INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS REVIEW

Created: 7/1/1995

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

International Narcotics Review F

Mga

International Narcotics Review I

5

The Shape of Trafficking To Come?

Colombia: Implications of Ihc Cali Kingpin AfTCMsQ

Peru-Colombia: Disrupting the Airbridge

Opium Up. Man uana Down4

I

Infrastructure in Northern Mexico <j

[ |

America

Prospects fot the Prosecutor General's Office

2S

uly mi

ThU Review is prepared by therime and Narcotics Center, *ithfrom other offices. It assesses narcotics re laird developments worldwide. The rr pen leadshort Perspectiverug-related Issue or trend ihatbetietT Is of special importance. The Perspecirre, mhuh does notoor dir.ated Directorate of Intelligence assessment, is intended to be tpeculatne and to generate diScmssKm The Perspectitt is followed by feature ansdet. and the remainder of the report examines various dimensions of the drug problem by-region Questions and comments are welcome and should br addressed lo the.

International Narcotics Review Q

5

The Shape of Trafficking Tb Come? j

The recent arrests of Call drug mafia chtefuins Gilbcrlo Rodriguez Orcjucla and Jose Sintacruihe arrests and surrenders of many of their top security and support personnel, and the escalating pressure being put on remaining kingpins and their associates suggest the tradiiional trafficking command and control in Cali soon may collapse. If ihc lop drug lords were to be successfully prosecuted and effectively blocked from managing their criminal opera-ions from prison, we believe ihe cocaine trafficking industry tn Colombia would become more dispersedarger number ofofgar.iiaiiora. Traffickers in othermay seek to fill the void caused by the dismantling of the Cali mafiastructurencrease their involvement in all aspects of the cocaine

The Cali kingpins' practice of controlling the day-to-day operations of their organizations, delegating responsibility only when necessary, and carefully compartment ing informalion may effectively preclude successors fromtotal charge of existing operations. Assuming that Bogota can deter the jailed kingpins from continuing lo oversee their operations, key lieutenants and otherare given only enough information and authority to perform their specificbe unlikely to maintain tbe structure and vitality of the present org jnizaltons.esult, no trafficker seeking to claim ihc mantle of leadership is likely to achieve ihc power and resources thai the Cali kingpins have commanded.

The Cali kingpins do not appear to have been grooming successors to lead their trafficking

Second-tiern the existing Cali mafia organizations probably will uy to increase their standing and power if the kingpins can no longercontrol over their organizauons. but they would appear handicapped by notomplete knowledge of the trafficking operation, let alone the ability to control it. They would lack Ihc kingpins' tremendous influence and vast technical and financial resources, and many would face security, financial, and logistic problems. Although Ihese new trafficking leadersocalized power base, they would need to further expand their own operational networks, reliable contacts in the government and security services, and connections for international distribution to gain the power and influence of Gilberto and Miguel Rodriguez Orcjucla, Jose Santacruz Londono. and Pacho Herrera Buitrago.| |

It is unlikely lhat any of the traffickers now poised toarger share of the drug trade if the Cali mafia trafficking structure is dismembered would dominate the Colombian drug trade as the Cali kingpins have)

a

The proliferation of new groups lo till ihe void lefl by the Cali kingpins' being taken out of action is likely to further increase competition among trafficking interests and heighten the prospect for greater levels of violence between rivals. Some trafficking organizations are likely to work togetherelatively equal basis in cocaine production, transshipment, andthrough temporary athlialions and contractual agreements. Othets, however, may prefer to disperse, rather than consolidate, (heir operations Inside Colombia for fear of attracting Ihc attention of counlemarcotics forces. Indeed, lacking the broad penetration of the government andforces and the financial and technological resources of the Calimany of these organizations may prove more vulnerable to counternarcotics surveillance and operations.j

