5
WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUEDHE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
Tht 'allowing inlelliaenc* orgonirofionr participated in Ihe preparation ol tht Estimalt,
Ihe Control Iniril.geiwehe intelligence orooniioliofti cf the Oepartmtno of Sfoit ond Defense, ihe Notional Security Agency, ond ihe Energy Rettarch ond De'elopmeni Admlni-iioilon
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Controlpreientwg Ike Control Imelliocnce Agency
The Director of Intelligentc ond Reieoreh reprtienilng iht Department of Stalt Tht Director. Otfenie InlcfKgerKt Agency ThtoimaoI Security Agency
Iht Deputy AiioloM Aoramittroto< for Nolionol Security. Energy Seieorth ond Development Administration
Abstaining;
The Special Aiiiilont to ihe Seeretory for National Security. Deportment of iht Treowry
The Auiitant Director, Federal Buteau of
Alto Participaling!
The Aiiinon! Chief of Staff for Intelligence, PtpctrSmtnl of the Army
clor of Norol lnleQ^rn<c. Drparimew of rhe Nary
The Assistant Chief of Sioff. Intelligence. Deporlmeni of the Air Force
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CONTENTS
i
PRINCIPAL JUDCMENTS 2
8
I. SOVIET VIEWS OF THE ROLES OF THEATER FORCES
OPPOSITE NATO 8
Security Hole 8
of Soviet Interest! WirWn the Warsaw 9
C Political Roles of Warsaw Pact 9
II. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF FUTURE
WAR IN EUROPE 9
Khrushchev 9
10
MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND WAR-FICHTINC
STRATEGIES U
Theaters of War With NATO15
Strategies and Objective*ar in Central18
C The Strategic Backdropar in
PACT PLANNINC FOR INITIAL OPERATIONS IN
CENTRAL19
A.19
Cround Forces20
Air Forces22
Theater Nuclear Force*23
Crremkal. Biological, and Radiological Warfare13
Naval Forces 24
Strengths and Weaknesses24
WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
NOTE
This Estimateis concerned with the Warsaw Pact.ground and tactical airin the European USSR and Eastern Europe opposite NATO. Soviet naval, bomber, and missile forces: are treated only insofar as they bear directly on potentialland campaigns. Soviet theater forces opposite China are discussed inhe Sino-SooUt Relationship: The Military Aspects. Details on Soviet general purpose naval forces are contained in NIEower Naval Policy and Programs. Comprehensive estimates on Soviet strategic attack and defease forces are contained inoviet Forces For Intercontinental Conflictetails of order-of-battle and equipment characteristics which arc outside the scope of this Estimate may be found in Joint CIA/DIA memorandums and in Defense Intelligence Agency reports and estimates.
i
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
The USSR considers its military strength in Europe tohe protection of its national interests, to the maintenance of its strategic postureis the West, and to its management ofpolicy. The Soviets appear committed to maintaining anumerical edge over NATO in some key elements of theater forces such as divisions, tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. Theyhowever, separate Europe from the larger context of the overall theater and strategic resources available to the USSR and the West We believe that the Soviets, given this larger view of the existing balance, consider both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to bo deterred fromwar.
Soviet thinking on the nuclear aspectsax in Europe has changed in the past decade and may still be changing. The Sovietsno longer expect that any NATO use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be answered with massive Pact nuclear strikes throughout NATO Europe. We estimate that the foUo^ving considerationscurrent Soviet concepts of the initial stagesar in Europe:
Soviets believear in Europe probably would begin with both sides using only non-nuclear weapons.
also believe that the Pact would quicklyon-nuclear NATO attack, go oo the offensive, and achieve earlyin penetrating NATO's defenses.
The Soviets would continue to use only noo-nuclear weapons as long as possible.
NATO would initiate the use of nuclear weapons to compel Pact forces to halt their offensive. .
If NATO's initial use of theater nuclear weapons were sdective and limited, we could not confidently predict the Soviets' response. But they have been broadening the range of options available to them for responding. They might continue purely non-nuclearOr they mightassive theater nuclear
we cannot exclude the possibility that they wouldlimited nuclear strikes of theirhave considered this alternative.
