imported remarks of deputy foreign minister semenov
during mini-plenary meeting ho.3, pril
Minister Semenov said that today he intendedArticle iii of the Draft Treaty onwhich the Delegations are working out. Asthis Article contarris the key questions ofdocumenthole. It was hardly necessarytime to reproduce the history of the sides'in connection with Article III sinceis well-known. He would merely recall thatside has had the opportunity to stateconvincingly the unacccptabllity of theby the US Delegation on Delegation proceeds from the premise that thecontained in it do not correspond to theof the negotiations and to the principle ofconditions for limiting ABM systems. It is theof the USSR Delegation that constructiveagreeing Article III is possible only on the basisprinciple of true equality, which flows fromnderstanding between the US and USSR
Minister Senenov then said that, in the interest of achieving rapid mutual agreement on the given question within the limits of the above-mentioned principle, the USSR Government has instructed the Soviet Delegation toew Article III for the Draft Treaty on Limiting ABM Systems. Minister Semenov wanted initially toew introductory remarks regarding certain features of the new proposal.
Minister Semenov said that the' Soviet side proposed that,ramework of ABM systems limited to low levels, the US and USSR could provide ABM defense of both national capitals against accidental and unauthorized missile launches. This would permit both sides tothe general intention of undertaking measures aimed at reducing the risk of accidentallyuclear war. At the same time, given this approach, itimpler task to insure equal conditions for limiting ADM systems. In particular, in the context of the USSRproposals of Januarynd 2S,t would
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be possible to solveutually acceptableuestion of limitations on ABM radars byhe basis of the MARC concept proposed by the US side and to meet US considerations related to equalfor limiting accordingly the individualnterceptors subject to limitations.
Minister Semenov also wanted to explain that, pr cecding from the afore-mentioncd conditions, the Sovi side considers it appropriate that the text of the Dr Treaty should not spell out the national capitals of US and USSR, and limitations on ABM systems would not mentioned in this way but would be determinede eral way, for example, as circular areasilometers centered on the defended location.
Minister Semenov said that, as regards ABMdeployed for defense of ICBM launchers,side proposes that the Draft should provideUS could deploy an ABM defense for the ICBMwithin one ICBM base. At the same time,standpoint of strategic stability, the detcrmininj
factor is the number of ICBM silos protected by ARMs -The sides have discussed this repeatedly. The Soviet side takes into consideration the US point of view on the question of the number of areas of deployment of ICBM silo launchers to be defended by ABM systems and is prepared to agree to limit the number of such area: in the USSR to two.
Minister Semenov then said that the Soviet side, guided by the task ofuild-up in strat* weapons, proposes that the right of the US toystem components around its national capital and the right of the USSR to deploy ABM system components for defense of the remaining SO percent of the ICBM launch of the number of ICBM launchers within the base defenc in the US not be realized during an agreed periodorears.
Minister Semenov then read and handed to Ambassac Smith the text of the new Soviet Draft Article III of Treaty for Limiting ABM Systems (see Section U) .
Minister 5cmenov concluded that the Sovietwas convinced that this new proposal by the USSR is constructive and contains all the prerequisites for workingutually acceptable solution on the central question of limiting ABM systems. The Soviet Delegation proceeded from the premise that it would be- reported to the US Government and chat the US side would consider it with all due attention.
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate SAehukin duringost-mmt-planary conversation uith (IS SALT delegate Brown,elsinki:
Shchukin said that the sides were spendinc too much time on minor things. ay ABM details did
because as wc had both observed many times ABMs arc unable to defend cither countrv against
I asked him why Washington and Moscow as place He slillh^rl foliation.
o L V 0 aVoid in formaLthe question that might arise as to why one part of the
Wff bCinf defPndcd instead'of another. He in oJaJr' dthe place names ourccomodate us. ointed out to him that
sell in the United States had included populart0he capital, but added
i oncevn that could be solved by leaving out the namesreaty.
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT dtiogate Pleshakovost-mini-plenary conversation uith US SALT delegate ilitzs, pril Helsinki:
Plcshakov then asked if Nitze had had the opportunii toamiliar with the new Soviet ABM proposal which Minister Semenov had outlined at the Heads of Delegation meeting and what'his own personal reaction was to it. Nitze saidajor problem with the new proposal was that it initially gave tlie USSR two areas to beversus one for the US and eventually three versus two. He thought that politically we couldutuall acceptable agreement only on the basis of equality in the number of areas defended. If they raised the point of equal number of silos covered, he would regret this. To do so would regrettably, leadeopening of thethe Delegations had had on the ICBMs covered by the Moscow ABM system. Pleshakov replied that it is not the numberites that determines strategic it is the number of ICBM silos defended that is the decisive factor.
