N9
423
Tht following /ntelfrgence organizations panittpaled in the prepare Hoti of 'hii edi'moiAr
Ih* Control Intelligence Agency ond (hoorgoniioitom ol tha Daport--onii of Stale aid Ooftnur, and lha NSA,
Concurring.
Dr. R. J. Smith, for lha Depute Director, Cannul InWlllganco
Mr. George C. Dermay,lor th* Dlroitor of Inttlilganca ond Raiaorch, Dapail-
t of S'-'l.
Vke "dm. Varnonovrooet, for hSa Director, Defeaso Inlaaliganca Agency Dr. loud W. Tordaib, lor tha Diactor, Notional Saonily Agency
Abtloining,
Or. Chorlai H. Mthordr, for tha Aulilunt Qanorollotnic Energy Cat-nwiion. William O. Cragar, lor lha AtfirtoM tnrtelor, fWfral Buraou o* ImaitigoKon, rha wejin boing outride of *alr (urlidleiioo.
CONTENTS
THE PROBLEM
CCWCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS
THE CHINESE THREAT IN ASIA
A. MiliUry Po-ver
B People'i
C Pohtio and Diplomacy
D. Chinai Vila) Inter call; Korea and Taiwan
POST-MAO PERSPECTIVE
ISftltET^
communist ch'na and asia
THE PROBLEM
To survey recent Chinese foreign policy artel alternate lines ofin the near tarm, to define the) nature of the Chinese threat in Asia, and to estimate Chinese Intentions In the area; and to estimate the longer term outlook for Chinese foreign policy.
CONCLUSIONS
Chinese Communist regime has (alien far shortosition of dondnanco In East and Southeastfor the kadership ol the world revolution. Neither iu effortsdrplomacy nor at supporting revolutionary strugglespursued consistently oregard to objective realities.pretensions have earned China the enmity of thehis bizarre domestic programs have cost China greatly inrespect elsewhere in theet China's location and size,traditional apprehensions of Its neighbors, ensure forupon Asia regardless of the policy il follows.
long as Mao is the dominant figure, major changes inposture do not appear likely. Mao will remain anobstacle to any accommodation with the USSR, aadlittle alternative to continuing hostility toward theailureVietrumese Communists to achieve their aims might requirein buries, but tbe Chinese would almost certainly notovert attack, nor would they be likely toajor newccttftkt
C Nevertheless. Chinese aspiistions for political dcasirsance in Asia will persist Ahnost certainly Mao and his immediate successors will not expect to achieve this by military conquest, although force and violence figure strongly in Mao's doctrines. Tbe Chinese may hope that the possessiontrategic capability will give China greater rVeeoMro
lo su|>porl "people's war" or, more remotely, lo engage in conventional war In Asia by dlminbhing tho possibility of nuclear attack on China. Whatever Chinese hopes, however, the actual possession oi nuclear weapon? will not necessarily make China more willing Ioirect clash with die US, indeed, It Is more likely toobering effect.
modlhcatioiiv In Chinese policy flow from itsthe nuclear age, die principal threat from China will forbe in the realm of subversion and revolutionarySoutheast Asia. In South Vietnam and Laos, Peking must takeof Hanoi's direct interests. China's policy toward Cambodialargely conditioned by Sihanouk's attitude. If he moves veryacccsrimctktion with the US, Peking's pressures againstbe increased The Chinese may seea more lucrative targethinesivspcsrisored "people's war."is already providing some training and support, but even tbemust realize that the Thai insurgencyong, difficultChineseore clear-cut choice in Burma, and whetherincreasu the insurgency or restore more normalcould be an Indicator of trends In Peking's foreign policy.
rest of Southeast Asia is less important in Peking'sscheme because the Chinese lack direct access andfor im urgency In these areas are minimal. Peking seeksand embarrass India, but not to confront it directly sothere is no threat to Tibet.
is in the area of conventional diplomacy, which sufferedin the Cultural Revolution, that Peking could most easilychanges. Restoration of normal diplomacy wouldtrend toward recognition of Peking, and this would in turnon odser countries, particularly Japan, which does notbe leftpening relations with the mainland. Taipeisuffer dipiWatic losses In this process.
