APPr-OVSD.
COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO NORTH
COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO NORTH'
KEY POINTS
Communist aid to North Vietnams estimated6 billion. Total Communist military and economic aid was higher4 than in any previous year as the following table indicates.
ilitary mod Economic Aid lo North Vtataaa*
Million Current US I
Military ,.
Total
data combine iotrlircoce nlonilr* wiih US ao-lopW when appropriate. Table* baledUy on inakigm to US .id profrarniScar* Vietnam, wfatcti w* bdim portray leu valid eat Ma let than (bcac above, ate aha tbown la H> trrt
The high level of military deliveries2 replaced North Vietnamese combat losses in that year.
The cessation of US air attacks in North Vietnam at3 and the decline in combat activity in the South3 resulted in decreases in air defense equipment asslsl-
'Thlt oicnwrandnm hai been prepared Jointly by the Central Irrirlllfence Agency and ibe DeirtiK Intcfligetira Agency, and Im- been concurredby ihe Bureau ol Intelligence and Research. Department of Stale.
1
-Samat
and In the amount of ammunition and ground forces equipment provided to Hanoi.
he delivery of ammunition to Hanoi markedlyandevel as high as thatlthough deliveries of ground forces equipment continued at relatively low levels.
At the levels of military aid shown. North Vietnam's military capabilities in the South have increased, demonstrating that NVA capabilities are not exclusivelywhen the aid flows of only one or two years are considered.
Ec<mormc aid to North Vietnammounted to6 billion, rising from0 million0 to2 billion
Economic aid was reduced to0 million2 with the closure of North Vietnamese ports, but rose34 with their reopening and an increase inefforts, coupled with the continued need for consumption items.
China became the leading supplier of economic aid for the first time
"Ibe estimate of military aid to North Vietnam is not comparable with US aid to South Vietnam.
Communist forces in South Vietnam can launch attacks from redoubt areas, while the GVN is required to maintain roughly twice the number of men under arms to defend all of Souththus must have commonsuratcly larger logistic support.
The type of equipment supplied to South Vietnam because of its mobility and firepower requirements is necessarily more sophisticated and expensive than that received by Hanoi.
Estimates of total military aid to North Vietnam are subjectide margin of error owing to the weak data base.
On the economic aid side, much firmer data are available on the amount of goods delivered, although thereack of information on quality and appropriate price data, as well as on the number of technicians and academic trainees.
2
aaa*,
The application of US salaries to numbers of Coromunistin North Vietnam is inappropriate because theydifferent productivity and Hving standards. The estimate presented in this memorandum is based on an analysis of Communist programs for technical services and academic training in other LDCs and considers the differences inand standard of living. It resultsower value than would be derivedS analogy.
DISCUSSION'
Military Aid lo North Vietnam
of military aid to Northsubjectide margin of error andbe used ai controlling factors' In formingabout North Vlctnamoso militaryor Soviet and Chinese policy.ange of data, methodologies, andvarying from reasonably valid tofor reasons discussed in the paper,Is not comparable to US military aidVietnam.
Military
value of Cxxnmuniit military aid towas calculated using two price series,analog and an adjusted analog. Themade principally to reflect known, widebetween US and Communist costs.result of the adjustments li small,total cstJmatp by only five percent.this small difference, the discussion belowthe adjusted estimate.hows Ihe
'The materiel poition ol ihe estimate uin or agrees with US analog! for South Vietnam, but Ihe service portion uses analogies adjuited to provide inure accurate estimates than would result from the unad|usted US analog.
military aid values arrived at in the adjusted estimate derived by the intelligence community.hows the military aid values arrived at by using an unadjusled US analog price series.
uring the, North Vietnam received0 billion in military support from its allies.4 billion of this was composed of combat materiel such as artillery, tanks and ammunition; tbe0 million comprised military support items including packaging and delivery costs, training, transportation equipment, andhese deliveriesajor factor
'Estimates In (he economic section of this memorandum treat those goods that hove dual (civilian and military) end-use except lo those cases In which the North Vietnamese Army receive* substantially more than its relative share In the population, Thus, POL and trucks are split between mihtary and civilian use in the appropriate- tables. Because the equivalent of onlyercent of North Vietnam's available food goes to usehis commodity is treated in ate economic section, At the riskinorahse for military rations has been included in the military analog In Table IB. That portion of North Vietnamese construction equipment and materiel imports (for use on such protects as roods, pipelines,hich is provided by Soviet and Chinese aid is also included la the economic aid estimates. On the US side, military construction costs In South Vietnam have made upercent of the total military aid package in recent years.
