national intelligence estimate
The USSR and China
histosical review program release as sanitized
" oct 9
DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELUGENCE
o bf mm UNITED STATESBOARD
The following intelligence organizations participated In the preparation of this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency ond tho tnltlKgwxe organisation! of the Deport-meats of Stoto, Defense, ond NSA.
Mr. Richard Halms, Deputy Director of Control Intelligence
Mr. George C. Denney, Jr. (or The Director of tntelliaonee and Research, Deport, roent of Stole
lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USA)', Director, Deform IniolCgance Agency
lieutenant General Morsholl S. Carter, USA, Director of me Notionol Security Agency
horles H. Rolchardl for Assistant General Manager for Administration, AEC ond Mr. William O. Cragar for Assistant Ditodor. Federol Bureau of Investi-notion, Ihe subject being outside ot their jurisdiction.
I. POLITICAI, BACKGROUND
II. THE MILITARY DIMENSION
IMPACT OF THE DISPUTE ELSEWHERE IN THE
Toward South and East
US and the
C Other Gwunumtl
ANNEX: TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
THE USSR AND CHINA
To estimate llic general course of Sino-Soviet relations over the next tlirce years.
relations, which have been tense and hostileyears, have deteriorated even further since the armedthe Ussuri River last March. There is little or no prospect forin the relationship, and partly for this reason, nothe fragments of the world Cornmuriisl movement will be
the Grst tinve, it is reasonable to askajorwar could break out in the near future. The potential forwar clearly exists. Moreover, the Soviets have reasons, chieflyChinese nuclear threat to the USSR, to argue that thetime for an attack is soon, rather than several yearsthe same lime, the attendant military and politicalalso weigh heavily upon the collective leadership in Moscow.
do not looteliberate Chinese attack on thedo we believe the Soviets would wish to become Involved inlarge-scale conflict. While we cannot say it is likely, wechance that Moscow might think it couldtrikes nuclear and missile facilities without getting involved inconflict. In anylimate of high tension, marked byalong the border, is likely to obtain. The scale ol fightingbn greater than heretofore, and might even involvecross-border raids by the Soviets. Under suchis an over presenl possibility.
D. Id the light of the dispute, each side appears to be reassessing its foreign policy. The Soviets seem intent on attracting new allies, or at least benevolent neutrals, in order to "contain" the Chinese. To that end Moscow has signified some desire to improve the atmosphere of its rcUtions with the West. The Chinese, who now appear to regard the USSR as their most immediate enemy, will face slid competition from the Soviets in attempting to expand their influence in Asia.
I. POllTrCAl BACKGROUND
he causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute ire complex and, by now, mtrrtangled-Some reflect primarily the clash of important national interests, compounded by historical and racial enmities, and the dUtrust of one great power for apower. These conflicting interests include, for example, the USSR's refusal in theo satisfy China's demands for the wherewithal touclear weapons capability, diverging foreign policies and international priorities, Chinesen(.ctioii with the terms of Soviet economic aid and Soviet economicSino-Russian competition for iriflucnce elsewhere in East and South Aria, China's claims to Far Eastern and Central Asian territory ceded lo Russia duringho some extent these issues would have arisen to complicate relations between Russians and Chinese almost regardless of the political systems in Moscow and Peking.
Ideology has abo contributed to ihc development of the dispute. From its early stages. Peking has chnllcnged ihc USSR's ideological supremacy andMao has rejected the Soviet model for internal socialist development; has also has rejected Soviet strategies for ericouraging the spread of Communism, and he has asserted that his own doctrines must be treated with the same respect as (hose oftruggle for leadership of tho world's Communist Parties continues, waged in great part with ideological arguments. These ideological arguments have compounded economic and political rivalries. The ideological perspective limits the ability of the tsvo sides to compromise their own quarrels, to agree to disagree. Misconceptions ol each other's motives and behavior tend to become encapsulated in doctrinal formulae, and are thereby made rigid.
Personalities have played some role in tbe quarrel. Klirusbcbev and Mao found each other particularly antipathetic After the. fall of Khrushchev, probes by both governments during visits by Chou En-lai to Moscow and Kosygin to Peking in tbe winter5 convinced both sides that then differences were beyond eornpromitc The Chinese interpreted Khrushcliev's removal as aof their own ideological positions, while the new Soviet leadership would nol jro beyond certain limits in modifying the basic course set by Khrushchev.
