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forces have now establishedover Portuguese Timor's two principaland Baucau. It does not appear from suchas we have that Fretilin resisted stronglycity. Instead its leaders seem to haveconserve men and suppliesuture Whatever their tactics, we do notFretilin forces will be able to obstruct aand complete extension of Indonesian controladministrative centers. Nor will theyto block the establishment of anregime in Dili. However, they will becarry on guerrilla activities for soma time tothe period before some act ofplace, Fretilin will probably try very hardactivities to obstruct Djakarta's plans tothe territory into Indonesia and to keepon developments in Timor. Most membersworld community, however, want to bury the issue
as quickly as possible and the Indonesians willbe able to contain guerrilla activity (and news about guerrilla activity)evel that could cause significant international embarrassment.
The Contending Forces
forces already outweigh
Indonesia now has well0 troops on the island, is moving more in, and can and will reinforce substantially if it needs to.
Fretilin reportedly0 troops; it may recruit more, but it cannot begin to match Indonesia's reinforcement capability.
equipment and materiol available toforces, although seriously deficient bystandards, is far superior to Fretilin's.
Fretilin has apparently stocked supplies in tho hills, but the more active its guerrilla campaign the sooner it will face resupply problems.
Its prospects for external support are dim. Most of Djakarta's Asian neighborsdespito domestic rumblings in somesupport or at least accept the extension
of Indonesian control over Timor.
and Peking, while thoy have voiced support for Fretilin's cauae, obviously do not regard itiablo contender for power. Neither Peking nor Moscow
is likely to complicate active efforts to improvo relations with Djakarta byarms to Fretilin.
Indonesia's ability to police the coast and surrounding waters is limited, smuggled arms are unlikely to reach Fretilin in any large quantity. No country capable of providing andarms in quantity seems likely to regardourse as very profitable politically. Nor does it seen likely that there will be the funds available
to make commercially attractive the movement of armsemote area well off the established Southeast Asian smuggling routes.
Prospects
overt military campaign,as not been carried out on schedule.difficulties, however, have not been caused by Fretilin
resistance as much as by poor weather.
I Notwithstanding these airricuitiesi Indonesia's errorts to establish military control over remaining administrative centers (see map) are unlikely to be contested very seriously. Similarly, Djakarta's overwhelming superiority in men and materiel should prevail against any effort to retake areasby Indonesian forces. The situation wouldifferent one should Indonesia transfer the burden of military defense to its Timorese allies. Drawn for the most part from the local bureaucracy and tribal leadership, they have shown themselves incapable of coping militarily with Fretilin's fighting forces, the core of which is made up of Timorese who served in the local Portuguese military force, and highlyafter the4 coup in Portugal through contact with newly-arrived Portuguese officers who have since departed. No such transfer is likely in any real sense, however. Indonesia will try to mask its continuing military presence as much as it can. Buthaving delayed its overt intervention in force until Suharto's concern with foreign reactions was outweighed by his conviction that his country's interests were being seriously threatenedIndonesia will not now draw down its forcesay that would risk its continued control.
guerrilla campaign willIndonesia some difficulties, perhaps for atime. The terrain is hospitable to guerrillaFretilin will not lack for resources to engageand harassment. rimitive roadnet will make
it difficult for regular forces to move rapidly against small groups of insurgents and Indonesian troops will be operating in alien territory among people whose language they do not speak.
cannot estimate how much support Fretilinable to attract in the countryside. In ansociety it will be difficult for Fretilin tonationalist sentiments. Long-standing tribal disputes
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and enmities sharpened when the Portuguese gave up all pretense of administration earlier this year and some of these rivalries began to take on pro- andovertones. Fretilin has apparently been able to ally itself with the tribal enemies of thegroups in many areas and this will reinforce its staying power in the countryside. But Indonesians have also had some success in manipulating the local Since they have little knowledge of tribalthey will be at some disadvantage in this regard but they may be able to compensate by the superiorrewards at their command.
7. Although Fretilin-led guerrilla activities will cause political and military problems for Indonesia, we do not believe these problems will be formidable ones. The Indonesian armed forces have had long and successful experience in suppressing insurgent activities and the area in which they will be operating, although hard to get around in, is also very small and isolated. Its isolation will facilitate the efforts the Indonesians are sure to make to keep information on Timoreseactivities from reaching the outside world. such time as Djakarta has been able to obtain some form of Timorese agreement to incorporation in Indonesia, Fretilin will probablyaximum effort to publicize its own cause and attempts at spectacular shows ofwill be likely. With their spokesman still active in Australia and presumably in New York, and particularly if there is some form of UN presence on the island, their guerrilla actions could reverberate outside Timor. But over the longer range, as is the case with continuedin Irian, such actions are unlikely either to seriously disturb Indonesian control or to arouse much foreign interest.
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Original document.
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