-Top Scorct
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Soviet Naval Policy and Programs
-Tep-5ecrer
214
4
SOVIET NAVAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence otgunizationt participated in llie preparation al thc estimate:
The Centralgency, tlie intelligence ego ni rotl Ihe Oepartmenu ol Stole and DtTentc. and the Nalional Sctu.ity Agency.
Concur ring;
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence repreieniing the Central InteUigenco Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Reiearch rcpieieming the Depariment of Stoio The Direcior. Defenie Intelligence Agency Tho Direcior. Nalional Security Agency
The Auiitont General Manage' for Notional Security repreieniing the Atomic Energy Co mm in ion
Abstaining:
The Special Aniiiant to the Secretory ol the Iieaiury repreieniing the Deportment
Of IOC
Ihe Aiiiilont Director. Federal Bureau of lave it .got ion
ALSO PARTICIPATING:
Tho Aniilonl Chief ol Staff for Intelligence, Department ol lhe Army
The Direcior of Na>al Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Antilant Chiel of Staff. Intelligence, Oeporlme.il of the Air force
-Iop-Soc-rl '
-Secret-
CONTENTS
JUDCMENTS .
DISCUSSION .
Preface
I. FORCE COMPOSITION AND READINESS
Readiness
.. 1
.
WARTIME MISSIONS AND 6
.2
Soviel Views ol the Nature. Course, and Tasksar with IheDeterrence and Nuclear Strike Missions
Anti-Strike Fleet Activity
5ecunnr the Sea Frontiers
Interdiction of Sea Lines of Cominunications
A Projcction/Intcrvention/Sra Control Mission?
Ill TRENDS IN SOVIET NAVAL
Oul-of Area Activity25
OF THE SOVIET NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OFIN
Peacetime Operalions in Soviet Policy27
Balancing of 28
Future Levels of Peacetime
Political Impact
STRENCTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE 30
VI. FUTURE FORCES: CONSIDERATIONS AND
A Baseline
Force Development
Decision Points
SOVIET NAVAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
A primary mission of tlic Soviet Navy it toeterrent to attack through thc presenceredible and survivable SSBN' force, and. in time of general war, to participate in the nuclear exchange and strike at soft targets such as military installations, industries and government centers.
-Thc Soviets routinely maintain five of their operationalstation. Thc Soviets also appear tosSBNsthc majority of
lasstakeeek to ten days to reach station after notice. This will change appreciably during the next decade since increasing numberslass submarines will be within missile range upon leaving home port.
- Under conditions of sufficient warning to get additional forces to firing stations, the Soviets might cun-cntly expect as manyea-based missiles to reach their targets in an initial strike. Under conditions of no warning, successful NATO damage limiting operations, delays in command and control procedures, orSoviet decisions, the Soviets might be able to launchew score missiles fromlasslass SSBNs.
- The Soviets ate attempting to increase the survivability of (heir SSBN force in several ways. They are constructing tunnels near SSBN bases suilahlc for concealment and prolcclion of theand have built dummy SSBNs probably to conceallevels during crises or to mislead NATO targeting.
-We expect lhc Soviet SSBN force to expand to C2 modem units by the.d unil is probably already tinderand we believe all of them will be completed If the proposed SAL Agreement covetingeriod isconcluded, thc Soviets will bc limitedolaleliverySLBMs, and intercontinentalno sublimit on SLBMs. This would require somein the numbers and probably some changes in tlie mix of Soviet strategic forces. Wc believe the Soviets willoree at (he level ofodem SSBNs untilut pressures will mount foi change in the mix of strategic forces innd we are uncertain how UmM will affect die SSBN force.'
- An extensive program to refit new and probably MIBVcd missiles to the force is expected to start in the, and to continue through the.
Thc Sovicis continue lo believear with tlic Wesl willevolvehort nuclear conflict, but they also see some increasing Iikcbhoodar could begin, and perhapsonventional level. Soviet doctrine calls for the earliest possible destruction of enemy nuclear capabilities, including naval, ir. thc early phasesonventional conflict. Because tlie Soviets flunk it unlikelyar with the West would remainwe believe that ihey would seek to destroy SSBNs in lhe early stagesonflict. However, it is possible, if tlie Soviets saw the opportunity to contain the conflict at conventional levels and given the low probability that they could actually destroy an SSBN. that the Soviet leadership would direct lhc Navy to refrain from attacking SSBNs in order to reduce the chances of escalation.
"Tli* Mfw Itil'lliscomU ill-nton IO iU loo*noten pjf
2
-We do not believe llul tlic Soviets would choosengagear conducted only al sea between the major powers. Soviet war time naval operations are seen as closely related to waron the Eurasian landmass.
-Soviet capabilities tor combating Western cariierirs* priorityforces for the surveillance of NATO carrier task forces in peacetime,ombination of air. submarine and surface forces for the destruction o( those NATO carrier task forces in war.
believe that, given time to coordinate all of their surveillance assets, the Soviets would probably bc able to locate and track most US aircraft carriers in the northeastern Atlantic. Norwegian Sea. northwestern Pacific Ocean and Uie eastern Mediterranean. We believe (hat coordinated strikes against Western carriers in these areas would be at least partially successful.
-Tbc degree of success would depend upon thc location of the carriers, whether the Soviets use conventional or nuclear weapons, and whether surprise were achieved. If nuclear weapons were usedurprise attack, most of the carriers In these areas could be destroyed. On the other hand, timely warningoviet attack would allow the carriers to take action which wouldassure the survival of some carriers, especially against aattack.
expect the Soviels to maintain the high priority on combating enemy aircraft carrier task forces. Cniise-missilc submarines will continue to be built throughout, as will major surface ships with antiship missiles. Thc SS-NX-L1 antiship nuclearmissiie will most likely enter the force in the next year or two.L
3
Thc strike capalwhty of the Soviet Navy against Western surface foices will be significantly improved by thc deployment with Soviet Naval Aviation of the BACKFIRE ASM strike aircraft. Theincreased range capability will give it coverage over all tlic major sea lanes leading to Europe and extend Pacific Ocean cover
age to Hawaii -areas that were formerly out of range of thc strike aircraft of tiic Soviet Navy. Kqually important. BACKFIRE'sfor high-subsonic, low-level flight will also giveettei chance than the BADCER of successfully crossing potentially hostile land areas such as Turkeyecce in order to operate over lhe Mediterranean, an area over which, in practical terms, thc Soviets could noi now operate ihcir naval strike aircraft. The BACKFIRE's variable-flight profile and high-speed2 at highgiveigher probability of penetrating carrier defenses in the open wean than is the case with the BADCER aircraft.
Soviet eapabililies for antisubmarineWestern SSBNs and defending against altacks from Western general purposeinadequate:
expect thc Soviets to continue to pursue various approaches to antisubmarine warfare, with emphasis on the anti-SSBN prob Jem. Improved ASW sensors and supporting systems and stand-off weapons will be more extensively deployed. The construction rale of ASW submarines probably will increase.