' See Annex.
leadess anti-Soviet policy in Peking, their private statements as ws-JJ aj tlisHr acti indicate thai they expect the Chinese problem to be with them fee thefurure-
he Chinese resumed their public attacks on Mosconc andSoviet leaders movedolicy that might be described as theof China. This policy has several aspects: ideological isolatioo ofthe world Communist movement, political Isolation of China bySoviet ties with Asian countries, economic isolation by drasticallytrade, propaganda designed to warn the Soviet people and theirperils of Maoism, and an impressive increase in Soviet militarykey points along tlie Chinese frontier. The Chinese have tried to counterby seeking support of oilier Communist states and Parties, by tryingpro-Qunese factions within Cornmusist Parries, and by nrorjagendavirulent tban that of tbe Soviets.
In launching the Cultural Revolution, one of Mao's alms was to rid the Clunese Communist leadership of elements inclined towards revisionist policies attributed to Moscow. Tbe Cultural Revolution movement was accompaniod by an upsurge of anti-Soviet propaganda and maltreatment of Soviet personnel by tho ChineseJudging from official Soviet propaganda, the Cultural Revolution convinced tbe Kremlin that the Chinese had virtually abandoned Marxism-leninism, had eliminated moderate cadres, and hadersonal Maoist dictatorship Intent on increasing its military strength. The fact that China was beginning touclear capability added to Moscow's fears. Tlmi the "containment" manures begun5 were continued and even intensified.
3ino-Soviet state and economic relations declined steadily. Each country lecalled iU ambassadornd during the following year each unilaterally cancelled several minor agreements. Cultural contacts, ostensibly regulated by annual protocols, are in limbo. The0 Treaty of Friertdship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance is technically valid. bill Peking has Indicated that it does not count on or necessarily want Soviet mllitaiy assistance, and the Soviets have implied that they would not feel bound to provide it. In the economic iphere. the total annual trade between the two countries, whichwak of overillionank to less0 million
As relations deteriorated, propaganda attacks increased. Inor example, when tliu Soviet embassy in Peking was under siege, die fino-Sovlct conflict accounted lor aboutercent of all Soviet propaganda, fxeign and domestic, and aboutercent of all Chinese propaganda- The Chaese were equally busy attacking the Soviets duringh moivtssary of lie Bolshevik Revolution. Nearly as voluble wii their dcnunciLxn of the
lo renew charges thai ihcera building up crops aloog (he bolder and in Mongolia.
ith the Ussuri River episodes ofhe already reuse and hostile relationship between the two countriesritical phase. The dozen or so known border clashes have involved uniformed forces as well as civilians, and appear to have produced several hundred fatalities. During March, lhe levels of propaganda rose to unprecedentedX percent of all broadcasts for the Soviets and aboutercent for thethe tone became notably harsher. Both sides began stressing highly motionalheroic deaths, funerals, patriotic tetters stained with blood, and the like. Sinco March, the level of propaganda has fluctuated at generally lower levels, but ominous new themes have appeared. Soviet commentators, who formerly sought tooviet attitude of cafan and restraint in dealing with Red Guard extremism, now stress that Maoism,riminal racistchauvinistic in (odea tion" that hasoint ofilitary threat" to the Soviet Union. In his June spocch to the Internationalenounced the Chinese Communists at great length anti alleged that Peking was preparing for nuclear war against the USSR. And al' though playing upon xenophobia and the threat of "foreign devils' isew lactic for Peking, the current campaign in China, emphasizing that the Chinese must not show "the slightest timidityildeems to be more extreme than in the past. Lin Piao has warned that China may have to cope withigt an carryconventionalr awar.1*
oth Peking and Moscow liave publiclyeadiness to negotiat* their border disputes. Nevertheless, each side has adopted rigid positions and has made deliberately annoying statements. The Chinese deny they intend lo claim thousands of square miles of present Soviet territory, but they insist that Moscow acknowledge that the treaties whereby Russian tsars gained title to those lands arche Soviet side has shown inflexibility by claiming lliat an uninhabited and frequently flooded island in the Ussuri River is "age-old Russiannd it has suggested provocatively that Manchuria and Sin Liang are not historically part of China. The talks on navigation and border rivers which resumed in Khabarovsk in mid-June have yielded some results in tho form of an agreement on navigation regulationsut no date has been set for broader talks on territorial matters, and the outlook for such talks is poor.
