Strategic Attack Programs
- d lCc*-fol Syrferoi Jo-vl,.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEHORANOLM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Addendum to CHINA'S STRATEGIC ATTACK PROGRAMS
Please add the following sentence to footnotenhird force mix will be includedhe Defense Intelligence Projections for Plannine."
Deputy for Nat
A. carver, onal Intelligence Officers
Control Systems Jointly
CHINA'S STRATEGIC ATTACK PROGRAMS
THIS ESTIrVUTf: IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence orgcnizoticni participated in :he preparation o' Iht estimofe-
Thetelliganeeand tht intelligent* ofganirat*int olDepart-men of StoW,ha National SacuKry Agency, and lha Atomic Energy Commlulon.
jiy Director of CeTtrol tntalDgence representing the Centrol
Tha Director of iRJeilsganee ond Research rapretenting the Depodirem of State
Theefenta Intelligence Agoney
The VfJOr, National Security Agency
-Thai AtrftMM General Manager (or Narionol Seeurtry teeeetentlng theergy Conmnaatoa
Tne Speclol Aiiiitant to the Secretory of tha Treasury representing the
of tha Treasury The Auittant Dlrecsar. federal Bureau of Investigation
TheChtaf of Staff forepartment of the Anny
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Deportment of ire Navy
Thaart Chief of Staff, Intalligence, Department of the Air Fore*
L NUCLEAR FORCE DEVEI.OPMENT POLICY
a THE STATUS AND DDXECTTON OF FORCES AND PROCRAMS
Tht SRBM Fere.
The Development and Production of Missile Systems
The Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Program
The Nuclear Weapons Progra-n
Nuclear Testing and Weapons Development
Future Availaudtty of Nodear Weapon.
Conlroi Systems Jointly
china's strategic attack programs
Chinas programs to develop and deploy nuclear weapons have slowedrobably reflecting
shifting of national economic priorities to emphasizeand basic industry coinciding with diminished influence of the military in policy circles since the fall of Lin Piao
changed perception of the strategic environment resulting from some combination of: a) Chinr's acquisitionodest but credible nuclear retaliatory capability against the USSR, b) Improved relations with the US, and c) perceived constraints on the USSR due to Soviet detente with the US.
China noworce ofuclear deliveryhalf missiles and half bombers. Its stockpile of nuclear weapons is probably sufficient for the missiles, though perhaps not for a" the bombers. These systems have the range to hit US forces and bases in Asia as well as targets In the eastern USSR but cannot attack the continental US. China's force suffersumber of vulnerabilities, but haseasure of survivability through concealment, mobility, and hardening.
Chinas present objective probably Is tooken nuclear capability to strike the USSR west of the Urals and the continental US.
willoken capability to strike Europeon Russia when its limited-range ICBM becomes operational, possibly late thb year or. more likely,
It Is developing two missile systems that could strike theUS:ull-range ICBM that will not be operationalnd, given tho present pace of development,not9 or later;ubmarine-launched ballistic missile system that will not be operational8 at the earliest, and probably will be later.1
Over the longer term. Peking almost certainly willotronger deterrent force against the US and the USSR. It is also reasonable to expect China to strengthen its regional deterrent and to increase its options for responding to limited nuclear attack.
ontinuation of present trends, which appears likely, China0 may haveissiles and wellombers for delivery of nuclear weapons against peripheral targets, including those in the USSR,ew. say six, ICBMs and one or two nuclear missile submarines for use against the US as well as tho USSR.orce would confer onomewhat improved capability to deter nuclear attack by the USSR and, for the first time, an ability to strike the continental US.
In the less likely event that China makes accelerated progress, it might have someCBMs and four nuclear missile submarinesorce would significantly improve China's deterrentagainst both the US and USSR.'
'thaha Dfaccto, of Naval IntdUgtnt* ue At loot now oa pafla
'for On petition of tS* Director, Dafrovj lotallifraca Afccy tot ihc footnota oo pap 7.
nuclear weapon programs have slowed markedlyt now seems likely that China will only moderatelyHi regional nuclear strike capability over the new few years and probably will not deploy full-range ICBMsallistic missile submarine before ihe.
Force Development Policy. The generalof tbe slowdown suggests the influence of notional-level policy decisions, and not oleh/ technical problems with IndividualBeginningnd roughly coin-ctdi-tg with tbe purge of Lln Piao and the subsequent reduction of tbe role and influence of the military in tbe government, China's national economic priorities began shifting to agriculture and basic Industry and away from mililary procurement China's present leader-ship may believe thatreater share of resource; to basic industry andto research and development wouldmore to China'sver over the loog run than pouring large resources into rhe production of obsolescent aircraft and hrst-generarion missiles.
Certain program* which coald yieldimprovements in China's strategicseveral years hence are still moving ahead, although for the roost partfor example, the programs to develop solid-propellant missilesallistic missileand tbe construction of facilities for the production of nuclear materials and for RAD work on airframes and aircraft engines. On the other hand, programs which could yield quick but limited improvements in China's nuclear weapons posture are languishing-die programs for the0 run)CBM and theomber, for example.
The decisions to move ahead more slowly with programs for nuclear forces probablyhange in the Chinese perception of the strategic environment, resulting from some combination of: (a) China's acquisitionodest but credible nuclear reraiiatory capability against the USSR, <b) Improved relations with the US, and (c) perceivedoo the USSR due to Soviet detente wilh the US.
Presentuclear strikegrown tHgbtly over thr put two tohut Itsemainswd now the Chinese have anuclear stnka by missiles and bombersthe periphery of China atm- vVh'la most of this capabilitystrategic on rotation, some of It isa theater support role withinAt the present rime. Ihe Chineseto
Chioa's preaeot stockpile of nuclearis probably suttsesert lor all its opera* oonal missiles, though perhaps toroo boo of the bombm.
Presently drployed Chinese missilesapability to striae ail US hasea and ailic on the periphery of China, and most of them can strike Soviet targets east of the Urals.an reach somewhat beyond tbe same areas, though their capabilities to penetrate to heavily defended Soviet targets areTheould attack Soviet targets close to the border, and oonld also reach Korea and Taiwan and. with staging frcn points close to rhe border, northern Luzon in the PbKppir.es and nearly half of South Vietnam.
