Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
MHISTO.TOLBB'lEWPROGSii,-SHaSEKSMIilZEB
Soviet Dependents on Spate Systems
r
L
SOVIET DEPENDENCE ON SPACE SYSTEMS
CONTENTS
Page
I
I. 6
A. Overview of Soviet Space
oncepts of Dependence and
II. SOVIET SPACEAND DEGRADATION 8
8
W
Photographic Reconnaissance10
Electronic Reconnaissance 11
Radar Ocean Reconnaissance13
Surveillance by High-Attitude
Photographic-Geophysical Satellites M
Dependence end
C Communicabons Relay Syitemi16
Molniya16
Molniya
Molniya 3 17
Molniya18
FutureIB
^Store/Dump Satellite*
D. Naval Support Satellites {Navigation)
Page
21
22
a 23
New Missions and24
in25
SPACE SYSTEM DEFENSES tS
25
Existing98
Potential 27
28
FOB SOVIET INTERFERENCE WITH US SPACE
SYSTEMS 28
88
Present Situation and Prospects (or the Near80
Crisis or Conflict 30
O. Long-Term Piospects
TABIES
Page
Soviet DependcncW Degradation: Space Systems (or Intelli-
gence and Military Support 3
Levels of Dependence and 7
Current Soviet Space Systems and Their Associated Military or Intelli-
gence 9
Soviet Orbital Inteceptor
Satellites 9
Soviet Dependence/DegradaUon: Intelligence Collection
15
Estimated Soviet DcpcndenoB/Degradabon; Cornrnunications Satellites9
Estimated Soviet Dependence/Degradation: Naval Support Satellites
(For21
Estimated Soviet Dcpendcncrj/Dcgradationi Meteorological2
Assessed Soviet Dependence/Degradation: Geodetic Satellites23
stimated ScMet Dcpendcnce/Dcgradatiori:
. 24
soviet dependence on space systems'
summary
This memorandum examines the missions of the most importantspace systems. It identifies the tasks those missions support, assesses the USSR's dependence on those systems, and assesses theof Soviet capabilities if the system were not available. Also examined are the Soviets' defense of their space systems and thefor their interfering with those of the US.
The USSR's space effort is diiected toward three broad applications: those having scientific and national prestige value, those relating to economic activity, and those supporting military and intelligenceThe latter comprise the great bulk of the effort and thisassesses the degree of Soviet dependence on them.
Three out of four Soviet satellites in the past several years liave been associated with military and intelligence activities. Theya variety of missions in the areas of intelligence collection,relay, navigation, weather,nd radarIn addition, the Soviets haveatellite interceptor
that can bo placed In orbit. We have identified one or more military or intelligence tasks to which these space systems contribute. These tasks in turn support the operations of military forces either directly or through the national-level decisionmaking apparatus.
Dependence and Degradation
Soviet dependence on these satellites is assessed in terms of the availability of non-space substitutes for the missions they perform or the support they provide. Insofarpace system is the only means ofarticular mission or providing support. Sovietis judged to be correspondingly high.
Also assessed ishe reduction in capability to perform specific tasks that the Soviets would suffer If these spacewere rendered unavailable. Dependence differs frombecause there are satellites for which the Soviets have noyet we believe their absence would have little impact on Soviet capabilities to perform the particular task.1
Judgments about dependence and degradation are provided for the present and for the period ten years hence, and are applied to three situations: peacetime, crisis, and conflict. Three levelsigh, moderate, andthree levels ofsevere, moderate, andused. They are summarized in Tabict shows that at present the Soviets arc highly dependent on three of their space systems: those that perform orbital intercept,reconnaissance, and radar calibration missions. The tableestimated increases over (he next ten years in Soviet dependency on space systems for electronic reconnaissance, radnr oceanand the detection of missile launches.
Increased dependence on future versions of Soviet electronic and radar ocean reconnaissance systems stems from what are likely to be improved technical characteristics for target discrimination and faster response time. The high-altitude system for detecting missile launches, which we project, willew capability that will extendwarning of missile attack by some ten minutes.S.in communications satellites and an expected substantial increase in the number of their military users will lead to increased dependence on them despite the continued expansion of alternate means of communications. High accuracy and faster response times are
' It ihould be noted that the tatSi to which the ulellrtei contribute am not mecauit, of the tame importance or valueiven situation It If beyond (ha icopa of (kit memorandum to aiiiltn relativeto the miaiioni of teconnaittance venut communication vmui mvlji-
tlon. etc.
TOR- cWaWf-W
Table 1
Eatimaled Sotlel Dependence/Dep'odaiion': Space Systems Tor Intelligence and Military Support
lie r.
htfvsrar.
Saulllu In tares pior
In it Hire ace
aeonnabianct.
El*oironic ReconnaUiance
ftadai onid raooana'uapc..
Surv.lUaitc* by Hlgh-AlUludrLaunch Dcucuon
.
Riral SupportLow/site**
Low/SIipM
rUga/oW.
Mo deraWalr
loWSliaU
Blghf&aer.
Low/Stfplil
lgh/SheAi
Iligh'Sei
uVrofr-Swr
k'ghf&it'r.je'tdvele h
Mcd^riU'Wsdirari
Modi'aie-HI|h<
UaOitou Moderate-Highi
Le* .'5
Mseoaif Hlgh'Sexx
M Uw.'Sop.v:
Low/See*!
Modtr ate/Mr odVah Uwi'5fjfat
lowfjfitaat
liVSopni
LoB/Saab Uw/SojA.
Mod crate-High'
i
Moder aui'VadtraH
Moderate HlgM
Modnate-aishj
.
ModaraitfWftkrow ,
aaUrolc *^
HljWWed.ral.
' tSr* Lw/SMiM * ^
characteristics of improved navigation and meteorological satellites that will lead to increased dependence in conflict should alternate sources of this support be denied.
In terms of degradation/the table shows that the impact would be severe if the capabilities of two of the Soviet space systems were not nowhose for satellite interception and photographic reconnaissance. The assessment for the satellite interceptor is based on the lack of non-nuclear alternatives for performing its mission. The assessed level of degradation the Soviets would suffer through the loss of their photographic reconnaissance systems stems from the diverse tasks they support.
5 the degradation which would occur if the Soviets lost their photographic reconnaissance systems would be even greater than today due to expected improvements in the capability andof those systems. In connection with the loss of the satellitethe possibility that the Soviets might use ground-based lasers to attack satellites is the basis for lowering our judgment to modcrate-to-severe levels of degradation. The loss of the projected high-altitude satellites for detecting missile launches would severely degrade Soviet capabilities to react to warning of missile attack, despite the existence of their long-range radar systems. New reconnaissance,and navigation systems with more rapid response time willmilitary tasks in crisis or conflict; loss of these prospective new battle-management capabilities is reflected in the increasedlevels shown in the table.
