9
49
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
9 (Supersede,
Soviet and East European General
Purpose Forces
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD At iooVored49
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CONTENTS
Page
THE PHOBI.EM
NOTE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. CROUND FORCES
Fronts g
Armies and Corps 8
Divisions g
Categories of Readiness 9
Division Equipment10
Armored Vehicles11
ArtilleryII
Missile Support12
Nuclear. Chemical, and Biological13
AIR SUPPORT AND THEATER AIR13
Cround14
. 15
Pilot Training 15
Air Munitions16
Air Defense Fightcn16
Warning and18
Surface-to-Air Missiles and AnH-Aircraft17
Electronic17
Transporl Aviation and18
SERVICE SUPPORT OF THEATER FORCES18
GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCESIB
Present Forcesjg
Recent Operational21
Capabilities Against Submarines23
Capabilities Against Naval Task Foices and Sea Lines of24
Capabilities for Sustained Long-ltangc Operations'24
Capabilities for Nuclear. Chemical, and Biological Warfare25
VI. AIRLIFT AND25
Airlift and Air Assault25
Amphibious Assault and
VII. THE CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES .
Ceneral Considerations
Ground
Air
Naval
VIII. THEATER WARFARE29
29
Against Europe30
Against32
IX. TRENDS TO33
Theater
Deployments
Cround Force
Tactical Aviation and Air Defense Equipment
Naval Forces
East European Forces
sr.cncT
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate thc strength and capabilities of Soviet and Eastgeneral purpose forces throughnd general trends in those forces over the nextears.
NOTE
This estimate covers those portions of the Soviet militarywliich correspond generally to the DOD planning categories: General Purpose and Airlift and Scalift forces. It should be recognized that this treatment of the subject is somewhat arbitrary. For instance, such general purpose force elements as antisubmarine warfare forces, air defense missile units in thc ground forces, and fighters in Tactical Aviation contribute to strategic defense, while cruise-missilecould be used for strategic attack. Conversely, Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles subordinated to Strategic Rocket Troops and medium bombers of Long Range Aviation would, in nuclear theater warfare, provide support to the ground forces.
East European ground and air forces arc considered theater forces for tlie purpose of this estimate. This treatment is abo somewhatsince most East European combat aircraft have the role ofair defense and can be logically considered westward extensions of Soviet strategic defenses.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. During the past year the trend toward larger and more flexible Soviet general purpose forces has continued. Ground and tactical air elements have grown, primarilyesult of the continuing vigorous military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border, and the Soviets have taken further steps to improve the capabilities of these forces for non-nuclear as well as nuclear operations.
.iXKbf
Thealfii Forces
e deploymenl, structure, readiness posture, and equipment of Soviet ground and tactical air forces reflect concern for both Central Europe and the Sino-Soviet border areas as potential arenas of major theater warfare. Out of atround divisions,rc deployed in Eastern Europe, all are combat ready. Aboulrc in the Sino-Soviei border area; al leastf these are believed Io be combat ready, und llie Soviets are continuingtrengthen this force. In both areas there are considerably higher levels of artillery and tactical missile support than are found elsewhere in Soviet ground forces. Thc Soviel forces opposing NATO, are bolstered by the East Europeans, and canreadily reinforced by the large ground forces which can be quickly mobilized in the western USSK. Forces on thc Chinese fron tier are supplementedongolian divisionsargo force of militarized border troops0hey could further draw upondditional divisions in the military districts (MDs) bordering China, and could be reinforced by forces from west of tbe Urals.
Soviet ground divisions in Eastern Europeopposite China appear lo be ready for combat withoutas do the airborne divisions; they have noof equipment or personnel. Among the other divisions,those in the western USSR can be fleshed out with reservistsvehicles and made ready to moveay or two; theseand those maintained at combat strength we designateIs, immediatelyecond major grouping ofconsists of those generally requiring mobilization of half ortheir personnel and with significantly lower peacetimemajor items of equipment; these divisions, which weII. could probably be fleshed out and deployed within adivisions which appear intended for longer termdesignate Category XII.
of Ground Forces. Sovietlie USSR probably have most of thc essential major ilemsfound in divisions in Eastern Europe with thetrucks and armored personnel carriersn irvost casesa higher percentage of older model equipment. The currentinventory of APCs is aboutercent of the total requirements,
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and about half of the available APCs are oldarmored trucks. Category IT! divisions receive some new models, but
tho amount nnd quality of their equipment is generally much lower than that in other categories; new production would be required to equip them like other Soviet divisions.
Support. There hasignificant increase in theartillery support available lo Soviet ground forces inand to some of the forces along the Sino-Soviet border,improving the capability of these forces to conductoperations. Soviet fire direclion techniques and doctrineof artillery, however, are noi up to those of the US.have also recently increased the nuclear fire supporttheir forces in East Germany with additional large free rockettactical ballistic missile (Scud) launchers.
Aviation. Soviet Tactical Aviation now has aboutand lightin air defenseattack or tactical strike regiments,nor reconnaissance strike units. Almost all of the air defensenow equipped with the all-weatherishbed. but overtlic ground atlack and reconnaissance aircraft are8 Beagle light bombers.
C. Soviet tactical fighters arc cliaracterized by short combat radii and small payloads; their design and rugged construction make them well-suited for operations from unimproved airfields. These character-islics wouldigh sortie rale from improved bases wherelogistics and maintenance support were available. Soviet tactical air doctrine, however, places heavy emphasis on operations fromunimproved airfields; from such airfields the sortie rate would bc low.
H. Air Defense of Theaterombination of SAMs and interceptors provides Soviet thcaier forces with good capabilities against attacks at medium and high altitudes, and some capabilitieseet. Capabilities for detection and tracking of aircraft at low altitudes have been considerably improved by thc widespread deployment in East Germanyower-mounted radar and data transmission systems. The Soviets have an excellent family ofartillery weapons for thc defense of forward elements of the
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ground forces. The new SA-fl SAM system now under development will prolmbly have sufficient mobility to accompany maneuvering ground forces and will have improved low-altitude intercept
I. Air and Sea Lift. Soviet airlift capabilities arc improving through the continued ^traduction of new, larger transport aircraft. At present the Soviets could, with die military aircraft assigned to this purpose, transport the assauli elements of two of their airborne divisions for airdropadius. Effortsmprove tactical air assault capabilities are indicated by the formation of lielicopter.equippedunits of battalion or regimental size. There is now sufficient Soviet naval infantry and amphibious shipping in each of the fourfleet areas to support battalion or brigade-size landings. Scalift of large Soviet forces, however, would require the use of merchant marine ships and offloading ports.
Naval Forces
J. There haseneral improvement in the combatof Soviet nnval forces which has been reflected in thescope and frequency of operations outside home waters. These capabilities could be particularly effective in confined seas, such as thc Mediterranean. The past year saw an mtensification of Soviet efforts to improve naval capabilities tu counter the threat posed by Western navies. Task force exercises involving surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and auxiliaries increased in number andsome were anticarrier, while others were aiilisubmarinc warfare-orientedt the same time, the Soviets madeuse of their growing capability to deploy small naval task groups in distant waters. Open ocean activities have increased in tempo as thc Soviets experiment with newly developed equipment, tactics, and organizational concepts. Despite oontinuing improvement inand training open ocean ASW capabilities remain limited. Soviet capabilities to combal naval task forces and to interdict sea lines of communication arc based primarily upon missile-equipped medium bombers and submarines, and on surface-to-surface missile equipped surface ships.
Capabilities For Theater Wortare
K. We believe that in tho eventajor military confrontation with NATO, Warsaw Pact plunning calls for thc deployment of five
4
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fronts' in Central Europe, to bc comprised of Soviel forces in Central Europe and the western MDs of thc USSR together with llie national forces of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Thc Soviets probably have some doubts concerning the reliability andof the Czechs, at least for the near term, but we have no evidence that their planning has changed.orce when assembled would probably containercent of them0onventional artilleryombat0 in air defense regimentsn ground attack orregiments) and upuclear capable tactical missile and rocket launchers. These forces would possess formidablefor nuclear and non-nuclear offensive or defensive theaterThey would still be best suited, however, for nuclear warfare for which they were basically designed, and would be less effective for sustained conventional operations. If speed were the primarythe key elements of these five fronts could be assembled in about two weeks.ituation where offensive capability against NATO (rather than maximum speed) was the prime consideration, the Soviets would almost certainly take at least three weeks tomobilizationorward deployment.
L. Thc Soviet forces deployed against China provide tlie capability for either nuclear or non-nuclear warfare in Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, and Manchuria. They do not provide the capabilityustained conventional war deep inside China. The heavy tactical nuclear mis-sile support provided these forcesoviet readiness to resort to nuclear weaponsajor conflict with China,
Future Trends
M. Wc have no evidence to suggest that any major changes will be made in Soviet theater force deployments in Eastern Europe, or that the number of divisions along thc Sino-Soviet border willto grow much beyond the approximatelyhat are now there. The Soviets coniinue to develop andemarkable variety of new weapons and weapons systems; equipment modernization programs for all theater forces will surely continue through lhe decade, but there is no evidence at present to suggest an impending change in the tempo of these programs.
oviet ternartimeroughly equivalent to id may group.
N, Nevertheless ihere is currently an unusual degree ofin estimating future trends in Soviet theater forces. The extent of deployments along the Chinese border could have far-reaching effects on Soviet theater forceshole. The trend towardnon-nuclear capabilities, and the introduction of improved equipment, could result in considerable growth in the size and cost of both ground and tactical air forces. And the competition for resources between theater forces and strategic forces claimants might intensify or diminish, according to thc fate of the arms controland the development of political relationships in the world
O. The Soviets will continue vigorous efforts to improve ASW capabilities, mtraducing new submarine, surface, and airbornesystems. These developments will not solve the mainhowever, which is toependable capability to detect, localize and classify submarines operating in thc open ocean. It seems likely that any basic improvement in Soviet ASW capabilities- -such an improvement as would gravely impair thc value of Polaristrategicarise only from technological innovation,which we cannotseful estimate. Short of moresuccess, however, we believe that5 thc Soviets willhave the capability to detect and track some nuclear submarines; this capability will be greatest in thc vicinity of narrow or restricted passages such as are found in the Mediterranean and Norwegian Seas where antisubmarine capabilities may be concentrated. Detection in the open ocean would result almost entirely from chance encounters.