-Although we believe thc Soviets in wartime would attempt to attack Western SSBNs, they have no effective capability to do so in the open ocean and will probably not acquire such aduring the nextowever, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets might lie able toew SSBNs in limited areas such as the western approach to the Barents Sea or in strategic choke points such as the Crecnland-Iceland-UK
do not expect that Soviet forces will have systems for the reliable detection of Western attack submarines beyond the range of thceapon systems during the period of this Estimate
'The Defenie Intelligence Agency and lhe National Seetmiy Agency believer thai leverd of thr noiuconiuc mcthod< euiietttly Vnnwn lo heh, the SovieU oiler pottiitUl (oi improving thru deed ion oi nudcai lutimtilind thu* could provide Ihemapabilitythreaten th'. iiuvlvabtlilyonton of lhe OS SSBN force deployed In lhe open ocean. Tlie Dirrctw ol Naval Intelligence, Department ol (lie Navy, and the Aetata* Chirl ol Staff. Intcluccnre. DepaMmenl of the Air Force.Ihii vtew.
4
Tlic Soviet and other Warsaw Pact navies have concentrated large numbers o! snul! coastal patiol. ASW. and miriewarfare ships, short-range submarines, and ASW aircraft in the Black. Baltic and Barents Seas and thc Sea of Japan to secure their sea frontiers in time ol war. Ihese forces continue to icceive lite latest Soviet equipment and have some significant capabilities against Western foices. The Soviels and other Warsaw Pact navies could probably establish control over the Baltic and Black Seas earlyonflict, and plant mines to prevent penetrations by Western naval foices. In thc Sea of Japan and in the Barents Sea. enemy surface units could lie destroyed quickly, but Western nuclear submarines wouldore difficult problem and thc Soviets probably could not protect theit ships from this threat.
Tlte Soviets and ibeir Warsaw Pact allies maintain amphibious forces in the Barents Sea area, 'in the Baltic and Black Seas, and in the Sea of Japan. The effectiveness of operations of these forces would probably vary widely. The North Cape of Norway could probably be taken fairly readily if the Norwegian brigade normally deployed there were not reinforced. In the Baltic. Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces could probably capture thc Danish islands, ii the Danish air and ground forces on Zealand were not reinforced, and link up with land forces attacking Jutland. In the Black Sea area, strong Turkish defenses and difficult terrain wouldoordinated land and sea assault on the Turkish straits more difficult. The Soviets probably could not seize these Straits quickly usingweapons Soviet Naval Infantry capabilities in the Pacific arc insufficient for conducting amphibious assaults on (he Japanese home islands to secure exits from thc Sea of Japan.
We believe that,onventional wai in Europe were Io continue for some lime, the Soviets would probably mount an interdiction campaign against Western sea lines of communications. The Soviets would have major problems in doing so. They do not have forward bases for resupply. and attempts to operate their small number of resupply ships beyond Soviet-controlled waters couldeasily countered. Thus their submarines would almost certainly have to return through choke points to an uncertain resupply situation.
Moreover, the North Atlantic sea lanes arc basically beyond the range of all but BEAR and BACKFIRE aircrafl.rolonged conventional conflict, therefore, the Soviets could effect attrition on NATO shipping, but could noi disrupt it completely. Wc believe it unlikely that, outside of direct involvementar with the West, the USSR would attack Western sea lines of communication, however vulnerable.
We do not believe the Soviets are building naval forces forin distant areas against substantial opposition nor do we believe they have much capability for such intervention now.
Soviet ability to sustain combat at sea for long periods would be severely circumscribed by logistics-related weaknesses. Most of ihc new larger Soviet surfacee no reloads for their major offensive weapons sysiems, and the ships' limited underway replenishment capability constrain Soviet abilities for sustained combat at sea. The current forward posture of the Soviet Navy depends upon the support of auxiliaries and merchant ships in anchorages and in Third World ports, andon-hostile environment.
Since thc, the Soviet Navy has diversified its areas of operation. However, the rapid growth rate in naval activity away from home waters that characterized Uieas slowed in. Virtually thc only increase in the last four years has been related to unusual circumstances such as4 in the Culf of Suez and the Bangladesh harbor-clearing operationse believe that thc majority of Uie Soviet out-of-area operations, especially those in the Norwegian Sea and thc Pacific Ocean, have been related primarily to training for operations against Western navies. But we also believe that many of the Soviet oul-of-area operalionsoviet decision to use naval forces more extensively in furthering Soviet foreign policy objectives in peacetime.
Through their naval operalions in peacetime the Soviet leadership has sought to influence US actions at some cost and risk while at the same time keepinginimum the chances of actual US-Soviet conflict. We expect this approach to continue.
- We believe lhat the level of Soviet naval out-of-area activity is appioaching practical limits, given the USSR's current priorities. Over the longer term, as newer more capable ships enter the force, there willoderate bul steady increase in the number of ships available for distant operations. Any rapid increase iu sustained distant deployment probably wouldore intensiveeffort, not only of surface combatants, but also of logistic Support ships.
Naval activity and port visits, particularly in the Third World, probably have improved the Soviel Union's position with some foreign political leaders, but it has irritated others.ajority of Third Worldlittle outward concern about Soviet naval deployments. Ncverlhclcss, in many countries, especially developed countriesaritimenaval activity is perceived as an important element in thc international political balance. As long as this view continues to be prominent, the Soviet Navy's peacetime operations will have significant political impact.
We believe that future Soviet naval developments willtrong resemblance to the current trends. Given thc bureaucraticin Soviet naval efforts and the Navy's apparenUy integral place in Soviet policies with regard to thc US, NATO, and the Third World, there is not much chance for the Navy to lose its position. However, given the genera! resource problems in the USSR, wc do not expect substantial gains for the Navy at thc expense of others. We thus expect basic changes lo the current line to come about slowly, if al all.
Thc Sovicl Navy has been widely perceived as equal to or even superior to tlie US Navy, despite lhe many asymmetries in the two forces. This perception has given the Sovietegree of credibility which, while not always fully supported by its combat capabilities, has made it an important element in calculations of international political power.
DISCUSSION
thc last decade or so there have been importanl changes in Soviet nav.il policies and pro-gram* as well as significant improvements in the USSR's naval capabilities. Beginning with the naval prot;rami emphasised largely under Khrushchev, the Soviet Navy has evolvedorce oriented to the defense of the Soviet maritime frontiersavy structured in addition for war-fighting on the high seas and for use as an instrument in support o( Soviet foreign policy in peacetime. Only recently have tin- Soviets Considered their Navy to be an important instrument in supporting their foreign policy objectives in many areas of thc world. This use has brought thc Soviet Navy into frequent contact with thc West and into situations where its presence and activities have increased the risk of conflict as well as thc hope of gain to the Soviets. This Estimate describes Soviet naval policies and programs, and theof thc Soviet Navy both for war-fighting and for peacetime operations in distant waters.
i FORCF. COMPOSITION AND READINESS
Soviets describe nuclear submarines and naval aviation as thc main striking forces nf their Navy, but thoy nlsOarge surface loict. llie active Navy currently hasajorinus surfaceuxiliary ships,aval aircraft Thcforce has nuclear- and diesel-poweiedmissile, cruise-missile, and torpedo-attackTlie major surface force is about equally divided between ocean going escorts and larger ships ol dnsuoyer and cruiser size. Minor surface combatants include mine warfaie ships, submarine chasers, and patrol craft, primarily for operations in coastal waters. Soviel Navji Aviation has three
principalstrike,and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. Esccpt lorelicopters which arc carried An iuflace ships. Naval Aviationand-based force
3 The Soviet Navy is organized into ioui major fleets: the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific Ocean (seehe Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets have all ol thc ballistic missile' and cany thc burden of the open-oceanWestern naval forces andsea communications/The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are tailored for control ol these seas and for the support of land operations along their shores and at their entrances. Tlie non-SovietPact (NSWP) countries contribute to thc latter missions. The Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the surface ships, and the Northern Fleet thcfor Mediterranean Sea operations. MoslOcean deployments come from Ihe Pacific Fleet.hows the roles and disposition of selected Soviet and NSWP naval forces.