C. The departure of Mao could. In time, bring significant change in China's reUtions with the outside world. There could be contention and struggle for leadership that would freeze major policiesong Interregnum. But on lialance. we believe Mao's departure willtrong movemenl toward modifying his doctrines.
less Ideokigical approach would not necessarily moketo deal or live with In Asia. Pimuit of Its basic nationalistgoals could sustain tensions in the area,hinabeginning lo realize some ol its potential in the economicweapons nekls couldar more fonnidableAsia than is Maoist China.
DISCUSSION
I, INTRODUCTION
SO years ul nile. Inn Chinese CornrnuntaU have not come closeChina's aipustloni for leadership or domlnatloo in Asia. Therereasons for thai China haa of cense hadperate from antnadecruate to "icoort the hall range of itt nrrfmnWa Maoistwith making China tbe lender of the world leroasfmn has often ledand artiont harmful to other rnore nwchnoanl or torn rasUnivalin Alia. Tha tension and irKOaaisttavcfci in tha beate ChJraeac approachpolity have been magnified by frequent dvlfb In actual laetjciIn consequence, Peking hu railed to pursue any angle courseand maalmun eReotrolonged period.
1 In the fliuh of victoryeking joined the ussr in proclaiming Ass* ripe for revolution ami celled fur "people'r war* against allin the area. But China wu not ready to offer match practical assistancehii end, lotnl cceruTtuaiat parties larked the strength for revolution, and the relrsefpal remit wu lo alienate tU- leaden and luppurten of the newty inde-pmdent Asianwho considered thoraisatves anti-imcenaast and dererving of Mrings support, net as enmity.
1 The Korean war forced China to coucentratr on mom immediate lecurtyu aftermath Peking shifted to the line nfaWence ab-ood while concentrating on construction at home. But thil One, which had eons<dcrabk> promlie of winning friends, diplomatic recognition, and broad eon, nercial opportnnltlei for China, gradually gave wayote belhgerent and revolutionary kne. By the, ihe dispute with the ussr began to take shape and has ilneeood deal of China's energies and attention. Dining the, Chinareat leas of prestige as the absurdities, admtnMralhe centurion, and economic chaos of the Great Leap became evident to tha world.
owever, Ghana seamed to be hack on an even keal and graelig kt strength andorkfcig balance between support for revolutionary goals and insprovlng China't mtcrnational pavilion larmrd lo cats* tn Chinese lieeign policy. China was closely aligned with North Vietnam and North Korea, commanded respect among mirnerons communist parti ea. and had established an 'saris" with Indonesia. The revokrtions in Vietnam and Lam were progressing.
Maneuvering wai underwayew Afro-AMiin cotdeteivcc, which (be Chinese hoped to tutn against the USSH Saveiul nuntomnvunlst slates wero considering tecognaicrn, and Ranee actually took this step, Chou fcn-lai ctnbsiked on an cstensive tour of Africa. In. Mao'i archenemy Khrushcttuv fell and the Chinese esploded their bVn atomic device.
