fighting maybe greater than heietoforc. and might even involve punitive cross-border raids hy Soviet gtound and tactical air lorces. Under such circuiiistnnca.of the conflict willontinuing possibility.
IV. IMPACT OF THE DISPUTE ELSE WHERE IN THE WORLD 1
A. Policies Toward Sooth ond East Asia
ln those Sooth and East Asian stations which view Chinaotential security threat, Moscow appears hopeful of gaining politically From its quarrel with tlie Chinese. We see tlie recent Soviet suggestions concerning 'aof collective security in Asia" as an effort to capitalize on an anticipated reduction in the Westero presence and, at the same time, to prevent any significant Chinese gains fn its wake. In trying lo contain the Chinese, the Soviets can play upon Asian fear of China and Asian resentment of Chinese support of localelements. These themes will be particularly persuasive in such mainland states as India, Burma, and Thailand. The Soviets may also try to exploitlocal animosity toward (he large ethnic Chinese minoribes in Malaysia and Indonesia.
Tho continuation of thc Sino-Sovietwith the Soviet effort to project its influence into South and Eastwork to limitoptions. Peking has dearly believed that the prolonged struggle In Vietnam would lead ultimatelyubstantial weakening of US power and influence in Kail Asia, 'lhc Chinese have foreseen oppniMiniiics inY-tiui!!for expansion of tlicir own influence, pattlcuarly in such nearby states as Burma and Thailand, (hey may also have hopedar more influential role in Hanoi and, by extension, in Laos and Cambodia, once Soviet war materiel was no longer necessary to the North Vietnamese. But with large Soviet forces poisedense border, Peking will almost certainly Snd it more difficultntimidate its southern neighbors by flexing its military muscles or rattlmg its nuclear weapons. .The Chinese will face intensified Soviet competition in dealing with established Asian governments and in organizing leftist groups.
Thc continuing Sino-Soviet conflict will be reflected in an important way in relations with Japan. The Soviets see Japan as the emerging power center in Asia,erious military potential as well as an ability to provide the Chinese, via trade and aid, with the sinewsodem industrial state. Moscow wants to forestall both developments, but its leverage in Tokyo is not very great. It can get some small advantage from Japanese hopes for thc eventual return of Habonui and Shikotan and can exploit Japanese interest in investmentin Siberian resources. Moscow lias some influence in Japan's main op position party, the Socialists, and even uniting the indepenrJent-mindcd Japanese Communists, though Peking alsoallies among the leftist opposition.
"Tbu <lunm.nr> ii ixedteared on tlie xumnplion that tlie dispute between the USSRCtiiiu tcntjtM at about Mi present lew I. ir. short ot major wji.
CCGfiCT
li'udi in this conlosl for influence in Tokyo are thc common cultural traditions and thc longstanding Japanese distrust of Russia. In addition, Japan probably views Chinese markets as more profitable over the longer term than costly and risky joint enterprises with the Soviets in Siberia. (In any case, the Japanese areosition tn bargain for and secureapanrelishes its current bargaining position among theUS, as well as China and thewould almost certainly not want to anugoruze any of them in order to gain some transitory advantage with the USSR or China.
he US and the West
lsewhere, the Soviets have taken thc position that, because of ibe China problem, tbc USSR should generally seek to avoid provoking unnecessaryoverthe US in particular and the West in general. Since one of their greatest fears is Ihat thc US or Iho Federal Republic of Cermany might be willing to put pressure on lhe USSR In collusion with China, they will try lo preserve an atmosphere of detente, and to be aceomrnodaung on minor issues. Problems with China may have encouraged the Soviets lo look upon arms control measures with growing inlctest, seeing Ineans to reduce tensions with Ihe US and lo bring additional pressures against Peking. Wc are not suggesting that the Soviets presently contemplate any sacrifice of essentialthe division of Germany and the legitimacyoviet sphere in Eastern Europe. Even less likelyajor revision of China's anti-US stance.
