NATIONAL INTEUKJENCe ESTIMATE
Communist China's International Posture^
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1 FORX1CN POLICY: SOME PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES
A TW Idcetockal Base
B TV Militarydrr(
C Dwnntk CoomataUForrfgn laJCiO.M
II PROSPECTS AND CONT1NCENCIES
A Pf hog'i AcQvin Forrign Policy
C. The Triangular Rcbtiocubip: US/USSR/Chii>a
B. Chun and ihe World CooimunHy
COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE
China's return lo active diplomacy raises new questions about the direction of its foreign policy. After four years In whfch the internal preoccupations of the Cultural Bevotution thoroughly overshadowed foreign relations, Peking Is now moving to repair its international image and to exploU new opportunities. In attempting to estimate how China will play this new role in international politics over Ihe next year or so, this paper will etamlne Peking's options in terms of those policy factors which ore most likely to remain constant end those which ere subject to greater variations in response to domestic or external events.
It must be acknowledged at ihe outset that we have remarkably tittle Information on the decision-making processes in Peking. Thus, estimates of short-run tactical moves are susceptible to considerable error. As In the past, sudden twists end turns in Chinese policies will probably continue lo surprise us. But in the broader perspective of long-range goals and basic capabilities, this paper attempts to set useful guidelines on the course that China is likely to follow In adapting to the outside world.
domestic and foreign obstacle! stand in the way ofPeking's basic goals, whethe- these be Chinareat powerof the world revolution orore traditional but highlycountry coooerned primarily with Asian interests.
the domestic aide, stability and steady growth in bateofmilitary,far fromin the best ofhina's marginal economy willimit its maneuverability to foreignreat deal ofto be done to restore effective governmenttoommunist party. So long as Mao lives, thedisruptive campaigns exist and hit death could usher toleadership uncertainty and Intense rreoccupation with
China's aspirations remain blocked directly orby the realties of the international scene including: thepower and hostility of the I'SSR, its most Immediatewell as rival for ideological leadership Li the CommunistUS presence and US commitments around the periphery ofthe growth in economic strength and Ktf-coofideace ofrival, "apan.
should the Chinese regime wish to alter lb basicapproach and use its growing military force aggressivelyareas, its options would be limited by the risk oforhe superpowers. From Peking's point of view,adventures in Southeast Asia, against Taiwan, to Korea, o* toFar East would be needlessly risky and the potential prizethe game. Pelting does, however, have room, evenor aorne maneuver directly between the twoas well is around their flanks or under their guard inAsia, the Near East, Africa,ven to Eastern Europe.
he Chinese see the USSR as their majorBy axepting negotiations with the Soviets, coohng'mproving their diplomatic image, the Chinese lUy have reduced the risk of hostilities with the Soviets
Tber. rfcii prospect, however,enuine rapprochement emerging hamesent Sino-Soviet rafts. But both sides are apparentlyhat their dispute not endilitary test. Thus, as long as they Loth continue to exercise the present degree ofaution.
ikely to be some improvement in diplomatic and tradebu* little movement b. border talks. As long as Mao lives there Is almost do chance of significant compromise on the ideological questions,
C. With the US, Peldng has moved from its previous intransigence tomore flexible approach better designed lo exploit the Sino-USfor Chineseope to unsettle the Soviets by playing on their fearsino- Anapprochement es well as exploit the potential for changes In the balance of force: In East Asia resulting front the drawdown cfilitary pretence. In pursuing hi new flexibility, however, Peking does not erpect en early major improvement in Sino-VS relations and any smallare likely to be limited to marginal issues. "
poses special problems to Peldng because it too isAsian power, fa outstripping China ui economic growth, end is resistent to Maoist subversion or Chinese threats. And the Chinese,
who remember Japanese imperialism Id Chine during World War II, wonder what threat the Japanese may become to their security over the long term and fear Tokyo will ooe day take on the role ofof Taiwan. Tbe Chinese answer so far has been to continueather rigid end vituperative propaganda attack oa Japan's leaders, their policies, end their alleged ambitions in Asia. While this may impress the North Koreans and some people in Southeast Asia, It does little good for China's cause in Japan itself. Nonetheless, end despite the burgeoning growth In Sino-Japaoese trade, any basic shif; tn China's approach to Japan seems unholy in the present ideological climate In Peking
Southeast Aria,rner fear that the Indochinesespill over into China seems to have lessened. Indeed, theto believe that the VS Is being forced gradually to withdrawpresence frwn the region and that this process willthe prospects for Chinese influence. Rathej than useforce to exploit possible developments in this area,Lkely course will be to increase its support to subversiveactivity. The Chinese will seek to maintain their role asleadersexposing themselves to undue cost oraddition they will rely on conventional diplomacy when thisneeds. There is abundant evidence that Peking feels no need to
set deadlines and has no schedule to fulfill; it is clearly prepared for the long haul.
n tlie longer run,'s successorsore steady and pragmatic course, they are likely to have greater success than Mao In expanding China's political influence and acceptance. We cannot be sure, of course, how future leaders will see their situation, and it is possible that they will be prepared to employ China's developing powerore aggressive manner. We think it more likely, however, that they will continue to focus their foreign policy on diplomacy at the overt level and on subversion at the covert level. The open use of military force will probably be judged needlessly risky.
K. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if Invaded, we see no compelling factors moving Pekingolicy of expansionism, origher level ofaking. For all its verbal hostility and latent aggressiveness, neither the present nor die probable future leadership is likely to see foreign adventuresolution to China's problems.
k FOREIGN FOUCr. SOME PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES
A. The Ideoloflicol Bote
J.art, Peting Mil) peroeives the outride world in traditional ways. The Stao-ccDtnc view of tbe Middle Kingdom has survived the advent of theThe part century hasesidue of bJnoroess and frustration among thosethe vastseme of nationalism and patriotism has Wen outraged by what they see as unfair treatment of China by foreigners. Tliis baste seme of fojurtk* and frustrationhobutcd the people's acceptance of enormous MCrirVoet and hat pcrouHod the oommunirts to carry out revolutionary programs aimed at reachingWhile popular expect*bow hat* been repeatedly disappointed, the basic dynamiirn of Chinese oatrooalinn remains to he exploited again and again- Unlike the Ideology of Mioism, which may not long survive fts creator, the traditional sense of China'sd role In the world will probablyomUnt theme to this and any foreseeable Chinese government.
I Maoist ideology, which empWtes th' toevitabdiry of chus conflict and world revokitioo, adds an ingredient of violence and rniliUncc to trailirionalrives. It attempts lo project the revolutionary experience ofnto tbe worid stage by advocating the defeat of the affluent Wasters Powers through the mobilization of the poor countries to the well
l-ithe bJnitt of Ui* revolutionary bur. bowevo, tnd bos eoOFpfed andpolicy of peaceful cocviiteoc* for appti ration where till rslb IU needs Analogous to tbe domestic unitedolicy which served lb* oom-inunists -rU In the Chinese dvOcoexirtroce line was ot gii mtrxided It betemporary accomirtoda'ioo to Ibc dorm ef toternatiooal conductould be replaced as other ooun fries folic* ed ChinxevorubOGary pub But at (be prospects for world revoluSoo bo* dimmed, peaceful roeiitteace hatarger role lioreignn while propaganda itreai oo me more orthodox policy of revohitionary strugglehigh pilch
3ontinues to play an eicwjit ion ally Important role In tbei. offoreign policy. Although deculonoulcii may bold varyingf faith In revolutionary input, all are required to Justify iheir proposals Lo iii terms. Such fuitibcatkm hu become particularly importantesult of th* OuVural Revolution during which the purge and couatexpjrgeivided leadershipnbocalued by knling internal poliocaJ detutions with eatvusl Wrestos Many domestic Sgures deposed during theRevolution, foe Lo-ftance, wvra accused of foOowing pobdet that were pro-Soviet or "aocial usj ibe excesses of the Cultural Revolution have subsided,the Nturn to more ooovectiooal diplomacy bas been dotted in tbe rhetoric of Maoist ideology.
6 Tha Mliiory Ingredient
Military itienglh batajor preoccupationradmhjp longto Mao'i drctum that tbe "bandun' was tbe source of all political power. Mufeoter, tbe Chines*o as tenjitive to tbe needs of defense as they have beco to tbe role of violence as advancing wold iwolutioo PohOcal concepts and programs are uocxeNed to strategic and tacticalriors and troncnurted lo the Chines* Boaises ood tbe rest of tbe world to taartial rhetoric. Th*stung position of the mfliUry In Coenrouniat China has assumed oew importance ur- .of Hi vital role fatg the regime during tb* Cultural Revolutiony-product, tbeppeari to have Ins-eased Its iiifluenc* over the formulation and execution of policy.
Communist China's military power It Impressive by Asian ptandanis 'jut remains markedly Inferior to that of tbehe People's liberation Armyhose basic strength tes to th* aue and fighting ability of lb ground forces, bas the capability lo puta (ormJddbl* defense of the main-bod ag Inst- penfforts overtean toend axderritc tb* Chinese Armec? Forors have yielded scene cr editable resurM. ecossomic and pohtxxU dlsnrpticos have leftAto certain areas againnodern oppoceot Some of lb more *vi-deot problem are an apparent eWtriency to motorUed transport and heavy armament, an air defense system which probably tacts adeaua'a coaunupk*-Dons and data proxcinng capabtlities,ivy which remains little osort defense force.
