CHINESE AFFAIRS

Created: 12/23/1974

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Chinese Affairs

top secret

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CHINESE AFrAIHS

This publication is prttotrad for regional specialists tn tha Washingtonby the Eastacific Division. Office of Currant Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate o' Intelligence and from tha Directorate of Science and Technology. Commtnts and quarries are welcome. They should b* dlrtctad to tha authors of the Individual articles.

CONTENTS

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all indications, Peking has chosen to play down the Vladivostok agreement on strategic arms as having little impact on the axms race and onpolitics.

Chinese officials from the beginning have downgraded the accord arguing that it doe3 not amountreakthrough and that it lacks the kind of controls required to make an arms limitation

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disparaged it aa

vTrtu^TTTyrneanTngTess in light of continuedand testing by the "super powers." China's first public acknowledgement was buried in an account of Deceinberf Soviet missile testing, which charged that Soviet testsockery of Moscow's claims that the Vladivostok agreementarge step toward curbing the arms race.

Vice Premier Tong naiao-ping, in an apparentto the accord, saidanquet speech onh that the more the US and USSR contend for hegemony the more they play up detente in extravagant terms.ong-standing Cliinese line, Teng said that the Soviet-American detente ir. fact is aimed at covering up arms buildups and war preparations.

Earlier, Peking's domestic radioighly ideological article which argued that competitionthe US and USSR is fundamental, protracted, and absolute. With the Vladivostok agreement clearly in -rtind, the writer claimed that even though Moscow and Washington might reach agreements that serve their interests, this does not change their goaler-whelming the other side, nor does it solve thein the US-USSR relationship.

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accuracy of this analysis is, of course, crucial to Chinesu policy, and Peking in tha past has reacted to Important US-Soviet agreementsay that clearly indicated China believed itshad been adversely affected]. Hints of this _igrt of reaction, however, have been absent from

convncntary regarding both secretar^^KisiiTngor'a preparatory trip to Moscow in October and the Ford-Brezhnev summit in Vladivostok in late November. This suggests that Chineseregarding the agreement ar* an authentic gauge of Peking's attitude and that tha Chinese apparently are not overly concerned that the Vladivostokwill prove harmful to Peking.

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