EUROPE, THE U.S., AND THE USSR (NIE 20-1-69)

Created: 12/4/1969

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

49

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Europe, the US, and the USSR

OA HSSfOamfiOG^-ItrlBVSEJNRJlL

DIRECrOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Contwried in bf tht UNITEO STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

A.

49

Tht toiiowing intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimatei

Tha Centralgancy ondInialEgonc* organ-rat iora ot (he Depart-t'iiIi of State and Dri'tnio, ond ttia NSA.

Concurring!

Dr. R. J. Smith, far lha Dfpur, Dv-oeior. Cantrol IntaUQonca

Mr. IKomc. Llha DVaoor of In'allJaence ond OetearaX hMM of Stat*

U. OeiortoO.eev. r. (Menu ImalL^enca Agency U. Geo. Monhol S. Carter.Wor. NofionoJ Secv.iry Agency

A.lor iha Aimwm Ga-.roleCom-

Abstaining,

Mr. Wilson O. Crager. lor theederal Bureau ofrha mbjerf being outildt ol hu iumdidlon.

mis doGuaenc htt Dtin approTBd for. ralaasa through the HISTORICAL Jims* PROGRAM ol the Cantral Intelncy.

Pat*

HBP

CONTENTS

DISCUSSION

I. THE STATE OF WESTERN EUROPE

A. Materia! Success and Psychological Unrest

II SPoliciesations

France

The UK

West Cerinany

G European Integration Status, Proapecti. Implicahons

II. WESTERN EUROPE AND THE US

A. The Political Relationship

B The Ecooomic ReUtionvhip

C. Tlie Security Relationship

AND THE USSR

A. Soviet Policy

II. The Situation In Eastern .

Popular Attitudes and LeadershipOutlook lor Political Change

!i Outlook lor East-West Trade

AND CONTINGENCIES

. 1

1

1

. 3

. 6

0

11

34 15

16

SEgWET

EUROPE, THE US, AND THE USSR

NOTE

As the title suggests, this estimate deals with broad trends in Europe and in European attitudes toward the two super powers. It isurvey of all intra-European relationships. Thc estimateour lo five-year period. Its principal conclusions are found in.

DISCUSSION

which was the original scene of thc "coldasather considerable political stability, both in terms ofpolitics and state relations. But during thc past year or two aevents have occurred which have raised the question of whether newbe operating on the European scene. Among these events were thestrikes in France in May and8 and the subsequentde Gaulle. Socialist leadershipesl Cerman government for thea rising social malaise in Italy,most significant ofin Czechoslovakia which culminated in thc Soviet invasion. Thesequestions, not only about the continued applicability and durabilityinstitutional arrangements as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but alsopossibility of changes which might challenge the basic assumptionsthe policies of the major powers.

I. THE STATE OF WESTERN EUROPE

A. Material Succoss and Psychological Unrost

Europe today Is more prosperous, more democratic, andthan at any time in modern history. In the past two decades ItsUKsurpassed most forecasts, andis more pervasive than ever before. Indeed, the economicthc major countries are so alike and so interdependent that thederail arc less striking than die fundamental similarities; all arc mixedwhich arereater or lesser exlent welfare states grafted uponneither wholly "capitalist" nor whollyonsequence, many

ol lhe economic arguments which formerly distinguished Left from Right have become blurred. Both now largely accept the mixed economy and each merely claims to be able to manage it better than thc oilier. Nevertheless, prosperity and technological advance have not eroded all ihe old antagonisms and have helped to create others, including the generation gap.

In Ihe past decade, the pace and extent of economic and social change throughout Western Europe have acceleiated. An educational syslem designed for an elite of gentlemen is slowly being supplanted hy one intendedass of technocrats andhousands of small and medium-sized businesses have been absorbed by larger enterprises. The percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture has appreciably declined and will decline slil) further. This evolution in social structure and economic organisation has been only imperfectly reflected in the political system.esult, some states (France. Italy) have suffered serious unrest which could recur. Others (Spain, Portugal) haveifficult transitioness rigid system.

lt is possible that extremists would see in these difficulties opportunities either to turn the clock back or toevolution by thc extreme left. It is unlikely that radical leftist governments wiil come to power in tlie absenceevere economic depressionollapse of political authority: most of Ihe workers are interestedetter share of the pie, not revolution; thc "new left" is small, fragmented, and isolated; the major Communist parties have as their immediate goal tooalition government, not to destroy the political system. Except in Spain and Portugal, svhere the extreme right has the capability to stifle political and economic evolution, the radical right is small, if not moribund; it woulderious social crisis to revive it.

Despite economic prosperity and greater internal stability and externalensation of drift and dissatisfaction has arisen in Western Europe. Thc great political projects which formerlyense of mission to political leaderseeling of participation in major undertakings to thoir followers nosv seem at best to be Utopian or distant: supranational, federal Europe, "Caullist" Europe, Atlantic "partnership" willi (he US, Cerman reunification through free elections. In the meantime, the bureaucratic problems of managed economies and the subtle maneuvers of coalition politics arouse eitheror boredom, but not enthusiasm.