SE6HBT
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DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
he miiin missions ol Soviel general purpose forces iiicludn; security of the territory and coastal waters of thc USSH and of neighboring allies against external attack: military pressure on or actions against Western Europe and China in tuppori of broad Soviet objectives, deterrence of or action against developments in Eastern Europe contrary lo Soviet interests; and lhc establishmentilitary prnvunce (primarily naval) in areas ditlunt from the USSH. Forces developed for these missions contribute significantly to the main missions of other parts of the military. strategic defense and attack forces
2 Soviet theater forces (ground and tactical air forces) have been the main beneficiary of Russian military tradition. Soviet marshals would not be content with anything lessassive standing army backed up by an efficientsystem. However, Soviet theater force development has been adversely affectedecade or more of competition for resources with Soviet strategic nttack and defense programs. During the Khruslichcv regime theater forces were sharply reduced and equipment modernization programs were slowed. In recent years, however, these trends have been reversed; theater' forces have grown, primarily asirsult of the build-up of forces opposite China, and theirhave been improved.
he SovieU view Central Europe and thc Sino-Soviet border areas as the most important potential arenas of major theater warfare. Soviet forces deployed in both areas enjoy priority for men and materiel and are maintained in aliigh state of combat readiness. Other areas contain theater forces of lesser sire and lower priority. Reinforcements and reserves for both major potential theaters of wai would befrom the areas of greatest population density, primarily west of the Urals.
A. During the past year we have acquired important new evidence on Soviet mobilization procedures and on the differences between Soviel ground forces stationed in Eastern Europe and reinforcing units stationed inside the USSR. Further analysis along with some new evidence has permitted more confident estimates of the availability of certain types of ground force equipmert.
II. GROUND FORCES
he Sovietsarge number of relatively small, heavily armored divisions at various levels of readiness. For the moil part, divisions at tbe higher levels of readinoss aro subordinated to armies (in some cases tonthese armies and corps would be incorporated into fronti. As compared with most Wettem forces, the combat power of Soviet groundreater extent contained in the divisions; tlte higher echelons have fewer combat attd support units. In general, the levels of service support are austere.
Pronh
Wo have no evidence that the Soviet* consider any of their present large theater force commands athe term is apparently reserved for wartimeartime front would consist of at least three pound armies (and/or corps)actical air army; it might also include one or more airborneIn addition fronts would contain such non divisional support as artillery divisions or brigades, tactical missile units, air defense missilo units, engineer units, nnd rear services.
Tint Group of Soviet Forces, Germanysront-in-being. This is now probably abo true of tbe Far East Military District (MD) which contains one army, threeactical air army, and heavy nondivisional combat support. Tbe Transbaytal MD may in due course achieve near wartime front status, and in case of major hostilities withront would probably be formed in the new Central Asianpon mobilization for opcraUons in Europe, two fronts would probably be formed bt the western MDs foropposite the Central Region of NATO, and one miglit be farmed in tbe Odessa MD On tlie southern Hank of NATO.
In wartime, tbe Soviets would establish theater-level bcadqoarters in areas involving more than one front and/or elements from several types of^ theater forces, air defense forces, and strategic attack forces.
Armies and Corps
believe that in wartime Soviet ground (otccs would be deployedprimarily as armies or corps. There are IS Soviet giound armies; weadditional armies will be formed in the Sino-Soviet border area. Most ofwithin thc USSR would require mobilization of army level supportto commitment. The armies in CSFC, however, are almost certainlyas tlicy now stand; llvose along thc Sino-Soviet border, will piobablymaintained at or near combat-ready status,
oviet armies haveine divisions and additional supporting units. These armies are probably intended for commitment with their normally assigned division structure, but tbe Soviets have demonstrated that divisions can be readily transferred among armies i: necessary. Armies are nominally of two types; the Tank Army, in which allajority of the divisions are tankand thc Combined Anns Army in which alliiijoiiiy nl tin- divisiu-ts are motorized rifle. Most armies now appear to bo of tbe combined arms type.
oviet armies have rather Ught combat support. Typical of army levelsupport units are: an artillerycud missile9n air defense missiieignalngineer bridging and assault river crossing units. Tbe inclusion of such units in the various armies
Soviets hive recently carved this new millluy diitrtct from the Turkestan MD.
RET
apparently depends upon wartime missions and peacetime readiness levels, For example, In CSFC one, possibly two, of the five armies lack an artillery brigade. The army troops of Soviet armies in CSFC range0 men.
ozen or so Soviet corps headqualters. They do notan intermediate echelon between division and army headquarters; inthey function as small army headquarters. They have fewunits, sometimes none. Three of the five divisions now deployedare probably subordinatedorps headquarters.
Divisions'
Thc Soviets now have atine divisions of three diflerent types:re motorized rifle.re tank,re airborne. This is four more thanlast year, reflecting almost entirely the build-up opposite China,
The Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions are basically designed for combat of short durationuclear battlefield. Theyery highof tank to personnel; when fully equipped with vehicles tbey have excellent tactical mobility. To achieve these characteristics the Soviets have sacrificed staying power to some extent The divisions are apparenUy designed to tight until reUeved by fresh divisions.
Categories of Readiness
oviet ground divisions vary widely in terms of peacetime personnel strength, leveb of major items of equipment on hand, and thc modernity of equipment on hand. Tlvcy also vary as to tho extent and type of training con-ducted. We believe our evidence on Soviet divisionseasonably 6rm basis lor estimating equipment levels and the extent of training activity.our information on personnel strengths is less complete. We believe,that thereelationship between equipment and personnel levels.
espite considerable variation, Soviel divisions fall into three general groupings consistent with thc states of readiness described in Soviet military writings. Divisions stationed in areas where filler personnel and equipment are not readily available, such as those in Eastern Europe and some of those in the Sino-Soviet border areas, probably have all or almost all of thdr equipment and personnel. The seven Soviel airborne divisions arc probably equipped and manned at the same general levels. These divisions are essentially combal ready as they stand Wc designate them Categoiy I.
e also designate asumber of divisions located in tbe western USSR which can be readied for commitment very quickly. They are not manned and equipped ut the same high levels as those described above, but can be fleshed out with specified local reservists andivilian vehicles and be made ready to moveay or two, thus meeting thc
' For numbers and deployment of Soviet pound divisions, sec Tabic L
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criteriaigh slate of readiness. These divisions have aboutoercent of their equipment on hand. Their personnel strengths probably range around two-thirds of that found in divisions in CSFC, but with considerable variation among divisions. Personnel strengths in subordinate tank units would tend to be higher, in motorized rifle units, lower.
second major grouping consists of divisions having aboutoof Iheir equipment. Their personnel strengths vary considerably,ranging from about one-quarter to one-half of GSFC levels. Thesecould be filled up with reservists, augmented with opand deployed within several day*eek. These weII.
There arc some Soviet divisions with even less equipment than Category II divisions. They probably containen each, primarily an officer cadre and enlisted caretaker elements. They appear to be intended for later mobilization, and probably could not be equipped like other Soviet divisions without increased new production. These we designate Category III or cadre divisions.
Thereivisions along thc Sino-Soviet border which we cannot as yet assignategory. When the build-up is completed, these developingwill probably ber II.
Division Equipment
The Soviet motorized rifle division (MUD) at full strength lias0 men andajor items ofhe equipmentediumrmored personnel carriersndrtillery pieces. The Soviet Unk division at full strength hasen andajor items of equipment,edium tanks.PCs,ieces. Soviet airborne divisions haveC0 menajor items of equipment We have previouslymall number of tank divisions as "heavy" tank divisions. These were smallerotorized rifle regiment) and contained heavy tanksS-3J. Heavy tanks are still observed in some tank divisions, but we are not certainheavy" tank division now existseparate type.
Soviel divisions inside thc USSR, with the exception of those along thc Sino-Soviet border, are probably not as generously equipped with new model equipment as those in CSFC. There is, however, no apparent uniform distribution of new equipment. New models of armored vehicles have been delected in some divisions of each category,arpathian MDivision whichin thc invasion of CzechosrovaVia lacked antitank guided missiles and was short of APCs. (After it became part of lhe occupation force, thesewerewo Category II divisions mobilized at the time
'These iiKfcaws ofajor items of eqoipment per divirtan over lutestimate result primarily from increases in artillery. See
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of ihc invasion had few or no APCs. On lhc olher hand, one division from Ihe Baltic MD was fully equipped with lhe newest Soviel medium tank,
Armored Vehicles
far Ihe predominant feature of Soviet ground force equipment isThe Soviets would require0 medium tanks lo fully equipof divisions;odest estimate of tanks not in divisionsIhis number toarge scale and continuous peacetimewould be required to meet these requirements and to maintainprogram. We believe thai ihe annual production4 andmedium tanks8 was adequate to0 of those tanks and to account for Soviet exports to olherThe newest medium tank,as been producedrc probably now in inventory. Thcanks) appears lo Iiave been met at least to some extent by die usemodel tanks and assault guns. We believe that there are no largeSoviet tanks.
