this estimate is issued BY the director of central intelligence.
the united states intelligence board concurs, except as noted in the text, as follows:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency ond theoigarviotiom at +eof Stale. Do feme, ond Ireaujry. and the Nolio-iot Security Agency.
Concurring:
Tho Deputy Director of Central InteH-genosthe Central Intelligence Agency
Tho Director of Intelligence and Research lepreienllng the Deportment of State The Director, Do'eme Intelligence Agency The Director, Notional Security Agency
The Aiilstoni General Manager for Notional Security repretentlng the Atomic Energy Commhuon
The Special Au'uort to the Secretory of the Tremuty repretenting the Departmeri et lhe Treaiory
Abstaining!
'ito.ni Director, Federal Bureau af In veilon
also PARTICIPATING/
The Aulitant Chief ol Staff for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army
The Director ofIttelhgence, Deportment of the Nary
The Auitfont Chief ol Staff, Intelligence, Department of if* Air Force
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR VIETNAM
precis
Communist military forces in Soulh Vietnam are more powerful than ever before.
The South Vietnamese Armed Forces (HVNAF) are still strong and resilient and have generally acquitted themselves well since the ceasefire, but the decline to the present level of US military aid threatens to place themignificantly weaker logistic posture than the Communists.
Hanoiariety of military options, but the evidence pointsarked increase in military action between now andesigned to:
-defeat the GVN pacification program; -inflict heavy casualties on the RVNAFj
gain control of many more South Vietnamese; and
force the GVN into new negotiations at disadvantage.
i
Trnrr.
inimum the Communbts will sharply increase the tempo of fighting hy making greater use of their in-country forces and
In this cue, their gains would he limited, hut KVNAF stockpiles of ammunition and other critical supplies would probably beby April or May belowday reserve required forcom hat.
Wc believe that tlie Communists will commit part of their strategic reserve to exploit major vulnerabilities in tlie South Vietnamese position or to maintain the momentum of tlicir military' effort.
ommitment wouldreater risk of major defeats for top KVNAK unitsurther compounding of GVNand logistic problems.
Without an immediate increase in US military assistance, the GVN's military situation would he parlous, ami Saigon mightthe possibility of new negotiations with the Communists.
It is evenresponseajorthe Communists would move to an all-out offensive by cornmitting all or most of their strategic reserve. But our best judgment now is that thry will not do so.
Hanoi prefers to achieve its dry season goalsilitary-political campaign that avoids the risks and losses of an all-out offensive,
Hanoi probably hopes that by setting limits on Its militarythere would he less likelihoodtrong reaction from Washington and that frictions with Moscow and Peking would be minimized.
At currently appropriated levels of US military assistance,the level of combat that we do anticipate in the next six mouths will place the Communistsosition of significantover RVNAF in subsequent fighting,
discussion
ur estimates on tho Vietnam problem Over the past year have focused onommunist offensive against the South that involved the commllinent of NVA/ VC forces now in South Vietnam and aof Hanoi's strategic reserve divisions in North Vietnam Tlie principal judgment in our last fuH-dioss review (made inas that such an offensive was unlikely throughlthough the risk would grow ase also judged that such an offensive would be the only thing that couldecisive Communist victor)'.
NORTH-SOUTHCommunists
ilitary. The Vietnamese Communists now have tiicir Strongest military force in
South Vietnam In the history of the war. That force is better trained and equipped than it was at the time of2 offensive. In North Vietnamese military writings theon preparing for renewed large-scale conventional waifare that appeared3 has been followed4 by an emphasis on those aspects of combined-arms tactics that were found wanfiuglsohe training cycle for new North Vietnamesewas extended by several months.
At the same time, NVA inventories and continuing military assistance from die USSH and China have proven adequate to replace expenditures and losses in the South. Inthe receipt2 of jet fighters, SAMs, AA guns, and associated radars, and the reconstruction and modernization of airfields in the North Vietnamese panhandle have givenore than adequate air defenceagainst the South Vietnamese air threat to North Vietnam and to Communist base areas In the South.
In South Vietnam, there has been little change in the numerical strength orof NVA/VC combat forces over the past
year, hut the rrli.il ill lint lon und modernization ofl and support elements haveThe NVA/VCs ability to adapt to changing Mtitutbmv Ii at nn nil-time high, and thoy can Im* rempplltxl and reinforced faster than oil.replacements have been infiltrated fiom tin- North to offset the past year's combat losses. Armor levels have been kepi essentially constant In the past yrar, and artillery levels liavenrated. Sufficient supply stockpiles are available in-country to support country-wide combatat2 offensive level for an extended period. Moreover, tlir Communists arc sending additions) Urge quantities ofMipplie* Iu Ihr South. Infiltration thus far In the dry season ha* been heavier lhan last year, and we rspeef this pattern to continue.
