CIA HISTORICAL REV'iFW PROGRAM
AS SANITIZED
CIA aod Guatemala Assassination.
CIA History Staff Analysis Gerald K_ Haines5
Introduction
in the, the Central Intelligence Agency directed covert operations aimed at removing the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman from power in Guatemala, included in these cll'oiis were various suggestions for the disposal of key Arbenz government officials and Guatemalan Communists. The Agency drew up lists of individuals for assassination, discussed training Guatemalan exiles for assassination teams, and conducted intimidation programs against prominent Guatemalan officials
This brief study traces,hronological manner, the injection of assassination planning and proposals into the PBFORTUNE covert operation against the Arbenz government2 and into the PBSUCCESS operationi attempts to illustrate the depth of such planning and the levd of involvement of Agency officials. It also attempts to detail where the proposals originated, who approved them, and how advanced the preparations for such actions were. Finally, the study examines the implementation of such planning and tben the end, the plans were abandoned and no Arbenz officials or (iuatcmalan (Communists were killed. The study is based almost exclusively on Directorate of Operations records relating to PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS
Background
As early2 US policymakers viewed the government of President Arbenz. with some alarm. Although he had been popularly electedrowing Communist influence within his government gave rise to concern in the United States that Arbenz had established an elTectivc working alliance with the Communists. Moreover, Arbenz' policies had damaged US business interests inweeping agrarian reform called for the expropriation and redistribution of much of the United Fruitlthough most high-level US officials recognizedostile government in Guatemala by itself did notirect security threat to the United States, they viewed events there in the context of the growing global (Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union and feared that Guatemala couldlient state from which the Soviets could project power and influence throughout the Western Hemisphere.'
OA and Intelligence: Community reports tended to support the view that (niatemala and Ihc Arbenz regime were rapidly falling under the sway of theirector of CentiaJ Intelligence (DO) Walter Bedell Smith and other Agency officials bdicved the situation called for action Their assessment was. that without help, the Guatemalan opposition would remain inept, disorganized and ineffective The anti-Communisthe Catholic hierarchy, landowners, business interests, the railway workers union, university students, and the Army were prepared to preventCommunist accession to power, but they had little outside support *
Other US officials, especially in the Department of Stale,ote cautious approach. The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, for example, did not want to ptesent "the spectacle of the elephant shaking with alarm before the mouse " Itolicy of firm persuasion with the withholding of virtually all cooperative assistance, and the concluding of military defense assistance pacts with El Salvador, Nicaragua, andlthough the rJepartment of State position became the official public US policy, the CIA assessment of the situation had support within the Truman administration as well. This led to the developmentovert action program designed to topple the ArbenzBFORTUNE.
PBFORTUNE
isit to Washington by Nicaraguan President Anastasion which Somoza boasted that if provided arms he and GuatemalanCastillo Armas could overthrow Arbenz, President Harry Truman askedlo investigate the possibility. Smith sent an agent, codenamed SEEKFORD,Guatemalan dissidents about armed action against the Arbenz regime *his report,Chief of theDivision of the
Directorate of Plansroposed to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles that the Agency supply Castillo Armas with armsS.0OO and that Nicaragua and Honduras furnish the Guatemalans with airaining Department of Slate support. Snath,fficially approved^ ]'s request to initiate operation PBFORTUNE to aid Guatemalan exiles in overthrowing Arbenz Planning for PBFORTUNE lastedonth, however, when Smith terminated it after he learned in October thai it had been blown. 9
Throughout planning for PBFORTUNE there were proposals formonths before the official approval of PBFORTUNE. Directorate ofhiorking from an9 Guatemalan Army buand information supplied by the Diiectotatc of Intelligence, in Januaryofficersst of "top flight Communists whom the new governmentto eliminate immediately in event of successful anti-Communist coupaskedto verify the list and recommend any
additions or deletions Headquarters alsoist of an
additionalommunists and/or sympathizers whom the new government wouldincarcerate immediately if the coup succeeded "
Guatemala City added thiee names lo the list in Ins reply Nine months laier.