hese developments outlined pose the Urges question of how far the foreign policy of each legime will be arTccted by the continuing deterioration ol the relationship. The Ninth COP Congress did not formally demotefrom its position as enemy number one, but the choicest vitriol waslor lhe Soviets. Chinese overturns this year to "ultraicvinonist"suggest thm Peking lias become more flexible inasically anti Soviet foreign policy There is good reason lo believe that Ihc Soviet leaders now see China as their most pressing inlcrnatKmal problem, and arc beginning lo rjitoi (heir policies on other issues accordingly. Brcihnev'i suggestion for
an Asian collective security system, and Foreign Minister Cromyko'sthe USSR Supreme Soviet in July, inoderate tone toward theiurtiivitrd uritJ,mi.. i
il" .unit luwaro inc vvest
was Juxtaposed willi harsh words for the Chinese, both suggest that Moscow is seeling allies, or at least benevolent neutrals, against China.
H. Untiloviet tlieator forces near the Chinese border were very thin, though some steps were taken to improve their capability to handle border skirmishes. Tbe Chinese also saw to their own border security reouirements during theeriod.ersist errf and impressive Sovietbuildup begati Int thai time there were many possible reasons for tho buildup: tho Chinese challenge to Sovlot hegemony, Cliina's wcccssful nuclear tests, and Chinas growing role in Asia. At any rate, it appears that the present Soviet force structure in the East reflects decisions takenMoscow may recently have raised iu original military force goals.
ofhe Soviets had someround force divisions alongborder and in Mongolia, double tbe figure ofboutdivisions were at combat strength, and others were gradually being raisedstatus. These divisions were backed up by an unusually largeconventional artillery and of tactical surface-to-surface missiles. TheSoviet tactical air strength has kept pace with the ground lorce increase.
There has been no corrcspondiug buildup on the Chinese side. The Chinese have only about nine ground force divisions in the border areas of Sinkiang. Inner Mongolia, and the Ueilungkiang-Kirin regions ol Manchuria. Andthe Chinese have more thanivisions behind them in thenchou Military Regions, these are no match for Soviet 'divisions in lire power and mobility.
Tbe disparity between the Soviets and Chinese in other types of forces is even more pronounced. Chinese air defenses have been unproved in recent years, but remain thin, whereat Soviet air defenses are heavy and have been strengthenedhe Soviets bave continually maintainededium and heavy bombers in the area, and could quickly add to this force from other parts of the USSR; the Chinese medium bomber forceozen Or so it largely obsolete. Thereonsideiable number o( strategic missiles in Soviet Central Asia and the Far East which could be targeted against China. Finally, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is moreatch for the entire Chinese Navy.
ilitary confrontation, the factor of space affects each country, though in different ways. The great length of the border makes linear defense -ilong ilk whole extent virtually impossible. The USSR's vital Tiaiuiiborianruns close to Ihe MancJiurian bordtu: thus defense in depth is not feasible for the Soviets in lhat sector. Hence. Soviet strategyoncentration offorces for raptd attack or counter -attack along traditional invasion routes into China. What we know ol Soviet tioop dispositions seems to bear out this analym In contrail, Ihe Chinese mHilary planner might feel that he could yield
part of Sinlian^ and northern Manchuria to an attacking force Not only onestrategy accord with Mao's concepts of "protractedut livepositioning large Chinese theater forces in those salients prior tooffer Soviet commanders the opportunity to encircle and trap these units.