l.A
Soviet and Chinos Military. Aid to Noilli Vietnam: VS Analog Prices
Million Curmit US I
I07O 1 2 3
USSR
Combat
Military Related
China
Cum'jM
1 Pieiltniaary-
illion in mililojy aid abouiillion perlo havg been delivered from other Commuoin oraatrieB.
for com hatlurlod* an oltmaio (or uuiniuniUen import) irliKh izIhHii figure*d. See paragraphuller explanation.
Military Related
enabling the North Vietnamese tnajor offensiveeplace tho losses accruing from that offensive, and expand and modernize then-armed forces. Since the cease-fire, estimatedaid has been well below that2 and virtually no new types of equipment have been provided Nonetheless, byhe North Vietnamese had developed their most powerful force ever in the South, and aid has been sufficient to enable Hanoi to maintain this force.
eliveries of combat materiel and equipment varied greatly from year to year, generallyNorm Vietnam's military needs. Soviet and Chinese military hardware and ammunitionto North Vietnam were valued5 million05 millionhe Soviet Union contributed about three-fifths of this aid which consisted of air defense equipment as well as ground forces equipment and ammunition (seehinese aid during this period focused almost exclusively on ground forces equipment and ammunition. Military related support for North Vietnam's armed forces during these years was valuedillionillion respectively, or aboutercent of combat materiel deliveries. Transportation equipment, spare parts and delivery costs each comprised nearly one-quarter of the total during the period (see
2 Spring Offensive resulted in the highest military aid levels of the war, with the exceptionhe Sovte* Union0 million, over three-quarters of which consisted of expensive air defenseincludingircraft,issiles and antiaircraft weapons. Deliveries from China were valued0 million and were againIn ground forces equipment and ammunition.
The cost of military-related support bom the USSR and China also soaredhe heavy fighting and US bombing throughout Indochinareater need for auxiliary support. Sparc partsurface-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft-were estimatedillion, while the value of transportation equipment nearly doubled from previous levels, principally because of Urge Communist truck losses. Delivery costs were abo high during this period.
Soviet and Chinese military deliveries dropped sharply5 millions theof US air operations in Indochina and ain fighting in South Vietnam resulted in reduced requirements for Hanoi's forces. Except for theissile system, no new major weapons systems were delivered to North Vietnam. Hanoi
Trblf
Soviet end Chtoom Deliveries ol Combat Materiel mnd Equipment to North Vietnam'
Million
UWR China USSR China USSH China USSR China USSR China hina
Total Combat Malarial
i
Forces Equipment
Craft
Individual categories ate rounded lo Ihe nearest II minion, lotah to tbe nearestillion Total* may not add tow
of rounding.Preliminary.
1 Valuta lor ammunition are let* than ftgurea previously pubttthed. Thia deereaee was the rendl of mote complete dataomparable costa.n average priceer ton waa used for valuing Communist ammunition, compared lo an average price of0 per ton on the US lido. The higher unit coat of ammunition redact* Communist rmphaM* on the use orall caliber ammunition which at more eipenaive in term* of unit weigh! cost*.
TableS
Communist Military-Related Support to North Vietnam
Million Current US I
USSR China USSR China USSR China USSR China USSR China
Total UHitary Support 40 25 45 30 30 HO OS
Transportation Equipment (Trucks,
Halieepttrs, and
Medical
Delivery
Hpaw
Technical Assistance
Communications
Pwllminsry.
imported ground forces equipment andat nearly half2 rate. Military related support fell30 mtitiaa, even though POL costs were more than double most previous years.
he preliminary estimate of military deliveries duringperiod of increased combat in South
' Individual categories are rounded to the neatestillion, lotah to the nearestillion. Totals may not add because of rounding.
