0
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Suporsedesnd Memo to Holders of)
Soviet Policies in the Middle East and Mediterranean Area
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OFELL1GENCE
r.-ru hi by In*
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai indicafod0
Aulhenlicolod:
CUTtVE SECRETARYy^iy
Tne Wowing infeliigtnco orgonizofioni partkipaled in ihe preporoiion or* ihrs esfimcmii
Tho Central Inlefliaence Agency ond iho inleltigenco organirationi ol tha Depart-menh of Stale and Delenio, ond Iho NSA.
Concurring!
Dr. R. J. SmHh, lor the Deptrty Dlrsctor, Coniial Intelligence
Mr.ughes, iho Director of Intelligence andpojlmonl of Slate
Lt. Con. Joseph F. Carroll, tho Direclor, Defense Intelligence Agency
U. Gen. Manhall S. Carter, the Director, National Soeurity Agoocy
Mr. ChorlM A Sonsroer, lor lhe Auiitanl General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-minion
Abstaining!
II am O. Crogar, for iho Assistant Director. Federal Bu-eou o! Invoit'iga'lon iho wbjoel being outside af hH rjriidicllan.
i
.V is fc:cnc^liwaca hgaaog.
CONTEND
DISCUSSION 3
I THE STRATEGIC SETTING; BROAD SOVIET CONSIOERA
HONS AND
II INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POWER IN' THE
Miliiary Aid
Economic Assistance 4
Olher Economic Intereits
Tlie Soviet Military- Presence
IN THE MIDDLE
llie Arab-Israeli
The Arab
Son-Arab
IN THE WESTERN
North Africa
European StatesIt
V SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN CERTAIN
Arab Israeli Hostilities Short of AllOul
Full-Scale Arab-Israeli
IntDrveniiou in Other Area
East-West
VI. LONG TERM13
IB
SFsfPET
BESTCDP1 HVAllABLE
SE^fr
SOVIET POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN AREA
SUMMARY
the lastears, the USSR has cstalvlishcd itself as afactor in the Mediterranean world. By exploitingnnd especially thc Arab-Israeli conflict, the Sovietsto deny the area to Western intetests and influence. Theirhas heen that the displacement of Western with Sovietwouldroad strategic reversal for the Westconsiderable gain for themselves. Nevertheless, they have notarea as one which engaged iheir most vital national interests;focused on their relations wiih thc US iu general, onCentral Europe, and on their conflict with Communist China.
Arab-Israeli conflict provides lhe Soviets with theirof leverage in the Middle East, but it also faces them withsevere complications. Thry have extended enough militarythe radical Arabs tothoroughly involved in thcbut their efforts have not created an effective Arabmilitary attacks, particulaily against Egypt, intensify thisThey wish to piovide Egypt with effective defense,also to minimize the risks of direct involvement; yet if theydefuse the situation by pressing the Arabs to make concessionsthey would jeopardize their influence in the Arab world.dc-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets willup theit aid to the Egyptians, and they may provide newand additional personnel lo improve Egyptian air defenses.
the Soviet support for the Arab cause in theMoscow's relations with tbe radical Arab states areoccasionally serious strains; none_of these countries is entirely re-
saftrlET
SF*FT
sponslve to Soviet pressures, and each is jealous and suspicious of the others. Thc still more uncontrollable feclaycen movementroblem for Moscow, chiefly because any direct Soviet support for it involves embarrassment in Moscow's relations with establishednevertheless, we think the Soviets will continue to develop relations with the fedayeen discreetly.
he Soviets have aspirations to establish themselves in theMediterranean as well, but Tunisia and Morocco remain generally wary of the USSR and retain strong ties with tbe West. Algeria has accepted Soviet assistance, but more recently it has been drawing nearer to its immediate neighbors and to Fiance. Although the new regime in Libya has close ties with Egypt, it shows no signs ofa Soviet presence, and Nasser is piobably not anxious to encourage Soviet influence there. Among European states with interests in the area. Moscowoncerned to avoid provoking alarm by ilsin the Mediteiranean lest this conipiomise its policies inEurope; France, in particular, has ambitions to enlarge its role in tho Mediterranean.
K. Since the June Warhe Soviet military presence lias grown In the area;oviet military advisers are now stationed in several area countries; the Soviet naval squadron in llie Mediterranean has been strengthened, and is supported by air and port facilities in Egypt. Mow the USSH might use ils military strength in lhe Mediterranean area in times of crisis and war isn this paper in four major contingencies. (I) Arab-Israeli hostilities short of all-out warull-scale Arab-Israelither disputes in the area in which Soviet interests were involvedast-West hostilitiesbolh Ihe US and the USSK.
F. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean region is likely to prove durable. Radical nationalist forces will continue to work against Western interests and will continue to receive Soviet support. Thus lhc rivalry between the US and USSR in the area is likely to persist at least so long as it continues in thc world at large.
SE#?ET
DISCUSSION
L THE STRATEGIC SETTING: BROAD SOVIET CONSIDERATIONS AND OBJECTIVES
I. Soviet power first moved Into lhe Mediterranean in lhc mid-lUSOi. Seizing on thc opportunities for influence offered hy Arab-Israeli antagonism* and hy increasingly militant and anti-Western forms of Arab nationalism, andover lhe Middle En-stem memhen u< lhe ncivly formed Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Iran, andhe USSR cased its way tnto both Cairo and Damascus with offers of arms, economic aid. and political support During, through lhe use of these and other convmtwxsel instrument* of influence and power, tlve USSR became the primary backer nf the radical Arab slain. Today lhc Soviet Unionajor factor in the Middle East,l client dates in varying degrees nf dependency and with elements of its own armed forces now present in the nrea Hie Soviet leadrisliip almost certainly sees its gains here as thc most extensive and successful of all its efforts to expand Soviet influence in areas of tlse world once dominated by the West.