Soviets also face problems of rime.ar with Chinaits aims quickly, to avoid the dangers of protracted conventionalagainst the inexhaustible reservoir of Chinese manpower. Tbe Sovietsthis military problem by using nuclear weapons, but this wouldcomplicate their political problems. Moreover,ovieta conflict with the Chinese, If it Is to occur at all. should befairly soon, before the Chinese deploy an MHBM force.
is almost certain that there will be no significant easing ofthe neat two or three years. Conflicting national interests, competitionof the Ccmnninist moswnent. and genuine fear of each other'swillapprochement Even the border problems are not likelyresolved. While both sides may be willing to reach some temporaryneither is likely to compromise any fundamental positions
ho propaganda line in both the USSK and in China is very sharp. Each country now considers the other Its most iininediatc enemy; each country accuses the other of plotting with the Imperialists to encircle and destroy it. In this kind of atmosphere any act by tbe other side is viewed with suspicion; any military preparations appear menacing. For the first time, it is reasonable to askino-Soviet war could break out during the next two or three years
The fact thatuestion can be seriously posedeasure of the gravity of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Tbe potentialar exists; to the Soviets, at least, early military action might seem to have many advantages. But ato attackohtical act and wc have no turn evidence about the intentions of Chinese and Soviet leaders.
Wehat an unprovoked, major attack by China Into Sovietis highly unlikely. This judgment Is based primarily on tho fact of Clilna's disadvantage in military power, and its basic unprep3xedness for largc-scaid war beyond its northern borders. Moreover, since the Korean War. China has avoided major military confrontation with lhe two great powers. It is also hard to see wliat advantages China could gain from an attack. Propaganda about the Soviet threat may of course be designed to foster the national unity required to rebuild the power structure stuttered by the Cultural Revolution, but an actual war could imperil any gains achieved. At present the Chinese probably have two ob fectives- tooviet attack which tliey believe lias grown more likely with the Soviet military buildup, and lo promote national preparedness to meet the threat. Peking apparenlly has chosen to signal lis determinationliategy of small-sen lit confrontations in border aicus whore (he Chinese legal clnim is good.
contrast, we sec reasous why the Soviets might now, or In theconsider major offensive actions against the Chinese. Soviet planners,beyond minor border clashes, must feel that tbe real danger is yet tothe tenure of Mao, or that of his immediate successor, theuclear rrussile force,ore substantial mediumthan they now possess. The Soviet leaders might feel that even aof Chinese missiles would alter the strategic situation, and that asgrew, the Chinese would be under lower inhibitions in using theirTito Soviets might hope to prevent thissing theirto knock out Chinese nuclear and nussile installations, whileretaliatory attacks on tlie ground with their own theater forces.period for exercising this option is beginning to slip away.
The Soviet leaders might see other important benefits in militaryajor del oat of Chinese forces would demonstrate tbe might of the Soviet armed forces throughout tbe world, and help the prestige of the Soviet leadership at home. Tho Soviets might even hope (or the downfall of the Mao-Lin regime, or if it survived, the detachment of Slnkiang. Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria from China. They might thus be able touffer zono like lhat in Fast em Europe. In fact, protection of national minorities in tlie Sinklang and Inner Mongolian regions against Chinese oppression might be the excuse forar.
A body of recent evidence concerning Soviet military activity suggests that Moscow may be preparing to take action against China in the near future. Lately, there has been unusual military activity on the Soviet ride of the Chinese border, including an unusually large exercise in which China was apparently theenemy. Some air units were temporarily deployed from parts of the Western USSR normally considered the base for reinforcement against NATO. Also, the Transsibenan Railroad has beenolume of military tjafBc apparently large enough to interfere with norma] civilian traffic. This military activity seems disproportionate to any visible Chinese offensive threat. Meanwhile the Chinese, whose military force deployment had lemained virtually static during the earlier Soviet buildup, have recently made minor adjustments in their air defenses which suggest that they may beore serious view of the situation.
There are also political indicatois that suggest that the Soviets may be preparinghowdown with China. Tlie Kremlin is clearly trying to ease friction with the West; one purpose is almost certainly to expand its freedom of action in tho East. Soviet propaganda ro|>eats (he themes that Maohat he thinks that war is tlie only solution to his problems, that like all warmongers, he falsely accuses the Kremlin ol planning an attack on him in order to excuse his own evil plans Finally, recent articles and broadcasts deplore the oppression of Uigurs. Kazakhs, and Mongolians in China, and suggest that rebellion by these peoples would be rasti&ed
On (he oilier hand, the Soviets must recognize the formidable risks olaction.nilitaiy poini of view, this rests mainly on thr uncertainty
ulcomo. Even if lhe Soviet leaders believeonventional air strike would knock out Chinese nuclear and missile installations, they must surely realize that they would berocess which they could not be sure of controlling, and whose course would be determined as much by tbe Chinese as by themselves. They must also ask tlicm selves whet Iter, later if not sooner, it might bo necessary to use nuclear weapons against Chinese troops orwith all the political costs ofourse, and whether the Chinese, thoughreat disadvantage in modern weaponry, might still manage to deliver nuclear weapons on Vladivostok or Ksubarovsk.
