CHINESE THREAT IN ASIA
A. Military Power
R. PrapVi War
C Poll tut and Dijdcanncy
D. Chinai Vital Interests:ami Taiwan
COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA
To survey recent Chinese foreign policy and alternate lines ofin the near term; to define the nature of the Chinese threat in Asia, and to estimate Chinese intentions in the area; and to estimate the longer term outloolc for Chinese foreign policy.
Chinese Communist regime has fallen far shortosition of dominance In East and Southeastfor the leadership ol the world revolution. Neither Its effortsdiplomacy nor at supporting revolutionary strugglespursued conslstendy oregard to objective realities.pretensions have earned China the enmity of thehis bizarre domestic programs have cost China greatly inrespevt elsewhere in the world. Yet China's location and size,traditional apprehensions of its neighbors, ensure for it aupon Asia regardless of the policy it follows.
long as Mao is the dominant figure, major changes inposture do not appear likely. Mao will remain anobstacle to any accommodation with the USSR, andlittle alternative to continuing hostility toward theailureVietnamese Communists to achieve their aims might requirein tactics, but the Chinese would almost certainly notovert attack, nor would they be likely toajor newconBict.
Chinese aspirations foe political dominancewill persist. Almost certainly Mao and his Immediatenot expect to achieve this by military conquest, although forcefigure strongly in Mio's doctrines. The Chinese may hopepossessiontrategic capability will give China greater freedom
to supportar" or. more remotely, to engage In conventional war in Asia by diminishing the possibility of nuvlecr attack on China. Whatever Chinese hopes, however, the ictual possession of nuclear weapons will not necessarily make China more willing toirect clash with the US; Indeed. It Is more likely toobering effect.
modifications in Chinese policy flow from Itsthe nuclear age, the principal threat from China will forbe in the realm of subversion and revolutionarySoutheast Asia, ln South Vietnam and Laos, Peking must takeof Hanoi's direct Interests. China's policy toward Cambodialargely conditioned by Sihanouk's attitude. If he moves verytccommrx1 <tion with thc US. Peking's pressures againstbe Increased. The Chinese may seea more lucrative targethinese-sponsored "people's war."is already providing some training and support, but even themust realize that the Thai insurgencyong, difficultChineseore clear -cut choke in Burma, and whetherincrease the Insurgency or restore more normalcould be an indicator of trends In Peking's foreign policy.
rest of Southeast Asia is less important in Peking'sscheme because the Chinese lack direct access andfor insurgency in these areas are minimal. Peking seeksand embarrass India, but not to confront it directly sothere is no threat to Tibet.
is in the area of conventional diplomacy, which sufferedIn the Cultural Revolution, that Peking could most easilychanges. Restoration of normal diplomacy wouldtrend toward recognition of Peking, and this would In turnon other countries, particularly Japan, which does notbe left behind in opening relations with the mainland. Taipeisuffer diplomatic losses in this process.
C. The departure of Mao could, In time, bring significant change In China's relations with the outside world. There could be contention and struggle for leadership thst would freeze major policiesong inlen.-gi.um. But on balance, we believe Mao's departure willtrong movement toward modifying his doctrines.
es* ideological approach would noi necessarily maketo deal or live^with in Asia. Pursuit of its basic naUon^tgoals could sustain tensions in the area,hin,beginning to realize some of its potential in the economtcweapons fields couldar more formidableAsia than Is Maoist
ean of rule, theommunUti have not come closeComa's aspirations foe leadership or domination In Asia. Thenrcsionsis. China has of course had to operate from aninadequate lo support the full range N" tt* pretensions- Maoistwith making China the trader iA the world revolution has often ledand actioni harmful to other more traditional or conventionalIn Asia. The tension and Inconsistencies in the basic Chinese approachpolicy have been magnified by frequent shifts to actual tacticsIn consequence, Peking has failed to pursue any single courseand maximum effectrolonged period.
the Bush of victoryeking joined the USSR in proclaimingfor revolution andpeople's war" against all eiistingm the area. But China wej not ready to offer much practical assistanceend, local cornmuniitlacked the tfrength for revolution, andresult was to alienate the leaders and supporters of the newlyAsian governments who considered themselves antiof Peking's support, not its enmity,
1 The Korean war forced Chinancentratr on more Immediate security concerns, and in its aftermath Peking shifted to the line of peaceful coexistence abroad while concentrating on construction at home. But this line, which had considerable promise of winning friends, diplomatic recogni;;on. and broad commercial opportunitiesi.ru. gradually gave wayore belligerent and revolutionary line. By the, the dispute with the USSR began to take shape and has sinceood deal of China's energies and attention. During the, Chinareat loss of prestige as the ahcurditiei. administrative confusion, and economic chaos of the Creat Leap became evident to the world.
