Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General
Report of Investigation
FRAIN BAMACAIG)
Frederick P. Hitz Inspector General
A. R. Cinquegrana Deputy Inspector General for Investigations
APPnOVin FOH RELEASE1
portions are classified SECRET
7
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PROCEDURES AND
QUESTIONS
What are the organization, mission, goalsof
Graphic Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Union
What information was available to theoncerning Bamaca?handled? how reliable were thefrom whom the information was
what information was available to the cia between2 and the end of5 concerning Bamaca? How was that information handled? How
reliable were the cia assets from whom the
information was
|
^SECRET^
Chronology: Key Events Pertaining To Efrain
Bamaca
What information was available to the cia Between
5 and5 concerningwas that information handled? howthe cia assets from whom the information
Graphic: Reporting on Bamaca's
Graphic Occupants of Senior Guatemalan
What do cia personnel recall regarding reporting
on
What information did cia have linking Alpirez
Deo the cia meet its responsibility for collection of
intelligence pertaining to the bamaca
IS there any evidence that cia employees or assets
were directly or indirectly involved in bamaca's
was information regarding bamaca's fate properly shared with the congressional oversight committees?
Deo the cia meet its responsibility forin the bamaca
Was information regarding Bamaca's fatewith ambassadors and otherofficials? Did cia meet its responsibilityln the Bamaca
whye agency not provide informationregarding bamaca's fate to
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS STAFF
Report of Investigation
GUATEMALA:FRAIN BAMACAIG)
INTRODUCTION
etter to President Clinton that was simultaneously released to the New York Times, Representative Robert Torricellilleged that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in the "murders in Guatemala in thes". citizen Michael DeVine and Guatemalan insurgent Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. He further alleged that these two individuals "were murdered under the direction of Colonel Julio Robertouatemalan intelligence officer Iwho] wasontract with the CIA and remained on its payroll at the time of theorricelli reportedly told Bamaca's American wife, Jennifer Harbury, that Bamaca was killed about four months after being wounded2 encounter with Guatemalan Government forces and that Alpirez was responsible for his death.
On, the President directed the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) toovernment-wide review of all
allegations surrounding the DeVmekilling and the disappearance of Bamaca as well as any related matters. Shortly before this, an investigation that had been initiated by the CIA's Inspector General in5 at the request of then-Acting Director of Central Intelligence Admiral William Studeman regarding the relationship between the CIA and Colonel Alpirez was broadened to include questions regarding the Bamaca and DeVine cases that were raised by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the IOB, as well as other issues that were raised during the public debate that followed Representative Torricelli's allegations.
his Report concerns the Bamaca matter, the information that the Agency received both before and after his disappearance and whether or not that information was handled properly. It deals, among other things, with questions regarding what information was available to CIA on Bamaca and when; whether the Agency met its responsibility for the collection and dissemination of intelligence pertaining to Bamaca; what information CIA had linking Alpirez to Bamaca; whether there is any evidence that CIA employees or assets' were directly or indirectly involved in Bamaca's fate; and, whether information regarding Bamaca's fate was properly shared with the congressional intelligence oversight committees.
BACKGROUND
frain Bamaca Velasquez, who was also known in Guatemala as Comandante or Commander Everardo, was reported to be one of the leaders of the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA)-one of four Guatemalan leftist groups fighting against the Guatemalan Government. Bamaca was first reported missing in2 when his guerrilla unit and Guatemalan Army forces engagedirefight in western Guatemala. According to press reports, the Army announced at the time that Bamaca was wounded
in combat, then killed himselfunshot to the mouth to avoid capture. This account apparently went unchallenged untilhen Santiago Cabreraember of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) who had escapedilitary base after being detained forear, testified before the United Nationsuman Rights Commission in Geneva that he saw Bamaca at an Army base the day he disappeared. Then, inabreraore detailed statement, in which he said he saw Bamaca chained to his bed, his body swollen, and his right arm and leg entirely covered with bandages.
Accorciing to press reports, Bamacauatemalan Mayan Indian who rose to the top ranks of ORPA. ORPA is one of four guerrilla groups that forms the larger URNG. Bamaca was reportedly the leader of the Popular Campesino Resistance (RFC) forces that were integrated into the Luis Ixmata Front of ORPA.
Jennifernited States citizen, reportedly first met Bamacaisit to his guerrilla camp0 when she was workingook about women in the Guatemalan rebel army. She has said that she and Bamaca were married in Texas oneclaration and registration of marriage was filed on, nearly two years after the date she identifies for the marriage and over one year after Bamaca'sisappearance. (Materials relating to the marriage claim are included ino this Volume.)
According to press reports, Harbury was determined to obtain definitive information concerning Bamaca's fate after his disappearance. She met repeatedly with. and Guatemalan officials, and staged three hungerfirst in3 in Guatemala City, the second in4 in Guatemala City, and the third in Washington, D. C, inlthough US. officials have told her on several occasions that they believe her husband is dead, press reports indicate that Harbury believes information is being withheld from her. She concluded the5 hunger strike, according to the media, after Congressman Torricelli's allegations revealed that Bamaca was killed
about four months after being wounded in the2 encounter with Guatemalan Government forces on the orders of Alpirez who "was under contract with the CIA and remained on its payroll at the time of the
PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES
OIG investigatioi linitially involved two investigators from the Investigations itaff of CIA's Office of Inspector General. By early5 the overall investigative team had been expanded toecause of additional tasking from Congress, the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, and the Acting DCI. Five of these investigators were actively involved in this Bamaca phase of the investigation. These investigators reviewed relevant files in the Latin America (LA) Division!
onnation Management Staff Jountennteuigence center (CIC) of the Directorate of Operationsn the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) and the Office of General Counselnowledgeable members of the components were interviewed, including former and current Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station at Guatemala City Station. Seef this Report for additional details regarding the procedures and resources involved, and the scope of the entire investigation.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
he following questions are addressed in this Report
What are the organization, mission, goals, and activities of ORPA?
What information was available to the CIA before2 concerning Bamaca? How was that
infonnation handled? How reliable were the CIA assets from whom the information was acquired?
What information was available to the CIA between2 and the end of5 concerning Bamaca? How was that information handled? How reliable were the CIA assets from whom the information was acquired?
What information was available to the CIA between5 andoncerning Bamaca? How was that mformation handled? How reliable were the CIA assets from whom the information was accruired?
What do CIA personnel recall regarding reporting on Bamaca?
What information did CIA have mriking Alpirez to Bamaca?
Did the CIA meet its responsibility for collection of intelligence pertaining to the Bamaca matter?
Is there any evidence that CIA employees or assets were directly or indirectly involved in Bamaca's fate?
Was information regarding Bamaca's fate properly shared with the congressional oversight committees? Did the CIA meet its responsibility for congressional notification in the Bamaca matter?
Was information regarding Bamaca's fate properly shared with Ambassadors and other appropriate Embassy officials? Did CIA meet its responsibility for such notification in the Bamaca matter?
Why did the Agency not provide information it collected regarding Bamaca's fate to Bamaca's American wife?
FINDINGS
what are the organization, mission, goals and activities of ORPA?
According to the Agency's Guatemala City Station and press reports, the ORPA is one of four leftist groups under the umbrella of the larger URNG organization The three other groups that form the URNG include the Rebel Armed Forces, the Guerrilla Army of the Poornd the Guatemalan Workers Party-the official Guatemalan Communist Party.
In the past, the URNG reportedly has attempted to increase the scale of its guerrilla warfare activities in both the capital and the rural areas of Guatemala to force the government tostate of internalhe URNG reportedly has used international pressure to force the Guatemalan Government to focus on human rights issues, and has planned strikes, demonstrations and other public forms of protest to bring attention to its cause.
The leader of the ORPA is Rodrigo Asturias, who is known by his nom de guerre, Gaspar Horn. Under Asturias, all ORPA activity reportedly is concentrated along International, Political and Military lines. The International Line's objective is to gain political and financial support for ORPA as well as to generate pressure on the Guatemalan Government in the human rights area. The Political Line is responsible for propaganda and the mass media and works with guerrilla front groups and other coUaborating groups in Guatemala. The Military Line includes international support networks in other countries and combatant fronts inside Guatemala.
At one time, ORPA consisted of two active guerrilla fronts-the Luis Ixmata Front and the Javier Tambriz Front. The Luis Ixmata Front operated in the western sector of Guatemala (San Marcos and Quetzaltenango Departments) while the Javier Tambriz Front was active in southwestern Guatemala in six areas close to Guatemala City.he Guatemalan Army believed it had nearly neutralized the Javier Tambriz Front. Bamaca was said to be the leader of the Popular Campesino Resistance (RFC) group, which was part of the Luis Ixmata Front.
ORPA, which is believed to field less than^(combatants,
maintains an extensive international support network. The group's activity includes propaganda, logistical support, political activity, fund-raising, and medical treatment for wounded guerrillas. ORPA international operations are said to be handled in Mexico-its most important foreign base. However, many activities are also carried out in Nicaragua and Europe. ORPA propaganda has been publishedumber of news agencies and magazines in Europe, Central America, and North America.
Many ORPA guerrilla leaders have received training in Cuba and Nicaragua and many have more than ten years of guerrilla warfare experience. Many of the guerrillas are native to the areas in which they operate. They haveomplete program of small arms military tactics and physical training, ensuring that all combatants are well prepared for combat. The Guatemalan military considers the ORPA guerrillas to be experts in the use of mines and booby traps.
ORPA activity in the past has included assassinations, harassment of military posts, armed encounters with Guatemalan military troops, propaganda, roadblocks, ambushes, sabotage, robberies, and kidnappings. Despite the high level of inilitary efficiency reached by the ORPA guerrillas, they reportedly have limited their potential by operating for several years in the same, relatively small areas.
Guatemala National Revolutionary Union (URNG)
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG)
Aimed Forces (FAR)
Revolutionary Organization ol People in Arms (ORPA)
Guerrilla Army ol Ihe Poor (EGPj
Party (PGT>
So*o
AKA Pablo Monsant
Fewer ihanl tighten*
Rodrigo Asturias AKA Caspar flom
Fewer adherer.^1
RKardO Ramirez AKA Rolando Monti
Approaimately^J
guernlUs'
Ricardo Rusaks AKA Carlos Gonzalez
Fewer ihuiH members*
reportedly murdered US Ambassador John Gordon8
Luis Umm from former) j- led by Efrain
Strongest group: almost completely Mayan, righting for "indigenous rights'
No armed guerrillas; draws strength from radical students
As ofi is eaiimaied ihai ihe URNG has abouJ and an undetermined number of rjmpaihiKri/iupponers.
combs'.in is
What information was available to the cia before2 concerning Bamaca? How was that informationilandled? How reliable were the cia assets from whom the information was
acqulred?
(mtelligence reports
been founcnnat referommancierEverarac^ri^usrolem the ORPA guerrilla group prior ton only one of these reports is Cornrnander Everardo referred to by his true name of Eh-airiBarnacaVelasquez. In summary,reports
| discuss Commander Everardo's leadersru^posmon in ORPA, his participation in guerrilla activities, his teachinguerrilla trainingilitary counterinsurgency sweep against his guerrilla front, his position in ORPA and the Luis ixmata Battalion, the Guatemalan (interception of material destined for rum, and his leadership
naa issued an analysis ot the statushe analysis, |
concluded that ORPA wasthreatening insurgent group operating against theThe analysis provided ORPA's prioritywas to broaden its organization and military effort. Itstrength and key personnel in each ORPA front andand recommendations for meeting the ORPA3
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala; White House Situation Room; Department of State (State);
National Security Agencyefense Intelligence Agencyepartment of the Treasuryecret Service;
Federal Bureau of Investigationational Security Council Staff (NSC);
Commander, Joint Special Operations Center. Commander In Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO).
[noted an increase inagainst farms in the Atitlanecent attackroupverardo who burned the dairy at an areawas said to have toldl
ORPA intended to punish farm owners^'ho cooperatea witnArmy by destroying their farm productionhis guerrillas to kill
thee report was
o:
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR);
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO;
FBI; and
NSC.
uerrilla camp andinformation regarding ORPA's Javier icompany. Commander Everardo was mentioned asat an ORPA military training school where theinstruction in military strategy.the
guerrilla group attached particular maporiancetogamin^Tcmtrol of several areas of the countryside. The group reportedly was composed of approximatelyen armed with light weapons, received logistical support from an infrastructure in the surrounding countryside and conducted propaganda and military training in ^reparation for an armed revolution. The report was disserriinated Ion5 to:
VS. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO; and
NSC.
iverardo was mentioned as leacung an :ont containing aboutrmed combatants, in an areaounterinsurgency sweep nettedrenade launcher and carbines belonging to the front. The report was disseminated Iono:
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala (Ambassadorxclusive for Director, INR, State; Exclusive for Director, NSA; Exclusive for Director, DIA; and Exclusive for USCINCSO.
seqr
ntelligence Report
proviaea tne statusthree unitsin the San Marcosfirst unit was underof Isaias, and the third unit had been under theEverardo. No details were available on the second unit.stated that Everardo had been killed in an unspecifiedunit commander had been identified. The function ofORPAto disrupt
agricultural production in the area. This report was disseminated Iono:
ntelligence Report
(provided information on the structure of theBattalion of ORPA. Everardo was identified as the leaderRFC and overall deputy commander of the battalion.had not been killed as the previous report indicated. Thisono:
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
SECJjfcT
White House Situation Room; State, INR; NSA; DIA;
Treasury; and USCLMCSO.
(aguerrulasrepctftealy fled
from the area, leaving behind liquor, foodstuffs, batteries, utensils, clothing, and material destined for an ORPA battalion. The material included Christmas cards intended for Commanders Everardo and Isaias of the ORPA urban front. The report wasn December
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury; and USCINCSO.
ntelligence Report The last reporthat has been found included
^regarding thereport stated that the Luis0 armed guerrillas and was augmentedpart-time RFC fighters. The Battalion was said touse of support units based in Mexico, and wasin the cultivation and protection of opium poppy ui thearea of Guatemala. The report mentioned thatheaded the RPC. It stated that the RPC operated inregion in three different zones and that year plannedits work into previously unaffected areas, especially intoThe report was disseminated
0 to:
7
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO;
Drug Enforcement AdixiirustrationS. Customs Servicend FBI.
What information was available to the cia Between2
and the end of5 concerning bamaca? how was that information handled? how reliable were the cia assets from whom the information was acquired?
Between Marchnd, two major Guatemalan daily newspapers reportedrmed encounter between the Guatemalan Army and ORPA at Nuevo San Carlos in Retalhuleu Department- One account, attributed to the Guatemalan Army's press office, noted that two guerrillas, one of whomroup leader, died5 review bytheMI
MoTGuaTerrtalarinewspajte mcmaecTphotos of an individual described as an insurgent who was killed in one encounter. There was nothing in the reports, however, that identified the insurgent as Bamaca or Commander Everardo.
(comments that the armed encounter in which Bamaca was presumably captured was reported by the pressore thorough manner than were most other Guatemalan Army/URNG engagements.
ntelligence Report. the Agency Station in Guatemala City obtained information!
>ertaining to the capture iverardo,mmanaer ot the ORPA's Luis Ixmata Battalion.
Everardo had been caught in an
ambush near San Marcos, but the news of his capture had not been publicized- Although lightly wounded in one arm, Everardo was reportedly in good physical condition, was being treated well by the Guatemalan Army and was cooperating fully with his captors. In addition, Everardo had told Guatemalan military intelligence officials that Cuba was providing training to ORPA guerrillas and had firrnished Sovietifles to Everardo's battalion six months
he information was sent to Headquarters by theon
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury; and USCINCSO.
providedith Station ol
2
There is no indication of further reporting by
|on the fate of Bamaca untilhen Headquarters directed the Station to canvass its assets for additional information on Bamaca.
(reports submitted by the Station during pecific individual in the interrogation or killin*
one of2 implicated any specific individual in the interrogation or killing of Bamaca. Nor did the reports mention Bamaca by name. Rather,
all1 | nly tohis fact later contributedelay during4O effort to retrieve all Bamaca reporting.isspdling of "Everardo"O computer search contributed to the delay and resulted in the initial omission of thentelligence report from analyses prepared by the Agency's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) on Octoberndith the exception of the^BLntclligence reports and the one Station report cited above, there was no further Station reporting referring to either "Everardo" or Bamaca until
3 Embassy Telegrams. During the springeries of telegrams between the Embassy and the Department of State, available to both the Station and Headquarters at the time, discussed the Embassy's efforts on behalf of Bamaca's American wife, Jennifer Harbury, and related information about his fate. Specifically, the Embassy reported the claims of former Guatemalan guerrillas, Santiago Cabrera Lopez and Jaime Adalto Agustin Recinos, that they were held in clandestine military prisons prior to their escape and reappearance in Geneva inhe Embassy also noted that Cabrera and Recinos said that, while detained, they had seen Bamaca2landestine Guatemalan Army prison. The Guatemalan Army, according to the Embassy, denied holding Bamaca and claimed he was probably buried at an unmarked grave near Retain uleu, the site of the2 clash with government troops. The reports by Cabrera and Recinos led to renewed efforts by the Embassy to determine Bamaca's whereabouts.
According to Embassy reporting, Harbury contacted the Embassy's Human Rights Officer on3 to request the Embassy's assistancencruiring of Guatemala Government officials about Everardos whereabouts;rranging for the exhumationrave where he might be buried.ater discussion on Marchith Embassy officers, then-Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro De Leon Carpio (later to become President) said that he had become involved in the case after
2V
SECRET
receiving discreet inquiresishop and the URNG. De Leon added that when he approached the Minister of Defense (MOD) and other government officials, he was told Everardo was probably buried in an unmarked grave in Retalhuleu. De Leon's office subsequently requested and received permission to exhume the grave, but theroceeding was halted by then-Attorney General Acisclo Valladares, who claimed that the exhumation was illegal as no family members were present and there were no other means by which to identify the cadaver. The Embassy reported that Harbury claimed she and other international observers were present. However, Harbury was reportedly afraid to identify herself as Everardo's wife and the exhumation was not completed.
On, according to Embassy reports, Embassy officers met withhief Otto Perez Molina, who confirmedhe military definitely did not have Everardo and had never heard the name "Bamaca" until after the guerrilla leader's capture;amaca was probably buried in Retalhuleu. Perez Molina offered no further details regarding the capture of Bamaca. On, the Embassy's Human Rights Officer contacted Harbury to communicate this information and offered to actonfidential conduit for future messages between Harbury and the Guatemalan Government. Embassy reporting also indicated that Embassy officials had stressed during all conversations with Harbury and others that "our involvement in this case does not imply in any way that we are taking sides in Guatemala's armedinally, an3 Embassy telegram noted that the Embassy's efforts had turned up little information not already known to Harbury and that the Embassy had no independent new information concerning Everardo's current whereabouts or status.
Except for general references to the claim by Cabrera and Recinos that they had seen Bamaca alivehere is no mdication that any further details of their allegations were reported or made available to the Agency untiltate officer provided an Agency officeropy of an4 sworn statement that Cabrera had made in.
confirmed the stories being told by "Willy" and "Carlos" (referringand Cabrera) regarding captured URNG members,who were being held in clandestine prison cells bymilitary.Bamaca was alive incknowledged that capturedwere held in cells on military compounds byArmy,the military used physical
coercion against URNG membersaspartersuasion process to convince them to work against the insurgency, "ihe substance of
| report focused primarily on the clandestine detention program, not Bamaca's fate.
49.
7^
|to Washirigton
consumers- The Station request for guidance was premised on an expressed concern that precipitous Department of State action based upon the information could endanger I
disturbing is tha State deskail, and possibl rring and the d
(urucanon with theelephone, regarding
iangers our aDiuty to collect additional information Weequest HQS speak with State Department regarding source protection and what is and is not appropriate use of our reporting. If source protection problems persist. Station plans to carefully reconsider our coordination procedures with the Embassy.
tation reminded the Chief, Latin
America (LA) Division of its questionseporting and again requested guidance fornformation. Thefficer surmises that
Station request for guidance had not been included in the DivisiorT^eports database because it was addressed directly to the Chief of the DO's LA Division
UKrA member, Raul Molina, traveled to3 to pressure the Guatemalan Government and >rove the military's claim that Bamaca was dead. I
|the URNG leadership did not believe that washe capture of Bamaca, third in command of ORPA, seriously damaged the organization, as it was forced to change safehouses, tactics, and communications procedures, ^fff^ff^fff^fff^fff^fff^fg the URNG leadership believed Bamaca's capture and the knowledge he possessed concerning ORPA and the URNG would be extremely valuable to the Guatemalan military. Thus, the URNG believed he was soil alive.
SECJSEf^
3 Embassy TPlPgram.s, The Department of State continued to report, however, on the activities of Harbury, who had arrived in Guatemala innd the Embassy's efforts on her behalf. According to that reporting, on3 Embassy officers met with Harbury who requested the Embassy make her presence and cause known to the Guatemalan Government. Harbury hadell-known human rights attorney to handle her case andourt order torave in Retalhuleu Cemetery reported to contain Bamaca's body. The exhumation took place on, but forensic experts concluded that the body was not that of Bamaca.