Political leaders are disconcerted by the attacks of intellectuals and middle class students who condemn the "establishment" (in which they Include die Communist Party) but who know better how to castigate existing institutions than how to improve them. Neither Ihe "establishment" nor its attackers seem able to galvanize mass or elite supportauseoal; both arc frustrated and uneasy. The depth of frustration svas demonstrated in Paris in8 and in various acts of violence in Italybe trend toward violence and demonstrations, which for the most part is neither influenced nor condoned by the parlies of lhe left, raises difficult questions about thc

SEfRET

diameter and direction of modern polilical (or quasi-political) activityrelevance lo existing constitutional structures. How Iheseaffect foreign policy and international relations is not easy lodoes seem lo be emerging,rowing belief,younger people, that the established ideologies, the traditionalpolitical activity, and Ihe historic nvalrtes among nations areand Irrelevant lo the real concerns of the individual and theof society. This is not to say that these ideologies, patterns, andabout to be swept away; all may well survive, bul Ihey will be fociand

B. National Policies ond Preoccupations: France, lhe UK, Germany

rnnce. Do Caulleisionew missionurope united behind French leadership. He dreamedEuropeanonfederation of nation-states led by France, excluding thc UK, independent of lhe US and the USSB, able to resist the "hegemonies" of both, and at the same time capable of restraining and containing Germany. He was able to block UK entry into tho European Community, bul lie svas unable to rally other European states behind his vision of Europe's future or Io convince the US or the USSR to accept France's pretensions to great power status In Ihese basic respects. French foreign policy, at least during de Caulle's tenure, thus fdl well short of achieving his major objectives

3 Nevertheless, his successor probably agrees wiih Ihe principles which informed that polics. although he will be less abrasive in attempting to apply il and more open to compromise on secondary issues. France after de Gaulle will continue to be jealous of Its sovereignty and anxious to demonstrate that it has notocile member of the "Anglo-Saxonhis consideration precludes the return of France lo NATO's Intcgraled military structure. Thc forte He dissuasion, begun under the Fourth Republic, is al once the most visible hallmark of French sovereignty anil Franco's most tangible claim lo great power status. The composition ol this strategic nuclear force may be altered and its completion ddayed. but it will neither be scrapped nor integrated inanner as to diminish French control over it. Any US or "European" proposal which might give Germany the possibility of participating as an equal nuclear partner wouldtrong French reaction. Tne Cerman "problem" will remain the focus of French policy in Europe, and France will continue to support the conceptour Power responsihihtv for ils solution, or better, its crmlammeot France thus will be suspicious and resentful of US-USSR negotiations or German Soviet talks; at lhe same lime, France will remain jealous of lis special relationship with Wesl Germany whldieeseans of aligning German policy with French policy lo the greatest extent isossiblc.

pposition In enlargement of the European Community is Ihe single most important position laken by de Gaulle whidi his successor probably

3

SEMET

will discard. Thc French have agreed Io Ihe opening of negotiations on the British and other applications, but they are alio pulling pressure on their partners to adopt lhe agricultural and other policies scheduled lo be completed before the end of the transitional period. The French aim is io oblige ibe British and other applicants lor membership to choose entryommunity which they would have difficulty modifying to thc detriment of French agricultural and other interests ll is highly improbable, moreover, that France would agree to accept Community regulations and greaterauthority which would inhibit French diplomatic and commercial independenceli lhe Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The UK. For most ol the postwar period, the UK has sought toultiple role as junior partner and principal advisor lo the US, as theof Western Europe to the US and of ihe US to Western Europe, and as the spokesmanultiracial commonwealth with global Inleresls. The recurrent weakness of Ihc British economy lias made It impossible for tbc UK to sustain the varied and often contradictory positions inherent in these roles. British political influence in the Commonwealth countries that count in work) affairs has steadily declined and probably will decline still further. The 'special relationship' with the US (us Im much of lis psychological bold and in any case no longer confers upon the UK any indispensable benefits. Finally, the French drive to exclude the UK from continental Western Europe forced thc British to decide svhich of their roles would serve their interests best. Prime Minister Macmillan chose the European option1 and Prime Minister Wilson confirmed this choice

The British government is persuaded that entryuropeanoffers the UK its best chance toignificant role in world affairs in the future. In submitting their application, the British declared Iheirof the Treaty of Rome and. by implication, its tacit poliiical goals. But the official British attitudeolitically uniled Europe is still ambrvalenl. Both Macmillan and Wilson have explicitly re peeled suprarvalionalism. There is scant evidenceajority of British poUicians or Ihe British public has undergone conversion to lhe Monnet visionederal Europe. Indeed,from special inleresls to thc short-term economic costs have become shriller as the possibility of entry has come closer. Nevertheless, thc leaders of all British parties leel that they have no realistic alternative: ihey probably will accept full membership if tliey can obtain satisfactory transitionaluch areas as agricultural policy and Commonsvcalth preference*.

To obtain those coneesjions. the Brilish require thc continued support of Wesl Oermany. The British in years past so eagerly pursued any glimmer of detente with lhe Soviet Union lhal fhey often appeared to be vvilling toessential Cerman interests. More recently, lhe British have becomefirmer on preserving allied (and West German) rights in Berlin. UK caution on thc Cerman 'problem' and sensitivity lo Wesl German views are likely to continue so long as entryuropean Communityajor goal of British foreign policy.

