Soviet Policy in Asia
OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
(Supersede. NIEIN FULL
THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimalei
Ihc Central Intelligence Agency ond lhe iniell-aence oroonijattons ol lhcof Stale and Defame, ond the NSA.
The Oeputy Direcior of Control Inlelljgenco
Thc Director of Intelligence ond Research. Department ol Stale The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Tho Director, Nolionol Security Agency
Ihe Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission, and Ihe Assistant to Ihc Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ihebeing outside ol their jurisdiction.
SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA
II. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD
Militaiy Aspect $
Current Soviet View and Policy Problems
Military Option .
POLICIES ELSEWHERE IN
A. Northeast Asia
PERCEPTIONS OF ASIA IN THE 19
SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA
toots of lhc conflict between the Soviet Union andgrown strong and deep. There will certainly be changes inof theas now. periods of relative calmimpioving state relations. But differences between thenational interests, waning ideologies, andsimply too basic and too vital to permit aof the dispute,
policies toward China have been fairly restrainedtense spring and summern effect, the Soviets arebuy lime; time in which to contain Chinese power in Asia andtime in which to improve their already impressive militaryalong the Sino-Soviet border; and time in which somehow tothe men who will one day succeed Mao that Iheir futuie mustcloser, or at least less troublesome, relations with the USSR.
Soviet leaders seem to be at least mildly satisfied withof their moderation. China, though still antagonistic, iswith much greater circumspection than it once did and hasils efforts to aggravate tensions along the border.that Peking does not itself revertore activelythe Soviets are likely lo try to maintain their restrainedat least (or lhe next few years.
whatever their plans and hopes, the Soviet leadersthe bitter past and must also allow for some grim possibilities in the
future. They are apprehensive that Chinese political and ecoiiotnic power will grow at more impressivehat Chinese foreign policy will become ineieasingly vigorous and elfective; and that China will further damage Soviet interests in East und Soulh Asia and will iuundermine thc USSR's roleorld power. And they arc fearful that by thehina's offensive strategic strength will betoajor threat to impotlant targets in the USSR.
E This serious concern about long-teim Chinese militarytogether with anxieties alxnit Mao's intentions, particularly along the Sino-Soviet border, has led lhe Soviets lo ponder the use of force against China. The continued strengthening of their forces along the border certainly suggests thai the Soviets have decided to keep this option open. But they seem also to have concluded, at least for the time being, that the disadvantages of thismilitary risks and possibly severe politicaloutweigh the rather uncertain net advantages in any situation short ofthreat or extreme provocations from China. And if the Soviets should decide that military action weic necessary, they would be more likely to engage in cross-border opeialions. limited in both time and scope, than to undertake more ambitious and risky efforts to neutralize China's strategic potential or to occupy large portions of Chinese territory.'
F. The problem ofthe problems of trying to contain Chinese power andcome to be seen in Moscow as central to Soviet policies throughout most of Asia. But concern about China is not the only major motive force liehind these policies. Efforts to undeimiue US and Western positions is also an important common
1 Lt On. Donald V. Bennett, lha DareeMr, Del true IntrRlgiraca Agency,paraeraph Bi* Centt. lot rhe AeistaM CW oll thendCenfor theof Slaff. Intel licence. USAF, join htmhis dmenl All threeihe thrust of UiU end ihe lotecoinc coneimtoiu coocemmg On Soviel polkyImpfvihe Soviets have derided Co live with the Chineie lineal and hope (orIm (be poil-Mao period- Thev behaveDure Uetv that thert leadership has notpolity opoou lowird Chiraa aad is ptobaUy notwith Useits rurreoi marinate (actM hati.-r. at military artsan
aEaii.it Chin.ll uiwter active consider alloo in theimnriVated by lhcbuildup al military capabilitict opposite China whicti are already rnOrc than adequate (oreus. If the Societa ihouldoluliin. whatever course of actumdopt would probablytnkeChiaew nuclear weapons proportion aad dehsery larrimevwee lompirtr lieatrarot ol tha >irw. teeto Part II,
tlicmc, one which, moreover, would (and did) exist indej>endcntly oltroubles with China And much of Soviet policy in Asia Is. of oiutse, formed by and tailoied to theperhapsproblems and opportunities presented by the individual Asian states.iscussion of ihese may be found in paragraphs)
C. The Sovietsormidable problem in seeking to assess tbc overall correlation ofsia in the decade ahead. They face, ineries of crucial imponderables: tbc policies and strengths of post-Mao China; thc scope and intensity of US interests in Asia; the impact of Japan's growing strength: and. in general, the effects the emeiging quadrilateral balance of forces inhe consequences of lhc interaction between the four major powers on the scene.
H. The growing complexity and uncertainty of internationalin Asia is not likely of itself to diminish the USSR's interests or lessen its opportunities in the area. On the <witrary. Moscow may over time find itself forced and in some cases encouraged to devote more and more of its energies to its position in Asia. There could be new crisesis China, arising either from renewed troubles along die border or from conflicts elsewhere in Asia. But aside fiom its relations with China, the USSR is not likely deliberately to press its interests to the point of confrontation, and. in general. Uie more complicated theand lhe more perplexed thc Soviets are aboul the likely shape of the future in Asia, the more Moscow will be inclined to react rather than to initiate, to play it warily and by ear. rather thanby some sort of pan-Asian grand design.1
. Or. Donald V. Bennett, lheDe/ente Intelligence Agency, docs. thisBriK. Cen. David E. Oil. fot the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel, licence. CX'iiiKliiwnt ol thc Army, joint him in thii distent Thevhat these longer ,anK predictions tend essentially to rule oul thc possiUililyino-Soviet military clash. This pottihility docs noi appear to boitlwr in Motto* oi in Pekingajor military conflirl occur by design, ni "calculation or ecculent. the Soviei perceptions described in this section would be drasticallyat would the interrelationships olworld-wide, especially those ln Asls.
! ff I
I. HISTORICAl BACKGROUND
I. Asia lias longurgcl of Russian encroachment. Fiomh to thr ISththe Russians continually starred uith the remnants ol the Mongol Empire in Siberia and Central Asia Beginning in the IflthRussians expanded Into Siberia unlil Ihey reached the Pacific and encosintered China. In Central Asia their tonqucsts were halted by confrontation >vith Bntish power in Persia. India, and Afghanistan. Japan's decisiveover Russian forces5 piobably prevented Russia's outright annrution of part of Manchuria and Korea lhe BolshevikInitially renounced expansionist alms in Asia nnd elsewhere, yet by thehe former Tsarist protectorate of Mongolia had been restored to Moscow's control. Itussian influence had been reasserted in Sinkiang. and seveial Communist parties had beenby Moscow to gain influence elsewhere In Asia.
ut the Russians have probablyof Asia at least as muchource of danger as an area of opportunity From tlieh to theh centuries theKhans contiolled MoaBOW, and their hanh
rule has left it deep impression on the Russian cmseiousness. And in modern times, during tho first half of this century, Moscow found Itself in more or less continuous conflict with Japan, which intervened in the Russian civil war ui the earlyin part in order to annex all Soviet territory eastilt:engaged the Soviets Inland battles along the Mongolian andborders in ihc. During Wnild War II, until Ihe defeat of Hitler's forces, the I'SSR adhered to anan because Stalin feared that the Red Army could notwo-fiont war.