3
System Defenses
The USSR almost certainly understands the requirements andfor the defense of its space systems. Soviet interest in defending its space systems stems from the Soviet perception of US antisatellite research and development and the development of the USSR's own satellite interceptor. The satellites already have at least some inherent protective capability by virtue of their technical design features, such as bulky and thick-skinned construction, and maneuverability. The use of multiple spacecraftapability to launch backup satellites rapidly affords other means of coping with the loss
jTlx- Soviets also may judge that ihclr satellite interceptoreasure of deterrent protection. For existing, or follow-on, space systems the Soviets could add various types of defensiveat any
Noninterference Proipech
The USSR has participated in de facto, mutual iiiminicrfereiice with all space systems for years. The Soviets gradually muted their position that space reconnaissance was contrary to international law as their own capability expanded, as detente progressed, and especially after the signing2 of the strategic arms limitations agreements. The Soviets probably do not regard US non-reconnaissance, militarysatellites as "national technical means" of verification protected by the provisions of these agreements. They have long reserved the option to interfere with direct broadcast satellites, and while they have toned down their subsequent discussions on this issueheir position apparently has not changed significantly.
Short of preparationonflict involving the use of Soviet and US forces or what they believed to be US action against their own satellites, we believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets wouldwith any US military or intelligence-related satellites in thefuture. We believe that the degree of Soviet dependence on space systems we have forecast for the next ten years is not by itself high enough to deter the Soviets from interfering with US satellites in the face of other compelling reasons to dooviet decision to interfere would dependost of other factors, notably on Soviet estimates of the overall political costs, of how much and for what purpose the US relied on its own satellites, and of the US ability and will to respond.
Increased Soviet dependence on space systems, however, probably will increase Soviet incentives not to interfere with US satellites and to enter into explicit non-interference agreements. Nevertheless, we think it unlikely that the Soviet leadership would find acceptable an agreement covering all space systems. In particular, we doubt that the Soviets would agree not to interfere with direct broadcast satellites.
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
A. Overview ol Soviet Spoce Systems
ince iti inception,USSR's spice program has grown to encompass the use of satellite systems1road range of military and nonrnilitnry applications upon which the Soviets have become increasingly dependent Its program can be broken down into three groups ol activities: that which provides scientific information and creates national prestige, that used for direct economic benefit, and that which supports military or intelligenceThis memorandum focuses on Sovieton space systems that support military or intelligence activities.
he bulk of the USSR's efforts inbased on the number of satellites and variety ofin support of military or intelligenceThree out of every four Soviet spacecraft launched in the past four years or so have provided direct or indirect support for such open torn The Soviets regularlyignificant part of their
'nclude! theCS thank" li-ir
ground ittliuni, dita proNdltif centos, andimi cotn-muxieatKini links.
. "Sovirl Space.ndSoviet Foma for IrjterrmtinmMl Conflict Thraufh itwo. rwiho dncuiiion ol Soviet ipjc* program*.
space efforl lo collecting intelligence withand electronic satellites. They are also beginning to use radar ocean reconnaissancefor intelligence purposes. Another areato the Soviets is space communicationsfor the command and control of military and intelligence operations Additional space efforts in support of military or intelligence activities
n-.ctrxnologicalfor collection of weather data for operations worldwide, geodetic satellites for the contribution they make in improving the accuracy of ballistic missiles, and satellites for exercise and calibration the Soviets also have anorbital interceptor, although it has not been flown since
number of Soviet military andspace launches per year grew rapidly inthen leveled off in. Wethe present level of launch activity willstable fur the next yeaf. or vo Tl.rof launches may then decline as theto rely upon satellited capable of more time
in orbit, of performing multiple missions, and of more efficient or direct recovery of data they collect
mostpecific space systemone mUsion of significance that supports a
-Top
of specific uses or tasks. Forhotographic jtconnsuiuice lyitetn that collects high-resolution imagny aids in the verification of agreements on strategic weapons, as well its in analysis of foreign weapon systems.
fl. Concepts of Dependence and Degradationo assess the Soviets' "dependence" on their military or intelligence space systems, wethe availability of substitute* for thethey perform or the support they provide. We also assessed theis. the reduction in capability to perform specific tasks if the various ipaee systems were not available. This study does not address such other important aspects as satellite replacement easts or thenecessary topace system's capability.
e have established three levels ofmoderate, andthreecorresponding levels ofmoderate, and slight (secnsofarpace system is the only means ofarticular mission or providing support, (orSoviet dependence is fudged to be high. There is not.ne-to-one correlation between the aisessed levels ofand degradation- There are space systems for which the Soviets have no substitute, yet the absence of the space systems would create tilde impact on Soviet military or intelligenceFor example, see the discussion of radar calibration satellites on)
liis memorandum does not address specific scenarios in which various space systems are. or
Tabli
would be.ntend, we define threesituations as follows:
military forcesormal alert status and no crisis or conflict exists for the
USSR.
period of tension in which Soviet militaiy forces are in an increased stale ofsuch as in3 Middle East war. (Use of the orbital satellite interceptor, by deflm'tion. wouldrisis situation and might lead to conflict.)
or nuclear warfaremajor Soviet military forces.
iven situation, the tasks to which the space system* contribute are not necessarily of the same importance or value. It is beyond the scope of the study lo assign relative values to reconnaissance versut communicationi versus navigation, and so oo
ft. The evaluation of dependence and degradation dependsreat extent on ourding of the role and effect) veraM of non-spaceIn some cases, there is more than one type of substitute,ingle space system mayto several military or intelligence activities or taiki. Generally, the xubititute would beexample, high frequency cornmunka-born linksubstitute for communicationBui the substituteoviet space system could alsoon-Soviet spaceas US navigation and geodetic spacecraft.
ur understanding of Soviet capabilities to provide substitutes for current space systems, and hence our judgments about dependence andarc made with fair confidence overall. Our
of Dependence and Degradation
lou
no practical or wtiatacwry aubauoile. stitaumkea are available, but they are
net ai coanairnl or do not pcriwm
the aaittion as wdl. subuhnttflavailable, and they are
at least practical or adequate.
fafrmm..
SbtU
no meaniacful capabilityapabilityt, butub-
itanually redapability not km. aad it is cute-
ueliy untouched.
confidence it greatest in the judgment* concerning those Soviet space systems in which the dependence is high and/or the degradation is severe.-Forwe are certain that the Soviets are highly dependent on satellite systems (or photographic reconnaissance of areas denied to Soviet personnel or aircraft overflights. We are less certain about our evaluation of those space systems thattasks for which the Sovietsroad
range of substitutes, such as for-
lions satellites.
oreover, our assessments apply to ansituation in which Soviet space systems, as well as the alternate ways of performing the tasks, remain intact and operatinganner most reasonable for the situations of peacetime, crisis, or conflict We have assessed each type of space system independent of the other ones.
ur confidence in our judgmentsthan for today. Our assessments are basedexpected technical characteristics ofsystems, as well as on our estimates ofpolicy about the uses of spaceboth of these factors are subjectduring the next ten years.
II. SOVIET SPACEAND DEGRADATION
discussion of Soviet space systemsaccording to functional categories:intelligence collection, communications,(foreteorological,calibration. Within each category, theof each space system covers its functionSoviet dependence on the system, andin Soviet military capabilitiesresult from its loss (seeoror tasks supported by Soviet satellite systems).