Nitze disagreed and pointed out that with thelaunchers for ICBM defense limited to lownder the Soviet proposal,er site under the US proposal, strategically significant defense of large numbers of ICBMs is not possible. He could, for example, foresee that, iii the.case of the US defending Grand Forkso ISO interceptors,imited number, perhaps less thanilos, would be defended. Given ABM defenses of three different areas, as they proposed for the Soviet side, greater concern could arise as to the creationotential baseefense of the territory of the country.
Plcshakov disagreed although adult-fine that he could understand the political aspects to some extent. As regar the number of ABM sites for ICBM defense, he said that geological and geographical differences, andeapons systems, and other factors had led to different methods of ICBM deployment in the two countries. The US had deployed ICBMs at bases havingilos. In the
USSR, different numbers of silos are deployed at various dcployrjcnt areas. National means ofarc able to determine precisely how many silos would be defended in each country. As for Nitze's apprehensions that three sites would constitute moreerritorial base than two sites, this was not so The components deployed for ICBM defense would be different ICBM silos arc hardened and builtifferent way from buildings in cities or for industrial purposes Therefore, the components for defending the former are different and would only be able to defend the ICBM silos in the area. Thus, the area of coverage would be small and there would be no possibility oferritorial ABM system. The number of ABM sites is therefore not the controlling factor strategically.
Plcshakov added that Nitze had been correct in saying
unchersnterceptors would *
ben each side. These numbers could, however, be discussed and different numbers agreed to. Ministereparture interrupted the-conversation at this
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusovost-mini-plenary conocrcation with US SALT deleg Allison,,pril Helsinki:
Following Che mini-plenary meeting, General Tr-said that he wanted to keep his promise and answerad asked at the end of our last convers; concerning the equality, or lack of it, in the Sovi< ADM proposal of IS He said that the Soviet proposal tabled at this morning's meeting rci unnecessary any other response to my question -- it clearly provides for complete equality for both side terms of an .VGA defense and defense of equal number; ICBM launchers. He added that any inequality in the posal is to tho advantage of the US and referred to provisions permitting the US to keep the Spartan mis Missile Site Itadars and Perimeter Acquisition Radars ready deployed by the time of treaty conclusion. Tr concluded by pointing out -- in what seemed tohat "tongue-in-cheek" way -- that this clearly indi that the Soviet side would go to almosc any lengths' reach agreement.
I tola him that my view of the new Soviet propo was quite different; it seemed to me that threeor the USSR and two for the US could not be called The essence of the new Soviet proposal was thathe inequalityhich was contained in IS Decqmbcr proposal. Also, the provision to defer of the permitted deployments for three to five years the effect of preventing US constructionecond while the USSR, with its NCA defense already opcrati deployed, could go ahead with construction of an ICD. fense.
Trusov said he thought it incorrect to concentr attencion on the number of sitesiscussion of conditions for limiting ABM deployment, and asked wlv did not consider important the number of launcher si protected- eplied that when ICBM launchers to be tcctcd are deployedarge area and the ABM depl> area and number of interceptors arc limited, the numl silos cannot take on primary importance. We both un< that the defense of ICBM launchers is dependent on f; sucli as interceptor range, radar range, the need to j
radat-s, and the concept of preferential defense. we understandumber --or exampleof ICBM launchers deployedarge area cannot be the criterion for determining equality of conditions if the ABM defense is limitedBM launchers deployed0 kilometer circle. Trusov said he understood that it is not possible to protect ISO ICBMsBMs, but only the defense planners would know which of the ISO were being protected and both sides should have nn equal opportunity to make the-preferential defense
As we rose to leave, we agreed that this discussion needed to be continued.
Raportad remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during aconversation vith US SALT advisorelsinki:
I said that the new Soviet ABM proposal was clearly unequal and could not serve as the basisolution. Kishilov of course demurred, and askedonsidered it unequal. aid that it was unequal on its face and in its effects. Insurely the Soviet side must realize that the US could neverumber of ABM defense areas smaller than the number allowed the Soviet Union. Kishilov claimed that the Soviet proposal was not inequitable, and said that equality should be measured in terms of what was protected rather than number of locations. In particular, what counted was the number of ICBMs defended, rather than the' number of places for such defense.