2 Clearly, the Soviets have in this period looked upoo the Middle East as an area of strategicart of this attitude no doubt wasfrom llieir rrcdeccssors. Crarist planners traditionally viewed this part of the svorWpecial Russian sphere uf interest and periodically sought to expand Russian posver soiithssaidv. Iu modern times, especially since thc death of Stalin, this geopolitical emphasis has been accompanied by an ideologically inspired hope that the anlicolniualitt attitude nf the Third World could be made to work for social change and for the emergence of local power elites sympathetic to communism And this has been foined with the view that the Middle East has become one of the main arenas ot the Soviet snuggle with lhe Wrvt and the US The Soviets may see the area as more complicated and the opportunities less immediate than they did5 svhen they fusta military supply program for Egypt. Bui ihey evidently still hope to brine, lhe slates of the region into an anti-Western alignment and ultimately to establish their osvn hegemony there. Finally, the area is seen in Moscowtrategic military zone: in hostile hands, ithreat to the USSR and bkxk Soviet access to the Mediterranean, in friendly hands. It protects the USSR's southwestern border and permits Moscow to move Its influence into the Mediterranean world and beyond. The Middle East and much ol lhe non European Mediterranean ss-nrld arc thus. In the Soviet ssorld view,important, and vulnerable.
his Is not to say that the Soviets attach the same sveight to their problems and objective* in the Middle East and Meditrrriiiirjri basin as they do to their prime concerns elsewhere Their Make there is leva critical to their interests thantions with the US in general, their concerns in Eastern and Central Europe, and llieir conflict vvith Communist China. It is in these areas and with these countries thai Ihe most vital of Soviet national interests are directlv en-
3
SfJkfRET
gaged. There are in addition certain self-imposed limitations on Soviet politic* in thu Mediicnanean area and tlte Middle East. Tin* preservation ol lhe USSR's position In llie Middle East would noi he wurth thc serious risk ul nuclear war with the US. whereas its presence in, say. East Germany, might be Hut at least until recently Moscow has been able to ban- Its approach tn the Mediterranean area on rnlcsiUtions of opportunity and risk within the areaithout senoiis tonllicts with Its obvettivcs elsewhere.
Inevitably, as the degree of its involvement in tlie area hos grown and the level uf its conimilment risen, the .USSK has found Itself laced with mount' ing costs and risks. It li.is exhibited some anxiety to eontiolnd to curb the excessive enthusiasms of some o( its clients But II hat also chosen to hse with danger, and its position is now potentially vulnerable lo Ihcand penis of events over which it may hate liille or noactions of lhc Arab states, ol Israel, and even of the US. Broadly speaking. Moscow hat behaved as ii it wishes theo remain an area of at least some tension. It appairntly believe* thai the risks al tending this are manageable, nnd that continued polarization in the urea will make itdifficult for the conseivalivv Arab states lo maintain their tlet with the US. thus decreasing US influence throughout the area But the Soviets clearly recognize dot in the event of anotherhe Middle East they would beiih some scry hard choices.
II. INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE AREA
n moving into the Mediterranean, the Soviets- have used the conventional instruments of power available, short of live actual use of foice, to exploit the opportunities open to them They hate used military and economic assistanceeant of penetration anday ol promoting Arab depcntlenc* on the USSB. thry hate maneuvered polittcauy fo pressure and seduce and support; and Ihey have introduced their own natal power into the areaeans of adding iu lhcir influence and diminishing that ul Iheir antagonist*
Military Aid Thc first and still most important Soviet instmmeiil ofis militaty assistanceSince thc rnidlMOt. lhc USSK hasS billion of inch aid to four ArabIraq, Syria, and Alpena, this represents roughly half of all Soviet military aid to notiGsmmuimt countries. Egypt, with4 billion in aid is by far the largest beneficiary Iraq and Syria have also become almosi wholly' dependenl on the USSR for weapons, equipment, and spare parts. Il was Moscow's piompi and extensive irtnpply operation in the wake of thc June War whichiorcd the leverage, it hud momentarily tost in the Arab world.
Economic Asiiiraicr. Tho USSR has also engaged in substantial economic aid programs in the Mkldle East and the Mediterraneanhe
'L
* Scp Aopendn.I
Soviets have committed atillion ol economic aid lo Egypt. Iran. Turkey. Iraq. Algeria, and Syria (inoicent of their total nunotnic aid cornmitmciit* to all nuu Communist countries. These program* imr different policy aims in different countries In tbe case of Egypt, for example, Ihe aim is to assisl the dcsclopmcnt of the leading Arab nationoviet client, nnd lo reinforce the overall pattern of dependency on the USSH; with Iran, ihcreolid cionomic ban* for expanded relation* as well at the political purpose of helping to loosen Iranian lies with the West. Though in other areas of thc world Moscow is becoming more selective and tough-minded, the policy of economic assistance in the Middle East and the Mediterranean area is likely tu continuechst.inli.il scale for thc foreseeable future.