Four new NVA corps headquarters have been identified since lateiu central North Vietnam, two In South Vietnam'snd one inontrolling several infantry division equivalents null, these headquarters are designed to give the NVA High Command greatly improved command and control. Also,4 lhe capability of NorthMICs to mount limited attacks againstalUliom was nt ended sooth of the principal South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) airbase al Danann. The pi escort' ofnn Communist air defensein South Vietnam and the upgrading of equipmeni ami weapons hu resulted in an NVA SAM and AAA capacity to defend base areas and key personnel infiltration and supply routes in the northern and western Imrder regions Iriiui VNAF aii strikes andice,
Vict Cong guerrilla forces contribute very little Iu the overall Communist military strength in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong giienlllas and guerrilla support structure have beeneakened state since the$ offensive, and they have not regained much strength sinceoday more than ever NVA main force* are the principal threat to the RVNAF.
Other Considerations. We know of noon the part of the North Vietnamese people that is strong enough to affect Hanoi's ability to continue its quest to gain control over South Vietnam or that would require any significant modification of its strategy North Vietnam lKisieallynified state runightly knit party and technical elite with the dedication to pursue choseneven in the face of great adversity.
There ore domestic factors which could impact on Hanoi's freedom of action in tlie South, but wc know little about their relative weight. The regimeigh priority on ecu Kin lie reconstruction and development, and thereocal element within thelhat wishes to concentrate on theseat the expense of the struggle in the South. The limited intelligence available on thishowever, dues not allow us lo determine lhe depth and extent of debate over national priorities, or its probable future course and consequence.
areas of uncertainty arecarried by the counsels of theChina in Hanoi and the degree toMoscow or Peking is willing toon the question of military action inThe USSR and China may seeinterests in detente advanced hy aof relative peace in Indochina, butno convincing evidence that theywith the US as necessarilyto take major steps to keep HanoiThere is similarly no convincingthe Soviets and Chinese havetailored their aid to North Vietnam Into Influence North Vietnamese strategy.
In any event, whatever Moscow's andintentions, they could not restrict North Vietnam's short-term military options, although Hanoi would haw to consider the longer-range implicationsoviet and Chinese un-uillingm-Ai to replace equipment and supplies lost in combat.
final factor affectiug Hanoi'sis ils assessment of the US position.one hand, Hanoi must be encouragedParis agreements not only endedparticipation in the war, hut alsoa lurther reduction in the Americanpresence throughout Southeast Asia.the North Vietnameseinterprets recent politicalin the US as further reducingsupport for Saigon. On the otherprobably considers Presidentof an unknown quantity onissue and is unsure about howreactramatic Communisteffort to upset the balance inis almost certainly still some concernthat as long as the US retainsin Southeast Asia, Washingtontoouth Vietnamesecnllapse-
The South Vtetnameje
The military performanceRVNAF has been reasonablythe ceasefire agreement. AtVietnamese military forces arcproviding security sufficient to protectof the populace, despiteand equipment stringencies.period, government forceslien ted command and controla high degree of tactical flexibility.was evident iu such diverseas the1 MR-3into Cambodia and the six-hourin the late summer4 of aheadquartersegiment from the central highlands to coastal Binh Dinhwhere the regiment was immediately committed to open an interdicted section of Route 1.
Nevertheless, the quality of many RVNAF commanders is still marginal,at company and field-grade levels. This failing was especially evident in several units of the 1st Division in the fighting southeast of Hue in August. In addition, the RVNAF is plagued by the perennial problems ofmanning levels in many units, aaggravated by highlowprocess, and in many cases poor quality replacements.
South Vietnamese military shortcomings arc most apparent within the territorialhalf of lhe troops under arms. In some areas of the country the Regional Forces (RF) haw performedcoastalnd the northern delta. In southernnd io the northern Itigh-lands ofowever, the territorials have performed poorlyesult of inadequate leadership, discipline, and unit manning. In the southern delta provinces ofainly defended by territorial forces, security has deteriorated markedly since early this year, in large part because of the interplay of twoharp rise in South Vietnamese desertions from Uie territorial forces and ain recruitment. In the deltahole, then-0 percent decline in the present-for-duty strength of RF battalion lineduring the first ten monthsnother factor contributing to the spottyof the territorials is that they have in recent years been confronted with main force Communist units and not fust VCThe CVN is implementing plans to re-
I rain .'ind upgrade lln* territorial forces, but il remains to be seen whether the action will lie effective.
