DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
INSTITUTE FOR THE USA: THE KREMLIN'S NEW APPROACH TO AMERICA-WATCHING
MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:
American Kremllnologlsts viewing the Soviet scene through the cracks in the Kremlin wall sometimes have the feeling that someone is looking back at them.
They are correct. His name is Yuriy A. Arbatov, and he is the Chief of the newly-formed Institute for the USA created to provide thoetter basis for understanding the United States in all its complexities.
Should we be reassured or alarmed by theMoscow has tho nation under scrutiny byrather than party dogmatists? asis forudgment onby analyzing the political andof the man and his Institute ashis publications and statements.
Later Years: Distorting the American
Gradual Shift to Non-Distorting
Rise of America-Expert Yuriy A.
Early Commitment to Non-
of the Institute for the
of the Institute for
Central Committee's Domand for
As Interpreter of.
nis Direct Access to Soviet
His Objective Approach to America-
Positionajor Policy Issue:
Probable Influence of the New
America-watching during Stalin's lifetime distorted and oversimplified tbe complex process of policy-formulatl innd analyses of the American scene had to comply with Stalin's arbitrary decision7 toarsh line toward. In the Khrushchev period, Stalinist distortion of. for the first time was subjected to official criticism, but Khrushchev permitted amateurism to dominate America-watching because he (and several of his close colleaguos) acted as their own experts. It was not untilhen thefor the USA was established,rofessional and systematic approach to understanding the complex forces Influencing policy ln America was initiated. The post-Khrushchev leaders recognized the absolute necessity for havingnalyses of these complex forces. They probably were convinced that the blunders resulting from Khrushchev's dilettante approach to policy toward. could be avoided only bya real professionalism.
The man they selected from, the Central Committee apparatus ln7 to develop the new Institute, Yuriy A. Arbatov, ell-informed expert on. whose judgments are relatively free from distortion. In the, he made his markew kind of party publicist who defended Moscow's policies on the basis of factual Information and logic, avoiding such Stalinist crudities as trying tooint by branding an opponent as "fascist." By the, when he began to work as an America-expert on more serious matters of policy for the Central Committee apparatus, he became one of the leading advocatos of liberalized research on. He championod the
conceptpproach toapproach which probed the social, political, economic, and ideological factors influencing Washington's policy doclsions.
Arbatov is far bettor informed on Americanthan the old experts. Ho rejects the Stalinist dogmn, which apparently is still hold by some Soviets, that policy is mado byomogenous "minlscule handful" indirectly serving the interestsomogenous group in Wall Street. He assigns real Importance to disputes among diverse forces within the Administration and Congress, to pressures from non-official groups, and to economic problems. The Instituteection on. Foreign Policy Mechanism, and one of the topics under systematic scrutiny is how American foreign policy is made. Another Section probes Sovietology in the USA. At the same time, as an expert making interpretations for the politburo, he is an opponent of research work on. which is not directly related to policy problems.
In the course of establishing Arbatov'sSoviet leaders by-passed America-experts withinbecause they weretho quality of tho old nroduct and the abilityoldone of those
pcdebvixvu in uuutjur, na tne possessorlodding, dull mind, dedicated to the dogmatic view thats completely By contrast, men who have talked with Arbatov depict him as highly intelligent and eager to expand his already considerable fund of knowledge on. His ideology (Marxism) does not prevent him from accurately appraising the diverse forces at work on American policy makers. Some of the specialists he has recruited are more informed and open-minded than tho traditional dogmatic America-watcher, whom he has disparaged as wearers of ideologicalrbatov probably will have toontinuing struggle against competitors in other institutes and men ln the party,
who mighteturn to the more simplistic (and distorted) view of policy-making in.
Arbatov has Mated that he is callod upon to make Interpretations of American policy "to theis Instituto apparently produces estimative as well as analytical papers. policy. Tho Institute functions more as an adjunct of the Central Committee's International and Bloc departments thancholarly component of the Academy offormal role.
Arbatov reportedly has access, beyond the Central Committee departments, to specific men in theparticularly to Kosygin and Suslov. Sovlot sources indicate that Arbatov's high-level supporters facilitate the process of recruitment of high-quality personnel. But lt is not clear that he has the support of all Soviet leaders, or, more precisely, that he has recoived equal encouragement from all.
In this connection, Arbatov hasrominent spokesman for those Soviet leaders who are anxious toisarmament agreement through negotiations. Privately and ln Izvestiya, he has warned American policy makers against dolaying disarmament talks. In hiswith former Secretary of Defense McNamara onrbatov argued by implication the need for influential Americans to strengthen the hand of moderates in tho Soviet Union, stating that the Soviet decision to engage in anas talksontroversial one, that deep divisions existed in the Soviot government on this issue, and that many who now supported the talks had only recently moved to that position. Subsequently, other members of his Institute insisted privately to
|that arms talks must not be aeiayea or biockooT: This line was self-serving, being Intended toense of urgency among American officials to start negotiations. Nevertheless, it probably also reflected the real view of those leaders with whom Arbatov had close contacts.
Thus Arbatov and his Institute experts are net only engaged in policy support, but also they appear to have committed themselves to the support ofajor issue* This means that Arbatov's findings have been, and probably will continue to be, exploitable materials for some (rather than all) politburo members on various issues concerning policy toward. However, this does not mean that Arbatov deliberately has distorted, or will distort, his findings in order tothemreconceived policy-support package.
The Institute for the USA has made it possible for the politburo to appraise Washington's various policy actions with increasedwith greater accuracy and comprehension. The requirement thatinterpretations of any American policy-move must be rejected should buttress any tendency among the Soviet leaders to examine American policyore open-minded way than in the past. At the very least, the work of Arbatov and his staff should reduce the degree of error in Soviet appraisals. intentions on specific issues.
What actions Moscow will take on the basis of this improved comprehension is another matter. The more open-minded Soviet leaders may not have the opportunity to use new insights to reduce frictions in Soviet-American relations. Their relatively increased open-mindedness would conflict with the doctrine-soaked policies of the post-Khrushchev period, Influenced significantly by the conservative thinking of Brezhnev.