S. Other Economic Inlerettt Economic interestsole in Soviet policy. IhiIecisive one. The Soviets want lo maintain access to Ihe waterways of the area; uvcr half (he Soviet merchant marine tonnage is based in Black Sea ports. Continued closure of the Suez Canal increases the cost of Soviet shipping cast of Africa, hut Moscow has learned lo live with this situation, however unhappily. The USSR also has some interest in Xliddle Eastern od and gas. both lor itself and for the countries of Eastern Europe. Although Soviet supplies of pctroli-um appear adequate foi domestic consumption and substantial exports for many years to come, East European and Soviet impoits from thr Middle East would release corresponding quantities of Soviet oil and gas for additional vales in hard currencyut Communist imports are likely tomall proportion of Middle East oil sales, and such imports would be further limited by the desire of Ihe producing stales tosesvhcre for hard
currencies.
he Sochi Military Pretence. The Soviets have substantially increased their military presence in the eastern Mediterranean since llie June War. The number of military advisers attached to Arab forces has been greatly increased and the Soviet naval squadron has been strengthened. The smiadiou's poliiical objective* apparently are to show the flag, to demonstrate support of the USSR's allies in thr area, and to reveal to the world that the Mediterraneano longer an exclusive preserve of llie US Sixth Fleet. Its primary military roles are to monitor the Sixth Fleet, to complicate and inhibit its operations even In peace time, to develop capabilities against Polaris submarines and, in the event of Isostilities, to attempt to deny Western naval forces the use of Mediterranean waters. Currently, the Soviet naval units also veem to have some effect in deterring Isiaeli attacks on Egyptian poits.
rom the few surface ships and submarines deployedhe Soviet Mediterranean squadron has since grown to becomerc est Soviet naval force outside home fleet operating areas. Excepi lor occasional peaks, the Sovietusually consists of aboulurfaceauding ships,uie-wl and nuclear-posvered submarines. No.ui.illy. betweennd IS auxiliary ships provide logistic supportre inteUigtrncef the surface combatants an fiiuippcd with siuiacc-to air or surface-to-
5
SGkfRET
surface missiles,l flic submarines sire nuclear-powered. Inoviet naval reconnaissance aircraftntisubmarine warfare (ASW) amphibian iiircmft Operate from Egyptian air liases in support ol thc squadron.
We esUmate thai lhe Soviets haveilitary advisersinnnnew hundred in Iraq, and lesser numbers in the Sudan. Vemcn, and South Yemen. Although these advisers arc not known to have command authority, in Egypt and Syria they occupy iinportanl advisory positions at or near command levels, and arc present with units down to battalion/squadron level.
Since thc June War the Soviets haveumber ol "facilities arrangements" with Egypt which permit the Soviet naval squadron to make regular use ol repair facilities in Alexandria and of storage Facilities there and in Port Said. Wc have no evidence ol any such approach to Syria. The Suviel* would probably lilc IO have similar facilities in Ihe western Mediterranean. They apparently sought such arrangements with Algeria, but base been rebuffed In fact, thc Algerians have recently called for thc withdrawal from theof the fleets of all non-riparian powers.
Soviet naval units, both surface and submarine, use the Egyptian facilities Ihroughoul the year; bolh surface vessels and submarines arc at times supplied and repaired by Soviet tenders which remain on station in Alexandria. While not bases In the conventionalEgyptians evidently retain formalfacilities do provide support services in much the same way. But in caseajor East-West crisis the availability of these facilities to fhe Soviets might be uncertain nnd would depend to an important degree on theof the crisis.
For purposes of refueling and resupply. the Soviet Mediterranean squadron relies primarily Onaval anchorages (mostly in internationalt use; Egyptian shore facilities moreasis of convenience, than actual need, though these do enable it to extend tlvc length ol lime its diesel submarines remain in the Mediterranean from two months to six. We believe that the Soviets would be reluctant to undercut their anti-imperialist propaganda hy seeking to establish bases ol their own in Arab lands. And even tlie radical Arab governments would want to avoid the stigma of such bases (fhough Egypt no doubt derives some comfort Irom thc presence of Soviet naval vessels as deterrents lo Israeli action).
III. POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Arab-Israeli Conllict
evident damage done to Sovicl standing in Arab eye* during thelias since been repaired and the Soviet position strengthened. Moscowitself even more firmly as the champion of Ihu radical Arabs, thusan enlargedegree of Arab support for Soviet policirs elsewhere.
SF* El-
ajor voicv in international ncKOti.ilions concerning (lie area. Titc USSBachu'ved (hii positionrice, not only in term* of lhc hardware involved in rcsopplying thc Arabs bui also in Icrrns of the strains created by thecritical Arab-Israeli conflict and live USSR's inability to produce either an acceptable solution or adequate protection for its clienls. But these strains are not likely fo undermine Soviet influence seriously so long at the Arabs have no alternative so nice* of great power support against Israel and continue lotlie USminittcd to hurl's cause. In any case, the patronegree of Arab leverage over the Soviet* as well as vice versa. For. iu lhei.u'li conflict, the Soviets arerisoner of Arab emotions lhan the architect of Arab policies
Ifl The Soviet* have not. however, harnesvedo the moreaims of the Arabs toward Israel, and it is unlikely they will do so Moscow'lo accept the legitimacy of Israels statehood .md Soviet diplomatic activity proceeds from the premiseegotiated settlement should give Israel security. Vel the Russian* recognize that In order to maintain their position with thc Arabs they mustenerally hostile po*lureis Israel and broadcast their firm opposition to Israel's policies.