Sine* China'i intervention in tbe Korean War, which Polingefensive move. Chinas military posture has remained bexicsdly cautious and prudent Moreover, after this experience Peking appeared some-hat more restrained in the us* of miliary threats to further Its foreign polcy obfectjves. Tbe abortive owe agair.it the off shore Islands In 1KB and tie deicGSiv* teirJorcemect along the Formosa Strait inh reflected Pi bag's costcero Over another rmrrotitatioo wllh the VS. Even agaiist the deniOosYabiy weaker power of India, Peking was careful2 not to be. on* embr oiledengthy campaign Peking was probably satisfied to male tlx point that. In rpite of (event loternajeadye to defend itself.
For all Peking's militanc* Inlogicil field, the deployment ol China'i mililary forces remains basicallymilitary doctrue emphatirrs clefeos* in depth and tha engag haiA of th* entire civilian populaCoo to over* COmc an attack The fearS attach has eased, to part becauseessening concern sincethat tbe Southeast Asian war might raaD over into China, and is probably lower now than at any other nm* tn the past SO years. Tb* Chines* now view the Soviet Union as posing tb* most Im-necLate exuiury thecal and over the past year have beenn extewtiv* campaign to prepare for the postib-hty of an eventual war In accordance with this altered threat, there arc mdkaboot that the Chinese are adjusting their miliaryalthough theren no wholesale movemenl of boons lo the northern border.
Even though the main approach to the defense of China tbJ emphasiiei defense Inao't 'people'sIs more to itseadineu torolonged, defensive war wltbic Chine. Tbe Peking leader ship bat clearlyigh priority to acquiring tbe military symbolsreat power, especially strategic weapons, but also convenbonal fortes as well Peking probably want* the strategic weapons primarily as aSoviet or VS attack and to Increase Chinese bargaining strength on irstertaCWcal btucs.o evidence that the edssevomeottrategic capability will necessarily make the Chinese exec aggressive. They will oootinue to be deterred by crverwbehnir.giy tup trior VS and Soviet power both fromattacks tar. from engaging In "nuclear blackmail" in East Asia China wants tts views to have Impact on the International sorerilling toscarce resources to achieve thit goal, but it can be expected to continue to exercise caution In employing its conventional and nuclear ftreugtfa. Peking eopectt its political Influence la Asia to grow, not Iron the open use of military power, but through active diplomacy and the encouragement and support of subversive and revolutionary activities,acked by the looming piescncr and growing power of immemorial China on the Asian tceo*.
C Pornest* Cos- Affectusg rWfpi Inhrativti
n addibon to lhe Iderjospcnl and military precoodjboos cited above,factors aletermin* and often severely restrict the range of fee earn pobcy tactics and hast-umlab liopen to Peking These doai-rtie ooostnUnb aperst*
to limit tbe economic, psynd bureaucratic raounn available for tbe eeodjct of foreign relations.
-JO. The Chinese economy duringot even approach tbe high ru) growth rate* ofombination of factura were reaponilblc for thisdistorted pUruting and buture rnanagetorot of the Creat Leap Forward at tbe end of. the eeasat-oa of Soviet aid; bad agiicul rural eooaVi->ns In the early yean of tbe decade, and finally, the ditruptiooj of tht Cultural Revolution. Arime, tbe proportion of reaourceao the military red or liKteaird. adding lo China's technological eapabtfitirs, hul further hobbling development of the dvillan aconotny.
his failure toigh rate of growth in the civilian economy tout. China's eapabibty to use aoonenmc leverage for foreign pobcy guab Cbina'l Image fc> tiet tbe economic model for Asia has been largely destroyed. Tbe febted potential of the "China market" ha* sort much of iii attraction to world traders, thereby'an exact In exchange for trading privilege*.
okey Ineptitude also hinders the Caneae. If Fchmg't Intense prao oupa Uon with Intarnal potties had paid off b, terms of rapid eeorwmic, social, and poiitieej development, the Chinese sr-i'm nowounder domestic base for the conduct of foreign affairs. In fact, the major experiments designed to puib China ahead. Including bothat Leap Forward and the Cultural Itcvolu Bon. have been disasters Although the acooomy has largely recovered, party oeganUaboo remains disrupted. dvH adnairuiv .hasand lairing tensions haveated within the readership asresult of the Cultural Revolution.
he foreign Lobcy apparatui proved as vulnerable as tftber bureaucraticto the impact of tbeRevwloboo Forhree yean, the formulation and execution of foreign policy were paralyzed by pokbcal aa-fightirig Red Cuard activities In embassies abroad and within tbe foreignItself brougU eonriructive activityirtual standstill AD axnbsxsedon but oae were recalled to Peking, eanbassy staffs were aubsusntialry reduced, andposturing was offered assubstitute for traoWoal dVomecy.