A.Interceptors
IX In thend. Ihe USSR developed and tested an anfisatettite (ASAT)employing an orbital interceptor which destroys satelliteson-nuclear kill mechanism Seven intercept tens were conducted and live were suc-cessful. including ihe last (our. Theull operational capability at Ty-uratam after the last test In December
The system has demonstrated the capability to" intercept (argets at altitudes upm when launched by theooster that usesCOM as the first two stages. With this booster we believe the system is capable of intercepts at up0 nm altitude.
he Soviets have alsoability to perform some of the orbital operations required toatellite in geostationary orbit We there/ore believe the Soviets couldthe orbital interceptor of their present ASAT system with the large booster (used to launch Soviet geostationary satellites) and thus attackspacecraft They have not conducted any tests ofombination, and we therefore do not believe the Soviets now have an operational capability for this ]
*Ses "Soviet Captbjlitiat to Develop Stialegic Losernteragency Intelligence Repon..S.
he Soviets may believe their orbitalservesdeterrent roleis the US. It their-lore will serve essentially twodetenence in addition to its actualrole Nevertheless, we judge the USSR'son its orbital interceptor to be low in peacetime (ice Tableumber of other factors contribute to deterring the US fromwith Soviet space systems. The associated degradation is slight. In crisis or conflict, the Soviets have no other way to fully replace (he interceptor's capability, therefore the dependence is fudged to be high.otential alternative to the orbital interceptor, Soviet antiballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads could be used to attack satellites up tom. Depending on theirhowever, both US and Soviet latelliles would be vulnerable to the effectsuclear explosion inat very long ranges. In due course, the Soviets may be able to disable most low-altitude satellites with the large, probable User system at Sary Shagan* Thus,5 the USSR's overall
Table 3
Cur realSpace Sysleajs and Ikeir Aaaacialed Military or rnleUiccDce Taski
*
Kiio-a, Pr-.irt.Qf'm-ud VlHiUrj orBc* Tatkr
ii'orm orbital taUnapl at uirlllla*
a
| |
ill
s*
II
ll
1
Verify porllOM ol
KiiaUUh ortocaueu el lorotarondlUom
il'lMi-ilor tlalua a( wnlni ind>nlD<-
J
KilaMialiol koouliUM
xkr ol bold* of Uod-bucd
MDonally MnUgM
t. iB UxWk.1
X
PVrforai waafiof andLmomaaaa
Wai*alMM aU.
IX.i* maul.
. Mp
CcmnddaBdioalrol mfJilaiy or icwILchiw
I'o.iior. rmlllar,
IB. CoTrnttoe ol orauier lalormaUoa
mprova *sural| lo iha dellirr/ ol icktlad
_
Table 4
Kailmated So-iel Dependence/Degradation: OrblUI lufercepiot Salelllles
t(
ifca*r klW<^x.
dependence on orbital interceptor satellite* and the degradation in capabilities resulting from its loss would likely be reduced somewhat.
B. Intelligence
USSR has been involved longersystems to collect intelligence dataany other type having militaryreconnaissance satellitesedicated satellites forreconnaissance appearedlsothe first flight test* occurred in a'hat2 had evolved into areconnaissance system.2 theflight testsatellite that may leadtype of surveillance from4 the Soviets began flight tests ofof reconnaissance satellites to acquiredata more rapidly.
Photographic Reconnaissance
reconnaissance is theactive Soviet space activity in terms oflaunches Annually there are aboutflaunched, and eachoays. Such frequent launchesflexibility because the satellites can beorbits suited for specific targets. Thesein the perigee range0 nm. Onespacecraft is almost always in orbit andinstances two or three satellites arc inthe same lime.
he Soviets have two operationalreconnaissance systems- Oneow-resolution camera with an estimated resolutionoeet This type of satellite is used in "search" missions to look for targets and also to obtain coverage of large areas for mapping. The second typeigh-resolution camerawith an estimated resolutioneet, which enables identification of most strategicand determination of some technicalIts primary use is for "spotting*photographing targets whose existence andare known.
1
he photographic reconnaissance systems are used to cover target* important for Soviet military planning and to monitor development* in crisis situations. T
Moreover, the Soviets haveimes their capability to launch^
rconnaissance satellites on relatively sliort notice. During3 Middle East war, for example, sia satellites were launchederiod ofays. The special missions during this period bad short lifetimes, generally about six to nine days, due to the need for more timely data.
he Soviets used their space nation, Salyuto test the feasibilitygain experience insatellites for urtelligeoce
There is good evidence to associateiUs manned reconnaissance activity; however, its exact capabilities and Soviet intentions for the use of such satellites are not known.
he Soviets also tested Ihe firstew type of unmanned satellite from which capsules, orere
.lap
af the niquc
Sovied introduce this bucket recovery technique operationally, it will allow them additional flexibility. They could, for example, recover some satellite Imagery without having to end the spacecrafts mission. In addition, the Soviets might not have to launch as many spacecraft tolow of data comparable to that obtained by current systems.
We expect evolutionary improvements inphotographic reconnaissance systems including changes to their present high-resolution system which will permit operation in lower Orbits with more precise attitude control We bolleve their objectives for this system will bechieveof about one to two feet and to obtain better coverage and response by recovering imagery inhey probably will also improve thesensors on Salyut-class spacecraft. We do not bebeve. however, that the Soviets willisible-frequency, near-real-time system with mod-eratc-to-high resolution before the early toecause of limitations in sensor technology, data handling, and image display.
Lackingear-real-time Imagerythe Soviets might choose toimited optical reconnaissance system in which imagery data arc stored on board the spacecraft andto live ground periodically when the satellite is over the USSR. Retrieval of some imagery data would be much more rapid than with the present technique of recovering the entire spacecraft or by recovering several bucketsingle satellite. However, the number of frames of data which could betwcen each retrieval would probably be limited because of re frictions in dnta storage fn the spacecraft and in the tunc available forof data to ground stations.
Electronic Reconnaissance
he Soviets have electronic intelligence (EL1MT) systems on three types of operational spacecraft to collect information on the location and characteristics of land- and ship-based radars. Because of the major differences between these systems, we refer to eachhe earliest EL1NT collector developed in thes still In use and is carried on low-resolution photographic rtxonnalssance satellites. There arcolights of this fust-generation system per year; each one normally isays in length-)
ELI NT pay load apparently is recovered together with the photographic capsule. The short orbital lifetime limits the usefulness of these vehicles to spot checking or sampling selected radars.
L
A secoitd-gcnmoon ELINT system, first launchedonrecoverablc satellite designed specifically for electronic reconnaissance, Somef these spacecraft have been launched, and the Soviets maintain an active network of four to six of them simultaneously. In orbitsan
T
Inhe Soviets launched the lint satellite in what we suspectew electronic reconnaissance satellite. Only two launches have occurred so far. The first satellite was placed into an orbitm
Beginning Inhe Soviets launched an advanced ELINTnon-recoverable satellite designed specifically for electronicEight of these third-generation satellites have been orbited, and the Soviets recentlya network of three active spacecraft. These spacecraft, in orbitsm ^
oviei ELINT satellites appear to be used primarily for operational support rather thananalysis. [
3
think the satellites were designed to pcoviuc^ operational support foe military forces.
reei torn*
cean.
j
I/ oW.
i^t; 2Ss
locate , ySuany).
ft.
strategic survdllanee system. The first fourwere launched in highly elliptical orbits that reach an altitude0 run over the middle latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere, The latest one iseostationary orbit drifting westward towards
itep
these high-altitude satellites are operattxTby PVO Sfxany. While wc do not fully understand theof these satellites, the more likely possibilities are the detection of missile launches and nuclear detonations and/or meteorological and atmospheric research.
he Soviets are capable of developing andpaceboroe early warning system,of several satellites in high-altitude orbits to provide nearly complete coverage of US 1CBM launch areas. Wc think the Soviets have sufficient interest Inpace system, and we know they have experimented with appropriatehat its role Is detection of ICBM launches. Tlte satellite system, however, should be significantly more reliable.