here has clearlyarge clement of Icmpori/ing in the USSR's approachategotiations on the Arab-Israeli question. It In. sought through talks with the US and others to influence US policy in llw area and to demonstrate to tlse world at large lhat tbe Soviet interest is in peace. The Sovietsigh value on their brokerage function, tbey would be extremelyif, for example. Egypt sought to bypass lliein in any serious ner;otiatioii* on the future ol Ihe area. But II seems certain that lhc Sos-iels arc noi ready at tin* time toheir Arab clients the kind of concessions wliich might open up the possibilityenuine settlement
his does not rule out thc possibility of Soviet suppoil al some point for stepsodus vivendi to defuse the situation In certain nrcumstaiiccs. Ihe Sosiets might actively seek an arrangement which ss-ouid diminishiittyrs of renewed hostilities while still allowing them tn tntcy tlie fruits of continued Arab-Itraeh tension Even here, however, Moscow must be concerned not only with the terms of tlve arrangement but with the Arab reactions to them In any ease, Moscosv is not likely to put very licavy pressure onhreat to suspend all armsorder to bringodus, vivendi.
IB. The Soviets probably will be inclined to slayolicy which will bend with events, hoping by it to avoid being diawn into conflict, while rrin-forcmg their political and military presence in Ihe area. It may be. however, thatan assist from thenot permit the Soviets toso comfortable andourse. Indeed, aggressive Israeli policies againsi Egypt pointharpsnintt Soviet dilemma, whether ro seekasser regime by givingew level ofincreasing tlie risk of direct Sovietalternatively, lo presso-
SE^T
SECRET
nfluence in the Arab world.'
calculations have certainly taken into account that Israel Listo develop and produce, and might soon beosition toweapons The Soviets probably Itehevc that such weapons woulduselul to Israeleterrent againstiteuipted at any early date. Hence, while the USSR svould takeany Israeli nuclear weapons toolitical campaign against Israelemphasize Arab dependence on the, Soviets, it would piobably not takethc possibility of thetr actual use unless Israela desperateIn such circumstances, although Soviets have the capability toweapons under their control on Egyptian territory, wc think itthat they would do so even under heavy Arab pressure. Tlieymore likely to ihrealen Israel from their own territory or from theirthe Mediterranean.
The Arab States
llie degree ol Soviet influence over individual Arab slateswill coniinue toil is probably highest in Egypt and nil in Saudi Arabia. Among the revolutionary states. Syria. Iraq, and Soulh Yemen would Ive more susceptible to Soviet urging or advice dun Algeria and Yemen. Kuwait. Lebanon, aisd Jordan are not anxious, to cooperate with lhe Soviets but Iry to maintain good leUttons.
In Egypt, Moscow can influence lhe governments attitudesariety uf external questions and can expect to pi iy some rnlc in thc formulation of Egyptian economic and military policies Therereat deal, however, that the Soviets almost certainly cannot do in Egypt. They cannot guarantee lhal Nasser willower, his late will depend on hrs health and on hu own political skills. They cannot dictate the choice of his successor since they lacktrong political organization within Egyptandidate lor thewhom they could cultivate without alienating Nasser himself. And, in Iho kul analysis, they cannot control Cairo's liehavior on questions Iheconsider vital
f Soviet influence over Egypt has its limitations, these arr. even more markedhe Arab world Ideologically, ihe regime in Syriaood deal in common with Moscow, and it is almost wholly dependent on the USSR for military equipment. Offsetting this, however, are several negativeSyrian nationalism is xenophobic Of the Arab stales bordering Israel. Syria is tlte most intransigent, rejecting all effortsolitical settlement andwar of national liberation" Moreover. Syria is dominatedrequently changing coterie ol military men, close Soviet relations with today's
MWili'vil.lfuii.il loiwi ol military lUjirnrl thai thc Sovirti imijilt coniidrr no dlumird in , .
SEWET
if^ET
leaders carry thr risk oi offending ihmc of tomorrow TU' Utter consideration also applies to Iraq. In Jordan, thc Soviet* have had littleipanding tlieir influence since Hussein has so far chosen to deal ss-ith the Western powers which have long supported his regime and supplied his *rmy. Soviet prospects would presumably Improve if Ionian accepted Soviet arms or if the fedaycen came to dominate th* rrginsr
Despite the USSH's extrusive influence in some Arab capitals, lhc fortunes of individual governments; in the Arab svorld are largely beyond Moscow's ability to control. The Soviets cannotegime's survival, nor can they be as-sund of success should they sack to bring one down. The Soviets wiU thusstand aside fn the event of important disruptions, moving in to attempt to capitalize on events as the dust set ties. Though surely concerned about Ihewhich would floss- Irom Nasser's removal, and though they svould seek to forestall such an eventuality, active Soviet intervention on behalf of Nasser would be unhlery. Revolutions in Saudi Arabia. Jordan, or Kuwait might be cheered by the Soviets, but could not now be inspired by them
There are still further complications in Soviet dealing* with the Arab world. Thc trade of most of tlie states uf tlie area is still heavily oriented losvard the West' Moreover, while tlse radical Arabs are united in their hostility to Israel, the government* of Egypt. Syria, and Iraq piofoundly dislike and distrust one another. They are actively competitive in inter-Arab affairs, and Soviet policies concerning one may seriously complicate policies toward another.
lve Soviets have for the most pat limited their dealings ami tlieirsupport to existing governmenls, but thereeen exceptions. Thus, the USSJT pros-ided arms and diplomatic support lo the FLN during lhc Algerian revolution, it has consistentlypecial status for tho Kurds in Iraq; it has alio tried (though modestly) lo promote thc fortunes of Communist parties in such countries as Iraq. Syria, and Lebanon.
ith the fedaycen, the Soviets have dealt cautiously, mostly throughThis is partly because of the fedayeen's penchant for free wheeling militancy, which Moscow cannot hope lo control, and partly because of itsto get involved in rivalries betsveen them and goverranents of theet the Soviets nosv appear to believe that dealing with the fodayeen exclusively throughmedium of Arab governments will no longer suffice in the lace of an emerging sensealestinian identity. Peking's vocal support of fedayeen cxtrcmitin adds to Soviet inducements to keep lines out to these movements.atah delegation has been in Moscow recently, lhe visit was unofficial, and arm* tu the fedayeen probably svill continue lo be channeled through area governments. Soviet support for the fedayeen will continue tu be discreet, in an effort lo avoid anta^iiaing Arab govirnmenls.