ven if the Soviets succeeded completely In destroying Chinese nuclear and missile capabiutics, and were, in addition, able to establish viable buffer states on the frontier, the rest of China would remain unconquered. The Soviets have no assurance that the Mao-Lin regime would fall, or that, in any case, the Chinese would stop fighting. Regardless of the type of regime in unoccupied China, It would be even more bitterly hostile to the USSR than it is at present, and it would be even more determined touclear capability
oreover certain political factors militateoviet attack on China. The nature of collective leadership is such that the men in the Kremlin might End it easier loolicy of taprcrving military and poubcal defenses against the Chinese heresy than toecision tooviet-initiated war would certainly complicate Moscow's relations with Hanoi and mightreduce Russian influence there. Both Communist and non-Communist states in Europe might take advantage of Soviet involvement in Asia, particularly if the war werear would make reconciliation with China impossible for many years, and it is by do means certain that the Soviets have given up all hope of some improvement in tlieir relations with Cluna after the period of Mao and Lin. Brezhnev's article In the August issue of Problems of Peace end Socialism reaffirmed Soviet fneridship for the Chinese people and suggested that boa long period of tension rather than an early outbreak of hostilities, The same note has beeu struck In other recent statements.
s above noted, we do not lookeliberate Chinese attack on the USSR. We also believe that Moscow will jeek to avoid becoming engagedrolonged and full-scale war with China. But the Soviets have set in motion an extensive series ofpolitical,ready themselves for continuing or increasing levels of hostility. Their preparations have alreadytage which would permitariety of military options. Of these, tho Soviets might find the most attractive toonventional air strike designed to dcstioy China's missile and nuclear installations. The Soviets might calculate that Ihey could accomplish thiswithout getting involvedrolonged and full.scale war. We cannot say that they are likely to reach this conclusion but wo believe there is al least some chance they would.
n any caie. it is dear that tension between the two countries has become acute Al the very least, polemics will remain strident, and the dispute in its present form will probably intensify and grow.hange in Chinese
policy,ill occur periodically. The scale of fighting mayhe greater than heretofore, and might even involve punitive cross-border raids by Soviet ground and tactical air forces. Under such circunutaitOKS,of the conflict willontinuing possibility.
IV. IMPACT OF THE DISPUTE EISEWHERE IN THE WORID 1
A. Policies Toward Sooth ond East Asia
In those South and East Asian nations which view Chinaotential security threat, Moscow appears hopeful of gaining politically horn its quarrel with tlie Chinese. We see the recent Soviet suggestions concerning "aof collective security in Asia" as an effort lo capitalize on an anticipated reduction in the Western presence and. at the same time, to prevent any significant Chinese gains in its wake. In tryingontain the Chinese, the Soviets can play upon Asian fear of China and Asian resentrnent of Chinese support of localelements- These tberncs will be particularly persuasive in such main land stales as India, Burma, and Thailand. The Soviets may also try to exploitlocal animosity toward the large ethnic Chinese minorities in Malaysia and Indonesia.
The continuation of the Sino-Sovietwith tho Soviet effort to project its influence into South and Eastwork to limitoptions. Peking has dearly believed that the prolonged struggle in Vietnam would lead ultimatelyubstantial weakening of US power and influence in East Asia. The Chinese have foreseen opportunities int-Vietnani period for expansion of their own influence, particuarly in such nearby states as Burma and Thailand, they may also have hopedar more influential role in Hanoi and, by extension, in Laos and Cambodia, once Soviet war materiel was no longer necessary to the North Vietnamese. But with huge Soviet forces poisedense border. Peking will almost certainly End it more difficult to intimidate its southern neighbors by flexing its militaiy muscles or raiding its nuclear weapons.Chinese will face intensified Soviet competition in dealing with established Asian governments and in organizing loltist groups.