Three days later, according to Embassy reporting, Ambassador McAfee met with Harbury to discuss the exhumation results. In response to Harburys request for support for her efforts, McAfee informed Harbury that she and other Embassy officers had discussed and would continue to discuss the case with the highest level officials of the Guatemalan Government, including President De Leon and MOD Enriquez. McAfee also indicated in an3 telegram to Washington that "we have no evidence to confirm Harbury's claim of the ongoing detention of URNG combatants, to include Bamaca, but against that possibility iMcAfee] has continued to press the issue with the [government of Guatemala]."
tary prisons na<
aiways existed in Guatemala.that insurgents
captured by the Army were helaHncommurucaao in isolated locations in different military zones, interrogated and, after the Army believed it had extracted all useful information from them, killed them and disposed of their bodies. As to Bamaca,!
A|was included in the report and noted that
lad raised the question of landestine military prisons with MOD Enriquez several times. MOD Enriquez had insisted there were no dandestine prisons or prisoners being held incommunicado. TheH(report commented further that the MOD's official response migntsTemifference in interpretation of the term "dandestine militaryn the minds of the Guatemalan military leadership, this term mightixed, secure siterisoner is held, and not thesites that had reportedly been used for detention rather than incarceration.
clandestine prisons and cemeteries had caused great concern within the military. The two specialists, who had been imprisoned in connection with the DeVine killing, made public allegations that they had been part of Guatemalan Army death squads and could provide
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala (principal officersxclusive for Director, White House Situation Room; Exclusive for the Assistant Secretary, INR and the
Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, State; Exclusive for Director, NSA; Exclusive for Director, DIA;
Exclusive for Special Assistant to Secretary, Treasury; and Exclusive for Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
3 State Telegram. The Department of State reported that senior State officials Anne Patterson and John Shattuck met with Harbury in Washington in3 to discuss the Bamaca case. Harbury recounted the testimony of URNG prisoners who said they saw Bamaca alive in March and2 in secret army detention centers and stated thatRNG prisoners had been sighted alive in different places at different times. Harbury also described the exhumation in Retalhuleuuerrilla who the military erroneously had claimed would be Bamaca. Harbury, noting Army statements that her husband had shot himself in the mouth to avoid capture, said the cranium of the body exhumed in Retalhuleu had been smashed by rifle butts,ullet. Harbury said she believed Bamaca was still alive, basedeported Guatemalan Army policy of exploiting all URNG captives for their intelligence value. Harbury placed great emphasis on Bamaca'sears of experience in the URNG and his close ties to ORPA leader Rodrigo Asturias and concluded that Bamaca knew too much of interest to the Army to be summarily executed.
State further reported that Harbury alsoomplaint she had filed in3 with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rightshe IACHR subsequently requested, inhat the Guatemalan Government take precautions to protect the lives of URNG and other prisoners who might be held in secret detention centers and to investigate all allegations regarding such cases. Harbury provided Patterson and Shattuck with copies of the IACHR's letter, which recommended that the Guatemalan Government undertake serious and effective investigations of the cases mentioned inomplaint, mduding interrogation of witnesses by independent experts to guarantee impartiality.
other
Embassy
implicated any individual by name in the interrogation or killing of Bamaca.
4 Embassy Telegram. The first mention of Alpirez in connection with Bamaca's fate was made by Harbury in
ccording to Embassy reporting, Harbury returned to Guatemala in4 and met with Ambassador McAfee to discuss her new proposal to seek the release of Bamaca and other URNG combatants in exchangeno-fault" pledge by various groups interested in Guatemalan human rights. According to Embassy reporting,eeting on, Harbury noted that she hadist of Guatemalan military graduates of the School of the Americas, located in Fort Benning, Georgia. She further maintained that two persons on the list, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez and Major Mario Sosa Orellana, were identified by witnesses, not further identified in the Embassy telegram, as having supervised Bamaca's torture at one of the military bases where he had been held. Harbury told McAfee she was contemplating riling criminal charges against them in Guatemalan courts, although she preferred toegotiated solution before resorting to the courts. McAfee indicated that, while the Embassy had not reached any definitive conclusion on the validity of Harbury's charges, her accusations did raise serious questions that must be addressed by the Guatemalan Government. She pledged the Embassy's continued support in pushing the Guatemalan Government to investigate the fate of Bamaca and any other detainees.
4 Intelligenc^Repjjrt, MWBBmBMM
Station obtained
| had been assigned to an Army unit based inin Militaryn2 when Bamaca,Evarardo"as captured. Because ofhigh rank within ORPA, Alpirezinterviewed Bamacafficers tookas theor
status-
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala (Charge d'Affairesxclusive for Director, White House Situation Room; Exclusive for the Assistant Secretary, INR and the
Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, State; Exclusive for Director, NSA; Exclusive for Director, DLA;
Exclusive for Special Assistant to Secretary, Treasury; and Exclusive for Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
V
7
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala (principal officersxclusive for Director, White House Situation Room; Exclusive for the Assistant Secretary, INR and the
Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, State; Exclusive for Director, NSA; Exclusive for Director, DIA;
Exclusive for Special Assistant to Secretary, Treasury; and Exclusive for Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
ntelligence Rgpojfcof document removal was
)rovi<"
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala (principal officersxclusive for Director, White House Situation Room; Exclusive for the Assistant Secretary, LNR and the
Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, State; Exclusive for Director, NSA; Exclusive for Director, DIA;
Exclusive for Special Assistant to Secretary, Treasury; and Exclusive for Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
4 Embassy Telegrams. According to Embassy reporting available to the Agency at the time, Harbury returned to Guatemala in4 and met with Embassy officials. During the first meeting, on, Harbury asked for an account of Embassy reports and fmcUhgs, if any, on her case. She was told that Embassy officers regularly prodded their Guatemalan Government contacts for action and answers on all unresolved human rights cases of interest to. Government. Harbury was also advised by the Consul General and | (bat the Embassy was unaware of any new information rejprdin^Bamaca's whereabouts. Harbury then requested that the Embassyeeting with President De Leon so that she couldompromise solution to him personally. Harbury's offer involved moving Bamaca andthersublic prison where she and an United Nations representative could visit and monitor their welfare until their release. In return, Harbury would drop her campaign against the Guatemalan Government and criminal charges against Guatemalan military members. Ambassador McAfee requestedeeting, but, President De Leon was not able, or not mclined, to meet with Harbury.
subsequent4 meetings withHarbury noted that MOD Enriquez, whom she had methinted that Bamaca was alive and being held by
responded that he had never heard the MOD infer that Bamaca or any other prisoner was alive. Harbury replied that she "was reacting between the lines, but correctly; she believed Enriquez was suggesting the possibility of opennessegotiated solution."
After again meeting with MOD Enriquez in Guatemala, Harbury met with Ambassador McAfee and others from the Embassy on. Harbury said that, during her meeting with MOD Enriquez, he was pirrposelyanchtecreetiy sounding her out on compromise solutions.Harbury that the MOD might only be playing anelaborate mental chess game with her and emphasized that the Guatemalan Army has never admitted that it ever held Bamaca. Thus, it would appear strange and illogical that the armed forces would do so now and in this way. Harbury dismissed this and repeated her claim that the MOD was sounding her out. In documenting the details of Harbury's May visit to Guatemala, the Embassy noted Harbury's insistence that Bamaca was alive and being held by the Army but that the Embassy had no information to support her belief.
eeting three months later with McAfee and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs Mari-Luci Jaramillo, MOD Enriquez said that "perhaps Bamaca is alive somewhere, because it is only in URNG interests that he continues to be (sic)e speculated that Bamaca could be in Chiapas with the Zapatista guerrillas since there was reportedly an ORPA unit there. He also said Bamaca could turn himself in to. Human Rights Verification teams arriving in Guatemala, if Bamaca were still alive outside of Army control. MOD Enriquez stated emphatically, however, that the Army did not have Bamaca and reiterated that he had no idea where Bamaca was.
dditional Embassy reporting during the summer4 addressed the Bamaca case.4 telegram assessing De Leon's performance during his first year as President, the Embassy noted that De Leon had irnmediately shown his commitment to human rights upon taking office. He had, for example, dismantled the "Archivos"-the Presidential security staff that was reportedly responsible for many abuses-broken tradition byivilian police director, initiated reforms such as human rights training, and removed military personnel from the national police. Nonetheless, these measures, coupled with an increased atmosphere of toleration for dissent, had failed to reduce the number of reported abuses committed3 or to remedy the lack of progress in resolving older, high profile human rights abuse cases. In the Bamaca case, the Embassy noted that the lack of results was partly due to factors beyond the President's control, such as the passage of time, incomplete prehminary investigations, lack of evidence,ut was in greater part because of "the impenetrable wall of silence maintained by the military on cases mvolving theirilence De Leon has not broken through."
tation Reporte Station informed the DO at Headquarters that J
'as convinced that iamaca wasiretignt with Army troops in2
two
guerrillas wno escaped and testified in (Jeneva did so for political reasons in support of URNG propaganda objectives.!
4 Statement bv Cabrera. On Octoberabrera, also known aswom statement in Spanish to an attorney in Washington, D. C, detailing the events surrounding his capture and imprisonment by the Guatemalan an Agency analyst
thePeg
Willingham, the Department of State's Guatemala aes^Trncer, had planned tp attend the OAS session but were unable to do so as Cabrera's testimony was takenlosed session.
of the existence of Cabrera's statement until Wiliinghamopy
iliingham gave no indication of
when or frornwnorrisnere the statement. He believes, however, that Harbury or her attorney provided the statement to Wiliingham as Cabreras statement was sworn and notarized in the law offices ofttorney.
in aacuuon, fcmbassy reporting indicated thattatement was faxed to it from State, INR onnd that this was the first time the Embassy had received an actual text of Cabreras declarations.
Accorcling to Cabrera's statement, in9 he joined ORPA's Luis Ixmata front, headed by "Commandernd servedombatant until his capture by the Guatemalan military ineld captive untilabrera says he was moved several times between Guatemalan military detachments and subjected to interrogations, beatings, and physical and psychological torture. After some months in captivity, Cabrera said he was forced to collaborate withnd participate in military operations, which eventually led to his arrival at Santa Ana Berlin in Coatepeque in the Quetzaltenango Department on. While there, Cabrera indicated that hefficers mention that they had captured "Commander Everardo" during combat in Nuevo San Carlos, Retalhuleu Department.fficer, Simeon Cum Chuta, asked another former combatant in the Luis Ixmata front named "Augusto" if he could identify Everardo.
Cabrera's statement, translated into English, describes his first sighting of Everardo in captivity and offers specific details
concerning his incarceration. The full text of Cabrera's statement, relative lo Bamaca and his fate, is as follows:
One arrived at Santa Ana Berlin, Coatepeque, Quetzal tenaneardembers, induding Simeon Cum ChuU, comment that they had captured Everardo in combat in Nuevo San Carlos, Retalhuleu. Simeon Cum Chuta told Augusto in my presence that they had captured Everardo of the URNG-Cum Chuta asked him if he could identify [Everardol, and Augusto said yes (since before heollaborator heombatant in the Luis Ixmata Front, whose commander wasum Chuta then invited Augusto to accompany him so [AugustoJ could identify Everardo.
I followed Cum Chuta and Augusto, since Everardo had been my commanderanted to seeaw Everardo with my own eyes. He was recliningetal bed, handcuffed, and with his feet tiedope. At thatid not notice any wound on him. Everardo saw me but did not greet me. Neitherreet him, for caution's sake. Augusto identified him, an act which greatly pleased Cum Chuta. "Augusto" spoke to Everardo against theelieve for the purpose of ingratiating himself to Cum Chuta and Captain Laco who was also present. They say that Captain Laco was from the staff headquarters in the capital.
At that Juncture, Captain Laco asked mead anything toaid no and the Captain then asked me toeft.
A soldier with the surname Ochoa (originally from the Goririzea plantation) told me that Everardo had been capturednit of the 3rd Battalion of San Marcos Department whose officer-in-charge was Colonelaptain whoseo not know was in charge of that unit.
I found out from Ochoa that, upon capturing Everardo, the Army took him to the Nuevo San Carlos militaryew moments later, Everardo was taken by helicopter to Santa Ana Berlin. All of this was related to me by members of. Even Everardo himself told me sopoke to him in the days that followed.
Forontinued to see Everardo at Santa Ana Berlin. He was also seen by other prisoners such asAugusto,"
nde was subjected to interrogation by members of, whose pseudonyms were "Kaibil" ornd Captain Laco. They had arrived from the capital. He was also guarded by the previouslypecialist, Simeon Cum Chuta; Rene Alfaro Loarca, also from; and, "Fernando" (his legal name is Pedro Juarezromn Santa Ana Berlin. The specialist Molina was also on hand.
1 noticed that Everardo was subjected to interrogation day andeard Major Soto, fromerbally abuse him, offering him death by stabbing oraw the major put his pistol in Everardo's face, shouting to him that he was going to kill him. He wanted to break Everardo's spirit
Two or three daysaw Everardo dad in Army garb. The Army had forbidden anyone to talk to him. There weregents guarding him. Evenanaged to talk to him. On one occasionas the only one watching overanaged toonversation with him. He recognized mead served in the Luis Ixmata frontear and nine months under his command. With tears in his eyes, he askedake known his capture before the human rightsromised to help him, but told him that he should be careful with others among the captured combatants (such as "Karma" and "Augusto").
as not at liberty to leave the military base byould not make the statement with regard to Everardo's capture.
On or about April1 saw Simeon Cum Chuta turn over Everardo to four persons dad in civilian attire and arriving byersonally saw Everardo leave the base at Santa Ana Berlin in that same helicopter.
Lateraw the report prepared by Simeon Cum Chuta, staring that the helicopter that took Everardo away was headed for the nation's capital
Onhe Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff sent messages to the operations commanders and those of- They stated that the military operation had been terminated. That same day, the prisoners (myself induded) were sent to the bases where we had been previouslyeturned to San Marcos Department (the acurunistrative center).
In late May or earlyajor Mario Sosa Orellana from, rounded up the prisoners of war along with the members of. He told us that matters had to be handledore clandestine fashion and that, if we were to see something happening in, it was not to be talked about, even to the soldiers. Then, he told us that Commander Everardo was dead. He said that he had tried to escape, that they had captured him, and shot him. Upon stating that, he looked at our faces to determine who among us was assailed with sadness.
In1 was in Militaryan Marcos Department. Aboutgain saw Commander Everardo at Military Zonen San Marcosaw him inormitory, handcuffed to the same bed toad previously been handcuffed. That same evening. Colonel Julio Alpirez, the third commander of Military Zonen San Marcos Department, arrived. Major Mario Sosaajor in, was also there.
The colonel instructed the Major that Everardo did not have to be there with us, the other prisoners of war. They took himecret room of the military infirmary. They prohibited us from coming near there and talking with Everardo.
Prior to being transferred to the infirmary, Everardo had spoken withe had told her that, prior to his arrival in San Marcos Department, he had been in Military5 in Quetzaltenango, the previous June. "Karina" related this to me.
I do not know if it was an act of carelessness, but, that night, they dispatchedoldiers with mepecialist to tend toaw Everardo in that room of the infirmary. He had both his hands handcuffedouble bed and his feet bound.
At daybreak the next day, Colonel Julio Alpirez came on the scene again. Upon seeing me, he inquiredas there. He ordered me to leave and told me: "You saw what was happening here. Be careful and don't go telling anyone that Everardo is here."
That same day in theajor Sosa Orellana arrived and ordered the spedalist Juan Orozco Giran to bring in the medical team from the regional hospital that is subordinate to Militaryhe spedalist made his exit and returnedas, unidentified, green in color,ilver dock on top and
some valves serving aselped to get it down. They handed over the dispatch to Major Sosa, stating that the team had already arrived and that the doctor was on his way in his own vehicle.
Then, Sosa Orellana said: "We have to take this to where Everardoverardo spent the night with the agents from. We were not permitted to enter. The nextpecialist Simeon Cum Chuta sent me toypewriter from that room of the infirmary. The door had been locked and there were three soldiers nearby. They opened the door for mentered. From the inside. Colonel Alpirez turned to me and said: "You, what are you doingold himad been ordered by Cum Chuta. Spedalist Gualip was there and stated that it was his fault for not having the typewriter previously. The Colonel told me: "You're the only one who came in yesterday and now you've come in again. Be careful that you don't divulge what you've seenon't want to hear reports to the effect that Everardo is in that condition, tied up. If you talk, you know what will happen to you."
pecialist Rene Jimenez Rosalesperations officer. Major Soto, were also present.
They were interrogating Everardoeard Everardo, as if he were [half] asleep or drugged. He had on only his underclothing. His entire body was swollen. His right arm and his left leg were entirely covered with bandages. He was bandaged about the eyes as well. The gas tank was near him.
One or two daysgain saw Everardo. He was cladoldier's uniformould not see his arm or leg. But, his body was no longer inflamed. He was once again speaking normally.
That is the last timeaw Commandereft the baseew days andeturned, he was no longer there.
4 Embassy Telegrams Onay after Cabrera delivered his sworn statement in Washington, Harbury returned to Guatemala. On Octoberheunger strike in front of the national palace in Guatemala City.
According to available Embassy reporting, Harbury told the Consular Officer who visited her that'she planned to continue her hunger strike until Bamaca was presented alive or until she wasirm answer regarding his whereabouts. The Consular Officer emphasized that the Embassy continued to place priority on her case, and noted that the Ambassador and the rest of the Embassy staff raised the Bamaca case with their contacts at every opportunity. The Consular Officer also emphasized that, despite Harbury's assertions to the contrary, the Ambassador and other Embassy officials with whom Harbury had met in the past had been completely candid with her with regard to Embassy efforts to obtain information concerning Bamaca's whereabouts and the Embassy's lack of any independent evidence regarding his fate.
n two separate occasionsctoberndmbassador McAfee also visited Harbury. Harbury told McAfee emphatically that all assistance to Guatemala should be cut off until the Bamaca and other human rights cases were resolved. McAfee responded that military aid had been cut off years earlier, but that the Embassy continued to believe that institutional change and its necessary funding should continue in order to improve the overall conditions that would affect the future human rights situation. The Embassy also reported that, onn the Guatemalan Government's only public statement during Harbury's hunger strike, MOD Enriquez restated the Army's position that it did not know where Bamaca was and that, if the military did have him, they would surely have presented him long ago to the Human Rights Ombudsman's office.
y UCM Keane to pull together itstcukVjH
Kerning. "Comandante Evarardo"o that
Keane coulddefinitive" Embassy statement. According to the Station, Keane indicated that the Embassy statement had been requested for the NSC and the White House, both of which were receiving telephone calls from Harbury supporters alleging that. Government had not pursued Harbury's view that Bamaca was still alive and being heldandestine army jail. was under an Octobereadline
"Comant
igence reports-(l)
confirmed as true trie claims ot two escapedthat they saw BamacaheAlpirez) interviewed
Bamaca after his capture andfficers took him away. In addition to the report ncluded copies of the two^tenTgence reports as
iments. HfKkVmemorandum induded the conclusion that
48^
SECJJET
the best information available to the Station indicated that Bamaca was captured alive in2 but the Station had no information regarding whether Bamaca was still alive.
uNeStationprovi^^
classified memorandumThis
memorandum included the DI analysis that had been faxed to the Station and was based on information that had been retrieved from Agency files by searching under Bamaca and "Everado"he analysis, drafted by DI Office of Africa and Latin America (DI/ALA) (luatemalan analyst^ ^ddressed the issue of clandestine prisons, as well as Bamaca's fate, and was derived from previously disseminated Agency intelligence reports, except for the2 intelligence report on "Everardo."
ccording he analysis was initiated at the request of the NSC. Prior to its issuance to the NSC onowever, Diazopy to the Stationbased on the Station's separate request for analysis. In preparatlorifor the analysis^ had initiated an electronic search for DO inteUigence reports, using as search criteria the names of Bamaca and "Everado"s Everardo was misspelled^ did not retrieve theeport mddcatin^natbverardo had been captured alive, was in good health, and was cooperating with the Guatemalan military. Thus, theeport was not included in the DI analysis that was faxed to the Station and issued as an intelligence analytic report on.
II to but not nameain the" the Station's first memorandum secondeport that E
uatemalanreferred
y 4 report, wasaisonotidentifiedin
Nor dide ui analysis discuss the March been captured by the Guatemalan
Army in good condition and was cooperating fully with his captors. According to the Station reports officer, the Station had no knowledge of that report until4 when it was faxed to the Station by Headquarters.
Halso recalls that he was in touch with Department of ersWu
State officers Wiliingham and Savastuk during the same time period, and all three were comparing reporting that State and the Agency hadadds that he did not consider Cabrera'statement significant when he was drafting the October analysis on Bamaca and histes that Cabrera named numerous senior Guatemalan officers and noncommissioned officers in his
statement detailing the interrogation of Bamaca. According tol
Alpire2 was only one of several officers mentioned by Cabrera, anc Alpirez was not the most senior officer named. Regarcling the Octobermphasizes that he and the di/ALA were asked to focus on what happened to Bamaca, rather than identifying the person or persons responsible for his disappearance or death.
