MEMO (DELETED) RE COPY OF OUTLINE OF VERIFICATION POLICY OPTIONS, TASK II (W/A

Created: 1/15/1970

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FORi Dr. Laurence E. Lynn,SC Col. Paul von Ins, JCS Mr- Spurgeon Koeny, ACDA Mr, Frank Perez, Stat* Dr. Ronald Easley,r. William Van Cleave, OSD/ISA Maj. William Barlow, OSD/SA

The attached outlines the CIA contribution in response totem ir. ould appreciaterevisions prior to our Friday meeting.

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Special Assistant tor Strategic Arms Talks

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Outline of Verification Policy Options, Task 11

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OUTLINE OF VERIFICATION POLICY OPTION'STASK 11

The paper will summarize our problems and policy options relating to verification. The general subject of national means of verification will be addressedwell as selective direct observation (SDO) and potential "forms of cooperation" that may be used to improve our monitoring capability. The paperinclude efinition of the term "national means of verification" 2) tbe sensitivity of various collection systems and their relationship to estimating the status of Soviet capabilities, 3) US appreciation of Soviet collection and analysis of information on US systems,he relationship between collection assurance and the type of SALT agreement that may be reliably monitored,olicy to date involving SALT discussion of "national moans" andolicy issues to be resolved. Someof tbese headings follows:

ofational

This section would cover the meaning

general term "national. the type of technical collection systems now in use. It would then explain the formsollection that could expand their capability, includ- -ing arrangements on testing and theof the usual national procedures in weapons development. Lastly, the section would introduce the subject of on-site

. Collection Systems

A review of substantive teamdate stresses the generally highsensitivity of our technicalsection will state

necessity of maintaining our capabilities

this area. Consequently in any subsequent US-Soviet bi-lateral discussions, where agreement

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for example, woulduantitative agreement,uarantee of telemetry data would be required to support agreements involving qualitative aspects of weapons systems. This section would delve into this relationship and discuss the issue ofassurance as it relates to the collateral constraints -developed by the verification teams.

Policy Concerning verification

. Policy on SALT verification ie outlined in ACDA Memorandumatedntitled "Strategic Missile Talkst Related Aspects of SatelliteDisclosure Policy." This document proposes three alternative approaches the US might take in regard to the problem of verification ranging from exclusive reliance on national .means todirect observation fSDO). Guidance to the Helsinki delegation was non-commital in this am and specific policy lias not been determined. In any bi-lateral agreement involving exclusively national means of verification there is afor an understanding that neither sidesignificantly with the others verification capability. Such an agreement could be spelled out formally or be subject to tacit understanding "by both sides. Examination of the existing US-USSR nuclear testing treaty might provideguidance as to how best to handle thispossible verification interference -problem.

Policy Issues

A number of key issues emerge with regard to future US policy on verification. Among these may be included the following;

extensive need our future discussions with the Soviets be in order to obtain sufficient assurance that our various collection systems will be allowed tomonitor Soviet compliance.

there forms of verification cooperation, in which the US should engage while at the same time assuring our own national means of verification?

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we push any further on the subject of on-aito inspection.

the sensitivity of our "national means" preclude discussions of some issues with the Soviets.

we aecopt SALT agreements that Involve qualitative aspects of weapons systems without understanding on the non-interference with our means to monitor that type of At risk is the loss of all data on Soviet weapons developments if tho Soviets discuss and then do not agree.

what stage in the talks should we raise the issue of non-interference with national means."

--Shouia we pressormal or tacit understanding.

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Original document.

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