3 The defeat of Japan in World War IIdirectly in Soviet territorial gainsSakhalin and theestablishmentro-Sovietin North Korea Worldndalio restructured the politics ofWestern colonial empires werethe pressure of resurgent Asianand were replaced bymost cases polilically weakundeveloped. Inevolutionary line
ami provided at least moral support to the
CoinmuuisI foices which hud emerged in Chiru. Vietnam. Indonesia. Malaya, and elsewhere He was principally sotsccrned,wiih (be advancement ol Sovieleven, in someheofareas adpeent to the USSR. Stalin's successors, however,ore flcxlldi- and oppuilunislic approach,on efforts in Asia and elsewhere in the Third World lo enhance tlieir influence through state-to-state relations (svith both radical and conservativextensions of military and economic aid, and various forms of pressure.
Bui, to Moscow,rime postwarin Asia was rhe Chim-se Cotnmunisi victory on the mainland Whatever Stalin's reservations about Man Tse-liing, this victory encouraged the Soviets lo believeime tlsat their security in Asia and llieir influent,-world-wide had been greatly enhanced. Some Soviel optimism on these count* apparently survived both the Korean war and signs in thehat Peking was becomingrestless with ils subordinate intei-national role, llut0 all such Sovielhad evaporated: the Sino-Soviet alliance had begun to come apart, and the USSR's position in Asia (as, for example, in Indonesia) no longer seemed soew years later and Moscow perceived (andproclaimed) that Chinese foreign policy had become "clearly hostile."
oday, Ihe Soviets look upon Chinaompetitor and adversary and evenrow. Ing security threat. Yet other important Soviet concerns in Asia, chiefly the US role and the visible re-emergence of Japan, also demand Moscow's attention. Moreover, as public and private Soviet statements acknowledge, these other concerns greatly tomplkatr Moscow's approach to Ihe Chirm problem.
II. SOVIET POUCY TOWARD CHINA A. Origins of Ihe Conflict
6 Manifestations of serious difference*the USSR and China began tofor Ihe most partthe. Peking, distrustful of Khrushchev'sInternal politics and anxious to assert its own notions about economic development and social discipline. In effect declared ils doc-trimil independence of thc USSRn thc course of putting into effect the Creat Leap Forward. Strains in the relationshipgrew rapidlyonsequence both of China's griming pride and sensitivityits own sovereignty and the USSR's mounting concern about the lia/ards of China's aggressive foreign policies.ccording lo Peking, tin- Sovicls renegedromise to provide major aid for Ihe developmenthinese capability in nuclear weapons, ln the following year, disputes over foreign policies and the nature of ihe international Communist movement came into lhe open, and Moscow, seeking to apply heavy pressure, suddenly terminated its economic aid programsubject of contention) and withdrew all its technicians and advisors from China.3ensions had grosvn significantly along the borders and the issue of Chinese territorial claims to large portions of Siberia and Soviet Cential Asia had been joined in public.
he onf this bitter, vital dispute are varied andand psy. etiological, ideological, and even cultural There has been contention because each state wishes for its own purposes toeading role In Asia, and neither relishes competition from the other. There have been furvdarncntal disagreements concerning policies toward the US. differing assessments of the risks involved in one or another aspect of East-Westand diiputes over ihe level of support one partner owed Ihe other in particular situa-
(such as Iho SImv AmericanIn Ihc Taiwan Straits. Behind such clashes of Interests lay China's strong lesentment of its subordinatetrong Soviet suspicion that Mao wished to dominate the partnership, and the well-founded concern of each that the other would in the end prove to be an unreliable ally. And contributing to ill will were conflKling ideas about the proper courses of domesllc isolicy. themselvesof thc fact that the Iwo states are In vastly different stages of economic development.
o. Ideological factors have also been an important source of contention and have at times added to lhe forccfulncss of theMao's challenge lo Soviet ideological supiemacy. together with differences over strategy for the spread o( communism, have provoked serious bilatrral disputes andin the world's Communist movement And largely because of ideology. Soviet and Chinese conceptions of each other's motives and behavior have tended to becomein doctrinal formulae This, in turn, has nude it extremely difficult for thc two sides lo compromise their quarrels, even on minor issues.
inally, broad cultural differences,by strong historical and racialhave helped to give thatrong emotional cast and an extra degree of intensity Indeed, mutual misunderstandings and resentments may have been inevitable in the wake of the encounter of these two self-contained and antipathetic culturesven during the period of at least niperficiauy cordial relations, many Chinese showed thei.-disUke of the Russians' patronizing attitude toward Chinese traditions, andnd paiticularly after live onset of the GreatCultural Revolutionopular aversion in China to things Ruvvian was raised to thc level of regime polity, 'llie Soviets, for
their part, have always regarded Oriental mores as alien and vaguely menacing and often cihihitcd their uneasiness by demanding ao kiiowk^grmcnt of the superiority of Russian (and European) ways. (
B. The Miliiary Aspect
t least until the, the Soviet lcadttv seemed to view their conflict with China as almost eiclusively political and idco-logit-al Initially, they did not seem especially concerned about Chinese military capabilities or interested in tlse use of their own forcesis China, even for essentially political purposes But gradually Moscow perceived that the Suso-Soviet dispute wasilitary dimension as well. This perception may have been basedather bioad and simple calculation: It is prudent to improve military capabilitiesarge.hostile and pcrliaps not altogetherneighbor. Moscow presumbabiy wished to be better able both to protect its ownand to apply military pressure onihould this prove desirable. And il knewli"onhe development in placeheater force structureredible deterrent or as ancombat force should deterrence fad. Of course, the Soviets realized thatast nMQfl they could count on lhcir strategicSoviet intercontinental ballistic missile can lie targeted againstthey alio presumably feared that these capabdities would be too overpowering to Im suitable for contingencies short ofnuclear war.
he buildup near China has taken place mainly under Khrushchev's successors.had orderedi vor improvements in borderwould have in time authorized more substan tial measures in response to Mao Tse-lung's
of Chinese territorial claims in July
nny ease, presumably some time in
after Khrushchev's removalthe subsequent Sino-Soviet udksto naught, the Soviets decided tosubstantially their ground andforces near the Chinese frontier. Sincetotal number of divisions in tbe areatripled and tactical air strength hasaccordingly. These increases haveby roughly proportionatein overall Soviet theaterthus they have have notmajor drawdown elsewhere in theEastern Europe. The builduphas, however, absorbed newotherwise might have been availableof theater forces in thc West.