On the subject of Bamaca's fate, the DI analysis offered as possibilities that (a) the Army may have kept Bamaca alive and turned rum against his former comrades; (b) Bamaca may have died of battlefield wounds and been buried in an as-yet unidentified grave; or (c) the Army may have executed Bamaca after it extracted whatever information it could from him. The analysis concluded, however, that "ALA does not have enough information to ascertain whether he is stillith minor editorial changes, the DI analysis previously faxed to the Station was published as an ALA intelligence report on, and disseminated to various Agency components and:
Director, Inter-America Affairs, NSC;
SE
Deputy Assistant Secretary, InterAmerican Regional Affairs,
Central American Affairs, State; Director, Office of Central American (CA) Affairs, State; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Guatemala Desk Officer, State; and Guatemala INR Analyst, State.
s explained abovel Hwas unaware, when heDI analysis, of the Marchntelligence reportEverardo had been captured alive and was cooperatingthedid utilize the4 intelligenceinterviewed Bamaca after
capture
4 State and Embassy and State Telegrams. The Embassy reported that DCM Keane had been apprised ony the Guatemalan Prosecutor General, Acisclo Valladares,abeas corpus writ was to be filed with the Guatemalan Supreme Court and would require an investigation into Bamaca's whereabouts. Valladares acceded to Keane's request for an investigation, to include interviews with all persons who participated in the2 firehght after which Bamaca disappeared, with the involvement of international representatives to lend credibility outside Guatemala to the investigation. During the reported meeting with Keane, Valladares also said that he had called on Harbury twice and interviewed her. According to Valladares, Harbury's position was that the Army was the only real power in Guatemala and, thus, she discarded the notion of an investigation by Guatemalan authorities or any international entity. Rather, what Harbury proposed to Valladaresnegotiation" with the Army. Valladares told Keane that Harbury's approach was unacceptable, as she was ctisregarding the entire Guatemalan legal system in favor of some sort of political negotiation with the Army.
alladares indicated to Keane that President De Leon also rejected Harbury's approach. According to Valladares, President De Leon had told him that Harbury had twisted the facts. De Leon offered as an example her assertions that De Leon as Human Rights Ombudsmanescription of Bamaca in connection with the exhumation2 that originated with the Army. De Leon said, however, that the description of Bamaca was provided to him by URNG members who requested De Leon's intercession to try and locate Bamaca. On, President De Leon announced that he had appointed Cesar Alvarez, Guatemalan Ambassador to the OAS, to coordinate the investigation concerning allegations that the Guatemalan military was holcling guerrillas, mduding Bamaca, in dandestine detention.
ntelligencethe Station obtained
2 capture of Bamaca was viewedreat success
because Bamaca was the only important ljiaigenousgiierruialeaa at that time. All other guerrilla leaders were of mixed Spanish descent. Thus, the armed forces believed Bamaca's captureevere blow to URNG morale.
ohe Guatemalan Government first
realized Bamaca's capture and death wouldolitical propaganda issue for the URNG when the two escaped guerrillas appeared before the Human Rights Commission in3 daiming to have seen Bamaca aliveandestine prison inside Guatemala. At therecommended to President
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO; and
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
4 Meeting at Department ofive Agency officers,A Division officers,
eetjn^vith Department of State personnel to discuss the Bamaca matter. In preparation for the meeting, the Headquarters
reports officer recalls that she was asked to pull together formation related to reporting: on Bamacal
The reports officer reviewed DO files and prepared a
Ibrief description of
I
heofficer was not
aware of an1 intelligence report alleging that Alpirez had been present at the interrogation of DeVine and says she did not know who DeVine was.
he reports officer forwarded the memorandum toand toofficer, who included
handwrittenhe1 report that Alpirez had been present at DeVine's interrogation,!
n addition to the five Agency representatives. State officers in attendance at theeeting, called at the request of State, were Anne Woods-Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Regional Affairs/Central -American Affairsichard Nuccio, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Alex Watson; Willingham and Savastuk. Accordinghe State officials wanted to know what the Agency knew about Bamaca and his fate because they had been dealing with Harbury, and the televisioninutes" was about totory on her hungerwas the primary Agency briefer at the meeting and says he explained the information available to him at the time, largely drawn from his Octoberrecalls that State's questions centered on two issues; first, whatnappened to Bamaca, that is, did Bamaca die on the battlefield as the Guatemalan Government maintains; and second, whether the Guatemalan Government maintains dandestinesessment, as conveyed to the State offidals, was
that there was not sufficient information available to determine whether Bamaca was alive, and the accusation that the Guatemalans maintained dandestine prisons could not be easily dismissed.
One of the Agency officers in attendance recalls that Nucdo, described as. Government "point man" on peace talks in Guatemala, was astounded at what the Agency knew about the Bamaca matter. Accorciing to the officer, Nucdo was upset and indicated that he had possibly been provicling erroneous information to Congress and others. The officer adds that Nucdo did not elaborate regarding the erroneous information. Further, the Agency officer's impression was that Nucdo had not taken Harbury's claims seriously and he was unaware of intelligence reports previously disseminated by the Agency to State, INR and detailed in the Octobergency analysis. Nucdo also implied during the meeting that he had material in boxes under his desk dealing with the Bamaca issue that he had not had time to read, mduding photocopies of faxes between former Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman De Leon (by now Guatemalan President) and the URNG. Another Agency officer remembers that Nucdo seemed unprepared and said at one point that he had previously met with URNG representatives and wished he had known of the information discussed by Agency officers at the time of those meetings.
Immediately after theeeting, Wiliingham, who knew and had worked with DIprovided himopy of the4 sworn statement in Spanish from Santiago Cabrerasays that he and Wiliingham were both aware that Cabrera, one of the formerly imprisoned guerrillas who had testified before the U. N. Human Rights Commission inas scheduled to testifyession of the OAS. WiUlingham and(planned to attend the OAS session but did not because Cabrera^esnmony was taken during dosed session. Soon afterthe statement fiomununary^nglish translation of Cabrera's statement and provided copies of the summary and Cabrera's statement to LA Division.
As noted previously, there is no indication that Cabrera's actual declarations in Geneva in3 were ever available to or recorded by Agency or State components, except for the general reporting that he had seen Bamacaa^^landesti^^ prisonhe Agency DI analystsaid that he does notecord of Cabrera's Geneva testimony exists, and the analyst confirms that he, andH Hcounterparts at the Department of State, have assumeaUnatTabrenvs Geneva testimony was identical to the declarations included in the October4 statement offered by Cabrera in
Shortly after theeeting, one of the Agency officers in attendance was telephonedtate officer. The State officer apologizedemorandum that was being forwarded to the Agency complaining about the meeting. According to the Agency officer, the State officer indicated that the memorandum describing the meeting initially was favorable but had become "politicized" as it went up the State chain of command.
Two days after theeeting, the State memorandum for the record regarding the meeting, from Savastuk through David Smith to Robert Homme, was forwarded to John Allen, the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America. In referring to theeeting, the memorandum stated that "ARA is disappointed with the results of Tuesday'sinute meeting and believes the CIA representatives were not entirely forthcoming in discussing the reliability of sources of its memos and TD's, or willing to fully employ existing collection capabilities to develop new information that may behe memorandum further indicated that INR was requesting Homme's assistance on behalf of ARA in "urging all relevant CIA offices to undertake the following, and to do soriority basis:"
(a) Explain in detail and in writing the previous and current reliability of all sources and sub-sources used in producing the memos and TD's relating to the Bamaca case, and whether those sources can be called upon again to offer or obtain additional information;
Review3 testimony of Santiago Cabrera Lopez before the U. N. Human Rights Commission and investigate/verify the names of Guatemalan military officers and locations of clandestine army prisons referred to therein;
Investigate the reports of the two Guatemalans now servingear prison terms in connection with the Michael DeVine case who claim to have knowledge of the Bamaca matter;
<e) Intensify collection activity to verify the current or previous existencemilitary prisons and also clandestine cemeteries used by the military for burial of guerrillas, and also to develop any new intelligence possible on the Bamaca, case including, inter alia, the cooperation of the MOD in the investigation and the possibility that GOG/MOD files relating to this matter, and the general subject of capture/detention/execution/burial of guerrillas, have been or are being destroyed.
he five Agency officers who attended theeeting dispute State's characterization. | |fo: example, says he can recall no part of the meeting that would have left the impression that the Agency was less than forthcoming or supportive.adds that he recalls the entire meeting went well, Agency represenTarives were extremely forthcoming, and there were no refusals by the mid-level DO officers to discuss source reliability. points out that, in response to State's request for extensive tasking of assets by the Agency, DO representatives did not refuse to cooperate but rather pointed out that such tasking takes time to yield results. The most senior of the DO officers who attended insists that State was provided with an extensive briefing on the Agency information collected on Bamaca, that no clissatisfactioh was shown by State officers at the meeting, and neither she nor her Agency colleagues showed any unwillingness to fully employ the DO's capabilities. She notes, however, that most of the Agency information on Bamaca was second- or third-hand, and State was apparently not happy with that fact.
ccording to NIO Allen, who did not attend the meeting, he was telephoned shortly after the meeting by Homme who requested that Allen contact his DI colleagues and ask that they be more forthcoming on the Harbury-Bamaca case. The State memorandum was also faxed to Allen who contacted LA Division officers for clarification and toesponse. Allen also spoke to Kvho told Allen that his impression was that the meeting went well and State officers were grateful for the Agency's assistance.
nllen sentesponse to State's memorandum that had been prepared by LA Division. The response expressed LA Division's surprise at State's disappointment regarding theeeting and added "as we recall there were no concerns expressed at the time and we agreed at the end of the meeting to aggressively pursue further reporting on thesen addressing the issues raised by State, the response noted:
regardatedarificatif
: is impo:
/ever, that this inlonrution is Fragmentary,
land in some cases contradictory whenmermformarion available. The speculative naturel is reflected in the Kiiemorandum ofctobeF was provided to ourAKAcolleagues-
we discussedovember, we arewith Guatemala City Station to secureon the report |
As (Consular Officer] began the story, Ms. Harbury interrupted almost immediately, maintaining that: (a) the article in the newspaper was false and the ex-guerrilla who had made the statements in the article told her (on videotape) that he had never been interviewed and the articlend (b) she was already aware of the guerrillas buried in Coatepeque and they had been killedifferent firelight, not far from the site of her husband's firefight, two weeks earlier or later in March. (She said she remembered that it was different fights because her husband was very upset to learn that his friend, De La Mora, was killed but almost in the same sentence, she said she couldn't remember if De La Mora or her husband was killed first) She also later said that the article, which she remembers as being from August, did not say anything about De La Mora and Bamaca being killed together, and that she has never seen an article which refers to that.
he Embassy added that Harbury said she was not willing to attend another fruitless exhumation and she is convinced that this one would be. She indicated that she would thank the judge for his good intentions but put the record straight the following day in court. The Embassy noted that the ACS Consular officer would accompany Harbury to court.
eported that guerrillas who were captured and
interrogated by the Army for information of intelligence value were given two choices once the interrogation is complete. First, they may enlist in the Army to work forgainst the units to which they formerly belonged. Once their usefulness has been fully exploited by, they would be assigned to other jobs, depending on their skills and capabilities. Alternatively, those who refused to integrate into the Army were summarily shot and buried in unmarked graves.
not take prisonersnor did the URNG.elaborated that the
Army did not believe it wa^violatjn^njniannghts by killing guerrillas, because the guerrillas know that by engaging in open warfare against the Guatemalan Army they face death.
the best
and opined
that if the Army did know where Bamaca was, whether dead or alive,
SEC^rf"
ihe Army would turn him over to put an end to the mediahis case.that Bamacauerrilla
fighting against Guatemala and noted
EC*
could not understand why this particular case was getting so much attention from. when thousands of others had died and had never been mentioned. The | (report was disseminated to the Agency on
he Station responded to Headquarters the same day, confirming that it was tasking* for information on the Bamaca case and clandestine jausananoting that information would be reported in appropriate channels as it was received. Station officers were tasked to obtain any and all information on the Bamaca case for reporting
sEcjeef^
report that Everardo ha<
4ecalls that thenalysis, which he drafted, was initiated based on additional reporting from the Station and included information from both the Octobernalysis and an Octoberntelligence report that indicated that Bamaca had been captured in2 and broughtilitary camp in San Marcos. As was true at the time of the Octoberwas unaware oi thecrwfft captured alive and was cooperating
id also not yet learned of the allegation at the interrogation of DeVinel
henalysis summarized the Agency's reporting on Bamaca, except for the as-yet-undiscovered2 intelligence report, and noted that "the reports also contain ;ond- and trurd-hand allegations that Bamaca was captured alive,
nhe analysis was disseminated to various_Agency components and:
Director, Inter-America Affairs, NSC;
Deputy Assistant Secretary, InterAmerican Regional Affairs,
Central American Affairs, State; Director, Office of Central American Affairs, State; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Guatemala Desk Officer, State; and Guatemala INR Analyst, State.
4 Agency Briefing of SSCI Staff, Ongency officers from the DO and the DI,et with SSCI staff membei
review the Agency's information on Bamaca. In response to questioning about the Agency's collection efforts, DO officers advised that LA Division was searching Headquarters files and the Station was tasking all available assets to clarify information about Bamaca, as well as lo elicit additional information. | he primary briefer, recalls that the briefing was derived from the intelligence reporting that was discussed in hisopy of which was provided to the SSCI staff members at their request.
4 Intelligence Report.Station officer obtained information pertaining to the role of
Quetzaltenangontheapparent death ot
an armect encounterroup of insurgents. Twokilled during the encounter, including one who appeared toinsurgent commander due to his American camouflagedboots, radio, and the weapon he carried. The insurgentidentification andnot
identify the insurgent
eported
the casualties to the local authorities and the human rights representatives in Quetzaltenango, and assumed they took care of burying theonth after the armed encounter,
KpKET
Iwas informedhad killed Everardo during the Marchncounter.
sec^cet
mmented that it was possible the Army
substituted the body of the dead insurgent commander for that of Everardo who apparently was killedeparate location. This woulday of covering up any evidence of torture that may have been used on Bamaca.
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO;
Department of Energy Headquarters, Intelligence Officer
nd Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Air Force.
SEJtkET
reported that
imacaelatively minor wound in one armirefight with the Guatemalan Army outside of Retalhuleu ine was captured and initially interrogated there. During the initial interrogation, it was determined that he knew more about ORPA activity in San Marcos than he did about guerrilla activities in and around Retalhuleu.n Military Zoneas advised and requested that Bamaca be moved from Retalhuleu to San Marcos for in-depth interrogation.
's request was approved by's Military Intelligence (MI) Division, which had responsibility for collecting intelligence on the different guerrilla organizations. The Sanas informed that he would report directly to the MI Division on all issues recardine Bamaca. Bamaca was moved to San Marcos and
| added that security regarding Bamaca was of the highest priority because of his importance to the Army, based on his position within ORPA and because he was thought to be an extremely intelligent individual who was constantly attempting to escape. Bamaca proved to beroblem,]
^hat he was encasedompleteeceived numerous fractures or broken bones, in order to control him and prevent him from attempting to escape.
SEC^fr
SEC
uring the approximate month that Bamaca was heldMarcohe underwent two or three
extensive interrogations at the hands of interrogators from theWhile Bamaca freely talked and providedORPA activities and personnel, he constantly providedregarding arms caches. This eventually led thechief to decide that Bamaca was no longer of any value.was issued by the MI Division to the Military Zonewas lo be killed. To facilitate this action, the,uatemalan Air Force, helicopter and Bamacaalive onto the
disseminated onia the(
old faxed to the Agency on Novemberlll
igencv Briefing of HPSCI Staff. On
j Agency officers from the DO and themembers of the HPSCI staff onto tnecase ofepartment of State liaisonalso in attendance. Referring
reports fromrovHieaa7lir<TnoTogv ol theand possible torture and internment of Bamaca.the Agency had no information on the current status ofon his possible death, the DO officers advised that theyto obtain more recent
he memorandum documenting the briefing, preparedAgency's Office of Coneressional Affairs, indicated thatmembei
briefing ana had no rurtner questions on the Bamaca case.
rimary briefer, believes that he provided the most curremmformation available to him, but he is uncertain whether he included in the briefing information derived from the4 intelligence report thai included the account of the iGuatemalanMBftvho had been2 that^ lhadmmandant certain, however,
4 Discovery ofntelligence rt Sometime betweennd
DI/ALA supervisor,
ntelligence reports, using as criteria meruime^oreaTnaca and Everardo, this time spelled correctly.] ^search retrieved thentelligence report and it was subsequently included in all DI analyses published after NovemberA Division of theeport andvistotiopy of the report to the Station onccording to the Station reports officer, the Station had no knowledge of the existence of the report until this transmittal of it from LA Division.
4 Agencyrecalls that thenalysis, which he drafted, was initiated based on additional reporting from the Station and included information from both thenalysis and thentelligence report indicating that a] ]had been told in2y thisad become aware of thentelligence report and it was included in thenalysis.ad still not learned of an1 report that Alpirez had been present at DeVine's interrogation
henalysis summarized the Agency's reporting on Bamaca, _
.oncerning bamaca's iate, the analysis noted that the evidence pointed to the likelihood that Bamaca was captured alive inut added:
However, we have no reliable information to ascertain whether he is still alive and being heldlandestine military prison. The last alleged sighting of Bamaca-provided by the testimony of two guerrilla escapees-was inlthough the Army wouldtrong incentive to keep him alive-for his supposed knowledge of OBPA's structure and personnel-and turn him against his former comrades, he may well have died of battlefield wounds and been buried in an as-yet-umdentified grave. The Army also could have executed Bamaca after it extracted from him whatever useful information it sought The Army, for its part, remains very tight-lipped about this and other similar cases, and is unlikely to open upull inquiry on the subject.
nhe DI/ALA analysis was cUsseminated to various Agency components and:
Director, Inter- America Affairs, NSC;
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Inter American Regional Affairs,
Central American Affairs, State; Director, Office of Central American Affairs, State; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Guatemala Desk Officer, State; and Guatemala INR Analyst, State.
November
URN^laaprompted interna
4 Intelligence RCPi
tation officer
the
,rompted mternational^ttention concerning the Bamaca caseeans of weakening the Guatemalan Government after the URNGevere blow because of the Government's agreement touman Rights Truth Commission
g^BH^^added that^BHH Sald tKalas far as theGoveriur.eni an< concerned.
information was Iono:
73
SOCKET
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO; and
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps; and Air Force
4 Intelligence Report. ie Station obtained informations
said
te believed tne bamaca case had been ruily resolved until Harbury resurfaced in GuatemalacUumme to have been the wife of the dead guerrilla. According to| (llarbury had been present during the exhumation of what was believed to be Bamaca's body. Harbury said at the time that she was an international human rights lawyer and had not spoken out when questions were asked concerning whether.airy members of the Bamaca family were present, alleged that Harbury claimed to be Bamaca's wife only when she returned toGuatemala. A comment included by the Station noted thall as presumably referring to the firsthat was stopped by the Attorney General when no family member was identified as present.
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO; and
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
ntelligence Report. the Station obtained informationncernine remarks by MOD Enriqut
^during the mcmtruyi ting in Guatemala Cit inriquez told
Bamaca case entails one of the greatest political efforts undertaken by the URNG. In describing his discussions with Harbury, Enriquez said Harbury threatened him, saying if she discovered her husband had been mistreated, the first goal of her protest would be to seek the cessation of Guatemalan access to United States non-traditional export markets. If need be, she would work for worse sanctions as
ECSt
well. Enriquez added that Harbury intended to dismiss as erroneous all information on her husband provided by military officials associated with Bamaca's capture and told him she would call on Colonel Alpirez, Colonel Perez Solarez and Major Sosa Orellana if the Army did not produce her husband.
his information was disseminatedl Hono:
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala; White House Situation Room; State, INR; NSA; DIA; Treasury; USCINCSO;
USCINCSOC Intel Ops Center MacDill AFB; COMJSOC; and
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
interna! conflict and supportea^hepositionof the URNG.whereabouts ofthat Bamaca was
dead and, when asked ii the Guatemalan Government could produce his remains, responded that Bamaca's remains werelace that "makes it impossible to recover them."|
unwilling to answer the questionTp^ was
disseminated to DIA onnomaae available to Agency Headquarters on.
thatG-3
Major Soto Bilbaoajor Sosa Orellana, who were assistedunidentified mmtarydoctorsassienedito the infirmary18id that the doctors
provided the necessary orugsusecimTheintciTOgations. |
that Bamaca waspecial prisonerthnt, when he wasmoved to the military irifirmary for care, the infirmary was cleared of all patients and other personnel to preclude anyone from identifying him. The majority of the officers assigned to the Military Zoneeadquarters level were aware that Bamaca was being heldell in.
uring Bamaca's incarceration at Military ZoneZone 18
an unusual number ol times, presumaDiy to cooramate with those conducting the interrogation of Bamaca. According toH
Hnotcd that Bamaca was not ato escape, thereby forcing the Armyhimull bodyI that
during the prior few weeks Army officers had noticed that ex-guerrillas who were coopted and working for the Army had been noticeably absent and further speculated that their disappearance was probably linkedecision by Army leadership to kill the ex-guerrillas.
ecret
he DAO reportommeritf
noting thatH ad no information to suggest trial former guerrillasnacrrecently been killed by the Army or thatecision had been made by the highdoubted that the Army would risk such an action in the highly charged human rights climate in Guatemala. It was precisely to preclude this possibility, accordingomment added by the Embassy, that Ambassador McAfee raised the issue of deserters' protection with President De Leon on. TheJB^eport was clisseminated on, viaH
It was laterproviae^otne^gericy in
(the Station requested Headquarters how the information
tation also^
}
resubmit the information in an "Exclusive tor format.
