Created: 7/26/1969

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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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Central Intelligence Bulletin


Vietnam; Situation report. (Page 1)

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CVietnam: There have been no major Communist-initiated military actions in the past few days, and most indications point toward only scattered, small-scale attacks in the near future.

There is growing evidence that the Communists are putting greater long-term emphasis on the use of guerrilla tactics, and of accompanying political action, throughout much of South Vietnam. Thisoften is consuming assets which previously had been used in main force, large-unit warfare.

Prisoners and captured documents reflectefforts to upgrade Viet Cong guerrillaand to rely more heavily on sapper units both now and in future offensive periods. There are some reports of personnel transfers from main force units downward into local and guerrilla units. Recentfrom areas around Saigon indicate that allied pre-emptive operations have made use of regulartactics virtually impossible for thewithout unacceptable losses to their forces. Most sources suggest the enemy does not intend to press main force warfare in the immediate Saigon vicinity.

This shift in Communist tactics in Southmay be an outgrowth of an evolving Hanoiwhich evidently callsharp decline inof replacements coming from North Vietnamthe next few months at least. Greater use of

)r*juerrilla warfare could help to reduce personnel (CJ.losses during this period and stillred-

imp sHCiun

ible Communist military threat. I





Communist China: "War preparations" havea major domestic propaganda theme in recent months but there are no signs that the Chinese are making efforts at military mobilization.

Peking apparently continues to believe that the recent border incidents with the Soviets justify giving high priority to military preparedness, but the regime's propaganda has been restrained and stops short of creating war hysteria. Moreover, many aspects of the war readiness propaganda are obviously designed to further important domestic goals. Appeals to prepare for war are repeatedly linked to the need to restore political unity and discipline, to stimulate industrial and agricultural production, and to restrict consumer consumption.

Radiobroadcasts from provinces in theegions are predictably most alarmist regarding the Soviet threat. Heilungkiang radio recently went so

far as to cite "Soviet revisionism" as China's

"principal and most dangerous enemy." |

or scattered

meetings where preparedness is invoked against

the Soviet threat, but they indicate that there is no talk of carrying the attack to the enemy, no evidence of general air raid drills, and only isolated mention of shelter building.

cite consumer rationing, restrictions on taking leave, and the levyen-percent grain tax in rural areas as measures of war preparedness.

that the

central ieaaersnip may be preparing to place more

on national defense industries and perhaps

has reached agreement to strengthen certainthe armed forces. There is little evidence to

support this speculation, although Premier Choureportedlypeech after the ninth

party congress in which he gave first priorityla ted production.

At this stage, Peking appears to be preparing primarily for an extended period of heightened ten-

ith Moscow rather than for any imminentaction.


ulIntelligence Bulletin



USSR: The effect of lunar masscalledhaveontributing factor in the crash of Lunaollowing an attempt at what apparently was to haveoft landing.

The spacecraft almost certainly deviated from its planned trajectory during its orbital flight due to irregularities in the force of the moon's gravity caused by mascons. by USlessearlarge masses of dense material at or near the lunar surface which disturb the path of objects in lunar orbit. These orbital perturbations are cumulative, increasing with each succeeding revolution.

The Soviets may not have anticipated theof the problem despite published USXr5They may be able to use the information collectedesult of the Lunaission, however, toplanning for future flights using orbits similar to those of

Jul 69



Elonduras: Delegates to the OAS foreign ministers meeting are conveningess than optimistic mood.

{[seventeen foreign ministers are attending the first session, but their governments had hesitated to support the meeting with high-leveland many apparently will decline to collaborate in the formation of an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Although Mexico is sending its foreign minister, it would have preferred the OAS meetingevel below cabinet rank, since the resolutions coming out of the meeting are likely to be punitive. Brazilian Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto is not planning to attend today's meeting. TheJornal Do Brazil quotes foreign office sources to the effect that Magalhaes may attend laterdepending on developments.j

The Costa Rican foreign minister is attending.

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Honduras remains tense,eader of the opposition Liberal Party claims that unlessforces have withdrawn or an IAPF has beenbyuly, Honduras will launch an all-out attack to drive the enemy troops out. "" " |

" believes that

El Salvador will renew armeo attacKs. inunsigned flysheets are urging President Lopez to fight again. Criticism of the Lopez /government for inaction against the occupation appears to be gaining momentum.


Jul 69

Intelligence Bulletin





In El Salvador, government-controlledcontinue to stress anti-Honduran propaganda but have softened attacks against the OAS. Privately owned radio stations, however, continue to exhort the government not to accede to OAS pressure. The Mexican foreign minister has information thatSanchez fears that some of his hawkish military officers would refuse to obey orders to evacuate

rflonduran territory.

Jul 69




The right-wing SocialistsPremier Rumor's effort to re-form aDemocratic-Socialist coalition, thus prolonging

the government crisis. President Saragat maythe Christian Democrats toinorityalone. That party's left wing may makenowever,ajority-wants left-wing Socialists in any new gov-

ernment even if the right-wing Socialist party still refuses to participate.

Jul *9

Intelligence Bulletin

Original document.

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