Created: 4/4/1972

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Reported remarks of Soviet SAL? delegate Trusov during Mini-Plenary Heating Ho- 2,prilteloinki:

Trusov said that during the recess before the present phase the Soviet side had once again analyzed tho differences remaining in regard to constraints on ADM radars and also on large phased-array radars which are not ABM radars. As it had noted in Vienna, the Soviet Delegation believes that it is sufficient to have geographic constraints on the deployment of ARM radars without any numerical limitations, inasmuch as the number of such radars to be deployed within the agreed radius of deployment for ABM system components for defense of the national capitals and with anumber of ABM interceptors and launchers is determined by the specific engineering approaches underlying the system tp be deployed. The discussions in Vienna showed that the radius of ISO kilometers, which the Soviet Delegation had proposed for limiting theof ADM means for capital defense, did not evoke any objection in principle from the US side.

Trusov then said that, in view of the

tions -expressed by the US Delegation regarding the limitation of ABM radars deployed for the defense of the national capitalertain agreed number of modern' ARM radar complexes, the Soviet Delegation, for the purpose of workingompromise solution, had said that the Soviet side would be prepared to accept this concept. The number and nature of the ABM radars within these complexes would not be constrained. In advancing to meet the US side in regard to the question of limiting ABM radars for the defense of the national capital, the USSR Delegation believes that the US side regarded with due consideration the Soviet views on

possible ways to solve these questions which were expressed in Vienna on January

Trusov then said that the Soviet Delegation would like to reaffirm its view that proposals which put constraints on large radars which can be used for other systems and purposes not related to ABM systems, and in particular to air defense systems, are unacceptable. The Soviet side cannot agree to placing constraints with numerical criteria on radars in the form of power-aperture product, or to adoptionist of

tcristics, or to use of US ABM radarstandard. As is known, in advancing to meet the US side, the Soviet Delegation had agreed to include in the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty obligations not to give missile-warning radars and radars other than ADM radars ABM capabilities and not to test them in an ABM mode. The Soviet Delegation considers that tho provisions already agreed to in the Draft Treaty arc sufficient to preclude circumvention of the constraints to be placed on ABM radars and at tho same time not place constraints on systems that are not for ABM defenses. The Soviet Delegation is convincedusiness-like approach to solution of these two questions will enable the two sides to reach mutually acceptable solutions to them. This, in turn, would facilitate mutually acceptable solutions to other questions not yet agreed.

ad remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov curing Mini-Plenary Meeting do- Z,jlsinki:

Plcshakov said Chat, as he understood Ambassador Smith's statement that morning, the US side considers that the Soviet proposal of December IS,or setting limitations on levels of ABM systems isand rejects the proposal. He would not hide the fact that the Soviet Delegation has regretsonnection with such an answer since it is convinced that its proposal couldood basis forutually acceptable solution.

Plcshakov declared that, in this regard,cd -to recall the considerations which had guided the USSR Delegation in tabling its proposal ofirst of all, the Soviet Delegation had in mind the Understanding ofetween the twowhich provided for maintaining the principle of equal conditions for limiting ABM systems and noadvantages. The USSR Delegation has repeatedlyell-founded rationale showing that this principle-is embodied in its proposal. Moreover, the Soviet proposal that the deployment of ABM systems be limited in the US to the protectionertain number of ICBM launchers and in the USSR to defense of the national capitalumber of ICBM launchers equal to SO percent of the number protected in the US insures low levels oC limitation in both the US.and USSR. It also takes into account the condition of the development of ABM systems in the US and USSR. Minister Pleshakov also wanted to make special note of the compromise nature of the Soviet proposal of Decemberhich took into account the appropriate comments Of the US side.

Pleshakov said that the question now arose as to whether Ambassador Smith's statement had improved the conditions for searchingutuallysolution on the key question of limiting ABMs. The situation evoked doubt within the Soviet Delegation. Agreeing the positions of the two sides in this respect requires the efforts of both sides. As is known, the Soviet Delegation has repeatedly presented initiatives

Reported remarks of Soviet SAC? delegate Trusovost-mini-plenarij conversation oith OS SALT delegate Allison, Helsinki:

Trusov launchediscussion of "other large phased-arrayefending the Soviet position and reaffirming the. unacceptability of OLPAK constraints with the standard arguments. He said that OLPARs could not be limited in an ABM Treaty without limiting air defense capabilities, and contended that the US should find sufficient the Soviet agreement to undertake obligations to not give air defense radars ABM capabilities or test them in an ABM mode and to not convert air defense radars to ABM system use.

I told Trusov that we understand the Soviet concern about limiting air defense capabilities. Our concern differs in that we do not see the pure air defenseof very large and powerful radars but believe that the deployment of such radars couldaseossible wide-spread ABM system. When we were given to understand that the Soviet side objected to numerical criteria, we attempted to meet that consideration by suggesting the use of our Missile Site Radartandard. If neither of these US proposals for providing approDriatc verifiable constraints is adequate to meet Sovietwe must still seek through mutualolution to the problem. Trusov indicated that perhaps the US side could come uphird suggestion.