Readiness
Soviet surface ships and submarines ire kupi in several stages of readiness. Aboutthose units routinely deployed to forward iira* .in: ready TviMinnsay oi two.
An additionalin limited
readiness and would be able to pul to sea only with reduced stores and crew and at reduced combat effectiveness. Thc remainder are in overhaul and modernization and would not be ready even inays. In addition to these active forces, there arc numbers of older ships and submarines in an
NIE lWei Ferrer /or I
Coi/ltaSS. finlurdn'r din-union cf Soviet SUIM foirav
Disposition ot Soviet Naval Forces
flatus which would also require more thanays to become combat ready. Three fourths of Soviet naval aircraft could be ready with no advance notice, and all butercentoays.
II. WARTIMC MISSIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS
he Soviet Navy'f major missions in wartime are nucleai strike or deterrence against escalation, bluntinf, thr effects of enemy nuclear striVes. and supporting ground operations on the Eurasian coo tinent Tne first is accomplished by the Soviet SSBN forces The second involves both anticarrier and anti-SSDN forces. The last involve* controlling the tea frontiers of tlie USSR out to several hundred miles to ensure that enemy naval forces cannotit tlic land war while permitting Soviet naval forces to do so. It also involves, especiallyrolonged conflict, operations against sea lines of communication, particularly in the vicinity of the Eurasian continent, to prevent rcinforccmciit ami supply of NATO.
Soviet Views of fhe Nature, Course,asksor With the US
ver thc past icvcral years therecn numerous Soviet discussions of thc possibility ol conllict at both nuclear and nonnuclear levels in continental theatersorldu f
omcof older rigid Soviet scenarios in which eacala two to general war was viewed as virtually in evtiablc This loosening hu ledhich war inassociated naval ac livity -is teen as possibly starting at thelevel. The Sovietsrowing likelihood of this, but they still emphasize the strong likelihood lhal the US and NATO will be compelled to esca lale lo nuclear levels. Tliey apparently dooet to initiate the widespread use of nucleai wcu[>oiu, exceptajor preemptive strike In Kuiope wheir they oceome ccmviiiced that NATO will go beyond tlie limited use of nuclear weapons.
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llie conventional battle were going against them, we cannot iuIc out the possibility lhal they mighl initiate the limited use ol tactical nuclear weapons However, mosl evidence indicates that lhc Sovicis believeimited tactical nuclearwould,elatively oriel period, esca bteeater-wide nuclear war
ecause the need lo bc able to delivernucleai salvo (and conversely, noi to dobecomes so important, theand circumstances of possiblewell as deployment of nuclear weapons)of crucial interest jn Soviet doctrinalincreasingSoviet thinking*^
^include:
a preemptive strike-.
a limited tactical nudear strike; or
eriod without lespotuc. whileat negotiation presumably would bc made to bring the waronclusion.
udging from Soviet doctiine, we believe thai tlie Soviets' aim in the early conventional phasesar would be the destruction of enemy ground, air. and naval forces and of the greatest possible quantity of NATO's nudear weapons and delivery systems. This would be done to disrupt or weaken the nuclear counterstrike thc enemy is presumed lo bc preparing and to assure that Ihe nuclear phasc would occur under conditions most favorable lo the USSH. Naval operations arc seen as closely related to war developments on thc hurasion land-mass, to requirementstrategic strike against the US. and to tbe blunting oftrike against the USSH. While the Soviets recognize lheof naval operations for these purposes, we have no evidence tliat they have seriouslya war conducted only at sea between the major powers. Wc do not believe they would choose to engage inar.
Ihe Deterrence ond Nuclear Strike Missions
rimary mission of the Soviet Navy is toeterrent to atlack through the presenceredible and survivablc SSBN force and. in time ol general war. to participate in the nudear eachangc and strike at soil targets such as military installations, industries, and government center* In support of these missions, tlic Soviets routinely ma ii it.ii i) four of theirlass SSBNs on station, two in (he Atlantic and Iwo in the Pacific, intending lo be able to move most of them to filing areas in times of crisis or wai. Theass SSBN. armed withmapable of reaching thc US. Europe, Of China even from base areas, recently began patrolling in th-Barenti and Cfccntand Seas. Pat roh in those seas can be protected Irom Western air and surface ASW forces and require virtually no tiantit time (see l'iguie 2J. In addition lo thc forces at sea. Ihe Soviets appear to keepf" 3SSBNl rMdv for deployment fj"
he effectiveness of the SSBN forceeneral war would depend upon many variables, such as Ihe timing and circumstances of (he altack. Soviet survivability efforts, the effectiveness of SSBN command and control systems, and. not least. Soviet objectives. Under conditions of sufficient warning to get additional forces Io firing stations, high survivability, and adequate functioning of command nnd control systems, the Soviets might currently expect as manyea-based missiles to rcadi their targets in an initial strike' Undei conditions of no warning, successful NATOoperations, ddays in command ami control procedures,eliberate Soviet decision, the Soviets might launchew score missiles Soviet SSBN strategic strike capabilities are thus strongly scenario-driven, but it is almosi certain Ihey could not be completely blunted
'Thu Ettimitc ii bated onoviet (ilmneroiy pniwl lothe force to anercent availability,n tcm reliability of aboulercent.
U
ovici SSBN Paiiol *
he Sovieti aie attempting to increase lhc survivability of their 5SDN force in several ways. Thcy are constructing, near SSBN bases, tunnels suitable for concealment and protection of thcand have built dummy SSBNt probably to conceal deployment levels during crises or toNATO targeting.
1
onstruction oflassollow-on class, possiblyew missile, has abeady begun. Follow-on SLBM repbeements for thenlass and thenlass mty already be decided on. These programs would be carried out during the neat decade.
Anti-Striko feet Activity
Tbe Soviets include operations against West-em carrier strike forces and missile subrnarines under the rubric of weakening ocean-launched nuclear strikes. Soviet doctrine calls for both to be carried oul simultaneously as first priority tasks-Each would involve use of all available means of surveillance and attack, if possible in coordinated operations, based on obtaining masimum prior warning and on defending in depth.anceptartime disposition of Soviet naval forces In the North Atlantic.)
Major ewrcises0 lure demonstrated the Soviet approach to. and capabilitiesarge ocean surveillance operation coordinated with strike activities in various areas. They indicate that in the northeastern Atlantic, Norwegian Sea. northwestern Pacific, and eastern Mediterranean the burden of detecting and uackang NATO carrier task forces would be borne primarily by land based electronic surveillance, as well as by aircraft, submarines, and surface ships, supported by EL1NT and radarsatelliles.
1 Wc believe that, given time to coordinate all or dicse assets, the Soviets would probably be able to locale and track most UScarrien in Ihese areas.