:

est Gennaiuj. German foreign policy has largely achieved (wo of its principal postwar objectives: despite lingering but latent resentment in Western Europe over the Second World War and recent but growing uneasiness over German economic power, Cermanyespected and trusted member of the Atlantic Community, despite occasional misgivings in Gennany over Allied will-ingness to conciliate thc Sovicls at Cerman expense, West German security so far has been assured. In contrast, reunification o! the two Germanics remains as elusive and as remote as ever. The efforts toound political and security relationship with its Western partners, and at the same tune toeal Improvement in relations with East Germany, will present West Gennan diplomacy with its most severe tests in coming years.

M The Adenauer policy of subordinating reunification to reliance on US power and West European integration, and the Crand Coalition policy of attempting to put pressure on East Cermany and the USSR through apolicy in Eastern Europe, are now seen as inadequate. Moreover, the attitude of the West Cerman public toward East Cermany seems to haverofound change in the past several years; it is now at least tacitly acknowledged by most Germans that East Germany will not dissolve, or be allowed by the Soviets to dissolve,nited Germany runegime similar to that of the Federal Republic. Tlie West German government, while continuing sn Osipolilik more attuned to Soviel sensitivities and East Eumjiean realities, probably will pul primary emphasis on direct and parallel negotiations with the USSR, East Cermany, and Polandide range of specific issues. Provided the USSR, after considering East German interests, continues tothese efforts, Bonn may become less inclined lo defer to Western interests and views. This could lead to some disagreement and discord between West Germany on tho one hand, and its allies, particularly the US and France on the other, but the West Cerman government will continue to operate wllhin the framework of existing allied structures and agreements.

he new Otlpolitik. as it applies to East Cermany,ubtle and long-range policy, lt is subtle because itthe cumulative effect of agreements on functional problems ultimately will lower the political and human barriers between the Iwo Germanics, and it counts upon the East Cerman regime to cooperate to (his end II is long-range because, even under (he best of circumstances. i( would be some years before Ihese agreements and olher developments would begin to affect the nature of the East Cerman regime or alter its political relationship with tlie Federal Republic. In its effort lo improve relations with its Eastern neighbors, the West Germanprobably will agree to most East Cerman demands short of de fere recognition. But lhe East German leaders will be wary ol agreements thai would compromise their authorily or loosen Iheir grip on their population. The Soviets, svho iire opposed lo Geminn reunification and who have mixed feelings about East Cerman sovereignty, nevertheless share these coitcems. They therefore probably svill be receptive to East German arguments that

a genuine normalization ol relations between llie two Germanics would in the end undermine the Soviet position in Eastern Europe For iU part, the Federal Republic would hesitate to compromise relations with its EEC partners by reneging on past agreements or dragging its heels on proposals to make the Community more cohesive in the future These considerations place severe limits on the extent of cooperation and intimacyikely to evolvetlte Federal Republic and the East Cerman regime

C. European Integration: Status. Prospects. Implications

Ifi. Tlie European Economic Community (EEC)omplicated and ambitious attempt by sii nations of Western Europe to integrate their economic and commercial policies. Some olonsors and supporters also hoped (and still hope) that it would lay the foundationederalcapabln of recapturing for Westernajor role In world affairs. Since the EEC was establishedis members have abolished tariffs among themselves, agreedniform system of indirect taxalion, and removed most barriers to the free movement of lalior. Thc Sixroup have enjoyed higher rales of economic activity, trade, and growth thanlthough these achievements are not entirely due to tlie existence of the EEC. Intratrade has almost quadrupled.ommunity trade with the outside world exceeded that of the US.

espite these economic achievements, confidence in the fuiure of the Communityolitical entity isow ebb. There Is now lesslhat Ihe "logic" of the EEC will impose integrated policies on the member states and thai Ihc very complexity of those policies will require that they ultimately be administeredupranational authority possessing independent powers of decision. Since de Caulle left office, il has become evident that the obstacles to the political development of the Community derive from moro complex factor* than his abhorrence of supranationalism. Ono of the objectives which closer European cooperation was designed to promote has been accomplished; Europe is prosperous. But this prosperity has also reduced llie Impetus to extend cooperation into neiv and uncertain spheres. Defense policy, which mighlommunity function, is pie-emptcd by NATO. National government* lsesct by social and economic problems aie in any case reluctant to take steps which would irritate entrenched dotneslic lobbies and weaken their own authority. The lessened fear of communist itihveision and Soviel military aggression also has given new play to national interests. Theseamong others, have made the need for supranationalism lessand weakened the impetus behind tt.

ne of the the most pressing problems lhc Community faces concerns the entry of new members. The French have lifted their polilical veto on the admission of lhe UK. bul they have contended lhat lhe entry of additionalUK, Norway. Denmark, Ireland, and possiblymake the adoption of common policies more difficuli, slow down or even halt

further progress toward rnwnnic integration, and transform the Community into little rnoreegional trading bloc. It is difficult to challenge the logic of this argument, at least over the short term. On the other band, and with varying degrees of enthusiasm or conviction, Frances five partners have argueduropean Community was not meant to be restricted to six members and that Western Europe without the UK could never be independent of thc US or equal to it. This argumentequally difficult to challenge: thc UK would contribute significantly to the economic resources, military strength, and political influence necessary lo make the European Community at least potentially equivalent in power to the US.