Trusov commented as an aside that he had readS publication something which indicated that the power-aoerture product of the MSR iso 3xl06squared as we had indicated'; but something aboutrimes greater. He said this apparentlyesult of not multiplying average power by the proper area. aid that the radar builders state that the power-aperture product isohey are the ones who would know.

the only one which canolution.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT 'advisor Kishilov

a post-mni-plencry conversation ui th US SALT advisorZ, Helsinki;

Pld mQ ChaL Sen,enov intended to ask

PeCific ne" AB" position winch Ambassador Smith had alluded to in

srnirfnI"?ation' flc said that ^eywe-had "tied" it to the SLUM question. Thev did

"ayiff^ontogether J Ur ^ggestions on ABM

s:meClcondViUoLOUSl' "tt-Or,tCXt of

* /rs,li*ov suggested that we seemed reluctant to

ef0rc wc hcard theirs. I

fheir views were. oted that toward

tl?J% Kishilov and I

inrlnd^ad.conceivable possibilities

for 2- kishilov said that,

as he had said in Vienna, zero-zero was not in the

haS 1 Hc then addedthe Soviet

1 for t' He asked iffavored * eclined to comment on the subject.

emarks of Soviet SALT delegate PleshakovpoTt--ini-pler.arv conversation with US SALT iVie'slte/Broun and Hice, Helsinki:

Plcshakov reiterated his disappointmentAnhissador Smith's rejection of their Decemberonosal He said ho was not surprised at this he had interpreted Nitze's comments on March ^Othorcshadowing nonacceptance. He had hoped, however, the US wouldew counter-proposal.

Plcshakov emphasized the compromise nature of their nreer-berroposal; it took into account views US had expressed. The US had ncerestedefense of Washington; aid Lhat it was interestedefense of ICBM silos. The Soviet side hadoncession to the US in that it provedefense of onlyCBM silosilos at Grand Forks. Pleshakov mdicated that his side had expressed this ICBM defensecrently in its Decemberroposal ine able to say to their people that both sides had the samefor the defense of ICBM silos.

Brown said it sounded as if Plcshakov's words had meant that, if the US side did not want toapital defense at the present time, but might want to do so at some time in the future, it would haveright to do so. Pleshakov replied, if thy US side wants to make such proposal, the Soviet side^would be prepared to discuss it. fie also said that inview, NCA/WCA would have been Upmost equitable solution

and it could stillolution."

Nitze asked whether the Soviet position unchanged; that the ICBM base to be defended by the USSR under their proposal would bo outside the European part of the territory of the USSR. Pleshakov replied Probablyut he could not affirm this. He went on to say that there would have to be qualitative controls on both the ABM interceptors and radars in' The ABM components could not have the capability ofcities or large industrial targets.

Pleshakov went back to his point that theirhad taken into account out views and containedto those views; it was now appropriate for the

' '. Ml-13

US to come upompromise proposal of its own. Nitze said that the USh proposalompromise proposal and had taken into account previous Soviet expressions of views. Nitte said that it was his recollection that both sides hadtheumber of ABM proposals--five--and that it would be appropriate for both sides to negotiate equallyolution. Pleshakov said he would have his people check the record on the numbers of proposals.

Formal staOcmonfby Deputy Foreign Minister Senonov during Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 2, orilelsinki:

- '

"Ac Che* .meeting, on the Soviet Delegation .reaffirmed the proposal for the sides to assume the obligation jiof to start, beginning with July2 (but notntry into force of the ABM Treaty) new construction of land-based ICBM silo launchers, and also not to convert land-based light ICEM silo launchers into land-based heavyilo launchers in the process of modernization and replacement. In this connection we proceed from the premise that national technical means make it possible with sufficientto ensure verification of compliance with these obligations, and that in workingfreeze'there is no need to introduce into this question additional details concerning the volume of missiles, the diameter and depth of silos."

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakovonversation uith US SALT delegate Hitze, pril Helsinki:

As regards the number of ABM sites for ICBM defense, Pleshakov said that geological and geographical differences, and differences in weapons systems, and other factors had led to different methods of ICBM deployment in Che two countries. The US had deployed ICBMs ac bases havingilos. In the USSR, different numbers of silos are deployed at various deployment areas. National means of verification arc able to determine precisely how many silos would be defended in each country.


Formal statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenoo during Mini-Plenary Meeting Bo. 2, 4 April elsinki :

"Today we would like to continue setting forth the USSR position on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

"At the last meeting, on the Soviet Delegation reaffirmed the proposal for the sides to assume the "obligation not to start, beginning with July2 (but not before entry into force of the ABM Treaty) new construction of land-based ICBM silo launchers, and also not to convert land-based light ICBM silo launchers into land-based heavy ICBM silo launchers in the process of modernization and replacement. In this connection we proceed from the premise that national technical means make it possible with sufficient confidence to ensure verification of compliance with these obligations, and that in working out a 'freeze' agreement there is no need to introduce into this question additional details concerning the volume of missiles, the diameter and depth of silos. Such details are not warranted by the scope and nature of the possible 'freeze' obligations of the sides and can only complicate agreement; this should evidently be avoided by both sides. Moreover, the subject of the obligation is laid down with sufficient clarity and in itself it does not demand any additional delimitations, for modernization and replacement will be carried out within the framework of the obligations assumed by the side^s.