Mot to say, of OOafSSJ, that China's presence was not felt to the outside world during the Cultural Revolution. Trade and aid programsas did support for fubventfoo to Southeast Asia and elsewhere And China's potesatialeat power was evSdenl to the world as the development ofweapons cootinjed despite dornestic turmoil-as not9 that Chinese ambaxsaoors began lo trickle back to their porta, and the current campaign to retrieventernatiooal status and Influence Started In assrnesL The return to pre Cultural Revolution diplomacy has beensnd uneven, and the balance between radiual and snorefWcesVhcatc and potentially ansa bar.
ft. PROSPECTS AND CONTINGENCIES
A.Activist foreipn Policy
ith its foreign affalra appirutus largely restored, Peking bto recoup its pre Cultural Revolution diplomatic position and tofor influence bi new areas. Thii drive bar emphasized peacefulhas sought Influence through conventional, diplomatic means, fuId Urge part to the receptivity of other nationscorethebeen impressive, especially when toisolation at tbe height of the Cultural Revolution.
Most of tbe gaini. however, have coma in areas of leaser eoocen* to Peking and under drcumslarces which have raedc improve*sent In rrlattcoi easy andcheap
JA. In areas of prime iutcresl to the Chinese. Pekings policy has been V; sure.nd cautious experimentation have been charse of relations with tfa Soviet Union. Ae US. Southeast Asia, andnnas where pohey oVcisscni arc more ihff'cuh. dilfcrcncci withii> theapparently come lo the fore and strain the entire decision mating process. This was eapeeUuly marled In tha fluctuations of Chinese policy txward the USSR} and tbe Cvna'rruing holding operation purtuedis the Sovietseking's handling of the recent turmoil InKs effect on Sino-Americanbetrayed anitancc which underscored the- Id fonnulahjig pobeies on major foreign
s:-tw of the lovmediate dangei has been removed from thetbe Sino-Soviet dispute rernairu the single most importantfor iVing. At the same time, it conditions and determine* manythe CbJnese posture 'j dealing with other Cc*nmvioirt Stales, theand tbe West.
rcJations between Moscow and Peking had beenever the last Occade, and the Soviet trocp deplovmenit alongborder had been building since Ihe. the Chinese didto take the threat of Soviet military actioa seriously until afterof CreehosJovaVis Even then, Peking sought to deter tbearshly militant posture, combining provocative behavior oowith strident propaganda and bo wtensive war preparatiovipratsure continued to growowever, and alter bloody clashesUssuri In March and In Smkiang during August, Soviet diplomats beganbroad bln'tossible prcairtpfava strike again it Oiinesettnlefic weapons facuities The Chinese,w that they mightwith tbe choice between backing down and risking their nuclear'finally agreed In September to the border befotuttont whichPeking Oc*ober
he experience of thai teiiS* rummer moved the Chinese to reassex their foreign policy tactics. Far from deteiruig the Soviets, their militant posture bad not Only raised the possibility of broad conflict with the Soviets tc anlev^l, but also deepened Chinese diplomatic isolation. After what wasa prolonged debate early is the fall, the leadership decided that border taDcs offered tbe most viable means of defusing the dangerously tense situation. Al the (kTve time, the decision was apparently taken toide-ranging diplomatic campaign to restore China's world status and Influence, bothoterrcirt to the Soviets and in support of Chinese objectives Outside the bilateral Sino-Soviet framework.
ince tbef the border talks, mere has been no evidence of progress on any of tie basic Issue* confronting the negotiators. In spite of toe stalemate, however, there have been do specific reports of Sew border clashes, which argues that the mere existence oftalks has bad some itabiliring effect. For their part, the Chinese haveted their concern for maintaining the talks at the highest possibleigorously resisting any pot which might lead to their downgrading. The Soviets seem to have conceded this point, possibly bees ise of their preoccupation with events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East,onsequent unwillingness for now, to trigger newwith China.
espite theffect of the talks, the border situation lemainsexplosive. The Soviets have continued their force build up along tbe border. Although the Chinese have not significantly beefed up force levels near the border, there Is tome evidence that they have deployed troops north Into areas dose enough to be readily available in an emergency. They are also trying to improve the effectiveness of their paramilitaryhinese cfvd defense campaign; to bulla air raid shelters, disperse population and stockpile food-all of which are useful for domestic political reasons asIn effect.
nere have been signs of some alow, baiting normaurafioo of statealthough tbe Ideological gulf remains as broad as ever and questions of principle and substance are no closer to solution than before. After protracted haggling an exchange of ambassadors Is In tbe final stages of arrangement, and discussions for0 Sino-Soviet trad- protocol have been compleiM.