Soviels have placed considerable emphasis on gun stabilizationtank development;nd some of4 tanksstabilization in both the vertical and horizontal planes. Tbe Sovietshowever, equipped their tanks with stereoscopic range finders.
oviet tactical doctrine calls for the mounting of all infantry in amphibious APCs. preferably on the basis of one perwould require0 vehicles. In order to equip all Soviet forces wiih APCs on Ihe lesser scale evident in CSFC. thc Sovicis would require an inventory of0 such vehicles. Our analysis indicates thai there arc0 APCs in inventory, fewer than half of which are new amphibious modelsndhc rest are old modelndhich are essentially non-amphibious armored trucks with relatively poor cross-country mobility. Some APCs are found in divisions at all levels of readiness, but in generalivisions in the USSR probably have fewer APCs (and older models) than found in CSFC divisions. Many Category II divisions probably depend primarily on using mobilized civilian trucks lor personnel carriers.
new infantry fighting vehicle has begun to enter inventory inforces. Itow silhouette, tracked amphibious squad carrierm gun and an antitank guided missile. This vehicle isto Soviei tactical doelrinc; if is not well-suited for transport oflong distances since thc troop compartment is vciy small. The vehiclesighted in parades and In limited numbers wiih Soviet units,
Artillery Support
high density of tanks provides Soviet ground forces with veryfire support. Soviet capabilities to provide continuous indirect Breless impressive. One common Soviet practice designed to compensate for
11
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this is the employment of tank, to provide indirect Bre support from defilade positions The emphasis on tank fire is fully consistent with Soviet concepts of ground force operations in the nuclear environment.
ecent changes in Soviet artillery strength in GSFG have resulted in an overall increasen the number of guns available. In addition, there hasO percent increase in the number of multiple rocket launchers. These increases liave probably also occurred in some of the forces along the Sino-Soviet border, but we do not have evidence of them in other ground forces elsewhere within the USSR. These developments improve the capubilitics of Ihe ground forces for conventional operations. All Sovici lube artillery is towed rather than sell-propel led; it is generally lighter in caliber than NATO artillery and isby some. Soviet techniques for the employment of artiDery are not up to llwsc of the US. Theretrong terideney for Soviet artillery to rely oo rigid prior planning. The Soviets do not practice many of the modern tochniques for the massing of fires. Much of tbe recent increase in Soviet field artillery results from increased organic artillery in motorized infantry regiments.
Missile Support
The general support tactical ballistic missile ts the Scud, which isto army and /row echelons of organization. Wc believe there arc aboutcud brigades in the USSR and in the CSFC. In the GSFG. each army is behoved to haveaunchcr brigade and there are probably two larger brigades (up toaunchers) subordinate to GSFG Headquarters. Ground forces in the USSR probably have about the same level of Scud support as in the GSFG.
Soviet divisions deployed in Eastern Europe have Frog (free rocket over ground) battalions probably with four launchers each. We believe thatnd II divisions within the USSR liave three Frog launchers; Category III divisions may have two launchcis each.
ground commanders have long complained of tbc lack of asystem with the range and mobility suited to thc needs of the Irons.haveissile, thchich can meet these needs: wethat it is capable olound warheadangehave no evidence that theissile is deployed with the groundbebeve, however, that thes carried by the ScalcboardScaleboard units are probably under thc control of thcForces rather than Ihe ground foices. It is likely however, thatwould be used in support of theater operations if required. This istrue in the Sino-Soviet border area, where Soviet ground forces cannotthe heavy missile support from medium-range ballistic missilesmtenncdiatc-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) available in thc west.there are abo some mobile Shaddock cruise-missile unfts whichadditional fronl level support.
he Soviets have conventional high explosive warheads for Frogs and Scuds, but there is little evidence mdicahng the numbers of such warheads avail-
-Matt-f-
able or (heir tactical use. These warheads probably now include some of thc high fragmentation, improved conventional munitions type. This type of warhead for Frogs "nd Scuds would greatly improve their effectiveness for non-nuclear operations.
Nucleor. Chemical, ond Biological Weapons
Thc Soviels have developed andariety of nuclear weapons for delivery by Frogs, tactical ballistic missiles, and aircraft. For reasons of tactical readiness and efficiency we would expect nuclear weapons to bc stored in some Soviet depots in thc forward area. We have identified some sitesadjacent to Soviet -controlled airfields in Eastern Europe which appear to be intended for such storage. Wc believe that nuclear weapons are notstored in the forward area. We do believe, however, that the Soviets could react quickly to provide nuclear weapons to the using units of theater forces. They almost certainly have not entrusted any nuclear weapons to their East European allies, nor do we believe they will in peacetime. Even inthey would retain close control over any weapons allocated to the East Europeans.
The Soviets have developed all types of toxic chemical agents including nerve gases. We believe that the Soviets have almost certainly developed toxic chemical warheads for Frogs, tactical ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. Toxic chemical artillery shells and multiple rockets arc available to Soviet ground forces.
Available evidence indicates lhat the Soviets plan for the usearge number of.chemical warheads in addition to nuclear weapons In theater nuclear warfare. L
JSoviet theater forces are well organized, equipped, and trained for defensive chemical warfare. Defensive equipment includes newkits, but these do not provide timely warning againsi nerve agents.
lthough the Soviets are conducting reseaich activity applicable towarfare, we have no evidence indicating that they have produced biological weapons for tactical uses. There is some evidence, however, that such weapons might bc used in circumstances in which Waisaw Pact forces were being forced to withdraw.
III. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT AND THEATER AIR DEFENSE *
he mission of Soviet Tactical Avialion. which the SovieU call "Aviation of the Front' is lo support thc theater/front commander. Tlic functions of Tactical Aviation include air superiority operations, close air support and interdiction in conjunction with ground force operations, strikes againsi targets of strategicto the front, and air defense of thc theater of operations. Tactical Avia-
* For numbsrj and deployment of Sorter tactical aircraft, roe Table* II.
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tiort also provides reconnaissance support feu ground and air operations, and some air transportation. The air elements to perform these functions arc organized into Tactical Air Armies (TAAs) which in wartime are assigned to fronts.
oviet Tactical Aviation is organised intodentified TAAs. These air armies vary greatly in size and composition Thcb TAA. deployed in East Cermany. It hasombat aircrafl,ercent fewer thanlast year. This reduction is due to last year's withdrawal of Brewer-equipped light bomber units to theew air army has probably been created in tbe Trawbaylal-Mongolia areat now contains0 combat aircraft. Tbe other air armies in the Far East have been strengthened also. The additional aircraft were drawn primarily fiom reserves.
Tactical Aviation is now composed largely ol fighter aircraft. We estimate chat there are nowighters in regiments whose primary mission is air defensen regiments whose primary mission is ground attack. In addition there areight bombers in strike units andighter and Ught bomber types in reconnaissance and strike reconnaissance units.
There arc anlder model tacUcal aircraft collocated at Tactical Aviation bases. There is some evidence indicating that ground attack regiments haveighters instead of theurrently estimated. If so. this would indicate that about half of the collocated aircraft are in fact assigned to Tactical Aviation. Tho Sovieis continue toeserve ol older aircraft which has been used to equip new Tactical Aviation unit* along theborder and for deliveries to other nations, particularly thc Arab states. We lielieve that some of these aircraft have gone to thc Soviet air training establishment which has been substantially increased.
Ground Arrack
There areighters and light bombers in Tactical Aviation whose primary function is to perform close air support, air strike, and interdiction missions. The capabibties of this force were Unproved in recent years through re-eouippmg of fighter units wiih tbeitter and light bomber units with thorewer. However this re-equipment programear or so ago, leaving over half thc ground attack/tactical strike force still equipped with the obsolescentnKM andeagles.
Both the Fresco and the Fitter were designed os Interceptors; theirin ground attack roles is characterized by short combat radii and small payloads. However, their design and nigged construction make them well-suited for operations from unimproved or improvised airfields- Soviet tactical air doctrine indicates that ground attack fighters would be rather widely dispersed oofields and suitable highway sectionsilometers behind tbe front lines. Bomber and reconnaissance regiments would apparendy beilometers behind the front lines.
Since Soviet tactical aircraft use bght loads of fuel and ordnance, tbey can theoreticallyigh sortieorties per day. However,
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actual sortie ratesoviet ground attack unit areunction o( pilot stamina and logistic support than of aircraft characteristics. Tho pilot to aircraft ratio in ground uttack regiments is probablyoogistic support ill permanent, improved bases of Tactical Aviation could probably support high sortie rales for alew days, but sortie rates of such units operating from dispersed and unimproved airfields would probably be quite low.
c believe lhat Ihc Soviets do not rely heavily on forward air controllers with ground units to coordinate close-in ground attack operations. Cround con-Irolled intercept equipment with major ground formations is used to vector attack aircraft inlo lhe target area after which aircrews identify specific targets visually. While Soviet doctrine stresses attack of targets of opportunity, Soviet ground support tactical air exercises predominantly involve preplanned targets. Soviet tactical air strike doctrine and training concentrate heavily on attacks against the nuclear delivery means, logistic Installations, and command posts in theimmediate rear area. Close-in support of front line ground forces has received far less attention, but Sonet military writingsrowing con-corn for improvement in this area, particularly for non-nuclear contingencies.
Reconnaissance
econnaissance units of Soviet Tactical Avialion have been improved significantly in recent years through lhe continued introduction of the Brewer D, and more recently through Ihe replacement or most Frescos with the Fishbed H. Thc latter aircraft has considerably improved range capabilities over other new Sovielariant has appeared, recent evidence raises thc possibility lhat it could bc assigned ground altack rather Ihan reconnaissance missions. All reconnaissance units could bc usedtrike role
Pilot Training
The recent growth in thc numbers of Tactical Aviation units has increased Ihe requirements for aircrew personnel- This, plus Soviet programs for training aircrews for olher countries, has increased the size of thc air trainingWc bebeve thatombat-type aircraft are used for training. This Iraining establishment supports Tactical Aviation as well as other types of air forces; its growth indicates that thc Soviets will have sufficient aircrews lo maintain tbel Tactical Aviation or, if need bc. to increase it.
Soviet tactical fighter regiments concentrate their training on tlicirmission. However, the mandatory flying schedule for tactical avialion0 hours per year) includes aboutercent cross-training in oilierTills provides tlie Soviet air commanders with atinimallo use ground attack regiments in tlie air defense role and vice versa. The total flying tune for Soviet tactical aircrews probably averagesours per year. The Soviels have an intensive ground training program for aircrews.
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Air Munitions
Sovicl nuclear stockpile includes bombs for delivery by HelicalSoviet Tactical Aviation can deliver nuclear bombs with both fightersbombers; ground attack fighter regiments are trained In sophisticatedtechniques. The Soviets also have toxic chemical bombs available forand some aircrews specially trained lor their delivery. Wc have noSoviet use of tactical aireralt for spray dissemination of chemicalapability to employ this technique cannot bc ruled out. Thea variety of conventional munitions for delivery by Tactical Aviation,bombs,ounds.