"The statement of the US Delegation ofnce again raised the question of the need to include among systems to beesides land-based ICBM silo launchers, also land-based unprotected (soft) and mobile ICBM launchers.

"In this connection we would like to say that, in general, expanding [the number of] types of systems to be 'frozen'contains within itself the risk of considerable complication of the problem and the consequent dragging out of the period of time required to workraft Interim Agreement.

"We proceed from the premise that thenderstanding did not set the goal to resolve all the questions arising in connection with the problem of limiting strategic offensive armaments, but provided that the range of questions relating to these armamentsroad scope will be considered at follow-on negptia-tions. In this sense it would hardly be advisable to assume thatortion of strategic offensive weapons is being considered, they should be taken up in their totality, since the whole does not and cannot consist of its one individual pa'ft. Taking this into account, we take the position that in connection with working out the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement, there is no necessity to consider the land-based mobile ICBM launcher question, and that raising it would distract us from the tasks before us.

"As for unprotected fixed land-based ICBM launchers and old types of missiles, they cannotause o'f concern to the sides, since, as you know, the sides have long since stopped building such launchers; there is no need to include these types of ICBM launchers in the composition of systems to be temporarily 'frozen.' ecall that in Vienna the question was raised as "to whether the American side intended to resume*construction of such obsolete systems. This subject was exhausted by the clarification [negative response^ given at that time.

ould like to repeat thatnderstand it, by no means docs either side see the purpose of this stage of the negotiations as being the inclusion in the agreement of still more questions related to the limitation ofstrategic armaments, but consider it necessary to fix their attention on what ensues from thenderstanding, setting aside other questions for the follow-on negotiations andood basis for them. .

"The Soviet side believes that for the present stage of thefreeze' on land-based ICBM silo launchers is sufficient and that anshould be concluded on precisely that basis.

"The US Delegation proposes to include in the draft Interim Agreement definitions of strategic

tensive systems subject to the "freeze." But after all, we have been engaged in negotiations for more than two years, and it seems Co us that each side has always understood precisely which types of weapons were under discussion. There are no reasons to suppose that during the relatively brief period of effectiveness of Che Interim 'Freeze' Agreement this situation could change.

"The understanding of the sides of preciselywill be subject to the 'freeze' agreement, asthe capability of national technical means tocsrtair.ty, arr eesp.ttlly

sufficient, in our view, to prevent the sides from having any doubts on this score. Therefore adoption of the above-mentioned proposals on definitions which include quantitative criteria is absolutely unfounded.

"We have taken note of the US side's statement of Marcho the effect that the 'freeze' date would be the date of signing of the Interim Agreement. This corresponds to the real state of affairsreater degree than earlier proposals. However, we believe that the most appropriate date to begin the 'freeze' on land-based ICBM silo launchers would be July 1,2 (but not earlier than entry into force of the ABMt is.necessary to take into account thac both the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to theof Strategic Offensive.Arms and the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems could enter into force by July Therefore establishingate would encourage the sides to take steps to speed entry into force of the ABM Treaty as well as of the Interim Agreement.

"As for duration of the 'freeze' understanding, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise thac such anwould be in effectpecific period of time, agreed by the sides.

"In the course of the Vienna phase of thewe proposed that this period of time be no longer than two years. The US side then expressed misgivings concerning the brevity oferiod of time and its possible inadequacy for completion of the follow-on active negotiations with respect to the limitation of

strategic offensive arms. Taking into account these considerations of the US side and desiring in aspirit to facilitate reaching agreement on the 'freeze' on strategic offensive arms, the USSR Delega-tion conducted appropriate consultations. Wenstructed to propose that the Interim Agreementin force during the conduct of activeon the limitation of strategic offensive arms, but for no more than three years.

"We proceed from the premise that in the course of the follow-on active negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive arms to replace the Interim Agreement, the sides will concentrate on working out agreement on more complete measures with respect to the limitation of these arms. The existence of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms willcreate more favorable conditions and will facilitate successful conduct of these negotiations.

"We believe that establishmentonger period of effectiveness for the Interim Agreement would not meet the objectives set for the Interim Agreement. And will this not give grounds for dragging out the follow-on negotiations, perhaps for an indefinite period?

"As for the proposal of the US side to establish evenpecific number of strategic offensive missile launchers for% research, development, evaluation and training, we consider the solution of this question at this phase of the negotiations to be premature. Questions of limiting such launchers can be considered at the follow-on negotiations on limiting strategic offensive arms.

"At the same time, taking into account the "comments of the US side presented in Vienna, and desiring to solveonstructive way questions that arise, the USSR Delegation would be prepared to proceed from the premise that during the period of effectiveness of the 'freeze' understanding, construction of launchers at test ranges may be undertaken only for purposes of research, development, evaluation and training."

Original document.

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