Brezhnev has demanded, in recentloser watch in the USSR over the incursion of Western ideas. In this sense. Arbatov is workingituation of conflicting leadership aims. On the one hand, the leadership demands an improvedobjectiveinterpreting foreign developments, resulting in the strengthening of the geographical Institutes. On the other hand, there is an increased emphasis onforeign influences, resultingemand for greater doctrinal orthodoxy in the institutes concerned
with history, Marxism-Leninism, and philosophy. These conflicting aims may be reflected in the journal soon to be published by Arbatov's Institute. Articles maya mixture of some distortion and some accurate depiction of American developments. However, there is less likelihood that the demand for greater orthodoxy will corrupt the classified papers produced by Arbatov and bis researchers for the eyes of the policy-makers only.
The effort toealistic understanding of the American political sceneradual process after Stalin's death. One of his intellectuala grossly distorted Image of theon among party workers and academicians in the Khrushchev period. More and more, however, the Soviet leaders recognized that diverse and complex political and social forces were influencing the formulation. foreign policy and that it was to their interest to make an accurate (objective) analysis of these forces.
I. Stalin's Later Years: Distorting the American Political Scene
The basis of America-watching during Stalin's lateras hardly morerospering Stalin's doctrinal bias severely hampered research and analysis. Moreover, his conception of what the Soviet internal control system shouldis, his view that police controls should beSoviet researchers walled off from sources which would have revealed the increasing complexity of developments in. and the need for sophisticated analysis. He required acceptance of the simplistic myth of government control by "Wall Street" which depicted one group of capitalists alternating with another at the helm of government following national elections. This distortion suppressed knowledge of sharp differences on policy Issues among Congressional Democrats and Republicans and within the Cabinet. It alsoany understanding of the new phenomena,he stratification among Americanbig, middle, and small, the rise of influential
corporation managers and high-level technical personnelesult of the managerial revolution,he big increase in the ranks of intellectuals who were becoming influential as opinion-makers of the new urban and suburban middle class. In short, the deep diversity of interests of different groups within the capitalist class should haveajor research target but was not studied, inasmuch as it conflicted with Stalin's doctrinal view of the basic Americannamely, homogenous "capitalist" interests competing with homogenous "proletarian" interests.
Stalin would not relax controls sufficiently to permit researchers to work out an accurate view of these diverse American interests. He apparently believed that he already knew all he had to know regarding how policy was made. He was dedicated to Lenin's view that it was made byinlscule handful" of capitalists who, as like-minded individuals, were obligated only to advance the economic interests of "Wall Street." Intelligence reporting on. apparently provided him with the tactual information he needed whenever he had towhat major policies had been made. He apparently did not want additional insights, such as might have been provided him by American specialists, regarding different policy views within. government and amongfigures on the outside. His "Wall Street" dogma was the substitute for insight, and he seems to have downgraded, or discounted, the implications for policy
of internal government disputes and extra-government pressures.
lsgainst "servility toward the West which was launched7 simultaneously with the Cold War, researchers analyzing the Americaneconomy'sought security in an arid, quotation-laden approach. Those who worked in the Institute of World Economy and World Politics, of the Academy of Sciences, had just witnessed the denunciation of Its Director. Eugene Varga, for writing that Western capitalism would De temporarily free from crises, oror aboutears. Previously, this had been similar town view. But when Stalin changed it
preferring that researchers postulate an "imminent economiche Institute was abolished. Its researchers were transferred,ere section--the Section on Economics of Contemporary Capitalism, Institute of Economics,7 They were unable to acquire foreign publications and were impelled to distort the American scene, inasmuch as "Every Marxist work on the economics of capitalist countries mustill of indictment." While Stalin lived, accurate studies were derided as poisonous products of "bourgeois objectivism." As the son of Anastas Mikoyan, Sergo, later put it, researchers in Varga's institute had been "suppressed."
II. The Gradual Shift to Non-Distorting Research
Following Stalin's death inarticularly in the fallhe first signsiberalizing thaw began to appear in articles on the problem of objective analysis of capitalist countries. Scholars were toldew era had begun and that they must stop distorting and oversimplifying:
Many scientists takeogmatic and attitude toward the economic situation of present-day capitalism. This finds*expression in an unexplained rejectionuppression of the achievements attained in the capitalist countries in the development of production, science, and technology. (Problems of,
Party personnel, too, were directed to avoidideas about the decay of capitalism which are now current in our propaganda." ,ig step in the direction of objective research was made by Mikoyan in his speech of6 toh CPSU Congress when he demanded accuracy in order to explain "the complexity and contradictory nature" of developments in capitalist countries. He complained that academicians had limited themselves to
selecting isolated facts to prove, "for purposes ofhe approaching crisis of capitalist) and impoverishment of tbe workers, failing to provide "an all-sided, deep evaluation" of events in capitalist countries.
Varga's old institute was revived and expanded, following the Congress, to be the present-day Institute of world Economics and International Relations. But America-watching was still limited in scope, having been confined to one of sixsmall Section for Problems of Americantbe Institute. Better working conditions for its researchers included access to American source materials, and one reportthat on occasion Section members were drawn in to Join task forces preparing papers to servo as background information for men in the Central Committee. It may be conjectured, however, that tho Suction chief did not have direct access to the top Soviet leadership and that the work of his Section usually was not oriented toward policy.
A. The Rise of America-Expert Yuriy A. Arbatov
Yurly (or Georgly) Arkadyevich Arbatov, byDoctor of PhilosophicalCandidate of Law" who had graduated from the University of Moscow, made his mark inarty publicist on political developments in capitalist countries,on intellectual currents in. By thee was working for the Central Committee apparatus. ost-Stalin critic of Americandevelopments, he tried to make his critiques convincing and credible, which meant that he had to read extenslvoly. books, journals, and research papers in addition to the American press. h CPSU Congress, Arbatov apprently was encouraged to make available to researchers American materials, primarily with tho Intention of training them to write "convincing and well-groundedArbatov'sWestern political ideas. He declared
that the "enormous quantity of factual information" accumulated by Western sociologists should bo "used by us, critically."
