WEEKLY SUMMARY

Created: 6/14/1974

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

Significant Trends

Soviet Propaganda Attacks on the US and

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Increasing Soviet propaganda attacks on tne United States and Britainigh point this week in the Moscow pressof Secretoryune foreign policy speech, 3evin was accused of making psychoio.'i preparation for complete withdrawal from the establlslied principles of Alliednd of using "pressure and threat" to force Soviet acceptance of Anglo-American proposals at the coming Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers. Similar Soviet accusations have recently been made against US foreign policy

The immediate tactical purpose of the current Soviet campaign Is twofold: to exert pressure on Bevtn and Secretary Byrnes, bythe British and American people that present Anglo-American policy may leadreak with the USSR; to prepare Soviet and foreign opinionossible break-down of tlw Paris Conference, by placing the blame in advance onestern Towers, An additional motive for accusing the Anglo-Americans of preparing for "withdrawalllied cooperation" may be to prepare world opinion for unilateral Soviet action in areas of Allied disagreement, on the ground that the Western Powers themselves have already abandoned cooperation in favor of "pressure tactics,"

The present Soviet campaignropaganda barrage of several months' duration against Anglo-American "imperialism" and tlie allegedly hostile designs of "reactionaries" in the United States and Britain. During this period the emphasis of Soviet attacks, which hacl been directed chiefly against Britain in an apparent attempt toedge between that country and the United States, shifted to equally strong denunciations of both countries, mcreaslrig emphasis has been placedesigns for bases throughout the world and Presidentabor policy has been played up asreactionary" domestic trend In keeping with US "imperialism,"

These attacksogical development of the basic SovietthatR is "encircled" by hostile "capitalist" powers. Temporarily abandonedorld War n, the slogan of "capitalist encirclement"revived immediately on the conclusion of hostilities-

It was strongly emphasized in the election speeches of Soviet officials last February and found its most violent post-war expression In the Soviet reaction to Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri. The USSR will continue to use tho same slogan to attach any Joint resistance by tho Western Powers to Soviet policy and to Justify any future Soviet moves to enhance the "seciirity" of the USSR.

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The Azerbaijan Settlement

Premier Qavam's success in reaching an agreement withleaders on tbe terms which he originally proposed ia qualified by the established presence of Soviet elements in Azerbaijan and the concessions which he has been compelled to make to the Soviet-supported Tudeh Party in the rest of Iran. The settlement, which, according to Azerbaijani leaders, was finally concluded on Soviet orders,odification of the previous stand of the Soviet-supportedhe Azerbaijani "Army" Is to be incorporated into the Central Iranian Army, land distribution and Internal reform are to be carried out according to Qavam's proposals, the Azerbaijani have officially given up their bid fornd Qavam is free to carry out his professed ambition to restore them to full allegiance to Tehran.

Qavam, however, will be hindered in his efforts to develop aand genuinely Independent Iran by the presence of Soviet officers and men in key positions in thermy" and police, and by the growing power of tbe leftist Tudeh Party in tho rest of Iran. In order to better his position in negotiations with tho USSR, Qavam recently has played up to the Tudeh Party and has carried out severely repressive measures against conservative elements.

In the last analysis, however, Qavam's future success inIran's independence will depend upon great-power policy. The Soviets appear to have recognized that their recent Iranian policy, while accomplishing Us Immediate military and economic objectives, was heavy-handed and over-hasty. Qavam's skill in mobilizing Iranian resistance and in exploiting world opinion through the UN apparently helped to convince the Soviets that gradual penetration (employed so effectively in Sihluang) would succeed better. Accordingly, with their oil and military objectives assured, ihe Soviets could afford to witlidraw full support from theoreover, the Soviets clearly feel that "time is on their side" in Iran and that the general economic backwardness of the country and the unpopular labor policy of the British oil companies will forward their cause.

Original document.

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