hile continuing lo add new units* to their forces in the border areas, the Soviets9 seem to have concentratedon effoits to fill out existing units and to improve command and control procedures and tbe support structure. Among otbeithey haveew Military(MD) opposite Sinkiang. They have ulso pulled back or realigned certain strategicunits, in order loem less vulnerable to Chinese atiack.
hc border areas have been quiet since the last serious military clash in thend the ground forces of both sides have remained in essentially defensive postures. Though lhe Chinese have moved several field armies northward over tlse past two years, thc bulk of Chinese ground forces are. still deployed generally well back from thc border. And most Soviet divisions have not yet been given sufficient men, transport, or support above division level, to engage inoffensive operalions. Although they now maintain many combat-ready elements in thc area, the Soviets svould probably need
Ihree weeks or to.risis situation, to hnng all their forces to full strength in personnel and equipment
C. Tho Current Soviel Viow and Policy Problems Ahead
view of the China problemin Soviet media and in intra-Party
iiias glossed over lhc conflict of national interests and cultures and tends to be self-contradictory- On the one hand, the Soviets base repeatedly and bitterlyChina's "great power chauvinism" On lhe other, ideology precludes tho admission that fundamental disputes or rivalries canbetween Socialist stales. And,vlien lhe strident and even semiSoviet propaganda campaign against China reached ih peak, commentaries have generally downplayed military aspects of thr problem Principal blame for the dispute is placed on Maoew associates. Forecadehc Soviets say, Mao repressed his anti-Marxist tendencies because of the opposir tion of pro-Soviet elements in Ihe Chinese ComuHinut Party leadership But in recent yean, the indictment continues, Mao has purged Ihe Party and used the armed forces and public media to turn his country onto an an ti-Soviet course because, among other things, he realizes that the USSH constitutes the chief obitacle to his Pxpansionlit goals.
official Soviet view ofumber of genuineapprehensions. In part, however, iterve the purposes ofpoliiical warfare and thus offers adistorted picture of thc generalEmphasizing the personalMao, for example, may be anof attack, and no doubt accuratelystrong dislike for the man. but itlhe Soviet leadership's full awareness
its problems withucerbaled bynot solely personal in origin and will not ot themselves evaporate once Mao has poo*.
learly, lhc Soviel leaders wish loChinese power in Asia and elsewhere and in tlse Communist movemeni. and ihey wish at the same time lo be able sornehow tothe course ol Chinese policies in general llieir pronouncements and general behavior indicale that they also hope thai, withoutany substantial concessions of their own. they can persuade China to mend its ways and ic-establish good relations with tlieUnion. They may not be convinced that these aspirations are ultogctlier realistic; theyreceive conflicting advice on this point from their experts, some of whom hold that lhei cat is receding while others suggest quite the contrary, But. lacking any attractive alternatives, lhe leaders never-tlieless seem willing to proceed on thelhat time is on their side.
n any case, the dominant notes struck by most Soviet spokesmen, including it re/lines', since llie summereen consistent with this approach: the Soviet military forces are prepared but will not behe USSR is patient nnd relies on its basicsvith the Chinese people during this tcni penary period of misrule; the Chinesewhich takes power in the relatively near future will be likely toore normal stale-to-state relationship svith the USSR andestoration of economic and cultural lies, some Parly contacts, and even Soviet military assistance.
n the aflrrinath of the border incidentshc Soviets have in fact tried to develop correct If not cordial state-to-si ate relations with China. There have beenthough so fat iiieonclusis'e. border nugotiations, an exchange of ambassadors (in
our-year hiatus, and anagreement to triple trade from the low leveloviet propaganda concerning China is critical but is seldom bellicose, Thc Soviets seem generally satisfied svith theturn of events and willing, if necessary, to letborder talks drag on cndlesdy Tlie Sos-iets seem to be stallingesv regime in Peking. And, assuming no major nesv Chinese moves diiectly against the USSH. they arc likely over the neat few years to maintain this restrained approach.
evertheless, thc Soviet leadership is probably unanimous in its dislike and distrust of Chun, and it still operatesense of profound disquiet concerning its relations with Peking in Ihe future Growing Chinesepower, in the absenceavorable turn in Chinese attitude, coulderious threat lu Ihe security inleresls of the USSR. And whatever hopes Moscow may have for improvements in Chinese attitudes, it hascontinuing concern thai before Mao and bis entourage disappeai, they will succeed in pushing Chinaundamentally non-Marxist and durably anti Sovietorm of bureaucratic state, highlyand dominated by the military, with the Communisl Party demoralized andss atching from the sidcliises The Soviets abo fear that, even if the Maoists should fail in this. Mao's successors may noi represent much of an improvement, speculating lhat post-Mao China might go through yet another upheaval comparable lo the Culturalor svorse. They have implied that in this event China might then turn more vigorously against tbe Soviet Union as the principal enemy.
hatever form the post-Mao regime assumes, it does not seem at all likely to us that Peking will ever again be willing loitself lo Mq&losv There is at the
lime little chance that Moscow could remain content tor wry lone; unless itominant position And even il Sino-Soviet iclations should improve laiily substantially for athe post-Mao era or evenmutual dislrust. differing doc-'mil views, and divergent nalional inletrus will almost certainlyasic healing of the dispute Indeed, contention between the USSR and China, though it will surely vary in intensity, seems as firmly rooted and as destined to endure as the more familiarbetween the USSR and tlse West
his is our estimate 'lhe Soviets'are of course shapedifferent perspective and guided by different objectives, and prospects may not be in their view quite so pessimistic. Still, the Soviet leadership mutt prudently allow for grim possibilities. It must, for example, acknowledge tlie possibility that Chinese political, economic, and military stiength will giow at an impressive rate and that Chinese foreign policies will becomevigorous and effective It will in any case remain apprehensive that China will more effectively threaten Soviet Interests in East and South Asia; will complicate Soviet relations with the Wesl. particularly with Ihe US; and willeneral undermine the USSR's rolelobal potter
oscow demonstrated0 that it did not wish to raise tensions with thc West while embroiledrisis with China On that occasion, however, it was icluctant to make any basic changes in its approach and pet-(erred instead tn temporize. But over the long lerm, if the China problem persists ln serious form, the Soviets may have tomore far-reaching changes inis one or another of their principal adversaries. They might, for example, ponder thc advisability of offering some major coo-cession to Peking in an effort to puichasc good
will, or al least diminished hostility. Or, alternatively, they might consider thc wisdom of making substantial adjustments in theirto the West in an effort to buy time while pressures and perhaps even military action were brought to bear against China.