Air Defense Fighters
0 the Soviets haveubstantial qualitative improvement in the air defense elements of Tactical Aviation. Most of the aircraft delivered to the force in recent years have been late model, all-weather,isbbeds, which now constitute more thanercent of the aircraft in air defenseTheight-weight, ruggedly designed, Machll-weathercan also perform the air superiority mission. This aircraft can and has operated for sustained periods from unimproved airfields. It has been produced in eight, possibly nine, variants. The latest variant, identified in East Germany, has improved payload capabilities and improved air intercept radar.
As in the ease of tactical air support aircraft, Soviet tactical air defense fighters can tlieoretieaUylying rate of four or five sorties per day. The principal constraint on sortie rates is pilot fatigue and logistic support. Tbc pilot to aircraft ratio in air defense regiments isohc logisticat permanent improved airfields couldortie rateer day for atew days. Soviel tactical air defense aircraft were designed to Operale under the austere conditionsattlefield environment. The sortie rates of units operating from unimproved airfields would probably bc low.
Warning ond Control
Soviet theater force air defenses in Eastern Europe are coordinated with the national air defenses of the other Warsaw Pact countries and with the alr ticfenscs of the USSRir defenses of all theater forces wouldact in accordance with the general plans of the commander of PVOS until those forces were committed to ground operations; at that time, control would probably be maintained by the Deputies for Air Defense of the major force commanders.
During thc past year, the SovieU have continued to exhibit major concern for improving their air defense posture in the forward area, rxuticularly against low altitude attack- Thc Soviets have approximatelyadar stations in Eastern Europe, and arc continuing to deploy the rower-mounted Squat-Eye radar at those stations. This radar, first observeds improving the low altitudeaod tracking capability downeel. It is possible that where thc terrain is suitable this capabilily isas loweetrack-mounted air surveillance radar, Long Track, has also been deployed
SECRET
in Eastern Europe at Soviet radar stations. Data transmission systems for rapid reporting of tracking information and for ground control of intrjrecptors have probably been widely deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.
Surface-to-Air Missiles and Anti-Aircraft Artillery
forces in Eastern Europe have aboutattalions. Anwhich usually consists of three battalions, is deployed with theSoviet Forces in Poland. Hungary, and probably Czechoslovakia. Inthere aiecgimenls deployed for defense of CSFC Inthere are probablyodditionalattalions manned bytroops ol thc ground forces. Theystem deployedapability to intercept target* at medium lo high altitudeo. and some capability downeet. It is useddefense of relatively static rear area installations, as il is not mobileprovide continuous support to maneuvering troops.
as been deployed in East Europe to provide low altitudeof Soviet tactical airfields in East Cermany. Poland, andfavorablo conditions, including optimum acquisition, this systemaircraft ateetange. Deperrding onof weather, site masking, elevation of tho fife control radar, speedarea of the target, the minimum altitude could bo as lowranges.
Thc Soviets are now deploying thc track-mountedystem into thc theater forces. Thcas been identified at training sites fn East Germany. Tlieangend wc estimate that it can engage targets down toeet at lesser ranges.
Thc Soviets rely heavily on light anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) for airof ground forces. They have introduced ii new radar-controlled, quad-mounted,m weapon, wliich is carriedracked chassis which aLso mounts thc AAA fire control radar Gun Dish. Both the Cun Dish and the Flap Wheel (used withm and lower caliber) operate inand. The older Fire Can radar is also still in use with AAA guns.
In addition to the improvement of dieir active defenses, Uie Soviets have, sincengagedrogram to improve the survivability of their forces, especially in Eastern Europe. Revetments and/or hard shelters have been constructed at Soviet radar, command and control, ground and air installations to protect those resources. Camouflaging has been identified at radar sites and airfields.
Electronic Warfare
Soviets have the capability to jam airborne radar bombslghts,headquarters facilities, troop concentrations, and other criticalconjunction with air defense weapons sj'Stcms operations in thc field.no evidence tooviet capability to jam terrain-following orcoking radar equipment. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) capa-
bilities probably have been incorporated into tbo Gun Dish and VTap VVheel AAA radars.
se oi ECM by lhc Soviets to protect their tactical aircraft has been of rather limited nature Centrally they use specially Btted ECM aircraft for protection ol tactical strike light bombers against enemy ground-based radar andctive noise jammers and chaff, Including thc rockel-Bred variety, constitute tho bulk of their ECM equipment. Tlie strike aircraft have ECM equipment designed to defend against enemy fighters. This equipment Includes an Al radar threat-warning system and chall dispensers, and possibly jammers. Ground attack fighters may have cannon shell chaH for use agaimt ground-based fire control radars.
Transport Avialion and Helicopters
OO. Soviet Tactical Aviation units provide light troop transport and utility support to the ground forces withight and medium transports such as Cab. Crate, and Camp andelicopters, primarily Hound and Hook. Most of the TAAs have one or more rcgimcnti equipped with helicopters; over half of the regimentseavyedium heUcopters. The Soviets continue torowing appreciation for tho tacticalof armed heUcopters, but there is no evidence that the Soviets havea halicoptcr intended specifically for arorod missions. Light and medium helicopters have been observed armedariety of weapons such asguns, rockets, and antitank guided rnissues.
IV. SERVICE SUPPORT OF THEATER FORCES
The Soviet system of supply and maintenance support was designed to support theater forces in thc contextrief nuclear war. Mobile stocks of conventional ammunition and fuel at division and army level are adequate for about five days of combat. Utile is known of the availability ol supplies at fre-nr-lcvol The Soviet resupply system down to fronl-leveb remains heavily dependent on thc railways. The Soviet maintenance system is apparently based in large patt on minimum peacetime use ol essential items of equipment This equipment is retained as much as possible in covered storage, with wheeled vehicles often up on blocks, combat loaded. Unit maintenance organizations at all level* are small The Soviel system would piobably be adequaterief nuclear war, but it appears less well-suited for major conventional operations of long duration.
The rear services of iho /runt are responsible for the naupply of tactical air armies as well as the ground armies. Supply levels at permanent bases of TAAs arc probably adequate to support sustained combat by air unils for about the same duration as is the case with groundabout five days. He-Supply after this period would be restricted somewhat by the limited availability of transport, particularly fuel tracks and pipeline equipment, at both front and air army levels The extensive logistical support system which would be required for sustained air operaUons from dispersed unimproved airfields docs not appear to bo available In Soviet forett* in East Cermany.
lte general austerity of rear service support has been sharply criticized by Soviet logisticians over the past several years, and some efforts have been made to remedy tho situation. The fuel supply system has been improved through the introduction of collapsible portable storage tanks and pipeline units. The carrying capacity of general purpose transport has been increased through tbc introduction of now heavy duty trucks with four-wheeled trailers. The logistics load on the railroads bas been reduced somewhat by tlie introduction of lank transporters, and by the expansion of the capabilities of transportThc growing number and improved load-carrying capability of helicopters in theater forces is ameliorating lo some extent thc chronic problem of limited truck transport in ground units.
V. GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES
bc principal missions of thc Soviet general purpose naval forces are: defense against seaborne attack, interdiction of sea lines of communication,warfarend support of opcraUons ashore. Tbe navy is abo being used increasingly for political purposes abroad. In the past year the Soviets have strengthened tbeir Mediterranean Squadron and conducted naval operations in the Indian Ocean and thc Caribbean. Naval programs are emphasizingASW and air defense capabilities. New construction includes several new classes of attack submarines, and surface ships belter equipped for long-range operations.
Present Forces
ubmarines. Our estimate of the strength and composition of tbe Soviet general piupose submarine force over the next two years is as follows:
October
1
iie-Mtisile
auncher*)*
33
(moltuncher*}
.
U
Dieict'
as
Diesel
.
Diesel
11
'
.
0
.
IncludesUulan snbntaiines.
Increaieiecoil of the inchiiiocionvcrcion unit) which have had their ballistic nustde tube* removed.
' Include* thelass.
'The reduction in dfcMl-powcred submarine) result* Irom estimated retirements snd transfer* lo other countries.
' The propulsionweapon* systems In dtvsc classesoi been determined.
aving emphasized quantity in the past, are nowprograms designed to improve lhe quality of (heir submarinesenhance their submarine warfare capabilities. At least four new causespurpose submarines are prohabiyeries production. The nuclearVlasses are quieter than earlier Soviet nuclear submarines,of high submerged speedy, and have new lower frequency, activeC-class is equipped with eight short-range (up toissileswhich arc probably antiship weapons although the possibility of anrote cannot beat thb time. The small Ft-cUu has beenlo have dictrl propulsion for surface operations. Its siilmtcrgedunknown; it may be closed cycle diesel or fuel cell. We have no goodthe characteristics oflass. Tlierc ii some evidence that tbcbeenubmerged bunch antisubmarine missile whichin one or more of the new classes
Construction of earlier classes of cruise-miaiilc submarines appears to have ended with tlie delivery during the past year of thc last unit of theuclear-powered boats are being modified by removing their cruise-missile launchers, streamlining (heir bulls, and installing new bow sonars.
Surface Forcei. Wc estimate the numbers and types of Soviet majorships over the next two years as follows;
1ionm
Trrr
Surface Ships
SAM/SSM Light Cruisers
9
Light Cruiteri
Helicopter Ships
SSM Dcstioyen
SAM Destroyers
Cruben
Escorts
2
... 11
...
0 48
no
2 B
3
107
217
cruisers.estroyers, andscorts arc
status;
number of minor combatants and auxiliaries, including submarine chasers, landing ships, mine warfare ships, andatrol boats equipped with short-range cruise nussiles-
hc Soviets continue to improve the capabilities of their surface forces. The sixth unit of tho Kresta-clas* light cruiser, now nearing completion, lias new SSM launchers, smaller than those for thenstalled In earlier ships of this class. It also carries the new SAM Erst seen on tlvc helicopter ship Moskva. Future Krestas will probably be similarly armed. The second of the two Moskva-class Itclicoptcr ships has probably become operational; both arc equipped with tbe new SAM systemew missile launcher which is probably for an anti-
20
submarine weapon but which might also be designee! to accommodate an SSM. Over tbc next several years conversions and new construction programs wiU probably add2 missile armed ships to the fleet each year. In addi-fion, the Soviets areew class of patrol boats armedow short-range cruise missile.
acal Avialion. Our estimate of the strength and composition of Soviet Naval Aviation for the next two years is as follows:
Heavy Bombers
Rceonnailsance).