SO. The prospectenuine rapprochement arrowing out <rf the Sino-Soviet talks now seems remote. As long as Mao lives there Is almost no chance of significant com pro miie on the Ideological questions. Peking seeing do prospectilitary advantage over the Soviets, Ippeort committed to the long.term process of keeping tensions below the flash point while attempting to pile up political points in the communist world by embarrassing the Soviets at every opportunity. Evenontinuation of tbe deep national antagonism and the ideological schism, both rides are apparently concerned that the dispute not endJlitvy test Over the last year both sidesbad cause to estimate the costsrolonged Jitary confront*boo,rospect that neither finds particularly advantageous.
C The Triangular Relationship: US/USWChlno
he Chinese apr oacb to the US lei bees strongly affected by their pok*-tcal conflict with the USSR This was apparent earlier thli year when Peking moved from its previous Urtranogence against the USore flexible approach better designed to exploit the Sioo-US reUttonship for Chinese purposes. The primary aim was undoubtedly to unsettle the Soviets by playing oo their fearsino-US rapprochement By cWmorutrating their ooncern over this possibility, the Soviets have probably Insured that the Chinese will continue to exploit the "triangular relationship" wherever and whenever it suits their needs. Even though events in Cambodia caused the Chinese to takeharder hoe against the US, they have clearly maintained the option to returnore flexible postureerves their Interest
Theor changes In the balance of forces lo East Asia resulting from the drawdown of US military presence Is tncthei factor encouraging more flexible Chinese tactics toward the US. The Chinese will hope to speedtroop withdrawals from the area, especially from Taiwan. At the same time, they ate possibilities for improving their relations with states now forced to rely Ins on American guarantees. Peking may also hopean exert itsto exacerbate frictions causededuction fn the US posture. The Chinese probably see the US-CBC relationship as particularly vulnerable In this respect.
There are do indications that Peking expects to bring about an early, fjtajor improvement in Sino-US relations. The Chinese probably expect do far-reaching US coDoesiious on Taiwan, which remains the Dialo test for Peking AVer are they likely to give up tbe US as the prime target In their Ideological offensives against tkc capital*it-imperiilist enemy Korjcthcless, Peking will wiih to maintain sufficient flexibility to exploit the triangular relationship and to move prompdy In whatever duscnoo offers the maximum benefits
For these reasons any early Impfovernent fa Sino-US relations Is likely to be limited. For example, although recent US trade concessions have been studiously Ignored by the Chinese In public, they have privately shows some Interest Id bow far the US might reeve In this direction. While likely to reject any formal trading relationship, the Chinese seem ready to accept more subtle, indirect trading through third parties. Similarly they are Likely to show b'ttle Interest la formal diplomatic rccognitioQ to long as the US remains committed to the CBC. At the same time, however, they ail] probably retain an Interest In keeping lines of cornmunicJb'ob open through contacts such si those at Warsaw. Tbe pace of Chinese gestures will probably be slow and erratic, subject tofelt in Peking from changes In Sino-Soviet and Soviet-US relations
eking wul a
For some years to come, Sino-Soviet relations will be Peking's major con-cezn In foreign affairs. Peking has already shown an acute sensitivity to the pos-efbtlity that the US and the USSR might find considerable common ground In Oppoeing Ciina. la reaction, Peking will attempt to exacerbate the esnsting
ruspidons between Moscow and Washington; wiD increasingly portray itself before the world as the innocent victim of "collusion" between the superpowers; and will throw out lines to other Western Powers and the Third World in an effort to elldt new support. The more direct solution would be for Peking toapprochement with Moscow, but there seems litUc likelihood that Mao could accept the shifts required to move bis regime closer toward the Soviets. Thus, over the neit few years, or until Mao's death, Peking will probably con-oeutrale oo keeping the Sioo-VS-VSSR relationship ss fluid as possible in order to prevent any alliance against China.
D. China's Regional Aims
outheast Aria. Peking's early fears that the Indochinese war might spill over into China Kerns to have lessened is recent years. Even though Peking has expressed apprehension that US frustration In Vietnam might lead to further escalation, the baste Judgment of the Chinese seems to be that theogged down in an indecisive effort that Is more bxery to leadithdrawal than to further expansion of the fighting. Their confidence in this Judgment roust have been shaken temporarily by the US move Into Cambodia, but iheirof the ensuing political costs for the US has probably pcrcuaded them that ft is still valid. Thus, what we believe to be their long-range estimate probably remains unchanged; ie.rotracted struggle Hanoi's patience wiU outlast that of the US.