D. Ihe Military Option
he Soviets have already given some thought to the possibility of dealing with the China problem through the use of force, in pari because they are especially concerned about the security of their border, which isubject of controversy with Pekingile frontier (includingile Sino-Mongol!an sector) does not lend itself to linear defense Moreover, the Far Eastern sector lies at tlie endhin, lengthy, and vulnerable logistic lino (thc Trans-Siberiannd most developed centers in this area of the USSR are Hose to the border. In the western sectoi the Soviet logistic position Is much belter, but here the problem isby the various nationality groups which straddle the border.
n any event, dui Ing the summer9 tlie Soviets gave the impression to theand others, that they were seriouslya rcsoit lo drastic miliiary measures It now appears that Ihe main Intent of their ominous hints was to move the Chinese into negotiations, butnumber of military options weie surely underin pari because there could be no guarantee that the Chinese would, in fad, step bad and consent to negotiations
ome Soviet leaders, especially after the Uvsun incidents, may have been attracted by the notion thai it might be dcsitable lo teach thc Chinese an even stronger militaryi e. stronger than already taught by Soviet actions in si>ccilic border incidents Perhaps there was also some hope (though it could
not have been much more ilun (hat) in Soviet circles that (hc Mao-Lin regime could no(ili(ary tlel*ca( at tho liaudi offorces and that its successor would be more "realistic" visa-vis the USSR, or at least less troublesome And some Soviets must Ivavc argued that it would be better to moveagainst China sooner rather than later, when Chinese nuclear weapons deployn.it ut would be well advanced.
The Soviets apparently have difficulties in estimating Chinese strategic offensivebui (heir apprehensions probablythem low. worst case estimating. The Soviets appear to believe lhal the Chinese cms, by (he, buildubstantialof ballistic missiles capable oflhc European USSR They doubtless are aware of the small but steady Chineseofedium bomben. which can be used to drop nuclear bombs, and that the Chinese may be developing ASMs for these bombers. Finally, the Soviets may fear that tlie Chinese eventually wdlub marine-launched ballistic missile system,of striking important laigets within the USSR.
inimum Ihe Soviet leadership seems concerned that such capabilities will eventually provide Chinaredibleforce and (hat, under its cover, Peking might feel free to pursue, for example, more aggressive ground actions against Soviet or Mongolian territoryore remotetbe Soviets probably allow for the possibilityajor war between China and tbe USSR resulting from accidenteliberate (though perhapsdecision by Mao Tse-tung or hisAnd, finally. Soviet planners must have also considered thc possibility of large-scale warfare deliberately initialed by the USSR itself.
2S. In very broad terms, (he Soviets mightumber of different kinds of military optionsis China Onewouldon nuclear groundof limited scale and wiih limited goals. This couldaid in force against Chinese posit tons or localities fairly ik-.ii thc border, designed essentially to punish. Impress, and perhaps deter the enemy (in the manner, for example, of Israeli punitive raids against Arab guerrilla bases innother possibility wouldore ambitious ground force move seel) into Chinese border provinces, such as Sinkiang or Inner Mongolia. This mightunder the guiseampaign to rescue or liberate oppressed minorities in ihesesome of Ihe territory thus acquired might then be establisheduffer zone. Yet another possibility would he non-nuclear air strikes on Chinese nuclear and missileMore drastic options aie of couise availablehe Soviets, Bui i( is highlythai Moscosv has ever seriouslyas an availableull-scaleto conquer China with conventional meansarge scale nuclear attack inlended to destroy China or to bring it immediatelyls kt
The military options which may have been weighed by the Soviets9 probably would be generally relevant today and are likely to remain soime Neither Chinese nor Soviel military capabilities have radically improved In (he interim and no major changes in the balance seem likely for thc next few years The Cliinese will probably be able gradually to expand their strategic offensive capabilities, but are not expected to have missile or modem bomber forces which Ihe Sovieis svould consider formidable until at least the.
The disadvantages of military action against China have to dalein the Soviet mind lhe rather un-
advantages. Tin- Soviets could not lw certain of their ability to control cillicr the nature or live duration of activetd No irutter howonventional Sovicl attack might be initially, Moscow would have had lo reckon with the possibility lhat Peking would be able ond determined lorotracted conventional campaign againstforces. It could riot be certain that the Mao regime would bl overthrown, though it could be sure that, in general, Chinesetoward the USSR would be gieatlyAnd Moscow could foresee that once bogged down inrotracted conflict, its alternatives would appear to be anwithdrawal oi resort to the use ol nuclear weapons in an effort toive end to thc conflict. It is also conceivable lhat. using theirircraft, the Chinese could strike, for example. Vladivostok,oi Alma-Atauclear v. caponield in fhe megaton range.
f Ihe USSR were to use nuclear wcap otis. it would have to face the povsibslrty of nuclear retaliation. In addition, the Soviets seem to understand that they mighteavy political price indeed if they were thc first to violate the nuclear truce of the past quarter century. They themselves have placed great emphasis on Ihe desirability of anban on first use of nuclear weapons They would surely be concerned that their violation of the truce might fundamentally alter world opinion toward the Soviet Union and lead to basic shifts in the foreign policies of major slates. Tliey would fear that tho US might feel less inhibited about using its' own nuclear weapons, for example, in Vietnam. They would also fear that their action wouldumber ol otherIndia, West Cermany. andacquire then own nuclear capabilities.
oreover, (he Soviets would Iiave tohe general effectslow against China on their policies elsew here in the world. Motcow ha* invested heavily in ils campaign to project an image of peace andeeially in Western Europe, and has long sought to convince Third World slates that tlte USSR is Ihe protector of the down trodden and (heilitary move against China uould in most circunutances jeopardize bolh these policies Possible UScould the US in some way take significant advantageino-Sovietalsoajor Soviet concern, particularly if the USSR found itself more or lessengaged ui China against an enemy which simply would not quit.