Peru-Colombia: Disrupting the Airbridge

inicrdktion efliini in both Colombia and Peru since5 appear tn have disrupted the flow of cocaine along the airbridge, for years the mam conduit of coca derivatives moving from Peru to Colombia Intensified law enforcement pressure-including the arrests of major Colombian andnarcotic* traffickers -is forcing cocainelo alter methods of operation, including routes and modes of trantponaiior. These chances have led to significante pnee and wipp-lres of coca, atome areas There also arethat someroups in Peru arc in disarray and may be stepping up attempts to bribe cocntcmareotics personnel to ignore illicit shipments. I

Importance of Ihe Airbridge

Drug trafficker* have long preferred air loutes lociniictincd cocaine banc io Colombia for final processing. The airbridge has provided ihern security from interdiction by ground-based police units and also from possible harassment or ihcfl of narcotics by bandits and guerrillas Air transportation also has allowed traffickers topeedier return on their lnvesimcnt. reduced possible spoilage of semirefined narcotics because of hot and humid conditionsin drug areas, ard permitted Ihc use of staging areas with poor roadet decrcasiag lace nf drug nperil cm being disrupted b> aatJBM

Principally for ihese reasons, the airbridge is the most important choke point available to Peruvian and Colombian security forces tryingtem theof narcotics between the two countne* Lima and Bogota have sought to eaploil this key lufficker vol-nerabiliryarlymainly on attempting to deny traffickers the use of airfields by deploying security forces to municipal airports

ami by blocking runways of rudimentarysucceeded in disrupting many drug flights fromgrowing areas in the Upper Hualiaga Valley, but traffickrrs soon dispersed their activities to other areas ol Peru, particularly in the Aguaytia, Apuri-mac. and Pachitea river valleys.3eru pursued an aggressive aerial interdiction effort to force down trafficker aircraft that was set back when the United States suspcitdcd intelligence and radar truckinghave been critical to ihc effective use of Andeanllowing traffickers to resume direct flights without concern for their safely. Changes in US law and theillingness to ensure full compliaiee wiih intcnucional norm* regarding shootdowns allowed US intelligence support to resume last Pccember; however, Ihe Peru-Ecuador border war earlier this year effectively delayed implementation until March.)

Renewed Targeting of the Airbridge

Trie resumption of US intelligence .support has allowed recent Colombian and Peruvian interdiction operanom lo disrupt ihe airbridge more effectively US detection and rmnitoring airplanes and ground-based radar have helped both countriei scire, destroy on the ground, or force down numerous Illegal drug Iraig plane*.!

Lima alone has scfrea or destroyed nine drugplanes sincehese successes have bolstered the confidence of interdiction aircrews ard increased their sesuc oft domestic antidrug programs

Peru has hem the most assertive in denying ils national airspace lo trafficker flights

m

VI Territorial Air Region (VtRAT)-which was given responsibility for monitoring and controlling the airways) Force assigned two US

by helicopter the following day. After troops drew fire from traffickers, the Colombian Air Force used ground-attack aircraft to strafe portions of ihc air-

icld.

rrnvn-nirrrrr-of engagement' (or potentially lethalaircraft, these include the declarationflight rones, radio and visual warningand Ihe firing of warning shots In late June,Air Force aircraft based at Tarapotoa single-engine Cessna north ofwas heading toward Colombia. The Airtracked the Ces<ni for nearly lam hours,which it ignored radio and visual warningsas warning shots. The

author-red ihe interceptor to tire on the Cessna, which disintegrated and crashed in the jungle some 5fi kikunetti* south ol the Columbian

rcidi ui wese iirei-

reportedly airliftedteams to the airfields lo seize any aircraft that remained at the site.l

Colombia also has been aggressive in targeting drug planes On numerous occasions this year. Colombian [unships have used US-tritiitig uailToTorfkiw suspected narcceics-carrying aircraft. On a: least five occasions. Air Force planet la:er strafed vjipccicd drjg plarsf-while on Ihe mound.

rme*

antK. att

prxnrrH

me rune, iotut 'iiaiLUULS-canying aircraft was delected in southern Colombia. After being informed of its landing sile. Colombian interdiction forces arrived at the airstrip