2
Soviets reckon, however, that once nuclear weapons areby cither side, (he risk of escalation Is very great because the side that struck first massively would liavc the advantage. The likelihood of an attempted preemption by one side or the other with massive, theater-wide strikes would increase greatly.
classified Soviet writings are vague with regard to the issue of nuclear escalation from the European theaterS-USSR intercontinental exchange. Unclassified writingssuch escalation as likely.
evidence does not reveal Soviet intentions towarda Pact offensive into France. The Soviets might prefer not lo involve the French in the conflict because the independent French nuclear capability would increase the risk of nuclear escalation.
Because of the uncertainties in our appreciation of current Soviet nuclear doctrine and our lack of information by which to judge how Soviet political authorities would respondroposal by the Soviet military to use nuclear weapons, we cannot confidently predict how die Warsaw Fact would reactATO initiation of nuclear war. But we judge that the odds still favor rapid escalation once nuclear war began in Europe.
The Warsaw Pact hasivisions In varying states of strength and combat readiness andactical aircraft, in Easternand the portion of the USSR opposite NATO. Anotherivisionsctieal aircraft in the central USSR probably constitute areserve for use against either NATO or China. Elements of the Pact's navies and strategic attack and defense forces would also be useduropean war. The Soviets evidently plan for military operations against NATO in three separate theaters:
In the northwestern USSR and Scandinavia, to defend Murmansk and Northern Fleet installations, to neutralize or seize NATOLn northern Norway, and to attack NATO naval forces and merchant shipping in the Norwegian Sea,
In central and western Europe, to destroy NATO forces in West .Cermany and the Benelux countries, and, using airborne andforces against key Danish islands in conjunction with ground attacks through Jutland, to assist the Pact navies in gaining control of the Baltic Sea and assuring passage from the Baltic to the open ocean.
southern Europe, against Greece and Turkey to secure the Turkish Straits and support naval operations in the easternAlso, operations against northern Italy, intended to
secure (he southern flank of Pact forces attacking West Cermany. might be launched from Hungary thrmigh Yugoslavia or Austria.
The Soviets would expect Central Europe to be the decisive theaterarge-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Whether they would launch offensives all along NATO's flanks concurrently with anyaign in Central Europe is uncertain. We believe that the Warsaw Pact has the means to conduct limited, but not general, offensive operations in Scandinavia and southern Europe while simultaneously carrying out an offensive against the NATO center. We judge that early Pacttoward the Turkish Straits and northern Norway are more likely ihan in the other flank areas such as Italy and (he rest of Scandinavia.
The Soviets consider it likely thai, in the caseATO-Pactmajorbegin priorcarryingarge-scale reinforcement with ground forcesUSSR. Until about the, the Soviets expected toa reinforcement in advance of war. This change, which hasthe,
may have occurred because the Soviets no longer count on having the time for prior reinforcement, and also because of the danger that such action could be counterproductive. For example, it might cause NATO touildup of its own that would work against the Pact's initial numerical superiority of forces in Central Europe. The Soviets may also believe that the reinforcement process is not as severely threatened by NATO nuclear attack as il was in earlier yean. This change in doctrine does not necessarilyhange in Soviet preferences butwhat is, from their point ofrudent planning assumption. This appreciation of Pact offensive concepts has important warning implications for NATO. In particular, we no longer can be confident that the movementivision force from the USSR into Central Europe would take place before an attack.'
The Soviet military evidently believes that Pact ground forces are superior to NATO's. They also believe that Pact theater forces now in Central Europe are not only capable ofATO attack in the early daysonflict, but are also capable ofon-nuclear offensive into West Cermany. This rapidly advancing offensive would depend on theforces in Central Europe havehe Soviet ground forces are more dependent upon the tank than any army in history. If the Soviets were ever forced to conclude
TW Director at Ni*ai Intelligence. Department of the Navy, believe* that BustheH> believe* that tlx Soviet. actively CoaiUler attack
plans whkh do not Involve ihe movementivision force (ram die USSR to Central Eorope before an attack.
that (heir tanks were unable to penetrate NATO forces they would have to rethink their strategy and contemplate radical redesign of their forces.'
The Soviets probably consider that NATO's tactical air forces could blunt or perhaps even halt this Pact ground offensive. Because of this, the Pact evidentlyassive, theater-wide air offensive during (he initial, non-nuclear phasear. aimed at destroying NATO's tactical air forces and other nuclear systems and facilities. This attack is to be conducted by lactical aircraft and by bombers of Soviet Long Range and possibly Naval Aviation. The all-out nature of this scheme and deficiencies in ihe capabilities of most Pact aircraft would make ithighly risky operation, its success depending heavily on surprise tolhat NATO's air defenses arc not fully prepared and mobile nuclear systems not dispersed.