- -
iccftgv
seekford. ihe cia agent in touch wiih Castillo Annas, foiwaided loisposal list complied by Castillo Annas Thai list called for the execution through executive action ofuatemalans (Category I) and the imprisonment or exile ofdditional Cniatemalam (Category II)EEKFORD also reported al Ihe same time.hai General Rafael Tiujilio. ihe dictator ofepublic, had agreed to aid Castillo Armas in return for the "killing of four Santo Dominicans at present residing inew days priorccording lo SEEKFORD. Castillo Annas readily agreed, but cautioned that it could not be done prioray because of security reasons. Castillo Armas further added that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were already beinghere is no record thai Headquarters took any action regarding Castillo Armas' list
After the PBFORTUNK operation was officially lerininated, the Agency continued lo pick up leports of assassination fanning on the part of ihe Guatemalan opposition. In lateor example, an opposition Guatemalan leader,onversation with SEEKFORD, confirmed that Castillo Armas had special "K" groups whose mission was to kill all leading political and military leaders, and thai the hit list with the location of the homes and offices of all targets bad already been drawnnecember SEEKFORD reported further that Castillo Annas planned to make rnaximuni use of the "K" groups Another source subsequently reported that Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Salvadoran soldiers in civilian clothes would infiltrate Guatemala and assassinate urauuiicd Communist readers
In addition to monitoring events in Guatemala, the Agency conlinued to try to influence developments and to float ideas for disposing of key figures inovernment 3 proposed noi only to focus on sabotage, defection, penetration, and propaganda efforts with regard lo Guatemala, but to clinunale [
^According to"js drafl memorandum, aftertory that to oust the Communists, he could be eliminated His assassination wouldto the Commies" and used to bringass defection of the Guatemalan armywestern Hemisphere Division memo of3 also suggestedkey Guatemalan miliary officers if they refused to be converted ton "jalso"pd^'cd plan of
action whicheference to "neutralizing" key Guatemalan military leaders x
In the psychological warfare area, Guatemala City Station sent
ll leading Communists in
Guatemala, "death notice" cards fortraight days beginning3 The station repealed the operation beginning3 but reported no reaction fiom the targeted leaders!l
3
ivc
PBSUCCESS
By ihc fallS policymalccrs. including CIA officials, were searchingew overall program for dealing with Arbenz The Guatemalan leader had moved even closer lo the Cc-rnmunists. He had expropriated additional United Fruit Company holdings, legalized the Guatemalan Communist Parry, the PGT. and suppressed anti-Communist opposition following an abortive uprising at Salama In response, the National Security Councilovert action operation against Arbenz and gave the CIA primary responsibility.
The CIA plan, as drawnestern Hemisphere Division,
combined psychological warfare, economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary actions against Guatemala. Named PBSUCCESS. and coordinated with the Department of State, the plan's stated objective was "lo remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government ofn the outline of the operation the sixth stage called for the "roll-up" of Communists and collaboratorsuccessful coup u
Dulles placedin charge of PBSUCCESS andenior DDP
emporary stationo cooidinate the
planning and exocution of PBSUCCESS. Other kev Agency figures involved wereStaff Department of
StateAssistant Secretary of State for [_
rom the Office ofAffairs, and
State liaison io the Agency, also played major roles.
Training
Although assassination was not mentioned specifically in the overall plan, thea special paper on liquidation of
personnel4 This paper, according toJuef, was to be
utilized to brief the training chief for PBSUCCESS before he left to begin trainingforces in Honduras onfollowing
day requestedilencers (converters)aliber rifles. Headquarters sent the Thealso discussed the training plan with the agent StiEKFORD
onndicating that he wanted Castillo Armas and the PBSUCCESS ^officer to tram two assassins In addition, he discussed these "assassination specialists" with Castillo Armas4
The idea of forming assassination" groups) apparently originatedArmas2 Adapting Castillo Armas' concept, the
routinely included two assassination specialists in his training plans "
CIA planning for sabotage teams inS4 aiso ir.cU.dcd'K" group named to perform assassinations The main mission of the sabotage teams or harassment teams, however, was to attack local Communists and Communist property andvoid
attacks on the army han depictingplan foi ihe
CALLICERJS (Castillo Armas) organization snowea the "K" Group It wasparamilitary planning packets as late as (he springriefingJune lso mentioned that
sabotage teams would assassinate known Communists in their areas once the invasion operation began."