1 Ttwrc pracailmi aie hSenilrtcd by aen clil aviation (OUcago Convention) ind By subsequent Inicmaitonsl law.j

Impact on Traffickers

Improved air interdiction efforts have forcedto reduce their use of the airbridgef

ines the cause

Many traffickers appear to be stockpiling drag sup-plies until pressures easel-

tmiinaance ot coca cenvanves for waning prices in many areasi

i

I"

mc Irafhvxeis nave niweret as much asercent-!-

Such

obably Approach the break-even point and may force some producers to lay off workers or suspend production soon if prices remain I

Trying To Find Ways Around the Problem

Airbridge interdiction efforts are compellingtochangc thcit methods of operationJ,

ihc wealth of the traffickers ccimbinecl with lowsalaries make lower rankingthose knowledgeable ot aircraft readinessto traffickers'

At least some traffickers may be poised to avoidentirely by using riverine or land routes

fickers undoutneaiy win make greoier use or reru's rivers to iry lo minimize disruptions to'heir opera-

tions. [

Oulluuk nod Implications

Already offood start, aerial interdiction efforts have ihe potential to cause more serious, systemic problems for traffickers over Ihe long haul. If pressures are continued, traffickers are likely to become more desperate in their anempts lo ci ream-sent interdiction forces Many, for instance, are likely to step up efforts so buy off key militaryby offering enormous sums for theirShould these attempt* fail,africixrs could be expected to iry to coerce security personnel through violence and intimidation. Eventually,threats to US detection and monitoringat presentincrease as traffickers conclude thai ihc gains from relieving the pressure outweigh the risk thai such violence might intensify international antidrug resolvcf"

A serious attempt by Peru and Colombia to improve their riverine and road interdictionwith theore pronounced impact in curbing trafficking. Al presern.luvial highwayssable, if inconvenient, backdoor to efforts to control iheWithout then and ihe few eitant roads in the drug areas, irafhckcis would have to rely on far less efficient means of transport, including human and animal pack trains. Such clumsy uansporutionwould further reduce profits and put traffickers* valuable drug cargoes at greater risk of theft or loss.

iiidjui uaicuucs pmuueiiiglu the navigablefRiver; these tributaries Dowarc suitable forlarge loads of narcotics. Some of theseare already being used by traffickers toprecursor and essential chemicals to jungleto move at least some narcotics to stagingTraffickers have avoided riverinethey are slow, but they are likely to secas an increasingly attractive alternativeinterdiction pressures ore sustained.

Over lime, intensified and sustained aerialcomplemented by operations lo disrupt other avenues ut moving coca derivatives to processingnr res in ColoRtbta. cou'd erode theof many traffickers" operations. tub-iiaMially reducing their incentive to continue producing and trafficking in cocaine. Those traffickers thai remain in the drug business probably would become fiercely

spurring confrontations between groups, which would further stress the illicit trade. The troubles faced by the Caliresult of the recent arrests and surrenders of key leaders and securitywith an effective airbridge program couldrend toward processing finished cocaine in Peru hy othergroups and by Peruvian drug traffickers. Some Peruvian groups already have sold finished cocaine directly to traffickers from otherappear increasingly reluctant to pay high middleman prices for Colombian-produced narcotics. Cocaine carried overland and exported through Peruvian ports would, as it is now, beto aerial interdiction efforts.)

This allele is Stxrci]

Peru: Opium Poppy Cultivation Continues Tooncern

Large areas of Peru arc suitable for opium production, and the potentialapid change over from experimental plots to large-scale cultivation is great-Opium poppy prefers locations where nights are cool and humidity is high. The Huallaga Valley, where coca cultivation has declined over the last two years, is particularly well suited to poppy cultivation, and farmers there may be seeking an alternative cash crop to coca. Lima has declared war against opium production and heroin trafficking in Peru and has vowed to destroy alt poppy cultivation, but the government will have difficulty coping with the problem because the crop is dispersed in remote locations andantidrug resources are already stretched thin. Frequent aerialmissions to identify poppy fields and the transport of eradication teams to destroy small isolated plots would be cosily and difficult.

Original document.

---

---