Survivability. The Chinese have attempted to achieve survivability of theirombination of eoncrahnenf. mobility, and hardening Missile units arceitheremlmobile rnode. moving (rem garrisons to temporarily occupied, inson-spteuous field sites, or at fixed soft sites with runnels tr_ protect miss-lea and essentialbur with unprotected launch pads. Camouflage and other nsrauss are usedto- conceal the locations of these launch areas. There are indications that scene further deploym.nl of theBBM may be in tbe >crnlrnobiJ* mode. Provisions foe theivabtlity of Chinese bombers we not as trtensive as th-ae tor the mlsiik' force.
L'-ie let medium bombers, capable of delivering nuclear bombs, with an operating radiusm and deployed at four airfields.
ew nuclear-armedight bombers, with an operating radiusm.
conirol system* joint!/
In the case of the US. it rears on US fears for the securityew US bases and odes of allies in the Far East
Coab- The scale and variety of the
cunot. view of their deterrent the
Chines* probably believe thai they havea modett but nonetheless credible nuclear irtallatory capability igainst the USSR. At the same Bnse. it is dear that they rrahz* thu thetr force remain, vulnerable in important respects.
They are workingased-array radar northwest of Peking, but presently have no effective means of deter dug the approach of hostile ballistic missiles.
Redundant, hardened strategicfor theorce are under construct ion. but are not completeationwide ryttern.
Reaction time for present missile force* Is several noun. The Chinese may be Iwking to future systems to dive them
China must also be aware that its present ability to deter nuclear attack through the threat ol nuclear retaliation would be marginal af the stakes wen high.
In the case of the Soviet Union, iton Soviet fears for tho security of some few dlies in Siberia and theFar East, aad perhaps on Soviet uncertainty about IRBM drplovrneot in writ em China which might be with In range of some cities In the Urala.
con facilities that China has established inch, care thatltimaie objective Ii totrategic nudear capability befitting apower. There i> no reason to believe, how. ever, that Peking aspires to pabdaies of US and Soviet When considered in relation to US and Sovieihinese strategic programsa mull effo> t. The pace of the Chinese effort, moreover, it slow and deliberate, and programs areilli an economy of means, reflecting limited Chinese resources.
China's present objective probably ia toa token nuclear capability ba strike the USSR west of the Urals and the continental US. Over tbe longer term. Peking almost certainly will seek toorce of nuclear delivery vehicles that willtrongerto nuclear attack by other tbe US or the USSR. It is also reasonable to expect that China will attempt to improve andeipand its regional and theater nuclear capability, both to strengthen its regionaland to increase Its options forto limited Mtcsear arrack.
Proipects for Mafor Systems. The Chinese mayimited capability to striketargets west of the Urals, possibly starting in4 but more likelyy then, they may have completed two of the three tiloi In the Held now being built for the. An initial operational capability (IOC) for the CCS-X1 in45 would also require either an early resumption of flight tr.ling or that the Chinese be satii-
fled with the very limited flighthile thopossibly reach
it could not reach US targetscvptortion of Alaska aod several US bases in the mid-Pacific, uscruding Cuam. There ts no evidence of prep ar abo os for furthereployment.
Tbe Chirtcse have no capability to attack the cceirmersral US directly and are unttkety to attain uoc for several years. The full0 run)CBM now undercould nee be7 |at the earliest^
Jim their sneaT
rcceot test of thehe Chineseto use It toalelli-e. which could mean that the currentf therogram Is Its applicationarge space booster.
The other system under development by Chine that could directly threaten theUS is the ballistic missile submarine. Conitruction of one or mote such units is probably under way, and the lead hull might be launched this year or next The missile lor the system probably willwo-star* aeJid-prapeDant SLBM.o the early US Polaris and probably capable ofuclear warheadange of0m. Flight testing ofissile has not yet begun, and probably will take at least throe years. Therefore, even If test firings begin soon, tbe missile Is unlikely to be ready for system Integration with the first operational SSBN beforeinimum of sis months for full Integration of the system, the earliest IOC date wouldut In view of China's lack of experience in the flight testing of
systems, IOC might berater.*
Prospects for Future Forces. Underassumptions. Chinese prospects areas follows:
If the Chinese show little more urgency and no greater rale of devr4opment and deployment progress over the neat sev-oral years than in tbe past few years, they may have0and wellombers for use against peripheral targets, incrudlng those in rhe USSR, butew, sayCBMs and one or two SSBNs capable of aetackiog the US.
If the Chinese make accelerated progress in the development of mtercontlnenial systems and second-generation regional systems, and shift rerources to hasten their deployment,0 they mightegional force of about the sameas above, but qualitatively Improved, and someCBMs and about four SSBNs capable of attacking the US.
The fust protectionetter reflection of Chinese performance to date and we nave no present basis for cacdactlng aoy markedIt would mean that byhina would have somewhat improved its capability
durlna the past year. el
a- >Nct>an orevice, lariilbd S>ubmanor apparentlybeen con-du.W. Some Wrf-bastd tasUna;LBMhat* occurred ?
'llrintpWrtc urn)and iha SSI1N
ii launched aVk veai as eipectrd. the SLDM/SSBN irtum could mch IOC aiwiOC> by
Control Sys'oms Jointly
deitt nuclear attack by tbe USSR by virtue of:
an enlarged and Improved regional strike force;
aa ernergenvy strike capability against targets In the Par East by one or two relatively Invulnerable SSBN*
a token and vulnerable capability to strike targets in European Russiaandful of ICBMs Hi silos.
The intereontinental strike element of this tore* would Have eonfrrred on China for the first time the ability to strike tbe continental US. This would have considerable political and osyvdofatgacal value But the ICBM force would be small aad vulnerable and only the SLBMs wouldurvivableforce, and then only for short periods
In the less likely event that China makesprogress In the development ofsystems and second-generation retriorial mistde systems, th*0 couldignificant capability to deter nuclear attack by th*capability that the Chinese could feel fairly corsfident would deter Soviet nuclear attack unless the stakes were very high Thia improved deterrentwould be based principally on Chinas expandedCBMs inorce probably large enough for assured retaliation against large populated areas in European Russia.
This number of ICBMs would also improveeterrent position versus the US. Moreover, with four nuctear tubman nes.periods of tension China might be ableeep one or two nuclear missile sabrnaiines on patrol in the North Pacific from where they could strike targets In tha US.*
"Thr Director. Drfenwi Itfellicrnce Aireney, be-Jli-vrihin! case,etter (fleer, should also brhird fort* rata wouldora (intied force, and tttricomlnenul ballittic mtnflr lyiteraj would baal the expenseiiuiliK other ht-dnrtary wcton.