C. Other Communis! Parties
he fragmentation of the international Communist movementgan with Yugoslavia in liMS, has been accelerated by Ihc intensification of the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Thc main document of this year's International Communistregisters the decline of Soviet influence over other Parties byihat the Communist movemeni has no single center, no leading Party. Peking will continue to have some success in creating anti-Moscow factions in Communist Parties and various front organizations. Beyond that, the Chinese will be able to attract the interest, if not always thc suppori, of youngrepelled by lhe USSR's statushave' society. Yet the Maoist model has lost much of its previous lustre, because of the self induced domesticof the last few years, which seemed so incomprehensible and pointless lo others throughout the world, both Communist and non-Communist. Wc do not foresee any significant nan owing of the canting insures in the worldmovement
ndeed, we rather expect lo sec more Communist Parties adopt positions which support ucilticr Moscow nor Peking. This separalcuess may parallel lhe neutrality practiced in various ways by the Romanians and the NorthThe North Koreans and many Parties in tbc Thud World may share Castro's suspicion, expressed some lime ago. thai neither Moscow not Peking is
sufficiently commiticd to thc itiuggtc ugainittill olher Parties aie likely to move toward what both Peking and most oi the present CPSU leaders regard as revisionism. These Parties are likely to deprecate the use of violence by Communistseans of obtainingis the position taken by the Italian and Finnish Parties and die one toward which theParty seems to be beaded. Other Parties will advocate lessening thc role of rubng Communisthas been thc policy identified with Dubcek and Tito. Temporary alliances may often cut across Ideological boundariesas seems to be indicated by Peking's recent flirtation with Bdgrade-And many Communist Parties, regardless of their political completion, may find it less difficult Io coexist with non-Communiit groups than with each other.
scene r-
ANNEX
-4BCBH -
TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
all ofnlle Siiio-Sovirt border1 deriveshtreaties by which an expanding Oarist Empire acquired somemiles of territory that had been under the nominal control orof Manchu China. In both the western and the eastern sectors, theterritory essentially unpopulated or inhabited mainly byRussian nor Chinese. Chinese propagandaPeking and Moscow have long agreed that these treaties should servebasis for determining the allnemcnl of tlie border and for settlingissoes-
Wesfern Sector (See Mop)
Most ofmilc western sector was defined by0 Treaty of Peking and was demarcated in accordance with4 Tarbagatay (Ta-ch"eng)oundary modifications and territorial exchanges were made by1 Treaty of lb (or St.eking refers to the loss ofquare miles through theselaim apparently based on theextension of mobile pickets sent to regulate use ol pastures by nomadic Kazakhs in Central Asia (seehinese control in Central Asia fluctuated greatly throughout history, however, and the westward limits of its authority were vague and usually remote from sett In! areas of Chinese population. When the boundary was actually demarcatedussian officials interpreted0 treaty to refer to permanent Chinese outposts located considerably east of the maximum Chinese claim.1 treaty transferredquare miles from the Lake Taynn, IU, and other areas to Russia.
he southernmost sector of the border in the high Pamirs was determined, without direct Chinese participation, by an Anglo-Russian treaty designed primarily to define the boundary between British India and Russia. Although Chinese maps depict the de facto boundary in this sector, it is labeledonly sector of the entite border so designated The Chinese claim ofquare miles in the Pamirs apparently is based mainly on Manchu military operations conducted in this region duringh century
Border incidents and tensions in the western sector have arisen frequently because of the relatively large population sti addling theTurkic-speaking Muslim groups such as the Kazakhs, Kirgir, and Uighurs. Moreover, movement by these largely nomadic and semi nomadic peoples across the fronlieis
itt Sino Mongolian border Ii not included in (hitX-inarcaliM" refers lo tlie acTutl pliyttral martiniour-Uiv on die pound. uiu ally by iiLirtRSpilLiii. nr. In (lie cawater boundary,i line onup.