I asked Kishilov what the Soviet side had in mind in referring, in connection with national capital defense, to meeting the US view on "equality ofof ABM limitations with respect to types of ABM interceptors". At first Kishilov said that "there was something to thatnd that we should ask about it. He said it related to hard siteid not understand, and asked if he meant that his side was offering assurance that the Soviets would not deploy ABM defenses at Moscow to defend ICBMs in that region. Kishilov was then perplexed, and said that he was not talking about ACM interceptors with respect to defense of Moscow and Washington at all, but to interceptors for ICBM defense, aid that theas referring to, which had been used by Semenov both in the private meeting-the day before and again this morning, occurredaragraph devoted to ABM limitations for defense of capitals. Kishilov said that, as both sides had long agreed, there were no restraints on types of interceptors for defense of capitals (except as provided in Articles IVaid that was indeed the standard position of both sides, andid not understand reference to meeting American preference in this regard.
Reported remark* of Soviot SALT delegate Grinevskiy. during c. post-mini-plenary conversation oitk US SALT delegate Parsons, pril Helsinki:
Crinevskiy said that he had not fully understood Mr. Nitzo's statement in the mini-plenary on testing in an ADM mode. Assuming that he referred to the technical complexities,old himas sure that the interpreters would exchange full notes as it was important, in order to gr-asp the points, to sec the exact wording. Crinevskiy then referred, with some edge in his voice, that what he did not understand was the procedure. This statement was an interpretation of an Article already agreed. Normallyegotiation, the parties expressed their viewpoints before language was agreed, settled their differences and came to agreement. It was strange to agree.first and then place interpretations on the agreement afterwards. xpressed surprise saying that we had made clear many tines our concern with "testing inM mode." From numerous discussions, including some in the "Croup ofarious aspects had como up indicating that thisubject ofinterest, and, finally, that it is much better to assure that we had similar understandings now rather than find out later that wcisunderstanding As Crinevskiy continued to be grumpy, eminded him mat nothing was agreed until everything was agreed, but while we were nottatement in that connection, this principle made it possible to bring up any subject at any time before final commitment.
I told Grincvskiy that since ho had mentioned Mr. N'itzc, as confusedeference he had made after the Special Working Group yesterdaytatement he attributed to Mr. Xitzc on. He had not explained the reference yesterdayad meant to come back to it. ad to do with mobile ABM systemsould not recall the Nitzc statement. Grinevskiy said that last May 5th, he thought, Mr. Nitze hadtatement relating this Article to components, especially radars that could be moved. At our luncheon on April S, Mr. Garthoff had given Mr. opytatement on this. Mr. Grincvskiy then said that what he had in mind was the desirability of ourtatement on this
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukinost-mini-plenanj conversation- with US SALT delegate Oroun, pril Helsinki:
Shchukin wene on Co say that both sides should move along more vapidly instead of circling Che subjects remaining at issue, but he supposed that we were constrained to proceed according to diplomatic custom. He thought it important to resolve as many of the issues as we could by May, because at the Summit Meeting there wouldarge number of subjects, of which SALT would be only one. The political leaders could not be expected to look at these matters in the detail with which our Delegations could examine them.
Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grincvskiy and advisor s'.ishilov orking luncheon conversation uit'n US SALT delegate Persons and advisor Garthoff, pril Helsinki:
Garthoff asked why the Soviet side had proposed the peculiar arrangement of not specifying nationalbut suggesting that thereeparate side understanding to the effect that Moscow and Washington were meant. It had been said that this change was introduced to meet wishes of the American side; he hoped the Soviet Delegation now understood that this did not meet the wishes of the American side--on the contrary, we found the proposal Grincvskiy said that there had beenin the United States when the Sentinel ACM program had been proposed because some cities would be defended while others would not be. Garthoff suggested that it should be left to the American side to decide whether it had such problems and how it proposed to deal with them. We did not agree with the suggestion made by the Soviet side. Grincvskiy then said that his Delegation had instructions from the Sovicc Government on this subject, and asked if we had instructions from the US Government on this point. Garthoff: replied that we did not, and that comments so far from the American side (including
7 -Original document.