*Serahlr 11
seJSet
seJret
Non-Arob Slates
Cot* ertiing Uriel itself. Moscow docs not have full mastery over its Dm policies. It ts obliged by its relations vtith the radkul Arabs. In fact, toostile attitude. This is made easier by the USSR's unremitting opposition tohich the Soviet leaders see as an internal security problem in the USSR and Eastern Europe As noted. Soviet policy does not seek the destruction of Israel. Not only would this remove the Soviets' principal leverage on the Arabs. Moscow also recognizes tliat Western military and political support makesactor with which the Soviets must contend.
The USSR cmnys no special relationship with Cieeco,r Iran and. in fact, suffers from the legacy of theen it posed an nclive threat to nil Ihree. Soviet ambitions in these states are curbed by llie membership of all three in US-supported alliance systems and, in general, by the nnti-(Communist convictions of all three governments. Nonetheless, Soviet relation* with these states have improvedonsequenceajorecaderecast its image into thateace-loving and benevolent neighbor. Economic aid to both Turkey and Iran, sales ol military equipment lo Iran, and promisesiofilable trade wiih Crcece arc intended to add substance to thc new image.
Economu ally, at least. Iran has gone thc furthest in response; it has con-traded for at5 million worth of Soviet arms,ovietileHearingbringillion worth of natural gas annually from the Persian Gull to the Soviet Caucasus. Turkey has accepted some Soviet economic aid and seeks to avoid antagonism in lhcbut the chmaie between the two countries is certainly not warm Greece under thc junta is vigorously anti-Communist, ami trade will probably
remain lhc mail significant contact with the USSR. Moscow probably expects at least Turkey and Iran tu draw farther away from Ihe US and hopes to benefit from such movement. Rut the chancesignificant increase In Soviel influence in these three countries will be limited for some time to come.
IV. POLICIES IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN
North Africa
hough thc western Mediterranean is not without its attractions and its opportunities for the makers of Soviet policy, the USSR'sar leu compicDOui and Its prospects are much less promising than in tlie Middle East-Two circumvtanevi shape the politics of the area in ways not wholly congenial to Soviet interests. First, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have had longwith France which have shapedcultures, their economic associations, and their tiolillcal outlooks. Second, though there Is wide popular support for the Palestinian cause within the west Arab states, lhcir government leaders are
"See METuAey Ovei TheFiveECRET.
stopr
less willing than the eastern Arabs to accept Nasser'* leadership, less dependent on Soviet support, and more suspicious of the policies and motives of bothnd the- USSR.
ecent developments in North Allien pose further obstacles lo the growth of Soviet influence there Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are patching up old quarrels whichime contributed to Algeria's desire for Soviet support These states sue. in addition, moving somewhat closer to Franceesult of French effoits lo improve relations. Moieovcr, in the wake of thc Libyan coup, concern over tlie westward extension of Nasser's influence has grown in all ihree countries. Their tendency to draw together may in timeense ofdivergent from lhat of the eastern Arab nations.*
Algeria is more revolutionary, more antkolonialist, and more anti-US than Morocco and Tunisia, tl Iv thus easier for the Algerians toommon cause with both the Egyptians and the Soviels. The Algerians have received substantial amounts of Soviet arms and military training assistance as well as Soviet supportariety of economic development projects. But they have not allowed the Soviets to influence their domestic affairs, to interfere with their relationship with Fiance, to reorient the grcal bulk ol Iheir trade away from Western Europe, or to guide tlse course of Algerian foreign policy in general There has also been recent evidence of frictions in Soviet-Algerian relations. Algeiia has views on some international issues which coincide with those of the USSR; yet it islient slate, nor is it likely to become ono.
Libya's military junta is unsure of its internal position and uncertain about both domestic and foreign policies. The junta, or at least its head. Co'onelhas sought and receivedIroops and several hundred technicians and advisers, as well as publicNasser. The latter no doubt welcomes the chance to extend his own direct influence into Libya, and he would be disinclined to see this eroded by thc USSR'sajor role there The Libyan regime, perhaps al Cairo's urging, has several times rebuffed Soviel diplomatic overtures and Soviet offers of aims; it apparently prefers to buy from France and other Western suppliers. At least .is long as lhe present junta stays in power, wc think il unlikely that the Soviets will gain significant innurnce in Llbya.