Projections of China's Strategic Nuclear Delivery Forceompared with)
Last Year's Projection8
Status 4 Continuation: ce preienl t'anda
IOC oMimited-range ICBMol lull-range ICBM
Missiles capeWe of reaching US: lull-range ICBMs and SLBMa
I Missises caoawe ot reaching omy Asian snd Soviel targeu. Including limited-rangeomoers wpabee of reaching only Asian and Soviel targets:s and noeloar-ecajipoeda NQIC: A" bars repyesanr high sieves of ranges o'uncfiainry tutelar in* stated aonaiuont.
NUCLEAR FORCt DEVELOPMENT POLICY
iu'i plan* Io cteitrinuclear force, aa evidenced by anaryai of IU develop-event and deployrrsenr programs. Kavo patted through several stages. HlradUghrecision waa made at an early date bo cooaDy on devdopmg and deploying at quickly aabstle forcegainst rxrtpbera
: !be beffnnmg,y tbe US aad it. sibee, or arty poreuOm! adversary. The devdopment effcrt wm bated mostly on the aid provided by lb-USSR before tbe Sino-Soviet splitiven the incomplete status of this assurance program and the rudimentary nature of China's technical and Industrial bate at tbe rime, this wet an ambitious undertaking. Nonetheless, it appears to have rucoeeded. There is good evidence nowimited oumber of nucscar-equippedRHMs and some Sovietype short-rangemissiles (SRBMs) were deployed by tbe end*
By thehe Chinese had begun to prepare for the next phase of thoir plan for nuclear forces, rots phase coincidedharp rise in Sino-Soviet tension anderiod when China's military eatablishmeoi was in pciirkuJ ascendancy Th. or^eetrvr dux
sJH|( thil Otj, WU tO JsMtaBM
China's mmlroal regional deterrent and toeasure of strategsc deterreoce against both the US and tbe Soviet Union. Starting in the, the Chineseexpandednd production facilities. The effort progressed throughout the second half ofespite the serious turmoil created by the Cultural Revolution, suggesting that it had high priority and some degree of immunity from th* politicalBy tbe.eployment had been expanded, tbeRBM had been developed and initially deployed, tesDhg of the technically similar and longer rangewhich could reach weal of the Urals) had started, and the first two Chinese earth satellites had been suooeasfuCy orbited. Flight testingarge ftsJJ-nnge ICBM. thelso began In this time period, and the laidajor solid-pro-ractading tbe (Wurmen! of as SLUM
1 The pattern oftossrees toward ao mtercormacotal ouclear strike capability and an enhanced regional deterrent forceto changesarked way
Afterhere were notest latmches of theCBM.
hree operational silos lorbegun9ontinuedlow pace. So far aa we know, no others were started.
-uccessful test in September IWL, theull-range ICBM waa teat-launched once2 aod twice
-o additional rued launch sites for Iheere started, although work continued at fixed sstet already
China's program to develop an SLUM continued to make steady, gradual prog-rest but the program hat moved more
thin expected and flight resting of an SLBM Hill haa not occurred.
China'i production of thotrategic bomber began to decline from the rale of about two aircraft per month1 to one per month2 and then was suspended
Productionight bombers began to declineigh of about five per month1urrent rate of two per month.
eer ago it seemed possible that the slow progress Is scene program*hase and thatime all or most programs would move forward rapidly. This has not occurred and it is now dear that the strength levels projected for China's strategic forces inill not bo achieved. Thatindicated that byssuming moderate progress, China might haveissiles and an equal number ofor use against peripheral targets, iodud-ing those In the USSR, as well as someCBM* and one or two SSBNs for use against thet now appear* that byhe Chines* capability Is likely to fall short of even this moderateheir forces.
lthough technical or peor jammioccan be adduced in all cases to explain each program's termination or limitedthe overall pattern suggests the influence of more general, national-level economic and strategic factors. And Indeed, there Is evidence from China's economic policy debates and from developments In isorvstrateglc military pngrams1urning point for the country's overall defense weapons policy.
. China's Strategic AttackanrOP SECRET f
t Is dear thatoughly coinciding with the purge of Defense Minister Un Planumber of his military asaoctatrs on the Politburo, rsabonal ecocajuau prioritWa were shifted to give more priority to aspscutture and basse indarstry. apparently to some eirrnt at the expense of military procurement.1 thereebate over the allocation of resources between the steel and electronics Industries which was probably partly rdated to defense issues. After llie fail of Defense Minister Unational economicrordcrence was held in1 and2 to review the shortcomings of past poheira. Utile is known of any decisions made at th* conference,ong-range pohcy env phattring the primacy of agriculture aad thefor industry to support agriculture hai been in effect since.
2ndustrial production continued to expand atercent per year and certain sectors petroleum, fertiliaer.andat even higher rates. During this same period, severalprograms, in addition to (hoe* strategic program* already noted, slowed perceptibly. Eiamples are military aircraft production and destroyer commictsori Not all program* slowed and indeed we have noted Increase* In conventional submarine and tankIn some cases technical as opposed to policy decisions may explain the decrease In activity. Nevertheless, it seems clearumber of important military program* ilowedime when the other sectors in Chinese industry weretrend whichthat priorities had shifted.
'olicy review bl2 led to China's purchase3 ofillion dollars' worth of whole industrial plants from thehe first such massive Imports sine* thc cessatlon of Soviet aid. These plant Import*
to rupplement rather than replacedomestic investment programs. There has also been some increase In weapons-relitcd Imports but not on the saase scale. Thus, developments of the past year in China'* Import policy reartforoa tho impressionelative shift tn resources and emrshaois from rmLtary to civilian UvdttsQtet rat* Occurred sincei iillnliaa It Is not possible to determine whether there hat been any shift of priorities or resources within th? military between general purpoae forces andregie fcrcrs.
the strategic weaponsduring the past year seem tothat certain programs which couldimprovements in China'sseveral years hence arealthough for the most part slowly.the construction of facilities forof nuclear material) and lorand development of airframes andengine* is proceeding steadily, andon programs to developmissile*allistic missilethe other hand, pcoframi whichquick but relatively limitedIn China's nuclear weapon*to be languishing. These includedeployment of rheand theroduction program.
failure to move forwardaircraft production and mmikprograms could be due Hist as muchccnatderarloeis at tohe current leadershipthaireater share ofto basic industry and perhaps toand development wouldto China's national power thanresources into the production ofaircraft and first-genera Hon mUssles. The Chinese may have fudged that white they could moderately improve the capabilities of their regional nuclear forces, they bad no hope, in the near term, of deploying nuclear delivery systems its modes and numbers sufficient toa credibk. retaliatory capability against European Russia They may believe thatsystem*ettor prospect oftheir capabilities against the USSR. Improved relations with the US may have reinforced China's technical and economic reasons for not moving rapidly to deploymissile systems. Moreover, the PRC leadership may have come to believe that the retaliatory capability they had already achieved sgainst targets in Siberia and Central Asia together with US-USSR detente hadthe USSR's option for an outright attack on China.