at onceombination of circumstances intcvened to produce major shifts in the Chinese posture In foreign slain. Suddenly, tn IMS, the war la Vietnam becanvc much more than another war of liberation. With the US intervention, Mao's theories on the validity of psrrrllU war were being sub piled to ci:icue lest, and China Rseil felt (ha risk of direct conflict wt* the US. Tbe prallusielicateow lo more success ln the Wtoans war without provoking an American attack on North Ylctruan and rstrrruarty ChSsa
& The entire caseation of how to eonfrnnt the US was nrspnrersfjy the subjectebateebate which wasamputated by changes In the USSR, where tha bow loarlmhsp waa bant at tefarildaag its position wflh Asian Comrnuimts,in llanol. Tbe Soviet ptoposai far 'united action* to support Hanoi, however, was regarded by Maorap which wouldChinese freedom of action and uadormina Peking's da mi to be tbe centerew revolutionary movement. Most Impm" qnt, Mao saw ibat any aecomrno-dation with Moscow would contribute lo lha erosion cf morale and Ideological purity which he apparently feared was uln-ndy ipreuding rapidly throughout the Chinese party and society,
Ihe rest of the world, lhe Chinese found that Ihey hadrevolutionary enthusiasm ol tltalr friend. Chon En-fal's African tour wasafter era bamming reaction lo hii vivid dtterlpnoeii of Africa'srevolution With the coBapae la 1MB of the "Bandung II" ConferenceChina was rebuffed in ita effort to form an nort-Sovief ond anti-USAfro-Asians. Tbe recognition by France oi not followedush ofAnd theakarno coilpvdnarisrve bloeidbathIisdorvcsjan Corimuraats andwave of iioarnt repression of lha overccsstanunity there.
& Cbua reacted to rheae (ircuwolancrl. not br snoring its resoiuisonsryhot by calling for aa acceirratlas of tbe worldwide revototsooary raove-rnrnt. Soppasedy. ihj vortoas Uixirgencies, rctrrssb, parties, and front poops weald step up their efforts tn order to divert US letoertcs and wear down the US wiH. Al the satae time, the USSR and Ha client, would be eaduded from the new phase of intensified revolutionary aetlvlly, md China would remain the center of the rncwernerit.
net effect of this line wai to create an even wider gnp betweenprescriptions and objective icalky. In dealing with main-unisonal security, eepoctnlly thosehnut of tin or onto! lor.US, China was forcedemain ruulfous nnd prudent. At the domesticIhe Cullural Revolution deepened, Peking liecame more and more rigid and
dottrtiMlre, inavnsillve to the advice of H* friends,nd inlesiblc towards Hi enronies, and iiscreasinglr oblivious to tbe tietcitoniilori ol Hi inter-national poiUIoo.
. the Chinese leaden might lsave been contont with their positionot been lor new eUveloprneriti8 The onfet al negotiation" over Vietnam -ta busmrnconttfodlabon el the Chassis by Hanoi, mined to <tndleaic the poaiboo of the USSR, aod pointed to growingan rota. And the USSR engagedctatantia) mflflary hnaUarp the Far East winch waa cJrerry caraeted against Chtta The CWone have not leactcdimilar bulkhip ol their own along the Soviet frontier, and they probably do not eapeet on open Soviet attack. But they are no doubt concerned afcoul Soviet ctTcrts to Influence Internal development* in China in one way or another. All this win brought mlo sharper focus by (ho invasion of Crechuslovakii and thepromulgation of the "Breahnav doctrine"
IL In sere, by the endhe revolutionary line had failed In Itsctpal oc^rcnVaa. II vans beccaning Inereaalegry clearettlrmtnl In Virrtnaai waa ant aatsry to vahoate Mao's strategy of 'people'she kakaaca ef the USSR In th* legion had not been conUasrd bast had h> fact grown, both In the ccanmunlst capita* cf Pyongyang and HarvaL and in Sooth and Southeast Aria. Chins had failed completely tobroad united front" agatnat theUS and the revisionist USSR.orrnd Itselfs Chou En-lai acknowledged, and laobiled on most key policy Issues.
IS Yet Peking's lack of progress toward its revolutionary objectivrs has by no means completely vitiated HS uiauancr- In Asia. China's location, lire, and history, buttrrawd by the traditional apnmnenraons of ita neighnsure forapr Impact upon Ann lagarrlhei of the policy it foflowv. Awareness of China's eiMtaoce and potential for making trouble affects tbe cvnrant pcJlcacs of every country in the sstee.