that North Vietnam received0 million worth of equipment andfrom Its Commiinist donors. Thisoreoreover, China appears to have been tbe main contributor, for the first timeith deliveries totaling0 million comparedillion for the Soviet
Union. Tho shift results largely from tho cessation in US bombing which reduced the need forair defense equipment from the Soviets. Chinese military aid apparently increasedillion over the previous year. The delivery ofillion) account* for mora than half the increase. Increased ammunition shipments and inflation account for tbc rest. The cost offor example, increasedercent4nd for other categories of militarytbe rate of inflation, although leas, was still substantial.
ast year the estimated value ofsupport items increased5 million.equipment and spare parts were again two major components in this category, althoughby the high rate ofby moreercent over3 record level.
Comporlions of Military Aid to North and South Vietnam
omparisons between US military aid to South Vietnam and Communist military aid to North Vietnam are misleading. TTuoiigliout (he war, South Vietnam's forces have been roughly twice the size of North Vietnam's forces in the South, primarily because the missions of South Vietnam'spopulation aadrequired logistic supportuch larger and widely dispersed militaryTo compensate for the Communists' ability to concentrate their forces and firepower on objectives of their own choosing, the CVN hasarge combat air force and an ability to redeploy forces rapidly by ground and air transport. Thus, the typo of equipment supplied to South Vietnam by the t'S has been more sophisticated andmore expensive than that received by Hanoi.
notherhat the cost to provide the same service or goods to each country may vary far reasons unrelated to tbe amount being supplied. For example, the cost of transporting goods from China to North Vietnam is much less than tbo cost of transporting goods from the US to Southsimply because of the distances involved.
ofantaSow* aad Cktmrnma Mart* VaMaaat aad UP KA to aaata
nlet
o
to
(MillionI)
Total
Air ) Naalj
0aaaa4 rowiKatt)
Tram par tat kin Kuuipmenl. .
Delivery
Tpchnieal Aaniatanre and
.
which include
do not permit timely or complete estimates. Analyti-cal techniques vary from the inclusion of an item based on direct evidence, ]udgments on somefor which partial evidence is available, and on others where there is virtually no evidence.
ombat Materiel and Equipment. Very limited information is obtained' vehicles andhe POL estimate isdependent upon tho level of military activity and equipment Inventories; ollwr factors such as storage capacity and the number of civilian construe lion projects act as limiting parameters on military
For Other items such as medical supplies, cosrununieatioris equipment, and sparevirtually no information on deliveries or usage rates iswerr estimated hated mainly on tbe US cipn irrxr in Yi< tru m. In the case of medical supplies for example. US medical deliveries have averagedercent of total military aid during the past two years,imitar percent was used to estimate Communist deliveries Finally, the number of foreign technicians stationed in North Vietnam and the number of NVA military personnel trained abroad was derived from limited information.
Pricing. Once tho quantitative estimate had been made, unit coats for combat materiel6 were assumed on the basis of US production costs. These prices were developed under the assumption lhat aJj^ equipment is new when delivered.
he final major component of theweapons and all types ofderived indirectly
' This estimate is parlletilarly rtiafcy i
' Includes air defense and ground forces equipment and ammunition.
Under the combat supportS equivalent prices or international prices were used with the exception of twocosts and technical assistance. In recent years, the US analog price for packaging, harvdling, anding of materiel sent to South Vietnam has been aboutercent of the value of tbe goods shipped. Price estimates for this component, however, were adjusted downward to reflect what were believed to be more accurate shipping charges, given the shorter distances between the Soviet Union and China and North Vietnam. Delivery costs werefrom general data on Soviet freight ratesore limited knowledge of Chinese rates, which averaged out toercent of the value of goods shipped overland by the Soviets and 6for the Chinese.
If US military technicians were stationed in South Vietnam, the US analog price for their costs (based on the pay scaleS Army Major) would betimes our price estimate for foreign military personnel stationed in North Vietnam. The estimate was basedilitary aid to North Vietnam has been described as "non-refundable" in both the Soviet and Chinese press.