The continuing Sino-Soviet conflict will be reflected in an important way in relations with Japan. The Sovietsan as the emerging power center in Asia,erious military potential as well as an abuity to provide the Chinese, via trade and aid, with the sinewsodern industrial state. Moscow wants to forestall both developments, but its leverage in Tokyo is not very great. It can get some small advantage from Japanese hopes for the eventual return of Habomai and Shikotan and can exploit Japanese inteiest in investmentin Siberian resources. Moscow Ins some influence in Japan's mainparty, die Socialists, and even among the independent minded Japanese Communists, though Peking also possesses allies among tlie leftist opposition.
"Ihu dKusnion it predicated" on the asiumplinn Hist ike dispule between the USSR and ctt.tii icnuint al about Hi. ihoil of major war.
he major Chinese assets in this contest Tor influence in Tokyo are thn common cultural traditions and the longstanding Japanese distrust of Russia. In addition, Japan probably views Chinese markets as more profitable over the longer term than costly and risky joint enterprises with the Soviets in Siberia. (In any case, the Japanese areosition to bargain lor and secureapanrelishes its current bargaining position among the powers tbe US. as well as China and tbewould almost certainly not want to antagonize any ol them in order to gain seme transitory advantage with the USSR or China.
US and the West
Si Elsewhere, the Soviets have taken the position that, because of the China problem, the USSR should generally seek to avoid provoking unnecessaryoverthe US in particular and the West in general. Since one of their greatest fears is (hat the US or the Federal Republic of Cennany might be willing to put pressure on the USSR In collusion with China, they wiD tryreserve an atmosphere of detente, and to be acexsmmodating on minor issues. Problems with China may have encouraged the Soviets toon amis control measures with growing interest, seeing ineans lo reduce tensions with the US and to bring additional pressures against Peking. Wo arc not suggesting (hat tlw Soviets presently contemplate any sacrifice of essential(ho division of Ccrmany and the legitimacyoviet sphere in Eastern Europe. Even less likelyajor revision of China's anti-US stance.
The fragmentation of tho international Communist movement which1>cgan with Yugoslaviaas Ikco accelerated by the Intensification of the Sino-Soviet quarrel. The main document of this year's International Communistregisters the decline of Soviet influence over other Parties bythat the Communist movement has no single center, no leading Party. Peking will continue to have some success in creating anti-Moscow factions in Communist Parties and various front organizations. Beyond that, the Chinese will be able to attract the interest, if not always the support, of youngrepelled by the USSR's statushave" society Yet the Maoist model has losl much of its previous lustre, because of the soil induced domesticof the last few years, which seemed so incomprchwisible and pointless to other* throughout the world, both Communist and non-Communist, Wo do not foresee any significant nan owing of lhe existing fissures in the worldmovement.
1 noted, we rather expect to see more Communist Parties adopt posit kmi which support neither Moscow nor Peking This sepa lateness may parallel the neutrality practiced in various ways by the Romanians and (he NorthIV North Koreans and manyhe Thud World may share Castro's suspicion, expressed some time ago. thai neither Moscow noc Peking is
sufficiently coconut tedhe snuggle againstoil othei parties are likely to move toward what both peking and most of the present cpsu leadcis regard as revisionism these parties are likely to deprecate the use of violence by qxnmunistseans ot obtainingis0 taken by the italian and finnish parties and the one toward which theparty seems to 1m> headed. other parties will advocate lessening the role ol ruling communisthas been the policy identified with dubcek and tito. temporary alliances may often cut across ideological boimdaricsas seems to be indicated by peking's recent flirtation with belgrade and many communist parties, regardless ot their political complexion, may find it less difficult to co-exist with non -communist groups than with each other.
all ofnlle Sino-Soviet border1 deriveshtreaties by which an expanding (diarist Empire acquired somemiles of territory that had been under the nominal control orof Manchu China. In both the western and the eastern sectors, theterritory essentially unpopulated or inhabited mainly byRussian nor Chinese. Chinese propagandaPeking and Moscow have long agreed that these treaties should servebasis for determining the luncmcot of tlie border and for seatingissoes.
