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USSR: "Containing"China
Moscow Is displaying fresh signs of concern over Communist China's stepped-up efforts to secure wide' international recognition. Thewould clearly like to limit Peking'scontacts in order to maintain China's sense of vulnerability to Soviet military and political pressures and to avoid providing it with additional outlets for anti-Soviet activity. Nevertheless, the Soviets seem somewhatoss for an effective means to counter the trend toward increasedacceptance of the Chinese.
Although the USSR has avoided publicon Canada's recognition of Peking, which was announced onctober, its activity behind the scenes underscores concern that other states
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loscow is also troubled oy Peking may eventually gain membership in the UN, but the Soviets found it expedient this year to revert to their traditional stance of public endorsement of Peking's "rights" in that body. Last year, with Sino-Soviet tensions at their heightesult of border fighting. Gromyko omitted the usual statement of support for China from his General Assembly speech, but this year he called for "full restoration" of Peking'shis gesture was clearly dictated by Moscow's present policy of minimizingpublic friction with China.
forceful and open campaign to limitesort to diplomatic arm-twisting would belie Moscow's assiduously cultivated Image that its relations with China are on the mend, and might make Peking less willing to persist in its reciprocal restraint. Moreover, such quixotic tactics might also damage Moscow'sto improve bilateral ties with states now seeking closer relations with Peking. Finally, the USSR undoubtedly appreciates that many of the most important factors improving China'sposition are beyond its power to influence.
In the immediate future, the Soviets can be expected to make additional low-key approaches in an effort to delay Chinese recognition and UN representation. On certain issues, such as "two China" proposals. Moscow will be free tomore vigorously, arguing publicly thatis the sole representative of China butadmitting, as it did to theew months ago, that Peking's presence on theCouncil would be "embarrassing" to the USSR. Over the longer term, however, the Soviets may fall back on the widely shared hope that broader diplomatic ties will increase pressure on Peking toore moderate international course.
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