II. THE STATUS AND DIRECTION OF FORCES AND PROGRAMS
uring the post year, fnr rhe first timen SRBM unit wasield launch site. The unit was observed at Mu-chla-yen In north-centralocation enabling it to cover potential route* within China by an invader moving through Sinlriang or from Mongolia, (Seelthough SRBM equipment had been observedew missile-relatedin Chinaheir locationsinappropriate for operationalof the system. The more recent evidence suggests lhat the Chinese haveew SRBMs operationally deployed since the.
ChiflMB Mluilt UnlUh-atar Support Rob
e do not know bow many SR5Ms unitiew,| |
unlikely that any nes/ SRBNt units were (crmed after later generation missiles became available and. since there Is no evidence that the system Is still In production, additional deployment Is unlikely. The total forcedoes not exceedauncher".
Initial Opuratiead Capability
All fMlmatrd ranges io (his Hstlnsssnexpressedterrnson-rotating euth (NRE).
lthough ft Is en obsolescent endmissile system with slow reaction times, thoppears likely to remain la Chinas inventory (or several more years at least Two launches were conducted recently from the Shiung-ch'eng-tzu Missile Test Range- the first sinceheir purpose probably was lo test operational crew proiiciency and mkrile system reliability.of thaay have endedbehas not increased2 at tbe latest
Eitmitad Cha.Kiert.tlea and Puformanc* af
lheadhun-Ranis Bdlullc Missile-
here is some evidence that part of Useorce Is befog relocated forheater support role.'j
uring the past year, deployment of China'sRBM system continuedeasured, deliberate rate.aunchers are estimated to bo operational now. About five launchers are known to have been
Estimated CharattecJtKi ind Performance of thaee Sallbac MiWle
CMflguralxra Leneth Diameter Preprllsnta
as oever been teat-tired lo of mora thanm.D N'RE. Alrhoogsi this fall, rfwrt ef treem- the uneertaUUMtursctertMlea kave open the pouibflily that tt could fly to at least IJCO dd, to It it ran. rotted an IPBVt.
"That fa, for aorcJoytnant anatui relaUvaly rued .targets lupperting; tbe operation, of enemych as troop coocentranom. itagmc arras, and In-vesten rotiars. Such uaa ts distoroUhfd from lacucal ate hi support of (round force* which are ta direct contact with aa enemy.
Control Systems Jointly
to operational status during the pastaverage lor the program. T
The present alow rate of deployment suggests tnat tho Chinese do not intend to io-creaae Ibe ilze of theRBM force rig-nificantly. Some further expansion of tbe force may occur if the Chinese replace theystem with thet some established sites and institute some semimobdeof the system. Thererowing body of evidence that Ovipa is exploring; scmimobile dcplc Trsertf of thend. in fact, may already have begun deployment tn this mode.
Emulated chirictrrtitki and perlormnce ef
beegional ICBM program continues toajor enigma In Chinas strategic weapons effort. The system has not been flight-tested in user 2Vi years, 1
I arthermorc. there is
no'evidence thatues are being built. It apnear- -reforc. that while thehaveaoarsdorcd the program, they plan to deploy the system in only token numbers.
helight test programonly two firings of the vehicle Inrole, borhfoma range of some
third stage, the vehicle was also u'ed to launch China's two successful satellites during the
Id. When theeaches IOC in4 or. more likely, the first halfS, as estimated, the Chinese willoken capability to cover targets In the European USSH. pcasibly including Moscow. They may consider the creation ofapabilityjustification forargelyinixsale. Tne reasons behind theto truncate the program are luskown, but probably include poboeal and strategicas well aa the coats of deploying enoughoredible threat to the Eiiropeen USSR
hlnai first true ICBM-du* syitcrn. thecavtinoed lo run into technicalduring the past year. Of the four launches of the system made to date, only the firstSeptemberto have ben completely .ueccsdul. '
After in interval on-psd erercises witnissile began in4 nnd are still continuing. (Secbe activity may involve only checkout of the launch facility or training. Aeither one in-country or another attempt to launch abe scheduled To occur sometime in tbe neat few months.
Ei rented Chaniiwttna ind Pwierauuic* or theaterconOieDUl Ballistic Missile
I iTi l? itiofi
PL It ii still much too eaHy to reachconclusions as to when theight reach IOCeapon delivery system. Continuation of work onaunch silos for the system at the YYu-chai rangehcad dunng the past year indicates that the Chinese retain their interest In using theeapon system. (Seene of those silos, startedould finally be ready to support flight testing of tbey the end of this year. Corotructionecond silo there, started int abo proceeding slowly. There It, however, no evidence of the construction of opcrstbocau1 silos for tben the field]
construction of operational silos is started soon, the system probably could attain IOC sometime7 at the ear best If the difficul-tjes take longer to correct, or now ones appear, IOC will be even later, say
tho history of the programIt seems unlikely that the programsmoothly and uninterruptedlyearly IOC It is even possible thatymenl of then thethis Estimate. The fact that theto use the system toatellite
Construction continued to be observed atof these sites over the past year. In terms of the total number and variety ot sucbnow available, the Chinese have theand testing capacity forallistic missile and space effort fax larger than the one which Is apparent. (See5.)
urrent operational Chinese ballistic missile system* all use liquid propeilants,ajor investment has been mode in theneeded to develop and produce such systems. Those facilities were initiallyin the Peking area. In the,arge production complex was built near Feog-chou in east-centralarge deselopmcntal facility forsystems was started In0 near
VTa-hsmg southwest of Shanghai. Th-nstallation now Is neoring comt-etion and appears to be designed to develop and perform static tests of both liquid- and solid-propellant systems. At least two possibletest facilities have been discovered recently near An-ning and Sui-yang.