Photographic-Geophysical Satellites
eries of satellites launched during the past three years apparently collects basic mapping and geophysical data having military/intelligence value. The satellites operate in orbitsun high andow-resolution camera thatextensive coverage of land areas and polar ice fields,
he Soviets are likely tobsile-launch early warning satellite, using infrared sensors for detection during the boost phase.
o provide worldwide, real timeomprehensive early warning system, the Soviets would require some type of data relay capability. This most likely would be achieved through an additional ground station In the Soviet Far East,atellite-to-satellite relayis conceivable. The Soviets might choose to deploy an early warning satellite system to cover those dose-iit SI.BM launch areas near Europe as an initial step before they have the data relay system In anypaceborne early warning system would provide as much as IS minutes more warning than Soviet early warningpace-bomc early warning system would provide only about five minutes more warning than an over-the-hort/.oo detection system, such as that under construction at Kiev and Komsomoiik, assuming
Dependence and Degradation
t is, of course, recognlTed that intelligence information, for whatever purposes and for what-ever uses, is collectedariety of SovietIn addition to space reconnaissancesupport for basic Intelligence activities is provided by public information, human sources, and non-satellite SIC1NT of several types, as well as air and naval reconnaissance. In most cases, non-space resources provide more voluminous amounts of data. And sometimes non-spacedatareater Impact or are morefor intermediate and low-level commands. We are confident, however, that the Soviets use satellites for intelligence coUectiontheyoviet-controlled, independent, and reliable way of corroborating information gained from other sources. Moreover, by their nature, space systems arc capable of providing intelligence collectionlobal basis, particularly against remote or denied taigets. Of equal impor-
tancc, such Mlellila can help verify thai certain unreported events have not In fact occurred.
n general, Ihe tasks performed with data from Soviet intelligence collection satellites chance with the escalation from peacetime to crisis, as well asransition from crisis to crariittct- The emphasis on the tasks changes too. In peacetime, for example, Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites collect data that assist in the detailed analysis of foreign weapons systems. In crisis or in conflict,ask is of lesser Importance.Soviet electronic reconnaissance satellitesdata from the radars of US surface shlps-L
3
Considering all of thesediverse space systems, the variety of tasks they support, the alternative sources and the changes In data needs and uses which occur under differentjudge that the USSR's dependence on these spacecraft ranges from low to high (seeighest dependence is on photographic reconnaissance systems during peaeetime.
eacetime environment, Soviet space collection systems primarily support the activities of basic intelligence and warning and theprocess for international agreements. As an example, support for verifying the compliance of the US and other nations with internationalas for strategic amis limitation, mutual force reductions, and nuclearalso is provided by open source material, human reporting, SICINT, and (in some limitedair reconnaissance, Satellite photographic reconnaissance of US ICBM and ABM facilities, however, undoubtedly is the only continuouslymethod of data collection available to the Soviets to verify2 Strategic ArmsAgreements. Although the Soviets wouldsome capability to detect vioUtions ofagreements without space reconnaissance systems, the USSR probably is more reliant on these systems for this function than for any other.
5
Estimated Soviet Dependence iDegradation: Intelligence Collection Systems
risis or conflict environment, spacesystems primarily support threatand locating enemy forces and assessing their readiness. Photographicsatellites become somewhat less important for this activity than they were for verifyingagreements. In contrast, although tlieupgrade their other sources of data,on their electronic and radar reconnaissance spacecraft rises because the alternate collection methods arc expected to be lessatellites. The real-time satellites are publidyat relay systems and given names in the Molniya series- Three types (Molniyaolniyand the new Molniyaxe lbhour orbits,ourth type) iseostationary orbit The store/dump satellites are not identified aselay mission and are given Cosmos names- They use low-altitude orbits.
now5 we expect that the improvements in existing intelligence collectionwill result in greater dependence. Theseare likely to embody broader areamore frequent coverage of any given area, more precise data, and faster recovery of theIn addition, because non-spaceare likely to be less able than now to match the performance of improved space systems. tin-Soviets are more likely to view data fromcollectionwell as the uses of suchessential
We judge that the USSR would experience degradation in capabilities today ranging from slight to sever* if intelligence collection spacecraft were not available Degradation would be sharpest for the photographic reconnaissance systems.e expect that the degradation the Soviets would etperience would be greater than for today for all of these systems except for that of thesatellites.
Molniya 1
Molniya Is arc the oldest of the real-time relay satellites, tint launched In1 satellitesigh-altitude orbit, and the spacecraft is visible to the USSR for nearly ten hourstretch. Molniya Is haveajor national own muni rati cms relay system. EachIimitedwo-way carrier capable ofelephone channels,ingle television channel. This limited capacity requires the USSR toarge number of active satellites. At present there are at least cigMfor use.
atellites are used extensively for several types of high-level military support
Communion lions Relay Systems
uring the past five years the Soviets have greatly expanded their use of satellite systems to relay communications. Not only are new systems emerging for this purpose, but the older ones are being used In new ways. Both real-time and store/ dump-relay techniques are now used by Soviet
n the put year or so, mobile terminals foratellites have been identified with units supporting Soviet front and possibly theaterThis deployment, still in Its early stages, probably will eventually eitend to all Soviet front and army commands.bat operations and landline and multichannelbecome extended. The reHabdity of satellite communications under these conditions would be virtually unaffected.
heystem with mobile ground terminals is better suited overall to (ill thefor communications support of theater forces than other modes of communication presently in use. Soviet theater force commanders haverelied on high-frequency radio,radio relay systems, and laud lines for command and control communications. Use of theeliable, high-volume system with good signal qualityigh data transmissionwill significantly increase the commandcapability of theater forces. Moreover. Mol-niya satellites will be instandy available should landline or multichannel systems be disrupted or overloaded, as has happened during crises and natural disasters. Similar problems would beas theater forces move forward during oom-
Molniyo 2
The Soviets began to launch satellites in theeries inotential tenfold increaso in relay capacity over Molniyaut so far has shown only about twice the capacity. These satellites use orbits Identical to Molniya Is. Typically, only four Molniyappear to behe Soviets are continuing to launch both Molniya Is and 2s, suggesting that both will be in use for several more years.
In the last three years the Soviets have shifted the bulk of their commurucations for non-military/
topacecraft. The aata routinely relayed now on Molniyachannel. common-carrierUse of these satellites extends into the Inter-sputnik system (the Soviet-sponsored counterpart toith operations! ground stations in Cuba. Poland. Chechoslovakia, and Mongolia.
Molniya 3
he Soviets launched the first oftype ofnlyhas been launched so far- Thesean orbit similar to the other two types ofAlthough we are not yet sure, theyhave double the relay capacity of the Molniyahave not seenpacecraft usedalthough the Soviets indicated theyused for the US-Soviet Hotline.
here are also two spacecraft in the Soviet geostationary communications satellite program, both launchedhe first was antest of the booster and satellite propulsion units. The second satellite, named, wasover the Indian Ocean-
^We do not know theresent status or its actual relay capacity.