II. IMMEDIATE HtOSPECTS
n the near terra, there does not appear to he much chanceajor change In China's lotcrnrdloml portoro. As long as Mao is the dominant flgure of the regime and the sewrce of ideologkal guidance, Chinese policy willbe confined within fairly Barrow limits. He is iiieiy tn remain an Imar-mouniaha) obstacle to any accommodation or mcdas vivendi wsth the USSR Indeed, ChassisBar tha Soviet Union has rccecuyrvel al teen ecnrnl lo that against the US. China now has two "naraheiith age, Mao haa become less tstahb and even asore obaraaed wtth nrvoJa-ticciary goals.ot likely to be any ilackeiang in his commitment to the notion that China is the center for In* pi ring ihe world revokition nnd thai its principal alkui are not to behe established Ccmmaniat regimes and purlin, but In tho guerrilla movroumti tint have accepted "Mao's thought" and intend lo persist in protracted struggle, in this sense,ittles alternative lo continuing hostility toward the US
d will ita tlii- fairly rigklfmmowotk, (here ate itgna of some
j'.'li.i TnnD llaniIonlr<(Ik lory nnrlr. In
bul they could bo tignlAun' if douiollc of airs are onteringatosu The growing cuocum ihal Ibe US and USSR are purvuins parallel. anrj-Chlncae pofccla payactor dictatingoras to cornphcrit or dbrapt what they teeacit alliance. What aiah piovci mtghl be Is not at all clear, and in tbe end Ihey may be of no gnat ssgrulkance. Aa long at Maoist ideology is rlorswnarrl, bowoaer. tbe road solocsnsd. Iruracnlly. tna Cbtstetc aay bt CBiiaaag to tee) that they haw move roans lor ntanwieer nsta car tbe US tarns tbe USSR, though of ccaias tbe Taiwan nominal will crastJoae to obatraet Stao-US resoUOra-
hether shJfb as Cbsnrar tactics do occur could depend, of course, on develereaoent* in Vietnam Tho Chinese ahaady rsceeelv* that tbe war tn Vletaarrn ii likely to endegotiated settlement. Thty have taken some steps to mate their tSppraUfon to negotiations. And at tome point Di this prorata, they are (Holy to re-ensphnstre their broad polilical interest bt the area, seeking to make It csear lhat no Lasting settlement ran bt achieved without Peking's aporoval
lft. Of coune, i- is possible lhat the Chinese will choose not to adjust to developments in Indochina, bul rather seek to disrupt them.rdlute by the Vtetoarnose Cooimaniiti to achieve their aims would probably not lead to ealreroe reactions by the Chinese. Almost certainly the Chinese arc not going to launch an overt attack In Vietnam or setae sense territory elsewhere, nor are tliey likely toajor new front of cotiHict. using their own resources. At the other eatrerae, there is Utile likelihood that tht Chinese will suddenly become quiescent because of tho outcome fai Vietnam. Tbvy are going to remain active In support of those movements that Ihey believe are loyal to Maoistnod have scene potential for effective development.
any case, China's foreign policies arc likely to be influenced todegree by the internal crisis. Even if the extremes of theare alreadys possibleew phase of corndv*and disruptive economic initiatltes may prove at debilitating aspurge. If, on the otherore moderate line In internalthan order may also be gradually restored, and the Foreignmuy gain greater SnEueoce over policy. But as long as Moorules In Peking, (here will be an inherent instability ti China. Foreigna general seme will be subordinate to and reflect the internal line.will ba moro likely to respond to outside events than lo launchinitiatives of US own,
III. IHE CHINESE THREAT IN ASIA
these cornidrintiOns do not mean Ibat China will be aIn Ada or In international politics. Chinese goats, in Asia at least,clear. Almost allin Peking or onChina's rightful position is one of polilical dominance on (he Asian i. it.
land, and ultimately throughout Eat! and Southeast Asia. Such aspnaiions have deep hiKojical root* In thil aoue, Chinahnrat to Asa and to thote outside powers which seek to play on Important rale in Asian affairs. Tbeis tow the Chinese intend to accompliih their ctjfectives.
