SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Created: 12/4/1969

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER II

Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces

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The following intelligence organitations participated in Ihe preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency ond the- intelligence organizations of the Depart ncr'i of S'c'e and Defense, ond tha NSA.

Concurring:

It. Gen. H. E. Cwshmop,SMC. Deputy Director of Central JnlefBaence

irector of htrifejMMi ond Rentareh. Depoetinerit of State

U. Gen. Dooold V. Bennett, the Director. Defease Intelligence Agency

Wee Adm. Noel GoyW,ecte*.Security Agency

Dr. Charles H. Reiohardt, for the AuHlont General Manager. Atomic Energy

Abdahik+g:

Mr.. Casiidy. (or tho Aiwiont Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the lubject being outiide of his Jurisdiction.

This document corthiins information effecting the national security of the United States vrithin iho meiifcssjct of tho espionage. Code. Tho raw prohibits lis transmission or the revelation of its contents in ony.manner.toperson, as wall as Its use In any. manner prejudicial to the safetyinterest of Ihe United Statoi or for tho bene-fit of any foreign government to fho detriment of the United Stoles, ll h, to be seen only by personnel especially inosctrinated and outboruedetve information In the designated controlecurity must bo maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the

Noo be Irihcn onmay be contained herein, regardlesKpf thobe gained, if such action might have the effect of revealing tnes^xistenceof iho source, unless iuch action is first approved by the

CONTENTS

rilF. PROBLEM

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

L INTRODUCTION

II. GROUND FORCES

Armin and Corps

.

Categories oi Readiness Division Equipment Armored Vehicle*

Artillery Support

Missile Support

Nuclear. Crserrdcal and Biological Weapons

AIR SUPPORT AND THEATER AIRAttack

Rrvjr.naufcjncc

Pilot Training .. ,

Air Munitions

Air Defense Fighters

Warning and Control

Surface lu-Air Missiles and Anti-Aircralt Artillery

Electronic .

Transport Aviation and

SUPPORT OF THEATER FORCES

V CENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES

Present Forces

Recent Operational Activity

Capabilitiri Against Submarine.

CapabilitiesNavalorces and Sea Lines ofi

C^pahilities lor Smtiined Long-Range

Capabilities lor Nuclear, Chi-iniral and Biological

VI. AIRLIFT AND

Airlift and Air Assault 38

Amphibious Assault and

VII. THE CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN

General

Ground3D

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Naval Form 31

VIM THEATER WARFARE

Against Europe

Against 34

IX TRENDS TO

Theater91

36

Ground Force 36

Tactical Aviation and Air Defense 37

Naval

Eatt European

'

cd on station and would extend ihe urea of patrol activity, but such support croups would be highly vulnerable in time of war.

Copobiltries for Sustained Long-Range Operations

oviet efforts to eipand and improve the capabilities of the navy tosustained long-range operations are continuing. They- are constructing more seaworthy, longer range combatants and new typei ofnd they are gaining valuable operational experience by mom frequent "show-thc-Bag" cruises and open ocean exercises. Tlie Soviets continue loix of navaland merchant ships to support naval forces at sea. They have, however, transferred some merchant ships to the navy and have recently done so with one of their largest merchant tankers. The submarine force generally has beenprovided with specialized support ships to meet operationalSurface forces, in contrast, have operational brru rations because ofafloat support, particularly In terms of specialized repair ships, thus somewhat limiting the sizeorce that can be deployedistance from tho USSR and the length of timeorce canombat capability.

lthough the Soviets have not constructed large numbers of specialized auxiliaries in the past, they may now be developing new and larger logistic support ships- An unidentified type of large ship presently under corjtnxoooaval shipyard may be the firstew class of logistic support ships.until new logistic ships are available in quantity, the Soviets probably will continue to press for the use of shore facilities such as those made available by the UAR and Syria. Wc continue to believe that with their present resources the Soviets can support only limiled surface naval operations on the high seas for extended periods of time, or larger operationsew weeks. Without overseas naval shore support facilities any major increase in long-range surface operations would require augmentation of existing auxiliary forces, not only with oilers and cargo ships from the merchant fieet. but also with ships designed to provide specialized technical support to naval forces at sea.

Capabilities for Nuclear. Chemical and Biological Warfare

Weapons. Wc bclicvrt thai nuclear weapons have been allocated to the general purpose naval forces. Nuclear weaponsariety of types and yields are available for delivery by air. and surface-launched cruise missiles anda small number of torpedoes and depth bombs. Soviet naval cruise missiles could carry chemical warheads. The most bkely candidates for such warheads are those cruise missiles used by naval coastal defense units. Chemical shells for naval guns mounted on destroyers and cruisers air probably also available; such shells are stored in port and placed on ships only dunng major exercises or in wartime.

Drfente. The Soviets continue to construct ship* with water washdownhermetically sealed compartments, filtered vratiUtion systems, andstations that would enable those ship* to carry out their assigned

I UP SCCRC?

missionsoxic eharucal biological, a* radiologk-al (CBB) etrv^ment. Extensive training is provided (or the maintenanceermanent, high level of CBB readiness tor the various naval units.

VI. AIRLIFT AND SfiAUFT

Airlift and Air Assault Capabilities

We haw recently dentified probable Mrroobile units of battalion or rep-mental size. They are probably structured and armed along the lines of airborne units. Photography of two of these unit* stationed on the Sino-Soviet border indicate* that each containsorganic helicopters. There may be five more such units along the Sino-Soviet border and one in the rsesorussian MD.

The Soviets continue to add to their military air transporthere are now as manyedium transports assigned to military transport units, of whichreubs.f the Utter provide the rnain uitenheaier lift for theater forces and haveain mission the support of airborne troops. These could lift assault elements of two airborne divisions for airdropadius of. Some Cubs have improved range and weight-carryingf these could liftaratroops with support mg equipmentadius ofaximum range. In an emergency, this lift capability could be augmented by other military transport and by medium- and long-range aircraft in the Soviet Civil Air Fleet.

The range and (Mvfaad limitations of thenderscore the importance of the neweavV transport, which can carryounds of cargoroopsadius of.ange. The first few of these aircraft are now in service; someould be operational byith thehe Soviets would be able to airlift all types ofassignedotorized rifle division.

Amphibious Assault and Sealift

We estimate there are currently0 men in the naval infantry, organized into brigade-size units, with two brigades located in the Baltic Fleet two brigades in the Black Sea Fleet, one brigade in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, and one brigade in the Northern Fleet The naval infantry's missions are apparently to assist in seizing critical beachheads and to conduct diversionary operations on the seawardmall force of naval infantry has been present from time to time in the Mediterranean sincehey have conducted several landing exercises, suggesting that the Soviets may intend to use theoken intervention force.

The current small number of landing ships in each of the fleet areas restricts the landing force to battalion- or brigade-size. New landing ships with greater speed, operating range and capacity are being built, however, and there will probably be an increase in the strength of the nasal infantry.

Original document.

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