Future Developments
now5 we expect thatwill introduce follow-on. real-timesatellites with improvedImprovements will include technologysucharger communicationsmore powerful relay signals. This lhouldof these systems more' convenient and, inarena, more available to loweris the case today. These new users maysmall, fairly mobile oqulpment. Weto see the Soviets install equipment forof communications satellites Into amobile weaponsas surfaceaircraft Moreover, by thethat geostationary relay satellites willinto operation and will carry the bulkcommunications to ground stations Inremote areas of the USSR.
expect operational use5 of arelay spacecraft that can supportof data from Soviet intelligenceeither throughrJuotrgh an intermediate ground station.the Soviets would deriveatellite system that conductsdata relay. This could allow therelay data from reconnaissance, earlyocean surveillance satellites to the USSR orforces outside the Soviet Union inWe doubt that present Sovietxatettltes arc capable ofask. Themight be able to introduce and starta spacecraft In ther.
The key element In our assossmeot ofdependence on communications satellites Is the growth In users. Uses of Molniya satellites fortopartly with the introduction of many more terminal! at lower echelons of command. Abo.now5 we project the availabilityulti'itser Molniya which will permit direct, two-way traffic with mobile users. This may benow for certain sensitive applications, such as ballistic missile submarines. Other likely initial recipients of terminals would be command and control ships, bombers, reeorinaissance aircraft, and airborne command posts.*
esult,5 the USSR will be using communications relay satellites much more widely than today, for both mflitaiy/intclllgcnce andpurposes. This will especially be the case in the Central Asian, Siberian, and Far Eastern areas of the USSR and for communications with naval units at sea.
* Even by IMS, however,othai tenninab will be deployed at the level of tanks, taexart thipi, and Meeccptoi atreraii. These etenieefli. i. conOnue to receive data liy oilier communicafMiiu media fiona some Intermedia If level o/ command.
Judge the USSR's dependence on allMolniya spacecraft today to be lowcrfioi, or conflict! (aooand uses of theserelatively high-capacity means ofto the Soviet government andare performed extensivelyno means completely duplicated) bysyiterns. These alternative lyitemshigh- and low-frequency radio, landlineradio relay systems,arietynetworks. At present, non-spacecommunications relay probably could fulfillmiUtxiy/intelligence requirements incrises, or conflicts. The Sovietsadequate redundant means ofthat the loss of any one, while causinginitial confusion and delay, would nottheir capability to conduct essentialstate or to prepare for and conduct
taut-
Table 6
Estimated Soviet Dependence/Dtgiedation: Communications Satellites
SiorrJDump
c
Modi
3
he expected satellite dcvolopn>enls and growth in usage will lead to increased dependf military users on space cornmunications. This will be the case especially if automated data support systems for command andrequite considerable channelput into use as we anticipate. At the same time, however, the Soviets now havepolicy to maintain key military communications redundantly so that eriti> cal command and control nets can be reconstituted in case any one means were lost. The Soviets will probably be unable, however, to maintain irdun-dant ground-based systems with capabilities equal to future satellite systems. Therefore, we expect (heir dependence on Molniya communication!will increaseoderate level.
We judge that the USSR would suffer only slight degradation in military capabilities today if the Molniya spacecraft were not available.e expect that degradation in their capabilities from loss ol Molniya communications will riseoderate level.
Satellites
n addition to the Molniya type of satellites, the Soviets have orbited two types of satellites which store and subsequently retransmit^
3 Both
sets of satellites use low-attitude orbits. Aboutf these satellites are maintained for use at any timel"
3
L
e judge the USSR's dependence on these spacecraft today and5 to be low across the board (seeenerally, there are attentate ways of providing communications, such as high frequency or commercial service, although they may not always bo as timely. Similarly, we judge that the USSR would surfer only slight degradation il these spacecraft were not available- We think Ihe Soviets could easily use other means.
p Tup- Snki*
hese spacecraft active in separate orbitalm high.ong devclopmen! and testing phase. Ihe series of first-genera (ion satellites became available for use in the. The Soviets generallyetwork of three of these satellites active at one time. Second generationwere first launched in. Four have been orbited so far. All are active at present, and appear to be undergoing test and evaluation.
D. Noval Support Satollites (Navigation)
TGC
oviet satellite program to providesupport to naval entities has been active since' There now are two generations of
hort of conflict, the navigation lupportof these spacecraft more than likely can be replaced today, even for ballistic missileOther means which the Soviets use for this purpose are celestial navigation (weather and abncspheric conditionsottomnavigation, and probably the US navigation satellites and (he US LORAN radio navigation beacons. In conflict, these substitutes will notthe navigation support role a* well as the naval support satellites. They are not as convenient, and in some cases arc not as reliable or secure.
w.5 the USSR probably will havefollow-on satellites intended to include an eatremeJy accurate navigation capability to support follow-on or new strategic offensive weapons, such as replacements projected for thend theoreover, if the Soviets try to develop an air-launched ballistic missiletrategic cruise missile, thoy would probablyrecision navigation satellite which might be able to update the missile's guidance system during flight.
e judge the USSR's current dependence on these spacecraft for navigational support to be low, except in conflict situations (seeependence in conflict is judged to be moderate.e expect this dependence to remainunchanged, except thatonflict situation Soviet dependence on much-improved navalsatellites will become high and the associated degradation will be modcrate-to-scverc.
E. Meteorological
The Soviets orbited their first "Meteor" weather satellites9 after several years of testing. The satellites still have certain'limitations for collecting weather data,elatively low orbit (now itn optical systemelatively narrow Bead of view,imited picture storage and transmission capability. This has required multiple satellites to provide timely global coverage. The Soviets keep about eight weather collection spacecraft active in orbitEach has an instrument packageof several radiometers that yield data on the heat balance) of the earth, and television andicannert that provide cloud cover information on the earth'i daylight and dark portions.he Soviets modified their rrieteorological satellites to permit real-time transmission of imagery.
In addition to normal weather forecasting, the Soviets also could use the data from these satdlitos to:
improve weather data transmitted to ships and other out-of-area stations;
7
Estimated Soviet offtotitattlDtoradalion: Naval Support Satellites (For KangaliSD)
uilshfil
71
1 Tf>j> (if
'sbfx
optimize the targeting of photographicsatellites;
provide post-strike verification of nuclear weapon
monitor ice packs and floes.
If this capability were linked to ground andcommunication networks, the Soviets could also provide information in near realtime tomilitary units and shipslobal basis.
Soviet officials haveuture three-tier meteorological satellite program. The three tiers apparently are to consistow-altitude manned spaceedium-altitude satellite (similar to the current Meteorystem of geostationary satellites. We believe the Soviets are proceeding with this program, and they could have it in use by thehe low- and medium-altitude satellites could havesensors.
Recendy the Soviets launched the firstew family of weather satellites named Meteore know little about this satellite at present, but expect that it is an improvement over the earlier Meteor spacecraft, and that it will be part of the three-tier system.