A. Military Power
lmost tertalnly tbe artneae do not erpect toominantmilitary conquest, even though lorce and violence figure strongly mand Chlneae Communist practice. In the cases where theresorted to military means- -in Korea andwas, in their viaw.
ckteoshe io protect iha recurttr of tie* border,riKspal ob|cotiv* ei Chfaa, hi* meet Mates. Is to Insane tts security against nrafrirndlv power, ranged along tts frcmWrv where the Oanrm sea an immeduste threat so rhe* security, they -Ul be prep-rrd to mu force, evenol neuher Mao nor he.a seaceeasors am BcH/beheve that the Cmnoae revosn-uon can be esported by thaiberation Army, or thatiml in tha style of imperialie cn ra^tabc course.
fl this, of enures, anpha primarily to Chinaonventional military power, but US acquisition of nuclearill not necessarily increase Ms aggressiveness. Ine Chinese rBM baeaj iW ihe EeaaaaatNbysjbnsjipabiHty will give China grcolw freedom to support -people's war" or, mora re-moldy, to engage in conventtanol war In Asia by diminishing the possibility ofattack on China. The Chlneeo cerUhily horsed to gain such freedom In tbe Taiwan Strait crisis of iOWlotting the Sino-Soviet .llitnce to deter the US. Moscow', refusal la that Instance to back Chma with ru.dear threals wasajor factor In convincing Peking lhat it must have Its own nuclear weapons.
Wtotever may nave been Chinese hopes in Iha past, however, the eotuel pceMnon of nuclearknfy tocewnog effect China has no hope of achieving parity with ather Iha US or the USSR In nuclear weapons hi ihe toreseesobleesprt. ts propaganda concerning Chinas ability to withstand rmelear attack,i ahnoat certainly come to renJtae.oes not already, that either th* US or the USSR peasesaes more than srjfameat nuclear weapons to devastate China.
Io these ctrcumstnatea.kely to remain cautious in areas of possible direct confrontation with the US or tbe USSR, calcnUtiag lhat Its own possession of nuclear weapons may Increase, rather than lessen, the chancesre-emrjltve nuclear strike against it. For some time,ikely lo value US nuclear capability primarilyroat Power status symbol and for
"The lot-lligncrnimnlly Mtkaalo that tha mO rrasaft* Initial opera-iioiui capabilityhlnea.alltaluS, uld (hu II iha CUnaar achieve ft* dale, Iha. latahivluutxnfarirm-p- halDaHi inbaflra wDl alio nrnhtbly h, andWay Id the ears.
lit political eJTects. In turn, wben China actuallyuclear power chirtojT Ihe next rJecade. It will probably beo lite comirulnts and cora-pricntiont of policy ai the other nuclear
s. Indeed, the Chinese oth-lo develop (besr own nocfear ar powers.
o cannot predict tha ultimate effect ol Chi note acquisition of nuclear weapons on the rest of Alia.inimum. China will rain greater pteatige and respect; translated Wo poll Ileal gains, this will probably mean that more OTuntries will seek aorne relationship with Peking al Taiwan's expense, end that sotnc vriD erplore the pcasioibty of acrsstrrrruveiaMun,slruweufticirnth/ fietiblc to ntauitt rochHowever, law twnVrles aro HWy h> respond favorably to China's desire In inonopoha nuclear power I. Asia and lo preside
eople's War
Whatever rvabheations in Chinese pobcy low from Us advance into tbe nuclear age, the principal threat from China wil. for many years, be in tbe realm ofand rsrvolutlonary activity. Such activity will be eoneiucted malnh/ in Sriutheast Asia when II relates directly to Peking security rraerests in denying the US or other unfriendly powen positions close to China's borders. It abo serves to rarfafy the mote general internal of China In establishing its own dominance in tbe area and In -he world revolutionary nvovenvent.