Some compromise between these two conflicting views probably .will be made; many peoplo in Western Europe, including many in France, still have an emotional and political Investment In tho ideaunited" Europe. In an increasingly bureaucratic and technological world, it remains one of the few political concepts still capable of generating enthusiasm andIt is thus unlikely that the Community will stagnate indefinitely or that it will dissolve. Community efforts to increase and perfect intra-European cooperation will continue and expand, although the necessary compromises will probably dismay doctrinaire defenders of the Treaty of Rome If they persist, the UK and perhaps otber nations wiUuropean Community. Butong time to come this Community is likely to resemble tbc confederation de Caulk- had in mind more than the supranational government envisaged by Manner.

argerinherit some of the problems now bedeviling the nation-states Much of its energy would be absorbed by difficulties of internal organisation and administration- The Commissionimilar executive authority would be preoccupied wiihits authority and reputation for equitable dealing among itsnational and regional constituents. It is probable thatommunity would have little inclination or Interest in adding to its "domestic" problems by adopting "outward-looking" policios or by taxing its heterogeneousto pay for greater defense appropriations The member nations on occasion may find it easier to combine against tho US than to agreeolicy distasteful or harmful to one of iheir number. But enlarged or not. the European Community will lie no more than an economic union for some years lo come, with its members pursuing foreign policies based largely upon national interest.

II. WESTERN EUROPE ANO THE US

A, The Political Relationship

lthough the policies of the European states and the pace and extent of integration will be determined by tlie Europeans themselves, they will also be influenced by the altitudes and policies of the US. For tlie pastears, thc

US litis been thc single most important political, economic, and military (actor in Western Europe. In these circumstances, periodic tension and strainthe US and various nations over specific issues or general concepts is both natural and unavoidable. The US has been the guarantor of Westsecurity, the principal sponsor of Germany's political rehabilitation, the major source of technological progress, and thc mainstay of economic and financial stability. As such, it has been the target of criticism by some but of courtship by all.

Ihis is not to say, of course, that the West Europeans have been content to be courtiers. The drive for European unity derived in part from their dissatisfaction with this role,idespread recepliveness to Gaullist criticism of some USin anti-GaullistthisThere is no conceivable US policy which will satisfy all of the allies. They balked at certain US policies when they were economically impoverished, militarily helpless, and domestically unstable; surmounting these hazards has not made them any more amenable. In recent years, moreover, American prestige has declined because of Vietnam, the well-publicized domestic unrest in the US. and the widespread belief among younger members of the political elites that the US and the USSR are collaborators in defense of the status quo. Thus there will be no lack of disputes in the future; the inclusion of neutralsuropean Community, commercial and monetary questions, the recognition nf China, and negotiations with the USSR on East-West relations or European security will be among thc contentious issues over which the US and one or more of its allies svill frequently disagree.

Thc key question is whether disagreements on these matters couldegree of intensity likely to damage the present political relationship between thc US and Western Europe oraralysis or disintegration of the institutions through which it operates. In many respects, thc US and Western Europe alreadyased on many shared economic, political, and military interests- Although US weight in thc "community"NATO, the OECD, the IMF and its Croup oiless overwhelming than it svas and will become still less in the future, the ties between thc US and Western Europe are strong, extensive, and unlikely to disintegrate. On the other liaud, the relationship probably will become more delicate and more subject lo strain and misunderstanding. Europe's greater economic strength and independence, its reduced sense of danger, and its anticipationecline in the US military presence in Europe svill all contribute to some attenuation of US political influence. In these circumstances, it will prove to be more difficult than in the past to achieve common, or at least mutually acceptable, policies within NATO and between thc US and individual allies on such matters as bilateral US-USSR negotiations. Thus, thc US probably svill find it increasingly troublesome to satisfy its allies and speak for thc West on issues affecting European interests: an era of tougher negotiation and greater com* promise within the Western Alliance probably has begun.

SEPTET

B. The Economic Relationship

Most of Western Europe clearly is in thc stage of self-sustained growth and mass consumption characterized by rapid industrial expansion, greater production and wider diffusion of durable consumer goods,arked increase in Ihe number of persons possessing ot aspiringourgeoisof living. This economic development so far has been very profitable for American business despite the existence of two preferential trading blocs (EFTA andhanks in part to the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of tariffthe US stillavorable trade balance with Western Europe. Moreover, American firms were very prompt to increase their investments in Europe in order to avoid having to compete from outside the Common Ex-Icrnal Tariff bikI in order to take advantage of the large tariff-free European market. Tlie managerial, technological and capital advantages enjoyed by US firms, long accustomed to planningarge market, have givenronounced lead in important sectors over their European competitors. The estimated value of US direct investment in all of Western Europe rose from less thanillion0 toillionhc total invested by the US in the EEC countries during the same period rose from6 billion to4 billion.