Strengths ond Weaknesses of the Methodology
stimates of military deliveries to Northsuffer from serious weaknesses* which have always existed but arc now more acute because of the major decline in mtclligcnce collection andsince the3 cease-fire agreement. Because of the paucity of direct data on deliveries, military imports frequently show up for the first time on the battlefield in South Vietnam. The time delay makes assignment of actual delivery arbitrary.
JOUtcr
assumpnons could nave been used to come up with much higher or lower figures.
nother difficulty in estimating military aid concerns assigning specific shares to the various donors. For some major items, such as aircraft, this is easy because the particular item is produced or exported by only one country. Other items, however, particularly individual weapons and associatedare produced by both China and the USSR. Prior to the cease-fire, relatively goodon the shares of this materiel provided by the Chinese and Soviets was
he commodity prices used represent the value of the equipment in US terms and do not reflect Soviet or Chinese prices or what Hanoi may have paid for tbe equipment. The assistancehas been providedrant basis. In the past,
'See tbe economic sectioniscussion of food and POL costs.
problem ii even more acute with military-related support items where we are forced h) use the US experience in Vietnam in order to estimate such categories as spare parts and medical supplies. We have, however, made adjustments for the size of the opposing armies and the different situations facing the two sides which we believe are
In short, estimates of military deliveries of combat equipment and ammunition to Northare fairly good, andore complete data base would produce estimates of the same relative nuinitude. This is not true, however, for the value of most military related support items, where the lack of hard data makes our estimates subject to wider margins of error.
Communist Economic Aid to North Vietnam
ingle acceptable valueCommunist aid to North Vietnamore complex than it might appearsurface. Information on the amount ofdelivered is relatively good, and the numbertechnical advisers and studentscan be roughly estimated. The choice ofprice series, however. IntroducesSimply assigning analogies from theprogram In South Vietnam is unrealisticbecause US salaries are considerablythose of Communisto copeproblem, we have computed two separateaid bilk:
key difficulty in trWerring US salaried to the Communist aidhat they reflect productivity.very reason to bdteve that the Community would require fewer people to do the same fobs il they were of the same >lill level as reflected Id the prevailing US salaries. This conclusion Ii consilientlobal Communist aid pattern of project assistance to less developed countries much more labw-tntenflve (mat Is, requiring morethan that from other donors.
one based on CIA estimates of international market costs and appropriate
another based on South Vietnam analogies.
Economic Aid Flows
otal Communist economic aid to North Viet-namas6 billtonj
ITotal economic"and trammg^aTHtri the difference between imports andincreased throughout theharp but temporary dropnnual aid levels rose from0 million0 toillionr from0 million to5 billion, depending on which set of prices is used
ome major changes In composition andof commodity Imports and aid took place over this relatively brief period. Most of North Vietnam's imports0s in previous years, consisted of seabornelarge partgoods, transportation equipment andthe USSR and Eastern Europe.these deliveries were sharply2esult of the mining of Haiphong Harbor and the curtailment of industrial reconstruction diuing the bomlring. Hanoi shifted emphasis to overlandfromfoodstuffs, petroleum, and other items that were either essential for the war effort or for meeting minimum civilian consumption needs. Consequently, while Soviet and East European shipments fell drastically, China's contribution dropped less (sec
mports rose sharplyith theof Haiphong, tbe resumption of large-scale reconstruction, and the continuing large-scale needs for food and other basic consumption items. China continued tbe heavy use of the overland routesnd became the leading supplier for the first time since before the war. Spurred by an upsurge in food deliveries to fill the shortages created primarily by typhoon damage to3 autumn rice crop, import tonnages climbed overerceni to an unprecedentedillion tonsin Imports
North Vietnam'* Estimated Trade Balance wiih tho
petroleum, machinery, equipment, construction materials, and industrial goods also occurred as the pace of reconstruction picked up with theof prelirriinary damage surveys. Most of the tonnage increase4 was seaborne, withimprovements in North Vietnam's porthelping the USSR and Eastern Europe to sharply increase their deliveries, China also stepped up its seaborne shipmentslthough its share of total Cornmunist deliveries declined from3 high.