The quantity of Pact Uctical nudear delivery systems has beenin recent years, and this would enable the Soviets to conduct nuclear warfare in Europe at higher intensities before having to use
f the Bureau ofIteaeardi, Department of Stale, bclirvei thaf iheary leaden would be far none cootervatW (kao tbe Eitimam indiotci ia ihei.of the balance fa.f the ebCty ml Wana- Pactuccrtafcj oHeaaive deep inio Weat Caraway.
Soviel mfliUry wrttinji dorquence of foilNATO attack aad thenmaahing eeonteroffenitve deep inlo Cermany.
iruou to doubt that Soviet mfcury ar political leaden would hiw
confidence in carrying it out with oci, the lo.on alreadr in CerMral Europe
TW Soviets hav, beam ea trend, oawtwMr any anSiurr operation, defensive or offensive. Thii waa vividly demomtnted la the tut Soviet miliar, operation inoccupationCuebotwralrla
Numerical force ritioi which Rrongl, (avor the Soviet. anay not appear nrnrJy min So-iet eve* The Soviet mUtury leaden would be prone lo calculaleont, earn basis and ua* aauimptioos diflerenl from the Wm If the SovieU esmmed that Weal German,obefore lb. Part, ihey -ovid me Part troop* being cymekly outnumbered.
The Soviets, ouldInclined to credit the Wat with advantage. In character-
iitid of equipment. ThU appean to be the care especially withhere arc Ideations of Soviet apprehenatona over the air operation which their itrategyi tbta Eatimale points out
Finally. Soviet behavior In MBFB mutiu that the SovieN today am far more cemservalive" in celculaUng their lorce requirement. In Europe than the- were ten andean ago.
Thi. vWw o(k.of the cha-cc ofcdescribeEattmale suggest, iha, the So-ieo wemtd much peeler t,efore rurtmgIf rheyha, Ml* ami rei-ioeeeme* they wouldbJ'"Wat Germany. Thefe-
pmrtkin, Iniuatten of opemuon. before reinforcement appean looviet kidgment thai there not ln fad be tin* to bring force* forward before ihe war
their USSR-based systems. There is. however, no direct evidence that they are deliberately seeking an alternative to using their USSR-based nuclear forces in large-scale theater nuclear war. Available evidence, although inconclusive, suggests that the Soviets have nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, but we can only roughly approximate how many nuclear weapons might be stored in the likely storage facilities.
Soviet military doctrine categorizes toxic chemical agents along with nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" and implies that the Pact would use chemical weapons once nuclear weapons were in use. Wc have little doubt thai the Soviets possess substantial stocks of toxic chemical agents but cannot estimate the sire of their stockpile. We have good evidence, however, that some toxic chemical munitions areto Soviet air forces in Eastern Europe. Pact forces emphasizeand equipment for defense against chemical and radiological effects and we judge ihey could operateBR environment morethan NATO forces.
Since .tlie, the Soviets have carriedajor expansion and renovation of their theater forces:
In the ground forces, the numbers of tanks and artillery pieces have been substantially increasedariety of other changes in organization and equipment have brought about larger and more modern divisions. Motor transport capability has been added not only to supply ammunition for the added weapons, but also to improve overall logistic capability. Modem ground-based air defense systems are being assigned to the ground forces in large numbers. Technical improvements, particularly in air defense and artillery weapons, and the improvements to the APCs alsoto greater theater force capabilities. Despite thesehowever, ground force units stillriutureof old and new equipment and some units in the USSR have substantial shortages.
The Soviet tactical air forces opposite NATO have remainedstable in numbers but have begunewof aircraft and weapons that is enabling them to change (heir traditional air defense orientationroader range ofas well as defensive missions. But the full realization of their possibihics is still some way off. Despite the acquisition of some new aircraft with capabilities similar to the better NATO aircraft, the majority of Soviet and East European tactical aircraft still have short ranges and low payioads and lack the sophisticatedand avionics of US aircraft.
Wc have recentlyiece of evidence that suggests the Soviets have, or plan lo have, nuclear artillery rounds.