Medium Rombers
Radjer
Badger Cv
Badger C*
Blinder
Light Bombers
BeiSle
Patrol/ASW Aircraft
M.dje
May
ASW Helicopters
Hound
Hormone
1 OCTonui
Indude* aboutankers,eeonnaiwaiict,iGgurcd for ASW, andoavea-lional numbers.
' Configuredcany thedtonfigured to cany theipper ASM.
Except for shipborne Hormone ASW helicopters, Soviet Naval Aviation is Und-based. The total number of naval aucraft has risen slightly over the past year due to increases in the numbers of ASW patrol aircraft and ASW helicopters. Inyears tbe emphasis in Naval Aviation has been on ASW and oo improving reconnaissance and strike capabilities against surface ships. Long Range Aviation (LRA) aircraft continue to support naval air forces.
Defense. Near the approaches to Soviet naval bases areaval coast defense sites which employ tbe Samlet (SSC-2b) cruiseeffective range of the Samlet varies fromo. depending onol the guidance radar. In addition, we bcUcve that thca mobile coast defense cruise missile, is operational and istlie '
Recent Operational Activity
past year saw an intensification of Soviet efforts to improveto counter the threat posed by Western navies. Task forcesurface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and auxiliaries Increased in
SKftfcf
sccBcr
number and complexity; some were anticarrier, while others were ASW-oriented. At the same time, tho Soviets made increased use ol their growing capability to deploy small naval task groups in distant waters on "show-the-flag" cruises. Open ocean activities have increased in tempo as (ha Soviets expenmoW with newly developed equipment, tactics, and organizational concepts.
Thu almost constant watch off J'olaris bases, ai well as Soviet writings indicate the gravity of Soviet concern regarding the Polaris threat to (he Soviet homeland Soviet intelligence collection ships have used harassment tactics agaimt Polaris submarines entering or leaving port. On occasion the Soviets have uied diesei-powered submarine* In the central Mediterraneanying in wait" rolo In restricted passages on tubmarine transit routes.
Much of the increased activity is directed to improving ASW capabilities with an emphasis in areas which are of especial interest to the US Navy for operations of Polaris and attackNorwegian Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. In the Norwegian Sea the Soviets are Increasing (be deployment of submarines and surface ships and am using new laud based ASW aircraft in an effort io improve ASW defenses. In thoask group composedoskva-class heUcoptcr ship, several other modem ASW ships, attackand ASW patrol aircraft based ln the UAR conducted antisubmarine exercises in8 and againn the Pacific, submarines, ships, and long-range aircraft operate from time to lineide area east andof Japan.
by Soviet attack submarines generally followed trie patternyearsew notable exceptions, including thelasslass nuclear-poweredlass diesei-powered, eruise-misvile submarineswo year confinement to home waters. For tlic past year orIIar-powered, cruise-missile submarines, have not been sighlcd inAtlantic; bul, one was detected recently off the Bahamas. Anattack submarine was sighted recently in (he Culf of Mexico, thedeploymentoviet nuclear submarine to (his area. The Sovietsbe experimentingonger patrols by diesel submarines; in (hethey apparently deploy for periods of four to six months, wiihtime spent fn port. Early this year two submarines supported byspent fouralf months in the Indian Ocean.
Amphibious forces of (be Mediterranean Squadron recently conducted the largest lauding exercise ever held outside Warsaw Pait waters. Seven Soviet landing ships participatedanding exercise on tho UAlt coast with seaward screcnbig by Soviet, and perhaps Syrian, and Egyptian naval forces. During the UAll landing, the helicopter ship. Moikva, conducted ASW exercises In the eastern Mediterranean. For the past twooviet landing ships have been in the Mediterranean almost continuously.
Thus far9 the Soviet Navy hoi visited two new areas as part of its expanding role of showing (heask group of twoubmarine.
sceffrr
SLC'HLI
and an oiler made the first visit to Guinea and Nigeria. In addition, the task group operated off Chana in what appeared to be old-fashioned gun-boatintended to speed release ol Soviet trawlers the Ghanaians had previously seized. In June andorce composed of three missile-equipped ships, two submarines, and several support ships cruised thc US cast coast, and, afterHavana and other Caribbean ports, operated in the Culf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Soviet naval units arc continuing to make visits in east African and other Indian Ocean ports.
Capabilities Against Submarines
oviet emphasis on ASW was intensified by Moscow's recognition tha! Western nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines {SSBNs) have replaced aircraft carriers as tbc primary seaborne strategic threat, and that Western torpedo attack submarines must be neutralized if the Soviet Navy is to gain access to and operate In the open ocean In wartime. Attack submarines probably offer the Soviets the greatest promise in ASW, although thelass and tbe diesel-powered classes are not considered to be particsiLarly effective because of their noisiness. Tlie antisubmarine capabilities of the new classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines arc clearly better than those oflass, but wc cannot yet determine the extent ol improvement. We believe all will have new or improved antiship or antisubmarine weapons and new sonars with increased range. One or more of the new classes will probablyrimary antisubmarine mission.
ll major surface ships have sonar and some type of ASW weapon, but thc Soviets designate certain classes specifically as antisubmarine. These Include their most modemMoskva, Kresta, Kashin, and Kan in classes; all have SAMs for operations at sea without air cover and arc equipped in varying degrees to operate ASW helicopters. Inlioduction o! tbe Hormone Iiehcopter hasetection andystem with increased range and quicker reaction capabilities. In addition, thc Moskva class has new sonars with increased detection capabilities andew ASW rocket weapon. These improved detection and weapons systems probably will appear on new ships; some older classes are expected to undergo retrofit.
ntil recently, Soviet antisubmarine, shore-based, passive acousticsystems have been close inshore surveillance devices. Tlteir capability to develop long-range systems is limited by hydrogcographic conditions and their technology in this Geld lags well behind that of tlie US. Lack of ready access to deep water with favorable acoustic characteristics for long-range soundinhibits Soviet deployment of fixed, long-range shore-based systems^
^Based
upon thc limited evidence available and the limitations imposed by geography, we consider it highly unlikely that the Soviets will soon achieve capabilities in
this field comparable to those ol thc US. Our analysis of the Soviet systems leads us lo believe thatuld not be effective against quiet-running submarines.
HI Despite continuing improvcmeiit in equipment and training, we believe lhat current Soviel abibty to delect, localize, and classify submerged submarines in tbe Open ocean continues to be limited. However, detection potential and the capability lo maintain contact increase appreciably within coastal areasto Soviet naval bases. Capabilities to classify and destroy submarines duteeled within range of an ASW platform are considered good-
Capobilitios Against Naval Task Forces and Sea lines of Communication
Soviet capabilities to combat naval task forces and to mterdict sea lines of communication are based primarily upon missile-equipped irvedium bombers and submarines, andesser extent on SSM equipped surface ships. These capabilities could be particularly effective in confined seas, such as theLong-range Bear reconnaissance aircraft are assigned the raissloo of providing target data to these platforms.
Soviet capabilities against sea corrununicstions are greatest In tbcAtlantic and northwest Pacific. Of theeneral purpose (torpedo attack and cruisc-misslle) submarines in thc Northern Fleet, we estimatehird could be maintained continuously on station in tbc Atlantic approaches to Europe. In thc Pacific about one-third of thceneral purpose submarines could be kept on station in the northwest Pacific and the approaches to thc Sea of Japan.elatively small number could be rrraintained continuously on patrol off thc US mainland for any length of time; we estimate this number at abouteneral purpose submarines in the western Atlantic and about half as many off Ibe US west coast. As more nuclear-powered units enter service, these numbers will increase.
7 thc Soviets experimented with an afloat logistic support group for submarines in the mid-Atlantic, ln thc summer9 the Soviets again carriedimited support and replenishment operation in the westernin connection with the naval visit to Cuba. Use ofupport group wouldonsiderable increase in the number o! subinarincs which could be maintained on station and would extend thc area of patrol activity, but such support groups would be highly vulnerable in time of war.
Capobilities for Sustained Long-Range Operations
oviet efforts to expand and improve tbe capabilities of the navy tosustained long-range operations arc continuing. They are constructing more seaworthy, longer range combatants and new types of auxiliaries, and they arc gaining valuable operational experience by more frequentcruises and open oceanhe Soviets continue toix. of navaland merchant ships to support naval forces at sea, They have however, transferred some merchant ships to the navy and have recendy done so with one
of lhcir Urges! merchant tankers. The submarine force generally has beenprovided with specialized support ships to meet operationalSurface forces, in contrast, have operational limitations because ofafloat support, particularly in terms of specialized repair ships, thus somewhat limiting thc sizeorce that can bc deployedistance from the USSR and the length of timeorce canombat capability.
llhough the Soviets have not constructed large numbers of specialized auxiliaries in the past, they may now be developing new and larger logistic support ships. However, until new logistic ships arc available in quantity, the Soviets probably will continue to press for Ihc use ol shore facilities such as those made available by lhe UAR and Syria. We continue to believe that with iheir present resources thc Soviets can support only limited surface naval operations on lhe high seas for extended periods of time, or larger operationsew weeks. Without overseas naval shore support facilities any majorin long-range surface operations would require augmentation of existing auxiliary forces, not only with oilers and cargo ships from the merchant fleet, but also with ships designed to provide speciaUzed technical support to naval forces at sea.
Copobilitles for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Warfare
eapons. Wc believe that nuclear weapons have been allocated'to thc general purpose naval forces. Nuclear weaponsariety of types and yields arc available for delivery by air- and surface-launched cruise missiles anda small number of torpedoes and depth bombs. Soviet naval cruise missiles could carry chemical warheads. The most likely candidates for such warheads arc those cruise missiles used by naval coastal defense units. Chemical shells for naval guns mounted on destroyers and cruisers arc probably also available; such shells are stored in port and placed on ships only during major exercises or in wartime.