Vietnamot. To these ends, Peking lupporti and assists tbe Com-munbti In Vietnam and Laos. For the potent, at lout. Peking has lo lake account of North Vietnam's direct interests in both Soulh Vietnam and Laos. Pelting could try lo chcurrrvent the North Vietnamese and open competing lines to tha National liberation Front and to the Pathet laa But its chances of gaining siirnincant iorlnence are poor and the coat In relations with Hanoi pcteotiaDy to great thatatktly. Though sharp disagreement could develop over tactics ia Laos, la grsivsral Hanoi and Peking alrnovt cersadruV share tbe same rrnnscdate goal; comrnuntst control of Laos, with Hanoi i. the
dorninanl role.
AatatW.Jote aDy of the US andS strategic base, Thailand ba key coject of Chinese policy In Sosnheast Asia and wiD raobabfy receive Increased rnsrsfsasts after the war tn Vietnam la settled. In this respect. Thailand st the most obvious target for -people'she poStics! leadership of the Thai Insurgency is now lodged In Peking, tnd lha Chinese are pnrridmg some training aad arms. Moreover, the Cruiser* haveeavy propaganda commitment; recently Ihey have announced tht fcrrrratioohai "Teople'i Army" supreme command and pubUdicd tbe now manifesto of the ThaiParty.
be Chineseoon certainly continue to support the Thai insurgents. Yet they mint realtee that the insurgencyong, difficult fight; it ha, made Utiletaining the allegiance of ethnic Thab. And Thailand possesses
mony strengths. Thut,cAUote ibat at someba Chlncie might want lo rexonalder Ibair tirppott, if at doing ao they could Induce Bangkok lo draw away from Iu aiJtnc* with thr US.
eriod of cordial Sirso-Burrnese relations waa broken byha truck* ol Iba Cultural Rcvoluaco nearly two yean ago. Since then ibe Crura tc haw openly supported (be Burmese CoronaunM inoirmta* aad pub-bcry tadersad ibe foisnafioaated treat with Iba tonne Imurgrots. Daring muchhe inrurgeocy did ineiease akng the SrnoBunneac border. There a, on (be other band, tome evidence that the Crimen; may want to tatterr more normal relattona. Ncutrabtt Burma would, of rant, be receptive toove, especially il accompaniedetup in (be inrurgency. Thin tha Chineseairly clmr-cit choice between increasing (lie Iniurgency an nrsrtbtrn Burma and restoring more normal genrrnmcut-togowmnvrnt re lai lorn. How they decide could provide tome Uidleation concernoig lhe estrnt of their commitment to (he policy of insurgency in general.
afnhodhL Hr.lt tioni with Phnom Penh have lucfuated In recent years, partly becsiiM of Sihanouk', belief ibat Peking iian inturgeney. which he ilyiea the Khmer Rouge. But the Chinese have been willing louaiber of Intultt and taunts from Sihanouk and Io famish hltn arms, rntanly because of the lisvpesrtanca of Cranbodia to the ptotecution of (bt Vietnam war. The Chinas* tho value the. fact that Cambodia is ostensibly neutral and fre-qtserstly anbArorescaa. fusaby. to tbe long term Camborne eonVJ be of potssntjal stgnsoVaaca hasweang ta Iramryracy ha Thrnlted. wsth rasnhntiam temtory possibly serving tort* of the tame rmrpons it bat served In tbe Vietnam war
afor change ta retaltons will probably depend kaaa on Peking than on Sihanouk. He has song balieeed thai China will become lhe dominant force In lha Farand br sees value io trying to use the Chi poshounter, weight to his traditional enemies, the Vlrtraunese nnd ibe Thais. In Iheae cir-esimWances, Peking will probably ccntimsc to have cornkierahie Influence in Plinom Penh. Nevertheless, If Sihanouk feeb (hat theelling against Ihe Communists In Vietnam,apable of becoming more cooperative with the US. Should he attt*rrpt to move veryhis direction, however, neither Hanoi not Peking would be reluctant to step op political peoasurot against him and to Increase support lo dissident groups in Cambodia.
f her Arttsa listasravauaes In the rest of Southeast Asia are much brasin the Chants* rrhrme, mainly btcanor the Chanaaa have no da-oct acerss aad Ihe irusrrrgrots' prospects are curreritrf itrninsal The attempt of the Maoist-oriented Irdoaeaitn Cumsraasisti to develop an auurgency tn East Java last rarararaar rrauhrd not oafy la brOure but ns the drain of hay readers, Pesnrsg oceaiiotui fly pobUctaan the erpksits of the Malayan CmnmanM Patty, which In turn pays bornageao. Peking, of course,onsiderable potential asset In tha large ethnic Chlnettalaysia, but tht Ommunbl move ment't ovarkkrfiraoeiion with the Qdnese hampers ib avowed policy ofnd movement urth the Malays. Peldng hu little ingisenco In lhe
lluk movement in Ihc Fhllipplnra, lltongh CKlnn periodically mibtleinni Ihe opioid of Filipino imiuginii.
ttdio. In the tale IWra. China come lo regard IndM oscornr/ctiior forna, ancctally bocauK India icvmtd lo benefit from ihc siqipott of both ine USSR and US. Thm Chants* policy has been frames! to harass and latrrnldatc India and drjiscaittroteai generally Incapable of baking the roleeading Allan power. Since tie border war of lOOt the Chines* have snatoTalncd tome knv! of teataoa and ihrnnt along tha Indian frostier; their rriOsiiv aid to Pakistan serves tke fame general purpose.
f Cheat chose to. kt could probably cause cornaderable trouble by *up-porting ehsssoenti ilong therontier, especially ta the ourtlaonSL The Chinese eagerly puhlKUtd tha Naaalbarl trprfssaag* tn Dart^ehog aa the beginningoo-uupircd peasant upheaval In Eartero India, the Qtstteee have propa-gsndtnrd and apparently have provided limited arms and training to Naga andmbcuren. Prling'i aim norma to be to eiabarraas and worryDelhi wlrhoui becoming deeply Involved, and we da not foresee much cfaanga In this atrjbsde.
C. Politic, ond Dlptemocy
n general, China's relations with (hu nonconvuunlst world hove suBered in eorncqueoce of the Cultural Revolution. Its citrcme seuophobla and rryswria impinged on Chinese diplomatic relations. Foreign dlptomriti In Peking were abused and humiliated; Chlnmo embassy staHs abroad wen reduced andwithdrawn. Even now, the functioning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains disrupted by political campaigns and factional disputes.
s In tha ana of normal political relations and conventional diplomacy thai tlin Chinese probably have the greaiest room for change.much effort, (he Chineae could raaurne normal diplomatic activity In Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Moreover, there appears toew movement towards diplomatic ret jTUtion of (Sunt. Thoagh the Chinese have ednmted no eagerness for such recognition, there Ii ne donbt ihey would regard itain, especially Ifrend adds to proattaea In Japan and tin?where for doser retaticos wtth Oaon.
3ft The neat two yean should present tha Cmnear with new opprartsrauoea for nesting some asfbseece on (opener* poamce. The lenroons associated wilh the Oklaawa qursOoc and the US-]apan*te SacurSty Treaty all lend themsec.es to erpaCrtatlon by Peking. Crane couldftoes oitrfre to restore more normal commercial re Ultra and could entourage the visit* of Jnhuerrfialnaiiucians. Toigniiwm' Impact io Japan, how am. Chsneaswouldore skilled and On We dfplcsnacy than Peking hu been willing to adopt thus far.
eturn lo -nore normal diplomacy does seem hkely. The Bow ef vklinrs lo China has begun to increase, relations with the foreign em-
n Peking have been rosed, some new cxsmunilc iigroemsiits tiovc been
lontlnoVd lii rciriMnodecur tint liteor Chou
Endul may visit .iluouil. Some report! bate Indicated llwl Ctiiiirsec to Mum Iu Iheir pistes this stiieing. However, both Chlnu'i Internal polilics unci tlsc reliction ot* Chinese ieadm lo foreign events tould serve In delay move* to rciton greatero Cblnrac diplomacy. Peking's abrapt jseenpiraricrrieirt of the SD February teuton of the Warsawby refmncn to the case of delict ine, Chinese diplomat Lienthat Piking ia aa yet anunctded about Ks fonrana pokey pasture
hine's Virol Interests, Korea nnd Tar-nan
In North Korea, the Chinese hove seen their inSnratv dimfrtbh ilgnifkantrr, largely because of their own rude arrogance nnd partly liccausc of the conse-queneis of theenewed cultivation of Pyong) inn, .ml Kim It-song,eterioration, however, Is not likely toerrnnncrit aUlu ufDsnelun-ments In Korea tuu of ma{or importance lo China, especially if tensions there continue and the danger of hostilities grows. Eventually, we expect the Chinese to repair their position nnd attempt lo gain some infhienco over the Korean leader, ship. Pinbnbly. however, Chin- will sotolicy Intemled to Increase the risks of war. Its behavior during the past year, particularly in the Pueblo crisis, suggests lhal the Chinese are not about to pledge thesnoeiVc* unreservedly toongi adventurttm.
Taiwan, ofentral csatnrnt in Chinese feaeign pofacy. US support for therioeutnerrtal obstacle to any Crisnci* reccanirieeruaon of its relaliona with the US. Peking wil almost certainly not absusdoa Its claim lo Taiwan, and this position appears to rule cast acceptancewo-China solution. Ydot much Peking can do lo gain pcaaesiton of Taiwan as long all reluctantngageilitary confrontation wilh the US. There Is Ihc possibility of pressure on tbe offshore islands (Chi omen andove might appeal to Pekingest uf US intentions in tbe fsost-Vietnam period, especially If it could be used lo aggravate relationsWashington and Taipei.
IV. THE POST-MAO PEIISPKTiVE
a some respectsruitier* to speculate on th* lea-gar terns devclop-
meat of Chariese feaeign policy. The prssspect ofs^hadows
all other eonsSCWrationa In many respects, the situation is arsruogoos to that of the USSR In (he early IMOs, when the death ef Stake unlocked Soviet
foreign policy and ledcries ol significant new dspasturrt. Nam-ally, thisipprrmoot In Qdna's case also. Will Mao's departureew era of significant change In China's relations with Ihe mrttidc noeld?
e believe lhal Mao's departure willtrong movrnient toward itodifying his doctrine* iuhI Jettisoning his Jisniptive programs. In foreign affairs, new leadership will ultimately seek to focus more effect rvefy on antkvru! interests
iniderttood Inoii* reulnik- world view. Even if MaoJtt rhetoric should tempoturily norviw, wo iwllavu Ihu trend will bv towiud 'WMlcnttlng the Maoistin luvur of inon- practical diplomacy. Soon' rnodu* Vivendi with Hk*sosslulc. though anythiiigu renewal of (Ik old alliance ii mostn over, we would nuteturn fo thef peaceful roc listener or purl of an clort to undermine the US position In Asia.
utrocesj Is not IMrviubkould not fa any case have to be steady rind uninterrupted. II there Ir eorU ration and struggle for tbe Icodrnlup, mapr poJlrses could he forceoogterra tntrrrregnuin. Tbe timing of Mao's departure and the identity of the prirseipal tiuvivori could be Irrnwrtant to policy. Fu-ully.he mpoaar of ontsicV powers. It woulda great Jlmiiuew leadership had plausible ibrnahves or tbet believed that in mcmics were seeking to esplott China's weak-nesacs and uncertain tier. Thus, the tranaBton from Mao and ha generation may lait nstiny years before real ehnngrt evolve Meanwhile, susnport to subversiveef not to active irwrrtsmles. Is lOmly toontinuing role in China'i ratcrnfll policy.
n anycti Ideological approach would not necessarily make China easier to deal or live with in Asia. Pursuit of ll< basicnd traditional goals could lustaln tensions In Ihe area,hina that *vaj begin* nine, toomo of ita potent lid In Ihe economic nnd advanced weapons field* couldar mote formidable force In Asia than it Maoist China.
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