Tlie most unsettling developmentthe HVNAF. however, derives from the decline in US military aid available to the GVN. Inhe KVNAF received2 billion in US mililary assistance, as com-paied3 billion inunding at theillion level was insufficient toall HVNAF consumption and losses of supplies and equipment.
upplemental appropriation, nu moreK) million in US militaiy aid will be available to the GVN inn the best ease, that is, combat at an overall level no greater than tbe averagein; HVNAF could prevent Communist gains hi vital population areas over the next six months or so only at the cost of drawdowns ofL, spare parts stocks, and equipment inventories. Even at4 level ol combat, we would thus expect the HVNAF to Im'ignificantly weaker logisticalby the end of lhe dry season (and the Communists relativelyhe IWNAF's ability to copeubsequent sustained increase in the tempo of fighting would di'peod increasingly on whether the CVN received timely and large-scaleyond presently programed levels.
KVNAF combat capabilities appear in retrospect to have peaked in the year or so following the ceasefire. There has been Some decline in HVNAF effectiveness in recent months, hut this decline has not yet reached significant proportions. The RVNAF has been forced into an Increasingly defensive andposture, however, and even now HVNAF shortages arc limiting combatin some areas. It is likely that heavier combat would force the GVN lo dilutethe strategy and tactics that have stood it in good stead since the ceasefire. These have included an aggressive forward posture and generous employment of air and artillery fire to break up Communist military formations and lo blunt attacks.
IS- As important as the current level of US assistance is the; GVN's faithontinuing US commitment to provide military assistance in the future when il isoss ofin the US commitment to Southwould seriously affect Ihe GVN's morale and will ty continue the struggle regardless of the actual level of stocks on hand.
Other Comiilcratiom. Within the GVN there is firm commitment to maintaining South Vietnamese independence. Piesident Thieu ha* used his powermilitary andtrung hold on the governmental apparatus, and this apparatus has relatively little trouble in counteringpolitical and clandestine subversion efforts. Moreover, the vast majority of tlit Vietnamese people an; aware that they would fare badly under the Communist alternative.
But Thieu's bold on power may beless secure now (bui Itear ago for three major reasons:
Tlie Soulh Vietnamese reading of the US political situation, especially withlo what is seen iu Saigon as aUS commitment to Vietnam.
The escalation of Ihe fighting andhigher casualties.
economic reverses sincend the concomitant ineieases in urban unemployment and declines instandards.
Political opposition groups haveto harness these popular frustrations iu their intensified attacks against Ihe CVN for high-level corruption, press censotship, and Thi< u's and theonopoly of realpower. Although active political dissension is now largely limited to small groups, these issues could spur more widespread popular opposition, particularly in the upcomingyear.
The economic problems facing South Vietnam are not likely to lead to acuteon the government over the next year or so, unless the security situalioii markedly deteriorates. Sinceariety of reasons, the urban industrial and servicesof the economy have been stalled al well In-low capacity, and rapid inflation haseroded real incomes of mililarycivil servants, and city dwellers in general. In particular industries, such as cement and electricity, outpul lias remained high, but the overall unemployment rate of the urban work force is atoercent. On the other hand, particularly in agriculture, which is the heart of the South Vietnamese economy, there have been some positive signs over the past few months. The rice crop now being harvested appears larger than last year's bumper crop because of good weather conditionsahly high overall use of chemical fertilizers. Stocks arc large enough to assure adequate supplies without USice shipments For the fiisl time in about ten years. Foreign exchange reserves areulliou over lhe start of the year8 million, althoughgrowth isefleeting thesupply conditions, the consumer price level has held steady sinceeduc-
'Thempmtant factors In the ipsitvp incnsMr haw?illion inflow from oil i'tptoialion and rfihm'ilpaymentsesult of thi' urliiii riXFuum.
ing fhe annual rate of Inflation to aboutercent. Over the lunger term, the economic pressures on Thieu clearly will depend heavily on the availability of foreign aid. lint they will also depend lu part on how effectively the government can shift nddltiminl manpower and resource* In agriculture and otherwhich will, over time, make the country less dependent on foreign aid.