The Station sent the information to Headquarters on
nd it was disseminated day to:
same
Embassy, Guatemala (principal officersxclusive for Director, White House Situation Room; Exclusive for Assistant Secretary, INR and the
Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, State; Exclusive for Director, NSA; Exclusive for Director, DIA;
Exclusive for Special Assistant to Secretary, Treasury; and Exclusive for Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
international attention to the case would only serve to bring condemnation upon the Guatemalan Government and strain relations between Guatemala and the international community.
he Novembernalysis summarized the Agency's reporting on Bamaca and reiterated the conclusions in thenalysis I
>vemDernalysis also indicated mat, wruie tne evidence pointed to the likelihood that Bamaca was captured alive inhere was no reliable information to ascertain whether Bamaca was still alive and being heldlandestine military prison.
n, the DI/ALA analysis was disseminated to various Agency components and:
Director, Inter-America Affairs, NSC;
Deputy Assistant Secretary, InterAmerican Regional Affairs,
Central American Affairs, State; Director, Office of Central American Affairs, State; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Assistant SecretaryNR, State;
EC/
Guatemala Desk Officer, State; Guatemala INR Analyst, State; Director, NSA; Director, DIA; andentagon.
the URNG had been manipulating the iganda value and toedge between the Guatemalan. Governments. _
a few months after thetfamacaT URNGmessages to Bamaca's American wife viaorganization. These messages indicated that theinformation that Bamaca had been detained by theand was being tortured. For months thereafter,continued to send information to Bamaca'sinsisting; Bamaca was still alive. In reality
the URNG
no factual information regarding Bamaca after. The URNG information sent to Bamaca's American wife was completely fabricated, and the URNG believed Bamaca probably is dead.
convinced that, in the slim chance that Bamaca was alive,survival would have depended solely on his havingto the Guatemalan military. Thus, if Bamaca werewas because heraitor to the URNG.alive would be very dangerous to the URNG as hethe highest ranking URNG members ever taken bymilitary, and his intelligence value would havethat URNG intelligence believed that, if
Bamaca were alive, the Guatemalan military would have killed him
after. wife began demonstrating and theand military had informed. Governmenthad been killed in
Bamaca were alive, the URNG'sife's activities force the Guatemalan military to kill him and remove himhreat to the URNG.
gencyrecallsnalysis, which he drafted, was initiated at theof the Department of State. Rather than focusing onexclusively, the Novembernalysis assessedstrike and the Bamaca case in general from the perspectiveGuatemalan Government and press. The analysis concludedGuatemalan Government, persuaded that the guerrillasthe case and that international attentionmeddling, would be highly resistant to pressuresthe charges of human rights abuse more fully.also indicated that,
Guatemala probably will, therefore, continue to hold to its story and withstand any XJS. pressure-even sanctions. The military will be even less responsive to. pressure since military aid was halteduatemala could even react. demands on the Bamaca case by questioning VS. motives and limiting- role in the peace process-where the United States has gained leverage by building its credibilityair and impartial interlocutor.
, the DI/ALA analysisto various Agency components and:
Director, Inter-America Affairs, NSC;
Deputy Assistant Secretary, InterAmerican Regional Affairs,
Central American Affairs, State; Director, Office of Central American Affairs, State; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; AS, INR, State;
Guatemala Desk Officer, State-Guatemala INR Analyst, State; Director, NSA;
Director, DIA; and Directorentagon.
ntelligence Report.!
ie Station obtainedsaid
that Bamaca offered no resistance to an Army patrol during his capture on. The Army patrol subsequently turned Bamaca over ton San Marcos Department. Bamaca was held in San Marcos and in Santa Ana Berlin, Quetzaltenango Department,
te Station sent this information to Headquarters on. It was cUsseminatec the same day to:
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO; and
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
ECRET
7
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala (prindpal officersxdusive for Director, White House Situation Room; Exclusive for the Assistant Secretary, INR, State; Exdusive for Director, NSA; Exdusive for Director, DIA;
Exdusive for Spedal Assistant to Secretary, Treasury; Exdusive for USCINCSO; and Exclusive for Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
id been orderedits files and remove and destroy any mcrirninaringcould be used to identify or help trace individuals who mightas responsible for any activity that could be deemed illegalway.action had already been taken
at the Southern Air Base in Retalhuleu. In addition to the removal of all mcrimmating files, the facilities that were used in the early-tos as "interrogation" areas had been totally demolished and pits that were used to biu-^ruerrillas had been filled and covered over with cement. The^BHinformation was disseminated to DIA onana made available to Agency Headquarters the following day.
* that many Guatemalan junior officers assigned to an interior zone suspected. Government of abandoning the idea of being an impartial party in ongoing peace talks and favoring the URNGesult of the Bamaca case, j
jat both the President and Army high comm. mishandled the Bamaca case as the Guatemalan Government strategy appeared to be focused on discrediting Harbury as opposed to conducting an investigation that would lay the matter to rest once and for all. On the subject of Bamaca's fate,
tew nothing about
4 Intelligence Report.
asked to
provS^eTurtrTeraetaTis relative to theeport that Everardo had been captured alive and was cooperating with his captors.
[offered no new details relative to initial report and daimed that he had no specific knowledge of what happened to Bamaca at that point nor did he have information on Bamaca's whereabouts or that of his remains, promised to pass along additional details of the when they became availablel
as obtained |_
that Bamaca was capture< inned or lightly wounded around. Accordingamaca might have been alive four to five weeks after his
Ortega opinea mat oamaca was Kuiea py me ouatemaian Army once he had outlived his usefulness. I that as an uneducated peasant Bamaca wouicTnave had little to offer other than what he could have produced in his initial debriefings. According to
high-level position in ORPA was not discovered tuinHone after his death. I
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
VVhite House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO;
DOEHQ/IN; and
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
<
that the Guatemalan Army's press office wasTesponsiDiea visitroup of Guatemalan journalists to thea firefight with ORPA guerrillas at Nuevo San Carlos onof.
journalists were shown two bodies anduerrilla platoon lieutenant named EfrainThe journalistsiary reportedly takenbody and then photographed the bodyivilbrought to thehe incidentguerrillas'information
pertairung to the guerrillas was provided to then-Guatemalan Human RightsOmbudsman De Leon, as was normal procedure at the time. The(Jreport was disseminated to DIA on Decemberut was not made available to Agency Headquarters until.
tationStation obtained informationa clandestine burial site.l
said that doresn water wellarm in San Pablo. Thebodies of several guerrillas from Bamaca's unit butMajor Raul
Oliva Germeno,all
worked with Bamaca after his capture in the San Marcos
he Station sent the information to the DO at Headquarters on
here is no record that this information was ever disseminated I
the Stationiassined memorandum!
^^of the possible location ofa clandestine bun; siteana its plans to obtain additional information. There was no mention in the memorandum, however, of the three Guatemalan officers, including Alpirez, who reportedly "worked with" Bamaca after his capture. There was no further disseminationnformation.
Bamaca nor evidence of dandestine prisons
was foundesult of the inspection.
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO; and
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
lusive tor Director, White House Situation Room; Exclusive for Assistant Secretary, INR, and
Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, State; Exclusive for Director, NSA; Exclusive for Director, DIA;
Exclusive for Special Assistant to Secretary, Treasury; Exclusive for USCINCSO; and Exclusive for Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
e meeting was attended by him, the Deputyembers Richard Feinberg, George Tenet, and Chat Blakeman, State Department DAS for ARA/CEN Anne Patterson, Colonel Richard Wilhelm from the Office of the Vice President,oJ official. At this meeting, the CIA representatives expressed concern about the need to provide early notification on the information to the intelligence oversight committees in Congress. The NSC members asked CIA to defer
temporarily any notification of the oversight committees to permit pokcyrnakers to develop their strategy andemarche for. Ambassador to present to the Guatemalan Government.
lso at the first meeting with NSC officials, Feinberg asked, among other things, for an analysis of all available data that linked Alpirez to Bamaca's death.
gency Analysis. The analysis was produced on JanuaryJthe Chief of thel
the
nxeoraTricanin American Analysisn this "We have no firsthand accounts of Bamaca's fate, but haveumber of reports mcUcating that he was captured alive and killed while in custody of the military. There is significant circumstantial evidence to suggest that Alpirez was at least the intellectual author of Bamaca'so support this statement,BH referred to thentelligence report stating thatitwas known within the senior military ranks that Alpirez had killed Bamaca; the4 intelligence report stating that Alpirez had taken charge of Bamaca's interrogation; and the4 intelligence report in which Alpirez^
had
Bamaca after his capture untilook him away.
SE
SCecond meeting was held at the NSC on Januarynd attended
Feinberg, Blakeman,Patterson,and Wilhelm. Nb^andbStenacl^
7
mbassyessage from Ambassador McAfee to'State pointed out that the information in the Januaryeport was second-hand and possibly no moreumor. She stressed the need for corroboration before acting on it. She asked that past reporting concerning Bamaca be taken into account, questioned thenalysis andeview of earlier reporting concerning Bamaca. McAfee referred to Alpirez's negative reputation, but questioned whether he could be condemned for having killed Bamaca solely on the basis of one report. Further, she pointed out that Alpirez was unpopular within the Army and noted the possibility that he was being set upcapegoat. She also expressed concern aboutH ^welfare and about damage to the peace process in Guatemalaii^aemarche were issued. Finally, she asked that Hbc consulted as toemarche would affectnunanareqiiested that the allegations be investigatedemarche was made.
SChird meeting was held on Januarynd attended by II Feinberg, Blakeman, Bruce Pease of the NSC^uectoroiStateu
Office of Central American Affairs John Hamilton, Wilhelm, and Mary Ellen Warlow of DoJ. At this meeting, accordingemorandum preparedHamilton provided copies of the Januaryessage from Ambassador McAfee raising concerns about the circumstantial nature of the evidence
a briefing and written comment on the message by DI analysts.
SC Meeting. The memorandum preparedoncerning the fourth NSC meeting oncucaTe^^articipants were the same individuals who attended the Januaryeeting. That memorandum also states that DI analysts had prepared the written analysis Feinberg had requested
and were able to satisfy NSC and State representatives that theretrong circumstantial case against Alpirez. (The Januarynalysis is set forth in further detail inf Volume III.)
he Agency was released to notify theafter this meeting. Onhetold of the Januaryntelligence report that Alpirez hadHIthe
interrogation ofemarche mentioning Alpirez by name was prepared, sent to the Embassy and presented by Ambassador McAfee to Guatemalan President De Leon on February 6.
ECRET
V
Chronology: Key Events Pertaining To Efrain Bamaca Velasquez
Agency intelligence reports indicate that Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, also known as "Commanderas active in the ORPA guerrilla group.
25
and Registration of Marriage filed by Jennifer Harbury in Texas) claiming she and Bamaca were married on this date.
13
Army captured Bamaca near San Marcos the previous day. Though lightly wounded, Bamaca was said to be in good physical condition and cooperating fully with the Army.
former URNG guerrillas. Human Rights Commission in Geneva that they escapeduatemalan military clandestine prison where they saw Bamaca in March and
9
. Embassy help in determining Bamaca whereabouts and arranging for exhumation of grave where he may be buried.
iuuiu UAnviuituirna uui UlC Guatemalan military was holding captured guerrillas, including Bamaca, in clandestine prison cells.
stages first hunger strike in Cuatemala City.
19
Bamaca been captured alive, heldumber of times, and then killed.
EC*
7
epoiHir. military was concerned by two URNG guerrillas of clandestine prisons
and cemeteries.
Januarytells McAfee thai Colonel Alpirez and Major Sosa were
identified by witnesses as having supervised the torture of Bamaca while he was heldilitary base.
cemeteries.
Maymeets with McAfee and the Guatemalan Defense Minister
regarding Bamaca's whereabouts.
Octobera sworn statement issued in, former URNG
guerrilla Santiago Cabrera states that Alpirez was at the military base where Bamaca was bring held and present at Bamaca's interrogation.
Octobermeets with McAfee again to request assistance in
determining Bamaca status.
Octoberbegins second hunger strike in Guatemala City.
OctoberLeon announces new investigation into the Bamaca case and
pecial coordinator to head it
and DI briefings of HPCSI and SSCI staff members on Bamaca.
Novemberpresents demarche regarding Bamaca to De Leon. McAfee
also meets with Harbury and advises her that the State Department has concluded that Bamaca was taken captive but was only aliveew weeks after his capture.
National Security Adviser Lake meets with Harbury and affirms that there is no evidence that Bamaca is still alive. Lake tells Harbury that il was reported that Bamaca was held prisoner as late as
reports to have been told fmj]in
it Alpirez was in charge of the interrogation of
Lake meets with CuatexnaJan Foreign Minister Ruiz de Vieunar and presses for thorough Investigation of Bamaca case.
reports that Major Oliva Cexmeno, Colonel .eonei (jOOoyTand Alpirez. all worked with Bamaca after his capture in San Marcos.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Stale (DAS) Patterson informs Harbury that the US. Government believes that Bamaca is dead.
representatives notify HPSCI and SSCI staff members in separate sessions of Alpirez's alleged involvement in Bamaca's death
McAfee presents demarche to De Leon and askshorough investigation, requesting that Guatemalan investigators interview Guatemalan Army officers who may have been present in the area where Bamaca was captured
SECRET
7
DAS Patterson advises Harbury of McAfee's demarche and informs her that according to available data, Bamaca appears to have been
killed following his capture.
March?
March 10
March 22
March 2?
April 4
May 2
May 18
meets with Guatemalan Chief Prosecutor and urges him tohorough investigation regarding the disappearance of Bamaca.
McAfee meets with Harbury and tells her that the evidence indicates that Bamaca is dead. However, no one knows the exact circumstances or precisely what happened to him.
State Department press release states that the Guatemalan Government has been urged toull accounting of Bamaca's disappearance. The press release announces that. Government has suspended the participation of Guatemalan military personnel in International Military Education and Training Programs in.
Representative Torricellietter to President Clinton and the New York Times, charging the OA with direct involvement in the murders of DeVine and Bamaca.
The Public Prosecutor's Office in Guatemala City interviews Alpirez in connection with Bamaca's disappearance. Alpirez reportedly denies knowledge of Bamaca's capture, interrogation or relocation among various military units.
Harbury tells SSCI that Bamaca vanished in combat onear the Guatemalan-Mexican border area. She explains that former URNG guerrilla Santiago Cabrera witnessed Alpirez's presence at Bamaca's torture and interrogation.
A military court in Retalhuleu rules that there is no reason to hold Alpirez and other members of the Guatemalan military who may have been Involved in the capture and torture of Bamaca.
toDefensesaid BaTmeoamacacase should be taken up byClarification Commissioninal peace agreementbetween the Government and the URNG.
What information was available to the cia Between5 andoncerning Bamaca? How was that information handled? how reliable were the cia assets from whom the information was acquired?
5 Embassy Telegrams. In two separate telegrams, the Embassy described reports issued by the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman's office. The first report, dealtday investigation into the disappearance of Bamaca. The Embassy commented that the investigation by the Ombudsman's office was limited in scope The investigation concluded that Bamaca was not found to be detained by any Guatemalan officials or security forces and that it could not be determined whether Bamaca was alive or dead. According to the Embassy, responsibility for the investigation had now reverted to the Attorney General's office. In the second report, the Ombudsman's office concluded that the human rights situation in Guatemala had not improved and the security forces were still abusing individual rights. This report, according to the Embassy, was disappomting in that it was superficial and reached conclusions not fully supported by the facts.
Onarbury asked DAS Patterson to expedite her Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request and to provide her with access to classified information pertaining to Bamaca's disappearance. Harbury told Patterson that she planned to conduct another hunger strike onf. Government did not impose sanctions against Guatemala. In response to Harbury's requests, Patterson reiterated. Government's continued commitment toull account of Bamaca's fate and suggested that Harbury file another FOIA request to obtain the classified information she was see long. Patterson also told Harbury that "we do not have conclusive evidence but we believe that Bamaca did not survive for moreew weeks after his capture."
mbassy Telegram. Onmbassador McAfee reported that Harbury stated that she intended to file suit against the VS. Government if her FOIA request was not completedouple of weeks. McAfee also reported that Harbury reiterated her belief that. should impose economic sanctions against Guatemala. Harbury stated McAfee told Harbury that she did not believe Bamaca was alive because there was no evidence to support that belief. Harbury stated that her efforts were progressing on several fronts:riminal case against individual Guatemalan military personnel;uit against Guatemala filed with the OAS;eries of complaints filed with the OAS alleging Guatemalan harassment against her;archlanned hunger strike; e) various nonspecific efforts on the international level; and,ovie to be produced by Castlerock Productions. In regard to the FOIA request, McAfee directed Harbury to the State Department in Washington.
ilitary personnel who had been identified in Cabrera's testimony. The Station apprised the DO at Headquarters of
7
investigationhree month search for Bamaca during the period October to4 before concluding that Bamaca died of wounds receivedirefight inhree separate investigations, conducted simultaneously under the direction of the Guatemalan Supreme Court and Attorney General, Public Minister and Prosecutor General, and the Office of Human Rights Attorney General Jorge Mario Garcia, failed to produce any credible leads in Guatemala.
hen commenting on unsuccessful efforts to exhumeBamaca's remains on separate occasions inovemberthat this was neither
unusual nor mcUcatTveoferirjrts to prevent the release of Bamaca's remains. They explained that the military elements from Quetzaltenango Department (Militaryho killed Bamacairefight onere not aware of Bamaca's identity nor of the significance of his captureay or two after the firefight Bamacahad no identity documents on his person when he was searched after the firefight When Bamaca died of wounds, his remains were buried by military personnel without much attention to the site or circumstances. The armed forces did not learn of Bamaca's identity until they intercepted a
advising
the firefight.
Embassy, Guatemala; White House Situation Room; State, INR; NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO;
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force; and DOEHQ/IN.
tation Report. Onhe Embassy's human rights officer offered to allow the Station reports officer to review an internal Embassy memorandum relating to the Bamaca case. The memorandum quoted an I
[official whouatemalariiniiitar)'orricer whorisoner in Guatemala City. The officer reportedly was in Quetzaltenango when Bamaca was being held there and may have seen Bamaca as late ashe officer told the
tat Bamaca was movedotersonnel from military post to military post to provide additional security for the operation. However, Bamaca was also takeneadquarters in Guatemala Gty for more intensive interrogations. Bamaca reportedly was immobilizedast on his leg to prevent him from escaping. The officer said that, while posted at the Santa Ana Berlin military post (outside Coatepeque) in Quetzaltenango Department, his curiosity got the best of him and he made an unauthorized entrance into the area where Bamaca was being held. He was caught and was punished for his security breach. According to the officer, Bamaca was carted away to Guatemala City and that was the last he was heard of during the time the officer was in western Guatemala.
he Embassy human rights officer noted, however,stated that the officer gave contradictory and
speculative answers regarding what happened to Bamaca afterdeparture. Further,not
EOcET
beb'eve the officer has any idea what happened to Bamaca after
n the morning ofhe Stationormal copy of the memorandum from the Embassy. However, later the same day, the human rights officer asked the DCOS to return the memorandum to the Embassy. The human rights officer said he was not authorized to pass the memorandum to the Station and was not sure the Station was to know about it. The DCOS initially surrendered the memorandum withouthotocoi
ntelligence Report.|
| the Station obtained mformationl
Guatemalan President De Leon agreea toew
reinvigorated investigation into Bamaca's death. I
decision was made in the wakeeeting
>etween members of the Guatemalan Government Peace Commission (COPAZ)ormer US. Ambassador to El Salvador, who was now representing Harbury. President De Leon also agreed to task the Guatemalan Prosecutor General and Publiclvlinister tohorough investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Bamaca. There were also plans
7
presently abroad, and who had testified that they saw Bamaca in an Army dandestine jail. Their dedarations and declarations made by Harbury would be used in the investigation.