hile the military option will remain open to thc Soviets, it is thus likely to remain an unaltiactive and riskyurnover in the Soviet leadership which brought to the lore menore radical disposition, or perhaps one which enabled the miliiary touch more direct androle, might raise the chancesrastic Soviet move. The adoptionore aggievvivc postuic in Peking and the lesump-tion of Chinese raids along the border might also revive Soviet in IciestilitaryIn this event the Soviets would be more likely to resort to actions along the line of the limited, non-nuclear cross-border operations described above than to tbe more ambitious military actions wiih the grave risks andAssuming relative continuity in the Soviet leadership and constancy in Chinese policies, however, the drcurnsianccs and con-<ide;aliont which have so far persuaded the Soviets not to attack China will probablyat least for thr next few years. And in thend beyond, the arguments in Moscowajor military move may
bv reinforced by Hie continuing build up ol strategic nuclear eapabililies in China.1
*Ll Cm.ke Director. I. Sec-
ill- Cen. Duvtd K. Of, (ot (heChief of Staff foi li.ti-lln-ence, Department of the Ai if and Brig. CenItatlovk'h, lot lhc AstislAnl Chief or Slalf,ce. USAF, |oln hnii in tills distent. All three believe lhal thu etlunile inadeaaatHr eepretaes Ihe Soviet concern lea the thirst to then national mgiay poled by the Cfuorse. that il oveiemphatiici Soviet hopes for an improve-mi'iil In trillions after Mao; lhat ll places undue itresi on Soviet concern for world opinioni; and, final))', tintimplied (uJenieiil lhal Sovirl miliary actieai tujelnstejihely. rs maoe^iatty sup-peeled by evidence The DIA. Arasy. and An Force pen11vii li elaborated in the (cHcwing paragraphs.
n the Soviet view Chinese hostility, ihe ter-rilorial dispute, and Chinese military capabilities add uplear ihteal lo ihe nations) security of lhe USSRhis threal Hal has led the No.eti to ursdertake the military bu-Mup slottsj the bo-elei Be-cause oi the disparity I" mJitiry snengtii, the Soviets probably consider the ptvsenl threat tolerable llIt ts theperiod in which tlie Chinese will have noi onb in.iu.ivt conventional fouv> butuable nuclearihcni coomarue that there are otber issuer, tajrb aa ComprataM feedou-inant role ia East Asia and competition foe political and ideotoc.it at prestige am) authority throughout thebut these iaiuei,important in Dieinirlvei, ate te<nisdary to the concern lot national secunty.
2 We doubt thatny ubaaantaalin Ibe USSR whatr..true KtUemeni of diffvreneei with China nunder Mao Or hu tuccesiori Theloo deep and the basic objectives uf lhe iwotoo contradictory fot Men cow to believetaneeoncillalsvn oo trrrnt whichcould accept- Thainot to sayaper ' oth
rides doited It, but the bailc conflict would remain Thus, while the Soviet leaders may hope for aoraUr turn In thc relationship, they would noi con-SaSerum liLely. and could not imidrnlly trusthe chaisecould ocsur.uch* that the Soviets eipectuture will bringontinuation of Chineserotractedar uf stealer or lesier .nLr.ii.lv teady Increasehlnrie nu-
clear capability. Wc believe that Soviette d'liti-'il svilh thii future in view.
n any Soviet analysis of lhei opUon. idpolitical (Ottsequcivces, world opinion, and other such factors are not likelyeigh heavtlyeoniideralioeis of national securily. Over thethe Soviets hair repeatedlyhat they >ould afford to ignore socfa possible ill effnune case i" postal. Ihey mail now eon elude lhat they were correct- They may even Judge lhat in anany parts of Use world there wouldovett welcome lot almost any action which would reilgro the Chinese potential for creatine danifeiOus iituallrMis. In any even', the Soviets arc adept at finding or contriving rationales to juilify almost any
* Any Soviet decision loilitary option aould multeadership decision basedi/soon ot rail versus gains. Wa do netand are net bVely lo get unaaJjafuous iaforrmation ondnaiua aaaklaBej. Nor da wa luxow hew lae Soviet leaden would neigh all various lactotir In rhe absence af dirrtt evidenc* on Soviet drciuoniear understanding of Soviet perspectives, the etea'Cvt indication ol their iulentiont il the evidence provided by lhc military buildup along lhc bevMi bolder.
$ This buildup bos progressedhn point where Utc forcet alieady drplayed are more Uian adequate for ilelenie againsi any minor Chinese incursion even -henenchant for over-briningales- aato arearanc Yet. adeaMeval form air stall beutr. deployed, and the tssdsaUceaa are that tbe buildup wsll ccasunve for lhe neat lew yean.aeafiMard thai tbe Soviets aa* tbeir nn'Hary power for politkal i'i'.riUir. the scope of the bu Idup inJiiiitcs that tbe Sovieb are preparing (or tha poi-iiridiiy of large-icale hosolitsri Since it ii highly unlikely thit the Chinese will initiate mch hosbl-Itica, ile Autuwd thai the SoefcUot-ublllly lhat Uiey may find it in ibeir inleieils louth hostiiitici theauelvcs. We believe (hat lhc Soviets have not yet decided whether lo cieriite iu Ii an optMo, and wc cannotuture with any am.iaoee llawevei. it ia dear froea the buaVlap tbat tbey wish to keep rbe option in hand. IMA and Aj Force beboe lhat if iba Soviets ihould rhooae lorsdrtaiy lohstsoa.course of action ibey adopt would probablytrike against Chinese nuclearprniloclion and delivery facilities. Anny conaidrrs that il llie SuvkIs shouldililai* lolutinn it may includenike. but use evidence does not COiicliiihrlv Indicate lhal it jirohaWu would
SOVIET POLICIES ELSEWHERE IN ASIA
I Sovicl concerns with China over Ihe past decade Iiavetioug andpredominant influence oa Soviel policies elsewhere in the region of Asia Nonetheless, it is possible touickening of Soviet interests in Asiaeriod well liefore thc Sino-Soviet dispute came to Ihe surface and the motivesore active Soviet role "in Asia arc not to be explainedsometimes not atterms of Soviet efforts to contain Chinese influence. Basically, the USSR has been impelled by its rapid rise to great power status in the past World Warra toew and growing lole in Asia. It feels that its piestige requires it to be active in the region, that its security interests are involved ur threatened In various situations, and it sees opportunities to advance itsand positionreas ofiion- recent concern.
he Soviets have not. however, assigned equal pnonty to all of their concerns In Asia, and these priorities have tended to fluctuate Khrushchev, for example, did not regaid South-cast Asia as vital to Sovicl interests, while his successors haveore active policy there, though still leframing from major The initial Soviet approach to India and Indonesia with offers of ecooomic and military aid inad as much or more to do with general Soviet slrategy for advancing Moscow's influence in the Third World as with competition with China. The more recent quickening of Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean itself and in the straits of Malacca region also reflect thereat power concerned with global security as well as regional aimsis China And Soviet policy in the Middleegion which is mainly part of Asiahas litllc to do wiih Soviet con-
cerns over China, and much to du withambitions in (he Mediterranean andworlds.
s least since thc death of Stalin, the Sonet approach to non-Communist Asia has been on the statc-to-Male basis; ihere has been relatively lilfJe effort to use localparties as major instruments of Soviet policy and the ideological content in official Soviet dealings has been low. The region is too diverse lo lend itself to grand designs and aside from the common themes of protecting Soviet security interests, limiting Chineseand undercuttirig Western positions where feasible, the USSR has generally based its approaches on the particular circumstancesopportunities presentedountry-by-country bails.
he idea of an all-Asian collectivecompact, broached by Brezhnev in9 represents somethingeparture in Ihit paitn ul.irist Soviet approach In Asia. The vague Soviet scheme was put forward during tlse tense period of armed conflict on tlse Sino-Soviet border, and In tbe context ol the fears generated -mong China's neighbors by the ex-cesses nl Ihc Cultural Revolution. The initial Soviet aim was to take advantage ol thistoense of common interest between the USSR and the Asians, and to raise for tlie lirst time the question of containing Chinaommon goal The Soviets failed to follow up their idea with specific proposals, partly at least because the Asians failed tofavorably. This lack of positive response reflected the deep internal divisions in the area and the absence ol any sense of common regional interest as wellisinclination to serve Soviet aims. This does not preclude more vigorous advocacy of the proposal at come future date if it should appear useful, either fo contain China or to take advantage of possible further declines in Western in-"ucner'.
Thc rivalry between Moscowins had other far-teaching effect* on the Soviet poslure In Asia. Moscow'sefforts toecoftciliationIndia and Pakistan, increasingot regional economic cooperaiion. and concern oxer other trouble spots, such as Pakistan's internal crisis, reflects llie desire of thc USSH to pievent regional disputes ihat might offer an opening for Chinese trouble-making. The Soviet Party no longer promotes the forceful seizure of power by Asianarties n: seeks thc installation of nHl-cal regimes, for fear they would be attuned to Peking rather than Moscow. The Soviets also appreciate thc fact that their interests In Asia can be advanced more readily and easily at the preseni time by establishing closer ties with liOn-Coinmunist Asian governments through, normal state-to-state relations. For the timein fact, the USSR is being pushed in the direction of becoming somethingtatus quo power in Asia. As tbe other side of the com. Asian regimes long fearful of Communistncluding Thailand, Malaysia. Singapoic, lheeven Taiwan and South Korea, have begun lo believe, in varying degrees, that they can now deal ad-vantageouily with thc USSR and other "non-hostile" Communist states under conditions of lelativr security.
A. Northeast Asia
apan The Soviels have long been anxious to pull or push Japan away from its close relationship with the US,eutral Japan on friendly terms with the USSR anti increasingly open to Soviet influence. But thc Soviets do not appear opt untitle about tlielr abdity to accomplish their objectives in Japan. On lhc contrary, they seem to bemore and more uneasy aboul the role Japan may come tn play in Asia, wllh or with-
out Us ties to Ihe US, and mcreasinglyabout the possibility of closer ties developing between Japan and China.
Indeed, many Soviet foreign policywho worried principally about China9 now seem to worry more about Japan. One Soviet academician claims that hishas submitted to the Soviettudy which concluded that Japan, rather than China, had the economic, political, andcompetence, and would develop themilitary power to "organize" the entire "Pacific Basin" and achieve dominant power there by ther. Some Soviets apparently fear that, if present trends continue, the Japanese will establish some sort of partnership with Mao or his immediate successor, with Tokyo the dominant partner by virtue of technological superiority. And one high-level Soviet |Ourrahst familiar with Japan has arguedwhat is said to the contiaiy in the Soviet press, includingin his ownIn Japan desiring cooperation with the Soviet Union are not very strong at present and have little chance of asiuming power in the future
This frank admission is close to the mark; the Soviets really have very littleleverage in Tokyo. Bilateralis arc still loo slight to be more thanThe USSR's share accounts for lessercent of Japanese exports andercent of Japanese imports, less0 million oveialL Thc total Japanese trade with Communist China is about thc samebut the level of Japanese exports to China is rising sharply. The Japanese would welcome prospects for greater sales of machinery,and light industrial products to lhe USSH Moreover, Ihey wish to Join in efforts toI nl Soviet raw materials In Siberia, mainly coking coal, natural gas. and lumber. These considerations have elicited Japanese agice-
Io participate in joint development this yearew commercial port. Vr angel, on thc southern tip of I'nmorskiy Kray. Butbehavior gives Use Soviets no reason to hope that Japan will corne to regard the USSRital market or source of supply.
The Soviets must feel frustrated In their other dealings with the Japanese. Thehave always been deeply suspicious of Soviet political ambitions in Asia. Now they have also become increasingly cautious about closer ties wiih the USSR which mightChina. Thot olfers little condor) to the Soviets. The JapaneseParty (JCP)elegation toh Soviet Party Congress, and agreed to mute us criticism of Soviet policies, at leastBut the JCP evidently is determined to preserve its "independent" status Thishas caused the JCP to be unhelpfully neutral in the Si no-Soviet dispute, to oppose the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakiand to support the Sato Ros-ernment's claim to the Soviet occupied Southern Kuril Islands The curirnt leaders of the Japanew Sociahsts (JSP) are pso-Peking andapid lapproachcment between Tokyo and Peking Like the Communists, the JSP advocates the lelurn of the Southern Kurds by thc USSR. Indeed, tho Soviets seem almost friendless In Japan; Japanese public opinion polls invariably award the USSR thc title of "most disliked" country in (he world.
It can be argued that the USSRumber of strong cards yet to play that would induce Japan to move toward doseand evenwith Moscow. Tlie Soviets could, in theory, return some or all thc Kurd Islands, open up the Soviet Far East and Siberia to Japanese investment and development on much more generous terms than offered to date, and they might movcsatisfactory economic relations lo posi-
tive collaborations on security matters directed againsi tlie growing strategic power of Cliina. But there are serious constraints on both tides There are political and ideological obstacles tvithin the USSRolicy of welcoming large-scale Japanese development efforts in the eastern USSR and there are both strategic and political objections lo the return ol the Kuiils. On lhe Japanese side, there Is almostreat reluctance to become overly dependent on Soviet sources of raw materials and for tlie next decade, at least, movt Japa nesc resource requirements can be met from sources elsewhere in the Pacific Basin, which also have much lower investment
eyond these practicalons in Tokyoeeply ingrained distrust andof the USSR as wellense ol cultural, and more recently, technical superiority The Japanese have proven and will prubablyto piove very hard aod irritatingwith the Russians- Tokyo is likely to remain much more concerned withgood relations with tbe US and Inrelations with China than with drawing closer to lhc USSR. In sum thc Soviets have veiy Iii I- leverage they can apply against Japan
orea. The basic Soviet aim in northern Korea, like that of thc Tsars, has been toaramount influence there in order to enhance the security of the land and sea approaches to thc Vladivostok area.this, Moscow has sought power In Korea lo gain leverage against both Japan and Chin* The defeat of Japan5 gave thc USSR fhe opportunity to realize these aims, bul the hind was badly played. Not only did Stalin's miscalculation0 bring the US and then China into the Peninsula in strength; it also gave Kim It-sung the opportunity in Ihedecade to purge his party of Soviet-
Koreans, and Ioosi-(ion ol balance nnd iiidcpendcnee between Iho USSIl and China.
Tho Soviets aie leftilficullThey cannot move bys in Eastern Europe toore acceptable leadership withoutirect confrontation with China Yet Kim's propensity for "adventurism" threatens fiom lime to time to involve the USSR in unwanted confrontations with the US and perhaps, in time, with Japan Their is also tho continuing possibility that Klui will line up solidly with the Chinese or that his continued purges will pull the house down and Rivehance lo reassert Itsinfluence dhectly in the atea.
ilitary and economic aid pro* idesith some leverage and this may suffice for some years to maintain an acceptableol Soviet influence in Pyongyang. But from Moicow's point of view llie situation will probably appear as unstable with no revolution favoring Soviet interests in sight.
B. Southeost Asia
lie USSR has no important securitydirectly at stake in Soul beast Asia except for its concern over freedom ofIn the Straits of Malacca But it dida chance lo promote the growth of Commit-rnvl influence fn the unsettled conditions of the post-World War It period and II Joined with Pekingime in encouragingstruggle throughout the area. In Uie middle and the, however, Soviet policy adapted more realistically to thesituation in dividual countries under the general slogan of peaceful coexistence.
flrfoneiia. As noted above, special efforts were made in the Khurshihev era tonvilion of influence in Indonesia through generous economic and militaiy aid
and the cultivation of Sukarno. The flaw in Ihis approach was the Soviet inability Fowiih the Chinese for influence over the large Indonesian Communist Pattyhen the PKI, acting at least in the spirit of Maoist doctrines, attempted their coup and failedhc USSR's carefully nurtured state-to-state relationship collapsed. Tlie fall of Sin.-iiii" saw the adventew Indonesian military regime which exhibited extremeof all Soviet, as well as Chinese influence.
acking any significant base within Ihc badly mauled PKI. thc Soviets have had little choice but lo play for time and to deal as besl they can with Ihc anli-Couimunssland legal oppositionist groups. Since9 thc Soviets haveew ambassador, resurrected their economicagreed to reschedule the Indonesian debt, ollered lo renew credit sales of military span- pailsmall scale, expanded Soviet co:ivnt-icia1 mid cultural programs, and quietly saluted "realistic" tendencies among the "ruling militaryoscow is enhancing itsw ith established Sukarnoist and other tton-Cummimist leftist paitics, Organizations, and groups- All this activity is closely monitored by Ihc government, which sees it asuf the need Io continue holding rheat aims length. Thus prospects [or any mijoi expansion of Soviet influencerc slim. Moreover, cognizant ofmportance in Asian affairs, thcgovernment is seeking to improvewith Peking.
urma. Burma is another country where the USSR has long since lost out Io China in competition for control of the Communist movement and has devoted most of its efforts lo relations with the government in olfice Thaugli not an area of major Soviet concern, the USSR has provided Burmaodest Icni of economic and technical aid since Ihe
Moscow ha* beenbe military regime of Nc Win as "progressive" and pro-Socialist. (While SIturmcsc relations have eased since thc peak of thc Cultural Revolution. Peking did vilify the Ne Win regimeascist militaiy clique, praised Burmese insurgents, and still gives haven and support lo the Burmese White Ragn9 the Soviet Peace Committee declared ihat the "peace-loving people of thc Soviet Union, India, and Burma" shouldcommon front" againsi the "adventurous policies of the ChineseBut the USSR is nott self to anything rnoreery nsodest aid program. The USSR probably recognizes thai Burma's need to placate lhe Chinese will continue to place strict limits onllinurifiso^ Moscow to csjiand iUin Rangoon
Thailand, Malaysia, and Singaporeopportunities and activities in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand developed much later than in neutralist Burma and Indonesia.realizes thai each of these countries is apprehensivemible gradual deilinc in Western commitment*onsequent rise in the potential threat from China. In Moscow's view thu enhances Soviettoirect role in containinginfhici.ee in thc area, in limiting Western influence, and in making localair transit rights, shipping services, tradeheneficial to the USSR.
Moscow's prospectssodestin its influence in Thailand are fairly good.ong tradition of independence, the Thai* have grown somewhat uneasy about their alliance with lhe US. and to some degree they wouldompensatingwith the USSR Soviet advertisement of hostility lo felting provides an effective means
of entry and Moscow is indeed anxious lo block Chinese inroads in Thailand fperliaps even to the eaten! of not wishing toomplete UShe Soviet-Thai Irade agreeinnit ol Dcc.rnliermodest inIhc USSR certainto offer economic inducements for closer relations,ime when concern withinover the stale of the economy is growing.
he USSR's anti-Peking stance appeals to the Malaysian leadership. Sovietot the Arab cause also gains tbe approval of the Malays, many of whom feel kinship with their Muslim brothers in the Middle Kast. In addition, the USSRig buyer andof increasing ils purchases of Malaysian rubber. Moreover, the Malaysian Covemment is clearly detei mined toore "non-aligned" image and friendlier relations svith Ihe Soviets wouM help. Although Malaysia's basic security interests remain witb the West, thereood chanceodest increase in Soviel influence in Ihe near tcrtn.
he Soviets abo have an opportunity to improve their position in Singapore. Economic considerations play some pari in ihis, since Soviet merchant ships, and eventuallycould help Premier Lee Kuan Yew to keep Singapore's docks and repair facilities occupied. Bui more important, lee feels threatened by hit Malay neighbors and by possible Japanese ambitions in the area, and is concerned that neither lbc US nor Hupartners arc sufficiently committed to defending Singapore's interests. Whileto be quite wary of Soviet political activity, he seems to feel that Ihe Soviets could be useful in the overall balance of forceit he hopes to see maintained.
ndochina In the, tbe USSR fell it necessary and desirable to identify with Ho Chi Minh's armed struggle against lhe
French because of ihc Marxist character of ihr movemeni ami because of Ihc implications of lhc struggle for French and European pollito. From (hose Ix-gmmngs, Soviet in-solvcincnt deepened as the USSR sought to bmit Chinese influence in Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane. With tha USho USSR once again saw inter -nadonal implications in Ihe struggle which could be exploited to ils advantageis the US, particularlyiope and the Third World.
ut lhe Soviets have probably viewed lhe conflict for some time as one ofreturns for Irani interests. Its prolonga-tiOn tends to complicate reblions wiih the US in other areas of key interest to the USSR, threatens to force the Vietriamese Communistsosition of greater reliance on China, and erodes Soviet positions of influence in Cambodia and Laos, lor several years,has probably been in the position ofolitical solution (on termslo the Communist* bui less demanding than those of Hanoi) but unwilling to risk Hanoi's displeasure by taking any initiativesthis direction
5S. Given the USSR's reluctance Io exercise its influence and leverage in Hanoi, Moscow will probably continue to follow Hanoi's lead, doing its best to provide lhe Vietnamesesvith nn alternative lo greater reliance on China while encouraging the US tofrom thc area. In this latter effort,will continue Ks efforts to impress the US with the spectre of much greater direct Chinese involvement in Hanoi and in the war. At the same time Moscow will conlinuc to hold out the prospect that Hanoi itself svould serve to limit Chinese influence in Southeast Asia if only the US svnuld make terms and withdraw.
C. Soulh Asia *
oth India and Pakistan have cultivated increasingly good relations with (he USSR politically and in (erms ofand aid. The USSRreat in(eres( in thebecause of its desire for influence among its near neighbors to the south, its concern to counter China, and more recently, ils wish toradually expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Since, the Sovieis have granted substantial economicio India, and beginning inarge amounts of miliiary supplies. In the lasl two or three years they have cultivatedtrying to reduce Chinese influence ihere and to enhance Soviet leverage. Since atoscow has actively sought io reduce Indo Pakistani tensions, chieflyrevent crisis which Peking could exploit,
DO. Moscow has bad some success in its efforts. This is particularly true in the case of India, which now regards its tics withas vital lo its defense against China and considers its relationship with the USSRpecial one. Al lhe same lime, Nesv Delhi has always insisted on retaining itsand freedom of action. Thu* it hasdenounced thc increasing presence ofin theOcean, and has also opposed granting base right* to anyone. Pakistan has similarly shown itself unwilling to act as the Russians wish, sshile accepting Soviet military and economic assistance, it has not drawn back from its good relations with China.
hould Soviet interest in Asian collective security arrangements revive and assume more tangible form. Moscow might concentrate initially on one or another scheme for regional
Joecxrve'j PaliitiTh-^lj brie SN1I- liC
and cooperaiion in South Asia. In lad. the Soviets have been playing the theme of regional harmony in the area ever linee rhe Tashkent Agreement6 Inn Kabul, Kosygin recommended regionalcooperation as well, and, as an aspect ofultilateral transit trade agreement involving Ihe USSH,nd India. (Among other things, such an agreement would facilitate Soviet overland access to the Persian Culf and the Indian Oceanhere arc as yet no signs of an impending Soviet drive to the south even remotely comparable, for example, to the USSlVs push into the Middle Kast. Still, tho USSR's stiong influence in New Delhi, its longstanding conviction tliat India can beto Soviet relations with both China and the Third World, and its growing interest in the Indian Ocean might all help to persuade the Soviets that there iseed andhe USSR touch larger role in lhe affairs of the areahole.
IV. SOVILT PERCEPTIONS OF ASIA IN
he balance of forces io East and South Asia duringay be complex. fluid, and precarious. In the aftermath of World Warnd during most oft was pie-various enough (cf. Korea) but, al lean as conceived by Moscow, it was essentiallyand fixed, between the9 by its iunior ally. China) and the US. During, the Soviets lecognizcd reluctantly thai, withostile Peking, the halance had become triangular and thus moreand uncertain. It noweasonable proposition forhat Japan will more and moreort of tlie balance and by the, if not before, wdlood handour-sided game.
he Soviets thusormidablein seeking to assess thc overallof forces in Asia in the decade ahead. They confront, ineries oi crucialthe likely altitudes and policies of post-Mao China; the scope and intensity of US interests in Asia; the nature and extent of Japan's political, economic, and military Influ ence, and. in general, the consequences of interaction between the four major powers wnceiiied.
he Soviets can, of counte. construct alternate futures for the Asian scene and lhcir role in II. and China would suiely be central lo many of these. An ever more powerful and active and menacing China forwhich might even find its waypproaeh-in ;ii with theface them with an array of hard choices specifically concerning China itself. And beyond these, it would-ut ihem with the need to adjust policiesin East and Soulh Asia to complement primary needsis Peking. The unlorth-coming Soviet attitude toward Japan might shift, aid and support for Asian states which were willing to Join in Soviet-sponsored efforts to oppiise or contain the Chinese might ac crleratc. and other Sovietintended essentially to win or steal influence for itsime be de-cm pluvLzed.
hile the Soviets no doubtontinuing competition with (he US In Asia, they cannotery clear idea about Ihe probable form and severity of US-Sovietarc quite uncertain about the ultimate outcome in Indochina and its impact onelsewhere; probably are perplexed by the meaning and implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Asia and for Soviet interests in Asia, and remain apprehensive about thofor some kind of Stno-US understanding, reached at the expense of theew
crisis might incline the Sovietsmoderiilionis the US:eeumitialtoti with China, or lit effect. Chini's withdrawal from thc Sino Soviet con-lest, would pcotsably encourage Moscow to engage in more active competition with the US in East and South Asia and perhapsin the world as well.
hile thc growing complexity andof Inter national politics in Asia may from time to lime lead to changes in Soviet policies, it is not likely of itself lo diminish thc USSR's interest in the area. On the contrary, especially if both Chinese and Japanese power continue to grow. Moscow may over tune find itself forced and in some cases encoutaged to devote more and more of its energies to its position in Asia. Some problems might loom larger as the decade progresses, bui apower relationship might create new opportunities for the Sos-iets as well Japan could come lo represent an increasinglyand perhaps increasingly susceptibleElsewhere, concern over (hc withdrawal of British posver and. possibly diminishing US role combined with continuing anxiety about Chinaerhaps grosvlng apprehension
-ui Japan, could also lead Asians lo lookhe Soviets for security. This in turn mightore favorable climateovietcaence, especially in tlie Indian Ocean. And grow tug and more visible Soviel military power in one or another region nuc.li' eventually help to erode Asian resistance to Soviet bl.iiHlisliments or even pressures.
here could be new cristais China, arising either from renewed troubles along the border or from conflicts elsewhere in Asia. Bui aside from its relations with China, the USSR is not likely deliberately to press iu interests to the point of crisis andAnd, inhe more complicated the ciieumslances, and the more perplexed (he Soviets aie about thc likely shape of (hein Asia, the more Moscow will be Inclined to react rather lhan lo initiate, to play it warily and by ear, rather than incautiously by some sort of pin-Asian grand design 1
'Ccatccramf Saetsao IV. Lt Cen Donald V. Bennett, Ihe Ducdot. Defense InteOifenc* Agency,Hi< CenR. for the Aiautanl Chief
ol Staff (or Intelligente. of Ihe Amu.
lo cull attention lo their position with reference toI. page 3.
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