owever. China secmrd to be back on an even keel and growing in strength andorking balance between support for revolutionary goals and improving China's international position seemed lohinese foreign policy. China was closely aligned with North Vietnam and North Korea,espect among fHirnerous communM parties, and had evtahtUhedaxis" vith Indonesia. The revolution* in Vietnam and Laos were progressing.
Maneuvering was underway fornew Afro-AiUn conference, which iheped lu turnthe USSR. Several noncoinmuiilU states were conildering recognition, and Franc* nctuauy lot* IhH Wrp Chou En-lal embarked on anlour of Allien. In Octoln*ao* archenemy Khruthchcv fell and thelomlc device.
ui one*f circumstances Intervened to produce majorhe Chanes* posture In foreign affairs. Suddenly,he war In Vietnam became muchhan another war ofm. With the US intervention. Mao's theories on the validity of guerrilla war were being mbjected to eatreme teat, and China tUcll feltf direct conflict with the US. The problemelicate one how to aiturc su-wss tn the Vietnam war without provoking an American attack on North Vietnam and ultimately China.
ft The entire qurrtionjw to confront Ihe USapparently the iub]*ctebate duringebate which wai greatly eocupbented by changes in the USSR, where the new leadcnhip wu bent on rebuilding iti poiitlonan Comrnunuts. etpecially In Hanoi. Thc Soviet proposal lor "united action" loanoi, however, wai regarded by Maorap which would hanv Mringreedom of action and undermine Peking'* claim to be the centerCW icvohilionary movement.Important, Mao law that any acconuno-dation wilh Motrow would conlribule to Ihe erosion of morale and ideological purity which he apparently fearedalready iprcocHng rapidly throughout the Chinese party and society.
n the rest of the world, the Chinese found that they had overestimated Ihe revolutionary enthusiasm of their friends. Cluufrican tour was cut ihort. after embarrassing reaction to bit vivid oescrlptioni of Africa's ripenest (or revolution. With the coflapse In 1BS5 of the "Bandung II" Conference tn Algiers. China was rebuflrd In ih effort to form an anti-Soviet and anti-US bloc ofain The reeogniUon by Francenot followedush of other eountrli'i. And the alliance with Sukarno collapsedassive bloodbath for the Indonesian Comnumntiave ol violent repression of the overseai Chinese community there.
ftcted to these circumstances, not by muling its revolutionaryhut by calling for an acceleration of the worldwide revolutionarySuppotadly. the variousarties, and front group* would 'Hji up their effort* In order to divert US reaourcei and wear down the US will. At tbe nunc time, the USSR and It* cbcnti would be eicludcd from Ihe newf Intemihed revolutionary activity, and China would remain Ihe center of the movement.
ft TV nethis line wai to create an even wider gxp between dunes* Ideological prescriptions and objective reality. In dealing with major problems nf national security, especially then*hreat of confrontation with Ihe US. China was forced lo remain cuulluus and prudent. A* the domestic crliii of th. Cultural Revolution cVepencd. Peling became more and more rigid and
doctrinaire, insensitive lo the advice of Ms frieoda. utterly hostile and Inflnible towards Its enemies, and tDcreismgly obltvioos lo theof Msposition
Even so. the Chinese leaders might hive been content with their position had it not been for new dVvetopraenl*he onset of nepotist ions over Vietnam was tantamountepudiation of rhe Chinese by Hanoi, seemed to vindicate the position of the USSR, and pointed lo growing Soviet influence. And tlie USSR engagedubstantial military buildup in the Pai Eait which was clearly directed against China. The Chinese have not reactedimilar buildup of their own along the Soviet frontier, and they probably do notn open Soviet attack. But they are no doubt concerned abou' Soviet efforts to influence Internal developments in China in one way or another. All this was brought into sharper focus by the invasion of CuchoslovakU and thepromulgation of the "Brezhnev doctrine."