5 Embassy Telegrams. Onmbassador McAfee encouraged Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff Gonzalez Taracena to support Public Ministry questioning of Guatemalan Army officers assigned to San Marcosn MarchcAfee again raised with Gonzalez Taracena and MOD Enriquez the need for positive movement on the Bamaca case.
j the Guatemalan Government's principal defense with regard to tne rJamaca case would be to emphasize that Bamacaurderer and terrorist,. citizen, and to attempt to prove to the satisfaction of. media that Bamaca's marriage to Harbury was fabricated as partolitically motivated conspiracy to embarrass the Guatemalan Government.
atta
COPAZ to discuss the possibilityhorohe
death of Bamaca. Accordingember of COPAZ tried to persuade the military officers to worl towardsmthful and credible version of the events leading to Bamaca's death. The COPAZ member explained that the many different versions circulating about Bamaca's disappearance do nothing but discredit the Guatemalan Government and couldajor obstacle in the peace process. The military officers reacted with some hostility, saying the COPAZ member was trying to force the military to come up with scapegoats. The civilians at the meeting disagreed with the military officers and suggestedetter solution would be for the Army to admit it had Bamaca and that Bamaca had cooperated with the Army. This suggestion was also rejected by the military officers who said that the version of events claiming Bamaca was killed in combat was truthful.
iEGKtff
ccording.military will resist
pressure from civilians in the Executive branch because it believes it would have to compromise some of its officers and admit to wrongdoing. Civilians in the Executive branch are trying to enlist the support of MOD Enriquez to have the Army come up with amore truthful-version of events.
he Station sent the information to Headquarters onnd it was disseminatec same day to:
US. Embassy, Guatemala; White House Situation Room; State, INR; NSA; DIA; Treasury; USCINCSO;
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force; and DOEHQ/IN.
ody
exhumed during the search for Bamaca's remains was indeed Bamaca. Accordingtation comment, this waseference to one of three bodies exhumed on. According to the military investigation, the judge who presided over the exhumation and subsequently declared that the exhumed body was not that of Bamaca was paid to do so, although MOD Enriquez did not explicitly say so during the briefing. MOD Enriquez stated that the judge, who is currently retired, will soon present himself in
court to change his former assessment and will declare that the body that was exhumed was indeed the remains of Bamaca.
he Station sent the information tond it was
same day to:
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR, DSITA;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO;
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force; DOEHQ/IN; Secret Service; and FBI.
5 Embassy and State Telegrams. Harburyrief visit to Guatemala, meeting with Ambassador McAfee just prior to her return to Washington to begin another hunger strike. Harbury requested that McAfee approach Guatemalan authorities on her behalf to urge them to recognize the validity of her Texas marriage to Bamaca so that she could be guaranteed access to the Guatemalan court system. Harbury expressed her displeasureOIA request submitted to State had not been complied with yet. She repeatedly asked if. Government had evidence or reliable information that Bamaca was dead. McAfee told Harbury that all available evidence indicated that Bamaca is dead.
imultaneous meetings between Ambassador McAfee and the Guatemalan Foreign Minister in Guatemala, and Central American Affairs Director Hamilton and Guatemalan Ambassador Mulet in Washington discussed Guatemalan Government policy on Bamaca and the US. cancellation of Guatemalan participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. In Guatemala, the Acting Foreign Minister told McAfee that the Guatemalan Government considers the Bamaca case to be open and is pursuing it. He explained that he believed thatoal was not justice, but to damage bilateral relations. In Washington, Muletress statementhite Paper on Bamaca's case, noting that the Guatemalan Government's position was that Bamaca was not captured by Guatemalan military forces. Hamilton informed Mulet that. was suspending the participation of Guatemalan military personnel in IMET programs for the remainder5 dueack of substantial progress in the Bamaca, Myma Mack, Michael DeVine, Nicholas Blake, Griffin Davis, and Diana Ortiz cases.
mbassyandStateTelegrams. The U. N. Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) issued its first report on, according to the Embassy. The report detailed numerous human rights violations, many apparently connected to government security forces. The report also cited the URNG for human rights violations.
ashington-based URNG representative Francisco Ortega told State Department Senior Adviser Nuccio onhat ORPA leader As curias shared the URNG view that Harbury's actions are not politically helpful. Ortega also told Nuccio that he believed Harbury was "obsessed" and could not be stopped from conducting her latest hunger strike, that began on. In Guatemala City, DCM Keane pressed the Guatemalan Prosecutor General to begin interviews of individuals who may be involved in the disappearance of Bamaca. Keane also asked the Prosecutor General to consider recognition of Harbury's Texas marriage.
The Station sent the information to Hea, and it was cu^eminated the sameaay to:
Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff Gonzalez Taracenastateo^hatthe Army was losing credibility over the Bamaca
that mid-level officers are beginning to question vJ?atreally happened to Bamaca and may be pressuring the Army's leadership for answers in the case.
lpirez interview bv the Guatemalan Public Prosecutor. On, Alpirez was interviewed at the Public Prosecutor's Office in Guatemala City ^connection with
124
SEOrffr
the special irivestigation into Bamaca's disappearance conductedthe
H Alpirez
San Marcos) on
2 and was transferred to another post one said he served in San Marcosonths and his duties consisted of assisting the Second Commander of the zone in coordinating the activities of the general staff, monitoring the upkeep of the base facilities, and supervising the mechanical services and enlisted men's training. Alpirez specified that, as Third Commander, he was in command of no units and had no troops under his command. He went out on no missions because his work was done at command headquarters, although he occasionally oversaw administrative aspects of the detachments. He denied knowledge of military operations conducted against insurgents in Quetzaltenango Department and Military Zonend pointed out that, jurisdictionally, Quetzaltenango Department is independent of Military ZoneSane stated that he was not aware of any capture of insurgents while he was Third Commander of Militarye denied knowing anything about the capture of Santiago Cabrera, and said he had not spoken with Cabrera and mteaogating was not among his duties. Alpirez denied knowledge of Bamaca's capture, interrogation or being moved among various military units.
archmbassy Telegrams. Thethat Guatemalan Public Ministry Prosecutor Machucahe interviewed Colonel Alpirez for six hours.announced that he was still undecided as to whether orneeded to be brought to court. Prosecutor GeneralMachuca's supervisor, explained that theis interested in fully mvestigating the matter anddocumentary information pertaining toallegations. In addition,
that Alpirez denied any involvement in the DeVine or Bamaca cases during his interview with the Public Ministry. The source said that Alpirez also denied ever workingIA asset.
z
5 Embassy and State Telegrams. Onhe Embassy reported that Ambassador McAfee met with Guatemalan Prosecutor General Cuestas and urged him to quickly reinterview the other Army personnel implicated in the Bamaca case. Cuestas told McAfee that he wanted to get Santiago Cabrera's official statement as well as the evidence that Congressman Torricelli and. Government had on the case. Cuestas noted that he planned to send Prosecutor Machuca to Washington to obtain the evidence.
The Embassy also reported on5 that one of President De Leon's closest private advisors, Jorge Arenas, requested the establishmentrivate communications channel between. and Guatemalan Government that would hopefully result in the achievementositive outcome in the Bamaca case. Arenas expressed great personal concern to McAfee over the inadequate response to date of the Guatemalan Government, calling it negative and even harmful. He said heong talk with President De Leon about his concerns and offered himself as an intermediary to try toroactive positive solution to the problem.
Onhe State Department instructed Ambassador McAfee toemarche, using provided talking points,etter from the Secretary of State to Guatemalan President De Leon. The letter and the demarche stressed the importance of bringing to justice the murderers of DeVine and Bamaca. It also stressed. Government's willingness to cooperate toward that end.
In following State's instructions, McAfee reported that she met the same day with President De Leon and that De Leonommitment toward full cooperation to resolve both the Bamaca and DeVine cases. However, De Leon initially indicated that, since Bamaca is now accepted as dead, the case should be kept for the Historical Clarification Commission, because Bamacauerrilla who died in the war. Then, after the meeting, De Leon obviously reconsidered what he had said and called McAfee toillingness to continue to seek ways to resolve the case, without taking rigid positions that would constrain future action.
ccording to an Embassy analysis, reported on Aprilhe De Leon Government is currently faced with growing problemshrinking support base. Exacerbating the situation are recent coup rumors that are most likely the result of the Bamaca, DeVine and CIA cases. In order to resolve these cases, the Embassy analysis noted that De Leon would have to take on the Army, and in doing this, he would be facedajor problem because the Army represents his most important support base. The outcome, according to the analysis, could indicate paralysis for the De Leon presidency, until his departure from office in
5 SSCI Hearing. Accordingublic transcript of the open session of the SSCI hearing, Harbury described her involvement in Guatemalan affairs and stated that her husband vanished in combat onn Guatemala near the Mexican border in ORPA territory. She also noted that the Armyrief statement the next day saying that they hadadaver after the combat and sent it to Retalhuleu for burial. Referring to Cabrera's statements about Bamaca, Harbury testified:
ouldong time have continued to think that he was dead and buried in Retalhuleu if Santiago Cabrera Lopez had not escaped from an army base in
Now in fact Santiago had fought in my husband's division and he himself was taken prisonere had been very badly torturederiod of about six months and was placedew experimental program being carried out, or military intelligence, which wasew years old at thatew selected-out prisoners who were captured, instead of being promptly killed, were actually taken aside and subjected to long-term torture and psychological abuse until they would snap or break down and become partecret and permanent cadre of informants for theumber of these prisoners that he was able to name, we have confirmed are still alive and in army hands. Some of them have been alive for years. Again, the purpose was not to kill them, it was to keep them alive but broken.
On Marchantiago saw my husband in an army base, chained hands and feeted, undergoing interrogation. He was even able to speak with him briefly becausefficials wished for him to confirm that that was in fact the legendary Commander Everado that they had been trying to catch for so long. He saw him chaineded, hands and feetlanket, under interrogation, for aboutays. Everado was then moved; they were told he had been shot. But he saw him again in lateifferent base.
This time, he saw him strappedospital table with an unidentified gas tank next to the bed. He was stripped down to hisis entire body was grotesquely swollen several times normal size. One arm was bandaged completely shoulder to wrist, and one leg was bandaged completely hip to ankle as if they had ruptured, and he was speakingaving voice.
The man bending over the torture table was someone that Santiago knew quite well; it was Colonel Julio Alpirez. Santiago also named first name, both last names, rank and position of all the other very high level intelligence officials who were involved in his torture and interrogation. He also said that they had actuallyoctor to stand by to make sure they didn't accidentally kill Everado, The point was to break him, not to kill him. He was the goose that laid the golden egg in terms of military intelligence.
7
There's nothing, afterearsommander and founder, that he did not know.
Santiago did see himew days later. The swelling had gone down. He looked very ill but he was still alive. He could not see the arm and leg because he was dressedilitaryew months later, Santiago escaped having not seen Everado (sp) again, and had been threatened many, many times to never tell of what he had seen.
Mr. Cabrera Lopez in January met withnterrogated him very attorney style, up one wall and down the other. Heemoryomputer and never contradicts himself. He went to Geneva and gave all of this testimony to the United Nations Conference in Geneva inestified March the, and gave all of this list of names as well to the OAS Inter American Commission on Humanhen proceeded to give all of this information to the State Department to members of the United States Congress and Senate, and to all of the Human Rights Organizations, begging for help.
At that point, the army, of course, in Guatemalaitropaganda stunt, that Santiago was lying, thata deserter, he was trying to blackmail them, he was athat my husband was buried in Retalhuleu where they toldthe first place
On, a|
Bamaca was now lust ana naa aiea inyuetzaltenango) on the slopes of Volcanmall active volcano in the heart of contested insurgent territory. |
(alsoduring the time
Bamaca wasby
a Guatemalan intelligence officer named Jesus Efrain Aguirxe Loarca, up Volcan Santiaguito in Military5 to locate an arms cache. While on the slopes of the volcano, the patrol was ambushed by URNG insurgents. Aguirre was severely wounded in his right arm and in his anger made the decision to eliminate Bamaca, possibly by having him thrown into the activeonfirmed that Bamaca had died that day on Volcan Santiaguito.
hat it would not have been
unusual for an intelligence officer to make the decision on his ownBamaca who was deemed of
value. n0 -mcritten record
have been made of the events surrounding the death of anas Bamaca.that it would be easy to
determine when Bamaca died as Aguirre's wound was so severehe traveledS. medical facility forincludedthat Aguirre
rj-aveleclto. fromond again betweennd. TheBBreport was disseminated to DIA on5 and made avau^ble to Agencyays later.
isapproveassertions. The Station
responded on April (referring to the considerable and often conflict in c- reporting received in the Bamaca case. The Station also stated that it had no information to prove or disprove that Aguirre Loarca had Bamaca killedit of rage. I
jjiyiMHa oimmrmM-BHkia and
the peace negotiations. The
De Leon administration expects the URNG to use the scandal to place
EQf
demands on the Government with the objective of further delaying the signingeace agreement.
he Station sent the information tond it was
same day to:
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury; USCINCSO; DOEHQ/IN; and
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.
even
account for Aipuez's tirne during the first montn or so oteported internment, it must be remembered that it was not until mid-2 that ex-URNG guerrilla Cabrera identified Alpirez as one of Bamaca's interrogators. TheBpBreport was disseminated to DIA on5 and made avatjaDleto Agencyays later.
5 Embassy Telegram. The Embassy reported that onocial gathering Ambassador McAfeeefensive MOD Enriquez regarding the Bamaca and DeVine cases. Specifically, Enriquez persisted in supporting the official Guatemalan Government line that Bamaca disappearedirefight near Retalhuleu on; the Army never had rum; and the Army has no knowledge of his fate. In contrast, Enriquezossible willingness to reopen an investigation of the DeVine murder, to consider accepting an FBI advisory presence on some human rights cases, and to think about publicly announcing that MTNUGUA the United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala had interviewed all ex-guerrillas still in Army custody.
Enriquez claimed that he had no personal knowledge of what happened to Bamaca as he was assignedifferent area of the country at the time of the disappearance. Enriquez also noted that no soldiers had come forward with information that Bamaca had been captured at Military Zonen San Marcos or anywhere else. McAfee told Enriquez that. Government information had been provided to President De Leon on the Bamaca case,ebruary report indicated that Bamaca had been captured and detained by the Army at San Marcos, and that Colonel Alpirez, as one of the officers assigned to San Marcos at the time, certainly had knowledge of what happened to Bamaca.also in attendance at the breakfast and told Eruiqilezthatthe information was independent of that elicited from Santiago Cabrera.
nriquez added that he nowworn statementormer female guerrilla from Bamaca's unit who isollaborator at Military Zonen San Marcos. According to Enriquez, she saw Bamaca livingemale guerrilla companion at his guerrilla camp in San Marcos. She observed them kissing and embracing one another and said that she had never seen Harbury in the camp or withicture of Harbury had been shown at the camp, and Harbury had been described to all the combatantsollaborator and supporter of the guerrillas. Enriquez continued to reiterate that the Guatemalan Army never had Bamaca.
ee Report,
>btained informationthat
the URNG planned to make the most of Harbury's denunciations of Guatemalan Government human rights abuses since the URNG anticipates that the accompanying scandal will divert Guatemalan Government and international attentionfrorrilTRNGnon^ and foot-dragging in the peace process. I
lthough Harbury Lsormaror^^rficnat^heha^ad
ilXn^ffiliation with the ORPA and has followed its directives. The URNG anticipates utilizing Harbury as an even more effective
divert international attention from URNG refusal to sign any peace agreement
each contentious rum of the next negotiation round, the URNG plans to have Harbury increase her public denunciations of Guatemalan Government human rights abuses to discredit the Guatemalan Government
ntellit Station was told Bamaca burial sit
idhai bamaca Is said to be buned at me cabanas
ly detacruTientTSan Marcos Department) which is located on the Cabuz River. In response to the Station's request for Headquarters' views on dissemination,Headquarters advised the Station|to resubmit the information and include appropriate comments to make clear the "rumor nature" of the information.
he Station sent the information to Headquarters on, and it was disseminated on Aprils an intelligence
The Station sent the information to Headquarters onnd it was aUsseminated April^Bto:
propaganda campaign in April to. mteiiigence as; the URNG's greatest enemy, and themes include the idea. intellieence was responsible for Bamaca's murder and has been supporting death squads in Guatemala. The URNG high command hopes this will help relieve it of international political pressure during the urKOrning round of peace talks by embarrassing and weakening the Guatemalan military and the government of Guatemalan President De Leon as well as enlisting international public opinion on behalf of the URNG.
, Embassy Telegram. According to Embassy reporting, on, the Political Counselor (accompanied by an ACS Officer) met with Vicente Arranz, President of the President's Commission on Human Rightso discuss
the Guatemalan Government's investigation into the Bamaca case. The Political Counselor also conveyed Harbury's request to be present at interviews of the Guatemalan military and expressed concern over the difficulties she was encountering in registering her marriage to Bamaca in Guatemala. Arranz confirmed that Public Ministry interviews of military members had not yet begun and offered several excuses for the delay. With respect to Harbury's request to attend all interviews and visits conducted in connection with the investigation, Arranz replied that he would respond officially after receiving the request in writing from. Embassy and after discussing it with the appropriate Guatemalan Government officials. With respect to the registration of her marriage, Arranz accepted the Embassy's concerns but noted that the marriage issue was not relevant to the investigation, which would continue regardless.
the
Station
Guatemalan Government was preparing to suspend senior military officers Roberto Alpirez and Garcia Catalan, who are implicated in the DeVine death and cover-up,udicial investigation clears their names or finds proof against them, in which case they will be disciplined. The Guatemalan Government does not intend to conduct further investigations into Bamaca's death. The Bamaca case will be left to the Historical Clarification Commissioneace agreement is signed with the URNG.
the government is seeking"to have an amnesty in place for the Guatemalan military and members of the URNG by the time the agreement is signed, it is highly unlikely the Bamaca case will ever be fully resolved.
mbassy Telegram. The Embassy reported that onmbassador McAfee met with Guatemalan President De Leon and discussed the De Vine and Bamaca cases. De Leon conveyed to McAfee that in his opinion Bamaca's disappearance and death should be dealt with by the Historical Clarification Commission. De Leon argued that the Bamaca case goes to the heart of the conflict and cannot be separated out from its ultimate resolution.
With respect to the DeVine murder, De Leon implied that it will be difficult to pursue the intellectual authors of the crime and those involved in the cover-up. De Leon explained that any such investigations (especially regarding the cover-up) couldreat number of officers mduding two past MODs. De Leon also suggested that Alpirez and Garda Catalan were suspended due to their possible involvement in the deaths of two soldiers mentioned
recently by convicted DeVine killer Solbal, not for their involvement with the DeVine case which has already been tried.
tation Report Headquarters cabled the Station on Aprilnd requested its review of the NSC's request for release to Harbury of the location of the burial site included in the
/
5 State Telegram. Accordingepartment of State telegram, onenior State officials John Hamilton and Richard Nuccio, met with Guatemalan President De Leon's Adviser for National Security, Jose Maria Argueta. Argueta appealed to the US. Government to provide President De Leon feedback on his actions on the DeVine and Bamaca cases. Argueta explained that some form of feedback would encourage De Leon to take steps described by Argueta in aneeting regarding the abolition of military commissioners, shake-up of the military high command and moving forward implementation of the Historical Clarification Commission.
Prior to the5 meeting, Hamilton and NSC staff member Chat Blakeman briefed Argueta. intelligence conclusions about the Bamaca case that were derived from interagency-cleared talking points.. intelligence indicated that Bamaca had been captured alive in the spring2 by the Guatemalan military and had not diedirefight as the Guatemalans contend. Bamaca was held by the Guatemalan Army in Military Zonen San Marcos and was interrogated. Further, according to testimony of Santiago Cabrera, Alpirez had overseen Bamaca's interrogation with participation by other Guatemalan officers and soldiers (to include Military, Major Sosargueta claimed that the Guatemalan Government needs additional information torosecution, but Hamilton and Blakeman contended that the information already passed to the Guatemalan Government provided sufficient leads to undertake an investigation.
5 Embassy Telegram. According to Embassy reporting, the Guatemalan press reported onhat the military court in Retalhuleu had ruled that there was no reason to hold Alpirez and other members of the Guatemalan military in the capture and torture of Bamaca. The decision was the result of the Chief Prosecutor's preliminary investigation to determine whether an evidentiary basis existed upon which to bring charges against specific Guatemalan military members. Defense lawyers subsequently
requested the judge to "dose the case or dedare that there is no case. The judge acceded to that request, effectively closing the case to further investigation and judidal review.
5 Intel Station obtained informatio
a military judge mat there was no evidence to indicate Alpirez was involved in Bamaca's death and that the case was closed. mmW
Guatemalan appeals court had upheld the military court's decision on
igreed he would instructoiic Ministry toestraining order against the fading of the military court that would allow the case to remain open and the investigation to continue.
he Station sent the information to Headquartersand it was
same day to:
U.S. Embassy, Guatemala;
White House Situation Room;
State, INR;
NSA;
DIA;
Treasury;
USCINCSO;
Intelligence Units of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force; Secret Service; FBI; and
DoJ Command Center.