A: regard the likelihood of the PLA being sent into Southeast Asia for offensive action, the evidence of the pastears suggests Peking would be Indited in this direction only if China's security is seen as threatened, as on the Sine-Korean borderr if China Is provoked, as on then<han border2 Thus, we continue to believe that China would use its military forces to prop up North Vietnam if it appeared that thereeal danger of that government collapsing Similarly. China would no doubt react with the PLAirect military threat elsewhere along its southern borders.
Peking's more ktkc!yalmost certainly Its initialto aggravation in this area would be to Increase Its support to subversive and Insurgent activity. The fact that China continues its long-term improvement of Its logistic capabilities along tliis border, including the eurrcot road building In northern Laos, illustrates Peking's dnire to have support fadubM ready lor whatever cootingendes may develop. The character of the facilities, operational considerations, and recent history all suggest that Chinese plans In this area relate to the defense of south China and tbe assurance of nearby Iniurgencic* rather thanassive push by the PLA Into Southeast Asia. The objective, as before, would be to bring into existence friendly govcromeiiti responsive to Peking's political influence, and, In Peking's view, this could be done better bydiplomaticopen aggression.
32and Bumfl are already targetsubversive effort Thailand'j close Urs with the US guarantee China's continuing hostility. Thus far, Peking
hu had hole ojsportunJty todiplomatico Bangkok tadrelying onlong-term campaign to enouurege Insurgencygainst theb bo ruggectfon that Peldng Kcs this at an easy task or one that
caneven If priority. Ou the contrary,
s cooslstcat lo advocating local aelf-eaJiaoe* andn little wit rial aid lo the active Inrurgrots. Should thereub* anoain the US presence In Southeast Ana, tbe Chinese may combine this low level activity svKb more noaWve diploma be blandishments-
n Burma. Chinese propaganda is encouraging revolutionary activity, aup-plcmmlrd by imaO amounts of aid in arms and training to du nl ethnic CiiiKHiUcS. But diplomatic COOUctl with (hit eejlnViiwnetie bava been damaged rather than broken. Peking't return to nxdrrstiooe* areas of Its diplomacy may eventually be fit ended to Include Improved rvlatons with Rangoonow appears that both Odes are prepared to resume more normal relation* fc.ee an, Peking It not hkely tos support of Burma's insurgeata
Ci Elsewhere In Southeast Asia, the Chinese arco persist In encouraging local revolutionaries, but la these relatively remote areas. BguJicant material asssttaoc* is unhkely to be provided The Chinese will continue to find itlo rwfuse requests for aid from any source that claims an Insurgent orcapability, but they will continue lo urge telf-reliance rather thanon outside aid. Thus, th* Chines* will maintain their rule atleaders but without etontlng fhe-naehe* to undue cost or risk. These If abundant evidence that Peking feels no need lo act deadlines and bat no achedule lo fulfill; It it clearly prepared for the long haul
outh Asia Chana'i Inter eat tn Indiaelatively km rank on Peking's acala of priorities. China It concerned with Sino Indian horde* issues, withrivalries wfth the Soviets over Influence In South Asia, and withhatncapable of playing the roleeading Asian power. Toward these ends Peking has sought to embarrass and mtimidate New Lvlhu, but without becoming deeply Involved In the effort, For Instance, Peking has propagandized and provided hmited arms and training to Naga and Miaoeastern India without, however, attempting to nam thisontor
uger aoale, Peking's mJitary aid tomayorteopieiat of such Chineseas born out of common enmity to India. In the process the Pakistanis have become major clients of the Chines* and Peking will probably seek to ptrserve and raf ure this relationship even If SuyvIndian relations should Improve aomewhat In the coming years. Tentative feelers beta oro Peking and New Delhi ruggest both partiea may be readyeturn to cob-Motional dlpl icy Wbile formal lies nay be restored, to hoe with Peking's current effort lo bolster Ha diplomatic Image, tbe relationvhip will undoubtedly ran . cautious and cool tot torn* time to come.
ht ArUtn CornmuMiii Peking bow teems determined to cousobdafe tbe Cu/Tentfy Improved tie* with botb Nortb Vietnam and North Korea. If caJy because of the primacy of lhe Sino-Soviet oooihef, Peking bto go toriarthi lo improve Its re la boosngyaig and Hanoi, preferably at Moscow's expense. The error of pushing Pyongyang and Hanoi, whether Ideologioally or pohtkally. now seerns lo be clear to Peking and If unlikely to be repeated In the same gross forms as during the Cultural Revolution.
hina's present call for "rrilitanl uuiry* is probatJy designed, tn the farat Irutance, to acjueeie Out the Soviet Union. It also serves to give the Impreauionore active role In the "anti imperialist" struggle than ChLia's cautious actions warrant. Indeed, it seems likely that China will oontinue to tailor lb rol* toward propaganda and material support of those on the front hoes rather than aapote Itself to greater risk, this apparent effort to write (belt belatedly into any possible settlement lo Indochina, together with its sponsorship of Sihanouk, will reonire otrcJuI diplomacy If It Is not lo ahenatc Hanoi Having borne the burden of the fighting, the Vietnamese are bkety to be especiallyo any Chinese attempt to dictate strategy or tattsc* Currently the Cxunea* are moving with hnosie but their natural bent toward jhauvimsm Is nearly as bkely to erupt against the Vietnamese as against Westerners.