In sum. by the endhe revolutionary line had failed In itsobjectives. It was becoming increasingly clearettlement In Vietnam was Dot likely to validate M'w'a strategy of "people'she rnfiuente of thehe region had not been contained hut had in fact grown, both in the communist capitals of Pyongyang and Hanoi, and in Sooth and Southeast Asia. China had failed completely tobroad united front" against theUS and the revisionist USSR. Instead ft found Itselfs Chou En-lai acknowledged, and isolated on most key policy rentes.
et Peking! lack of progress toward Its revolutionary objective* hi* by no mr-.ini completely vitiated Its Influence In Asia. China'* location,andtiisrsnd by the traditional apprehensions of Its neighbors, ensure forajor impact upon Asia regardless of theollows. Awareness of China's esistence and potential for making trouble afreets theolicies of every country In Ihe area.
II. IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS
n the near term, there does not appear lo be much chanceajor change In China* international posture. As long ai Mao Is the dominant figur-of the regtme and the source of Ideological guidance. Chinese policy willhe confined within fairly narrow limits He I* Ukrly lo remain anobstacle to any
tkm or modai vrvetsdf svith the USSR. Indeed, Chinese enmity for tbe Soviet Union hai recentlyevel al least equal to that against the US: China now ha* two "number oneith age. Mao has become less Bed Me and even more obsessed withgoals.ot likely te be any slackening In his commitment lo the notion thai China i> the center for Inspiring the world revolution and that Its prtnclpul allies are not to be found In the established Communist regimes and parties, but in the guerrilla movement* that have accepted "Mao's thought" and intend to penM In protracted Strugs le In this sense, there Is little alternative lo continuing hostility toward the US.
ithinairly rigid itrategic framework, (here are signs of tome grralct Bcsltality toThese ligns aren contradictory and confuting, but they could be urr;*caot if domestic attain areew phase. The growing concern that Ihe US and USSR are pursuing parallel. anti-Chinese policies mayactor dictating Chinese moves to comr disrupt what they an-aot alliance. Wbat tuch moves mightot al all dear,hc end lliey may be of no great ilgniScance As long as Maoist ideology is dominant, however, the road to Moscow ii blocked. Ironically, the Chinese may be coming lo feel that ihey have monr room for maneuverhe US lhan theough of coune tlie Taiwan question will continue to obstruct Sino-US relations.
hether ihlfts in Chinese tactics do occur could depend, of course, on development! ba Vietnam. The Chinese already perceive that (he war tn Vietnam is likely to endegotiated tettlemeot- They have taken lome steps to mute their oppositionegotiations. And at some point In this process, (hey are likelv (otheir brood political Interest hi (he area, seeking to make It clear thai no ia>tingcan be achieved withoutpproval
lo remain Maoist con-
If. Of conrw.cmlble that thc Chlneu- will choose notevelopmenti in Indochina, but rather seek tn disrupt them.ailure by Ihe Vietnamese Communists lo achieve their aims would probably rot lead to eslreme reactions by the Chinese. Almost certainly the Chineseoing lo bunch an overt attack In Vietnam ortome territory eliowhere, nor are they likely loafor new front of conflict, using their own At the other catittle likelihood that the Chinese Iwvome quiescent because of the outcome in Vietnam. They are going active In uipporl of those movements lhat ihey believe are loyalrpts end have some potential for effective development.
prevails, then order ir professionali may geli and rules in Peking, t*enefiilPeking will be it new inltUtives of i
IT. In any ease. China'i foreign pobctes are likely to be Influencedignificant decree by the internal criill. Even if the extremes of the Cultural Revolution ore already pail. Il is possibleew phase of coercive social program" and disruptive economic initiatives may prove as debilitating as the political purge. If. on theore moderate line in Internal policiesilly restored, and the Foreign Ministry .over policy. Bui at long a* Mao lives.ent litsubtbt) In China Foreign policynd reflect the internal line.iipond to outride events than lo launch major
III. THE CHINESE Tn*- 'if ASIA
ll these consideration, do not mean lhat China willegligible factor in Asia or In tatemational polilks. Chinese goab. In Asia al least, ara (airly clear. Almost allin Peking or on Taiwan-would agree that China's nghll.il position r'he M'" m'm'
land,ultimately ilu^Aijrhoirt Eail and Southeast Aria- Such aspirations hive dWp historical roots. In this sense. China posesthreat to Asia and to those outside powers which seek to play in important role in Asian affairs. Theis how the Chinese Intend to accomplish their objectives.