Wc judge the USSR's dependence on these spacecraft today to be low except in conflictwhere the dependence is assessed to be moderate-to-high (seee expect this dependence to remain basically unchanged.spacecraft can provide the Soviets data on weather conditions around the world, particularly on cloud cover. Ignorance- of such conditions could adversely affect the Soviets' air and sea operations, as well as use of their own photographicusance satellites. Additional data on weather over Soviet territory and peripheral areas areby ground sensors, balloons, and aerialMoreover, during peacetime, worldwide weather data are exchanged by the developedCompared to Soviet-acquired data, though, this information generally has reduced usefulness for open ocean and underdeveloped areas, and is not always timely. More importantly, during conhen the exchange of weather data pte-mmably would be interrupted, the Soviets would be much more dependent on their ownsatellites for weather data over hostile territory and open ocean areas.
e judge that the USSR would suffer only slight degradation today if these spacecraft were not available. In conflict situations, the degradation rises to moderate We expect the degradation to remain basically unchanged for the foreseeable future-
f- Geodefk
incehe Soviets have beenimited amount of geodetic data, using mensuration techniques on imagery from their photographic reconnaissance satellites. This effort has been worldwide, but the emphasis has been on collecting data over the US. The Soviets have also gathered geodesy-related data through the optical tracking of Soviet and non-Sovietpart, under international cooperative
he Soviets began launching geodetic satellites to improve their overall effort in geodesy and gravimetry. These sriac*cxaft have manysimilar to the naval support satellites, but now arc In orbitsun high. These orbits allow extensive tracKng from the Northern Hemisphere, where Soviet ICBM launch sites and nearly all ICBM targets are located. The orbits also provide several opportunities each day forto be made on the same revolution from both the USSR and North America.
1
codctic satellites probably are intended to provide improved worldwide geodeticand to improve gravimetric and geodetic models of the earth. The most significantof these data Is to increase the accuracy of strategic ballistic missiles. We believe the Soviet geodetic effort, primarily based on these satellites, could yield earth models with positional accuracies ofeters.
e judge the USSR's overall dependence on these spacecraft today to be moderate inand low in crises and conflicts (sec5 this dependence probably will not change. Geodetic satellites are used to refine knowledge about the earth's shape and field of gravity. Theie data allow the establishment of an accurate geodetic grid of the earth's surface, and thereby reduce errors in delivery of some weapons. There is no other way to perform these tasks to the necessary degrees of accuracy. Thisong-range, research-oriented effort which has some key militarysuch as for missile targeting, but is not always time-sensitive. The support provided by geodetic satellites is cumulative and much of the required data collection and analysis almosthas already been accomplished. Littlesupport of this type could be provided by non-space systems, but practically any near-earthorbe tracked to provide some of this support.
judge that the USSR would sufferdegradation If tliese spacecraft wereThe impact of the satellites* absence,very small at the beginning, wouldWe believe that between now andthe Soviets push for improved accuracies ofballistic missiles, the overall impactunavailability of these satellites could rise.
G. Calibration^
Soviets orbit two types of satellitessystems^
One type of radar calibration satellite has been used since theew. more versatile type of satellite, first launched inlso is used for radar
r
3
9
feareoitir Moderate/Slithl
Assessed Soviet Drpendence/Dr gradation; Ceodctte Satellite*
Low/SIifht Uw/slight Low/slight Low/slicht
e judge the USSR to be highly dependent on the radar calibration spacecraft (see. There is no adequate substitute for this spacecraft This level of dependence for the calibrationwill still exist in
Table 10
Estimated Soviet Dependence/Calibration^
n
IMS
llTl'
Iliglu'SnfAi HigWSIithigh/Sh*** HlgWSu**!
3
c judge that the USSR would suffer only slight degradation it these spacecraft were not
3
H. Other New Missions and, Between now5 we expect theto introduce advanced versions of many, and perhaps most, of the types of satellites they now operate. The Soviets will likely consider certain new types of satellites to provide additionalto their military and intelligence capabilities, suchigh-altitude spacecraft to collectintelligence (COMINT).
The Soviets could be investigating the use of space-based weapons using lasers. Theuses ofeapons include satellitedestruction of high-altitude bombers orposts, or ballistic missile defense. The Soviets couldpace-based, laser antisatellite system by the. The other conceivable uses of space-based laser weapons would present extremely difficult technical problems. We consider it very unlikely that the Soviets could solve those problems andsable satellite
The Soviets now have the capability topace system for various types ofcoDecxson. We are-not aware that they
Intend to do so, but we think that some type of high-altitude SICINT system will become very attractive.
radar imagery satellite could provideInformation on key intelligenceof weather and lightingtechnology developed for the radarsatellite, however, wouldvery limited help to the Soviets inadar imagery satellite. Thisis elementary in comparison with thatfor an imaging, synthetic apertureare therefore doubtful that the Sovietscapable of mtioducingatellite.
space systems the Soviets mayto support military and intelligenceinclude those tor:
detection and tracking of submarines; and
detection and tracking of large aircraft, such as bombers and airbomo command posts.
We consider it highly unlikely that,he Soviets will have space systems in being tothese functions because of the extremedifficulties involved.
I. Gap! In Knowledge
Our assessments of Soviet ipice systems are based on objective evidence of.Soviet.space activities, on our understanding of general Soviet technical capabilities, and on our perceptions of what systems the Soviets regard as valuable. The subjects about which we have the leasthave to do withace systems and their missions and uses.
The following are key gapsurabout current Soviet space systems:
J
Elimination of these gaps would improveour understanding of the Soviet space efforthole. Direct knowledge of substitute way* to perform the functions of space systems could alter our assessments about the USSR'son space systems-Ill. SOVIET SPACE SYSTEM DEFENSES A. Awareness
he USSR almost certainly is aware of all the more fundamental ways toefense for, or protect, its space systems. Aitd wo suspect
3
that the USSR's interest in defending Its own space systems, as well as in the research to be able to do so. has stemmed at least in part from Soviet perception of US antisaiellite research andactivities
The Soviets have indicated theirof some of the older US developmentfor an antisatellitc capability, such as. The Soviets probably are aware that the US does not presentlyedicated, operational satellite intercept system. They may believe or be concerned. Irowover. that the US will liavc acapability to interfere with Soviet spaceIn the neat five to ten years. They may credit the Spartan ABM missiles at Grand Forks, North Dakota, withpotential capability to intercept some Soviet satellites now. Thus, the Sovietscertainly have had sufficient stimulus toresearch into the entire spectrum of defensive techniques for satellites.
The Soviets already have done research Into some of Oleic tcchniquesfT
Reported hisin then an investigation of the use of artificial plasmaspacecraft to reduce the satellite's signatureadar. One dear indicator of Soviet interest In antisatellite oiuiitenneasures is an1 publication which discusses sophisticated concepts for anti-satellite systems. The. report includes postulated future- US orbital intercept systems for theof satellites, as well as their neutrali ration (through optical blinding, jamming of up-anddown links,his publication also discusses explicitly the rtow-defunctirect-ascent antisatellitc programs.'0 Also mentioned are the counterrneasuret availablearget to prevent acquisition, such as maneuvering, deployment of decoys, and Interferenceadar sensor through electronic counter-measures. It can be inferred from the discussion of various postulated attacks by US satellites on Soviet spacecraft that detailed thought
hese program! were: ProjectUS Air Force-iponsored, oudear-Opped Thor missile at Johnston Island, Pacific Ocean; PtotedUS Army-ifWiuorrd. rui-dear-Hoped Spartan ABM missile at Kwajalcin, Pacific Ocean; and ProjectUS Airon-nuclear warhead for the Thor missile.
has been givenariety of defensive counter-measures for satellites coming under attach.
he Soviets must also have Investigated the vulnerabilities of spacecraft during the development and testing of their own orbital satellite interceptor This research undoubtedly made the Soviets aware of the ways thai such vulnerabilities can beor overcome, but we do not know the details of such research.