'pecial case for Peking Because of Japan's rerna.-Vableperformance and IS encouragement for ft toere acOve role In Asia, Peking Is showing concern over Japan's potential military power, and Its possible designs on another Crrater East Aria Co prosperity Sphere. This concerii was height cued Last fall by the signing of the Niton Sato cotn-aauavieruc On the reversion of Okinawa Peking baa always been apprehensive Over Japan's expending Influence to Aria, particularly In Taiwan, and has taken tha view that the Nlion-Sato oommunjoufore aasertive and direct rol* for the Japanese In the area Peklngi reaction bat been marked by aodigna-boo and by an wnjertlng ccorictjoe, that as the US disengages arocn Asia, Japan will Ml the void both eeooomicaJly and mlhtariJy and wQ assume the lead role In countering China. Adding to Pckingt dilemma it the awareness that tts1 assets and leverage In Japan have markedly dwindled and ant atnage has suffered from the extremes of tb* Cultural rurvorutsoo.
espite Its Imitation* and past. jcms to haveo oontinueourse of limited meddling in Japannternal affairs Peking has also launched an lnteniive propaganda campaign which raise* the rpecterenuhtanred, amperlaluticoreign policy ploy designed to fas trad, tioaal Asiao fears and to under cut Japanese Influence Moreover, tbe Chineseempting toase against US-USSR Japanesehich la alto Intended to strengthen Peking's band to its compea'tioo fa in/ueno* Is Aria So far this approach bat been luccessful in belping improve Chinas relations with North Korea, but hat notignificant impact on Peking's nooeom-muniat neighbori. Furthermore, tbe campaign has not beeo allowed to affect
nsaterudry Chinaurgeoning trade Japan, whichxpected Io reach record level* sj't; thii year.
ehMn. Tbebe Nationalist Ijo Taiwanroo-aJ blue In Chinese foreign policy. This symbol of the unfinished revolutionighly emotional Issue even after two decades. The Peking leadership faceserai rrustrarjoo of browing that they cannot tale Taiwan by force, thai it will not fall lo them by default, and that tbe growing strength of tlie independence-minded Taiwanese could weaken Peking's claim to the bland and perpetuate the Issue Indefinitely. Tbe continued recngritwo of the CftC by many countries Id the world and its presence Id the UN and othn International bodies blocks Peking bom full mtejaaOoraJ parn'a'peQoo anda for in Kant to the Chinese Ckrmnsunul leadership. Finally, the Taiwanomplei obstacle, to Improved re!*Goes with both the VS and Japan, thusimiting Peking's freedom to maneuver on toterriatsone] issues
cotstinues toChinese Interest he. of tbe strategicthe peninsula, tie quadrilateral competitioo for iulucoc* there, andrelationship between the north and the south. Peking has workedto regain it. Influence In Pyongyang and has rucceeded Indisplays of fj-.endi hip While attempting lo Unlit the role of the VS.Japan, however, Peking will iho seek to limit Northor tough political support forongs propagandacombined wtth quiet restraint on his military excesses to avoidinto another military ooofroritatiosi on tbe peninsula
L Chlno end the World Community
Peking'iili are not dotrtly engaged, Chineseactivity ever the last year has Involved far more tactical Peaibitybeen shownu the US and the USSR. The face ibowa tbe worldbroadly reaeoabtei thai displayed prior to the Cultural Revolution, anurtured Image of reasonableness, but entailing httle Or no change ingoals. Smo-Soviet eonsSdet arsons are part of the acjuaoVm toactivity, and In some oases, notably to Eastern Europe, tendtbe Qiinese approa It
astern Europe has become an attractive target lor Peking because Soviet problems there seem to draw Soviet aHanrioo away from China. In addition to In dote ties wttb Albania, Peking hat been actively cultivating the Rusnaruant. and more recently has shown real fletlb'Lty in shelving Ideology and improvinge taboos with Yugoslavia Ambassador* have returned to Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. Peking Is clearly preparing for longterm competition with the Sovietnd for this reasonikely to give greater attendee) to the East Europeans Much will of course depend on the subtlety and fcnesie ofpproach, but at this point the Chtneae have apparently assessed tbe
ctprxirtunitie, as worth pursuing Id this effort as fe other diplomatic endeavorsunderway, Peking will likely recover ground lost during the Cultural Revolu-_tioo, and.an bold lo Its new pragmatic diplomacy, achieve aorne fcewerd movement.