This is the mora necessary because the empirical studies of bourgeois sociologists frequently contain material which cannot be found in other sources . .ven disregarding the idea of applying such studies to our country, and considering only the use of the factual material they contain for the study of capitalist society, we must recognize the volume of such material and not ignore lt. The critical mastery and assimilation,arxist basis, of such material willfacilitate the study of contemporary capitalism. (problems Sil Philosophy,
redible critique of Western sociologists andew understanding of Western societies, academicians wore encouraged to exploit tbe published writings of "bourgeois" scholars. They were to be informed critics, rather than ignorant critics, of.
Even beforeh CPSr Congress inrbatov had had access to American scholarly publications for special propaganda use. He had been writing "convincing'" critiques of American events. For example, access to foreign materials had been indicated In his critical analysis of USIA, which was published His analysis was unusual, inasmuch as it reflected careful and detailed research, drawing on many current American government, newspaper, and academic sources. Far from being the work of an ordinary party polemicist in the Stalin-Zhdanov tradition, Arbatov's articleophisticated understanding of tho complexity of the American "psychological warfareof the debate being waged at the time in Congress over the new USIA budget, and of the ideas of scholars specializing In psychological warfare operations, such as Professors Lasswell and Linebargor. Access to the
works of other American specialists onalter Lippmann and Robertindicated by Arbatov's pamphlet published in6 on the'Vole of the masses in internationalhe Khrushchevian tone of this pamphlet strongly suggests that immediately after theh Congress, Arbatov committed himself to the relatively empirical policies of Khrushchev and Mikoyan. Hoophisticated writer, and he must have felt that he could advance more rapidly within the party's propaganda apparatus than the conventional hack, particularlyime whenwas under attack.
Arbatov thereafter, in his special fieldconvincing" critic of American scholars, used histo support Khrushchevian policies. In the above-mentioned6 pamphlet, for example, he defended the positions that there canparliamentary road" to powerfor Communists in capitalist countries and that thero is "no fatal inevitability of wars." In his review of Professor C. Wright Mills' book, The Powerublished in Pravda one implicitly rejected the Molotov view that negotiations with. were harmful to Soviet interests. Arbatov wrote favorably about the idoa of negotiations and detente in his critique of Herman Wouk (New. In an attack on Strausz-Hupe, he praised the idea of "realistic . .utual consent" as against international "ultimatums" as the way to peace (New,. Arbatovistinction between those influential American writers who favored detente and those who opposed it, and he displayed considerable skill in subjectingHupe's anti-detente argumentsational critique.
In this role, he was an early member of the new group of rational-minded party publicists who defended Moscow's policies on the baBis of factual information, avoiding the old standard propaganda cliches in order toense of sobriety in their approach. Arbatov discarded such Stalinist crudities as trying tooint by branding an opponent as "Fascist" or For example, inOA broadcaster,
Achatnv made only one sarcastic remark about'the man personally, and went on to dissect the broadcast's content, using logic as his major weapon. This approach was not entirely objective, but it may have been effective witheader-audience of New Times.
As an ambitious party member, Arbatov used his academic training for political rather than scholarly articles. They were all distinguishedasic orthodoxy of line, whatever that orthodoxy was at anyime, and combined richly elaboratod detail, includingcholarly structure. He showed considerable knowledge in refuting six BBC broadcasts by tbe former British Vice-Consul In Moscow,. Lockart, making Lockart's historical analysis appear to beNow, He was also comfortable in writing on doctrinal matters, but he proved toess able advocate In this field when confronted with the task of disparaging such serious students of Marxist Ideology as professor Isiah Berlin on Plekhanov (flownd Professor Maurice Cranston on the "non-scientific" nature of Marxist laws. (New,
Arbatov's ability to survive and prosper in the party Is at least partly the rosult of his willingness to shift with changes of direction. Tha Hungarian ruvolt of6 ledemporary slowdown In liberalization. When the party attacked non-party historians for having misrepresented the "struggle against vulgarization" to meanolerant attitude toward the ideology of the bourgeoisie" (Party,nd when the governmentecreeemanding that Problems of History dedicate itself to "partyncss" in historical research, Arbatov applied the new strictures to Soviet sociologists. He warned that their sociology "cannot be non-party" or cut off from Marxist values and that, contrary to Freudian views in the West, Soviet scholars must sea "class struggle" as the basis of psychological tensions in society. (Problems of
Following the7 Central Committee Plenum where Khrushchevajor victory over Stalinist opponents, Arbatov wrote in defense of Khrushchevian positions as the Soviet leader continued to advance against the "Anti-Party Group." Unlike the neo-Stalinists, who viewed Western leaderships as undifferentiated cabals of war planners, Arbatov depicted them along the lines developed by Khrushchev and Mikoyan:
Lately, some people in the capitalist world see fit to urge 'looking facts in theaccepting the challenge' and laying emphasis not only on the arms race, but on thewith Socialism in the economic and social spheres as well . .he supporters of Socialism, and indeed all honest men, can only welcome the desire of some bourgeois leaders to take up the challenge and compete with Socialism in the economic and social spheres. (International
And when, att CPSU Congress inhrushchev pursued his dispute with Mao over the importance of using material incentives when advancing toward fullof several points InArbatov was one of the publicists in the party who defended Khrushchev's position. Writing shortly after the Congress, Arbatov attacked Mao indirectly formaterial incentives far less Importantan's attitude toward labor than "spiritual That he was able to prepare this article for the party's theoretical journal on short notice suggests that he had become known among officials in the Central Committee as an articulate and quick-response propaganda publicist. At the same time, his university trainingtudent of philosophy qualified him for more basic doctrinal work, such as participation9 as one of several authorsto Fundamentals ofvolume reflecting, in part, Khrushchev's relatively moderate view of Communism and relations with the West.
Arbatov later wentefense of Khrushchev to open flattery In order to help bolster the Soviet leader's personal stature. oint article wrltton with L. Sedin in he participated in Khrushchev effort to build up his own political position as against that of other presidium members; those junior party cadres who desired advancomont had to engage in the sycophantic exercise. But ithrushchevlan, pragmaticthat is, it was non-Stalinist in its limited scope and passionless naturo, and Khrushchev was not depicted as super-human in mentality or divine in personality.