SS. Defense. Thc Soviets continue lo construct ships with water washdownhermetically sealed compartments, filtered ventilation systems, andstations that would enable those ships to carry out their assigned missionsoxic chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) environment. Extensive training is provided for the maintenanceermanent, high level of CBR readiness for the various naval unils.
VI. AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT
Airlift and Air Assault Capabilities
c believe thc Soviets arc organizing airmobile units of battalion or regimental size. They are probably structured and armed along the lines ofunils but with enough organic helicopters lo lift tlie entire unit.
he Soviels coniinue lo add to their miliiary air transport capabilities. There are now as manyedium transports assigned to military transport
SCCRCT
units, ol whichreubs.l (he latter provide the main intcrtheatcr lift for theater forces and haveain mission tbe support of airborne troops. These could lift assault elements of two airborne divisions for airdropadius of. Some Cubs have improved range and weight-carryingf these could liftaratroops with supporting equipmentadius ofaximum range. In an emergency, this lift capability could be augmented by other military transport and by medium- and long-range aircraft in the Soviet Civil Air Fleet-
he range and payload limitations of thcnderscore the importance of tbe neweavy transport; which can canyounds of cargoroopsadius ofm.angem. The Erst few of these aircraft are now iu service; someould be operational byith thehe Soviets would be able to airlift all types ofassignedotorized rifle division.
Amphibious Assault and Sealift
Wc estimate there are currently0 men in the naval mfantiy. organized into brigade-size units, with two brigades located in the Baltic Fleet, two brigades in the Black Sea Fleet, one brigade in the Pacific Ocean Fleet, and one brigade in the Northern Fleet. The naval infantry's missions are apparently to assist in seizing critical beachheads and to conduct diversionary operations on the seawardmall force of naval infantry has been present from time to tune in thc Mediterranean sincehey have conducted several landing exercises, suggesting that thc Soviets may intend to use tlieoken intervention force.
Tlie current small number of landing ships in each of thc fleet areas restricts thc landing force to battalion- or brigade-size. New landing ships with greater speed, operating range, and capacity arc being built, however, and there will probably be an increase in the strength of thc naval infantry.
9d. In addition to their miiitaiy sealift capability, thc Sovietsarge merchant fleet ofargo ships capable of transporting substantial quantities of miUtary equipment and supplies. However, sealift by merchant ships in most cases would require the use of ports. Considerable time might be required to gather suitable merchant shippingajor effort, since aboutercent of active Soviet merchant ships are normally outside Communist waters.
VII. THE CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES General Considerations
boutears ago thc Sovietsilitary poBcy which sought to create East European theater forces of sufficient size and quabty to meet in large measure their requirements for combat-ready units in place opposite NATO. This policy provided for aboutast European divisions andombat
SCCRCT
aircraft deployed from the Black Seahe Baltic. Along wali theoviet divisions andoviet aircraft then stationed in East Europe, these forces would bear the initial brunt of war with NATO.
This policy was probably attractive lo economy-minded Soviet political leaders, since it reduced the peacetime requirement for combat-ready Soviet forces- Tlir cost of the large nalional forces was to bc borne by the Eastthemselves, who were expected to purchase most of their arms from thc USSR. It was probably much less attractive to those Soviet military leaders who would have preferred to rely on their own forces rather than on allies. There was no integrated Warsaw Pact command and stall structure; command of the East European forces was vested in tbe various national Ministers of Defense. Under this arrangement, which stilt largely persists, the military viability of the new policy rested squarely on thc political rcliabihty of thc East European regimes. Soviet marshals may have considered that the examples of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Hungary put in question thc reliability of such regimes, but would have found it awkward to argue the point
5 strong military forces had been created in most of the Eastcountries, but strong currents of nationalism were straining tbe political solidarity of the East Europeans with Moscow. Tbe Czech crisis3 is but the latesteries of developments putting in question thc reliability of East EuropeanHungarian insurrection, Romanian insubordination, thc abortive Bulgarian coup, and Polish military disgrunUcmcnt at involvement ln thc Middle East crisisnly the Ulbricht regime in East Cermanyrelatively free from signs of unreliability.
Ironically, thc Warsaw Pact's first real military operation was directedember country. Czechoslovakia, in order toomestic polilical lendency that had alarmed the East Cerman. Polish, and Soviet regimes, but had been encouraged by Hungary and Romania (andho repercussions of this event have been unsettling in Eastern as well as Western Europe; it not only stimulated anti-Soviet popular sentiment, but also caused dissension within the Polish and Hungarian parties and governments. Although the fate of Czechoslovakia is likely to discourage any East European regime from asserting its national independence in opposition to Soviet interests for some time to come, the Soviets have reason to question the political reliability of those regimes and their armed forces.
Ground Forces"
European line divisions are generally patterned on the Sovietthere arc substantial variations in some countries. In general.field armies do not exist as separate entities In peacetime, butground forces conduct army-level exercises, and some front-levelprobably exist in peacetime. In wartime, armies would be formed during
* for numbers and readiness levels of East European pound divisions, see Table V.
77
mobilization from staff elementi and units of the territorial inilitary comniaeds; they would contain from throe to five division* and combat and service support units, and would bc similar to the Soviet combined arms aranes-
ew if any. of the Eastdivisions are maintained at full strength during peacetime. The best of those would containercent reservists after mobilization. Some of ll* lower strength and newly activated units wouldercent reservists as fillers- Like thc Soviets, thc East Europeans would require significant numbers ol reservists in order to form army- and front-levcl units.
Air Forces'
Judged in the light of equipment, training, and normalasi European air forces arc largely fo. national ai. defense. Ofombat aircraft, almost all are interceptors. Tho proportion of new model aircraft to East European air forces has Increased from ono-quarter last year to one-third now through thc delivery of new fighters. Almost all aircraft delivered to.thes fcart Europeans during the past two years have been all-weather Mig-Zl (Fuhbed) interceptors.
Czechoslovakia. Poland, and Bulgaria have ground attack air regimenis. but only the Czechsignificant number of new model grouid attack fighters (SU-TJ The Polo have mostly older models in the ground attack roles; thehave two regiments of. All East European fighter regiments, however, are cross-trained, probably to about the same extent as in Sovietair units.
There areast European radar stations. These stations are equipped with the same types of radars employed by Soviet forces. Each nation operates its own ai, warning and conuol system. We do not know how warning and control information is coordinated among the several East European systems and those of the Soviet theater lorces, but such coordination almost
certainly
Naval Force*'
ast German and Polish naval capabilities continue to improve with the. acquisition of more modem equipment and llie broadening of operationalwhile those of Romania and Bulgaria have lagged- Warsaw Pact Interfleet coordination has iricreased and East European navies may bcreater role The East German and Polish Navies have prime responsibility for surwil lance of the Danish Straits. Polish sul-marines and surface forces have operated both irtdepcodently and wiih Soviet units in the North and rJorwegUn Seas and in the waters west cf the British Isles; Bulgarian unils have operated wiih the Soviets in the Mediterranean.
For numberi aed type* ol Emit European combat ainraft. see Table VLFee nombeti and type, ol EaMiu. see TaWe VO.
VIM. THEATER WARFARE CAPABILITIES Mobilization
t- Soviets continue tn place heavy reliance on large-scale mobibzation in their theater warfare planning Scene Soviel military spokesmen dxl argue that man mobilization and reinforcement are infeasiblc under general nuclear war conditions, but their views have not prevailed. The Soviets have assumed onf tension prior to any ma)o< war which would provide time forThoy have stressed speed of mobilization and reduced the heavyon raiboads for deployment.
he Soviet conscription and reserve system provides more than adequate total numbers of relatively young reservists to Besb out all divisions However, in tlie interests of speed of mobilization, the combat units draw their reservists from tlm civilian population in Ihe immediate vicinity of their peacetimeThese- reservists are designated by name by the local voyenkomati (militaryesult, quickly mobilized Soviet units would probably contain some enlisted reservists In older age groups.
The Soviel reserve syslem calls for frequent mobilisation eaerdses and periods of active duty for reservists. If tbe practice in oneivision is typical, however. It appears that such exercises are infrequent and reservistprobably consists of lectures to reserve officers. There is some evidence that lessons learned from mobilization for the invasion of Czechoslovakia have prompted new emphasis on practice mobiUzation und reserve training.
Tbc Soviet mobilization system can probably flesh out all divisionsCategory IIIew daysobilization order and have them ready lo move. In situations where speed of reinforcement is tbe overriding factor, mobilized divisions would be deployed regardless ol Iheir equipment status.
The Soviets relycll-organr/ed system for mobilizing civiliantransport to offset the shortage of general purpose trucks in the ground lorces. Portions of Soviet city motor pooh are earmarked for military use. Trucks and buses manned by reservists arc formed into military transport columns which report to nearby divisions upon mobilization, where they arc reassigned to various units Most of Ihese Sucks probably serve as logistic support vehicles, but some are used in place of APCs. Army- and /ronf-level truck transport units aremobilized similarly. The biggest drawback to this system is that, on thc whole, the mobilized trucks are not well-suited for military use, particularly with regard lo off-road mobility.
Thc Soviets also plan to draw directly from tbe civilian economy other types of supporting, engineer construction, raiboad, signal andunits. Ihey apparently do not count on quick mobilization of new unitsa high degree of specialized military training, such as Tactical Aviation and missile units, although there Isairly large pool of trainedto servo as Gllers and replacements for standing units.
Soviet efforts to avoid ovcr-rcliance on railroads for deployment are evident in the formation of several military district-level tank transporter units. Tank transporters were used to move tracked vehicles into Eastern Europethe invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tlierc arc probably enough now available in thc western USSH to carry thc tanks of three or four tank divisions.
artial mobilization, time permitting, thc Soviets would probably reassign major items of equipment from units not being mobilized to fillul olher units. Such redistribution of equipment occurred during the partial mobilization for the invasion of Czechoslovakia
. Tlie Soviets apparently base at least part of their longer termplanning on thc Category HI or "cadre" divisions. Ihese divisions would probably be filled upombination of reservists and new conscripts, but would remain partially equipped and would generally contain older cquipmenl pending new wartime production.