lthough the Chinese have not yetolid-propellant ballistic missile, their continuing investment in facilities apa-ble of developing and producing solid-propel-lant rocket motors of various sizes up through strategic class ha* considerable significance for the future. The first such complex, at. Inner MongoMa. was started In thend further expanded several year: ago. Despite the substantial capacity of this installation, the Chinese started to build an-
comparable luge solid-propelbust coov ptex near Lin-t'ien in east-centrel China in ihe. The overall appearance of this fa-etliey. particularly the idestftkottlon there of three aod possibly four static teat stands, now Indicates that, like Hu-ho-heo-fe, it too Is dc-dgncd to develop and produce severaltypes of rocker motors, including at least to rhe strategic class. 1
firing of several types ofrocket motors has been under way atsince the. The rateappears daw and there it aaevidence that any solid-propeiLwtbeen flight-teated. TrHsairly long developmentalat Watt by US standard. Theabo Wave run into -echnscolthe way. In any case, the Chineseworking siifftalently long atoa large rocket motors to suggesttestingoltd-propellant SLBM.as similar systrrns for use to themlssde program, could begin to the
The Submarlrie-lovnched Ballistic Missile Prooraris'
submaririe-launchedprogram made rsrogrew during theAlthough flight testing of thenot yet begun, testingissilelaunch-assist device Installed to China'stest-platform submarine probablyuac"2 Ms the Lu-shua
The ChirsesFsLBM aimoat certainly will hasoft target capability^
' For the position of iha Director of Naval Into !U.
Performance and OmactertiUea ol is Qiioew Suceiurlng. Launched BalllUlc Mlnilit
The Chinese prciably intend to small tbeir SLBMbroenne with nuclearChina has designed and built atodern attack submarine, the Han date,robably nuclear powered. Its appearance1 ihowed the Chinese have developed tniimiiues lor designing andrnooWn lubmarine bulla suitable torpropulsion There still is uncertainty, however, about China'a success Ineliable nuclear propulsion system suits bio (or an SS8N. The Hun apparently haddifficulties which caused it to be returned to the shipyard for nsoreear. If indeed if is nuclear powered, trouble-free operationsonger period are needed touccessful system.
hina has adequate faahnes tor rhe assembly of SSBNs There are at least five and possiblyuilding positions suitable tor the assembly of large-diameter hulls in tbehall at the Hu-lu-leo shipyard and two at thein lhlpyardj
Aasuming that assembly of the lead SSBN takes about three or four years on the building ways. It la possible that an SSBN will he launched itt or IMS IV coostructioa haiang-chi is now (slushed, but the Chlneae are not Ekety tonb-martiM there untjl Late in rhe decade.
It is ir.ll too early to dHermlne with much confidence when China's first SLBM system will attain an opera Uocal capability. The pacing factor could wet] be the missile de-veloptnerrt effort. There is no evidences that SLBM (Tight testing has actually besrun, but such firings amid now be fairly near at hand. This testing is expected to be conducted from land-ba-od facilities prior to any launchesuhmaiine. Initial launches areto occur from well-instrumented range-heads such as Shuang-ch'eng'tzu or Wu-chai, especially in view of China's lack ofin the sraUdpropeUant area. After land-based flight teats,ass teat submarine probably will partldpate ka the flight test protpaan.
A night test program for an SLBM probably will take at least three years to corn-plrte.t ia rctatfvdy trouble free. Therefore, if test firings begin soon, the missile is still unlikely to be ready for systemwith the first operational SSBN before aboutllowinginimum of six months for hill integration of the missile andnne. rhe ear beat IOC date wouldut. in view of the relatively lengthy night test programs observed for land-baaed liquid pro pel La nt systems and China's lack of erprriervoe in the night resting of rolld-propel-lant systems, IOC might be considerably later.
the aence. we t
the Dimeter of Nan] [atrlli-foonote on paa* 8.
Hand la via
Thus far. there hat been no evidence in China's oceanographic or geodetic activities togniftcont effort toallistic missile submarine program. Over the pait three or four yean, however, some changes in Chinese marine profnros havethe beginning of an effort to develop subrrtarine operating areas ot missile test ranges through acquisition of detailed gravity data and sea bottom characteristics over an la-ceaslngly broader sea area. Neither of the areas surveyed inof Shanghai and off southsubstantiallythe target coverage already available to land-based missiles deployed on the
The Bomber Force
Tha TU-Id Srrolmgk Somber
roduction ofet mediumwas suspended at least temporarilyhe rare of production had declinedigh of about two aircraft per month1ate of one per month1 It is too early to determine whetherwill resume. If the suspension istheay bo the victim of ato limit investment in strategic weaponsart of the overall cutback In aircraft production sinceL
Aboutre currentlyat four bases, Wu-kung and Kung-ho in north-central China aod Ta-t'ung aad Sha-ho closer to Peking. (SeeU-lfia have long been used in the nuclear testing program, and the entire force it considered capable of detivvrring any nuclear bomb in the Chinese inventory. The threen the naval air force base at Sha-ho appear toaritime roie and presumably also would be available for nuclear delivery.
The primary mission of theased atot clear. They may have been based there temporarilyew airfield at Wen-shuim southwest of Peking. That airfield will have aircraft storage tunnelsype built at Kung-ho aod parking facilities typical of those atases. Thislan in which almost all TU-los would eventually be incorporatedingle forcetrategic nuclear attack mission and ccKHistinc of throe elements, one each at Wu-icung. Kung-ho, and Wen-shui.
Alternatively, the TU-lds at Ta-t'ung mightrimary mission of conventional bombing,onger range element to the convention'! force. They would,econdary mission of siraiegic nuclear attack, ihe absorption cf the TU-lflsegiments atine instead of maintaining separate unit integrity >upports this analysis, j
Suspension ofroduction and the possible assignment ofhird of the forcecewentional bombing unit could
onge In China's vsnw of the utility of theuclear bomber recce. Although China'i original goal for rheecce isorce much Lsrger thanircraft now available woold be necessary to penetrate to moreew targets protected by modem air defense, such as those of the Soviet Union There is no evidenceoUow-oo bon-'ieeodification program to improve thaapabilities,uture air-ro-turf ace missileossibility.
TTM8 force may have beenonly to provide an interimrtueiear strikes at greater ranges thanChinese missiles could achieve.TU-lflf to Ta-t'ung,ossiblerole, began Inbout thethe CSS-2range andcomparable to Ibeif thaoroe does not grow inthe Chinese might elect toversions of the aircraft, or tosome*hinaone suchrom the Sovteribut has not built aay. TankersDow the Chinese to eitend tbe combatthe existing force and to use moreattack profiles.