Piytholoeicoi Warfare
As in PBFORTUNE. an intensive psycrictogical warfare program paralleled the planning for paramilitary action. Utilizing the anti-Communist network establisheduatemalan dissident, the Chief of Political and Psychological Operations at LINCOLNajor propaganda campaign against the Arbenz government. Part of this program included the sending of new rnourrung cards to top Communist leaders These cards mourned the imminent purge or execution of various Communists throughout the world and hinted of the fortlicortiing doom of the addressee. Death letters were also sent to top Guatemalan Communists such as [
3 Guatemala Citythese letters
for the dissident leader. The "Nerve War Againsts it was called, also included sending wooden coffins, hangman's nooses, and phony bombs to selected individuals Such slogans as "Herepy" and "You haveays" were painted on their houses M
we
Wanting to go beyond mere threats, the dissident leader suggested thai theof one of the top Guatemalan Communists wouldositive effect onmovement and undermine Communis! morale. The dissidentcalled for the formationovert action group to performacts against the government LINCOLN cautioned the dissident leader,such techniques were designed only toerson's usefulness. Bynot mean to kill (heINCOLN cabled the dissident leader Respondingop Communist leader beCily i
he could not recommend assassinating any "death letter" recipients at this time becausetouch off "wholesaleeiterating thai the plan was "to scare noinevertheless suggestedmight wish to "study the suggestion for utility
now or in the future
While Agency paramilitary and psychological warfare planning bothwhich implied assassination proposals, these proposals appear never toimplemented had sought to use Castillo Armas' "K" group
scheme but there was no State Department or White House support Such was also the case when the subject of assassinat>on emerged in high-level Agency and inter-agency planning discussions.
Target Lists
A weekly PBSUCCESS meeting at Headquarter4 considered the eliminationf Guatemala's top leaders with "Trujillo's namedhose attending the meeting were [
]JDP Operations, along with State Department
Addressing the group. [ stating clearly that "such elimination was part of the plan and could bebjected to the proposal at that time [ owever, expressed the view that "knocking off* the leaders might make it possible for the Army to take over.""
Following this meeting. [_ ppears to be the Agency official who revived discussion of assassination as an option Onarch he broached the subject with
usl
returned from the Organization of American States meeting in Caracas.o condemn communism in Guatemala. L
again present,^ 3asked [_ hanged his thinking since the conference or, the possible methods to get rid of the Arbenz gowrnrncnt.[ cd that in his opinion "the elimination of those in high positions of the government would bring about itse then qualified his statement, according tc[ T* memo, by saying that perhapsmaller number,ould be sufficient
Lessarch. The records
do not indicate wh)fj Oft dtt date the
wcie asked to draw up an up-dated target list. Criteria for inclusion on the disposal list required that individuals be (I) high government and organizational leaders "irrevocably implicated in Communist doctrine andou: and out proven Communisthose few individuals in key government and military positions of tactical importance "whose removal for psychological, organizational or otherandatory for the success of military1
chief took tbe new list with him when he consulted Castillo
Armasbwopy of Ihc
list on the same day.rmas apparently discussed the
list and at least tentatively agreed that any assassination would take place during the actual invasion of Guatemala by Castillo Armas' forces There was still no time date for theactual beginning of hostilities, however.14
Agency contacts with conservative Guatemalan exile leader f_
J at the same time also produced an assassination list
IA cutoutist of Communist leaders he would like to see oose cannon, however They did not want him to become
involved in PBSUCCESS "
CIA received further Department of State encouragement forin4 Fueling the fireeeting
withand another CIA officer,
concluded that "more drastic and definitive steps lo overthrow Ihc government (in
Guatemala) must ben responseuestion ol whether Guatemalan l
J was "salvageable,"^ ^replied in the negative and suggested "he be eliminated
Onatproposedemorandum
the new Chief ofand [ ow serving asTJ
that assassination be incorporated into the psychological pari of PBSUCCESS.laidpecific assassination schedule leading upay. Ihe actual
invasion by Castillo Armas. Heaid
hiswas'obe ashowof force, no one was to be liarmed and theto lake place when fj The^. lOfficer.