Capabilities
espite the foregoing, we are not aware that the USSR has had, or now has, any on-going programs specifically intended to provide defenses for its spacecraft. Over the last ten years, however, we have seen the Soviets introducenumber of spacecraft having cliaracteristics thai provide at least some inherent protection. But we do not know whether they have any significant overall capability to defend their satellites beyond their Inherent designs. Moreover, we are not able to define the specific situations against which the Sovietsthe need to use, or rely upon, any defensive or protective capabilities their space systems might actually possess.
. Even though our knowledge of specific protective measures is sparse, it is useful to identify some defensive features of current and past Soviet space systems. These features are cither Inherent in the technical design of the spacecraft or were deliberately incorporated, although It is not dear that the purpose was protection. These features are presented below in what wc assess to be their degree of protection for the Soviets.
1
Sulky and thick-skinned constructionpiotectlon for the satellite againstand debrisuclear detonation, the pelletson-nuclear warhead, or laser radiation. The USSRifferent approach to space systems design from that of the US, For various technological reasons, the Soviet Union has produced bulky, thick-skinned spacecraft which are relatively unsophisti-
Beera*
They are scaled and pressurizedontrolled internal environment In con trait, the US generally develops thJaslonaerLlop tined, and vacuum-ce itt lied spacecraft Although it may be inadvertent, Soviet design preferences resultcgiee of protection that the US syiteiru do not have, particularly against thermal and laserand electromagnetic puke. Most Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites are also thermally and mechanically "hardened" for reentry. This technical design feature more than likely provides these satellitesurther degree of protection.
ii the capability to change the orbit of the satellite by the use of asubsystem. This capability can be used to make correctioni for the drag effects of the atmosphere, lo remove the satellite from orbit, or to evade an interceptor. Changing aorbit makes tracking of the spacecraft more difficult, which in turn makes it more difficult to picdict where the satdhte will be and thus to intercept it. Maneuvers are not likely to be effective against electronicumber of types of Soviet spacecraft with military or intcUigemv have a maneuvering capability. These are the high-resolution photographic reconnaissance satellites, the radar oceanspacecraft, tha Salyut 3all of the Molniya communications relay satellites, and spacecraft in geostationary orbit. We believe that these satellite* have thiscapability in order to perform their missions better, and not for defensive purposes as such.
satellitci,apability forarge number of satellites either in orbit, or on the ground available for launch-In terms of redundancy and sheer numbers, some types of Soviet satellite systems have this measure of indirect defense. This istrue of communications relay and photographic reconnaissance systems.ariety of technical and geographic reasons, the USSR keeps aboutommunications satellites active in orbit, including nearly
Molnty.sC
The USSR oould also be keeping older spacecraftormanteffect, maintaining silent spares. Moreover, the USSR useseconnaissance satellites each year. There is one such spacecraft In orbit nearly all of the time, and there regularly are short periods ol one or two days when two or three satellites are in orbit at once. The USSR has demonstrated several rimes its capability toencs of photographic reconnaissance satellitci. have them cover selected areas, and recover the data so as tolow of intelligence data.onsequence,ingle Soviet photographic reconnaissanceto become unavailable, the Impact almost surely would be slightonsequence, even though we earlier demonstrated that the USSR now has varying degrees-of dependenceumber of military or intelligence spacethe unavailability of any one satellite almost surely would be inconsequential.
Potential Features
Deterrence
e do not know to whit extent the Soviets rely upon deterrenceefense for their own satellites.he threat of retaliation, depends. In part, on the existence of their non-nuclear capability to attack satellites in orbit or to attack the ground-based systems that supportsuch as control sites or communications links. The Soviets know that theware of Soviet capabilities to intercept satellites, and theyare confident (hat the US does not presently have an operational satellite interceptor. Thus, the USSR might conclude that its orbital interceptor docs, io fact, presently serveeterrent.
n any case, Ihe USSR has two operational weapons systems" capable of Intercepting and destroying satellites:
The orbital satellite interceptor known to be capable of non-nuclear attack againstin orbits of upm altitude, and probably up tom altitude (Both situa-boos include the current booster.arge booster the interceptor could be used to attack geostationary satellites.)
The Calosh mini lei in the Moscow ABMThese art capable of nuclear intercepts at altitudes up tom.
The two systems provide lite USSR with an ability to respond, almost immediately in some cases, to any US interference with Soviet space systems.
Although these capabilities may not have been intended toeterrent role, they, in effect, do so byould be attacker of Soviet space systems to seriously consider them in its calculations.
USSR may havemay have ainterfere withsystems by focusing on thewhich are located outside the US.could be directed at commandsites or communications links, andthe form of direct attack, sabotage,local populations, or political pressure ongovernment to reduce or dose the sites.Soviets had any such capability, theylikely to try to exploit il when necessary.any such interference capability coulddeterrent effect once the US became aware of it
C. Oullook
do not know what paths the USSRin providing dedicated defenses for itsor. in fact, if the Soviets will dothan they have done so far. We know thataware of US interest in the subject, andthey will continue to follow USThe Soviets can expand the use ofinherent prolective features, or Introducethe additional ways of defending satellites ifto. We believe that the Soviets woulddo so if they saw the US embark onand deploymentatellite
IV. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET INTERFERENCE WITH US SPACE SYSTEMS
A. Retrospect
attitudes about the uses of spacereconnaissance systems have undergoneduring the last IS yean. Initially, thethat reconnaissance from spaceanother form of espionage and. as such,Byowever, whenignificant satelliteof their own. their attitude beganFor example, during Ihe negotiationsto7 treaty governing the peaceful uses
of outerhe Soviets avoided raising satellite reconnaissance as an issue. This was the firstsign that they had come to accept space-based reconnaissance as an important and oecessacyfunction. It is now enshrined in acceptance by the Soviets ol "national technical means" ofincludes space-basedsystems These meansundamentalof the ABMnd the Interimon Offensive Missiles, and will be included in any subsequent strategic arms limitationsccords. The Soviets probably do not regard US non-reconnaissance, military support satellites as "national technical means" of verification protected by the provisions of these agreements.
he Soviets have expressed concernabout direct broadcast satellites, particularly those that (he US might use. Although the USSR has the capability to build such satellites of its own (it indicated recently its intent toimilar domestic system--thee think It realized long ago that it is quite vulnerable to the internal political impact of these satellites. These spacecraft can transmit television or radio programs direcdy to listeners without routine,round station. The Soviets have focused on the potential of these satellites to relay what they call "offensive or illegal' information to listeners inside the USSR. The USSR has stated before the UN that it reserves the right to take action against such satellites- While it has toned down subsequent statements of this issuehe USSR'shas not changed significantly.