Wesfern Sector (See Map)
Most ofmle western sector was defined by0 Treaty of Peking and was demarcated in accordance with4 Tarbagatay (Ta-ch"eng)oundary modifications and territorial exchanges were made by1 Treaty of Hi (or St.eking refers to the loss ofquare miles through theselaim apparently based on theextension of mobile pickets sent to regulate use ol pastures by nomadic Kazakhs in Central Asia (seehinese control in Central Asia fluctuated greatly throughout history, however, and live westward limits of its authority were vague and usually remote Irom settled areas of Chinese population. When the boundary was actually demarcatedussian officials interpreted0 treaty to refer to permanent Chinese outposts located considerably cast of the maximum Chinese claim.1 treaty transferredquare miles from the Lake Taysan. Ill, and other areas to Russia.
he southernmost sector of the border in the high Pamirs was determined, without direct Chinese participation, by an Anglo-Russian treaty designed primarily to define the boundary between British India and Russia. Although Chinese maps depict the de facto boundary in this sector, it is labeledonly sector of the entire border so designated The Chinese daim ofquare miles in the Pamirs apparently is based mainly on Manchu military operations conducted in this region duringh century
Border incidents and tensions in the weitem sector have arisen rrcqucntly because of the relatively large population straddling theTurkic-speaking Muslim groups such as the Kazakhs, Kirgir, and Uighurs. Moreover, movement by these largely nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples across the fronlieis
ilt Sinn-Mongol an border Ii no) included in (hiteiiinrealioiTo llie scTiiii pliytlral markingour-Uiv on llielly by marker*pilLiu. nr. Iner boundary,el linemp.
has been customary. Along the nor than hall of the border, several naturalfacilitate such movement.
most publicized border-crossing incident of recent years occurredand Mayhen0 Kazakhs and Uighurs Bed from theTa-ch'eng areas of northwestern Sinkiang into Kazakhstan, apparentlyof finding better economic conditions in the USSR. Peking stillalleged Soviet coercion of these migrants and of Moscow's persistentreturn them to Chinese control Chinese concern is heightened becausetracts arc easily accessible from Kazakhstan and because the USSR haspast fostered dissident sentiments among their non-Chinese inhabitants.1
Eastern Sector (See Map)
ile eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet border is formed primarily by the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and, exceptmall segment at the extreme western end, was established by the Treaties of) andhina claims that these treaties resulted in the loss ofquareigure derived from the amount of territory that had been acquired by China in the Treaty of Nerchinsk (Nipehu)hichoundary that incorporated almost all of the Amur Basin vrithin China. During theears of Chinese ownership, however, the vast forest lands of tbe Armir-Ussuri territories had remained unsettled by Chinese and were almost exclusively the domain of scattered Tungusic tribes.
The Problem of the Amur-Ussuri Islands.h century treaties made no specific allocation of the numerous islands in the Amur and Ussuri. In the case of the9 Incidents, tlie Chinese base their claim to ownership of Cheti-pao/DamansViy on the fact that the main navigable channel lies to the east (Soviet) side of that isjand. lujcent Soviet public statements implyf"
that the Chinese version of the location oflaumuei is
acknowledging thewiuihhhiuui <ire hi..hp uwtueiriverine boundaries, theune Soviet statement cites exceptionsioerbank border Is in effect and claims that0 Treaty of Peking is "another suchhe Soviet version of the boundary, however, is based not on the wording of the treaty, but on an accompanying map, The Chinese claim tliat thethe Soviets have not chosencale smallernd cannot accurately show cither the riverineor island ownership.
USSR's evident determination to disregard the main-channelan unwillingness to see this principle applied to other and morespecifically Hci-hsia-lzii Island at the Amur-Ussuri confluence nearRussian sources describe the boundarythen maps show
"this area wat di< bun- tor .in .intl-Clunesc separatist regime, the "East Turkestan People'sstablished in liMG will. uVf .'luxet trainedlut is. ow melt on tlsrr map CQuaU appru-inialelyiles on the mound
as following the Kazakevichcva Channel at the extreme western end of the island. Chinese maps locate the boundary at the Amur-Ussuri confluence, directly opposite Khabarovsk. Hei-hjia-tzuow and marshy island aboutiles bog. It was occupied by the USSR in theollowing the Japaneseof Manchuria, and permanent habitations and installations were constructed on the island. Although the USSR is in de facto occupation, the Chinese case for envnership appears to agree with the intent of0 treaty as well as with the main-channel principle.
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