however, proposed the disposal of
eans of paralyzing the [_
Officer suggested that Q
e killed. This would, according toeliminate
character of Ihe Arbenz regime. Ther ^Officer called for the
disposalfin the Guatemalan
Communist Party (PGT)This would
leave Guatemala'sxi believed. On
be eliminated. vVas^ eliminated so that the rebel
forces would nol have to worry about him or deal with him after victory. The
Officer considered the possibility of reprisalseakness in his scheme, but decided lhat "such actions were expected anyway.'" The C "jOflicer argued that his proposal, if adopted, would not only be physically impressive but psychologically signiScant byhow of strength for the opposition. It would also "soften up" the enemy. He added that his first three suggestions had the previous approval of [
Onay [ asked Headquarters for permission to implement the
Officer's proposal and asked for suggestions about the specific individuals toNo reply fiorn Headquarters io[ has been found Onaythechief requested the names of the "four men" he and the
discussed assassinaiing. More than likely, thechief wanted
lo take up the issue again with Castillo Armas. Again, no cable reply frombeenl the samecompiling
information onand lists of home addresses for individuals named on lh*c
"disposal list" drafted in April^t arBC
Meanwhile, [ raveled to Washington androposal on Ithat suggested that as an alternative approach to the paramilitary action programsabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out n discussions with C
une. According tcconsidered the proposal and then ruled il
out, "at least for the immediaten the ground lhat it would provemore specific plans concerning the individual targets, liming,
and statement of purpose Both [ and*g'ccd thai the advantages gained
by this type of activity needed to be clearly spelled outliis appearse the end of
senous planning in Washington for the inclusion of selective assassination proposals Returning from Washington
however, reported to his staff thit the consensus in Washington was that "Arbenz must go. how does not
The Paramilitary Operation
On4 Castillo Armas" CIA-supported force of armed exiles entered Guatemala. While these forces advanced tentatively in the hinterland.^ atemalj City onndune meteading Guatemalan military commander, in the hopes of convincing him tooup against Arbenz. In these discussions, the military commander hinted he would like to sec [
illed. Thcf. rustrated by the continued inaction of the Guatemalan military commander, told him thai if he wanted them killed he should do it himself Despite the Guatemalan militaryacillation, a 'e indicated that he remained convinced that [ ]had to be eliminated.*7
With the Guatemala Army's position uncertain and the outcome stil! in doubt,days later, theinrequested permission to bomb the
andLINCOLN responded onune that it did not
want to waste air strikes oo[ attle was raging atlso supportedchiefs request io bombf_
ramatic cable which ended "Bomb RepeatINCOLNheld fastwas never bombed "We do no: take action with
grave foreign policy implications except as agent for theulles cabled LINCOLN *
President Arbenz, onitterly anti-American speech, resigned his office and sought asylum in the Mexican embassy in Guatemala City. [
fter Castillo Armas assumed the presidency, however. Arbenz was allowed to leave the country for Mexico, which granted him political asylum. Inther Arbenz government officials or Communists departed Guatemalaafe passage agreement with the Castillo Armashere is no evidence that any Guatemalans were executed
CONCLUSION
CIA officers responsible for planning and implementing coven action againstgovernment engaged in extensive discussionsalf yearihe possibility of assassinating Guatemalan officials
Consideration of using assassination topurge Guatemala of
Communist influence was born of the extreme international tensions in the early Coid War years. The Agency did not aa unilaterally, but consulted with State Department officials with responsibility for policy toward latin America In the end, no assassinations of Guatemalan officials were carried out. according to all available evidence
8
Proposals for assassination peivaded both PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS. rather than being confined lo an eaily stage of these programs Even before official approval of PBFORTUNE. CIA officers compiled diminution lists and discussed the concept of assassination with Guatemalan opposition leaders Until Ihe day tltal Arbenz lesigned in4 the option of assassination was stil! being considered
Discussions of assassinationigh level within the Agency Among those involved were Q
known to have been present at one meeting where the subject of assassination camewaic i" genera! terms that assassination was
under discussion. Beyond planning, some actual preparations were made. Some assassins were selected, training began, and tentative "hit lists" were drawn up
Ycl no covert action plan involving assassinations of Guatemalans was ever approved or implemented The official objective of PBSUCCESS was to remove the Guatemalan government covertly "without bloodshed ifajimiruiion lists were never firuli/cd, assassination proposals remained controversial within the Agency, and il appears that no Guatemalans associated with Arbenz were assassinated Both CIA and State Department officers were divided (and undecided) about using assassination
Discussion of whether to assassinate Guatemalan Comrnurusts and leaders sympathetic to Communis! programs took placeistorical era quite different from the present Soviet Communism hadeputaiion of using whatever means were expedient to advance Moscow's interests mlonationally. Considering Moscow's machinations in Eastern Europe, role in the Korean War, sponsorship of subversion through Communist surrogates in the Third World, and espousal of an ideology that seemed lo have global hegemony as the ultimate objective. American officials and the American public alike regarded foreign Communist Panics as Soviet pawns and as threatening to vital US security interests
Cold War realities and perceptions conditioned American attitudes towardweapons were legiiimate to use in the struggle against Communism It wouldtwo decades after the events in Guatemala before DCI William Colby prohibitedinvolvement in assassinationubsequent Executive Order banned anyinvolvcmcnl in
ri
ee Dispatch. COS Guatemala Cny lo LINCOLN. "Dcaif.*SC Policy Paper.J.OSi
"See I o[ cneo! PUp. on.'5 (TJ)
SpccuJ Dcpvry for PDSIJCCESS. nemo fo. the rcco-d. "Program for2J) See alto memo to[ Summary of Dirtcu.esniuvcuoru oo PBSUCCESS.'5ox ocs not srraiaJly meooon swxisinaoon either
5 laniuj,
S) and6I (S) SccalsolSu
S);toS)..