8 Ughf Bomber
s an o'd andbut Chin* still appears to considerImportant weapon system. t
yet, there is no evidence thatunits are being trained or equippednuclear delivery role. There are abortin Chins from whichand redeployment or ita gin gairfields closest to the border*tratagicai,atof the Soviet Union, iD of Southaad parts of South Vietnam andlimited range of tha aircraft luggettsmight also be usedheater supportChina. If it la to be used In thatield3 would be desirable.
currently haaighter-bombers, almost all ofto pound attack utnta.a pavsoad of0 pounds toofm, using externalcapabilities are continentheater ouclear role.slikely aircraft in Chinas currentmverarory to receive tacticalThere is no ooavsncingthat the aircraft now has a
The Nuclear Weapons Program
Noc/ear Tesfmp, and Wee^ons Devefopmenf
evelopments since2 indicate that there may have been some shifting of prl-
in China's nuclear weapons test(or the purpose of doveloping adelivery by the ILffl lightabMy of Nuclear Weopon.
hina's capacity to produce fissionable materials Is ea pending. CooatrucrJoo Isat Its second gaseous diiTusion plant, at Chin-kou-bo, and it is likely tliat thU plant will beeome fullyometime5n?-yuan pTat-adaun reactor is cootmuing iU codingests prior to startup and sboukl begin producing later thb
and the new nuclear weaponi fabrication complex atng it now complrie andChina's older nuclear sites appear to be active, and some are undergoing tnodeit(See
hina's capacity for production ofmaterials is roughly comparable to that of France. It is quite small compared to that of tbe US and USSR. Upon completion of the new production facilities in Siechwan China'sapacity will be lessf that of tbe Soviet Union, and Us annual plutoaium equivalent capacity no more thanercent of that of the Soviet Union. In terms of cumulative amounts, the Chinese stockpilemall fraction of the Soviet and US stockpiles.
Tbe future growth of the Chineseweapons stockpile wiO be governed not only by the availability of fissionable materials but also by the design of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile. Continued production of the type of weapons estimated now to be inof which use relatively large amounts ofminimize rhe size of the stockpile. At the same rime, that would leaserowing surplus of plutoaium, which could be used for additionalnd more platonium. If (he Chinese were to continue to produce theirweapons and use the remaining p'utc-nium fee all-plutoniiitn fission weapons, their future stockpile would Include the all-phito-nlum weaponsfuture stockpile combination of thermonuclearwith tester amounts. composite fission weapons, and all-pluronium fission weapons would, however, appear more likely.
The Chinese could have many uses for the potentially large number of ploronium fission weapons that might bo included in their stockpile by the end of this decade. In the light of their generally defensive posture, they might well stockpile low-yield fission weapons for tactical delivery by,s. or for tactical missile systems that might be available by then. Other weapons for which they mightuclei' capability include coastalmissiles, depth charges, and quiteatomic demolition mimiHons. There is, however, no specific evidence that theytoapability in these areas.
HINA'S NUCLEAR ATTACK CAPABILITY
Forces ond Cepabilltiei
Chinese nowapabilitystrikes by missiles and bombers*hc periphery of Chinair,i. (Seehile most
ofntendedheater support role. Including use within China')t th* retreat time, the Chinese are estimated lo have opersnooni;
may be that so far only scene of 'hendery few of theavebeen allocated nuclear weapons.
resently desalovedapebUtty to strike aB IS beaes and alhe* on the periphery of China. Launch Sites for thendre grouped opposite South Korea and Japan, oppose Taiwan and
While theovers only targets bi the immediate area,reso that the ones opposite Taiwan can cover Korea and much of Sesilheast Asia, and
Wrsadget let mediumrs, with an operating radiusun. deployed at four airfields. Although oil of tbo force could be used for deliverynd thermonuclear bomhvhird ef this force might havebomb delivery as its primary
a few of China's moreeagle |et light bombers, with anradiustn. also mayuclear delivery capability.
The Chinese probably have enough nucleararheads to equip all of the rr**sues. but it
Theomber could cover all of these areas, as well aa reconooitcr andUS naval forces in the western Par.fio.ould reach target. In Korea andand. with staging from points close to the border, northern Luzon la the Philippine, and nearly half of South Vietnam.
ost of Chinas presently deployedcan strike targets within theumber of CSS-la in north and northeast China can hU the Soviet Union, Including major bases and populated area, such asand Ussuriysk. aad all the CSS-2.
part of southern Siberia and tbe Soviet Far East. The TU-IOs have the rcnge to reach targets in the USSR as far as the Ural- from forward bases in China, though their cape,
are limited.ould attack targets closer to Ihe border.
oken capabi hry to Srike Sovietat greater ranges may be acquired,by4 or. more likely,y then the Chinese may have completed two of the three ales under construction io central China aad installedruatues in them
khc US&X3 bu an
rang* ol XOOOioan. While (be rnjtsile pomM* coo Id reach Moscow from [wo of (be three silos, the missile could not reach any part of th* USmall part of Alaska. It could, however, reach several US bases In the central Pacific, including Cuam. There Is no evidence of preparations for deployment beyond the three silos sow under
he Chinese have no capability tothe continental US directly and areto attain one for ai least severalheould not be operatxsnal until WT7 at the earliest. And an SSBN system will probably not be operational8 at the earliest" The Chinese do not seem to be pushing either of the. programs with any particular urgency, and even if no technical difficulties develop, the actual lOCs of these -ystems are Waif to be atear or more beyond these dates unless the pace ofIncreases markedly.
" Fnr the pnMlnn nf likeavillirparloiriii of ihe Navy, see ihc footnote
Strategy Undetlyiog Deployment
M. The exigencies of China'* securityhave changed drastically over the years. Begun with Soviet assistance, thestrategic program at first was predicated on the idea that the US waa tbe main enemy. This probably held more or less true until the rrud-lSGOa. But aa Ssnc-So-rset relations worsened to the point where large Soviet forces were positioned on the border and bloody border clashes eruptedhe Soviet Union Ix-came the chief threat. Chinese leaders make this fact clear by theirespressed concerns about Sovietand by the thrust of *bjirpolicy.
o dote, however, the deploymentstrategic 'ceces ihuw?on oas the Soviet threat laeflection of the fact that
substantial part of the cesnstructton andfor presendydwas begun before Peking's;the threat shifted. Tho Chinese mayfeared that an obvious andto the Soviet threat would have been
Harigernuieriod ol high renWon. Soli, ia the several yraui truce the Soviei threat became uppermost, there it no cvl-dertceesulting change in thu pattern of deployment. The mott recently started lived miuile launch iltet are at Laervkcrar-waoa. -herere optrmalty located for hitting both the USSR and US bene* In Alia. Within thv pint twotherave continued tn be deployed at fixed vile* in -auhwrit China where they can reach US base* and India, but not rhe USSR. Thu* it appear* that the Chinese dcployrnciithave been influenced less try athreat and moreeneral deter-mrnatWfl totrike capability around the entire periphery of China."
he Chinese have ihown that Iheysurvivability to be crucial to the effee-Qseness of their nuclear deterrent. They have attempted toom bl nnt lon uf concvulmcot. mobility, and hardening. Currently operational miuile units are oVptuyrdernsnvufMlc mode, *novina; Irum gamtonstemporarily occupted. in. consptcuoiw fieldnd at fixed soft sites with tunnels to protect missiles and essentia] equipment but with unprotected launch pads.