Exercises have shown that submarines and ASM-equipped aircraft would mount attacks on carrier task groups as thoy approach thc USSR. As the enemy foices move closer lo the USSH. antiship misi iie equipped surface ships, miss lie carrying pa trots boats, aad coastal defense missiles would addi tionally be brought to bear.
In tlie past eight years the Sovieis have de ployed five new antiship cruise missile systems and are preparing to deploy two more. These can be launched from aircraft, surface ships, aad surfaced or submerged submarines, they fly at various flight profiles, at speeds ranging from subsonic to moie than llirce times tbc speed of sound, use infrared and active radar homing, and can hit targetsun. Those with ranges ofjn or less largely use autonomous targeting andThose fired to longer ranges generallyorward observer,econnaissance version of the BEAK long-range bomber or.reemptiveurface "laltletaleThe Soviets alioew shipborne helicopters equipped for targetmissions, and thc potential exists (orto be targeted In the future by satellite.
In addition to cruise missiles, the SovieU arc ^devekjpiiig the SS-NXntiship ballistic missile.
ii
Conceptartime Disposition in the North Atlantic
J"
aximum range ofun
IS. Theas almosi certainly initially intended for deploymentubmarine. As it uses
tbc same size booster as tliet could bc deployedlass submarines willi little modifica-tiOQ to tbe launch tubes. Although this wouldreplacing strategic ballistic nuisiles, it would meangain in operational flexibility that might be useful if theere used to counter West-em tasV: forces. If deployment were to beew class of submarine or surface ship, it wouldbe under ronstructioo by now No such new platform lias yet lieen identified.
IS
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top Secret.
Tlie capabilities inherent in tlie BACKFIRE variablc-geometry >vini- bomber will significantly improve the strike capability ol (lie Soviet Navy against Western surlacc forces Its variable flight profile and high speed2 at highgiveigher probability ofcarrier del crises in lhc open ocean lhan is the case wiih the BADCER aircraft. The BADCER and BLINDER aircraft which have lo datethe strike capability ol the Soviet Naval Avis-tion arc limited by lange generally lo areas north of most sea lanes to Europe. The BACKFIRE"*range will give it coverage over all major sea lanes to Europe and extend Pacific Oceanto Hawaii (seequally important. BACKFIRE'S capability (oi high subsonic, low-level flight will also give it far more capability than the BADCER to cross potentially hostile landsuch as Turkey and Creeceoperate over theapability lhat in practical terms the Soviets have not had. We believe that the BACKFIRE will be operational with
believe lhat coordinated strikescarriers would be at leasl partlydegree of success would largely dependlocations of the earners, whether theconvenlional or nuclear weapons, andwas achieved. If nuclearurprise attack, most or all US carriersNorwegian Sea ond the northeasternthe northwestern Pacific, and in the easterncould be destroyed Timely warningSoviet attack would allow tlie carriers towhich would probably assure the survivalcarriers, especiallyonventional
Antisubmarine Operations
antisubmarine lask of the SovietWestern SSBNs andagainst attacks from Western general purpose
submarines. Anli SSBN operations arc probably planned in lhc Norwegian Sea. North Atlantic. Mediterranean, and western Pacific In time of crisis Ihe Soviets probably plan to stationships and nuclear attack submarines oflSSBN bases, to attempt lo dcleci and track missile submarines leaving port, and lo conduct area searches in likely Polaris operating areas. Diesel submarines, backed up by ASW aircrafl. would form banters in choke points such as the Creenland-Iceland-UK gap. Combined operalions using ASW ships. ASW aircraft, and occasionally nudear attack submarines have been practiced. Underwater communications, explosive signaling, IFF (Identification: Friend ornd ranging systems have been developed to,make tacticaland control of these operalions more effective. There have been attempts to trail Western SSBNs leaving their bases. None appears to have beenbut we expect the attempts to continue
oviet military doctrine emphasizes attacks against enemy nuclear-capable forces in the opening stageajor war. In an intercontinental nuclear war. this would include attacks by naval forces against enemy missile submarines al sea andstrikes against missile submarine bases.heater war. confined to Europe and theocean areas, the Soviets would, by ddinition, refrain from attacking submarine bases in thc US. But theater war doctrine apparently calls fordeployed submarines al the onset of hostilities, whether conventions! or nudear. However, it is possible, if the Soviets saw thc opportunily lolhe conflict at conventional levels and given the low probability that tbey could actually destroy an SSBN. that tlie Soviet political leadership would direct the Navy to refrain from attacking enemy missile submarines in order to reduce the possibility of escalation to inter con linen (al nuclear war.olicy would pose difficulties in execution, since naval forces would be unable to distinguish enemy rnissue submarines from aitack submarines.ore limited war, the Soviets almost certainly would
1/
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toft iflilOl
Iry IO ntr.ii.i. enemy ballistic mlsnfe Submarines, although they might increase tlicir attcmpls lo track some, ol ihem.
n lhcix yean the SovieU hawor had under development (our nc* ASW mix*iii; of toilyvlcmi thai canoming tor|>cdo ot depth bomb to langesom Two are launcheduilacc ship and two arc launchedubmerged submarine All. eiccpt possibly one. are suitable for cither nuclear orsvai heads. Most of llie ships carrying these weapons utilize sonais with ranges0 yards or less and would therefore require assistance from some other ASW unit in order to utilize the full range of these weapons.
hc itcw KIEV aircraft carnei has,lo lhc Soviets, been developed as mi ASW ship, and Hi equipment appears to support thuWhen Operational, in5t could actuounaiul and control center for an ASW last force, as has the MOSKVA. Its hcli copters will. UtC the MOSKVA'i. help locate sub matimi. andTOL fighters mil give thc lastetter air defense and reconnaissance ea-pability at Sea, thereby contributing to its ability to Operateostile cnviionment. We believe,from spacerobable ASW mission of Ihc ship, and standard Soviet aircraft squadron complements, that thc most likely load of aiicraft will boTOL fighters andell-copters.
KIEV Carrier
Soviel VSIOL Fighter
Despite new ASW platforms with improved sensors and weapons, and emphasis on ASWand research, tlie Soviet* stall have no effective capability to* open-ocean ASW. This limitation stems pnmarily from thc USSR's lack of Iiicdwith an ability to iletect submarines at long ranges within the broad expanses of the open ocean, fiom the lhort ranges of the Navy'i ASW sensors, and from the relative quietness of US submarines. We foresee nocoustic or nun acoustic detection systems or in submatinethat would permit the Soviets tof-fectivi' open-ocean anti SSBN capability during tlie next decadeHowever, wc cannot eiclude tlic pos-
"The Orlenie InttUitrrf Agency and the National St-
furjiy Aaeney believe lhalof lhe nonarauitlccurrently Inown tn In- under mveiiigaitoii by lheotT'i potential (orlvrit defection ol nuclear submariner and Ihui could provide thcrncapabilityutream lhe wrtxiUft ot aaf AV USdeployed inope* ocean. TV Diiedoi olIntel*
Cenee. Drparlmenl ol llie Navy, and ihr AitntJMl
Staff, liitelliecnre. Drii.iiiiiitiillie An I'ukt. dure tlm
sibility thai they might be able toewareas such as the western aptwoachesBarents Sea. or in strategic chokerid UK gap We ilo not a
pect thai Soviet forces will have systems loi th< reliable detection ul Western attackonil the range ol the latters' wcapom systems dui ing tlir period of this Eitimalc.