This is not to say that Libya lacks attraction for thc Soviets The USSR's Egyptian-marked reconnaissance aircraft flying from Egypt can cover th*as far west as Sardinia. The use of Wheelus airfield in Libya would extend thc range ofeconnaissance aircraft beyond Gibraltar. Moscow might thus seek to pressure Nasser into exerting his influence on the Libyan junta Iu provide these facilities for Soviet use. Nasser would be reluctant tn do so. but he is deeply beholden to the Soviets, and it is possible lhat he might agree to some suchthe Libyans reluctantly acq-nice inif Soviet pressures wen* severe. Even in these iii.umstanc.es, Soviet use of
NIEThe Outloo* (or Noithcheduled lor publication in0
SEjRET
Libyan facilities would probably be limited and (overt.ery small Soviet presence would be required, especially if Soviel activities were confined to refueling.
it also attractive to Soviet plannersts locationand its economy faltering. If XIs unable to flienglhrn ilsassistance from llie West, it ma) turn lo llie Soviets for aid.been made by the Soviets, but ihui far Soviet fleet visits have beenSoviet offers to provide economic assistance have been declined.be held byhange in government could pave the wayassociation with the Soviets. Although (he Soviets may seeklgeria. Libya, and Malta through which to stage Iheirnone of these countries is likely to extend such facilities at this time.
European Slates
Weslern Europe, Soviet policy aims currently at promoting anof detente and ultimately al reducing the US presence on thewill not wish to jeopardize Ihese objectives by initiatives in thewhich svould alarm Ibe countries of Western Europe. Itthat moves which seemed to threaten to cut off Western EuropeArab countries, and their oil would stiffen the Western posture tosvardin tbc Mediterranean and in Europehelpbetween Western Europe and the US.
3S- In fact, there are now signs uf same change in Europeangradual increase in concern over the growing Soviethe Xlcditcr-ranean. No general alarms have ycl been sounded, nor does Iheie appear to have been any significant political pressure for changes in overall policies tosvard the USSH. But concern is inn easing in West European military circles and this has been reflected in spciific counter measures under NATO auspices. siw.li as the evtiblislunent of NATO machinery to monitor the activities of lhe Soviet nasal squadron in thc Mediterranean
rance, which has strong interests in certain Arab statrs. has been thc most active of the West European slates in the Xledilerranean. In rrcvnt months Pompidou has sought to enhance France's positionediterranean power by improving relations and influence with countries on both shores of thefrom Gibraltar to Cteeee. Tbe Soviets have sought to take advantage of this policy, specifically of French support of the Arabs in their contest with Israel- But while Moscow has tned to use France to divide the Westernas in the Four Power talksiddle EasternSoviets must also be conce/ried ihat the French are thetr rivals. Thc sale of French arms to Libya, for example, may have depiised the USSR of an opportunity to sell its own sseapous to that couniry and prevented it from extending its influence overLibyan junta. Similarly, France's efforts in North Africa will help lo counter Soviet influence In Algeria and to blockorocco and Tunisia.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES
enlarged Soviet military presence in Ihc Mediterranean areaincreased Soviet mUstcrm- and required all interested states,the US. lo take account of Soviet altitudes and possible actions.in what circurmlaticcs lhe Sovieis might make actual use of theiris considerably less clear. Tlie paragiaphs which follow examineactions and eapabililies in four major contingencies;hortull-scale conflict,he present situation; (Mwar; (c) other area disputes in which Soviel inleresls wereand (d) East-West hostilities
Arab-Israeli Hostilities Short of All-Out War
current success of Israeli military activities against the Arabno doubt added to Soviet divilluilonmcnt with the Arabs' abilily toequipment effectively. Al tlie *ame time, Israeli activities increaseon the Soviets for rnore advanced types of equipment. Theturnedumber of Arab reqursls in thc past and have to datelimited both tlie quantity and qualily of arms shipments, partlythe Arabs' limited ability to absorb such malcricl. Tliey arc in thepoiiiion nl having provided enough to be thoroughly involved, bui ofsupplied supportind or nature touccessful |ob ofAppeals from Cairo for additional help have become more urgentraids have intensified.
Moscow is clearly aware that greater direct involvement entails heightened tisks. Itoncerned thai substantially greater assistance to the Arabs would not satisfy Ihem but only stimulate demands for even greater Soviel support in the future. Not only would large-scale effort be very costly tu lhe Soviets, but it would invohe such an eulaiged Soviet presence as to change the character of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship in ways that would raisefur both parties. Yet these hazards have to be weighed against alternatives which may seem to the Soviets lo be al least equally unpalatable. Certainly Moscow docs not like lo see Cairo helpless in tlie face of Israeli air assaults. Certainly it does not wish this sort of circumstance to svraken Nassers position and jeopardize domestic stability in lhe UAB. And certainly it would be fearfulefusal to aid the UAB in its hour of need would threaten to disrupt relations with Egypt and damage Soviet prestige throughout the Arab world
We believe lhat the Soviets will decide, if they have not already done so. that some sort of favorable res[>onso to Egyptian requests is necessary unless Israeli attacks near Cairo arc soonecision by lhe US to provide additional modern aircraft to Israel svould makeoviet response even more likely. But it will not suffice to increase the flow of air defense equip ment the Egyptians already have. a> ihr Soviets have recently done. The ixin-eipal Egyptian problem is the lack ol certain more advanced weapons systems and above all of qualified personnel tu operate an integialed air defense system
T
effectively. Hence any significant improvement in EgyiMiati defenses, al least in the short run, would almost certainly require Soviet personnel to man the
Additional Soviet MipptM for Egypt's air defense could be at various levels An integrated defense designed lo protect thc Cairo area might involveadvanced interceptors, several battalions of advanced SA missiles, and additional antiaircraft artilleryajor element* ofystem would have lo lie directed, operated, and maintained by Soviet personnel including pilots,onsadeiable period, perhaps indefinitely The Soviet* might hope that this system would deter atlacks on Cairo or subnet lite Israeli Air Force to unacceptable losses While this system would leave other prime areas Open to attack, tlse Soviets might calculate lhat il would suflice to serve Nassers political needs.