A great contribution to the furtherdevelopment of this problem (of coexistence) has been maderopagandist and persistent advocate of the Leninist Idea of the feasibility and historical necessity of peaceful coexistence of states with dlfforlng socio-political systems. Many speeches and talks by the head of the Soviet government and his well-known article "On Peaceful Cooxistence" published in tho American Journal, Foreign Affairs, in9 have thrown light on diverse aspects of the policy of coexistence. Moreover, he hasarticularly large amount of what is new to development of problemsthe peaceful competition of the two systems. (world Economics and International pril
Arbatov and Sedin, writing to defend Khrushchev's version of coexistence, distorted the image of Lenin Into thateace-loving Victorian radical. The main purpose of this distortion was to undercut Mao'semandevolutionary strategy againstarticularly in the underdeveloped countrios.
Arbatov contlnuod to defend Khrushchev's main formulations as tho Sino-Soviet dispute developed. He reaffirmed Khrushchev's revisionist thesis sot forth att Congress, namely, the idea that wars can be
abolished "even before capitalism disappears" in the world. He attacked the Chinese by name for the first time3 while defending the nuclear test ban treaty. (Pravda. hortly afterward, he attacked Stalin by name, linking the Chinese with his view that imperialist wars can be an "indirect" reserve of Communist revolution. , But as an American specialist, Arbatov was not one of Moscow's main polemicists in the dispute; he merely paraphrased the definitive CPSU articles on war and peace, and his work seems to have been used as an additional weapon among the polemical batteries Khrushchev had ranged against Mao.
After Khrushchev was deposed inrbatov's piecesombination of Khrushchevian and post-Khrushchevian political positions. For at least three weeks, he maintained an undiluted Khrushchevian position, attacking Mao's preference for "revolutionary war" over the CPSU Program's prescription for winning adherents to Communism "by the example and revolutionizing influence" of advances made in bloc countries. Beyond that, he again disparaged Stalinism openly by complaining that the force of example had been dealtamaging blow by those crude perversions of socialist democracy that were perpetuated lnuring the period of the Stalin personality cult." (World Economics and International, Within three months, however, Arbatov had shifted to comply with the modified, somewhat harder. positions of the new leadership.
This shift was reflected in Arbatov's important article (published ln Pravdahich discussed President Johnson's State of the Union message. He stated that the policy of conducting the Cold War was "notolitical fossil" and that the President's "bridge-building" line toward East Europe was political penetration "very close to the policy of madmen." But this new, qualified emphasis on anti-imperialism was not intended by the new Soviet leadership toomplete
reversal of the policy of contacts and negotiations with Washington. Ittop back from Khrushchev's non-support ofis, it was intended to mollify Ho and undercut tbe Chinese accusations in the world Communist movement of. cooperation. The new leadership alBO intended to warn tbe East European countries against moving away from the USSR and toward.ime of apparent weaknoss and indecision during the successlon-to-Khrushchov period.
Arbatov's pravda article providod an anti-imperialist smokescreen for tho new leadership, ln effectontinuation of negotiations with "moderatos" in the Johnson Administration. He portrayed the Administration as being lockedolicy struggle which was reflected on the surface ln "policy contradictions" he found in the State of the Union message. He went on to set forth several remaining Khrushchevian positions, namely, that tho West was impelled toore "cautious, flexible, and deliberate strategy" because of Moscow's ability to influence international opinion by the "force ofhat the West had to accept "economic competition" and had to make "concessions and compromises" ln foreign policy, and that bloc countrlos would not gainuclear war "even if imperialism, which unleashed lt, perished in its flames."
Arbatov carriod out his new and Important Pravda assignment skillfully, and he probably impressed the new leadership as being their best-informed and most astute expert on. Tho article's content Indicated that, for tho first time, Arbatov wasajor American political event of immodiate concern to tho politburo. And for the first time, he was given the assignment ofajortoward Hanoi. Thus he was elevated from the ranksere propagandistophisticated one) to the statusolicy-support expert on key current matters regarding.
B. Arbatov's Commitment to Non-Dogmatic Research
Arbatov's university training provided him with the ability to separate his rolearty propagandist from his role as an America-watcher who had to analyze political trends in.erious-minded and objective way. e joined the ranks of reformers who were championing the cause of liberalizing political research, and he openly supported Dr. F. M. Burlatsky of the Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences, who wrote on the need for "science"mpirical and objective study) in the analysis of political problems. (Pravda,he problems to be studied were primarily, but notthose appearing in Soviet society. Burlatsky emphasized the need to examine problemsew tool, namely, the discipline known in the West;as "politicalhich was unique in its many-sided approach, analyzing complex questions byombination of "scientific communism, theory of state and law, andas well as economics." He proposed that special research institutions should be established for "politicaloping to makeew, separate field rathertudy subordinated to traditional juridical science. the official Soviet concept of the inseparable bond between the study of law and politics had led to the absorption and denigration of the study of politics by juridical science; it had resultedigid, formal,of political problems.
Burlatsky was supported by Arbatov (among others) at the annual meeting of the relatively new Sovietof Political (State) Sciences (SAPS) in Arbatov, who was elected to the Executive Committee of the association, argued that development of "political science" as an independent discipline would make itto discover "scientific" answers to all current political questions. He suggested that political science research should be divided into two basic specialties, namely, "internal political, connected with the domestic
problems of socialist society, and external political, connected with international relations and thecommunist movement." (Soviet State and He supported Burlatsky's plea toeparate political science dedicated to the comprehensive and predominantly empirical investigation of the "totality of political realtions (and) political activities in all their manifestations." But otherat the meeting, while accepting the need for more emphasis on the study of politics, rejected the idea of an independent discipline to be introducedew department in educational institutions. Strengthened by the speech of V. M. Chfchikvadze, Director of the Institute of State and Law (and the boss ofheir view prevailed.
While Burlatsky's effort failed to leadeparateew emphasis was placed on political research. Onravdaollow-up editorial surveying favorableto Burlatsky's January article. Members of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, for example, were quoted as complaining that while there were scholars already working in some areas listed by Burlatsky (contemporary international relations, workers' movement, the study of socialist and capitalist societies,he level and scope of their works were not satisfactory, largely because these areas of research were still officially slighted. Regarding contemporary foreign politics, they also complained that dissertations in this field were adversely affected because they had to be arbitrarily fitted into the framework of the old juridical, historical, or philosophical The Pravda editorial seems to have reflected leadership impatience with the failure of these traditional disciplines to provide them with useful information,urrent nature, on the effectiveness of Soviet foreign
and domoatlc policy. Regarding Arbatov's American specialization, tbe editorial calledpolitical" approach to the study of political power in capitalist countries (among other areas of new emphasis). It concluded by urging resoarchors, without waiting for the establishment of special institutions of political science, to "considerably broaden their study of political problems in the existing institutions" of higher learning and research. It may be conjectured that between January andrbatov helped to convince some members of the Central Committeeroader, multi-disciplineattack on foreign policy problems would prove far more useful to the top policy-makers than the old rigid, formaliHtic and Juridical approach. He probably indicated that the increasing complexity of American politicsew, "complex" approach, undistorted byand dogma.
III. Origin of the Institute for the USA
A. America-watching in Other Institutes
In support of party Central Committee workers,on American foreign policy and economy was centered primarily in the USA Section, Institute of World Economics and International Relations. Tho Section was headod by. Lerain, who presided overcholars in three sub-sections, namely, American "foreignnd "disarmament." In thodeputy. Menshikov, son of the former Ambassador totated that research papers for the Central Committee included such subjects as "How. foreign policy changeis the USSR if Goldwater were to be elected to the presidency?" Ine wasook. The Main Drives. Foreign Policy. But young Mikoyan (also an Institute scholar) stated privately that the oldormay have meant Lomin (aboutears old) among"tooand doctrinaire" in their attitudes towardprobloms.
Arbatov6 directly criticized the impractical content of books on international relations produced by Soviet scholars, and by implication the Institute was his chief target. In his reviow of The ABC of) written by. Kovalov of Moscow State tlniver-slty, Arbatov praised the book as an exceptional work, primarily because of its treatment of political "practice."
The book will be of interest because of the close links between thoory and foreign political practices, because it reveals not only general principles, but also, so to say, the very 'kitchen' side of diplomatic work. This should be mentioned ln particular since poor ties with political practice have so far boon the weak spot of many even good works devoted to international relations., (emphasis supplied)
It is significant that Kovalev, the author praised by Arbatov, wasember of the Institute which was the major producer of books on "internationalnstitute deputy director Menshikov commented!
in6 that professionals wurmnif-uthat his Job was to "crack the whip" to see that they "got their booksnd that ho personally had written one based on materials accumulated during an earlier trip to and Managers. It sooms probable that when Arbatov wrote hla Kommunist review he was well aware of theproduct in book form and that he considered the product useless for practical policy support.
Tho Soviet leadership's determination to shapoworkolicy-support operation was suggested by tho appointment. Inozemtsev, in preferencerofessional economist, to be the new director of the Institute. ormer editor of Pravda, Inozemtsev was not respected among academicianscholar; he was brought in from the party's propaganda apparatus. Like Arbatov, he was in his middle) and was reported In the fall6 to be "very knowledgable" on American foreign policy, skillful in writing articles adapting doctrine to international developments, very intelligent, andood administrator." Arbatov's Kommunist review, into its criticism of useless theoretical works on diplomacy in general, may also have been directed against Inozomtsev's thick9oreign Policy of. in the Epoch of Imperialism, and this may have been an early fnstance of competitionthe two men.
Inozomtsev's Institute had traditional expertise in the economy ofnd unlike Arbatov, Inozemtsev personally had some proficiency in economics. As aMember, Department of Economics, Academy of Sciences, Inozemtsev apparently was viewed by men within the Central Committee apparatus as valuable because he was party-trained and notcholar, because heood administrator, and because his training would help tho effort to improve the Institute's policy-support work on complex economic developments in. Inbout two months aftor Inozemtsev waB selected as the new Director, one report Indicated that the
tute might be reorganized by moving specialists out to take up research ln Individual Institutes, separating economic research from foreign relations research. During his visit to. ln Inozemtsev stated privately that the Institute's main charter was to assess "foreignarticularly the economics of. Subsequently, tbe Institute's research on. was indeed concentrated on economic developments, with aplace being given to "socio-politicalInozemtsev's Report on the Institute's Researchconomic,
In addition to tho Institute of World Economics and International Relations, sevoral other institutes investigate aspects of American affairsecondary responsibility. The Institute of Africa (establishedrimarily provides support for Soviet political activity in the Dark Continent, but Includes in its scope of responsibility the study of tho "newin Africa. The Institute of Latin America (establishedenters its attention on Cuba and revolutionary activity ln the area, but itstask is to analyzo American policy ln individual
countries. The Institute of the Far East (establishedocuses its attention on China and secondarily on Washington-Peking relations. The ovidence suggests,that these three aroa-orlented institutes carry far less of the research load on American policy than doesnstitute.
These specialized institutes apparently were set up to support the Soviet foreign policy effort toward the countries of primary Importance in each geographical area. The Soviet leaders seem to have wanted Central Committee workers to provide more direct, detailed, and timely analyses of developments in the Congon Cuband in China This meant that the policy-support institutes were required to produce research papersew kind, namely, timely and realistic, rather than historical and academic; the reference-book nature of institute research was criticized. For example, the Director of the Institute for. Solodovnlkov,
stated tbat because of the appearance of many new African states, priority research had to be directed toward more detailed and timely work. (Academy of Sciences USSR Herald.) Tho Director of the Institute of Latin America, V. V. Volskiy, complained that research still hadeferon bookognitive-descriptivend T. T. Tlmofeyev stated that lt was necessary to "realistically evaluate" new factors ln the position of Latin America ln the East-Vest struggle. Both men had spokenession of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences which discussed the "new and complex" problems facing Soviet Latin (Academy of Sciences USSR Herald, Regarding the nood for current research on China, B. Zanegin, head of the Foreign Policy Section, Institute of the Far East, statod privately ln9 that tho older Institute of Oriental Studies is still active but deals with the "antiquities" of China; the newnstitute concentrates on current issues ln the politics and economics of China rather than on the traditional cultural and humanities aspects of China scholarship. Zanegin also stated that the institute had no directon policy toward Peking; policy-support usuallyrocess whereby copies of research papers were sent to tho appropriate "governmentCentral Committee departments. Later, the authors recognized sections of their papers Incorporated into official articles, according to Zanegin.
Thus the general trend in institute research after theas toward studies useful for currentof leadership policies. Greater stress on timeliness and practical usefulness of studies led to increased specialization on an area-country basis. This stress culminated ln the Issuanceentral Committeehich demanded an improvement in the organization, planning, and financing of institute research.
B. Establishment of the Institute for the USA
1. The Central Committee Demand for "Complex" (Multi-discipline) Research
In its decree ofhe Centraldirected the Academy of Sciences to recommend1ethods for "the basic improvement of the organization, planning, and financing of scientific research in the field of the social sciences." Regarding research on capitalist countries in particular, the decree complained about the defects in the organization of research, It noted that "many aspects and problems of capitalist society and the national liberation movement still await thorough and complex research. Theof these researches is not carried out purposefully enough." (Decree as published in Pravda onollow-up Pravda editorial onugust suggested that the demand for "complex" researchulti-discipline, multi-faceted approach rather than the old, oversimplified study which bad failed to comprehend the importance for policy of assessing the social and political complexities of the American scene. It stated that investigations wore required regarding the "socio-economic, political, and ideological tendencies of contemporary capitalism."
The attack on oversimplification and the demandcomplex" approach in institute research had been stated clearly prior to issuance of the decree. In the springembers of the Academy of Sciences criticized the procedures. Sorokin's Institute of Economics of the World Socialist Systems, stating that "the exceptionally complex tasks facing the Institute require an integrated approach to their solution and thus require the study of not only purely economic problems, but also social, political, and even ideologicalEmphasis added.) Some members suggested organizing special sections within the Institute for the study of "problemsocio-political nature." . Fedoseyev attacked the Institute's "simplified and overstylized points ofnd then declared that an accurate view
of the real situation in bloc countriesulti-discipline method of research:
The world socialist economy represents an extremely dynamic system and much hinges on the actual situation ln the various countries, on the level of their development, on the actually attained labor productivity, etc; lt must be consideredolution is needed not only for purely economicbut also for socio-political problems, and that these problems must be considered Integrally when analyzing all the possible results and all the existing tasks. (Academy of Sciences USSR Herald, (emphasis supplied)
Pedoseyev went on totrengthened effort by saying that the Institute should be supplied withpersonnel, matorlal sources, and premises;more researchers should be dispatched for trips abroad. The Academy of Sciences Presidiumesolution calling for (among other things) promptby the Institute of "objective and complete"on the economic processes taking place in bloc countries.
This "complex" approach reflected implicit Soviet acceptance of the multi-disciplineof the few practicalAmerican social and political science procedures. It was an indirect acknowledgment that Mikoyan bad been right when, in his speech ath CPSU Congress, he had disparaged Stalin's dictum on the shrinkage of capitalist production as Inadequate for explaining "the complexity and the contradictory nature of events ln contemporary capitalism." Moreover, it was an apparent reflection of the Soviet leaders' view that the complex aspects of modern domestic and foreign policyiberation of resoarch institutions from the old,text-book Images of. ln order to fashion them into useful policy-support units.
Reorganization within the existing institutes was one of the consequences of the decree's directives. Byhe USA Section in the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (which previously had three sub-sections) was revamped, made into aand assigned to working on policy-support analyses of special projects concerning. economy. This directed the Institute's work increasingly toward economicas. agricultural economy and. balance of paymentsit almostout of the larger field of analysis of American political developments. The USA Department chief, Yu. H. Melnikov, reportedlypecialist. aid to underdeveloped countries. His prior training had been confined to the field ofmerican "economic penetration" in Latin America. He was described in early
Januarya party back,
pedestrian in, and-the possessorlodding, dull mind, dedicated to the dogmatic view that. was completely "imperialistic." He apparently was not considered by the Soviet leadership as the man they needed toew start in improving the quality of analysis of.
Establishment of the Institute for the USA (five blocks from. embassy at Khlebnyi pereulokn7ore Important consequence of the7 decree's demand for improved social science researchcomplex" nature. Arbatov,-its new director, was qualified for the upgraded effort on. because he was intelligent, informed on the American scene, and relatively pragmatic, willing to view American trendsinimum of Marxist distortion. Moreover, he was reform-minded, having been active in the appeal ofmen to break down the old formalistic disciplines in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences.
Arbatov atnted prlvatoly that the main areas of research emphasis would be. economy, Soviet-American. foreign policy,. internal developments. . military matters, he declared, would be analyzed by other Institutes, but, regarding theaspects of the arms race, he stated that he wasroup to produce arms control and disarmament studies and to engage in non-government Soviet-American arms control talks.
In lineuggestion made in8 by Central Committee. Rumyantsev, Arbatov stated that the Institute wouldonthly journal. According to ono report, starting earlyhewill Indeedonthly Politics, Economics, Valentin Berezhkov (formerly of New Times) as 'the prospective editor and Vltaly PetrusenkoASS correspondent in Washington) as the deputy editor. Arbatov also indicatod that studies would appear in book form including, foronograph onprivate corporations. He indicated his Intention to arrange for exchanges of newspapers, journals, and other publications, and he is preparing for an exchange of He prefers to have his own Institute library rather than work out of the holdings of other institutes, and his Scientific Secretary for Foreign. Filatov, has already contacted. embassy and private libraries in thowell as the Library offor aid in buildingew collection. Although Arbatov intends to bring the Institute's personnel roster up, by9 ho had, of whomere fulltlme researchers. In addition,ost-graduate students were reported to be engaged ln research at the Institute.
Institute researchers told
suDscription list Of. publications, including the Congressional Record, from which they glean useful source" materials, especially from the "Extension of Remarks" section. They also stated that the New York Times and the Washington post are used as the most important newspaper sources.
Arbatov's search for bright, young, reform-minded workers fluent in Englishompetition between the Institute and other institutes. Inu. M. Melnikov, the chief of the USA Department in theof World Economics and International Relations, headed by Inozemtsev, stated privately that Arbatov's organization Another official in Inozemt-sev's institute asserted that "We are afraid that he will steal our best American experts. He can pay top salaries. He has influence and prestige. The goodyoung,lining up to work with him." in Business Week,
Arbatov himself privately disparaged the older In9 he was reported to have complained that the old approach failed to study theU.S. in all its "complex" aspects, concentrated on America's industrial and military development, and simplified the results of elections toere placement in national office of partingle, homogenous "profiteering" elite which was no different from the part which lost the election. The-symbol of this "dogmatic approach" was, according to Arbatov, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, where America-watching was leftimitedYu. M. Melnikov's.
IV. The New Approach Underway
A. Arbatov As Interpreter of. for the Politburo
1. His Direct Access to the Soviet Leaders
Arbatov's rise from the status of partyto thatigh-level policy-support worker was suggested by5 Pravda article. Later, onoscow Pravda identified him as aworker of the Central Committee." Subsequently, his new Institute assignment suggested that the Soviet leaders, who alreadyepartment within anotherworking onere displeased with the old product and preferred toew startan whose
views they respected. According to
Arbatov was appolntea iron xnc tpmrai Committeeis, from tbe party's centralhe was selected specifically to make it possible for the Institute to bring its product directly to the attention of "the highest authorities." Arbatov later stated privately that he Is called' upon to make interpretations. policy "to thend when, ongue-in-cheek article, Herman Kahn playod
the role of hypothetical Soviet expert on.ewswook, it was Arbatov as the leading export on. who replied to him (Newsweek,,
There is evidence of Arbatov'sspecific
in the politburo. He opened his
with former Secretary of Defense McNamarawith personal greetings from Kosygin.
eportea tnat in
FebruaryArbatov naa maae comnems to him whichthat he was "quite close" to Suslov. Theasserted that Arbatov had direct access topolitburo member Otto Kuusinen, and had laterobituary. He almost certainly hashaving worked in the party apparatus, to suchhead of the Central Committee's InternationalPonomarev and former head of the Blocwho is now head of the KGB. Soviethad discussed Arbatov
stated that his various hign-ievei contacts iacnitate the process of recruitment for his institute.
Working directly for the party's central apparatus and the politburo, Arbatov was completely policy-oriented. He rejected, as standards for the new approach to America-watching, highly theoretical speculation of the kindby certain American institutes (such as the Center for Advanced Behavioral Studies at Stanford and Herman Kahn's Hudson Institute). Heuestioner, who had asked if his Institute would resemble American "thinkhat "In politicalon't believe much in the sort of highly speculative and prophetic work your so-called think tanks specialize in." (Interview inweek,
Papers prepared by the Institute for policy-makers apparently are estimative in nature and hew close toof practical politics. According. Rumyantsev of the Central Committee, the Institute for tho USA (among others) is required to keep its workclosewith the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR. (Problems of During a'.-discussion between Soviet academicians and Senators Gore and Pell in Moscow onrbatov indicated his intimate knowledge of current Soviet policy on arms limitation talks; he apparently was assigned the task of urging the senators to intensify their appealsnitiative" from. Administration.
2. His Objective Approach to America-Watching
Shortly before his first visit torbatov
that Tire-ptrrpose-or- nisaavise nis govern-ment on the prospects for. In the process of determining the relationship. domestic problems to foreign policy, his intention would be, he insisted, to take an "objective and scientific" approach to this study ofs opposed to propaganda. He had indicated in his Business Week interview in8 that many Soviet specialists working on. still wore ideological "blinders" and that he would have to train many of his researchers virtually from scratch.
Arbatov's emphasis on the need for an objective approach was similar to the view expressed by the liberal-minded Vice President of the Academy of Sciences andtCentral Committee. Rumyantsev. Defining the nature of institute research on Western countries, Rumyantsev stated that It was necessary to acquirerofound and precise" knowledge of all"economic, social, political, andcapitalist countries and that the product must be an "objective and validof the overall productive potential of these countries. olemical statement on the need for objective research, he declared that
To an equal extent, it would be harmfulimplant illusions in respect toof modern capitalism, orits genuine forces.
He went on to warn researchers against "oversimplification-and stereotype-thinking "in the approach to an analysis of modern capitalism." ractical measure, Rumyantsey proposed the further development of "fieldnasmuch as "it is necessary to put-an end to the physical isolation of Soviet experts on America" (among others) from the countries which they are studying." Arbatov later stated privately that his first visit toould not be the last, inasmuch as he planned to make the trip over "from time to time."
Onrbatov used an article to argue not only for objective analysis, but alsoigher degree of sophistication in trying to understand the complexities of American policy making. Writing in izvestiya, he stated that the "most interesting" aspect
BrooklnBS Institute's book, Agenda for thewas reflected
the organic link between Internal difficulties that have reached an unprecedented height and the foreign policy course that Washington pursues.
In an apparent criticism by implication oftied to the traditional, Stalinist approachU.S. domestic problems, he warned that "manyindeed 'traditional* problems have becomefrom thoserears ago." was that America's problems were so complex problems" was the theme of hisonly the new experts could satisfactorilymany
Some of tho specialists he had begun toindeed moro sophisticated than tho traditionalAmerica-watcher. For example, when his newthe study of American economicnusually objective viewside rangesubjocts9 January
e "shocked" tne doctrinairef the USAin the rival Institute of World Economics andRelations, Yu. N. Melnikov. Arbatov's awareness of the complexity of the American policy-making process
was indicated by his comment
prior to. visit: he
jiuui wiiu men who will be making "or influencing" policy over the next four years, and also those who might be influential for years in the future. Thisonsiderable departure from the view that professors and newspaper editors do not influence the foreign policy of the "miniscule handful" of capitalists who control Washington's foreign relations. Researchers he visited in early9 were impressed by his "extremely sophisticated" understanding of American society and political trends, but they also received the impression that he isalways concerned with the practical political rather than the purelyaspectroblem.
In addition to rejecting the methodology of purely speculative studies of. as conducted in the "thinkrbatov also has tried, and found useless, the approach of the quantifiers of all:data. He stated in early9 that he had had some experience with the methods of physical scientists and mathematicians in the analysis of social problems and that he had found the approaches of these people too simplistic. He concluded that attempts to reduce "complex" issues of people and society into neat, quantified formulas simply "do not get verythese attempts can deal only with trivia.
