International Narcotics Review
June-July IMS
International Narcotics
5
The Shape of Trafficking Tb Come'.'
Irnjticaboos of the CaJi KJisgjin Arrcels
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Ihsruptins ihe Airbndeel 1
Mexico: Opium Up. Marijuana Down4
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ino
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tln America
Prospects for Ihe Prosecutor Gene nil's Office
Increased Security on San Andres Results in Decreased TrafifckinJ
24 Peru Opium Poppy Oataratioa Continoes Tooocecnj |
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piwru irorurirTier, wm COrimDU-lions from other offices, it assesses narcotics-related developments worldwide. the report leadshort perspectiverug-related issue or trend thai we believe is of special importance. the perspective, which does not represent adirectorate of intelligence assessment, is intended io be speculative and to generate discussion. the perspccihe is followed by feature articles, and the remainder of ihe report examines various dimensions of the drug problem by region- questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed to the authors,'" I
International Narcotics
Perspective
Colombia: Tbe Shape of Trafficking To Come?
recent arrests of Cali drug mafia chieftainsOrejuela and loseondono, the arrests and surrenders of many of iheir top security and support personnel, and the escalating pressure being put on remaining kingpins and their avsociatcs suggest the traditional trafficking command and control in Cali soon may collapse. If the top drug lords were to be successfully prosecuted and effectively blocked from managing their criminal operations from prison, sve believe the cocaine trafficking industry in Colombia would become more dispersedarger number oforganirations. Traffickers in otherMexico-may seek to till ihc void caused by the dismantling of the Cali mafiastruclure lo increase their involvement in all aspects of the cocaine trade J
The Cali kingpins' practice of controlling the day-to day operations of their organizations, delegating responsibility only when necessary, and carefully compartmenting information may effectively preclude successors fromtotal charge of existing operations. Assuming that Bogota can deter the jailed kingpin* from continuing to oversee their operations, key lieutenants and otherare given only enough information and authority to perform their specificbe unlikely to maintain ihe structure and vitality of the present organizations.esult, no trafficker seeking to claim ihc mantle of leadership is likely to achieve the power and resources thai the Call kingpins have commanded.
The Call kingpins do not appear to have beensuccessors to lead their trafficking empires. F"
Second-tier leaders in the existing Cali mafia organizations probably will try to increase their standing and power if the kingpins can no longercontrol over their organizations, but they would appear handicapped by notomplete knowledge of the trafficking operation, let alone the ability to control it. They would lack the kingpins' tremendous influence and vast technical and financial resources, and many would face security, financial, and logistic problems. Although these new trafficking leadersocalized power base, they would need to further expand their own operational networks, reliable contacts in the government and security services, and connections for international distribution to gain the power and influence of Gilbcrlo and Miguel Rodriguez Orcjuela. Jose Santacruz Londono, and Pacho Herrera Buitrago.1
It is unlikely that any of the traffickers now poised toarger share of the drug trade if the Cali mafia trafficking structure is dismembered would dominate the Colombian drug trade as the Cali kingpins have.
The proliferation of new groups io fill Ihe void left by ihe Cali kingpins' being laken out of action is likely io further increase competition among trafficking interests and hcighien the prospect for greater levels of violence betweenome trafficking organizations are likely lo work togetherelatively equal basis in cocaine production, transshipment, andthrough temporary affiliations and contractual agreements. Others, however, may prefer to disperse, rather than consolidate, their operations inside Colombia for fear of attracting ihc attention of counternarcotics forces. Indeed, lacking the broad penetration of the governrneni andforces and the financial and technological resources of the Calimany of these organizations may prove more vulnerable to countcmarcoiics surveillance and operations.|
capture of Cali mafia kingpins GilbertoOrejuela and Jose Samacruz Londono marks major counternarcotics successes that should bolster public support fur Pre.idcr.i
Samper government and should help theboost its image (tomesijcally and intemaiionaUy
aire sis. security services have pressed to capture thekingpins by auigrwng several thousand extra troopsursue the drug lords. The recent surrenders of other top Caliof whom areamong the most violent of the drugshould help reduce Bogota's concerr. thai ihewould retaliate against government raids with greater violence. The administiallon will prohahly expect relations with the United States to improve significantly and will look to Washington toendorse Columbia's antidrug performance and fully certify it ncxl March.
The arrest of two of the Cali mafia's top drug lords
as well as other key traffickers and securityput tbe drug syndicate, already feeling the heat from increased government operations against it. off balance:
Moste artels ihould bolsteraggingdroppedoints toercent last May in the wake of news mediatying him iomitigate popular perceptions of him as an ineffective leader:
Opinion leaders, who last month were questioning Samper's ability to hold on to office in the face of the Prosecutor General's widening investigation of the Liberal Party's drug ties, have touted the arrests as vindication of the President.
beral Party leaders arc rallying behind the Pies-deot. probably calculatingejuvenated Samper can hit the party out of its
dolJiurrs.l
Moreover. Bogota appears prepared to followits promise to pursue the remainingMinister Bolero has announced be hasthe troops devoted lo tracking the drug lordstoprogress on sev-
eral fronts of t
Impact on Ihe Government: Breathing Room for Samper
Domestic Political Gains. The arrests of Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela and Jose Sanucruz Londono are the most significant couniemarcotics successes of the
ihe mafia, including the arrest of seveinl of the Cali mafia's intelligence and security personnel and the discovery and deurucDon of the largestecade Having shattered (he kingpins' myilique of invincibility wilh the recent arrests, ihe security forces may pursue the remaining drug lords with increased
Relations Wlih Washington. The Samperwill strive lo use the captures and surrenders io smooth the relationship with Washington, and Bogota probably will be quick to lake offense at any signs of
continued criticism or distrust Government Minuter
Scrpa. for example, hai publicly complained dial Ue Uniled Slain hat downplayed Ihe significance of Gilberto Rodriguez Orcjucla'i ancM and iried to minimize Ihe Involvement of Colombian authorities. Comments by Samper ami other officials in recent weeks suggest that ihey expect an unconditional US endorsement of Colombia's antidrug performance and ihat they will expect Bogota ui be fully certified nest I
The Samper administration also wants Washington to assist in prosecuting the kingpins, in part to avoid Shouldering all ihe Name ihould the drug lords receive light sentences and to avert the type of cmbar-rassrr.cnn surrounding the incarceration2 of surrendered kingpin Pablolthough the government has publicly said il will not allow any special privileges, securing convictions and tenets probably will nut prove easy reports thai the judicial system has lively prosecute trafficker cases in the past, partly because,Tidies mam olarc susceptible to Cali mafia bribci andlegallyariety of sentence reductions. Justice
it
Minister Martinez has told f" ' e doubls ihe Colombian pcnuinility hold and convict the kingpins:
certainly come as demoralizing blows to ihe drug mafia. Narcotics traffickers already were espcriencing some operalional difficulty because of sicppcd-up government acoons toingpin:
Increased interdiction efforts since5 have disrupted trafficking activities along Ihe Colombia-Peru airbridge, which is Ihc main conduit of coca derivatives moving fiom Peru, while Intensified law enforcement has forced smugglers to change their routes and modes of transport at ion
Cali mafia traffickers are finding that Colombian Government pressure is making opertiiom more
difficult.!-
inimum, the captures and surrenders almostll prompt the mafia to reesnmirse and tighten iu security procedures and to postpone or slow some cperahuni over tbe short term. The remaining drug lords probably are sobered by the Cotombsar, security services' success in capturing two keyand will go deeper into biding and operate even more cautiously:
Rodriguez UHJUela Aft* Oeeidcd lo plead guilty, whichto press reports willyear sentence by eight years. His sentence could bereduced for confessing and participating in work study programs. Many officials are speculating be will serve some eight years. I
Impact on the Call Mafia: Feeling the Pressure
Disruption. The arrest of two of the four top Cali traffickers within one month, the surrender of several others, and the capture of key security officers almost
: control, even as he comiei-ed tn coxloct hi?
' The Gavin*Pablo Escobar escaped from bit ipcttHly bull jail andand iflloniaticca) anew ion formed on ihcfee and hu lawyers were able lojacrjEat. trig screen televisions, rooms for Escobar'sond weapons and communkaiionihad cental eiebusiness.
Serfret
It ii unlikely ihai tho remaining mafiawill view unleashing an ofTemive against Bogota as the preferred option. After hii arrest. Gilbeno RoJngvex Ore joe la said ihat he would not declare war agaimi Bogota because it was not aoption Unlike their former rival, the now-defunct Modcllm mafia, the Cali kingpins have worked to cultivate an image of nonviolence lhal has played well with the public, preferring to deal with their enemies through intimidation and bribery and selectively using violence onlyeans of internal coniro! Fsiriherrnorc. the top traffickers who are considered the mostI-ortoono and Henry Loaiza, who both face homicide charges, and Victor Palinow under detention j |
Surrender Options, The detention of Uilberto Rodriguez Oicjucla caused the remaining drug lords to consider surrender possibilities;
Victor Pali no and lienry Looiza turned themselves over lo tbeogotaaiza had come under interne pressure from the governmeni in recent months.
lowing Cilhcrto kotngurz urejueias arresf. lawyers for the fugitive kingpins made surrender overtures to the Cab prosecutor's office.
thai prosecutors are holding om for another opiurchin accepting surrender offen ihat come with strings. Indeed, Prosecutor General Valdivieso hastrong stance against negotiating deals with the traffickers who turned themselves in. He has said that, because ihc surrenders cameesult of government pressure, the (rafrick-ers are not entitled to automatic sentence reductions.
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Colombia-Peru: Row of Cocaine Disrupted,5
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Colorr-Wans seize three olrcratt suspecteduno
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Peru-Colombia: Disrupting the Airbridge]
interdiction cffotU in both Colombiasince3 appear to have disruptedof cocaine along the airbridge, for yearsconduit of coca derivatives moving fromColombia. Intensified la* enforcementthe arrests of major Colombian andnarcoticsforcing cocainelo alter methods of operation, includingmodes of transportation. These change* havesignificant fluctuationi in the price and suppliesal least in some areas. There also arethat some trafficking groups in Peru arcand may be stepping up attempts topersonnel to ignore
Importance of (he Airbridge
Drug traffickers have long preferred air routes lo move scmirefioed cocaine base to Colombia for final processing. The airbridge has provided them security from interdiction by ground-based police units and also 'unii possible harassment or theft of narcotics by bandits and guerrillas. Air transportation also has allowed traffickers topecdier return on Iheir investment, reduced possible spoilage of sernirefined narcotics because of hot and humid condi lionsin drug areas, and permitted the cse of staging areas with poor roaddecreasing the chance of drug operations being distupted by
Principally for these reasons, the airbridge is the most important chokepoint available to Peruvian and Colombian security forces tryingtem the flow of narcotics belween the iwo countries. Lima and Bogota have sought to exploit ihis key trafficker vul-nerabiliiyarlymainly on attempting to deny traffickers ihe use of airfields by deploying security forces to municipal airports
and by blocking runways of rudimentary airstrips-succeeded in disrupting many drug flights fromgrowing areas in the Upper Huallaga Valley, but traffickers soon dispersed their activities to other areas of Peru, particularly in the Aguaytia, Apuri-msc, and Pachilea river valleys.3eru pursued an aggressive aenal irsterdictjon effort to force dosvn trafficker aircraft that was set back when ihe United Slates suspended intelligence and radar Hackinghave been critical lo the effective use of Andeanllowing traffickers k> resume direct flights without
concern for their safety. Changes in US law and the Andean governments' willingness to ensure full
compliance with international norms regarding shootdowns allowed US intelligence support to resume lastowever, the Peru-Ecuador
border war earlier this year effectively delayed
implementation until March.]
Renewed Targeting of the Airbridge
The resumption of L'S intelligence support has allowed recent Coksrrsbian and Peruvian interdiction operations to disrupt the airbridge more effectively. US detection and monitoring airplanes and ground-based radar have helped both countries scire, destroy on ihe ground, or force down numerous illegal drug trafficking planes According to the US Embassy. Uma alone has seized or destroyed nine drugplanes sinceS. These successes have bolsiered the confidence of interdiction aircrews and increased their sense of "ownership" of domestic antidrug programi
Peru has been the mostenying ils national airspace to trafficker flights.
VI Territorial Air Regionwhich was given responsibility foi monitoring and controlling ihe airways| Force assigned two US
by helicopter the following day. After troops drew fire from traffickers, the Colombian Air Force used ground-attack aircraft lo strafe Portions of the air-"ficlc.l
mpact on Traffickers
mproved air interdiction efforts have forced traffick-rs to reduce their use of Ihc
lorces adhere fo internationallyof engagement' for potentially lethalaircraft; these include the declarationflight zones, radio and visual warningand the firing of warning shots. In late June,Air Force aircraft based at Tarapotoa single-engine Cessna north ofwas heading toward Colombia. The Airtracked the Cessna for nearly two hours,which it ignored radio and visual warningsas warning shots.
authorized the interceptor to tire on the Cessna, which disintegrated and crashed in the jungle someilometers south of the Colombian border!
Colombia also has been aggressive In targeting drug planes. On numerous occasions ihis year, Colombian
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unships have used US-low suspected narcotics-carrying aircraft. Oo at least five occasions. Air Force planes later strafed suspected drug planes while on the ground."
Many traffickers appear to be stockpiling druguntil pressures easel"
neol coca deriVafVresTWpcsnny-ts the cause
for waning prices in many areas!
ICkers have lowered' 'tneir price or coca base by as much asercent- -to
E
xh prices and may
force some producers to lay off workers or suspend production soon if prices remain depressed.
/sir rorce iieuco rity teams to the airfields to seize any aircraft thai remained al Ihe sitel
Trying To Find Ways Around the Problem
In late June, loruspected narcotics-carrying aircraft was detected In southern Colombia. After being informed of its landing site. Colombian interdiction forces arrived at ihe airstrip
1 These procedure* ore IdenUftcdonven-tioa oa civil aviMioB (Chicago Convention) and by tubtoqueni Hiicnutioaal bw.| |
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the wealth of the traffickers combined with lowsalaries make lower ranking(hose knowledgeable of aircraft readiness levels andto traffickers' tempting offcrs.l
Al least some traffickers may be poised lo avoid the airbridge entirely by using riverine or luod tout transport coca Ackers undout rivers to try to minimize disruptions to their opcra-lions.f-
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have easy access to the navigable headwaters of the Amazon River, these tributariei lowtowardare suitable for carrying cien large loads of narcotics. Some of these same rivers are already being used by traffickers to bring in precursor and esseitul chcmscalsto jtinze.soriesj
and to mot al leasl some narcotics to staging fields. Traffickers have avoided riverine transfers because they arc slow, hut ihey are likely to sec the river* as an increasingly attractive alternative if aerial interdiction pressures arc sustained.
Outlook and Implication*
Already offood start, aerial interdiction efforts have the potential to cause more serious, systemic problems for traffickers over the long haul If pressures arc coorinoed. traffickers are likely to become more desperate in their atsempls lointerdiction forces. Many, for instance, are likely to step up efforts lo buy off key military per* sonncl by offering enormous sums for theirShould these attempts fail, some traffickers could be eipecicd to try to coerce security personnel through violence and intimidation. Eventually, in/-ticker thteats to US detection and monitoringat presentincrease as traftickcr* conclude lhat the gains from relieving the pressure ouiweigh ihc risk that such violence might intensify international antidrug resolve]
A serious attempt by Peru and Tolombia to improve their riverine and road interdictionwith theore pronounced impact in curbing trafficking At present. Peru's fluvial highwayssable, if inconvenient, backdoor lo efforts to control iheWithout them and the few extant roads in the drug areas, traffickers would have to rely on far less efficient means of transport, including human and animal pack trains. Such clumsy transportationwould farther reduce profits and put traffickers' valuable drug cargoes al greater risk of theft or lots.
Over lime, intensified and sustained aerialcomplemented by operations io disrupt other avenues of moving coca derivatives to processing laboratories in Colombia, could erode tbeof many traffiefceis' operitKHts. substantially reducing their incentive to continue producing and trafficking in cocaine. Those traffickers lhat remain in live drug business probably would become fiercely
spurring confrontations between groups, which would further stress the illicit trade. The trouble* faced by the Caliresult or" the recent arrests and turrendeis of ley leaders and security perwmtsel -combined with an effective aL-hridgc program couldrend toward processing finished cocaine in Peru by othergroups and by Peruvian drug traffickers. Some Peruvian groups already have sold finished cocaine directly lo traffickers from otherappear increasingly reluctant to pay nigh middleman prices for Colombtan-prodjccd narcotics. Cocaine earned overland and caponed through Peruvian pons would, astow. beu> aerial interdiction efforts!
/
Mexico: Opium Up. Marijuana Down4 <
ITntTmild climate in Mexico allows
growers to produce threeear. The latecrop is the most signi(kant because ample falls during this
decline in Mexico's marijuana crop suggests that Mexican narcotics fanners are shifting to smaller scale but more lucrative production of the sinscmJIla
variety of
^tCvennetWi. opium proouciion will pro&afny continue to nse given the increasing demand for heroin in nearby US markets.!-
Opium Production Continues To Rise
[Bjnvaufin
Mexicomail producer by global standards, accounting for lessercent of world opiumlast year, itignificant supplier of heroin to the United States.!
Dl IN6S
Eradication is complicated by Mexico's climate and by vast, largely inaccessible, growing areas extending the full length of the country paralleling the Sierra Madrc Occidental mountains Unlike opiumoutheast Asia's Golden Triangle andAsia's Golden CrescetK where poppies are growningle four-month growing season. Mcsico's mild climate, combined with irrigation, enables farmers to grow narcotics crops year-round Although crop destruction disrupts the first link in the supply chain, anew crop can be replanted immediately regardless of season, especially l( young plants are readily available in nearby seedbeds. Eradication is most effective if mature plants are targeted because the farmer is unable to recoup ihe several months' growing lime
that is lost when the crop is dcstroycd.|
'lYaffkkiriB Infi Northern .Mexico
a major staging area for drug smuggling into the southwestern United States, northern Mexicoell-estabiithed trafficking infrastructure Mexico's three geographic regions south of the US border are dominated by powerful trafficking organtrations, all of which transship Colombian cocaine at well as Mexican-produced heroin and marijuanadrug smuggling is mostly channeled through major porta ofthe large volume ofcrossing Into the United Stales allows drugto be lost in thelarge stretches of remote, often inhospitable terrain are alternativeWith intimate knowledge of border control and law enforcement activities in their areas of operations, traffickers have developed excellent tradecraft skills and are able to change their methods rapidly to counter interdiction efforts.I
Mexico and Ihr US Border
It is estimated that aboutercent of rhe Colombian cocaine that enters the United States it believed lo move through northern Mexico across the USborder:
Mosl drugs are smuggled into ihe United States by vehicle, including tractor-trailers, recreationaland automobiles, through one of sevenports of entry. The limited number of north-soulh highway corridors in Mexico channelstraffic in these ports of entry, and trafficker* take advantage of the highway systems on both lidei of the border to move their product
Traffickers may also use rail line* that cross the hot. drr at several major ports ofLaredo, Brownsville, and El Paso in Texas; Nogalcs.
^Jr-iaoy unbound raikars
are scaled on the Mexican side of the border,and there is almost do inspection of the railcars as ihey cross into the Uruled States.
- Traffickers also use ahon-hop aircraft from northern Mexico to deliver narcotics io several slash points just across the border. Cross-border flights have abo been reported in areas where terrain masks ihc aero-'hat monitor the border.p
The Pasternide-Open Fronlicr
The Rio Grande valley constitutes the eastern region of the US-Mexican border, with Brownsville theport of entry. Other ports of entry in eastern and central Texas arc likely io gain in importance for drug trafficking because of the protection increasedtvul iraffitts smuggling ivperatjom For
Drug traffickers also take advantage of the wide-open frontier between ports of entry that is relatively easy to traverse The Rio Grande isindrance toa-sd pnsbabiy facilitates their operations;use boats and rafts to move narcolics across the rivet. Traffickers also avoid border controls by using clandestine bridges built aenvss the Rio Grande In remote areas between port* of entry. Condition,traffickers also fly small private aircraft to isolated airstrips In Texas. Backpackers carrying drugs can cross between pom of entry at almost any remote point J-
Trafficking in the eastern region of northern Mexico, particularly in the states of Tamaulipa* and Nucvo Leon, is dominated by the Juanue goreferreds the Gulf cartel.Abrego most likely has eonirol over trafficking In portions of Coahuila state as well. The Gulf cartel has properties on both sides of the Rio Grande River dial are used to support trafficking operations; for
example, cocaine is stockpiled in ranches on both sides of the border The organisation uses numerous ranches and airfields in northern Mexico as staging areas for deliveries of Colombian cocaine. The group also uses maritime deliveries to Mexico and ihe United States under the cover of ihe extensive fishing industry along Ihe Gulf coast.
IS
The Central Region: Most Roads lead lo El Paso
TV central region itraddliag the L'S- Mcsican border stretches from wcsicrri Tesas to Anzona. The major features of this region are its rugged and arid terrain and littler developed infrastructure. The Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua-El Paso, Texas, nexus is the hub oftrafficking in this region; the high volume of traffic that moves through the three El Paso ports of cntiy make them ideal for smuggling activity The Ciudad Juarei-FJ Paso trafficking hub is an excellent staging point for the mover-sent of nasxcaKs cilher east to Houston or west to Los Angeles Traffickers use short-hop flights to smuggle drugs to several areas outside the immediate vicinity of Ciudad Juarex-|
route from Oudad Juarez lo Sylmar. California, was believed to have carriedons of cocaine before it was disrupted.!-
The Western Region: The California "White Gold" Rush
primary avenue of nar-
The western border regionolics smuggling.!
limited road infrastructure and the volume of traffic through ports of entry in New Mexico andmake them less attractive to Iraffickersf
and Chihuahua, although Carrillu Fuentcs has properties in other pans of Mexico. Carrillo I'uenteside-ranging empire In northern Mexico that includes at least two air taxi services used toaircraft for the organization and ranches in Sonora and Chihuahua thai are sometimes used tor the construct>or. of airfields or as lias's sues lor narcotics Much of the actual movement of rsarcotics across the border, especially in Ciudad Juarer, is subcontracted to groups that specialize in only Ihis aspect ofThe drugs ate then re-colleclcd by Juarez cartel associates who forward the narcotics locenters throughout the United States One such
allows traffickers to smuggle drugs into rugged areas such as the Imperial Valley east of San Diego by horseback and backpacking.)
The most visible irafficking group in Mexico's west-emreferred to as ihe Tijuanacontrolled by the Arellano Felix brothers, who arc nephews of drug kingpin Miguel Angel Felix Gal-lardo. currently imprisoned in Mexico for the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena, The Tijuana cartel
operates primarily in Baja California and Sonora state. The Arellano Felix brothers nbcontract the actual deliveries into the United Slates with numerous smaller trafficking groups. These groupside variety of methods to deliver narcotics into the United States. Trafficking by vehicles through ports of entry is the predominant method, but some groupsin tlie use of tractor-tniilers.1
Trafficking Methods
Trafficking groups in the Mexican bordersometimes calledthe key role in moving drugs across the border.
rruny bditroperties ll uses to support opeiatiuni including produce companies that ship to the United States, at least one air transport company thatront for the purchase of aircraft, and airstrips near the bc*dei with the United States where cocaine is delivered from other parts of Mexico beforeinio the United Slates-I-
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Sccfei
Latin America
Prospects for the Prosecutor General's Office
Should Valdivieso be replaced, the choice of successor could have aimpact on government efforts to vigorously prosecute major narcotics traffickers. Two names have already surfaced as possible successors to
Juan Carlos' nvgucrra. tne wui-uiovvn alM respected Dean of the Javeriana University law school who was President Samper's nominee to replace de Greiff last year. Another candidate is Antonio Cancino Moreno, the head of the Presidential Commission on Military Justice Reformonstitu-tinnal law expert. I"
Peru: Opium Poppy Cultivation Continues Tooncern
Large areas of Peru arc suitable for opium production, and the potentbl forchange over from experimental plots lo large-scale cultivation ispoppy prefers locations where nights are cool and humidity isHualiaga Valley, where coca cultivation has declined over the lastis particularly well suited to poppy cultivation, and farmers thereseeking an alternative cash crop to coca. Lima has declared warproduction and heroin trafficking in Peru and has vowed lopoppy cultivation, but the government will have difficulty copingproblem because the crop is dispersed in remote locations andantidrug resources are already stretched thin. Frequent aerialmissionsdentify poppy fields and the transportestroy small isolated plots would be costly and difficult.
Original document.
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