The imputed value ofon internationalforward more rapidly4 than in any previous yearesult ofrapid worldwide inflation. Theercent increase in volume was considerably outdistancedear-doubling in value from less than SGOO million to1 billion. Of the total, the USSR and China accounted for nearlyercent, Eastern Europe aboutercent, and other Communist countries (mainly Cuba and North Korea) anotherercent.
Because the base of evidence is considerably thinner, the detailed analysis possible on tbeside cannot be extended to technicalor batoing. We estimate that0 foreign Communist technicians and advisers were employed in North Vietnamradual increase in the numbers of technicians or advisers was noted duringeriod,t 1
jTbc numbers of Vietnamese be-ing trainedrelatively stable throughout the period. Aboutercent of the students or trainees were sent to the USSR or Eastern Europe while the rest went to China. The increase in the combined value of technical and training aid stemmed much more from annual Increases In unit costs thanise in their numbers.
13
stimate hai Men Included toe the minuscule amount of commodities arriving: by air, except for occasional de-Hvertea of aircraft themselves.
mportboth pricecalculated in current dollars for each year and include an allowance for transportation.
contrast, CIA estimated
prices, where pOBaUHeTwerc based on world market information derived primarily from Irtiernatioiial Financial Statistic* (an IMP publication; andstatistics of major trading partners. Anto this rule is machinery androad category forepresentative global price series is not available, In this instance, US production costs were estimated by tbeof Commerceuitably adjusted for shipping, and subsequently inflated by the USgoods price index each year. Since the CIA estimates for North Vietnam have bomfrequently with South Vietnamese import price statistics to confirm their reasonaWenoss, it it not surprising that the results of the two series are not significantly different. The total value of imports as estimated by CIA is somewhat higher lhan the analog estimates, reflecting among other tilings the fact that they have been consistently checked to assure tbey measure the intcrnatioiial market cost to Hanoi's donors of their aid
"Textiles are usually priced In terms of linear meters. Toalue for textile materials, weough con-venhneters per metric ton aad then maiogsiality and price Mflnsenta.
plication, then, they also take cognizance of the substantial differences in average output and living standards among the donors.
In the absence of any existing series ontechnical and academic aid to Northsome innovation was necessary simply tonumbers of individuals in theser
we believe that0 Communist technical advisers would have supported the aid projects that were undertaken in North Vietnam4
J Scattered press and
37.
diplomatic reporting has suggestedough annual order of magnitude for North Vietnamese trainees in Communist countries is
of North Vietnam's aid receiptssimply by subtracting its exports fromof goods and technical servicesnalysis of such deficits withrepresents the best available methodaid deliveries to North Vietnam,Hanoi nor Us donors have everreliable aid figures. No meaningfulof this aid between credits and grantsTbe Soviet and East European tradeshow huge deficits for North Vietnamgrant aid reportedly is excluded,irrxcsent credits. However, thecredits and grants has little realBecause Hanoi's cumulative tradeits aid donors had grown so Urge thatno likelihood of rep*ynsent, the USSRof the major East FUiropean dooorsa moratorium on all past debts
Strengths and Weaknesses
data used In deriving the economicvary' widely in quality.
[The methodology
the final analysis, some overall moderate upward bias in prices (caused by overestimates of quality) probablyoderate downward bios in quantities from incomplete coverage.
J
I tlie weakest ot the data is in the realm oftechnicians and academic trainees.
Alter values are assigned to the importsthe estimates become
less exact but are certainly still defensible. The world market prices and Saigon-landed pricesto various bulkas food, fertilizer, andfairly representative. Both the US price series and the Saigon-landed price series used to estimate import values for many industrial goods, including machinery andequipment, may impart an upward bias to this portion of our estimates because of tbc probable lower quality of the equivalent goods imported by North Vietnam, |
Comparability with US Aid to GVN
lthough every effort was made tothose elements of the Communist aidfor which there was an equivalent USin South Vietnam, tlwre remainthat simply areari ofoperations In North Vietnam. Forsomeercent of South Vietnam'said0 million ofof (TOOof aidthan commodity imports and5 million in economicwas provided In the form of directpurchases for which there are nocategories iu North Vietnam.A ID-appropriated funds
was spent on salary payments to South Vietnamese technical personnel, purchases of local materiab, and grants to agricultural and industrialbanks.
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Original document.
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