NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETINCHINA-ANGOLA

Created: 12/11/1975

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Intelligence Bulletin

December5

CHINA-ANGOLA

Peklngi poller/ toward Angola continues to reflect Chinese efforts to capitalize on Moscow's heavy-handed support for the Popular Movement. Publicly, the Chinese areosition ol strict neutrality, and there is no evidence that any significant new amounts of Chinese military assistance are reaching the National Front or National Union.

The South Africans reportedhinese vessel transferred cargo to trawlers oH the Angolan coastonth ego. Indicating that Peking was making good on an earlier promise to provide tome arms to the National Union. No similar deliveries have been reported since. The Chinese may also have given tacit approval to Zairian president Mobutu to divert to northern Angola small amounts of military equipment provided 'o Zaire under China's formaliary assistance program-so Song as Peking it leftlausible case for denying direct involvement in Angola.

As long as other countries maintain their current levels of assistance to the National Front and the National Union, China can be expected toow profile with io former clients, endorse the Organization of African Unity's call for neutrality toward Angola, and score propaganda points at Moscow's expense. Peking it clearly concerned, however, that It may not be able to sustain this approach.

Any significant reduction in support for the Nations! Front and National Union by other countries, for example, would present the Chinese with difficult decisions. Mobutu would almost certainly want to divert to Angola large amounts of the Chinese assistance to his country to make up for the loss o' other sources, and such Increased Chinese involvement would not go undetected for long. Peking would be forced either to give Mobutu free rein and risk major damage tonternational image or to maintain restrictions on the use of Chinese equipment and chance notajor strain In Sino-Zam*an relations butefault to the Soviets in ihe rivalry for influence in Angola.

The prospecteversal of the Organization of African Unity's position on Angola or an agreement among Its members to go their separate ways on the recognition issue would be equally unsettling to The Chinese. This would almos: certainly lead To much wider African and Third World recognition for the Popular Movement and leave Peking on the wrong side of the fence. Such valued friends as Tanzania, Mozambique, Romania, and Yugoslavia have aLeady followed Moscow's lead in formally recognizing the Popular Movement.