14V
SECRET
(Additionally, stress and tension remain withinArmy as some senior officers choose their positionthat the DeVine, Blake,
and Davis cases are viewed as legitimate for expeditious resolution in contrast to the Bamaca case.
ith specific reference to the Bamacastated that Bamaca is dead and the case should Dethe auspices of the Historical Clarification Commissionwar ends. Additionally,that to continue
to subject the Guatemalan Government to pressure for the resolution of the Bamaca case, would only serve to damage the already fragile peace negotiations as well as detract from the other cases such as DeVine, Blake and Davis.
mbassy Telegrams. The Embassy reported that Ambassador McAfee met with MOD Enriquez on5ocial gathering. McAfee took the opportunity to press Enriquez regarding the need for continued progress in the Bamaca, DeVine and other human rights cases. Enriquez distinguished between the murder of DeVine and the death of Bamaca during the conflict. Additionally, Enriquez reiterated that the Guatemalan Government is actively searching for Contreras but that the Bamaca death wouldatter for the Historical Clarification Commission. Enriquez appeared cognizant of the need for the Guatemalan Government to resolve these cases but offered no new ideas about how to achieve that progress.
Onhe US. Consul General called upon Guatemalan Prosecutor General Ramses Cuestas to inquire as to the reasoning behind the removal of Special Prosecutor Lionel Machuca from the Bamaca and DeVine investigations. Cuestas revealed that he had recently discovered that Machuca had acted in direct contradiction to the Public Ministry's official position in the Bamaca case by failing to appeal the recent court decision to close the case to further investigation or review. Machuca subsequently lied to his superiors and to Embassy personnel in stating that the Public Ministry had appealed but that it had unfortunately been filed too late for consideration. Additionally, Cuestas noted that carbon copies of Alpirez's statement to the court had been tampered with. According toonfirmation of the decision by the military court would prevent Harbury or others from pressing any kind of criminal charges against Alpirez and the other rrulitary suspects in the future. Cuestas claimed to be preparing an appeal that willeversal of the decision in the Bamaca case.
With respect to possible future litigation filed against Guatemalan rrulitary members on behalf of Harbury, Cuestas said that he would work with Harbury. However, he opined that the issue of the legality of her marriage would first have to be settled if she were to press charges as Bamaca's spouse'.
AORepoA
^thebelieves that the US. Government is deliberately attemptingthe Army, but that thesethan dividing it.ers in
the Guatemalan Army believeand "sacrifices" an officer to thehen the US.will seek out other officersano^tt^rrir^to have themjustice for alleged crimes.that "things"
happened during the long war that would not be accepted today.
"lit is these occurrences that individual officers fear will be revealed and result in the ultimate destruction of the Guatemalan Army as an institution.
o oneact that he
dditionally, asked what DeVine was
oing in Guatemala Deyon<mall hotel in Poptun. No one has mquired into allegations that he was involved in smuggling both arms and illegal contraband.
that with respect to Bamaca, itstatement that he was marriedthat no one has inquired as to
whether Baniacawa^ireaay married in Guatemala. According towas in fact already married, and not only hacuiGuatimialan wife, but two children who currently livearm on the Pacific Coast.
gency Chronology. An updatehronology, prepared by
as published on Maynd citedlBntelligence reports that had been issued by the Agency and the DAO on Bamaca-related issues. The published updateummary of each intelligence report but included no analysis pertaining to Bamaca's fate-
, the Agency chronologyto various Agency components and:
Director, Inter-America Affairs, NSC; Mr. Richard Feinberg, NSC;
Deputy Assistant Secretary, InterAmerican Regional Affairs,
Central American Affairs, State; Director, Office of Central American Affairs, State; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; AS, INR, State;
Guatemala Desk Officer, State; Guatemala INR Analyst, State; Director, NSA; Director, DIA; and Directorentagon.
ie earn;
case was ciosea ana snouia oe taxen up oy tneCommissioninal peace agreement is signedGuatemalan insurgency.
investigative effort into Bamaca's fate in the future should be the responsibility of MTNUGUA.
he Station sent the information to Headquarters on and it was disseminated|
May |to:
ntelligencetation obtameoHniormatiox
)irez was not involved in the
or bamaca.
lamaca was turned over to military intelligence in Guatemala City sometimes after his capture.
he capture of Bamaca
was an emotional event with the armed forces, which resultedlevel attention to thethe
compartmentation and security ortne^peratior!was not maintained because of the excitement that resulted from the capture of an URNG commander. Bamaca was moved around San Marcos Department to help the Army understand URNG modus operandi and was recognized by enlisted men in the area as he traveled and assisted Army officers in identifying such things as insurgent arms caches.
Reporting on Bamaca's Fate reporting by date information available to cia
?
Guerrilla group leader kilted at Nuevo San Carte (Rralhuleu)
ateReport source: Press
captured ni San Marcos. In good health and cooperating with Amy
A DHeofevenr:Report source: CIA
3
killed at Santa Crui del Quiche, in combat
Report source: CIA
2
Two ei-guerrillas datm Bamaca seen alive in clandestine prison
Date of2 Report source: State
firms
reports Everardo dead
Daw of evert: No daw Report source:uemltas claim
Dale of2 Report source: CIA
Bamaca killed near sown, of Couepcque by patrol
A Date of evem:2 Report source: CIA
Bamaca interrogated, held irKommumcado. and killed
Due of event;2 Report source: OAO
Bamaca capiured and interrogated at Retalhuleu, movedan Marcos, placed In body cast, interrogated for one month before Ml chief ordered killed. Bamaca loaded aliveelicopter.
Date of event:2 Report source: OAO
Bamaca turned overn Saneld in San Marcos and Ran?ho Santa Ana
B
No* lortured or wounded, tarred over.
Aeport source: CIA
Bamaca diedesult of wounds after2 fight
Date of event:2 Report source: DAO
Bamaca died shortly after capture of wounds received in combat and buried in San Marcos near firefight sight
Date of event:2 Report source: CIA
Bamaca captured unharmed and may have beeneeks after capture
Date ofevew:2 Report source: CIA
Bamaca taken aKrt. interrogated by Alpiret atow dead
Date of event:eport source: CIA
4
kill Date Report
illcd in flrcfijhi uilh
macadkd or wounds:
tr flreflfhll
n source CIA
mac* ixocad
Date of event:io Report source: CIA
ha* witnesses to testify Bamaca committed suicide before being apprehended
Date of event: No date
Report source: CIA
Bamaca may be buried in Coatcpequ-
Date of event: No date Report source: Stale
URNG passed info to Harbury thai Bamaca was detained and tortured by Guatemalan iall info.fabricated
Date of event: No date Report source: CIA
Bamaca captured duringatnd then taken to Rartcho Santa Ana Berlin where beheld for one monih. inicrrogaKd. and moved so Guatemala City. Bamaca is dead.
Daw of event:2 Report source: DAO
Alpirei worked with Bamacaafter capture. Bamaca not killed in Sao Marcos
Date elevens;2 Report source: CIA
Alpuer killed Bamaca
Dale of event: No dMe Report source: CIA
5
Bamaca movedrom Pane ho Santa Ana Berlin, takeno Guatemala City
Date of? Report source: Slate
5
Bamaca interrogated at. tried to escape
A Dale of? Report source: DAO
Bamaca captured, iiiounded at Nuevo San Carlos, taken to Infirmary at Southern Air Bi>c. then removed via truck.ersonnel
Date of event:eport source: DAO
Bamaca MX takent San Marcos until end of March, held in San Marcos until end of April
Date of event:2 Report source: DAO
loo bodies in afternoon at Nuevo San Carlos and told one of two dead was Bamaca Date of event:eport source: DAO
Bamaca visit at San Manos
5
Bamacaantiaeuito. kilk
Date of evi Report sou:
of event:2 Report source: CIA
Bamaca is dead, remains are in place "impossible" to recover
Dale of event: No date Report source; DAO
buriedate of eve Report sour
Bamaca turnedDate of eve Report mil
j pa tits of Senior Guatemalan Positions
| 0 | 9 | |
Vinicio CEREZO Arevalo
SERRANO Elias
DE LEON C
Leonel BOLANOS Jobs Domingo GARCIA Samayoa
o' Delense fl
Hector Alejandro GRAMAJO Morales
Rene ENRIQUEZ Moral
rmy Head
-Edgar GODOV Gallan
Luis Francisco ORTEGA Menaido
Luis MENDOZA Garcia Cesar CABRERA Mejla Olio PEREZ Molina
Marco Antonio GONZALEZ Taracena
Jose Manuel RIVAS Rlos Mario MERIDA Gonzalez
Headord predessor
Augusto DIAZ Bsrrlos
f r i
Morris Eugenlo DE LEONEdgar Ricardo BUSTAMANTE Figueroe
the IMpiniwrc ol fntinUii Snuiiiy PifjfmmJ Stmtt Conn <o< laiviliui
What do cia personal recall regarding reporting on Bamaca ?
General. Most of the Agency personnel who were in the relevant Headquarters or Station reporting chain during the period from2 to3 have no recollection of any reporting specific to Bamaca oror example, then-Associate Deputy Director for Operations (ADDO) Hugh Price says he has no recollection of the Bamaca matter priorutside of the fact that Bamaca had been captured by the Guatemalan inilitary. Price adds that he cannot imagine that the Bamaca incident would have stimulated any interest at the time, or that the Station would have been involvedfull courto collect information on this type of internal Guatemalan matter.
Chief of LA Division from9 until December TwZ^oesnot recall either Bamaca or Everardo being mentioned to him, but vaguely recalls being aware2uatemalan guerrilla who was allegedly killed. j (notes that, had the Division or the Station known that Bamaca had been tortured or killed while in military custody, Bamaca would have been high on the listH
| /UternativeTyjJore high level officer in the insurgency movement, perhaps there would have been more interest by policymakers which in turn would have generated more collection by the Station
hief of LA Division from March
oasnot aware of any linkage between Bamaca and DeVine during his LA Division assignment and had no direct knowledge of reporting concerning Bamaca or DeVine prior to that assignment.
'unng nis la uivision tenure, loes not recall any specific tasking about Bamaca nor was la ware of any distortions in reporting.
ther senior LA managers offer similar1 to
says that he did not recall any reporting concerning Bamaca thatoccurred during his tenure as significant and that he wasof
Likewise, the
1 lo
states the name Bamaca or Everardo did not mean anything to him, and thentelligence report never came to his attention at that time.|adds that the name
Bamaca was not familiar and reporting on]
|pwas fairly common at tne ume, pernaps rnonTjniy^rieiflsoTiotestM no time did he make any linkage between Bamaca and Alpirez.
LA Division manager in the
om March tolso >amaca. According tc^d'he only] request that remotely related to Bamaca3
the Station to report on clandestine prisons,In addition, theofficer at the
time vaguely remembers having heard aboutTamaca, but as just another guerrilla, and the Headquarters reports officer
says she does not recall an>thing abouthe had comehe
would have been considered asjustanother guerrilla.
ever hearinguring his tour in Guatemala from The Station's reports officer from ays she does not recall when she first earned or Bamaca, out her recollection is that he was just another insurgent captured by the Guatemalans. She observes also that the
ndicated Bamaca wasRi^Wn^Tja
did not raise human rights issues that would have been of concern to the Station. She also notes that this information concerning Bamaca must have been shared with the Ambassador or the DCMl
|says ne recausurder, or human rights violations, although he has seen some in regard
He also notes that he never heard of Bamacato Guatemala. He does
ramifications, politics, andno|
reporting that indicates the Agencycircumstances of Bamaca's murder.
ntelligence Report.
lembers the report that Everarc lad Deen captured, not because of the details pertaining to Everardo, but because Sovietrovided by Cuba were being used by the insurgents. Everardo's capture was not an "out of the ordinary" event, andl
any abuse ofindicates that the reporting would not have generated special anenoon at the time. Absent any specific mention of human rights abuses, follow-up responsibility on the Everardo matter would have passed to the Embassy's Human Rights Officer who dealt with Guatemalans who were subjected to human rights abuse.
2 Station Re)
[that "Comandantenot recall theeports of specific guerrillareporting on Everardo, occurred with some
frequency, I
mbassy Telegram.
and says his first recollection ot Damacathat appeared in the Guatemalanr January'he article
reported that two former
chainedot when they were being held prisoner by.
impression at the time was that Bamaca was also being uuerrogated. The same article reported allegations oflurrriarirights abuses by various Guatemalan military officers, butl
aaamam Joes not recall whether Alpirez was mentioned in thearticle, but thought the article was nothing more thandds that guerrillas were publishing monthly newsletters at tnetime dting thousands of allegations against the Guatemalan Government. Further, almost everyone in Guatemala claimed thatas involved in any kidnapping or death that occurred.
(thereot of disinformation available
regaram^iurruirin^
ot recall whether hembassy reporting on the claims of the former as "Willy" (Recinos) and "Carlos"e does remember being aware of the guerrillas' claims and recalls subsequent discussions of them
^^recallsthatnethought the statements ot "Wuly" and "Garlos" were false.H (thought they had probably been paid to go to Geneva smce the^therwise could not have afforded to do so. He first knew of the former guerrillas "when it hit thend does not recall any mention of Alpirez in the context of their staternents( (recalls that Bamaca was one of the first issues Ambassador McAfee dealt with when Harbury came to the Embassy circa( (adds that, in other. citizen cases, the Embassy would react to information
EOcET
indicating torture, human rights violations,ut not to reports that an ir.surgent had been killedaptured.
4 Embassy Telegram.
le fcmoassy reporting of the Ambassador's Januaryeeting with Harbury, during which Harbury alleged that Alpirez and another Army officer had supervised Bamaca's torture, although all acknowledge that such Embassy telegrams were made available to the Station,neither Bamaca's fate nor Harbury's efforts were significant issues at the time.
speculates that, had he seen thefi^n
considered it significant as almost everyone inad been accused of human rights violations. not considerredible source given maffienadTearned from
| that she supported insurgent
i;ri: uatemala and was an URNG sympathizer.
>ffers that the Bamaca case did not have ie same4 as it does now, and he would not have recognized the significance of the information had he seen the Embassy report at the time.
What information did CIA have unking Alpirez to Bamaca?
he Agency received four intelligence reports, one Embassy report of Harbury's viewsworn statementRNG guerrilla, Santiago Cabrera Lopez, prior to the end of5 that linked Alpirez to Bamaca. In the first report, which was an Embassy telegram dated, Ambassador McAfee reported that Harbury told her that witnesses had identified Alpirez and Major Sosa as having supervised the torture of Bamaca. Harbury, according to McAfee, stated that the two military officers were listed as military graduates from the School of the Americas. Harbury also stated that she was contemplating filing criminal charges against them in Guatemalan courts.
he second report was report
Bhad personall^nterviewetibarnaca after hisas taken away by. Alpirez
I was assigned to the San
rcos muitary Dase at the time orapture andbecause of Bamaca's high rank in ORPA. This
- .The third document, swom testimony by Santiago Cabrera Lopez, was received by DI analyst | lonabrera's testimony was given in the law offices of Jose Pertierra, in. onccording to Cabrera, Alpirez was at the military base where Bamaca was being held and was present at Bamaca's interrogation. Alpirez reportedly told Cabrera not to tell anyone that he had seen Bamaca there.
nother intelligence report was based upon information
I1 'uatemalanH
Alpirez was in charge of meiruerrogation of Bamaca.
This report was disseminated
n, the Station reported that
id bet
nor
ipirez, and colonel Leonei Godoy all worked with Bamaca after his capture in San Marcos. This report was not disseminated outside the Agency.
he final relevant report indicates thatfro in a| Guatemalan^ he had Deen toldthat it wasknown in the militaryAlpirez killed Bamaca.that he
had been told that senior ofncersnaa^eQaecffiotro do anvthin, with the informatioi
Did the cia meet rrs pxspoNsmnrrY for collection of
intelligence pertaining to the bamaca matter?
fter his capture in2 ended his military significance, information pertaining to the Bamaca case would have been collected by CIA because of its relationship to human rights policies of the Guatemalan Government. There is no statute, executive order or Agency regulation that requires the Agency to collect and report on human rights violations. However,
leadquarters guiaancc Importance of collection and reporting of information concerning human rights violations.
hether CIA met its responsibility to collect information pertaining to the Bamaca case can best be assessed in the context of the actual reporting by the Agency's Guatemala City Station and the
SEpREV -
recollections of Agency personnel who would have been involved in the collection of such intelligence.
of intelligence on Bamaca began as earlywith reports of insurgent activities2 mformation was received
|irefight and the possible death or capture of an insurgent- Initial reports did not reveal any human rightscaptivity, torture, or interrogation. Therefore, Bamaca was viewed as nothing more than an insurgent who had been killed or captured in action against Guatemalan Government forces. Station and Headquarters personnel recall no questions being asked at this time by Headquarters or the Embassy with regard to Bamaca, and there was no particular tasking of Station sources for information relating to hirn.
report, the first indicationshuman rights violation^elative to Bamaca emerged. _U
the Station received information thatthe testimony of two URNGaliveandestine prison.Station
eport that Alpirez had mtervieweciBarruicaafterthe Station reported thatofficers
had been sen^oauMilitary Zones for thethat could implicate the Army in human rightsthe Station learned that the
Guatemalan Minister of Defense had given verbal orders for the removal and purging of intelligence documents regarding clandestine cemeteries.
tation personnel recall being keenly aware of the importance of coUecting and reporting on human rights issues.
^Station officers were regularly reminded to task assets for human rights reporting. In particular,!
|to task Station assets to report on Bamaca. He further stated that human rights was of utmost importance to the
interrogation, "military's belief that Bamaca was responsible for kidnappings and the murder. citizen and numerousurprise inspection of military facilities that )rovided no evidence of clandestine prisons or Bamacal-
ana lruormauon tnat me ukimij continued to teipouse tnat Bamaca was alive when there was no real evidence to support that. The most significant report came inuatei
that Alpirez had la'.an-aoa
md the" lection and
reporting ot intormation on miman rights violations. It is apparent that Agency personnel in Guatemala and at Headquarters were aware of the importance of collecting and reporting on human rights issues and that they honored this collection requirement. It is also apparent that when tasking was issued to the Stationl
reports.
JS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT CIA EMPLOYEES OR ASSETS WERE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVOLVED LN BAMACA'S FATE?
o CIA employees were ever alleged to have been involved as participants in the fate of Bamaca. No information was developed during the course of this investigation that remotely suggested that any CIA employee was involved in Bamaca's fate.
ion
vz versions otate, some information reported by
lis questionable when considering the chain of
acquisition and potential biases of
he first information received by the Agency that cited Alpirez's involvement in Bamaca's fate was provided by Jennifer Harbury to Ambassador McAfee on. During that conversation, Harbury named Alpirez as one of two military officers who supervised the torture of Bamaca after his capture. Harbury later repeated this assertion, which she attributed to ex-guerrilla Cabrera, during an5 SSCI Hearing when she identified Alpirez as "the man bending over the torture table" of Bamaca. Harbury added that those officers involved in Bamaca's tortureoctor standing by to make sure "they didn't accidentally" kill Bamaca. However, based on his4 sworn statement, the only account of his declarations available to the Agency, Cabrera did not say what Harbury reports. Rather, Cabrera said that Alpirez ordered another officer to move Bamacasecret room" in the military infirmary and Alpirez was present in the room when Bamaca, his body swollen and arm and leg bandaged, was being interrogated. Cabrera implicated other Guatemalan military personnel as well in the interrogation and incarceration of Bamaca, but he did not claim to have witnessed either the torture or the killing of Bamaca by Alpirez.
nlpirez denied any knowledge ofinterrogation, or movement among various militarythai Alpirez
interviewedBarnaca after his capture andfficers took Bamaca away shortly thereafter.
reported that! iaa named Alpirez as one ofhat
mAlpirez was in charge of
Bamaca's interrogation. However, noneprovided further details of Bamaca'srerr^^nari^y^ Alpirez or reported that Alpirez tortured or killed Bamaca.