Securing lhc Seo fionliers
i on the Eurasian continent, tin highest priority of thc Soviet Navy, not lo guard ing againsi altack* on the USSR, would be to emun that Soviet sea frontieis were not open lo attack, and lhal. conversely, ihey were Open to use by tht USSR Tlic Soviet and uther Warsaw Pact navic have oiw'nitrated largr numbciS of tinal! coaslai palrol and ASW ships, mine warfare ciaft. shon range submarines, and ASW aucraft in live Black Baltic, and Baicnls Seas and tlic Sea nf Japan ano1
p
deployed both mobile and fUed coastalmissile batteries- These forces continue lothe latest equipment and have not declined in overall capabilities despite the emphasis on forces Intended for more forward deployments.
The Soviet and otber Warsaw Pact navies could probably establish control of the Baltic and Black Seas earlyonflict, and plant mines to prevent penetrations by Western naval forces, fn the Sea of Japan and the Barents Sea enemyunits could abo be destroyed quickly, but Western nudear submarines wouldore difficult problem, and the Soviets probably could not protect their ships from this threat.
A key problem for the Soviet Navyax would be assuring naval passage to thc open oceans
from ihe Baltic Sea, Black Sea. and Sea of Japan, and denying to enemy forces thc strategic straits into these seas and the land areas near theFleet bases. Amphibious raids or counteroffensives would probably be conducted to outflank NATO forcei in coastal theaters. Ampbibirniswould be limited to regimental size in the Northern Fleet, lo two regiments in tlte Pacific and Black Sea areas, and to about three regiments in thc Baltic In thc Baltic, amphibious operations would probably indude Polish amphibious troops and would be coordinated with airborne assaults and with major ground offensives.
he effectiveness of ihese operations would probably vary widely. Tlie North Cape of Norway could probably be taken fairly readily if the Nor-wegian brigade normally deployed there were not
reinforced. In the Baltic. Soviet and Other Warsaw Pact lorces could probably capture the Danishil the Danish air and giound forces onwere not reinforced and link up with land forces on Jutland. In tbc Black Sea area, strong Turkish defeases and difficult ten sin wouldoordinated land and sea assault on the Turkish Straits more difficult. Thc Soviets probably could not seize these straits quickly using conventional weapons. Soviet Naval Infantry capabilities in the Pacific are insufficient for conducting amphibious assaults on the Japanese home islands to secure exits from the Sea of Japan. Moreover, such assaults would obviouslyar to include Japan, and. short of nuclear war, would certainly beresisted by the substantial Japanese Self Defcruo Foices.
Interdiction of Sea Lines of Communications
he importance to the Soviets ofNATO's sea lines of communication and the-ii on this mission would depend toeatent on the nature and length of aPact war. Soviet military doctrinea short war. in which interdiction of seacommunication would be unlikely to havo anImpact on the outcome of the conflictsliort war, or in thc early stages of aUie large number of nuclear torpedocruise-missilo submarines andthat would be most effective againstwould almost certainly be engaged inThe interdiction mission therefore doestoiigh priorityhort war.not driven force procurements over
the past two decades.
f the conventional phasear were to continue for some time, which the Soviets view as unlikely, they would probably mount ancampaign. Some Soviet writings have stressed NATO's dependence on sea linesulnerability to be exploited. Tbe Soviets
would have major problems in doing so. however They do not have forward bases for resupply. and attempts to operate resupply ships beyond Soviet-controlled waters could be easily countered. Thus, tlieir submarines would almosl .xrtainly have tothrough choke points to an uncertain resupply situation. Moreover, the North Atlantic sea lanes are basically beyond range of all but BEAR and BACKFIRE aircraft.rolonged conventional conflict, therefore, the Soviets could effecton NATO shipping, but could not disiupt it completely.
t is unlikely that, outside ofar with the West, the USSR wouldWestern sea lines of communication, huwever vulnerable The Soviets did not do so in theor Arab-Israeli wars. Such an attack wouldtheir own large merchant, fishing, and occano graphic fleets to retaliatory attack. If undertaken with small forces,ampaign could lead to loss of the forces; if undertaken with arge forces, it could lead to aa eapanded war that would not be justified by the probable gain
A Projection/Intervontion/Secj Control Mission?
lthough die Soviets are deploying their naval forces further from tlie USSR and are building new aircraft carriers and amphibious and logistic ships, they arc notapability to intervene in distant areas analogous to that of tbc US forces. The small Soviet ampfubtous lift and assaulthas been developed for uie in the areasto the USSR, and it is not growing at arate or with the type of ship necessary toignificant strategic projection of power ashore against substantial opposition. Moreover, the USSR has no ships for helicopter assault or air cover for dbtant amphibious assault The KIEV willum'ted potential along this line, but it was probably not constructed for this purpose, nor will itety substantial capability.
77
Such intcrvcnlionitiancc fiom the USSR implies control of. the lea at lea.it at the scene of action and ovci Soviet lines ofajor intervention involving projecting power ashore in distant areas could therefore not be under taken against significant opposition and without air cover. And in those aieas In which the Soviets might feel compelled to intervene in support of an ally or dient state, they would most likely have access to ports or airfields into which to In ing their forces. They thus probably do not see the need for, nor do they seem to bc building, naval forces forin distant areas against substantial opposition.
Forrojection mission, thc Soviets would require some control of thc sea. For thelea control in thc oceans isission in itself, but rathereans foravorable local balance tn order to carry out other tasks. In the Soviet concept, sea control means that naval task forces must be viableostileand thus must be able to defend thcrnsclvcs against air, surface, and subsurface attack ih order lo perform their primary mission. While theare taking many steps to Improve theircapabilities, tliey arc not following the US path. Thc new KJEV-class ASW aircraftor example, is different from US ASW and attack carriers (see Figurelie KIEV represents aapproachommand shipask force that would better bc able lo maintain Its position in the open ocean against attack, and at the same time carry out [ts combat assignments.
ven with this added capability,and there will be only twoIEV-dass ships byability to sustain combat al sea for long periods will be severely circumscribed by logistics-rdated weaknesses. Thc relative priori-
'Thtfased on the ship's enlmited primary motion but doe* not eidtide the perfortnance of olher minium.
ties in Soviet ship design and Ihe ships' limited underway replenishment capability consrrainabilities for sustained combat at sea Theforward posture of the Soviet Navy is based upon support from auxiliaries and merchant ships in anchorages and in Third World ports anda non-hostile environment.
If an ability to cany on sustained conflict in distant areasigh priority goal of the Soviet Navy, il would be developing less vulnerable re pleriishrnent capabilities and combatants better suited for this task. Moreecade after the first appearance of an underway-replenishment oiler, the Navy has onlyuch oilers^ and still has only three ships for underway replenishment ol solidew class of underway-replenishment oiler is being builtate of onlyarge ship whidi mightultiple-itoees-replen. ishmeot ship Is under contraction, but evidence on its role is incoodusive. Thus Soviet development of underway replenishment is growing, butlow rate in relation to thc relatively large number of ships thai might be serviced.
These apparent shortcomings aro criticai.only if the Soviet Navy is toustained war of thc land Ihe US Navy is suited lo fight, at thc end of long sea lines of communication. We believe that the Soviets do not espeet they will have to do tbis. They recognize the importance to the US Navy of sea control in broad areas, but also recognize tbat they arc not dependent on long sea lines andsea control onlyew vital areas.