III. WHAT NEXT? Hanoi's Options
has been Itttlc change Infrom thoseear ago.they include:
Maintaining4 strategy and level of activity in the South, in the hope that such activity would he sufficient to erode the GVN's military and political base.
Sharply increasing military action iu the South, butevel below thai of an all-out offensive.
Launching an all-out "general" offensive in an r'li.it In:u> imm<diati "total"
VKlilIV.
GVN hat demonstrated ato cope with the fint option, andHanoi'* intentions potnti primarily tooption. Kcliahlc
repottj over the pastntmths or to indicated that neither North Vietnam nor Ms fighting forces were confident of their ability tothe CVN militarily. Much of the evidence, however,iew In Hanoi that the stage lor Thieu's ouster couldet bythe level of military pressure on the GVN while exploiting Internal dissension.
onsiderablereliable reporting has provided detailsdry season intentions, these were
"sec ww.
OSVN romiliilirin which laid out Communist goals. According to the resolution the Communists hope to achieve their political giwb primarily by military means. In so doing, the Communists hope to use their form lo gain such objective! as:
titfealmc tlieN pacific jfnm program.
inflittitrg heavy casualties on HVNAF;
gaining control of large numbers of South Vietnamese In contested or government-controlled territory, and
forcing the GVN into new negotiations under clicutirstantes favorable to the Communists.
As would be expected in anylans for the northern half of South Vietnam were not detailed.mooch reliable reports hive beenfrom other ami to Indicateountry-wfdc effort is planned. Any CVN vul-nrrairilitick thai are exposed will be exploited in fulkiW'iip action.
here are various level* of militarylhe Communists could apply under2 wiihin the guideline* of the COSVN resolmiont the lower end of Ihc spectrum the Communists could relyon their in-country units. Under this scenario. GVN vulnerabilities would Ik most acute in the northern half of SVN and inof theificatly, HVNAF forces are spread thinfv along Routevital supply line for Hue and other maior cities near or on the coast. The road could heami the GVN wmi Idard-pressed to keep it open. The central highlands would be an area in which at least initial Communist successes would lie almosi assured. Kontum City, for example, remains especiallyto an NVA strangulation campaign.gains in the southern part of theto the survival of theprobably be more limited. Some additional expansion of Oimmonitt control, however, would likely occur in lhe provinces north and northwest of Saigon and particularly in the southern drill whrrv an erosion in security has already occurred.
so. undci this scenario, wcCommunist gains this dry season toTho RVNAF retains suffieienlresiliency to contend withactivily that de|H'nils only on thenow in country. Both sideshurt, however, and the key questionbe the regenerative capability of tbeforces. The HVNAF would be inprecarious logistic position, andto bounce back would dependon the level and timeliness of USAt the level rd combat calledtins scenario inwl at current levelsassistance, HVNAF consumption ofand other critical suppliesresult by April or May in astockpiles belowday reservet-i' intensive combat facapabilities would doubtless bedegraded by shortages of sparerrplaceraeril equipment.
The CominunisU, on Ihe other hand, would beur better relative logisticThey would also still have Iheir strategicmost of it atwidth to draw new personnel if they so choose. Thus, by the end of this dryituation would be created in which the Communists wouldignificant advantage over RVNAF for subsequent fighting
At the upper range of military action underanoi could choose during the dry season lo deploy sonic units from its slralegic reserve lo lhe South in response lo new opportunities or difficulties encountered
s
during the fighting, For example, up to amightf torom Ihe reserve to exploit local successesimilarcould emerge in the centralThe objective of such reinforcement, however, would he limited and consistent with present Communist strategy as expitssed iu Ihe COSVN resolutionven so. then: wouldisk that once embarked on thisarticularly if KVNAF appeared highly vulnerable. Hanoi mighi decide tomost of its reserve forces in an effort tnecisive victory over the CVN.
A limited commitment of the North Vietnamese strategic reserve of itself would mil make the GVN's situation untenable, hut it would result iu greater strains on RVNAF. For example, therereater danger that top KVNAF combat units might suffer major defeats, particularly since the South Vietnamese strategic reserve is alreadyMoreover, by utilizing part of their reserve force, the North Vietnamese would beetter position toigh level of combat throughout the dry season, thereby compounding KVNAF's logistic andproblems. Inituation, the GVN" would proltably look to the US for anincrease in assistance. If this were not foitlicoining, the GVN's military situation would be parlous, and Saigon might explore the possibility of new negotiations with the Communists.