In practice, Arbatov seems to startelatively open-minded approach in surveying the American scene. He seems aware that in the West Marxists are derided for their "tendentiousness and onesidedness." (Izvestiya, arxist, Arbatov continues to be critical of. "capitalist" system, but hisapproach and his new job has impelled him to become
better informed on precisely how that system operates and precisely what forces are at work in it. He is critical of the "weaknesses of the capitalist business cycle" and the "archaic" system of private ownership of industry, but he is dedicated to learning and applying technologycomputer aids and systemseven "management techniques" of American firms to his new Institute. (Interview in Business Week, He is critical of American foreign policy, but he appears determined to accurately report what it is and how it is formulated.
He also appears to strive for full understanding.9 round-table discussion
nrDaiuv appearea cu db "snaKen" rjy xne gaps roveareain his knowledge of how strategic decisions are made in. He apparently had been concentrating his efforts on the works of American foreign affairs analysts-,in the political science area, but he had not given his attention to the new group of war-gaming and strategic-exchange specialists. Butareer-minded worker, he reportedly was extremely anxious to fill in this knowledge gap, and he was taking copious notes by the end of the discussion. He is known to have privately disparaged his rival in the field of "non-government" bilateral Soviet-American disarmament consultations, declaring in9 that. Mil-lionshchikov was "uninformed" on disarmament matters.
Arbatov also seems to be aware that objectivity does not (and cannot) result entirely from his ownto be open-minded, but depends equally on theof other men in his Institute. These men apparently are permitted'to challenge analyses, testing and refuting them by the facts of developments in. They are permitted to hold minority views, implying that dogmatic certainty is consciously and constantly under attack:.
Da to v1 s" institute, with tne open ana
'finri atmosphere, and noted in particular that junior members were not afraid to speak up in the presence of
superlors (or foreignapparent change from the usual follow-the-line attitude of other institutes and ministries. Good questions were asked, and no one appeared to be an obvious party hack.
Arbatov apparently permits even his own analyses to be questioned. His Interpretation of President Nixonan who would provo to be difficult for the Soviet leaders to deal with (and therefore not to be proforredresident elected from the Democratic Party)was challenged by the Institute Scientific Secretary for Foreign. Filatov, who privately stated on9 that he had been the only Institute member preferring Nixon because the Soviets could more easily deal with this type of American leader than some "moderate" or "liberal." Thus even though Arbatov apparently finds lt difficult to separate himself from his personal bias (in this case, his "pessimistic" view of the Nixonhe permits alternative views to exist as one of several ways to dispel distortion and restrict the effects of bias.
In their research, Institute members almost cor-tainly are provided with classified KGB reports. The Institute, in effect, functions more as an adjunct of the Central Committee's International and Blocthancholarly component of the Academy of Sciences. It includes at least one researcher. Mlkbaylov) who has worked in the party's International Department, several others who had held positions ln tho Washington embassy, and one who had worked as an economic correspondent in New York. These experienced men are able to keep topics under scrutiny at the Instituteractical course.
3. His Positionolicy Issue: Soviet-American Disarmament Negotiations
Arbatov hasrominent spokesman for those Soviet leaders who are anxious toisarmament agreement through negotiations. During his9 visit to. hevarious
scholars, editors, andea ling-down of the arms race in general, and of American military spending in particular. He privately expressed the hope that no drift "to the right" would take place lnthat heoderate course for the nowon arms issues. He inquired about patterns of federal spending, and he suggested that the "military-industrial complex" in. wouldhift in public spending from armamentsassive monetary attack on poverty and unban decay. In the context of anotherthe ABMstatod privately that moro money "should" be going into the cities. His Izvcst iya article of9 had strongly suggested that he was somehow Involved in the Soviet debate (as well as the one inver allocation of resources, and that hopokesman for thoso Soviet leaders who were anxious to begin USSR-US talks on strategic arms limitations and for those leaders who preferred toeduction in Soviet military spending.
Him Izvestiya article of9 added some credibility to these conjectures, Regarding the matter of arms costs, he quoted MIT's G. M. Rathjens to the effect that. and the USSR could avoid another upward turn in the arms-race spiral, which might otherwise prove costly and dangerous for "both" countries. He tried to warn. policy makers against delaying and making unreasonable demands which would impode disarmament talks and prevent the conclusion of anposition he took earlier in almost every conversation he had with American scholars, editors, and buslnessmen.
In his talk with McNamara onrbatov argued by implication the need for influential Americans to strengthen the hand of moderates in the Soviet Union. He told the former Secretary of Defenso that tho Soviet decision to engage ln arms talksontroversial one, that deep divisions existed in the Soviet government on this issue, and that many who now supported the talks had only recently (and rathermoved to that position. In this way Arbatov informed the new Administrationelay in the start of arms talks might Impair the efforts of moderates in
the Soviet leadership. He took the same line with former UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg during the letter's visit to Moscow, stating privately on9 that positive responses from. were desirable because there was pulling and hauling in the highest Soviet circles about policy toward Washington. Other members of his InstituteAnatoliy Gromyko, son of the Foreign Minister and head of the US Foreign Policy Doctrines section of the Institute, onarch,. Shershnev, deputy director of the Institute, on 4
ue delayed or
strategic arms limitation blocked.
line regarding internal Soviet resistance to arms talks was self-serving, inasmuch as it was intended toense of urgency among American officials to start negotiations. Nevertheless, it probably alsothe real view of those leaders with whom Arbatov had close contacts. As for his probable disagreement with opponents of arms talks among the military,I
tkb aoout the conservative attitude of some of the Soviet military toward such talks.
B. The Probable Influence of the New Approach
The Soviet leadership's decision in7 to establish an institute of America-experts has made it possible for Moscow to appraise Washington's various policy actions with increasedwith greater accuracy and comprehension. The requirement that simplistic interpretations of any American policy move must be rejected should buttress any tendency among the Soviet leaders to examine American policyore open-minded way than in the past. They may not choose to use such an improved comprehension for easing Soviet-American relations, preferring instead to make their overall effort against Washington more subtle. At the very
least, however, the work of Arbatov and his staff should reduce the degree of error in Soviet appraisals. intentions on specific issues.
Arbatov has been encouraged to raise the status of America-watchingrofessional art practiced by experts rather than by party amateurs and doctrinaire researchers.
It is important to emphasize that the Institute is not an organization of scholars, detached from politics and examining academic subjects, butroup of experts recruited toanalyze .political matters whichdirectly to policy. Arbatov isender-minded intellectual, butough, policy-oriented analyst.Original document.