HI. TRENOS IN SOVIET NAVAl ACTIVITIES
the past decade ihe Soviet Navyan increasingly visible, capable, andimportant force. Continuous Sovieloutside of home watersut the Navy remains most active around
the periphery oi (he Soviet Union. Activities away fiom home waters have included ballistic missile submarine patrols, surveillance of US and NATO naval forces, showing the flag, anda for purpose of these deployments has been to assimilate operational experience in likely areas of wartime employment with new ships, weapons,ut-of-area operations by Soviel naval forces have also been undertaken lo promote Soviet interests, particulaily in Thud World areas.
Oul-of-Area Activity
ince the mid-lQGOt. the Soviet Navy haslis areas of operations. Indian Oceanbeganarribbean deployments begannd more distant operations in the Atlantic and Pacific have been undertaken In. However, the rapid growth rate in naval activity away from home waters that characterized theas slowed inseeirtually the only Increase in thc last four years has been related to unusual circumstances: muv^weeping operations4 in the Culf of Suez, the Arab-Israeli warnd the harbor clearing operations in Bangladesh in the aftermath of1 Iodo-Pakistan war. The following table shows an approximate average level of deployment in distant areas:
ome three fourths ol Soviet naval out-of-arca activity takes place in tlie North Atlantic,and Pacific and is related primarily to training for operations against Western navies. The Soviets deploy their newest and best ships in the areas nearest to the USSR and react to the presence of Western naval forces positioning by these ships to track or attack them and by occasionallytactical strikes against them. Mediterranean operations aie abo politically useful in that die Soviet naval presence lends credibility to the USSR's commitment to protect its Arab clients. The ouster of most of the Soviet military from Egypt2 has not resulted in any major changes in Soviet naval activity; Ihe greatest loss was theASW, and strike support provided by Soviet Naval Aviation in Egypt.
oviet naval activiUes in Uie Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and West African waters, oo Use other hand, have reflected largely political rather lhan military concerns. The Soviet forces normally deployed to these areas make many port caDs but do not otherwise operatereat extent Soviet task groups stationed in Use Indian Ocean and West African waten have generally been composed of older ships. However, newer ships and submarines have been deployed periodically to counter US presence and to bit press observers.
Atlantic" Mediterranean Indian Pacific
Ballistic Miuile Submarines (on nation)
Surfaceir-.
General Purpose
Amphibious Ships
Logistic Support and
1urface combatantsbmarine have normally visited Cuba twiceyear.
areurface combatant) and.ear,eneral purpose sub-maiioes, in transit.
ship* In PinpUdcsh and Culf of Sue* opera booi.
' There Isnit lo transit to or from thc Indian Ocean.
'Oceanographlc, space support. InteUierace.
-fed.
figure 7
Operations of Soviet General Purpose Naval Forces Outside Home
O3 -
Ship-daysO0
W Mine clearing activity In (he Gulf Ot Suez{Ha/Dor dearina actrrity in Bangladesh
26
Figure 8
Operations of Soviet Naval Surface Combatants
and Attack Submarines Outside Home*
Ship-days
O0 r
USES OF THE SOVIET NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POUCY IN PEACETIME
Peacetime Operations in Sovietince Ihehe Soviet leadership has actively used the Navy lo support its economic and political influence around lhe world. Thisbetween Soviet political objectives and navalwith otherresultedroader spectrum of Soviet naval activities. The Soviets probably believe lhat their stralegic retalia-
ease. (oretnoW oa (he toalo of peacetime mea of the Soviethe use of th* SSflN fleet,with the SRK and LRA, ai llie itiatefic deterrent So US attack. In the eyet of Admiral Corshkov, Commander -In -Chief o( the Soviet Navy, lhche inoal affective dVterient because of ill relitIvi Invulnerability. The uici of the SSBNi were teparatcly ditcuiied in Section II.
lory power is now such tliat the US would befrom expanding an incident involving US and Soviet naval forces into war. They probably believe as well that US commitmentolicy of detente and recvaluation of US overseasin the wake ol the Vietnam experienceinhibit the US. Finally, the Soviet Navy'siior peacetime rjperrtarxit in distant areas have improved as new ships have been added to the force and access has been gained to facilitiesIt is in this contest that the Soviets are using their naval presence in distant areas to demonstrate their superpower status and to promote Sovietinterests in general. The Soviet leaders realize, however, that llteir freedom to use naval power in support of policy is not absolute and that they. too. are constrained in their actions by thc deterrentwith.
hese peacetime operations are justified in the ideologically "correct" terms of supporting and protecting selected regimes in lhe Third World.lhe role ol the Navy involves protecting Soviet citizens and merchant, fishing, and other economic inleresls. Moreover. Soviet military writers see deterrence or restraint of US navalin opposilion lo Soviet interestseacetime, but dearly military, role ol lhe Navy. The Soviets have speculated, for example, that thc US Navy could not nowanding such as that8 because of the presence of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean.
s (he Commander-in-Chief of thc Soviet Navy. Admiral Conhkov. has put it, thc Navyplenipotentiary of (Jib Soviet Union" and afactor in creating conditions for buildingandn non-ideological terms, be has pointed oul that past Russian failure to pay proper attention to the Navy led to failure inpeacetime policy objectives, and that states which have failed to use naval power have not been able to maintain their status as great powers.Corshkov's rhetoric, we believe,oviet decision to use naval forces more extensively inSoviet foreign policy objectives in
he Soviets engage ln maritime activities in peacetime to promote the foreign policy interests of the USSR in many ways and for many purposes.
The most elementary is showing the flag through port calls by merchant and fishing ships, cceanographlc and hydrograpbic slrips. and finally (starting In (he) bycombatants. The fin( visitsountry have typically born publicized as reflections of tbc USSR's goodwill, while later port calls tend to be publicized less ertensivety and are frequently only for routine logistical support.
The Soviets have on two occasions used naval demonstrations la coocert wiih diplomacy to obtain the release of detained crews of their merchant and fishing ships.
The Navy has been used in low risk shows of limited force designed to support small client stales. These actions have generally involved naval forces that were small, bui tbe most powerful in tlie aiea.
Tbc USSR has also used its Navy in attempts to constrain US and other Weslern forces in crisis situations, as in successive Arab-Israeli wars, the Jordanian civil strifend the Indc-Pakistani waroviet objectives have been to reduce US freedom of action in the projection of naval poweroviet client or friendly power and to provide asymbol of Soviet concern. Thc Soviets ap-parendy believe that llie presence of their naval forces, though seldom equal in1 total combat capabilities to the US naval forces present during these crises, has had aeffect.
Bo lancing of Risk
be Soviets' doctrinal writings andprovide indications that they might use their navy to intervene to aid client states and insurgent governments and to reduce the freedom of the US lo intervene in conflicts ashore, even at the risk of conflict with the US. But actual Soviet behavior has been quite circumspect, and isore accurate indicator of die balancing of concerns in crisis situations. In times of crisis, Soviet naval forces have acted willi relative restraint In the latest Arab-Israeli war. for example, Soviet activity in the Mediterranean centered on close surveillance of US aircraft carriers and major groupings of lorces. While ll* Soviets' strengthenedthe number of combatants wasto increase the credibility of the threat of more active Soviet involvement. Ihcir ships took no provocative actions. There were no increases in fleet readiness in other areas, nor was there any other naval activity that might have Indicated an intentake hostile naval action.