Against Europe
tin- prime contingency underlying Warsaw
Pact force posture in Eastern Europe and tbc western USSR basATO aitack. Warsaw Pact forces were to blunt this attack and then destroy NATO forcesassive counterattack using quickly mobilized reserves. Prior to thc, thc Soviets assumed that any war with NATO would be nuclear from the outset, and they fielded theater forces designed to survive and fight in the wake of nuclear holocaust. In recent years, however,!
Jan assumption that tlie NATO attack would, at least
initially, be non-nuclear.
Soviet theater force strength in Europe is concentrated opposite IheRegion of NATO. In East Germany. Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the Soviets maintainombat ready divisions andombat aircralt. The East Germans. Poles, and Czechs can provide an additionalull strength divisionsay or soobibzation orderombat aircraft immediately.
Thc Soviets apparently consider remote the bkelihooduddenof hostilities requiring thc Warsaw Pact to fight without rcinrbreenient. They base their pbinning on the assumptioneriod of pre-bostibties tension and mobilization on both sides, andarge number of divisions in thc border MDs of the USSR which can be mobilized and readied to move westward quickly. Thc East Europeans model tbeir mobilization system after tbc Soviet example.
We have good evidence from documents and defectors about Warsaw Pact goals for the scope and speed of reinforcement in Central Europe. According to tlds evidence, the Warsaw Pact would seek to confront NATOarge force at thc outset ol hostilities. We liave no direct evidence as to the total size oforce, but on the basis of availability of forces wc believe it would probably consistivisions organized intor more armies and five fronts. They
-seefltf-
would wish to assemble suchforce nnd have il prepared for combat in about two weeksobiliutmn ordea. Tbe Soviet) and tome of their Eastallies have vigorously attempted lo achieve the Warsaw Pact mobilization and reinforcement goal despair limitation* on revoairces available and the polilical struggles in Eastern Europe; by8ad come dose to reaching thai goal
Priorhe Czochosiovukian crisishe Warsaw planningcalled for lhe deploymenl of Ihree key first echelon fronts opposite NATOailerew days.urs would have containedoviel andast Euiopean combat-ready divisions The centiaJ front (the main effort) consisting of GSFC and some East Cerman lotraationf would have been complete The northern and southern /routs composed primaiily of Polish and Czech forces would have lagged behind the centra! front in the readiness of army- and front-Icvcl support because of the requirement for mobilization. Within aboulays, up todditional divisions drawn from thc USSR could have beenwiih minimum essential army- and front-level support in eastern Poland and Czechoslovakia These forces would have constituted (be two frontsecond stralegic echelon. Tactical air reinforcement from the western USSR would require little if any mobilization, and could be deployed into Eastern Europeatter of hours.
The situation which has evolved since thc invasion of Czechoslovakia has probably altered Warsaw Pad reinforcement planning with respect to the Czech front. For the near lerm, thc Soviets probably do not count on tho Czechs to form an effective and reliable front, although Ihey have not disposed Iheir divisions to lake over Czech positions opposite NATO. Moreover, ihe Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia are not large enough fonarmy- and /ronf-levcl support is roinin-.al and combat air support consists of onlyighters- In the eventudden military confrontation with NATO the Soviets would have to rely on Ihe Czechs hacked up by the Central Croup of Forces. If Ihe Soviets were toenous military confrontation with NATO tliey would probably expedite the forward movement of lhe front from the Carpathian MD to reinforce or lake over the southern front.
In current circumstances, and with ipeed the primary requirement, the Warsaw Pact could in about two weeks assemble the key combat elements of Eve fronts (including the Czechs) opposingin the first echelon and two in Ihc second. The complete integration of divisions into effective armies and fronts would require more lime.ituation where offensive capabilily against NATO (rather than maximum speed) was the prime coiisideralion, iho Soviets would almost certainly take al leasl three weeks lo complete mobilization and forward deployment to concentration areas in Eastern Europe.
Tbis force when assembled would probably containercent of them0onventional artilleryombat0 in air defense regimentsn ground attack or reconnaissance regiments) and upudear capable tactical missile
31
SCCRCT
and rocketSee Tablen the event of nuclear theaterWarsaw Pact forces opposing NATO could be supported by tlie massive MRBM/IRBM missile forces and tbe medium bombers ol LHA localcd in (he western USSR. Iu non-nuclear warfare, the medium bombers wuuld piobably provide conventional bombing support. These lorces would possess formidable capabilities for nuclear and non-nuclear offensive or defensive tlrratet warfare. They would be best suited for nuclear warfare for which they are basically designed Tbe force would be less effective lor sustained conventional operations.
Should the Soviets elect lo execute the above described build-up against NATO, they would probably also mobilize their forces opposite Scandinavia and the southern flank of NATO for contingencies in those areas. In lhe latter area, only tha Bulgarians are likely to contribute to offensive action; supported by tho Soviet theater forces from the Odessa MD, tbey could launch an offensive against Greece and European Turkey.
We have reason to believe (hat (he Soviets wouldorward theater of operations headquarters somewhere in Eastern Europeain theater headquarters in one of Ihe border MDs of tbe USSR. We believe that tbe theater commander would direct all operations against NATO Europe; be would probably liave in strategic reserve Soviet theater forces from (he Kiev and Moscow MDs.
Against China
12d. Until recent years, tbe development of capabibties to cope withmilitary contingencies held overriding priority in Soviel theater lorces. However,5 thc Soviets have been building up strong theater forces along the Sino-Soviet border. By (he endhere were aboutivisionsnear thc Chinese border; aboutf (bcm were probably combat ready. Further, (he ground forces io the Far East and the Transbaykal MDs were acquiring army- and front-level artillery supportcale which exceeded that provided Soviet forces in East Cermany. Tactical air support had about doubled; (here are nowombal aircraft In the TAAs.
he vigorous military build-up opposite China was continued, including the construction of aufiolds and ground force installations. Wc have evidence nf one new division and additional ground force elements which. If all were associated with divisions, would increase tbe total toelieve that at leastf (he dirisions are nowombat ready status. As further evidence of tbe build-up, tbc Soviets have carvedew Central Asian MD from (he Turkestan MD.
In Turkestan and in the Siberian. Transbaykal. and Far East MDs there aredditional divisions at varying degrees of readiness. The Soviets could use reinforcing units from thc western USSR against China. Border guard units
above described fen* Include* Godi ab and groundt line, not include Warsaw Part forms in Hungary.
opposite China add considerable combat potential. They number0 men. and some arc equipped a* well or better than regular unlit. There are six Mongolian divisions which would support Soviet theater forces in any major conflict with China- At least one theater of operations headquarters wouldbe established in the even! of major hostilities with China.
he Sovicl forces deployed against China provide Ibe capability lur either nuclear or non-nuclear warfare in Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, and Manchuria. They do not provide thc capabililyustained conventional war deep inside China. The heavy tactical nuclear missile rapport provided these forcesoviet readiness to resort to nuclear weaponsafor conflict with China.
IX. TRENDS9 Theater Forces
12S. There is currently an unusual degree of uncertainty in estimating future trends in Soviet theater farces. The extent of Soviet coocern for thc possibility of conflict with China could have far-reaching effects on all Soviet theater forces-Soviet views of Ihe prospects for and probable nature of war in Europe are also unclear. The cost of theater forces has increased sharply in recent years. The build-up of forces in the remote areas along live Sino-Soviet border Is especially costly. Thc paucity of reserves in those areas necessitates high peacetime unit strengths; the distances from industrial centers necessitate expensive long haul logistics opera lions. Moreover, in allocating resources to theater forces, themust consider the competing demands of their strategic forces. And this competition for resources between theater forces and strategic forces claimants might intensify or diminish, according to lhe falc of the arms conirol negotiations and the development of polilical rclalionshijii in lhc world generally.
he current trend in Soviet (heater forces toward improved capabilities for nonnuclear warfare will probably continue. Higher scales of artillery support will probably be provided to at least some of the reinforcing armies and divisions inside Ihe USSR. Further Soviet emphasis on conventional capabilities would probably resultubstantial increase In the ground force logistics structure (more and better truck transport, more logistics support personnel, heavier maintenanceigher ratio of infantry to tanks in divisions, and larger ground reconnaissance units. Tactical Aviation would probably acquire aircraft capable of delivering much more weight of conventional ordnance to greater ranges The logistics support and maintenance elements of Tactical Aviation would probably be enlarged and stockpiles of conventional nir ordnance would bc sharply increased.
Deployments
e have no evidence to suggest any change in Soviet theater forces deployed in Eastern Europe. Even if the Soviels should conclude that (heof war Ino longer great enough to rationabVo tlicir current
33
dcployments. Ihey would retain sizable forces in Eastern Europe to enforce their hegemony in the area.
evidence suggests lhat at leastnd IIbo maintained in thc immediate Sino-Soviet border area. Tacticalopposite China will probably continue to growr soand light bombers may be added over the next year or so. Most ofwill probably be reactivated older models, although there may betransfers of tactical air units from the western USSR and thc deliverynuw model aircraft. The total ground forces may grow either in termsor supporting units.
Ground Force Equipment
The Soviets probably will continue the production of2 medium tank, with probable nvodifieations, at least through theew model medium tank may then begin entering the forces.9 the Soviet tank park will probably consist of roughlyndT-SSs.ew model tank is produced, it could by that time makeoercent of the Inventory.
Tlie Soviets will probably gradually equip infantry units in at least some of theivisions with the new AA1CV on the basis of one per squad. They will probably enter inventory at the rate ofer year. If the AAICV enters inventoryide scale, it will increase the firepower ofrifle units rigiuficantly. It will also probably cause broad changes in the Soviet ground force logistics and maintenance support structure.f not all. oldndPCs will be out of inventory. Reduced strength divisions will probably be equipped primarilyombination ofTR-GOp, and general purpose trucks as personnel carriers for tbenf this estimate.
Tbe Soviets arc almost certainly experimenting with improved (highonventional weapons. Some munitions of this type are probably now in inventory; within two or three years the Soviets could have sizableinventories of improved conventional artillery shells, bombs, and missile warheads in theater force units.
We believe that the Soviets will retain their current family of tactical missiles and that the number of tactical launchers will continue to grow. Barber model Scud launchers will be replaced with the new, wheeled version. The Scaleboard will probably be deployed in the areas of all major potential fronts, All potential /rents may be assigned Shaddock cruise missiles.