' Th* AWManl Ojri al Mail for Inlr
ii.inke Army, ind the Aulitanldepartment jfAir Fnice.with puraanphi osAS. Theyod roTh-rd OV US aaeaaaeoar ahtiurr wad beaWl1 KM IhBM. aadde-
pmrnvnlarind r4 primary
ibfrnv attaint i attatk. finaet
ikr-lftyment rnttrra* thwld lieid
In tlaaoaUmMty therein .way pMaaasalIaat raOlrt a* aa aliiiapteeval* ice a
eaeeeraae aruaentae-.uet fkruorU. -hd> uaH
drplnyina virtuaJlr every epmtaindat*.
aauira* th* dwelt of Soviet aitm*.
Concealment and eanvcuflage areat these launch areas. Thefrom nuclear and conventional blastby the tunnels cannot be
he Chinese are making tome proviiian for turvivabtUty of their bornber force. They have dispersal airfields aad have coratnicted tunnels for the protection of bomber* at one of four existingam and at another base under construction However, the force doe* not appear to have an operational alert rystem or an adeoaiate warning system to en-able aircraft to disperse on short notice. In the case of thehv Chinese may be inunlng on the siae and dlspersom of the haree tn ccenpbcate enemy tarr^stng.
tW.1 the Chinese have not begun construct .on uf any additional fixed missile sites. Ihey may believe mobtlity, whenever iraaible.etter pvabouauzty that mn nlei would survive an attack than doe* dr-pktying them ol fixed site* subject toverage by many enemy weapons. While aboutixed uto for there *tlD under ccerstructiran, there are indication, that further deployment of the system may tse in the scmimobile mode.
That some uniti, deep ln their tunneli. couldoviet nuclearhey may also believe that the Soviets could not count on destroying ill of the nuclear delivery eitenenta of the wvJespread Chinese bomber force* Consequently, the Chinese probablylleve they now haveodest but nonetheless credible nuclear retaliatoryagainst the USSR.
A Bor theno doubt fed thai their deterrent force remains vulnerable inrespect*:
They have no effective means of detect-ing the approach of hostile halUsticThey are wee kins;hased-array radar northwest of Peking that thould provide some warning of attacks from most Soviet ICBM completes.the short flight time of missiles !aarched from tbe Soviet Union would limit the amount of warning possible, and Soviet missile ccanplese* in easternare outside the radar's coverage.
ow Peking judges Soviet ability to pin-pouit all Chinese missile launchers ts aot known, the Chinese might, conser*ahveiy. overestimate Soviet abilitks to locate missile sites. Even us, they probably helieve that same of their u'mimobile units cook) not be targeted
Miraile force reaction times would range from less than an hour to several hours, depending on the system involved and its readiness condition.
imited capacity far retaliationajor gain for awhich confronts powerful Adversaries. Nevertheless. China might well judge that its present ability to deter nuclear attack by the Soviet Union Of the US through the threat
Control "Systems Jolnfty
retaliation pomtd by its nuclear strike force would br marginal if the stakes were htgh.
e. Id the cue of tbe Soar* Union, China's ability to deterttack would rest on Soviet fran for the leeurity of tome few cities tn Siberia and tbe Soviet Far East and perhapa on Soviet urtcer-lainty about the eilstence of IRBMmen Is in vrcitem China which might bring lomo ciliei in the Urals into range. China hai no capability at prevent to threaten target- in the USSR west of tbe Urals, though it may soonoken capability with the.
b. In the care of the United States,to deter nuclear attack wouldUS rears (or the teeuntyewand cstJe* of allies in theAlthough with thecould itnke port of Alalia,have no near-term prorpectnuclear sincethe
continental United States.
he Chinese have increased theirfor dctemnj; nuclear attack at the tactical end uf the nucleor itrtke spectrum bya capability to attack enemy targets on Chinese territory with nuclear weapons. This capability li probably Intended both to deter an invading Force and to provide an option to respondimited way to tactical tue of nuclear weapons by an enemy without risking tho imliBeal and mditary consequences of attacking target! on foreign soil.
IV. FUTURE FORCES
he curr-nt status of development and oVplriymrnt prwrrjms permits reasonablyestimates of the compositam and six* of China's nucttar delivery force within the next two yean or so. Through at6 the rote* will consist of wssrsehott- and medium-range missiles and, by that year, thr Chinese wdl probably have about SOewn operational saloa. As (or bombers, most if not ill of China'small fraction of its rmxes probably willtrategic attack role. The total number of aircraft of these types probably will not Increase much but thatof theorce configured to deliver nuclear weapons probably will grow slowly, as will the number of nuclear weapons avad-able for delivery.
n estimate uf longer tiim prospects must take Into consideration;
that thend SLBMsystems still have majorhurdle* to surmoont in thenprograms before they can achieve IOC
that, by companion with the L'S and Soviet programs, Chinese advanced weapon programsmalland slow progress.
that the pace of the effort has been slowed further by Chineseo adjust priorities in lavnr of building the economic base ol tho country.
that Chinos* Judgment* about priorities may have been influenced by aof what was strategically feasible In tbe near term, and reinforced by iheir perceptionhanged relationship among th* US. USSR, and China.
that, because ol fundamental rtrficien-ears in technical manpower andChase's ability to speed up its advanced veeapons effort is touted.