Inhe Agency received its first and only report implicating Alpirez in Bamaca's killing.
having been told that "it was known witf the senior ranks of the Army that Alpirez was the individual who killedhat information was related over dinner by a
Iuatemalanin
turn informe<
xcept as noted above, none of the other available Agency and non-Agencyreporting on Bamaca's fate mentions Alpirez, and oneHreport names another Guatemalan military officer as BamacTskiller. Further, Alpirez's claimfficers took Bamaca away has been corroborated!
oreover, the reporting regarding Bamaca's fate indicatesossible disinformation effort has been conducted|_
For example, the initial reporting
jwitrun two weeks of the2 firefight, like'
jcn or me reporting that followed, isBamaca was alive, well and cooperatingmilitary whilethat Bamaca had
been killed in combat.
otification. The first recorded notification to congressional representativesmaca appearsto have
tttei
reoJlesteo^tiWrief^
when SSCI staff members^B riefing at CIA Hel^fjiarters. "efing in anticipationelevision appearance byepresentative from theormer COSand DI
nIAriefingBamaca case to members of the HPSCI staff. The Actingwo other DO
officers,th^ndeafcM again the major presenter for CIA, recalls that heshared the same conclusions with the HPSCI staffnaware at both briefings of theeport mcUcaring "Everardo" had been captured and was cooperating with his captors!
ivensays none of trus miormanon woi conclusions at that time about the Bamaca case.
n, CIA analysts^ (andl
taff member from the House Foreign Affairsriefing concerning Bamaca. They gave an account of what was then known about Bamaca's fate. The staff member asked to review the DO cable traffic on the case. This request was refused because such access is not given to non-Oversight Committee Staff members.
nI/ALA analystO representative briefed Representative Bill Richardsonember of his personal staff, in preparation for their upcoming trip to Guatemala, on then-available information concerning the fate of Bamaca. Richardson informed the CIA official he planned to meet with Harbury while he was in Guatemala.
he next documented sharing of information with Congress regarding the Bamaca case occurred on5 when Acting Chief of LA Division^ Band other Agency officers met with HPSCI Members Combesr^nd^Scks and staff members from both the HPSCI and the SSCI. The contents of the5 report that Alpirez had killed Bamaca and that this was known within the Guatemalan military were discussed with them, alonj with the fact that
interrogation of DeVine.
he information regarding Alpirezs alleged role in the death of Bamaca had
he National Security Council had been briefeaon Alpirez, Bamaca and DeVine onnd, when Agency officers pointed out their responsibilities for advising Congress, NSC staff members requested that the Agency delay congressional notification until the Acuninistration could determine how to react to the information. Permission to brief the intelligence committees was given onnd this was done on Februaryhere haveumber of briefings on the subject since that time, including public testimony before the SSCI by the Acting DCI.
esponsibilities. There is no specific statutory or policy requirement that the CIA provide notification to Congress concerning intelligence that pertains to the death or fate. citizen such asombatant involved in an insurgencyoreign count
Bamaca's fate was not an issue at Guatemala City Station until3 when Harbury requested help from the Embassy in locating his remains. Harbury's dialogue with the Embassy continuedporadic basis and Harbury began to promote the possibility that Bamaca was still alive and being heldandestine prison. Although the Bamaca matterubject of interest to the Embassy and Station in Guatemala City, there is no indication that it was viewedashington issue until the fall4 when Harbury engagedecond hunger strike in Guatemala.
An obligation to "fully and currently" inform Congress of what the Agency knew about BamacaM
arise if Bamacaadequacy of Agency reporting on the humanin Guatemala, or when, as occurred inknown that the intelligence oversight committees hadin the fate of Bamaca because of his rdationship toU.S. dtizen. When it became dear that there wasin Bamaca's fate, formal notification should have occurredwith AgencyIt did not, as
mentioned earlier, because DI analyst^^Jiad not beencomplete details due to an erroromputer searchnot recognize the relevance of the
reports concerning and his alleged role in the
Statutory reo^iirements and applicable policy directives pertaining to relationships between Ambassadors and CIA COS's are set forth in detail inf Volume I. The key theme is that Ambassadors, as the President's Representatives, are to be informed of intelligence activities and information on which to base decisions concerning development of foreign policy. Guatemala City Station partially fulfilled the requirement by ensuring that intelligence reporting disseminated from Guatemala was coordinated beforehand
he record indicates that Ambassador Stroock received available information on Bamaca's fate under his nom de guerre of "Comandante Everardo" when it became available to CIA. Ambassador McAfee subsequently received Station reporting on Bamaca as it became available. Additionally, she requested and waspecific summary of Station mformation concerning Bamaca inhe summary, however, failed to contain theeport of Bamaca's capture that previously had been provided to Stroock, even though by that time the Station could have made the connection between Everardo and Bamaca.
Report Ambassador Stroock says that he recalls seeing an Agency intelligence report on "Comandante Everardo" sometime2 prior to his reassignment inut he paid no attention to it. According to Stroock, Guatemalans killed rebel commanders all the time and he also knew that the Guatemalan Government was not "very pleasant" to rebels who were captured, as he was sure that the rebels dealt likewise with Guatemalan military personnel. Stroock believes he probably read the report provided to him, but he does not recall discussing the Everardo report with then-C(
Ambassador McAfee and DCM Keane state that did not inform either of them of the March nteliig^ report regardingapture at the time of their arrival in Guatemala in3 andespectively. McAfee states that she is not implying that the Station intentionally did not inform her, but that the COS should have been familiar with the report. She adds that she received no briefing on either the DeVine or Bamaca matters when she visited Agency Headquarters in Washington prior to assuming her position in Guatemala;
DCM Keane cites the Marcheport as specific information that was withheld from fiirnTy the Station. Keane indicates that he was not informed of the report that Alpirez interviewed Bamaca by( (vhen he arrived or during the succeeding year, nor byH successor as COS( However, Keane also saysnenever asked about Everaraonorwould he have expected to have seeneport when he arrived as it was not significant at the time. Keane says that his relationship with
was cooperative, but adds thatj (was not as open with uuormation as Keane believes he shoulctnaveDeen. Communication was better wiaccording to Keane, although some information also^tvasnotshared by I
ho was reassigned to Washington!terArrmassador McAfee's arrival in Guatemala, acknowledges that he did not brief her on all Station reporting during the years prior to her arrival. He states that McAfe^considered herself an expert on Guatemalan affairs, andB Bbelieved she had an Embassy staff, as welJ as State's BureaTWrTTTcflligence and Research, to inform her of intelligence relating to Guatemala. Further, he notes that McAfee worked on the Guatemala desk at the Department of State in Washington for several months before arriving in Guatemala and had served in Guatemala previously.
hisworked
with Ambassador
and with DCM Keane. McAfee and Keane believe that,H
I should have shared thefponr^rucn
I ana ne maintains there was never any del told or hide information from her.
TacIDeencoorcirnated with Stroock and disseminated to the Embassy and INR when it wasdisagrees and notes that the >rt was minor and not unusual.
heeport was cited by Ambassador McAfeeepartment of State "Roger Channel" message to the Secretary of State as an example of information she had received "only well after it wasn the same message, McAfee also indicated that she had not seen the2
intelligence report until4 and had been told that the report had been misfiled in Washington under "E" forcAfee did not specify whether she was told that the report was misfiled by the Agency or by State, INR. Agency records indicate that the report was not misfiled in Agency files. Rather, the delay in its retrieval was caused by the misspelling of "Everardo" when an electronic search of DO files was initiated for documents pertaining to Bamaca andeaving out the second
Ambassador McAfee
confirms thaH id sharereport
about BamaccrTOm^fiive in arecalls that he brought the report for her review and indicated it was for her consumption only. Although he did not specifically tell her she could not share it with the DCM, manner when he brought her the report was sucnmatsne assumed it was for her use only. McAfee says that neither I | is successor, ever explained to her thaffertarn Agency reporting was very sensitive and could not be shared with even the DCM. She adds that she wishes in retrospect she had insisted that the DCM be shown the report.
Keane dtesas the
secondaynteuigencereporTthat Alpirez had interviewed Bamaca after histwo Agency reports that were either mistakenly or intentionally not shared with him. Keane says he learned of the | port from McAfee, and his understanding is that the information on dandestine jails was acquired inH he was Charge d'Affaires!
4 Intelligence Report The initial recollections of Ambassador McAfee and DCM Keane are that neither reviewed the4 intelligence report, indicatinglpirez) had interviewed Bamaca after his4 and were not advised until5 that Alpirez was thenamed in the report. McAfee says that she does not
recall seeing the4 report when she returned to Guatemala nor did Keane brief her. She also believes the Station should have briefed her on such an important report. Keane, on the other hand, cites the4 report as the second-the first being thtthat Bamaca had been seenanaSfflejaiPof two Agency reports either mistakenly or intentionally not shared with him. Initially Keane says he learned of the4 report in4epartment of State officer in Washington called it to his attention.
disagrees with the Ambassador and DCM.acknowledges that he did not inform Keane that Alpirez wasnamed in the report, that he personally'
handcarried the report to Keane foTTr^^Rnation prior to its release and remembers being "struck" by Keane's lack of reaction to the report at the time. Hadds that the Stationread folder" foreview of intelligence reporting that was issued in her absence, particularly reporting concerning human rights as the issue was high on the McAfee's agenda. The Station reports officer confirms that the Ambassador's post-vacation "read folder"opy of the4opy of that report is included in Station files and contains McAfee's initials.
reviewed the initialed copy of the MayAmbassador McAfee confirms that her initials are includedreport but reiterates that she does not remember readingAfter reviewing the copy, Keane indicates that he canbe sure that he had not seen the report at the time.
Why did the agency not provide information it collected regarding bamaca's fate to bamaca's american wife?
is no statute, Executive Order, or Agencypolicy that provides for disclosing clandestinelyto families of US. citizens or non-citizens who maymurdered, captured, imprisoned, or are missing in aAgency information can be indirectly conveyedfamily members for humanitarian reasons. Warnings and
compassionate conveying of information generally are the responsibility of the Department of State. Typically, Embassy personnel would receiveequest and would work through the Department of State in Washington and the Station to query Agency Headquarters for pertinent information. If the Agency concurred with the release, the information would be sanitized to protect sources and methods and then the information would be provided to the Department of State for release to the family members.
Formerconfirms he did not share any CIA information with Harbu^^Hesays this would have required permission from Headquarters, and it never entered his mind to seek such permission. Former COS I Halso never directly shared information with Harbury. Guatemalan Embassy personnel, including DCM Keane and Ambassador McAfee, as well as senior personnel from the Department of State and the President's National Security Advisor, all met at various times with Harbury and shared their evaluations of her husband's fate. Those personnel all had access to CIA reporting and that reporting presumably served as background for them andactor in their evaluations.
Another means by which. citizens, such as Harbury, may obtain unclassified Agency information is through the filingreedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Agency FOIA records indicate that Harbury has requested information from the Agencyumber ofhe Agency currently is processing those requests according to standard procedures.
CONCLUSIONS
conclusions set forthrelating to Alpirez, DeVine, Bama
SEfZRET'
Agency Purposes in Guatemala
gency programs in Guatemala during the periodwere conducted in furtherance of
nat were duly authorized by the President, reviewed by the National Security Council and reviewed and funded by the
Alleged Complicity in Deaths of DeVine and Bamaca
o evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA employee had prior knowledge of, directed, participated in, or condoned the interrogation or killing of DeVine. No evidence has been found to indicate that any CIA employee had prior knowledge of, directed, participated in, or condoned the reported interrogation, torture, or killing of Bamaca.
^^ . The1 report alleging that Alpirez M
(was present at DeVine's interrogation was seriously naweu ana
should have been reviewed more thoroughly at the Station and disseminated with appropriate caveats. Neither the Station nor Headquarterserious effort to verify the allegations contained in the1 report and Headquarters did not follow-up sufficiently on its initial efforts to have the Station do so.
imilarly, the5 report alleging that Alpirez had killed Bamaca was also based on questionable information and should have been reviewed more thoroughly at the Station and cusseminated with appropriate caveats. Neither the Station nor Headquarters made serious efforts to verify that report and Headquarters did not encourage the Station to do so.
ECRET
Congressional Notification
he Agency should have notified the congressional intelligence oversight committees in1 about the allegations that Alpirez had been presen^^ninterrozaticmt^ resulted in the deathS. citizen I
| The committees should haveiau^rThgnti the prompt and serious actions the Agency took on the basis of that report, in reporting to Dojj
LA Division officers intended to provide such notification to the committees, but neither those officers nor senior Agency managers ensured that this was done.
nhe oversight committees were expeditiously notified of the only report alleging that Alpirez had been responsible for the death of Bamaca. While notification was laudable, it should have been made clear that there were competing versions of what happened to Bamaca, and that the5 report was sketchy, third-hand hearsay, and unconfirmed. Furthermore, when it had become clear in4 that there was congressional interest in Bamaca's fate, formal notification of the4 report that Alpirez had interviewed Bamaca I
would be viewed ascommittees. No evidence has been found to indicate thattoin these reports,
hearings and briefings was intena^atonijsleaa the committees. Neither has any evidence been found to indicate that the failures to notify the committees4 of information indicating that Alpirez had interviewed Bamaca
committees.
Ambassadorial Notification
he Station did not keep the Ambassadors appropriately informed in certain instances. Concerns about source protection and possible threats to Agency equities in its liaison relationships appear to have been the causes of some of these failures.
mbassador Stroock was not properly notified inthe Ambassador
and cover-up
in the DeVine killing and was preparing toemarche.
mbassador Stroock was not properly notified inwhen allegations were
received that Alpirez was present at the interrogation of DeVine.
mbassador McAfee was not properly notifiedven after asking in4omplete summary of CIA intelligence rdating to Bamaca, that Alpirez had reportedly interviewed Bamaca after his capture in
Collection and Reporting Standards
provided by Agency assets was responsive to
included significant reportingraBnala, mduding the DeVine killing, Bamaca's fate, and the reactionsuatemalan political and military offiaals. policy initiatives in this regard.
in certain instances, concerns aboutor possible threats to Agency equities in itsappear to have been the cause of failures tofully and promptly.
tation reporting regarding human rights issues included some unsubstantiated reports from possibly biased sources about
Alpirezas well as the DeVine and Bamaca cases.
The Stafion^^Dn/lsionand the DO should have made stronger efforts to validate the information and place it in the context of other reporting, analyze the biases and motivations of the sources, and ensure that consumers of the information were advised that there were significant questions about its validity and hearsay nature. It also appears that LA Division and the Station gave insufficient attention and consideration to the possibility that Station asset reporting on Bamaca's fate was based upon deliberately false informationl
he Station and LA Division failed to meetforh particular reference to
the assets who provided key information relating to Alpirez, DeVine, Bamaca,
t the time the CIA first encountered Alpirez in ainrecords
apparentlyhe
had engaged in human rights abuses
he0
a substantial part of what.uatemalan involvement in DeVine's killing. It also served as part of the basis for at least. Government demarche to the Guatemalans and the partial suspension. military assistance to Guatemala.
Referral lo Department of Justice
Division and OGC acted prudently in ensuringreferral of the1 allegations about Alpirez toOGC should have probed more thoroughly toa preliminary inquiry whether or not there [was] any basisallegations. In addition, having made the referral, OGC didrecord or monitor the matter, or adequately respond tofor further information.
Analytical Responsibilities
factual basis has been identified for the DI
Tlconclusion in an analysis presented to the NSC inhat Alpirez was at least "the intellectual author" of Bamaca's death. That analysis was also flawed because
heDI| was not made awareAlpirez interviewee
and State customers prior to January
was reportedly present at the interri consequence, he was not able to include that information in briefings to senioLState officials and HPSCI and SSCI staff members in4 or in the^Htnalytic reports that were disseminated to the Ambassador
ix reports have been found that allege that Alpirez had knowledge of or was involved in narcotics trafficking or other potentially unlawful activities. None of these reports establishes any connection between narcotics trafficking and the DeVine murder, nor does any of them indicate that the murder had as its purpose coercion or mtimidation of, or retaliationovernment or civil population. Neither has other evidence been found to indicate that Agency employees were aware ofonnection or purpose.
188
Thus, there is no support for the contention that Agency employees engaged in an obstruction of justice in connection with the1 referral to the Department of Justice.
Dispersal or Destruction of Records
evidence has been found to indicate that anydispersed or destroyed records to prevent them fromby investigators. It appears that this allegation mayits source in an Agency effort to provide copies ofto former DCIs in order that they might be ableknowledgeably to public mquiries relating to Guatemala.
DO Records System
1NC1 *
RECOMMENDATIONS
eneral. The following areas have been identified in the course of this investigation as requiring the attention of Agency management and are addressed in this section:
Congressional notification;
Ambassadorial notification;
Selection of Chiefs of Station;
rm
rights reportint
lytical functions;O records system.
he paragraphs that follow constitute the IG's best judgment as to what should be done in each area, but we recognizeanagement review of the issues involved may develop different and better approaches to improving current practices and policies in each area. The most irnportant message we are conveying is that the identified areas require management's attention and remedial action. Thus, these recommendations should be viewedramework for further deliberation and development of responsive reactions in each area, notrescriptive list of actions that should be taken as stated. However, we strongly believe that the Overview Volume, with Conclusions and all Recommendations except the individual accountability section, should be made available to Agency employees in order that they may be fully informed and apply the lessons of this investigation to their own situations.
ongressional Notification. This investigation has shown that in the DO thereredisposition against sharing information with Congress despite repeated statements by the Agency's leadership that Congress needs information to perform its oversight role and has the right to such information. The DDO should work to replace this biasredisposition that favors sharing information.
The DCI should reaffirm that the Agency has an obligation to ensure that the Congress is kept fully and currently informed about Agency activities. The Director should make it clear that each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office is responsible for determining,ontmuing basis, which matters within their areas of responsibility should be reported to the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress. Clear procedures should be established to ensure that such matters are reported.
Each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office, in conjunction with the General Counsel and the Director of Congressional Affairs, should recommend criteria for the DCI's approval that are applicable to their areas of responsibility to govern which matters will be reported to the intelligence oversight committees-
Each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office should require their managers to reviewontinuing basis which matters within their areas of responsibility meet the established criteria for reporting to the intelligence oversight committees. In addition, each Deputy Director and Head of Independent Office shouldormal quarterly review of their activities to determine which matters, witnin or in addition to the established criteria, should be reported to the intelligence oversight committees. As part of this process all employees should be given the opportunity to identify matters that should be considered for such reporting.
Functions. DI analysts responsiblefinished intelligence and conducting briefingspolicymakers should be given access to |
to their areas of responsibility. The DDI should esUDl!sh standards that ensure that DI analysts consider all relevant information so that inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete statements are not incorporated into DI intelligence products or briefings.
Records System. The DO should intensify its effortsthat Headquarters and Station personnel are supported byand information management system that willdependable and timely access to allarticular individual or subject.
Accountability. This investigation has established that there is no basis for several of the most significant allegations that have been made against the Agency and its employees relating to its activities in Guatemala. Unfortunately, the investigative and political furor that was launched with these allegations and that has consumed much of. Government's valuable time and energy for the past several months could have been avoided or reduced if Agency employees had performed more capably in reporting the events in question.
A review of Agency activities relating to the Alpirez, DeVine,eneral failure to adhere to the proressionalstiuTC^ in collecting,reporting and analysis that the Agency expects from its personnel. The causes of this are puzzling. It may be that closer scrutiny or higher standards are now being imposed on the workforce. There are many possible explanations which we will not venture here.
Whatever the reason, from recruitment to reporting; from corroboration to processing; from validation to analysis; from congressional notification to crimes referral, the facts demonstrate performance that is not as professional or competent or sound in its judgments as the Agency and. Governmentight to expect. It is not that anyone engaged in intentional wrongdoing, but that so many errors were committed along the way. Agency management also must be faulted for the failures of Agency personnel that are identified in this Report of Investigation.
Many officers contributed to the problems and shortcomings described in this Report, but certain officers had special responsibilities and played significant roles that separate them from the rest. Although there is no evidence to indicate that they were involved in the specific events under review here, the level of professionalism that prevailed in the Agency must ultimately be laid at the feet of the most senior Agency managers, DCIs and DDCIs during this period. In addition, the names of individual officers who should be held responsible for specific deficiencies have been provided to the Director for his consideration and action.
P. Hitz Inspector General
ECRET
IK THE HATTER or THE MARRIAGE OF
JENNIFER KRISTIHA HARBURY AMD 1
EFRAXH"BAMACA VELASQUEZ
TO THEHONORABLE JUDGE OP GATD COURT!
i
JENNIFERARBURY, Petitioner, petitions "the Court pursuaftt to the Unlrora Declaratory Judgments Act, Chaptouf the'Civil Practice and Stonedlev Code of Texae, and pursuant to fche:Texaa Fanlly Code, tfor a, declaration that petitioner Jennifer Kristtna Harbury was lawfully narried to Efrain B'&Mcaunder Texas lav. In support of this petition, Petitioner ehovsfollowsi
X.
Petitioner isndividual residing in Travis County,n or aboutm, Jennifer Kristlna Harbury and Efrain Bataaca Velacques resided tbgether in the 6tate of Texas, agreod with each other to be married, exchanged carriage vows with eioh other, cohabited, and held themselves out It was their Intent and understanding that they wife Husband and Wife. All of the abovt acts vers done In the stare of Texas, under Texas lav, they vera legally
Petitionerthat tha Court declare her aarrlage to Efrain -Baaaca Velasquez to be lawful under Texas law,
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requoets that on final hearing, petitioner hava judgment as follovss,
j vuloLAtton triatviotina Itartoutry ana Efr&tn >aaaca Velasgues were lawfully aarrled on flepteabernder Texaa law.
Respectfully submitted,
Austin,7
Brian East State Bar0.
ATTORHEY FOR PETITIONER
lihibuvy
li02 Mut.L 0U1 OUceV
IK the
matter of the
marriage of
JENNIFER KRI6TIHA HARBURY AMD
EFRAIN feAKACA VELASQUEZ
KOTION FOR SUBSTITUTED SERVICE PTKS3 |THAyCAj;ZQK
TO THE HONORABLE JUDOS OF SAID COURT
JBJ NIPER KRISTINA HARBURY, Petitioner In thft above-entitled and -nimberedes this motion pursuant to tex, R. CIV, PROC. , thereby requesting the Court toiffer*nt method of substituted service, and as grounds therefor, shows the followiqgi
I.