Under cither variant of Optionuch will turn on KVNAF's morale and willingness to persevere. Not only will South Vietnamese forces In; faced with heightened Communist aggressiveness, but they will also faces-sibility that supply stringencies will constrain
"Ihcw> piinituUr ilepliiymrnt aornario* aieonlyn? nut meant In place whitraty rejlric-liuiEc un North Vfc-lisamcsc military flcsibillty.
their abilitv to counter (he Communist effort. Initial KVNAF successes in fending off the Communists despite these adversities would buoy morale and give the South Vietnamese increased confidence that Ihey could stay lhe course. On the othereries ofif nnt strategicallyset Ineeling ofwhich would adversely affect theuture performance.
The Forocos'
Wc expectharpin the fighting this dry season, with the Communists making greater use of their in-country force* and firepower thanhey clearly have lhe flexibility loortion of their strategic reserve, and we Iw-lieve thai they arc likely to Iwsc Iheir decisions on how Ihe fighting evolves during the dry season. We believe that Ihey will makeommitment to exploit major vulnerabilitiesIhe South Vietnamese position or tothe momentum of their military effort.
An Alt-Out Offenrttv. We estimate that an all-out offensive is unlikely III is dry season, although thereisk that Hanoi might move in this direction if it perceived an opportunity where il couldecisive victory. If the Communists shouldhis option there wouldajor increase in Communistitration and mosl of the strategic reserve would Ix? deployed to the Soulh. The offensive would pioltahly begin in tlie spring of tbe year when weather lasers combined-armsthroughout most of the country, with the major effort once again occurring innd secondary actions rlsewhere to keep the GVN from redeploying forces to meet the threat in the north. The fighting would be characterized by Interne artillery duels and conventional set-piece battles extending into populated areas,
be South Vietnamese would lie able to withstand the initi.il impact ol* an all-outiu no net offensive onh/ by traditie space for IIuk They v.habry lose all oforth ol Daiiang. Pleiku and Kuiitnin prov-inee* innil some tcrrltuiy Inndlhc KVNAF would he unable Ioustained Communist offensivethe DS provided early am! huge-scaleassistance. Casualties sod nmipmcut Wvs would run high on both sides, and (ho KVNAF would doubtless lose more than they did dining2 offensive, 'lheommunist general offensive, even with extensive US logistic support to the Sot ith. would binge on such intangibles at theand effwtiveticss of ARVN unit 'coders and tin- psychological unpad of the probable early Communist successes.
hechologk-jl impact of Communist successes in tlx- initial stages of Ibe offensive mightmore significant than llie actual effect on the military lulaucc. Therofnte, in the worslituation could develop In which the Saigon government would Im'lx- situation or retrain tU- initiative without the retiitioduc-ti.ii of US air and naval support. If this wereymlxiliesingmall number of carrier-based aircraft, it would notignificant impact on the Communbts, but might stiffen. RVNAFtoollapse in their morale and willingness tu keep fighting.assive commitment of US ah]Hiwcr in lhc Souththe early stages' of the fighting would probably blunt the offensive.
IV. IN SUM
e believe tliat Hanoi prefers to achieve its goalsolitical-military campaign which avoids the risks and losses of an all-out offensive. We nonetheless believe that the RVNAF will be severely tested over the next six months. Moreover, at currently appropriated levels of US military assistance, the level uf combat we anticipate this dry season will place the Communistsosition of significant advantage over RVNAF ta sub-sequmt lighting.
Hanoi probably see* much to be gained by slopping up its efforts to inflict punishment on the KVNAF whenever und wherever it can in hope of overcoming the present military deadlock and pushing Saigon into nrawed negotiationsisadvantage. At the same time, however, Hanoi may estimate thatproblems in South Vietnam portend increasing trouble for ('resident Thieu and therefore be reluctant tothis trend hy the application of tooevel ofpressure too soon. Finally, Hanoi may calculate that by setting certain limits on its military operations in the South this dry season there would Ik* his likelihoodtrong rrifrom Washington. This course of action would abo minimize friction with Moscow and Peking.
If the Communists were later to heroine dissatisfied with the results ofourse of action, they could always step up theAn ali-out offensive, however, would probably not occur at least untiln part because Hanoi would likely need time to gear up for such action following heightened combat5 and In part because Hanoi would probablyS presidential yeararticularly favorable thnc to launch an offensive.
Original document.
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