A. Military Po-er
lmost certainly the Chinese do not eipect toominanton by onTitary conquest, even though lorce and violence figure strongly In Maoist philosophy and Chinese Communist practice. In the cases where Ihe Chinese have resorted to militaryKorea andwas. In their view, defensive to protect the leeurity of their bordersrincipal objective of China, like mosto Insure Its security against unfriendly powers ranged along its frontiers. Where the Chinese see an Immediate threat lo their securrty. they wiD be prepared to vu force, even pre-emptively. But neither Mao nor his immediate successors ere likely toeve that the Chinesecan be riper! rd by the People's Liberation Army, or that armed conquest in the style of Imperial Chinaafe or profitable course.
All this, of course, applies primarily to Chinaonventional military power, but ta acquisition of nuclear weapons will not necessarily Increase ItsThe Chinese may hope that the possessiontrategicwill give China greater freedom to support "people's war" or, moreto engage In conventional war In Asia by diminishing the possibility of nuclear attack on China. The Chinese certamry hoped to gain such freedom in the Taiwan Strait crisis of IBS by exploiting the Sino-Soviet alliance to deter the US. Moscow's refusal In that Instance to back China with nuclear ihrrats wasajor factor in convincing Peking that It must have its own nuclear weapons.
Whatever may have been Chinese hopes in Ihe past, however, the actual posiession of nuclear weapons is likely toobering effect. China has no hope of achieving parity with either tbe US or the USSR in nuclear weapon fn Ihe foreseeableespite its propaganda concerning China's ability to withstand nuclear attack. Peking will almost certainly come to realiie. if it doe* not already, that either the US or the USSR possesses more than sufneient nuetear weapons to devaitate China.
In these cu-csimstarsces. Out* ii harry to remain cautious In areas of possible direct confrontation with the US or the USSR, calculating that itsn possession o* nuclear weapons may increase, rather than lessen. Ihe chan?esre-emptive nuclear strike against It For some time. China is fikely ro value its nuclear capability primarilyreat Power status symbol and for
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Kial effects. In mm. worn Chin* actuallyuclear power duringt decade, it will pnahabty b* suhtrctcd te th* Mm* constraints andtioni of policyth* other nuclear powen.
e cannot predict the ultimate effect of Chinet* acqirssition of nuclear weapons on th- rest of Asia.inimum, China will gain greater pmtlge and rwpeet. tranjlaied into pouilealhis will probably mean that more countriei will seek some relationship with Peking at Taiwan'snd that some will esplorr tbe possibility of accommodalion. if Chinese policy is sufficiently Beaiblr to permit such accommodations. However, few refineries are likely to respond favorably to China's desire touelear power In Aria snd to provide 'protecttoo* .or tbe area against all outside powen. Indeed, tbe Chines*may increase pressures in some Asian countries to develop their own nuclear capabilities oring more closely to other nuclear powers.
B. Paopla's War
Whatever modification* in Chines* policy flow from hs advance Into th* nuclear age. Ihe principal threat from China will, for many years, be In the realm of subversion and revolutionary activity. Such activity will be conducted mainly in Southeast Asia where It relate directly lo Peking's security Interests in denying the US or other unfriendly powen positions dose to China's birders. It also icrves to latiify the more general Interest ofstablishing Its own dominance In ihe area and In the worldvernent.
Vietnam and Loot. To these ends, Peking supports and assists th* Com-mucus's in Vietnam and Laos. For tbe present, at least, Peking has to take account ef North Vietnam's directoth South Vietnam and Laos. Peking could ley lo circumvent Ihe North Vietnamese and open competing lines to the National Liberation Front and to the Pathet Lao, But Ita chances of gaining significant influence are poor and the cost in relations with Hanoi potentially ao great thataneuver is unlikely. Though sharp disagreement kould develop over tactics tn Laos, in general Hanoi and Peking almost certainly share Ihe same immediate goal:ontrol of Laos, with Hanoi in the dormrL.nl rale.
JiailoFuf.lose ally of the US andS strategic base, Thailandey object of Chinese policy in Southeast Asia and will probably receive Increased emphasis after Ihe war Inettled. In this respect, Thailand Is the most obvious target for "people'she political leadership of the Thai insurgency is now lodged in Peking, and thc Chinese are providing some training and arms. Moreover, ih* Chinese haveeavy propaganda commitment, recently they have announced the formationhai Teople's Army" supreme command and publicised the new manifesto of ihe ThaiParty-.
he Chinese will almost certainly continue to support the Thai Iniuigents. Yet they musl realise thai the insurgencyong, difficult fight; ft has made iHtle progress in gaining the allegiance of ethnic Thais. And Thailand possesses
mam strengthss possible th*'some polnl the Chinste might want lo'hit support, if in doing to they Oild induce Bangkok lo draw away from Hi alliance with Ihe US.
eriod of cordial Sine--Burmese relations -at broken by Peking In tbe midst of the Cultural Revolution nearly two yean ago. Since then the ChineseOpenly supported tbe Burmese Communist movement andendorsed the formationnited front with the ethnic Insurgents. During rnuchhe Insurgency did increase along the SinoBurmesc border. There b. on the other hand, some evidence that the Chinese may want to resteec more normal reUOom. Neutralist Burma would, of course, be receptive loove, especially ii accompaniedetup in the insurgency. Thus the Chineseairly dear-cut choice between iivcrcstiing tbe insurgency in northern Burma and restoring mote normal government .to-gavemment relations. How they decide cnuid provide sotne indication concerning the ertcnl of their commitment to the policy of Insurgency in general.
Relations with Phnom Penh have fluctuated in recentbecause of Sihanouk's belief that Peking is sponsoring anhe stylet Ihe Khmer Rouge But the Chinese have been willing lonumber of intuits and taunts from Sihanouk and to furnish him arms,of the importance of Cambodia to the prosecution of the VietnamChinese also valise the fact that Cambodia Is ostensibly neutral andanti-American. Finally, in the long term Cambodia could be ofIn developing an Insurgency In Thailand, with Cambodianserving some of the same purposes ll has served In tbe Vietnam war.
a major change In relations will probably depend less onon Sihanouk- He has long believed that China will become thein the Far East, and he sees value in trying to use the Chinese as ato his traditional enemies, the Vietnomese and tlic Thalt. In thesePeking will probably continue to have considerable influencePenh. Nevertheless, if Sihanouk feels that the tide is setting againstto Vietnam,apable of becoming more cooperative withShould he attempt to move very far in ihb direction, however, neitherPeking would be reluctant to step up political pressures against himbereave support to dissident groups in Cambodia.
ther Areas. Insurgencies in the rest of Southeast Asia are much lesjin the Chinese scheme, mainly because the Chinese have no direct access and the Innrrgents' prospects are currently minimal The attempt of the Maoist-oriented Indonesian Communists to develop an insurgency In East Java last summer resulted not only In failure but In tbe death of key leaders Peking occasionally publicizes the eiplolti of the Malayan Communist Party, svhkh In turn pays homage to Moo. Peking, of course,onsiderable potential asset in Ihe large ethnic Chinese population in Malayvia. but the CommunistoseridenU Beat lon with the Chinese hampers Its avowed policy ofroadly based movement with the Malays. Peking has little influence rn the
Huk movrrnrnl inllppines. though Chin* peilodically publkiret (heof Filipino insurgents
India. In (hei, Chin* earn* lo regard Indiaompetitor form Aim. especially rjecauv* India seemed to benefit from the rupport of both the USSR and US. Thus Chinese policy hu been Framed to harass and Intimidate India and (Vernon str ate that II wu generally incapable of taking the rotesian power Since the border warhe Chinese have maintained some level of tension and threat along the Indian frontier, the'r military aid to Pakistan serves the same general purpose.
If China chose to. It could probably cause cortiiderabia trouble by isip. portingalong the Indian frontier, especially In the rwrtheost- The Chinese ragrrty publicized the Nasalbort uprisings In Dssrieeling, as the beginntngao-inspired peasant upheaval. In Eastern India, the Chinese haveand apparently base provided limited arms and training to Nags and MUo tribesmen. Peking's aim seems to be to embarrass and worry New Delhi without becoming deeply involved, and we do not foresee much change In this attitude.
C. Parties end Diploeisocy
In general. China's relations with the rsoocommunist world have suffered In consequence of the Cultural Revolution Its extreme xenophobia and hysteria Impinged on Chinese diptomabe relations. Foreign diplomats In Peking were abused and humiliated; Chinese embassy stalls abroad were reduced aridwithdrawn. Even now. the function! ns; of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains disrupted by political campaigns and factional disputes.
Nevertheless, It Is in the area of normal political relations and conventional diplomacy that the Chinese probably have 'he greatest room for change.much effort, the Chinese ccold resume normal diplomatic activity In Europe. Africa, and the Middle East. Moreover, there appears toew movement towards diplomatic recognition of China. Though the Chinese have eshiblled no eagerness for such recognition, there Is no doubt they would regard llain, especially ifrend adds lo pressures in Japan and elsewhere for closer relations with China
he neat two years should present the Chinese with new opportunities for netting some influence on Japanese politics. The tensions associated with the Okinawa question and the US-Japanese Security Treaty all lend themselves to esnhntation by Peking China coulderious overture to restore snore normal comnserclal relations and could encourage the visits of Influentialpoliticians Toignificant Impact In Japan, however, Chinesewouldore skilled anddiplomacy than Peking has been willing to adopt thu far.
eturn to more normal diplomacy does seem likely. The low oflo China has begun to Irscrease. relations with the foreign em-
in Peking have been eased, some new economic agreements hive been concluded In recent months, and rumor? recur that ihe Forssgn Minuter or Chou En-lal may visit abroad. Some reporti have Indicated that Chinese ambassadors are to return to ihetr posts thisowever, both China's Interna) politics, and the reaction of Chinese leaders to foreign events could serve to delay move*st are greater normalcy to Chinese diplomacy. Peking's abnipt postponement of thenuuy sersion of the Warsawiced by references to the case of defecting On net* diplomat Llao Ho-that Prising Is as yet undecided about its foreign pokey posture.
iol Interest* Koroo ond Taiwan
n North Korea, the Chinese have seen their influence diminish slgnio'carttfy, largely because of their own rude arrogance and partly because of theof the USSR's renewed cultivation of Pyongyang andsongeterioration, however, is not likely loermanent stale uf affairs.in Korea are of major Importance lo China, especially if tensions thereand the danger of hostiji.esventually, we eapeef the Chinese to repair iheir position and attempt to gain some Influence over the KoreanProbably, however. China will notolicy Intended lo increase the risks of war. Its behavior during the past year, particularly in the Pueblo crisis, suggests that the Chinese are not about lo pledge themselves unreservedly to Kim II-song's adventurism.
aiwan, of course.entral element in Chinese foreign policy US support for the CRConumental obstacle to any Chinese reconsideration of its relations with the US. Peking wiD almost certainly not abandon its claim to Taiwan, and this position appears to rule out acceptancewo-China solution. Yet there It not much Peking can do to gain possession of Talwnn as long as It is reluctant to engageilitary confrontation with the US. There is the possibility of pressure on the offshore islands (Chlnmen andove might appeal to Pekingest uf US intentions in the post-Vietnam period, especially if II could be used to aggravate relationsand Taipei.
n some respectss froHlesa to sneculafc on the longer termof Chinese foreign policy. The prospect of Moo's departure trvershadosts oil other conn derations. In many respects, the situation Is analogous to that of the USSR in thes. when the death of Slalm unlocked Soviet
foreign policy and lederies of signiflennt new departures. Naturally, Ibis msrstton Is uppermost in China's case aho Will Mao's departureew
era of significant change In China's relations with the outside world?
e believe thai Mao's departure willtrong movement toward
mndifyinK his doctrines and jettisoning his disruptive programs. In foreign affairs.
new leadership will ultimately seek to focus niore effectIvrlv on national Intetcsl'
nndrestorsd In terms ofnor* realists- world view. Evra If Maoist rhetoric should temporarily survive.believe ihr trend will be toward moderating the Maoist line In favor of more practical diplomacy. Some modus vtvendl with the USSR ts possible, (hough anythingenewal of the old alliance Ii most unlikely. Moreover, we would noteturn to the tactics of peaceful coemtence as part of an efort to undermine the US position In Aala.
utot Inevitable and It would not tn any ease have to be steady and uninterrupted. If thereontention and struggle for the leadership, major policies could be frozenong-term interregnum. The timing ol Mao's departure and the Identity of the principal survivors could be important to policy. Finally,he response of outside powers. It wouldreat differenceew leadership had pbusible alternatives or whether it believed that its enemies were seeking to exploit China'sand uncertainties. Thus, the transition from Mao and bis generation may last many yean before real changes evolve. Meanwhile, support to subversive movements, if not to active insurgencies, is likely toontinuing role in Charsa's cztemol policy.
n anyess Ideological approach would not necessarily make China easier to deal or live with la Asia. Pursuit of Its basic nationalist and traditional goals could sustain tensions In the area,hina that was begin-runc to realize some of its potential In the economic and advanced weapons fields couldar more formidable force Ln Asiaaoist China.Original document.