Tactical Aviation and Air Defense Equipment
here will probably be further increases in Tactical Aviation over the next few years through deployments along the Chinese border and/or theof new tactical air regiments in the low strength TAAs in thc western USSR.
Ove* lhe longer term tlie total inventory of Soviet Uctical Bircrnfl ii dependent in part upon thu level of non-nuclear capability ihey wish lo attain and upon the aircraft developed to meet thai requirement. We beLeve thai by9 there will beombat aircraft in Tactical Avialion
hc primary requirement for new aircraft for Tactical Avialion isof the obsolescent ground attack fighter and light bomber force, lhe Soviets have several new aircraft under development which could satisfy theseOne ol these, Flogger,ariable sweep-wing aircraft which offers speed, range, nnd dispersal advantage; over cuiient lightenimilar payload; it could have nil all weather intercept as wellround atlack capabilily. Flogger may become operational in Tactical Aviation units1 Thc eaTOL developmenl programs arc evidenceoviet requirement for an air-craft with improved take-off and Landing performanceould beinto Tactical Aviation2 to meet this requirement, although its payload and radius of operation arc very liiiulcd. If, as is more Lkcly, the Soviets elect to defer deploymentTOL fighter pending development ol one withperfonnancc, such an aircraft will probably not enter operational inventory. Tho all-weatherFishbed) interceptor is expected to bc the mainstay of tactical air defense units for the period of tills cslimate.
nother new aircraft, thc Fuxbal could significantly Improve the range and load-carrying capabilities of Tactical Aviation. Although it will almostbe deployed with strategic defense forces as an interceptor, variants of tbe Foxbat may be developed as tactical stiike and reconnaissance aircraft as well, replacing some Beagles and Brewers If such development is pursued, Foxbat could begin to enter thc inventory of Tactical Aviationears. The Foxbat is one of the largest and clearly thc most expensivethus lar developed by the Soviets. Therefore we believe flint the rate of delivery to Tactical Aviation svould he slower than with previous models.
he Soviets will continue lo expand and improve thetr theater aircommand and control systems and will attempt lo overcome the problems posed by the language barriers within the Warsaw Pact and the vulnerability of current systems to saturation Developments will probably include expansion of data transmission systems, computeriulion of control of manned interceptors, and better coordination between SAM and Interceptor defenses.
hcalcr air defenses will continue to improve through tbc deployment of new missile systems. We believe that deployment of theill continueoro years. In thc earlymost of thc Soviel .unties will have at least oneegimentull launchers and some armies in Eastmayegiments. Deployment ol liveill probably not extend to echelons below thc army level
he low altitudeystem probably will enter service wiihin the next Iwo or three years. More mobile than the cumbersomet probably possesses significantly improved low-allitude intercept capabilities, possibly be-
eet. I( will probably be cleployed along wiih thcor the defense of Ihe amiy and ils divisions.
The Soviets will probably continue to wort; on the low altitude tactical air defense problem. Al present, they rely on ught AAA. some of it radar directed, for intercept of targetseet. We believe they are capable ofighl, short-range SAM. possibly employing intermediate-range homing guidance, for low-altitude defense.ystem probably would not be available beforeriod.
The deployment of thendystems will strengthen <onsidcr-ably Ibe air defenses of tbe theater forces. Thend SA-u. which togetherapability to intercept targetsect ai very slrort rangeson the orderp to0 feet,ignificant improvement in mobility over thcndystems.
Naval Forces
believe that thc Soviet Navy will continue Io improve itsemphasis on the role of die submarine aod that Its operation on lhewill increase but that there will be no appreciable chango In theits missions. Beyond this, however, the Sovicls probably foreseesituations wherein the navy can assist state interests without-conflict. In suchmall Soviet naval presence couldinfluence far beyond that warranted by its intrinsic military capabilities.expect more frequent Soviet naval visits to ports and harbors of theSoviet policy will also derive considerable support from llie capacitya mdilary presence in some areas, sometimes ineterrent effect on the will of others, including tbc US, toOn the otheroviet decision to develop balancedfor sustained, long-range operations against substantial oppositiona major change in thc role of the Soviel Navy and would causein its composition. It would involve the addition of substantial forceslogistic and combat support, particularly air cover; itholly new spectrum of military and technical problems;be very expensive. For these reasons, wc think it unlikely lhat thedevelop any significant capabilities ol this kind durings.
n tbcs we believe the force of major surface combatants will be about tbe same size as it is now. However, the percentage of missile ships will probably double to anercent5 by retirement of some older sliips, conversion of others to missile slups, and new construction. Although no helicopter ships are known to be under construction, lhe Sovieis, after thoroughly evaluating Ihe Moskva class, may construct additional hcucopter-carrying ships for ASW. If the Soviets plan to build additional ships of lids typo the nexl unit could not be operational
36
Attack submarine programs will probably conlinuc to emphasize improved ASW capabilities and nuclear propulsion. We estimate that the annualof attack submarines will reachnits (atf which will be nuclear-powered) by tbes. One or more new classes will probably appearIne addition of new aitack submarines will be more than offset by the retirement of the numerous medium-range units; thus, thc number of attack submarines will probably decline by aboutercent9 but the proportion of nuclear and long-range diesel units will Increase substantially.
The problem of ASW obviously looms large to thc Soviets. During thc next decade Ihey will continue and probaMy expand tbeir efforts to develop organizational concepts, weapons, and techniques to counter the threat posed by US submarines, particularly Polaris. Tlieir eapabililies will improveas new detection and weapon systems arc installed more widely throughout the navy (see paragraphsnd a* the number of their attack submarines with improved ASW capabilities grows.
These developments will not solve Ihc main problem, however, wliich is toependable capability to detect, localize, and classify submarines operating in the open ocean. Tho Soviets do not possess Ihe large number of ships and long-range ASW aircraft which, if properly equipped, miglit conductsurveillance over great areas of thc sea. With respectixed long-range detection system like that employed by the US, tlie Sovieis at present not only lag behind the US in technology but labor under certain geographicwhich makeystem less workable for tliem than for the US (seeccordingly, it seems likely lhat any basic improvement in Soviet ASWan improvement as would gravely impair thc value of Polaristrategicarise only from technologicalconcerning which we cannotseful estimate.
Short of more complete success, however, we believe that5 tbe Soviets will probably have the capability to detect and track some nuclearIbis capability will be greatest in the vicinity of narrow or restricted passages such as arc found in the Mediterranean and Norwegian Seas wherecapabibties may be concentrated. Detection in the open ocean would result almost entirely from chance encounters, which will nevertheless become more probable because of the increase in Soviet naval operations generally.
East European Forces
will be qualitative improvements in East European generalforces over the next decade, but we see no trends which indicatechanges in their contribution to Warsaw Pact capabilities,political developments, we believe that thc Soviets will continueheavy emphasis on East European forces opposing NATO,tlie Central Region.
SCCRCT'
D1STR1 HUTION Ol- SOVIET CROUND DIVISIONS BY TVPE
STIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS, BY LO-CATION AND TYPE AS9
TABLE III : ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
TABLESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES BYY FLEET
STIMATED STRENGTH AND READINESS OF EAST EU-ROFEAN CROUND DIVISIONS
TABLESTIMATED NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL EASTCOMBAT AIRCRAFT9 AND PROJEC TIONS01
II : ESTIMATED NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST EU ROPEAN NAVAL VESSELS BYY COUNTRY
TABLE VIII: WARSAW PACT GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AVAIL ABLE FOR EARLY COMMITMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE
o
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41
TADLK II
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS. BY LOCATION AND TYPE AR9
c
itch Ml ov akin
MD
.
MD
MD
4
MD
MD
Ml).
.
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390
.
art ateotear model aircraft in rtaer*e, and anombat-type aircraft iu training
wen alto, atctoberlder model aircraft collocated with tactical uniti.ity or theee may be optf*-uonalij aattarvrd to TAF croccd attack otutt.
D il uted (or rrcM&aataanc* only, and baa no eorrbat tapabnity. For tbit rationncluded witb iheangrovethan with theight bomber variant* of tbe
total include* an allowance0 Foxbnt whirh may enter inventory
TABLE III
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OP SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT (AS
aiio-17 mio 19 uio-31 so-7 p it-28 vak-as
Air 01 M 23
Ground ..
Light .. .. ,. 2t7 .. .. .. IS'J
See paragraphf text (or flisiutaion ol crou-training ol Tactical Aviation unjl*.
TABLE IV
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET CENERAL PURPOSE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES BYY FLEET
Cruiae-MiWile Submarine*
3
Diesel <in<rai wiih 4
Atlack Submarine*
Long-Range
Medium-Rnne*
Short-Rangc
Unknown
Operational Surface- Ships
SAM/SSM Light
SAM Light
Helicopter
SSM
SAM
Reserve Surface Ships
Includes three in the Caspian Sea.
o
s
i<
Ti
6
'0 3
7 1
Baltic buck facitic total
19
3 20
8
!i
I
37
3 1
3
11
:'.
5
93
21 24
55
1
3
7
0 1
1
m3
217
4
A
2S
43
TABLE V
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND READINESS OF EAST EUROPEAN CROUND DIVISIONS
ITHEWOTH
Eaal
TOTAL DIVISION*
0
10
9
12
58
Available
I'1
IBM ABIT HDD
10
TABLE VI
ESTIMATED NUMBERS OP OPERATIONAL EAST EUROPEAN COMBAT AIRCRAFT9 AND PROJECTIONS01
Bulgaria.
Ciochodorokia EM Germany.
Hungary
Poland
Romania
.
WIG 21
riTTBB
. ii'iir.
IKRSCO
BEAOIX
305
0
--SECRET-
TABLE VII
ESTIMATED NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST EUROPEAN NAVAL VESSELS BY'Y COUNTRY
fei
Are*
Sea Area
grtflMAMI
h 11
Type*
MUsile Patrol BoaU
Torpedo Boats
Patrol Boat*
Ships
i
Figure* in parentheses are nugaienting tout guard units, which now operate in close coordination with the Navy.
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is
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