Ti IP 'ill Mi'
rh.it. neverthele*i, th* Chinese advanced weapons effort has ambitious(oats, as evidenced by the extensive fa-ci lines that have been eatabosbed for the developerxTit and production of nuclear weapons and liquid- and solidmissile*.
h* scale and variety af the nuclear and missile development and productionthat China has established indicate that its ultimate objective is to btnld anuclear capabtlirvajor power. This is suggested by the breadth of the Chinese effort, which includes allalanced strategic capability, as much aa by its size. There is no reason tohowever, that Peking aspires to match th* capabibt.es of US and Soviet nuclear forces.
ubject to the constraining Influences enumerated above. China's present ob|ectlv* probably is still tooken nuclear capability to strike tha USSR west of the Urals and the continental US.ossible, however, that the Chinese will not carry out even this limited objective within the period of ihla estimate. Fur example, the Chinese might conclude that the present strategicrequires an ICBM threat against the western USSR, butomparableagainst the US. Inase, they might drbbtratcly foregoull, to-ige ICBM. while continuing to use their targe ICBM boosterpace launch vehicle andew SSBNs.
ut their gradual past progress and the evidence of more ambitious longer term goals make it almost certain that the Chinos* will workorce of nuclear deliverythat, because of Its size and surviva-
development, asith follow-on rysrems,orratwhat faster rate ot
deplc-yment of seexind-grriera&ot.ill affect levels of deployment for theInd that the Chinese will not Irtctease their deployment of theeraculariy in new ofkety avsalamiity of theo provide coverage of both Soviet and US tarurts.
Both protections assume that the Chinese willjowlng number ofuclear delivery miuton and that there wdl notew strategic bomber during the period of this estimate, although some limited further produce on r tha TU-ie might occur."
povable ihracOont that Oiiaaw rtnteeaforcai maid take. Il ihould be anaphattrad that efa he ceeaadered in raMnair thai mes ml be caaepoaedeversal ta thea*In
Thty an iBMStd lo be iwDnn modrk
of peeaibs* tread*adprimarily for broad poller we It the
A. Con un ua Hon ot PrrarM Treradai
l the Ketr.
* Alttraft andabW aa atratecirarriers. Dw/ini the period of that th* Cbinrae probably -ill have avadaba* fuoonnimbk 'UctHal deliveryndci.lt
Croat* of Theitee Support aadoreeaSi>cceeam lop Ir.iiK.-rtr.otal Sraan ud Semad-cIeiierauDa Theater Supporticrjl
laeeehar. . ..
ii md rhc*>vaaee*
1 at Ol
Of tho twosto appro*imate the more likely frowth of Chinese forces Ln this decade. Itetter reflect van ofrtormar.ee to date and we bare no peeacot basis for protecting any marked changes in this record of performance. IOCS and force level, on the order of those shown for Case B, while requiring more rspid progressargerf resources, are nevertheles* within the bounds of China* capabilities. Both cases take account of what is known today about China'* apparent mixed priorities for developing at least sotne opera.
lional capability to strike targets at various distances, inchading strategic targets in both the USSR and the US."
"Tha Difeeasr, Drteaea ta keava (hat threea OMrd ease reheatfeai often, -huh. aidaooah notfcrir is Caaarotection UkrwU be ine-oded in rrAaet the toll ranee of po-lbdll lei (or China! tiu-ekar lorces. Tha 1otw" rair fudemenD ara brlafly rnenltoned In lha animate but an not representedhird force inuiIi-naaa nuclear capability ihu rowntraiedvrt Uauted lease. baarceeUoariial baOUtie ouailk lyitren weeld baat the erpraee el aipMidirai other
reat many variations of these cases are possible. For example, luccess with one weaponfailure withcould leadhift of resource allocations to dw more successful system to hasten its deployment. In addition,hina's perceptions of Its strategic requirements or the impact of political and economic influences could affect the pace and scope of theweapons programhole. It is not impossible that such influences will result in still another case, involving reduced Chinese effort. For example, as indicated in paragraphbove, the Chinese might decide to deploy an ICBM threat against the western USSR hut not against the US.
Implications of Future Forces
CapabUaUthe USSR. Ifmissile development and deployment trends continue, as projected in Case A.0 China's capability to survive nuclear attack and retaliate against targets In the eastern areas of the Soviet Union will be enhanced somewhat by enlargement of the MRBMRBM force from someoissiles. With the addition ofo the nuclear strike force, wellombers are likely to be available as strategic weapons carriers. Tho first SLBM units will provide an emergency strike capability against targets hi the Far East The small force of8 ICBMs in silos that China might have0 to threaten targets in European Russia would have little prospect ofoviet first strike and thus would have limited deterrent value. All things considered, however, China will have somewhat Improved its capability to deter nuclear attack by the USSR.
In the leas likely event that the Chinese make the accelerated progress in theof intercontinental systems andregional missile systemsby Case B. (hey could haveignificant capability to deter nuclearby tbecapability that they could feel fairly confident would r'eter Soviet nuclear attack unless the stakes were very high. Under this force assumption, the ability of Chinas regional nuclear forces to retaliatenuclear arrack will also have improved markedly. Chinas regional strike capability would numberaod-based missiles, net many more than inat about one-third of them second-genera Hon missiles with somewhat improved survivability aitd reaction time. The bomber force is unlikely to be very different from that of Case A. With some four SSBNs operational, China would be able to maintain one or two missile submarines on continuous patrol in the North Pacific but not in more distant seas within range of European Russia. This would significantly increase the number of missiles that would likelyoviet first strke and be able to retaliate against Soviet targets In Asia. China also would have aboutCBMs inumber probably large enough to make it uncertain in the calculations of Soviet military planners that some would not survive for retaliates/ strikes against large populated areas inRussia.
avobilUin AgorVuf the US. If present trends continue,0 China willew. sayCBMs capable of striking the continental US and from time to timewould be able to place one missileIn position to strike targets in (he western United States. This force wouldon China for the first tamo the ability to strike the continental US. This would have considerable political and psychological value-But the ICBM force would be small and
vulnerable and only the SLBMs wouldurvivable retaliatory force, and then only for short periods.
nder the less likely assumption ofprogress with the ICBM and SLBM programs, the Chinese0 would have CO ICBMs and during periods of tension might be able to keep one or two nuclear missile submarines on patrol in tbe North Pacific able to strike targets in the western US. Tbe submarines in particular, because of their potential to survive nuclear attack,ificantly strengthen China's deterrentversus the US.
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atltMII Director. FBI, for lhef Irrvextieotlon h. Dm- of NSA, for the Notlonol Security Aganey
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Theof thlt document whan vtedfreea The nf-ed. iTl'll IWlilliL.