28
the Soviet leadership hi* sought toUS action! at some cost and risk, whileume time keepinginimum thcactual US-Soviet conflict. (Moscow alwaysmonitors crisis situations and directlySoviet forceshe Soviets haveto stop US actions by direct navalbut have acted through their navalshow concern and thereby restrain lhe US.recognize that such behavior cairiei withrisk of conflict with Ihe US. and lhal (hismust be considered. Thus, despite thcthc Soviet actions incident to thcin3 were more vi-ible than insimilar crises, at no time have theIhey would be wiling lo push thisa purely naval challenge: rather, they havein their desire not lo do so. With theavailable to them, the Soviets probablythis approach throughout the period'Estimate.
Futuro Levels of Peacetime Activity
the growth of Soviet navaldistant areas in peacetime, there are bothand practical limits on the extent ofIn the absenceajor Westernthe Soviet political gains from acan be achievedairly lowdeployrnent. Occasional visits to Latinfor example, support foreign policy, butSoviet naval task forcetlnwould be unwelcome The Soviets haveassessedoken naval presencefor West African waters. In thea large unilateral expansion of Sovietwould not be well received either byof the littoral powers or by China.
SO- While the current level of abouturface combatants in distant areas can easily be held steady or increased dramatically for short periods, any substantial sustained increase in thesewould require some shift in the pattern of
ship dispositions and affect capabiliUes in home waters- Forcei kept in home waters, however, art lied to more important tasks and probably would not bc allowed lo fall below specified levels. Thc slowing of Ihe growth of out of-area activity and slumps in routine deploymentsurgethat the practical limits, under preseniare being approached.
ver the longer term, as newer, more capable ships enter the force, there willoderate but steady inciea.se in the number of ships available for distant operations. Any rapid increase indistant deployments probably wouldore Intensive shipbuilding effort, not only of surface combatants, but also of logistic support ships.
he deployment of military forcei far from the USSR to serve political purposes is probably viewedequirement to be provided lor after more central miliiary concerns are saved. Tlie vast majority and most important of Soviet nalionalinterests Hill involve tha defense of the USSR on tlie Eurasian land mass and its immediate peripheryimited or general war. Thc "state interests" that the Navy can serve in distant areas will likely continue to rank behind Soviet concerns about the potential danger from the US and China, and about possible opportunities in Europe.
Political Impatl
ho Increase in naval activity over the past decade has been one of the several factor? which have contributed to the USSR's superpower image. In that sense, the Navy is probably perceived by thc Soviet leadership as an "effective" Instrument of foreign policy. But aside from this, the Soviet Navy's record in this role has been mixed. Naval activity and port visits, particularly in the Third World, probably have improved thc Soviet Union's position wiih some foreign political leaders, bul have Irritated others. Stillaof Third Worldlittle outward
29
concern about Soviet naval deployments. Ncvcr-tlicless. in many oountTies. especially developed countriesaritime tradition, naval activity is perceived as an important element inolitical balance. As long as ihii viewto be prominent, the Sovieteacetime operations will have significant political impact.
V. CURRENT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE SOVIET NAVY
Navy's principal strengths stemstatus as the maritime aimasicallypower, with relatively little need forto protect extended sea lines olor to project power ashore in distanta result, tlie Soviet Navy has been free to conefforts on "antinavy" capabilities,negate thc projection and sea controlUS and allied naval forces. These strengths
the development of strong capabilities against aircraft carrien operating within strike range of the USSR; and
the' maintenance of very strong capabilities against tho operation of hostile surface forces In Soviet coastal waters;
the ability toignificant submarine threat to Western sea lines of communications.
same considerations also serve toof the more obvious "weaknesses" of theNotajor requirement toashore, for example, the Navy hascapability of this kind. While thenot view thist isa limitation on their naval capability.
importantly, however, the way inSoviets have chosen to develop naval forcesthem with real and serious vulnerabilities.
possessing impressive offensive strike capabilities, major dements of the Soviet naval
foieoi are rdatively vulnerable to attack them-
- Because Soviet naval doctrine emphasizes thc importance of the first strile and Soviet foices are strongly orientedre-emptive strategy, situations that gave tlie opposing force thc initiative could leave thc Sovietsrecarious position.
Thc Soviet Navy has been widely peiceived as equal to or even superior to the US Navy, despite the many asymmetries in the two forces. Thisior. has given the Sovietegree of credibility which, while not always fully supported by its combat capabilities, hat made it anelement in calculations of international political power.
To summarize, the Soviet Navy's majorof strength are:
The world's largest and most diversifiedof antiship missiles deployed onaircraft, and surface ships and at shore site*.
A large submarine force,rowing number of modern nuclear-powered unitsumber of modem as well asdiesd-powered units).
A substantial force of land-bated bombers, capable of strike and reconnaissance operations throughout the *ea approaches to the USSR.
A growing number of multipurpose surfacefaster and morearmed than Western counterparts.
A strong and steadily improving capability lor ocean surveillance (against surfaceespecially in and near the tea ap-proacbes to the USSR.
Large and rdatjvdy modern sea frontierforces.
.10
p-Setrc*
offensive and defensive mine war-fate forces.
Secure and reliable communications systems, providingugh degree of control and coordination between forces of various types.
A substantial capability for electronic warfare.
A well-developed shipbuilding industry, backed by large-scale research andefforts.
lie Soviet Navy's major weaknesses arc:
Ceographic constraints requiring theof four separate fleets, making itto concentrate forces or provide mutual
Inadequate antisubmarine warfarenotably:
ack of long-range open-ocean submarine detection capability;
-surface forces highly vulnerable toattack; and
forces markedly inferior to West-em counterparts in ability to detect and track opposing submarines.
(although improving) fleet aircapabilities, especially:
a lack of air cover beyond coastal waters; and
little capability to provide area defense for deployed surface forces. Although newer units have good point defense systems, older surface combatants and all auxiliary forces remain highly vulnerable to air or missile attack.
'The Director of Naval Inlelligence, Department of trie Navy, notes (hat this weakness refers to eorrcni eapabililies and that It may well chance in the future ar staled inn page SO.
poor capability for sustained comba(especially by surface forces deployed in distant areas, as evidenced by;
combatants optimized for initialstrike capability.imited or nofor principal offensive weapons;
-surface combatants relatively vulnerable to combat damage.
imited capability to provide logisticalto forces at sea; and
logistics train highly vulnerable to
potential vulnerability to electronic warfare measures, as seen by;
-ocean surveillance and target acquisitionheavily dependent on emissions from opposing forces, and
strike capabilities almost totallyoo complex electromagnetic systems for coordination of forces and guidance of missiles (in contrast to the flexibility of manned aircraft systems).
capability to project power ashore in distant areas, to wil:
-no sea-based lactical air power; and
-amphibious forces designed and equipped only for short-range operations In support of thc flanks of main ground forces.
Difficulty in meeting conflicting requirements of nuclear and conventional warfare, with little or no at-sea capability to change orwarheads and missiles on surface snd submarine units.
No major naval allies.
Lack of combal experience.