Ge vioe of citation by publication as to the Respondent EFRAIN BAMACA velasquez is authorltad by the provisions of TEX, R. CIV. In accordance with said rule, Petitioner has fi ed her affidavit for citation byruehioh is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as if fully copied and set forth at length.
I
A jaethod of service that is es likely as publication to give sjiid Respondent actual notice of the suit Is by posting at the Travis county courthouse,
liar)fjry/t>
Cauaa ho.
46
inn
I . 1'
nap
"SY
_ w. . _ v
t*l< olUtlMUiu*
.nation(xnyea.
atvaritwckt* tuutn tirr^iit UtlCowryM
cni.uu, am u W(
ith mymy.
to4 Nil owbtr ooiMil CMR, U< OtlliM "liK*tUrU< fUniic* ol
i
HUHiiiwiarMitHdeclire valid the narriage ot Jennifer Ekrbury end Efrain Bamaca velaaques.
ourtills,aifl*r rmv, mj.
j
u
KtHJCtai-KDnCO,
m
I, f.W IT**
t* fcuJuitUo CM |u> a
covumm IhcJu tmvIil
lit
w ELFANT
. : >
ran or ttau Couoly, tews, asceAltr
Pw^iS oobvr.
tlMlIf-MV
KMirr
it-
ih the matter op the marriage of
jennifer kristina
efraik fcrkaca trayis CQX,
order for service ih lieu of publication
i
on "this day ccae on to be considered the notion of jennifer kristlh> harbury, petitioner in the above-entitled and" -nuabared cause, for service of citationethod of eubstltjuted service different froa publication. having heard and considered said notion, the court is of the opinion that its grounds are true and correct, that citation by publication is-authorised as to efrfcln baaaca velasquez, and that the oothod :oe service prescribed herein would be ae likely as publication to glvB said respondent actual notice of the suit.
it is, accor0im0ly, ordered that service upon strain baaaca velasquez be effected by posting the citation,rue copy of the original petition for declaratory judgnent attached, at the travis county courthouse in austin, texas. service shall be effective on the date posted.
dated:
Ei:)
jl^X*T ,
HO. 9
THEOP THE HARRIAdE OF
1
JENNIFER KRISTINA HARBURY AND 1
EFRAIN iOAKACA VELASQUEZ
IN THE
fecai
,TRAVIS COU^Ttf^EXAS
LITEM
ourt finds that the Respondent EFRAIN BAKACA
VELASQUEZ, whoaxtv herein, has been cited by posting and
that no answer has been filed and no appearance haa been i
enteredj by such party Within the prescribed tiae, The Court
appoints /kaftJLt L. icenced attorney at law
of.tate, to defend the suit on behalf of the party.
el
3
r
12
HO. 9
THE MATTER OK THE MARRIAGE OF
JENNIFER KRI6TINA HARBOR* ANO
EFRAIN BAMACA VELASQUEZ
AND REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGE,
TRAVIS .COUNTY-, TEXAS,r.A-
on jtbitl data came on to be heard tbe Original petition Cot Declaratory Judgment Regarding Marriage in the above-entitled and -numbered oause, and having heard the evidence and argument of courtsai, the Court lo of the opinion that the petition should <be and hereby is,
GRANTED.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that JENNIFER KRI6TIHA HARBURY, Social Security, born1 in" Baltimore,nd EFRAIN bakaca VELASQUEZ, born7 at Flnca XI Tablero, El Tumbador, san Marcos, Guatemala, were legally married to each other under the lave Of the State of Texas on
WU'li TlUe I
u* were
piQWCU-
I on rco
d nolle* oc vlierc
iSUIt
ENTERING MAKH1ACE RELATIONS! I'I' Ch. I
licy agreed lo be itinrricti. andlic agrccptciil il-,cy UvcdNugtiiiietr in lids Male a* husband and wife and ('two represented lo oilier* (hat I'-ey were married.
roceeding Inarrlap.Ui be proved under this nomusi be commenced nol later ilian tin- year after tlie date on which "lu-relatitinslilp ended or not Inter thanyear after Septemberhichever It later.
Jau. Amended by Acts i
Acts mi, tjlut. 6elf. Sept.v.
and SioiMiary Notci
Is IWUC 3
1 In the
f
:rc mar-cmonle*
amciiduKIU. toIbl, lUbMl-lutetl "A" (ur "In any" and "iliUHp cummniml mil later ihan one year idler llic dale un which the telallonihlp ended ur nil lairr iban wite yenr alier Kepitmberhichever It Inlet" (nrDIliU acillvn, the auretmenl id the natttn tn maity may be inferredroved Ihit (hey lived together ai liitibmd and wife and repee. Knicd lu wherehey wetc married".
ftfcruInK.<
lituipllc* tmly toMillin Alter ihc effreilvp dale eif Ihta Act. a fil-elie-eflcntlve dale nl ihli 'by Ihe tn effecthe time lit tull vii filed, ond iholur ihftl purpou:."
Review Cnmincittartei Annual turvev ufUvn family Common law nmftlaje under ihcHmband andJownh W. McXnitht. W .SU.J tl9ttfc Jfi.T (ivt]).
LibraryellCSI
Marriiie
WESTLAW Topic Nn. JSJ.
(US, Marrlaie ii.
Note* of 'Cliluna
riage2
of avldancc Ctni rally
Reateacniattort or hftldlKf out lo It
Aj* t 14
C In |taeraJ *
Admlullilllly ol evidence ondltlooal ujmiaml tnpUtdtlcrtcd 3Inlaot 7
Prloe man tact1
10
Sulfleteney ol tv(danc4 libera uurdaa ofapacity to manyemnonJaJpmuaiptloni .'I whoblUUon 3
11
Sufficiency of ovldence undlllonal airceroaetConduct or aotlona ol partita, (tnaratty
3S
o
r ciuik mwU issue n
duplicate marriage license completed wlihnioil<ja as contained In ihv records.
(b) On live application and proof of identity o( both persons toarriage license was issued but not recorded as required5 of this code, the county clerk slinlluplicate license If eachpplying submits ui lite clerk an affidavit stating:
hat the rtfixims Jo whom the tiriylitnl licenseissued were mur rfed tuerson nuihorlrcdconduct mairlayc ceremonies befmc the expiration dale ofiptnal lUcusc; (Z) the. name of the nrouit wluilic ceremony;be date on which ilK^iUArrlajtr ccrriuitny occurred. AdJtd by Act*Mill. All..tfff. Kept.
Review Comm^'Urles
i lulbMld arid (vile. W. MrKnl|lll. a
er. I
wi:stiaw I'mrtc
Ulirsry Rileren*
I Sect70 ur cxpnufiiotit
SUDCUAITEIl K. MARRIAGE WITHOUTof Ceriuln Infiirnjol Mnrrlnifcs
sto^'lu any judicial, odmlnUtnulyc ur other proceeding, the marriagean and woman may be proved jjy evidence thai:
eclaration of ihclr marriage has been ewemed under2 of this code; or
.14
AND WIFEI
of elcnwnu of com-
ury "u'K-rg or lh<
requMni Ihn rti Ln tuu la which
aution* lo when Inru dose and Ream)liL rwr dafiled. rofcMrint L
-launoo-law mvrlue bmtmd" ind wile, la Killhuibandriarrled:uirlcd, livingJfter >inc -r. and twete married, or phruc "In
"IWU |m-
l wnii of evide nee-have senufcKed. to uarrtodoman tUliuuioil tether wu ouuldctiMWi) rahearlns of writ
la Tnu* In Jury cumraon-Uw mar-MM tbemielvc* lo
e murlcd wuommon.
defect! v* el emeritito uuiructlon.to reverie and and renund for
<rolit, denied, rehearing
t toiuolve com-:ive* out 'i hui-
iundicQuicd Irau>
rflew (C'vjipp.
lonlued. .
of <ommen-law vi by court, In lad lo dissolve10element wai tio ruppon
lONsuir
uueOlunaulroperlyn Court ol Civil Appeal*, and Vwnwi't Anti.Uv.SLFaglla v. ViltHom*il,ru1^.
he "nowuavdlettnl tucouM't llodioi olx*
diuimlnatlen ol hetraJilp: rrcord -UUlnuinr ivoportlnc ihe Undine notalletod comrnoa-Uw vVr. Iicm dfteaucTa (alhor and oiUnain v. WhUlurtJ Ma.
ENTERING MARRIAGECh. I
Juiliinmu, irror dlsmliaed.
In ibicncc of piaprr chtllrniculfl< dency of evidence to auppon dctet mtnauim by irlal coon oa Iimci eMvtrrntaiof tart, (of pvrpoaca of >lcttr> al certain pMcdi of land, tummwo'lavertain man and WMnmnetourtfln appeal. Naj> lia f. WIIBim. iav^oa.lf7ll WSWM
Eiluene* ofKi be married,i^iai or Implied, for purpOKi ol-(ton whether mm and woman had cwed ecraiwinJi* mirrlaic.wrll at hi*-cott ablution and cimimma l^ nr
rO
eclaration and Rcs^i'Rtloti
cclar&tlan airhall he executedan scribed by Ihe Bureau of vital Statistics of the Stale Department of -and provided by the county clerk, lUch party lo the declarationhe Information required In the ft"in.
(b) The declaration form thai! cintaln:
a heading entitled "Dcchnmton and Registration of Informal rloge,
apaces for each panv'i full name (IncludloB the woman'sddress, date-of birth place of birth (Includingun'nd social security numl f any;
pace for Indicating the1.nc of document tendered by each pn proof of age and Identity;
H) printedfor eacho check "true" or "false" In reapo
the following statement:ol related to mc
(A) an ancestor orby blood or aduptlon;
rother or sister,whole or half blood oc by ado
a parent's brother orof ihe, whole or half blood; or
a son or daughter of aor sisicr of the whole or half or by
rinted declaration and-HiI SOLEMNLY SV/BAl AFFIRM) THAT WG, TUB UN' I'.RSIGNED. ARE MARRIHDTHER BY VIRTUE OFTHU FU- OWING FACTS: ON OR ABOUT (L' WE AGREED TO BE MARRIE: AND AFTER THAT DATEOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND VIFE AND IN THIS STATE WE lUi SENTED TO OTHERS THAT WE *URE MARRIED. SINCQ THE DAI MARRIAGE TO THE OTHER P, AVE NOT BEEN MARRIE' ANY OTHER PERSON. THIS Dl RATION IS TRUE AND THE IN MATION IN ITAVE N IS CORRECT":
mmcdiaieJy below thearties' signalurcs- and
ertificate of the county clerk that the and oath and the place and date It was madr-lc) If either party Is underage at theeclaration shall have attached aharent of each underage person.
lai Uf,, eh. Ut.I. eff.d Ut, eff. June..h ,
mem tin-
at* lubaec. tc InnaiilMe
and) Th tlfatel tton It art
) IV.
J declarationnfw-appiieanrj In
uaderoie, at provide!
II J< 'Wt code, at ihe itcn, of Hit
- *iS2*5
0 ttllT Veftwe -ur-deraie atedWear to,ih*tca. (d)bkh rcadt
amy clerk thai!:
that all ntcauary loTorraa.on the form; *
Uk oflk luj;
arty aim the declaration to
:.Statutory
wanrcfutni at(eluhaect. fdj, (e)ovt,loniWltjT appearing aa aubiecj. fa td| nnd
3 amendment, tn the tccond acAtcncc of itibaccvtiulluied Vofulred* Inr fur
38 Ucfl
Mbttkutcel "aoelel iccttrUr number. If any" fortvibtUtuKd aubdr, OXJ) to (S) Tor for-mar lubdi.. which Had;
rinted daclamlcwiWe, the undmlsnrd eteelaree an marriedach other by vino* en* lax followingn or about (dale) we agreede married, andmm dale weto(eoW I. |hf. etate at "
Mi eenlfleate on ll* declaro-
han.
the
ration, del.b* on*!naI of ihe dicla/ailon to
i"ueeutcd under Ihla aoc-ihM li BfaV fade evidence of tha lalrriaie.-pjyj*dded
lo when thai wt were married';
a printed oalhOLEMNLY
swear (ortiut thg above
dcclaxatwn is true. that theaw given herein is cor. rect.m notar. bied to ant other person, andm not related to the othea rartt to the decuration within tub dft
GREES PROHtBlTF.fl BY LAW."
Rcfcreneea
hej tuiUtlct feeordt,A. Iteah Annulment nf marrUge where eaoient not obtainedcuniy derl. dutka.A. GotemoientI-WJ fee 'or wrrleei rendered In connection wtih aeewiunjCA. Local Oo*emmenl Code, ff.efined. Mc ff tlAIOkParenuleooMnt.l.
Lnw Kevlcw Comment*.ih< f'tmiu
Code. tUVtioniOft litio).
52
I Safety Code,Hb).
UaratUm under ihU aeetkm. ui
underan of age,
it 'JS Sri&BLr;
Proof of Idantlty and
The county clerk shall require proof of the Identity and age of eachthe declaration to bo establishedertified copy of thecertificate or by some certificate, lio-iiic, or document Issued by Ihl*.another state, the United Stales.foreign government.
Added byrd Leg-ff.
Crcua ttefarcocei Marriaae license, prvuf of Idrnjtfy and aae.
. Library kcftrcncet
WIISTLAW Topic No.I.
county clerk
etermine that all necessary Information Is entered In theorm and that all necessary documents are submitted to him; administer the.oath to each party lo the declaration;
have each party sign the dylsrallon in his presence: and
execute hli cenlflcnlc Jo ihe
(b) The counly clerk may not ceitlfy or record the declaration If;
either patty falls to supply any Information, or to provideienl. required by this subchapter:
either party li underean of age and waiver of ihe age rcn menl has not been ordered;
*J
Main under II yean ofrr,
?'u and wire
(j) cUIicp partyake- iu rei,i thef relationship
lic either parly.
(c) On execution of the declarniion. the countyrecordand all documents submitted with theor noteof them on the declaration form, deliver Iheof dieto thendopyhe Bureau of Vital
A declaration recorded at provided tn thli iceOOK evidence of llic msrrlaKe of the partle*.
(c) At ihe lime the panic* execute the dcclarnllon, ihcto each party printed materlnli about acquired Immune def (AIDS) and human Immunodeficiency viruihe cl-the declaration that the distribution wn> made. The n< prepared and provided in the clerk by ilw Teaaa Dcpartmc shall be designed to Inform the parties about:
(I) the Incidence and mode of transmission of AIDS
prima facie
"hall dlilrlbulc *ncy syndromeihill note on crlala shall' of Health and
HIV-
ihc local ovnllnbllliy of medical procedures, Wicludlivoluntary test. Ing, designed to ihow or help ahuwcryson* AIDS or XttV infection, anilbudles lo HIV, or infection, with any other ir liable causative agent of AIDS; mid
(J) available and appropriate ctiurueUni services rcjrr ling AIDS
AddeJn& Acl1AJr(l Bn-1 "* Amended by
Acu tvflv. Tltth.ff. Sept. t.
IIUluHcal and Statuiory Nulea
IW amendment added lubvc. lei.
) cfnet prrv
vtdei:
Tin Teaai Department of llrnlth iholi*ndounty elc/ti ihe Infoc. mailc-ttal milerlali dexribed hyAti a>
poufblc after ihevt lain thai,eemmy cUii ii not eeewb Hum vn declaration*dder! by ihli A
date of dm nu-ry I.o make ihe rtoia.rrunlije de-teflon LH Family before January X,
Rcftrancti
eiiiitlttlc.XA.afety Oi lvl/XU(lark. dotiei.CA. Guvermnem Cade.
Library Kaferrncci
t.
W GST LAW Topic No. IJJ.
CJ.S.J,
Be-.cw.Sulaiv... art.
S.
.
. 11
Acuhernon'* Ann.Clv.6i,S,
Hrfcraneea
tyearibli>
Library lUfereneaa
TIAW Topicarrlaje IS,
Sulci of Decision*
1
Auilwrtty to liiu*ourt ordeied waiver 3
Authority lo Uiwctrnniy
K lemalcunderoT|<jmnw* orovltlnni rd Vernon* Ann.Clv.Sl.BS5ESbeen compiled with. OpJVlly. QenWI60.
AllldeMU Under Vcriuvn't
Under Vtnuin'i AnuXlv.Cl. an. 4MUslac adltdavU aaeeuled by huibauvl
l.Ofi'. Abaenl Applicant
only one of the applicants IS able lo appear personally bt'1 county clerk to applyarriage license, any adult person or l' applicant may apply on behalf of the absent applicant.
(b) The person applying ou behalf of an abaenl applicanthe clerk:
he affidavit of the absent applicant as proscribed by SitbsccH this section;
roof of the identity and age of the absent applicantf this code; -
f.AND WIFE lHle I
stale, the
. clu 10
t fcVjHi II.
nbacc. ft).
f
b
fc
ender tair-
r*rtd wilecr efjoocrniai
(?j1u.
r
A.
MARRIAGE RE LAI
Ch. I
(J) If required, ihetablishlnic parental consett-enabliihlngrior marriaihas been dissolved,or the abiem applicant asyf this eK (c) The affidavit or an absent a| llcam mutt Include:
he abicni applicant's full laiiie (Including Ihe miildci,ddreis. date or blill- place of birth (Including cil>itiMiislilp, and social"illy number, ir any:
applicant Is nol preiei iltey wish lo marryot related i
a declaration that thepplicant has nol been dlv iheays;
a declaration lhai ihe al (itnlcsi to the other appllconi m
eclaration thai tho Ml' nppllrnni nil
(A) an ancestor or descends.-it, by blood ora brother or slsier. of the whole'or half blooda parent's brother or sUier of the whole or lalfa son or daughterrother or sltlcr of ihe wholeby
a declaration that the absent applicant desires lo ma name, age, and "address, of the person to whom ihe absent app> to be
the approximateon which ihe marriage is lo occui
Ihe reason the absent applicant la unable lo appear pen the county clerk for the Issuance of ihe license: and
i Lag, p. ISM.lheff. SepLg. eh.ff.. eff. Sept. "
(S) if Ihe iflweni applicant vjM be unable lo attendppointment of any adult, except ihe oiher applicant lourpoie of participating Inrcmony.
iff. Jsn.mended
t0 h
before the
on or the other
M,
ft- '
" atoll present to
Subsection (c)
oil provided by e>
mendttwm rewrote ihh teeiihleli prior thereto icadi
Information orMi* lie
OmliM
nformation penilniiuj to anlherihi applicant'! nunc. may be crnili-ud fiom Ihe application, ind say formM-tr rpplred by Subehaptau A. B.f <'d. eklpUr may be MRS on the county JwJrV* wriiun order, lu-fd (or |ood uuknd lubmlttcd lo ihe county clerktlx tl ne ihe tpolletllgn ti
nul} end renumberede
h Les. eiu I'Inserted "documeou t: prior maMije hu been dim
(b) deletededical ewmlfMiiloarder for iha abwntwrifcod br Subchapteroforme, iuW.bd.dded pat.
x-
robertj. gibson &
allqahcvs at law
au
sm
f
X|4 JENNIFER HARBURY MID
RPHRXM* BAMACA
TO WHOM TT MAV CONCERN:
A aearch was made of Travis County,arriage.;and Declaration and Registration of common law marrlaqes^ony thin writes.
Travis county has not computerized the'ae The, cearch reviewed the computerthat time and, the manually .executed rncordatime for tho dates hereafter listed', fthey werebath the male name and the icranio,
The ledgers eacheateB i
hrough
Fall5 through Spring ol!Springhrough Winter8 End8 through Summer00 through April2 March of2 through November
Computer listingo from December3 until.
The ledger, covering the relevont date ofaa double checked by an employee of the Travis County Clerks office.
Ift none of the above records appeared any record of either of the referenced partios having been married in Travis County,o far ac could ive decerned.
There isecord kept in Travis Countyfilings of "Domestichese are apparently set up in keeping with local ordinanceo allowing oomoaexuala, o file as partners and auch unions do notarriage. Therefore, I did not scorch these records.
AT
Theirorovision for an "absent apoitctxnt" tomarriage license". his in eremonial marriage ati opposedommon low marriage). ony of that statute.
I alsoopy of thn statuteommon law marriage, or as the statute entitles it, an "Informal Marriage".
I alaoopy of thv statute Authorizino the filing of such an informal marriage. will note in Secumberequirement is that the couole satisfy the requiremonts of an Inforr-aln this state". This would, or might.be, because other jurisdictions do not recognize or authorize suchcommon law"herefore the couple would have to satisfy the requirements, of Snc. 1 within the State of Texas(mutuallv) and anv absentee compliance might be unsatisfactory.
You will also note that in4 the statute requires that the Clerk "have each party sign -the declaration in his presence" and execute his certlficato to the declaration
1 find no statute providing an "absentee* aDpearanceeclaration of an informal marriage. - |'
Robert J. Gibson Attorney at Law
We trust this information miqht be oo some value toyour boslged
Original document.
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