"
ee also.
C oo ofSupport (or7oxS) He linedoxS)to
Hc*dcuincrs,S)
*M oxS) and
memo for the record. "PM Conference)ox 74
i-_ii4he Iteadquanm Registry copy
of the pouch. BoxS) hm to: manualtudy of Asmi^'joa"now on Ihc origiiul mirufcsi says the pouch was carried ioby f he actual
assassinationnS).
ox 5io
"SeenC Cuitcw Karuung ofCAlJJGERJSS)and 'Cootaa3.
"4 Box 7}
(Socio. PBSUCCESS. Rybat)
1
*To LINCOLN.TacucaJ Inssructions (panS) and to LINCOLN. "Inrvuctions*gainsto.S)
" See COS Cua'-emalaestern Hemisphere Division, undated. Box(C) and Guatemalao LINCOLN.ec also the COS. dispatch Guatemala Cityao LINCOLN.ox U) (S) f
"Sort T. nemo for the record, "Weekly PBSUCCESS Meeting withf TS) Even before this meetinglhat ibe lop Guatemalan leadership
reeded to be assassinated during the Cm hours of ihe revolution Tbey had io be "pulled out bytfweif too many of these birds gc< out ihey will be back in about
ihree
.
L drTuiMaraiive5oxS).[ lmemo for ihe record.oxS)
jeiemo for toe record, "Repon of MrOAS9 March
S)
* See. Chief. Economic Warfare.io All SialTOfficers. "Selocoon of
Individuals (or Discoul by Junta Group.iiS) We kjiow( og book He SignedII March
Bookforo, IJS(S)
"Memo.S).
" See memo and inachmeni ikxci on ihe memo wrocklhail Treturned toe Imfile
i i
O Sec memo Summary ofRS) See also 4.S) An attachment no.es lhat some
awu are also on anorher lisi fb.auachmeiii in) Secatsof
nemo to ihe reco-d. "SfMhooofremarks"Bo. IS!
"See^ mcnwlof landf j, -AcuofFoiway,-
Secrer. PUSUCCESS.ee emo
iindateA in which( Jsiaies. "YourSeacj.
PBSUCCESS.
io Director 11
oi 4
to Headquarters,oxS)xdonferenoe helduneeef2Secret. PBSUCCESS. Rybat)
o.
Socio. PBSUCCESS. Rybat)
"See"Dijpoul Listd essescopied from an anachmcni iodispatch,Iicoouinedames. See also
for the nuchmeoi (Dispaich dated,Secrer, Rybai)
"Sce^ emo. *Prtirni Sums and Pouible Fuiutc Course of PBSUCCESSio. US(S)
a t" lmemo foe ihe record. TootsVW Discussions of. (S) This memo is onpoaDy bomR. Boxolder J.
'ContactSecret. PBSUCCESS. Rybat) See alsofor ihc recoid. "Points Coverediscussion of3or ihc file. "Disposal Lis Prepared by.
o*S);
Headquancrs.o.ee earlier Agency meeiinrs *iih GuatcmaJaniS).
Dispaich. ii
Secret.
w LINCOLN.o,Socio, PBSUCCESS. Rybat)
io UNCOLN. l?o,nd5 io Headquarters. 22
oxSecret. PBSUCCESS. Rybai).
lo
Dulles,S)
" See Headquarters to UNCOLN,. (TS) jj See Gw.eouoao LINCOLN.Secret.) lohn H. WaJlei. CIA Inspecioi General, lenei io Thomas Farmer. Chairman ol the lnicliieence OvefwRht Board.9
Original document.
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