Much of this investment was made in the advanced technological and innovative industries: electronics, computers, telecommunications, precisionand optics.esult, US firms and subsidiaries controlercent of Ihe computer market In Western Europe,ercent of the semiconductor market,ercent of the market for integrated circuits. In addition, theEuropean-eontroiled firms in the advanced, science-oriented industries have become heavily dependent upon American technology;uropeans paid US linns aboutillion for patents, licenses, royalties, and the use of American industrial procedures.

These developments aroused concern in Weslern Europe overhe brainnd the Americanehind these slogansear of loss of control of key sectors of the European economy, especially thc most technologically advanced. Influential Europeans expressed the fear lhat Western Europe was doomedosition of industrial *helotry" unless steps were taken to resist American penetration of European industry and arrest European technological dependence on the US. Tlie Caullist nationaltailed because obstruction of American investment in France simply led to its diversion to other Common Market countries, thus damaging Francesposition. Nor could France persuade its EEC partners toimilar restrictive policy; they distrusted de Gaulle's motives and they desired American capital, technology, and management techniques for their ownommon industrial policy for all of Western Europe is unlikely In the absence of much greater poUtical cohesion than now exists.

Over time, several trends will attenuate European concern overhe growth of annual American direct investment in Western

SEjtET

Europe may already have passed its peak. The degree of cunt ml exercised by parent firm* in the US over their subsidiaries in Europe has narrowed. European managers are increasingly replacing Americans, their role as decision makers should lessen national rrsmtment toward US firms in Western Europe. On the otherationalist or "European" reaction against Ihese firms almostwould occur if thc US seriously attempted to make them comply with US antitrust decisions or US regulations oo tbc shipment of strategicimilar react son could occurecession in the UShange in the fortunesarent company led to unemployment in one or more of its EuropeanOn balance, however, it is unlikely that the problem ol US investment in Europe will prove to beajor disintegrating fitctoi in US-European relationsapr stimulus to European unity.

C. Tho Security Relationship

NATO has endured for twenty years, not because It meets all the needs of all its metnlien. but rather because it satisfies more ol them than any other arrangement conceivable under present circumstances. The Alliance provides security for West Cermany against thc USSlt, while relieving the anxietiesEurope would have about independent German military power. Hy engaging US power in defense of Western Europe, the Europeans are able to keep their military budgets low enough to be politically acceptable. The eapct.se to the US of maintaining large numbers of troops in Western Europe is high, but most ol the foreign exchange costs are covered by oaf set payments and US mdttary sales to the Alliance. NATO consultation does not give theeto over US policy, but it does giveeciprocal influence on each other's defense and foreign policies (including those of the US) which they might not otherwise possess. These considerations make it likely that the Alliance will maintain its presenttioiia1 stnitlure and inetnbership until thereuropean "settlement" which not only "solves" the Cennan problem, but also convinces the olher West European slates that ihey have nothing to fear from the Soviet Union. Thc chances forettlement in the foreseeable future are, of course, slight.

On thc other hand, thc hopes once held that NATO might develop into something more cohesive ihan an alliance of sovereign nations or that itsmighl be able lo agree on common policies outside Europe arc not likely to be realized. Thc effort to giveocial role through tlie creationommittee on tlie Challenges of Modern Society has metolite response, but il will not materially tighten the already strong bonds between Western Europe and the US. Attempts in the past by Franceortugal (Co* and Africa) and llie US (Vietnam) to obtain active support for their concernsEurope were uimscccssful. there is little reason lo suppose that similarwill succeed in lite fulune.

ope that Wesl Europeans will contribute more to the common defense effort is prolsably also unjustified. Tlie percentage of CNP and ol the total budget devoted to defense expenditures Is lower today thannd there is little

SKftT

tikeliliood, short of an active thiml lo NATO territory itself, thai there will bo any polilical will to increase il. Moreover. Sino-Soviet tension has bolstered the belief in Western Europe that the likelihood of direct Soviet aggression,latent, has been still further reduced. The combination of static defense budget* and heightened domestic pressure for greater social eapendtlures will make the offset problem more difficult to resolve in Ihe future, even with some reduction in American troop strength

he nature, extent, timing, and circumstances of any US troop reduction would be of critical importance. Buteneral svay, minorwell explained and wellleave European faith in the US nuclear guarantee basically unaffected. On thc otherarge and -abruptif it occurredime when the political atmosphere in thes oneroad withdrawal from internationalwould shake European confidence in the credibility of the Americanarge cutback would also have nn unsettling eflect upon the ability of the European nations to live In reasonable eonlidence with each olher {and notably with West Germany) as well as with the USSH.

narge cutback might produce renewed interest in aDefenseuropean nuclear capability based on the British and French nuclear strike forces,uropean procurement agency. Butobstacles lo irnplementation of such proposals would be formidable. In the end, the West Europeans would be more bkrly lo adapt themselves to whatever degree of prelection and support rise US wax wining lo provide than loradical measures, particularly If SACEUR remained an American andtripwire" US force continued to he deployed. In shnrt, ihey probably would Scire upon some comforting rationalization rather than face the domestic unresl certain to be generated by iwoposalt for more taxes for defense and longer terms of military service. Their faith in the US would be weakened and they would lend even more to avoid controversy with the USSR on matters not vital lo their interests, but tliey still probably would not succeed in replacing American power with their own.

III. EUROPE AND THE USSR

issatisfaction over Iho division of Europe has been growing in Eastern as well as Western Europe. The feeling is widespread that this divisionestige of the Cold War which detente and internal developments in Western and Eastern Europe are rendering anachronistic As noted above, many West Europeans believe that the US and the USSR subordinate European interests to their bilateral relationship and therefore collaborate to perpetuate the status quo in Europe. While preserving NATO and tlie American nuclear guarantee. Westhe yean ahead will continue tW attempts to lower Ihe polilical and economic barriers between East and West. In some cases, this will cause ihem to disregard American policies or preferences. With moreand depending upon (Ik- situation and lhe issue, some East European

willimilar altitude toward Ihe USSR. However, Ihe success ol these attempts lo attenuate in any fmiri.um-ntal way the division of Europe ulti-tnately depends upon the policies and objectf the Soviet Union.

A. Soviet Policy and Objectives 1

If one wwe to take Soviet statements at iheir face value, the objectives of the USSR in Western Europe are appaieni and simple. The Soviets want NATO dissolved, llie US expelled from the continent, West Cermany isolated, and all of Western Europe turnedarger version of Finland. If ihese objectives were reah/.id, concern for Soviet reaction would dictate thc poliiical lile and determine the economic decisions of the countries of Weslern Emope. The USSR thus would become thc major external influence in those countries, and Soviet interests presumably would be mure secure lhan they are under presentThis vision surely caresses the dreamt of Ihose ideologists and doctrinaire Leninists in Moscow who sometimes act as if Ihey have learned and forgotten nolhing from the events of tlie past twenty years in both Eastern and Western Europe

Of course, the rulers of the Soviet Uiuon cannot explicitly reject this vision. To do so would go against ingrained attitudes. It would also weaken theJustification for their oligarchy at home and undermine some of the rationalizations sustaining their dominant position in Eastern Europe. It would not only Impair what remains of their influence over Weslern Communist parties, but also would provide additional evidence to support thc contention of lbc "new left" that the USSRonservative state. Consequently, it is natural, convenient, and perhaps essential for the Soviet leaders to be able io claim und occasionally to act as if NATO wereesl Germany werend the USSR still sought and promoted revolutionary change in Western Europe. So long as the present type of Soviet leader retains power, their conviction that Ihey need to maintain ihu posture places limits on the extent of Sovietwiih the West. The USSH thus will continue to probe for and exploit Western weakness and division whenever possible.

While the Soviel leaders remain hostile and suspicious of lhc West in general and of the US in particular, they appear lo perceive lhat the present situation in Europe is. on balance, satisfactory to Soviet national inleresls The political obstacles In We-rtem Europe affecting greater commercial and technical exchange with lhe Soviet Union arr minor,oviet suspicion and economic backwardness, not Western policy, which places effective timits on East-West inlet course The division of Germany Isolds both West Germans and Eastinrawing together of lhe Iwo Germanics would loosen these restraints Any substantial reduction in the barriers between East and West would tend to weaken thc Soviet poslliun in Ruiopc And the Soviets may have

lft, "Basic Factois awl Main Terulencses In Current Sovietated

i9.i

SI

some apprehensionarge reduction of US |iower and influence wouldestabilizing effect

o bv sure, their increased concern over China makes it kss likely that the SovieU will want to raise tensions in Europe. The Soviets possess the initiative in this area of East-West relations since the USSR and its dependent client. East Cermany, are lbc only slates both willing and able to foment tension in Central Europe, lt Is nut now in the Soviet interest to do so, since the USSH is stillto erase the impression left by Czechoslovakia and apparently desires to explore with the US the possibility of strategic arms control. Nevertheless, these considerations do not oblige the USSR to sacrifice its essential policies in Europe: the continued division of Germany and the maintenanceoviet sphere in Eastern Europe. It is highly unlikely that the USSH would be willing to abandon these policies even if its dispute with China were to uitensify.

3S. For all Ihese reasons, it is unlikely that the Soviets really desire (or expect) radical change in Western Europe. Rather, they seek explicit US recognition of Eastern Europe as their private preserve. From the Soviet point of view, this is the primary objectiveuropean Security Conference. Until the Soviets feel that at least some of the Wcitera allies preiblrrrangements which would advance this objective, they are likely to content themselves with fostering dissension among them over tho issues to lie discussed, tbe attitudes to be adopted, and the concessions to be considered. Whether oruropean Security Conference eventually convenes, the Soviets might agree to some minor and teciprocal thinning out of military forces in Central Europe which would lighten their economic burdens without endangering their position in Eastern Europe. It is unlikely that the USSR would agree to any proposals acceptable to the Wesl concerning German reunification or the status of Berlin (which svouldseful pressure point).