S. The Present Situation and Prospects for Ihe Near Term
7 treaty governs the "peaceful" activities ol nation* In the-and use ol outer (pare, including the moon and oilier celestial bodiea. It doea not addicts eiplleity Ihe Urue ol noninterference with ipace system!
nd Z. amde XII of the ABM Treaty, provide that- "Ear* Party nradertaaaa not to aatrrferc with Ihe rational teehaecal mean of veftTarattaa of the other PattyM> eeeixdanceanner consistent with generally ircogntred prion pie*international law."
resent Soviet attitudes towardwith US ipace systems resull from an amalgam of political and other factors. In addition to the overall dependence of the Soviets on spacethey include detente and the US-Sovietand military relationship, the related matter of obligations under the SAL agreements, the essen-tially unprotected nature of Soviet space systems, the Soviet assessment of the level of US dependence on its space systems, and Soviets' view of the US ability and will to respond to any Interference on their part. Each of the factors is dynamic and would acquire different significance over lime. The net effect to date of all of them, however, is de facto, and mutual, noninterference.
The most important political factor atIs the impact that Interference would have on Soviet-US detente. The Soviets probably reckon that detente would not survive an attackS spacecraft, and it might not even survive USof sporadic, covert electronic or laserwith its space systems. Moreover, the USSR undoubtedly recognizes that plrysical interference with US intelligence collection satellites would be inconsistent with its obligations under the SAL agreements. It probably understands that anyattempt to prevent the US from using Its space systems to gather intelligence on Soviet strategic programs would constitute soiolation of these agreements that It could only be justified by an effort to disrupt the established US-Soviet political and military relationship. The USSRrealizes that such action would be soby the US.
Perhaps the most Important of the other factors is the USSR's overall dependence on space systems In general, and space reconnaissancein particular. As shown earlier in this paper, the USSR is deeply committed to the use of space systems, particularly for intelligence collection. This commitment, illustrated by the number of launches annually, grew to about Its current level In the mid- to, and has been rising more slowly in. CIven their dependence on these systems now and what will be greater dependence on these and other systems in the future, the Soviets will be reluctant to undertake any actions that could jeopardize them.
The generally unprotected nature of the USSR's own space systemsactor that probably
also weighs against Soviet interference. Moscow surely takes into account the possibilityevere US reactionoviet attack on US space systems, or to some lesser form of Soviet interference. The Soviets presumably would expect the'US response to Include something otherhysical attack on Soviet satellites, however, since they know the US does not nowpecific and dedicated capability for this purpose
nother factor is the Soviet assessment of the level of US dependence on Its space systems. The Soviets undoubtedly perceive that the US relies upon its space systems estensivelyariety of military and intelligence tasks. And the Soviets may be aware that substitutes for space systems do not exist in some cases.
Despite these considerations, we believe there is still some small chance that the USSR might engage in activity that could appear to the US as interference. It is conceivableoviet laser tracking device whileovietmight shine inadvertentlyS satellite. Moreover, if ihe Soviets were toround-based imaging radar against satellites, including US vehicles, the energy fromystem might affect US spacecraft and appear to be interference.
We canoot entirely exclude ihe very small chance that for all spacethoseby formalSoviets would conduct activities that are truly acts of interference. Such activities undoubtedly would be conducted in great secrecy. We are not certain we always would recognize such acts if they were doneery limited basis, but we believe we would recognize such acts If they numbered moreew.
Crisis or Conflict
USSR's positionrisis orbe influenced by some of the same factorsrelevant in peacetime. Their net effectbe that the Soviets would refrainwith US space systems until suchthe USSR perceived its vital interests to beSpecifically. US space systems likelyimmune to Soviet in inference untilas the Soviets believed that theirwould be compromised by US spacesystems, or the Soviet military position was judged to be undercut by US satellites directly supporting US weapon systems. Below thisUS military or intelligence satellites almost certainly would be safe until Ihe Soviets believed the US had taken prior action against Soviet space systems.
mall possibility that theuse interferenceS orrisis situationest of USsuch, it couldositive, though notin the escalation toward conflict with thethe Soviets tooktep, they mightatellite not owned by the US. Thedanger for the Soviets is that the USrecognize the Interference immediatelyUS inaction might unintentionally
C Long-Term Prospecls
prospects for standoff throughin peacetime, crisis, orthe same set of factors. Among them,dependence on space systems is sure toAs discussed in Section II, llduring this period. The impact of thisno significant change In peacetimeother factors, probably will be to makeeven more reluctant to undertakecould put their own space systems atthis growth will increase Sovietensure the unimpeded use of space,military and intelligence activities. However,that the degree of Soviet dependencesystems we have forecast for the neatis not by itself high enough to deterinterfering with US satellites in the facecompelling reason to do so.
he other factors that could lead us to reconsider these judgments include:
Soviet perceptionidening gap between what the US and the USSR gain from space
systems;
Soviet perception of developmentS space system that provided supportay which,risis or conflict situation, would be extremely disadvantageous lo the Soviets;
a Soviet belief thai Ihe US was unwilling, or torally unable, to Intoifete effoctively with Soviet ipace system*.
Soviet acquisition of additional, and more effective capabilities to interfere with US space systems;
the introduction by the Soviets of means of countering US interference, such as anfi-jam features and wider-scale encryption; and
a Soviet unwillingness to discuss an agreement prohibiting interference.
hile ihe growing Soviet dependence on spaceactor that contributes to dr facto don-interference, il also might contributeoviet interestoninterference agreement. It may have played this role already, since Ihe USSR is at least somewhat interested in the general topic of noninterference with space lystems. At Geneva in MayYuri Kolosov of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairspeech to the UN's Outerspace Committee suggesting that themight wish to examine noninterference with space systems. There has been no evidence,of Soviet attempts to follow up this proposal.
The USSR might view negotiations toward some sort of agreement on noninterferenceseful means of buttressing detente. While any such agreement would have to be acceptable to Ihe Soviets on its own merits, we would expect them to portray the possibilityoninterference agreement, publicly and privately, as aof detente, even if that were to be, in fact, much less Important than the technicaland benefits.
We conclude that the prospects seemthat the USSR would be willing to participate in negotiationsormal noninterference agreeent. Including some and perhaps nearly all spaceiven the Soviets' position on direct broadcast satellites, if they could not achieve an agreement limiting the use of such spacecraft, through the UN for example. It is very unlikely that they would want these satellites includedoninterferencehe rationale for Soviet participation could include the technical information they might gain during suehalthough they would have to expect toat least some information on their own systems. The existence of Ihe Soviet orbital interceptor could have an effect on ihe USSR's attitudeoninterference agreement. The interceptor could stimulate the Soviets to seek an agreeent that might prevent the US from developing orimilar system.
If the US commits itself to develop or deploy its own satellite intercept system, Soviet interest in the subjectormalriseajor Soviet objective would be shutting off the US effort, either by direct prohibition or by undercutting the US rationale for its system.
We suspect that any negotiations toward such an agreement would last several years and would be technically, if not politically, difficult. The followinc; specific features ol any potential agreement probably would be among those the Soviets would find most appealing:
positive protection of key Soviet systems.
barring US development or deployment ofsystems;
a focus on subsets of space syslems;
limited duration; and
bilateral.
Original document.
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