lsewhere In the world, Peldng It showing revived interest to fostering better relations where tbe cost Is cheap and the opportunities tempting. Tbit does not rule out support for revolutionary activity,vident Is the Near East Is contrast to the heavy arms aid from tbe Soviets to the Arab world, the Chinese apparently hope to rway tbe Arabs by conctartrarinr; their aid on the fedayeen. This will probably be mainly propaganda on 'people's war" with aome training and small-arms aid This also serves to keep tlx pot boiling and the Soviets corrected. But while Voouncing tbe uascfire as an American-Instigated "Munich" and decanting ftjoog ruppon for the fedayeen tb the lor-danias crisLs, the Chinese have carefully retrained from attacks on tbe Arab governments Involved, apparently unwilling to compromise future state relations in the area.
n Africa, the Chinese will be concerned to restore diplomatico the CRC to recent years. This will require more preafesnonal diplomacy and lest proselytizing. Indeed, China'] Foreign Minis by already teems to have accepted thb retreat from Maoist misiiontry work. For tje cost part, aid projects are Ukely to remain modest but withfforts lo makr them practical an! highly visible. Tbe constructioo of themjlioa TaMaiilaiambIa rail hbu appears to be Ouna't prestige project for Africa; the Chinese apparently also hope, through the provision of military aid, to xever* Tamaniaaior beachhead in Africa.
n an effort which may beini-tligbt Peking's return to the world scene, the Chinese have also beensg rnprecedentedIn UN membership. Is earner years, Pekingcoodtiooj on fts mem-bership which were clearly unacceptable to theody. More rtcentiy, Chinese tatrcials have dropped their eatrerne demands cod have aentumber of cautious feelers for support In tbe UN.hinese diptornati formerly spurned such support, now they go out of theirn eaunt appre-ciation for it. Despite an of this activity. Peking bat not otoed ,ti opposition to any tVO-Chint" formulatioo, and has continued to ma'* It clear that the CRC must ether withdraw or be dismissedeking would accept UN Memtenhp. Widened diplomatic reeogiubon of Peking, roch as by Canada andteadily Improving the chances for its admisslca to the UN; such an outcome seems likely within the next few
fl. Is general and bearing tbe contingency of Bilbtaryby the USSR, China's future mteroatiooalkcly to depend more on Chinese Internal developments than on externa! factors. If domestic pobbca! end economic -problems accumulate, to will the pressure to give them even bibber priority.
W WW i
withccwotnitant lessening In foreign interests- Mao Tsc-turig raniiris the key variable. So long as be retains his dominance within the leadership. Mao could attempt to reverse the present relatively moderate trends. Id tbe past, bis impatience has grown as his goals for China have been frustrated by economic reality and recalcitrant human nature. His ability to retreat andtill evident, butuestionable whether his age and health will permit another major push toward his visionary alms. In any event, despite his deep concern over Ihe Ideological conflict with Ihe Soviets, Mao's attention Is likely to remain primarily oo developments within China.e tuVery to abandon his caution and risk the destruction of Chica by provocative moves against either tbe VS or the USSR.
ao's death during this period could create succession problems that oould give Peking reason toow posture on the rntematiooal scene for some time. Almost any foreseeable combination of ruccetsors^-even presumablyMaoists like Lin Piao, the designatedprobably play for time to coosobdale their positions and to strengthen China to meet posiib'e challenge. In the longer run, as those who follow Mao ftce up to tbe Deeds of China, theikely to be away from the ideological excesses of Maobmore realistic adjustment to thewefl as tbeChina. Indeed, Jf the successor* persist In the present movement toward greater flexibility and pragmatism, they are likely to have greaterthan Mao In expanding China's political influence abroad Androger run, China'sethnoceutrinn will corriinue to fuel an assertive and potentially' aggressive nationalism
SO Presumably they will continue to focus their foreign policy on diplomacy at the overt level and oo subversion and Insurrection at the covert level. This could Include 'war by prory" as well as efforts to exacerbate US relations with its Asian allies and to exploit interna] tension within these countries. Webe sure, of course, how future leaders will see their situation, and it Isthat they will be prepared to employ China's developing powerore aggressive manner. It now scents bkely, however, that tbe open anduse of military power will continue to be Judged needlessly risky and therefore COunterprodixxrvc. Even tbe development of an Operational strategic weapons system may reinforce Chiooie caution rather thanore reckless policy. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if invaded, or If threatened directly with invasion, we fee DO compelling factors moving Peking towardpolicy of faparisionism, origher level of risk-taking For all Its verbal hostility and latent aggressiveness, neither the present nor the probable futurekely to see foreign adventuresolu-bon to Csiiiia's problems.
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