B. Tho Situotion in Eastern Europe

Popular Attitudes and leadership Problems

With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the states of Eastern Europe appear to haveegree of domestic stability greater than es-er beforo in post-svai history. This is partly because thc Sos'iets made their point when theyCzechoslovakia. But il Is more than this. Over the yean6 the people and llie tegimcs have arrived at anompromise of sorts: thc regimes will for Ihe most part avoid terror and will pay tome heed to consumer welfare, and the people will generally behave themselves- The terms of thic aiT.ingi-mrnt vary Irom slate to state, the bargain for thc people il better in some than in Others. But the principal boon In the citizenry is simply that things couldworse, and indeed once were

Yet stability in Eastern Europe is very much of tbe surface variety. For one thing, tlie East European* do not share in the prosperity which has swept tbe Wttt TV economies of most East European states are hobbled by somc-

times incompetent leadership, by (he political and ideological demands of the Communist system, and by suffocatingly close ties to the economy of thc Soviet Union. Tlic second industrialorganizational techniques and of advancedpassing these countries by. And this is one source of serious discontent, both among middle-level functionaries and among the better educated.

There is of course another strong and chronic source of dissatisfaction: the widespread resentment among thc people that they arc not allowed toin their national political processes and the knowledge that tlteirinterests are subordinated to those of an alien power, the USSB. Nationalism in Eastern Europe, never completely cowed, is now resurgent. Ihis nationalism is essentially anti-Soviet. The various regimes cope with this in differentthe Rumanian exploits and encourages it, the Polish repressesall must deal with it as an increasingly significant fact of political life.

Over the long term, nationalism in Eastern Europe is likely to become increasingly difficult for the Soviets toew kind of leader may be emerging in Eastern Europe. Until fairlyational Communist wasiberal Communist, ideologically motivated,an who identified independence with democracy. Tito came to this. Nagy and Dubcck followed. But the new breed of nationalists may be pragmatic and authoritarian, in the manner of Ccauscscu and Moczar. Such men would pose new and subtlefor the SovieU. They wouldight central control, in the name of communism and tlie party, and gain public Support through appeals to patriotism. With men of this type, it would be, and is, difficult for Moscow to decide where and when toine, and, equally important, it would not be easy for thc Soviets to contemplate the kind of action which might be necessary ifine, once drawn, were dearly violated.

Tno Outlook lor Political Change

It is clear that the USSRomplex of political, economic, and ideological problems In Eastern Europe which defy solution. This is sosolution" in one areaetreatefeat in another; no overall resolution of thc conflicting concerns of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe is possible Thus, national communism may keep the Communist Party in power in Romania, but it also attenuates ideological solidarity with the Soviet Union and revives anti-Russian attitudes in thc population. Economic decentralization and an embryonic market economy may reduce popular discontent, but only at the expense of ideological orthodoxy and the primacy of the Party. Tlie primacy ol an orthodox party, on thc other liand. ternls to stifle economic development and breed unrest.

These contradictions have convinced many observers lhat the Soviets are faced with an evolutionary process in Eastern Europe which, ultimately, they are powerless to contain. They therefore argue that Eastern Europe in time could attain alrtut the same degree of independence of Moscow in foreign policy as

l-'ni!ow enjoys. Over the long run. assuming the emergence of effective national leadership in EasternKadar. not Iheore veil confident leadership in the Soviet Union, this analysis may prove to be correct.

ithin the period of Ihis estimate, any such optimistic forecast almost certainly would be unjustified. Czechoslovakia demonstrated thr limits oftolerance: preservation of the dominant ioie of Ihe Communis! Party. Party conlrol of communications media, no outspoken criticism of lite Soviet Union, membership In the Warsaw Pact. It is unlikely that thc present Soviel leadership, or their likely heirs, would soften theso requirements. Continuing tension wiih Bed China or greater agitation inside tlie Soviet Union by writers and other intellectuals probably would increase their uneasiness and thereby sharpen their resolve to impose conformity and docility in Eastern Europe Given the will, there can be little doubt that they would succeed: there is no shortage of neo-Stalirusts and opportunists in Eastern Europe prepared to assist them. After alt the diminished role of the Party, permissiveness toward dissent, and the reduction of lhe Party nnd State bureaucracy are not mere theoretical concepts devoid of practical and personal effect; they mean the loss ol jobs and power.radical political change in Eastern Europe probably can succeed only with Soviet support or at least acquiescence.

The Outlook for cosf-Wesf Trod*

hc USSR, seeks more cooperative relations with Weslern Europe but is suspicious of comparable policies by Its chent states in Eastern Europe. Tbe Soviets realize that many East Europeans see in East-West detente an oppor-tiinily lo lessen their economic dependence and ideological subservience lo tbe Soviet Union through closer economic and political ties with individual West European states Although the USSH retains Ihe ability to impose Ils will on most of Eastern Europe, the imposition of harsher measures ihcre would harm its relations svnh Western Europe and aggravate thc economic difficulties of the entire Eastern bloc Consequently, how to pursue detente, increase trade and obtain credits, and at Ihe same time limit or channel similar efforts by Eastern Europe seriously complicates the formulation of Soviet policies toward Europe and the US. The Sovieis mayarsaw Pact coordinationuropean Security Conference an opportunity to establish both theand procedures through which they could monitor and control trade and economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe.

here are scs-ere reslraiiils on the economic independence of Eastern Euiopc. The tale of grosvlhu East European trade with thc members of EEC amias slowed;ft. lhe unfavorable trade balance of Eastern Europe (excluding the USSR) with these regional groups'Ine East European share of Writ European imports of manufactured products actually declinedoercent between tin-. Only East (Germany exports more manufactures lo Western Europe (riclwding West Cermany) tlian il imports. Takenhole. Eastern

Tret

Europe (including tlie USSR) is still to some extent an underdeveloped area supplying foodstuffs and raw materials to Western Europe in return for capital equipment.