Obsolesence of the larger number of forces built in.
31
y-teew-t-
VI. FUTURE FORCES: CONSIDERATIONS ANO OPTIONS
CO. Futuic Soviet naval development* willbeaiesemblance fo (he current trend'. Throughout Soviet history, thc Kremlin haisupported substantial investment in forces for defense of tlie sea frontiers, in submarines, and in shore-based naval aviation. Even given changes in thc leadership, these forces are unlikely to dc-.crease in importance. But Ihe national leadership, in spite of pressures from thc Navy on severalhai not always equally supported large surface combatants. Thus, investment in thoseil Likely to be more sensitive to leadenhip changes and might expesienee shifts In priority.
A Baseline Projection
Admiral Corshkov. who his commanded thc Soviet Navy under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, recentlyomprehensive rationale for the Navy's state and direction. He has emphasized the needbalanced"is. one which can carry out missions assigned it in nuclear war, non-nuclear war, or peacetime. He has called for surface ships which will have greater combat flexibility and be able to operate for longer periods in more distant areas. But he has also called for continuedof submarine and naval air forcei in support of general war capabilities. He foresees oweand expensive individual units, but he is also operating within budgetary constraints. Hesees little prospect for solving tlie anti-SSBN problem with present technology, and gives scant mention to forces for projecting troops ashore. His writings also reflect an interest in wterrbction of sea lines of communication.
Based on these consideration! and ongoing construction programs, the Soviet Navy probably will:
op priority for its SSBNfoice, expanding it, by tlie, to
(heodern units permitted under tlvc SAL Interim Agieemcnt.d unitiobably already under construction, and we believe all of (hem will be completed. If the proposed SAL Agreement coveringeriod is siaceessfolly concluded, the Soviels will be limitedotaleliveryICBMs. SLBMs. and intercontinentalno sublimit on SLBMs. This would require some reductions in the numbers and probably tome changes in the mix of Soviet stralegic forcei. We believe the Soviets willa force at the level ofSBNi until. But pressures will mount for change in the rnix of strategic forces innd we are uncertain how these willthe SSBN force.
Pursue an extensive program to refit new and probably MlltVcd missiles to tho SSBN force. This program is expected to Hart in the, and to continue through llie.
Continue (he high priority on combatingaiicraft carrier task forces. Cruise misiile submarines wul continue to be, as will major surface ships with antiship missiles. Thentishipballistic missile wiU most likely enter thc force in the next year or two.C
Expand llie area of potential strike coverage of Naval Aviation by introducing ASM-equipped BACKFIRE bombers, which will probably become operational
Pursue various approaches to antisubmarine warfare, with emphasis on the anti-SSBNImproved ASW sensors and supporting systems and Hand-off weapons will be more
. 1.
deployed. The construction rate of ASW submarines probably will increase.
Continue to give (he seaward defense missions about (he same share of naval resources, which will provide yet additional generations ofescort, and mine warfare ships and coastal defense missiles.
Continue to improve slowly the amphibious forces. They will not. however, be developed to tlie extent (hat they could successfullysubstantial Soviet power over greator against significant opposition.
Build up the afloat support forcesodest rate to permit more effective resupply and maintenance of Soviet forces in distant areas in peacetime, but not enough to supportdistant wartime operations.
This baseline projection thusontinued modernization of Soviet naval forces. New ships and submarines occasionally embodying innovativeand armament concepts will continue toand to replace older units. But because the process moveslowecade from now some two-thirds of the Soviet Navy probably will still consist of ships that are currently operational, and the remaining third will result from program decisions now being made. With the addition of even more capable and expensive units, and limited resources, the numbers of ships will decline.of the Navyhole, however, willInthe Navy wili become better suited for sustained peacetime deployments inareas.
ihc baseline projection assumes aof past bureaucratic accommodations, of apolitical leadership like the present one, and of national policies of detente similar to those now being pursued. This projectionudgment that Ihere will be no disproportionate Increase in allocation of resources to naval programs or major
expansion of facilities. Thc present share ofclaims has held steady for some timeercentage of total defense expenditures anda share that can be held for some time to come.
force Development Alternatives
(ti. It is possible, of course, that the Soviets will experience in tbe years ahead successes orthat will lead them to expand their efforts in some particular areas:
The detailed terms of thc proposed Strategic Arms Limitations Agreement have not yet been formulated. However, within the apparentof that proposed agreement, thecould expand their SSDN force beyondnits at the expense of other strategic
Frustration in Supporting distant clientmight lead the Soviets to conclude that substantial forces are necessary to supportmovements or to thwart US actions, and that sea control forces are needed tosea lines of communication to these forces.
The growth of the Chinese Navy could cause the Soviets toarger fleet in thewithout cutting back elsewhere, thustotal efforts to increase.
A leadership might come to the fore inthat would be more adventurous andexpansion of the Navyymbol and instrumentore aggressive foreign policy.
A breakthrough in the anti-SSBN problem would almost certainly result in majorBut our estimates do not indicate that such an eventuality is near,
n the other hand, it is possible that the level of resources devoted lo the Soviet Navy will decline.
thc apparent allowances of theSAL agreements, the Soviets could
33
top Satroi
chooseduce thc number of SSBNs in favor of other strategic programs."
Policymakers who are oriented more toward development of the civilian economy may come to thc fore and be strong enough tomilitarythose for the Navy.
It may be that, with Ihc completion of thc SSBN construction program atodern boats under the Interim SAL Agreement, some of the SSBN resources that werepecial net addition to Navy program! will not continue lo be available to the Navy.
A review of naval expenditures could leadutback in construe*.ion of mafor surface ships and in operations in areas distant from Soviet shores, and to concentration on direct defense of the USSR.
arious courses of development could arise from pursuit of some of these alternatives. Pursuing all of them on the high side would require major changes in the pattern of resource allocationshange in Soviet naval doctrine, and therefore is unlikely. Similarly, pursuing all of them on the low side is unlikely. Rut moderate adjustments to budget allocution could accommodate one or two of these changes, especially if they should bc offsetting.
Detente lotelltfence Agency doei nm believe that Ihe SovieU will choose, tooice ot lewer ihanodemie mluilr rubmannei durlnr.period of th* EcUmaW. however, the Soviet, aaay reduce ihe pace of SSBN production in the nearhe Director of Naval Uiellieenc*.of the Navy, aad th* AnaUot Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of (he Amy, share thi. view.
Decision Points
believe that, if the Soviets were loof these force developmentearly decision points would becomebuilding programs, in Soviet naval writings,leadership statements. Examples might include:
The national leadership showing signs ofmore receptive or less receptive loIrom thc military.
Thc opening up or closing down of building ways for naval shipbuilding.
The manner in which SSBN productionare allocated afterd SSBN is built.
Thc writings of tlie Navy's leadership settinghange In the party line on naval policy.
A decision made to decmphasi/e, say, domestic merchant marine construction and to allocate these resourcesore ambitiousshipping program The changes would be noticeable at building yards several yearsthey affected the force structure to any exlent.
thc bureaucratic continuities inefforts and the Navy's apparentlyin Soviet policies with regard to theand the Third World, there is notfor (he Navy to lose its position.thc general resource problems in thedo not expect substantial gains fot the Navyexpense of others. Wc thus exited basicthe current line to come about slowly, if at all.
34
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