If the Soviets felt lhat they had to provide protection lor the bulk of Egypt's population, industry, and militaiy installations, they would have to turn lo more sophisticated equipment and establish air delenve coverage of the lower Nile valley and lhe Sue/ Canal .ilea.ystem would require expanded early warning ground control interceptadais, many more advanced interceptors, greater numbers ol impiowd SA missile* and additional AAA for key point defenses. To make ihe system operationalew months would require lhe introduction ol entire Soviet units involving many thousands of men
he foregoing discussion of possible Soviet leveb of support for Egyptian air defense isustraumber of variationsnceivab!e. Tbe Soviets would of course strongly prefer to keep iluir support at the lowest possible levels ol risk and cost In decidmg whai levels of vupport would prove mfficient to llieir objectives, their risk/advantage calculu* would hove to weigh possible Israeli responses as well av Nasser's requirements. In view of the stake thc Soviels have In Nasser's survival, and in the preservation of lhcir relations with thc radical Arabs, the Soviets may feel obliged to enlarge their risks.
o deter Israeli raids the Soviets might consider deploying in Egypt missiles with HEip.iblo of Striking Israel piopet The Soviets,would have lo weigh the thanco thateployment would simply piovoke tlse Israelis into laiger attacks, perhaps on ihese missile ^situations themselves Moreover, Ihe threat of indiscriminate missile attack* on Israeli cities, let alone lhe actual delivery of such attacks, would involve the Soviets in an undertaking icpugnant to much of world opinion, and one they would necessarily estimate wouldncrease lhe chances of direct USFor these reasons, we think il highly unlikely lhal thewould deploy such weapons. Similarly, we think it virtually inconceivable that they would considerW weapons there.
4b. It might lie that, coincident with moves fui -vomit foirn of gieater suppoit in Egypt's defense, the USSK would pul pressure on the Egyptians to agree to military or diplomatic slept lo defuse thc present tension. Once Egypt's defenses
seemed more formidable, the Soviets might feel mote free toease-fire, whether fonruil ur lacit. They "ill probably continue lo be unresponsive to US appealsormal agreement In limit amis shipments to the Middle East, but if the crisis continue* lo intensify, they might tacitly consent to curbarm* shipments to Egypt if the US makes no additional aircraft sales to Israel
Fuli-Scole Arab-Israeli War
ull-scale Arab-Israeli ysar could not beeplay of7 war, if only because tlie Israelis now occupy eitcmivc Arab territories.the course of tin- military action, tbe Soviets would surely not want to show themselves lo be as helpless as they were7 llie presence ofof Soviet advisers with Egyptian and Syrian troops and of naval units in thc area would makeegree of involvement in any case. Whether the Soviets would cumtcler interveningarger and more overt way woulddepend on the course and duration of the war, anil above all on their estimate of the US response.
resent Soviet capabilities to intervene inar with quick and decisive effect are significant but not appreciably greater than they were inlthough Egypt has made facilittec available to the Soviet squadron and to naval reconnaissance aircraft, there are no Soviet ground or tactical air units ashore in the Mediterranean area. The Soviets could bring In such forces from the USSR, but they* would have difficulty in making them operationally effectivelant lived war. Tlie USSR could also provide aome covertin Egyptarked planet flying against Israel or. more likely, in defense ol Arab cities; ground support crews, andome naval personnel
given the probability of Israeli victory in fairly short order, thebe high thai lhc Soviets would fear involving themselves militarilylosing cause, with all the political damage within nnd outside lhe areawould entail. Since the Soviets would have an effect only if theyandcale which they would estimate would risk involvingwc doubt that they would embark on such an adventure.
Intervention in Other Area Disputes
instalHlity ol certain client states of the USSR and variousArab states could produce situations which threatened theor interests, ln such circumstances, the Soviets might be tempted tothey have doneimited way in the Yemen civilpossibilities could arise in the course of the chronic factionalSyria or Iraq, or if thereequest for direct Soviet militaryomestic crisisituation involving stiuggle between rivalMoscow might think il couldeslern move by movingitself. At present tho Sovietsimited capability foe rapid Itilerven-
SBpET
lion, litem may be as manyaval infantry noon* with ihcokenubstantial forceoved in relatively quickly from the USSR, but this would entail overflight problems with Iran, Turkey, or Yugoslavia.
Soviets would almost certainly be reluctant to commit their ownin thc Middle East for such purposes. For one thing, coups In theusually occur too quickly for inteivcnliOn by outside powers lo bebasically, the Sovicis have no wish to find themselves embroiled instrife, particularly if thereisk of finding themselves on thcAnd they are likely to avoid anyas moving troops intomight bring about nil-out Arab-Israeli warfare or threaten to involveIn general, the rule that the Soviets prefer to avoid risks inuncontrolled situations svould apply in such cases.