The prospects for any significant improvement in this relationship are slight. The quality of manufactured goods in Eastern Europe is below Western standards, and Ihe saleshem isarge increase in Eastern agricultural ex-ports is even less likely. Thc EEC already is burdened by huge surpluses in various product', and the Community has embarkedrotectionist course which severely restricts imports of foodslufls from non-member countries. Furthermore, thc gradual elimination of trading barriers within the tsvo Western economic blocs (EEC and EFT A) has tended totrade among member nations and leave less scope for external trade. Finally, the East European countriesonvertible currency, and Iheir trade with one another is plannedong-term (usually five-year) bans and coordinated with national ecooomic plans. Ihese impediments, plus their political andcommitments to the Soviel Union, reduce lhe flexibility with which the East European counlries can deal with the West.

Consequently, until Ihe East European states substantially modify their economic structures, there can bearginal increase in trade with the West through barter deals, "triangular' trade arrangements (Eait-West-under-devcldpcdnd schemes for joint manufacture and marketing between East and West European firms. Another factor in trade expansion would be lhe continued availabibty of Western credits. At the endotalcredits obtained from NATO countries arnountcd4 billion, of8 billion were for over five years. The repayment burden for these loanseiling on Ihe availability and utility ol credits from Western sources and obliges the East Europeans to seek the forms of economic cooperation mentioned above. Under the best of circumstances, thc economic division nndgap between East and West are likely to persist for some years to come. As this disparity becomes increasingly apparent, it will heighten Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND CONTINGENCIES

together, most of the judgments given above create thc picturerelatively stable continent over the next four to five years. Ilul there arcof events and developments whichsome probablythbew could fundamentally alter it. No account isexample, of rhe possibilityajor economic recession. Nor does ourtake account of possible major changes in the Soviet outlook, thenew- leaders in the USSR with quite ditferent tactical or pobticalthis appearschange things substantially. Sooutbreak of large-scale Sino-Soviet military hostilitiesenewal offighting which threatened to involve the great powers. TheUS-Soviet cnmpelilion in other world iireai sslll not necessarily nlloet develop-

16

men Is In Europe, but nn appreciable swing toward tlio USSR would provoke al least tome stock-taking in European governments. Depending upon theevents and circumstances,wing could cause some of the trends noted in this paper to be accelerated, slowed, or even reversed

restivencss now existing in both Eastern and Westernie stifled. It could manifcsl ilsclfariety of ways and overd-nn provoke significant changes. Much of this resliveness hasthe Inability or unwillingness of governments lo cope with many ofof modern life- -lagging application of technological change tourn and industrial production, outmoded educational systems,unresponsive bureaucracies, and the like: for this reason it is elastic,could grosv rapidly in direct ratio to governmental ineflecrivess.also spring, in West Germany for example, from foreignrecipitate USor frustration of the Ottpolitikagain arise suddenly in Eastern Europe over changes in readershipnew rfforts by East European state* to alter their economic policieswiih lhe USSH

such contingencies, the changes which are likely to occuraround problems and activities which are now visible: the Westto expand relations with the East, which has little room for maneuverhave some successes; the movement to strengthen and enlarge lheCommunity, which svill probably result in some progress butenlarged community to be even more absorbed In its own problemspresent; the question of the US presence and influence, which seemsdecline without, however, substantially reducing West Europeanthe US or encouraging the West Europeans lo assume moretheir Own security; lhe problem of nationalist resurgence in Easternmay produce some greater economic independence andlittle political liberalization or basic change in relations with lheSoviet effort lo have its primacy in Eastern Europe legitimized byagreement, with perhaps some give on matters of atmosphere butconcessioni.

4

hatever may be tho pressure for change, there are slrong forces at work to contain lhat pressure. Despite alienation from government and discontent over the course of European civilization among many intellectuals and students in thc West, lhe great majority simply want to live quietly and better. Despite growing nationalism and severe economic problems in the East, Soviet dominion is backed by force which the Soviet leaders hawillingness to use. Despite increased restivoness in boih East and West over the economic, political, and military weight of the US and the USSH, these two powers bavo attained positions which can be attenuated only slowly and with thruDespite West Germany's rxononWc power and its desire to improvewilli Kasl Cermany and the USSR, it has little alternative In continued economic integration wiih thc West and reliance upon American nuclear protection.

n sum, while there will be movement, it seems unlikely to be convulsive or to change in any fundamental way the structure of European power, at least during the next four or fivehe evolution which is underway In both parts of Europe will erode thc influence of the super powers, it may diminish the social and economic division of Europe, and it may provoke political crises and uncertainty. It seems unlikely, however, to produce revolutionary regimesuropean settlement or, alternatively, to bring lire opposing forcesangerous confrontation.

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