has been customary. Along the northern hall of thc border, several naturalfacilitate such movement.
most publicized border-crossing incident of recent years occurredand Mayhen0 Kazakhs and Uighurs Bed from theTa-ch'eng areas of northwestern Sinkiang into Kflzallistan, apparentlyof finding better economic conditions in the USSR. Peking stillalleged Soviet coercion of these migrants and of Moscow's persistentreturn them to Chinese control Chinese concern is heightened becausetracts arc easily accessible from Kazakhstan and because the USSR haspast fostered dissident sentiments among their non-Chinese inhabitants.1
Eastern Sector (See Map)
ile eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet border Is formed primarily by the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and, exceptmall segment at the extreme western end. was established by thc Treaties of) andhina claims that these treaties resulted in the loss ofquareigure derived from the amount of territory that had been acquired by China in the Treaty of Nerchinsk (Nipchu)hichoundary that incorporated almost all of the Amur Basin witbin China. During theears of Chinese ownership, however, the vast forest lands of tbe Arnur-Ussuri territories had remained unsettled by Chinese and were almost exclusively the domain of scattered Tungusie tribes.
The Problem of tlie Amur-Ussuri Islands.h century treaties made no specific allocation of the numerous islands in the Amur and Ussuri. In the case of the9 Incidents, die Chinese base ibeir claim to ownership of Cheti-pao/Damanskiy on thc fact that the main navigable channel lies to the
east (Soviet) side of that island, llecent Soviet public statements rmplyT
that the Chinese version of the location, of*channel isWhile
acknowledging the principle of international law that tbe main channelriverine boundaries, theune Soviet statement cites exceptionsioerbank border is in eflect and claims that the loot) Treaty of Peking is "another suchhe Sovicl version of the boundary, however, is based not on the wording of the treaty, but on an accompanying map, The Chinese claim lliat thcthe Soviets have not chosencale smallernd cannot accurately show cither thc riverineor island ownership.
he USSR's evident determination to disregard Ihe main-channel argument reflects an unwillingness to sec this principle applied to other and more strategic islands, specifically Hei-hsia-lzu Island at the Amur-Ussuri confluence nearRussian sources describe the boundarytheir maps show
Ibis area was die bust' toril-Chinese separatist regime, tlie 'Cut Turkestan People'sslablirlsral in IfMG will, (bel .voxel trained personnel (secint is.inch on tlwr man cAualf approximatelyiles on tlie mound
as following Ihe lUraJosvicheva Channel a( the ealreme western end of Ihe island. Chinese maps locate the boundary at lhe Amur-Ussuri confluence, directly opposite Khabarovsk- Hei-hsia-tiuow and marshy island aboutiles long. Il was occupied by tho USSR in lheollowing tlie Japaneseof Manchuria, and permanent habitations and installations were conslruclcd on the island. Although the USSR is in de facto occupation, the Chinese case for ownership appears to agree with the intent of0 treaty as well as with the mam-channel prfnciple.
CCCBO
R. BORDER: WESTERN SECTOR
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of NSA. 'a' lhe National Security Agency
i. Direcior of Central Reference, OA, for any other Deportment or Agency
document may be ce'oined,destroyed by burning In accordancesee-tity regvlo'iom. or retvned lo the Central Intel! genre Agency by
o-rogorneni wrrh theof Central Reference, CIA.
When thii document is disseminated overteot, the ovorteot reaplenn may retain 'rier Ind not in ccett oi one year. At the end ot thb period, lhe document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, orIobe reqveaed ol she forwarding agency to retain It in accordance wen2
The ride of thlt document -hen uied separately from the ten ihould be eloe-tlfledi FOB OFFICIAl USE ONIV
DISTRIBUTION:
White House Notional Security Council Deportment of State Department ol Detente Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureou of Investigation
Original document.
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