TERRORISM REVIEW

Created: 6/1/1995

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

8

Libya: Ryiimcorating Support for Terrorism

leader Mu'ummar al-Qadhaf) has begun during Ihe last two rear* to rebuild Libya's links to terrorism, negating the (osmetic gestures he bad made In the wake of IN sanctions Inibya has increased lis linunclal and logisticfor Palestinian rejectI and terrorist groups, with as the rTLP-GC, andara tut continues to target Libyanas evidenced by ihe3 abductionins an oppositionist in Cairo. Nonetheless, Tripoli has refrained from sponsoring anti-Western terrorist attacks since sanction* were Imposed lo Wave off harshersuchotentially regime-threatening UN oil embargo. There is no evidence Libya isplanning to attack Western targets, and reporting suggests that Qadhafi would he unlikely to do so unless he believed his current policy of restraint vrns no longer furthering his objectives.

adhafi publicly promised lociosc the Islamic Call Society and the World AmiCenter. Libyanorgani/a'iim (hat the Un-tcd States Government publicly identified as being cover ofjani2aoons for Libyan tenon st acti vibes.

Byibya had razed ot partiallytraining camps,

Reinvigorating Terrorist Links

Over the past two yean Qadhafi has reversed somemeasures and failed to follow through withDespite Qadhah's assurance* regardingfor

Nldal maintain) his headquarters and

his residenceadhah replaced "clean hillwith Musaadhafi loyalist andintelligence officer whonted bylor questioning about hitombing. While less active thanIslamic Call Society continues to supportgroups, and the Antt-Impciialisni topen as of

Qadhah also hai resumed more active involvementrelated activities. Qadhafi may havethat he has little io fear from current UNthe UN measures havermrrrujl impacteconomy because they have notoil revenues, which account lor morepercent of Ubya's eipon earnings

Trying To Sabotage the Peace Process. Since the signing of theaccord inadhati has publicly condemned the peace process and has stepped up support for groups that violently oppose peace with Israel. This support, however, is less than what Qadhafi provided to such groups in, when Libyan financial support for terrorists worldwide was at its zenith;

had rcuiTit-ilhe Popular Front

for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, most of which Tripoli had cutnd had become the PTLP-GC's primary foreign financial

Libya has provided sporadic funding to theIslamic Jihad-Shiqaqi taction since its leader, Fathi Shiqaqi, met with Qadhah* in

Inibya and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ> Created an organization to cany out intifada activities in the occupied territories.

1_

Qadhafi pledged5 meeting in Tripoli to provide the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and PIJ militants with resources to wage ihe intifada, according lo public statements made by HAMAS and PII leaders^

Targeting Diisidrrin. Libya's primary intelligence focus, apart from opposing the peace process, remains keeping tabs on, and occasionally assassinating,dissidents:

Libya's most leccm direct act of inarrnitional lerror-ism was lis apparent abduction of Mansurrominent dissident and L'S permanent resident, in Cairo in'

Libyan intelligence officers continue to monitordissidentsumber of countries in Europe and ihe Middle Gail.

Qadhafi's More Aggressive Stance Likely To Continue

Because Libya's resumption of rhetorical andsupport for rejeciionist groups has not resulted in ne* international sanctions. Qadhafi is likely to fot-luw his past partem of increasing his support until he meets opposition. Violent opposition to Israel hasornerstone of Qadhafi's foreign policy since he came to powernd he will not forego this policy easily. Antidissidcnt operations remain afor Libyan intelligence, bin we ripect ihst ihe VST) will be careful aboutr^tls for assassination to avoid possible Western rctnbution

Qsdhdfi has refrained from any attacks against the West since sanctions were imposed to stave off more serious international sanctions.Qadhah likely would reconsider his sianddown on anti-Western terrorism if he believed that the United State* or oiher Western countries inter Jed lo implement actions that could threaten his regime, such as the impositionN oil embargo.

remains an inconsistent sponsor of these groups, however, undermining his ability to influence or direct their activities. Libya has often been crili-

liable sponsor

1 According to Ihe US Code, "wnoniin" it premcdiinicd.otivated violence pcrpttnicd against noKombonoc largec* by lueaownkl fioups or c'lndctTine agents, utually iacended u>

influence ia uid*ncr "tnicrawtorfcilemjmrn

Involving; ciUuni or the territory of mere ihinoac counTvl

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Original document.

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