East-Wesl Hostilities
nuclear war, thc Soviets" primary concern in the Mediterraneanto limil damage from Western strategic forces, particularly ballisticAt this time. Soviet ASW capabilities against the latter arcpoor, despite the deployment of more modern ASW surface ships,fhe helicopter ship. .Moskva. Newer classes of Soviet ships,attack submarines, may soon be deployed tooviet capabilities to detect Polaris-lype submarines may beimproved, especially iu restricted areas such as the Mediterranean.Soviets would still be unable to impair gravely the value of Polaris asweapon in thc Mediterranean.1
t present, Soviet militaiy capabilities for non-nuclear war with Western powers in tbc Mediterranean are limited by the tack of tactical air support and an inadequate and vulnerable logisticsignificant effort to ameliorate these shortcomings svould be extremely expensive and would draw down from more pressing general purpose foice needs elsewhere. Efforts to acquire military bases for use in such conflicts wouldifficult and politically risky course. In the eventajor crisis in this area, the Soviets svould be able to nugmeui their Mediterranean naval squadron If conflict were to break out, they would seek to altack Western naval forces, particularly aircraft carriers. In addition, the Soviet threat lo Western naval forces and lines of communication would be enhanced by Ihe. difficulties of detecting Soviet submarines, and by Ihc USSR's capability of bringing more submarines into the Mediterranean from the Atlantic
VI. LONG TERM PROSPECTS
Some aspects of the Soviet position in the Mediterranean area are of course susceptible, to direct Soviet Control- Tlic strength of the USSR's naval
'ullerlw ASWfun iiiopm. Oin-ml Pmpn*LL SOURCE
SEprET
squadron, (lief lis military and economic assistance programs, und the degree of its political support for radical Arab objectives all are dependent on decisions made in Moscow. But many of the basic circumstances which shape Soviet policy in the area are determined iu Ihc main by decisions madeTel Aviv, in OiirO. in Washington. In the totality, then, the USSB is only one of several principal actors in the area and it is always possibleduring llie June War ofwill find itselfart not entirely of its own devising.
t is true nonetheless that Moscow's assumptioneading role in the areaignificant and probably durable accomplishment. It docs not now appear that the USSR will again be content toinor role in the Middle Kast and tin: Mediterranean. Even in thc event of another Arab-lsracll war and another defeat for major Soviet clients, the Soviets would almost cerlainly retain some sort of position in theit would prohabiyime bewould continue tooice in lhc shaping of postwar configurations With or withoutar, the political climate of tlie region is likely to remain generally turbulent Radical nationalist forces will continue to work against Western interests in thend in their endeavors will no doubt continue to (ind Soviet support.
5S. tl seems entirely plausible thai Soviet estimates of the USSR's prospects in the Mediterranean basin do not depart substantially from the general picture sketched above. In any case the Soviets must he optimistic about their ability lo icmain among thc major movers of the -nea Still,ecade of close involvement with their mercurial clients has probably persuaded them to be fairly cautious in their assessments. Certainly they can have few illusions about the military capabilities of thc Arab states. And just as certainly theybelieve that Ihe problems of Uie moie immediate future will always resolve themselves to Ihe benefit of Sovicl interests By the same token, however,setbacks and miscalculations will piobably not seriously discourage- them or deflect them from their course, ln any ease, the rivalry between the US and tlie USSB in the Mediterranean is likely to persist at least so long as thebetween them continues in thearge.
SfafRET
SfifRET
11
TOTAL EXTORTS AND IMPORTS OK AREA NATIONS WITH COMMUNIST (USSR AND EAST EUROPE) AND INDUSTRIAL I- lll.t: WOULD COUNTRIES. JSGB-llltW, MILLION US DOLLARS
(Trade wiih Coiuiiiunitt CountcnriH o( Combined Tnlnl Ranked in Deereaune, Importance I
AKO
EenOet. '
33
40
1
2lC
15
Yemen
IB
9S
82
Arabia
S.MS
D;ttj (or tin- USSR are virtually allodidalrk-orjiope are all front trade (Liti.stus nf The Ira developed COmiliii1*
" Data me liifdy fromtfde Statistic! o( tin- less detountries:not available, data areeisorted ui tbc Dinftion of Internationalawd ok tradel thecountries' and adjusted (or the differences in reporting source* The "industrial countries" includeuropean Economic Coin-iminjls. Austria, Canada. Denmark, Japan. Norway. Ssserten, Switzerland, (he Uniled Kingdom, and the US.
S4jJ^ET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NO"ICE
his document *as dtvimino'ed by I'l* Central Inletligenca Agency. Thii copy ii for lhe information and uie o'recipient ond of personi under hn jurbdialooeed-to-know bails Additional eucntial dissemination may be uu thor zed by theofficioli wilh.ii their respective dcpo'lmonls
of fnielhQencc ond Research, lor the Deportment of Slate
Delenu Intelligence Agency, lor Ihe Office of the Secaiary of
Defense ond Ihe oigcniiorion of Ihe Joint Chief) of Slofl t. Assisiont Chief of Stofl (or intelligence. Dtpor'menl of Ihe Army, for lhe
Oeportmersi of theuisiom Chief of Novo! Operationsfee thei rhe Keen,
O-el ofnreH.gen,e.ee rhe Deportfaem of the Ae
rare*
of Intelligence. AEC. far thenergy Commssion
Director, FBI. for ibe Federal Bureau of Investigation
of MSA. for lhe Noi.onol Security Agency
of Cenlrol Reference Service. CIA. for any other Depailmenl or
Agency
hii document may be resorted, or defrayed by burning in occordance with applicable security regulations, or relumed lo lbs Central Intelligence Agency by crongeme-ii -eh Ihe Central tefere-xeA
3 When ihn document it dj.se muscled overseas, the eveteai rec'pieeeiiteriod notrum o* one year- Arf *rt pecod.shouldbe dtU'Oyed returned to rhe forwardingl iheoge-scy tol In accordance with
2
he title o' ihu document when vied separately from lha ted should beHliirjjiw
D1SIH16UTION
White Hovse
Notional Security Council
Depolmenl ol
Department ol Defense
Atomic Energy
Federalf Investigation
LiLLU.r
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: