of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis
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Moscow Advances Its Agenda in Kazakhstan
Moscow has used its political and economic leverage toroad range af agreements with Almaty that bring Kazakhstan into closer alignment with Russia. These agreements, signed during the past year, advance Moscow's goals of ensuring Almaty's responsiveness to Russia's economic and strategic imperatives, limiting Western influence in Kazakhstan, and protecting the welfare of Kazakhstan's large ethnic Russian community-approximateiyercent of Kazakhstan's population.
Russia obtained an equity share in Kazakhstan's largest natural gas and oil project; control of key strategic facilities, including the Baykonur spaceong-term military presence; and special rights for Russian citizens in Kazakhstan.
Despite some impedimentsighter alliance, principally Russia's budgetary limitations and the two states' different economic policies, ties between Russia and Kazakhstan will remain close, as Russian leaders try to use the relationshipuilding block for wider economic and military integration among selected Commonwealth states.
Kazakhstan! President Nazarbayev has resisted Russian demands on some issues, including dual citizenship and the provision of peacekeeping troops for Tajikistan. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan's leaders and most Kazakhstanis strongly support closer relations with Russia, accordingariety of reporting. Almaty's recent accommodation of many of Russia's interests and Kazakhstan's inability to develop close reunions wilh other regional states to counterbalance Russian influence will raise Moscow's expectations of what it can get from Almaty in the future, making it difficult for Almaty to reverse course and distance itself from Moscow.
At home, Russia's Leaders must contend with the growing activism of Russian groups that do not accept Kazakhstani statehood and consider predominantly Russian northern Kazakhstan to be part of Russia. Russian officials have expressed growing concern that the deteriorating status of ethnic Russians in
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Kazakltstan willprovide ammunition for the Yel'tsin government's domestic critics, and the pressures of upcoming Russian elections are likely to complicate Moscow's policies and create unwanted tensions with Kazakhstan.
Cossacks and Russian nationalist groups are ttrengthening links to their ethnic brethren in Kazakhstan and could provoke an incident in an effort to build support for their agenda among Russians in Kazakhstan and Russia, thereby creating new tensions in Russian-Razakhitani relations.
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Russia has focused its economic involvement in Kazakhstan on projects lhat arc potentially profitable or strategically vital; otherwise, it has provided little assistance to the ailing Kazakhstan) economy.
Tbe Russian and Kazakhstan! Governments agreed in4 that Russia will assume complete contrul and legal jurisdiction over the Baykonur space complex--an integral pan of Russia's space progrnm-and the neighboring city of Leninsk for the nextearsyrar cxiensiou..
RusNia also has increased its influence over Kazakhstan's potentially lucrative energy sector, according to various reporting. For example, Russia obtained lastpercent equity share of the
Karachaganak fields,atural gas and oil project in
Kazakhstan.
Russian officials often have used hardball tactics lo elicit concessions from AJmaty on these issues:
Moscow
tied its cooperation with Almaty on sensitive ethnic Russian issues to AJjuaty's willingness to lease Baykonur on terms favorable to Russia.
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In ihc area of security relations, Moscow also exploited Kazakhstan's dependence toong-term Russian military presence in Kazakhstan:
Tbe bilateral military agreements signed last January call for the joint planning, training, and use of militaryreaty on the joint protection of external borders and the creationoint border command, and cooperation in the production and standardization of military equipment, according to the press. Moscow already exerts significant influence over Kazakhstan's armed forces and defense infrastructure through Almaty's reliance on Russia for training, spare parts, officer expertise, and technical assistance.
Overall, these agreements have advanced Moscow's goal of maintaining its predominant strategic position in Kazakhstan, despite Almaty's expanded network of
bilateral lies with other states.
agreement on border guard cooperation paves the way for deployment of Russian border troops on the rtazakhstani-Chincse border, which promotes Moscow's efforts to secure the CIS's outer borders against perceived external threats.
The Russian and Kazakhstani Defense Ministers agreed to newthat give Moscow ultimate control over foreignlo sensitive areas of military tracking. telemetry, andin Kazakhstan.
Moreover, Moscow has maneuvered to keep Chevron out of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPQ thai is seeking toew pipeline to carry most of the oil thai is slated to be produced from the large Tengiz oilfield in Kazakhstan to foreign customers, according to various reporting. The January agreement on the
construction of ihc first phase of the pipeline signed by Russia. Oman, and Kazakhstan excludes Chevron, according to the press, although the CPC probably will not be able to obtain the international financing necessary to build this pipeline on its own. T
Ethnk Russians: Tougher Issue To Handle
Russia's leaders have also extracted concessions from Almaty aimed at safeguarding the welfare ofillion ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, but this issue is far from resolved. In recent months, Russian official- have expressed increasing concern that the deteriorating status of the Russian community in Kazakhstan will provide ammunition for the Yel'tsin government's domestic critics, as well as threaten Russian interests in Kazakhstan, according to various reporting (sec charts on Kazakhstan's changing ethnic composition):
oscow conference last fall on tbe Russian diaspora, tbe Director of Russia's Migration Service blamed the dramatic rise in Russian emigration from0 Russians per month in
growing discrimination in employment, language, and (he media, according to the press. The Kazakhstani pressore than doubling of the net outflow of Russians from Kazakhstans compared with that
Meanwhile, Russian legislators and nationalist groups have escalated their attacks onRussian Government's allegedly inadequate help for ethnic Russians outside Russia, according to press reports. The Duma threatened last year to take the lead on this issue when legislators advocated the creationpecial council controlled by the Duma to formulate Russia's policy toward ethnic Russians and to allocate funds to assist them. "
In response to these concerns and pressures, the Russian Government has become more active in defending the interests of the Russian community in Kazakhs inn:
In an effort to slow the migration of Russian residents back toussian Government edict issued last August linked Russian trade credits to neighboring states' policies toward their Russian populations, targeted economic assistance to ethnic Russians, and threatened economic sanctions against Common wealth states to improve the lot of ethnic Russians, according to press
Kazakhstan is one of the primary targets of this edict because of its large Russian community and its rapidly escalating rate of Russian. emigration.
Moscow has shifted from its previous hands-off public approach
toward Kazakhstan's Cossacks, one of the largest, most unified Russian political groups in Kazakhstan, with possibly as many0 members. The Cossacksroad support network in heavily Russian northern Kazakhstan as well as close links to the Kazakhstan! armed forces' largely Russian officer corps, and Kazakhstani officials consider theajor security threat]
[Last December, the Russian leadership established aCouncil that reports to President Yel'tsin and declaredreadiness lo negotiate with AJmaty on the
This more assertive tack probably contributed to Moscow's headway (his year in obtaining Almaty's approval for expanded rights for the ethnic Russian community in Kazakhstan.
The compromise citizenship agreements signed in January permit Russians in Kazakhstan who choose Russian citizenship to hold property and most jobs, to vote in local elections, and to hold local office below chief executive level, according lo the press, giving ethnic Russians considerable clout in northern oblasts, where tbeyajority. Russian citizens, however, cannot be employed in Kazakhstan's diplomatic service, security services, or internal affairs administration or serveudge or procurator, and Moscow backed away-at least for now-from its longstanding demand for dual citizenship for ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan.
Nazarbayev recently announced that he mighteferendum on giving tbe Russian language the same status as Kazakh-another longstanding Russian goal.
Some Limits to Almaty's Acquiescence
The Nazarbayev Government has stood up to Moscow on issues thathis political opposition could use against him or that would entailcosts. In some cases. Nazarbayev's aanunistration has preventedbacklash by countering Russian demands with compromise proposals, whileRussian leadership's concerns about the dangers of instability inon occasion, constrained it from bringing the full weight of its leverage to
The Nazarbayev government has so far not allowed Russia to open consulates in the northern Kazakhstani cities of Aqmola and Uralsk, fearing Moscow would only use them lo encourage greater political activism on the part of ethnic Russians.
The Nazarbayev government has rebuffed persistent Russian pressure to provide ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan with dual citizenship.
Because of intense domestic criticism, Nazarbayev has declined to fulfill bis country's obligations under3 Minsk agreement to provide peacekeeping troops to Tajikistan. Almaty hadattalion of border troops under an earlier agreement, but Nazarbayev may pull them out in light
of the public outcry evoked by the fatalities these troops suffered in attacks
month alongjik-Afghan border
Kazakhstan so far has successfully resisted Russian pressure to turn over the pipelines it has promised to ihe CPC until financing for the whole system has been secured, despite threats from the Russian Oil Minister that Kazakhstan would lose access to current Russian oil export pipelines unless it did so.
Bilateral Alliance Part of Russia's Broader Agenda
Russian leaders arc trying tolose relationship with Kazakhstanuilding block for wider integration among selected Commonwealth states.
consensus is emerging in the government and legislature that some form of confederal union between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus should be developed. In recent months, the Russian Government has focused on expanding bilateral tics with Belarus-in addition toa steppingstone toward broader CIS economic and military integration, which currently remains limited.
For their part, Kazakhstan's leaders and most Kazakhstanis have long touted closer relations with Russiaolution to Kazakhstan's problems, accordingariety of reporting. Almaty's efforts to develop closer ties to other Central Asian states and regional powers to counterbalance Russian influence have accomplished little, leaving Kazakhstan with few alternatives to relying on Russia:
Russia remains Kazakhstan's largest trading partner and controls major rail and pipeline routes connecting Kazakhstan with Europe and Asia.
Kazakhstan's industries are concentrated in northern Kazakhstan and are more closely integrated with industries in Russia than with Ihe southern regions of Kazakhstan. Because much of the structure of the Soviet-era oil industry remains intact, oil refineries in eastern Kazakhstan rely on oil from Siberia, while Kazakhstan! oil. produced in the western part of the country, is shipped to refineries in the Urals.
President Nazarbayev is predisposed to seriously consider Moscow's concerns about the treatment of ethnic Russians in his country because they comprise aboutercent of Kazakhstan's population.
Kazakhslani officials also have expressed concerns about the long-term motives of leaders in China and Uzbekistan, two regional powers that borderactor that encourages Almaty to maintain its dependence on Moscow for its security needs.
Potential Pitfalls for Russia
Moscow's efforts to rapidly bring Kazakhstan into closer alignment face some impediments. For instance. Russia's budgetary limitations probably will prevent it
from financing the unification of Kazakhstani and Russian aimed forces, as called for in recently signed military agreements, or holding regular joint military exercises. Moreover, the differing policies of Russia and Kazakhstan on market reforms and fiscal and monetary matters probably will hamper economic cooperation.
Russia's government Icadcrs-who. according to various reports,table Kazakhstan within its existing horde rs--also must contend with the growing activism of Russian groups that do not accept Kazakhstani statehood- The pressures of upcoming Russian elections are likely to complicate the government's policy and create unwanted tensions wilh Kazakhstan.
A senior Yel'tsin adviser wrote in an article last summer that "quite influential forces" in Russia do not recognize the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan and consider northernart of Russia because it is populated predominantly by ethnic Russians. Some prominent Russianew reformers, and several nationalist groups are trying to organize referendums in Russia and Kazakhstan onolitical, military, and economic union that goes well beyond the closer tics envisioned by Russia's leaders, accordingariety of reporting.
Campaigning for Russia's scheduled December legislative elections and6 presidential elections already is fueling legislative opposition to the January citizenship agreements and supportunion"
referendum drive, according to press reporting.
Konstantin Zatulin. head of the Dumas CIS Affairs committee that would review the agreementatification vote, has repeatedly said he would oppose them because they do not include dual citizenship. The Duma also recentiy voted overwhelmingly to request thai Nazarbayev make Russian ihe second state language in Kazakhstan, after Zatulin's committee held hearings in which he blamed rising Russian emigration from Kazakhstan on the allegedly second-class status of the Russian language, according to the press.
and Russian nationalist groups are strengthening linksethnic brethren in
(and could provoke an incident in an effort to build support tor their agenda among Russians in Kazakhstan and Russia, toarsh reaction from Almaty, and toussian Government response. The Russian press reported rumors that the kidnapping last yearossack leader in Kazakhstan, whicholitical furor in Russia, had been staged.
In response to domestic pressures, Russia's leaders probably willougher stance toward AJmaty. particularly on ethnic Russian issues. The Russian press cited as evidenceougher Ku.tMan line in negotiations with other CIS governments Foreign Miniozyrrv's recent statements on protecting the rights of ethnic Russians outside Russiaresidenrial commission session on ethnic Russians
Russian officials also could reopen the contentious question of dual citizenship for ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan so as not to appear weak in their handling of this hot button electoral issue.
Moscow would come under tremendous domestic pressure to intervene, possibly with force, if significant Kn -un Jrjths occurred in any civil disturbances in
to
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