In the East European forces, reorganization, expansion, and force modernization has allowed them to assume greater responsibilities in Pact military plans. Although improvements in East European ground forces have generally followed the Soviet lead, they have tended to lagew years and to proceed more gradually.
The momentum of the Soviet drive to maintain superiority of theater forces in Europe seems likely to lead to gradual expansion and further technological improvements in Soviet theater forces through the end off the trend of the last two years or so continues, thesize of the Soviet theater forces will increase byen by the, when they would thenotal of moreillion.
"See footnote 2.
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SOVIET VIEWS OF THE ROLES OF THEATER FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
A. European Security Role
The SovieU have maintained large theater ground and tactical ai- forces since the end ofWorld'War li. Even in thefter the drastic cuts imposed by Khrushchev they never numbered much less thanillion men.
We do not have direct evidence on Soviet force planning objectives, but an important theme of recent Soviet military thought, as evidenced in theoretical writings and In Soviet doctrine fortheater war, argues the necessity for large ground forces in peacetime. The argument is based, first of all,irm determination not to bc caught unprepared again as the USSR was bylearly, the Soviets intend that any future European conflict would take place In West-em, not Eastern territory and they stress the need for large combat-ready forces and reserves to be available at the outset of hostilities toudden enemy attack and launch counlcroffeniives. Soviet analysis of the probable characterar Inapparently has led them to the conclusion that, even should Luge-scale nuclear exchangeslarge ground forces would still be needed to defeat surviving NATO forces and* seize Western Europe.
Soviet Union considers Itsin Europe fundamental to the protection
DISCUSSION
of Its national interests, to the maintenance of its strategic postureis the West, and to itsof foreign policy. One of the values of Warsaw Pact forces to the USSR lies In their role as an effective deterrenterceived danger from NATO. In effect, the Soviets view Warsaw Pact forces asuffer between NATO and the Soviet heartland. This helps to explain the Soviet Unions willingness and determination to maintain force levels in Central Europeong period and at considerable expense, despite pressing demands from the nonmilitary sector of both Soviet and East European economies. However, the size of the Soviet/Pact forces In the forward area, their doctrine of the offensive, and the across-the-board efforts to improve the capabilities of their forces cannot fully be explained In terms of protection against perceived threats from NATO, control of Pact allies, or maintenance of the status quo. Rather, theyesire for more ambitious policy options.inimum these would include the goal of clear conventional superiority to support political pressures, as well as to prevail in the event ofaction.
lse Soviets appear committed toemonstrable numerical edge over NATO in some key elements of the theater forces such as divisions, tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft They do not. however, separate Europe from tbe larger context of the overall theater and strategic resourcesto the USSR and to the West. Civen this larger view of the balance, the Soviets evidently have
8
utile confidence that they can either foresee orthe courseonflict with NATO and are therefore inclined to he very cautious in the use of their military force in Europe.
rotection of Soviet Interests Within Ihe Warsaw Pad
t is dear that the USSRATO contingency paramount in its defense planning for the European theater, and that there must beamong the Pact members for thai pfenning to be effective. The presence of large well-equipped Soviet forces stationed In East European countries and the availability of additional Soviet forces across their borders affords the Soviets considerable leverage in cierting control over these countries.
C Political Roles of Warsaw Pact Forces
ecent years haverowingof Soviet military forces to advanceobjectives in the Thirdfrequently to naval activity around Africa and in the Middle East Toward Western Europe, however, the USSR has been increasingly' circumspect in its use of Warsaw Pact forces for political purposes. Basically, there appear to be three reasons for this:
The Stakes (aod concomitant risks) are much higher in Western Europe, since thesecurity of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies Is at issue. Thus. poliucal-mflltary behavior which might be acceptable in the Third World could be consideredIn Europe.
It is unnecessary. From the perspective of the USSR's primary defenseIts nationalimpact on NATOowerful Warsaw Pact serves that purpose" simply by Its existence.
is undesirable. Although the Sovietsubstantial military presence as necessary to support their European diplomacy, military bluster or the creation of incidents has proven to be counterproductive. Detente has afforded tlie USSR many more opportunities forand iiilensiiying bilateral relationships
1 In Western Europe.
9
here are, however, certain instances when Soviet use of Warsaw Pact forces for plainlypurposes might be justified by the high stakes involved:
The Soviet Union will seek to maintain the status quo in Eastern Europe. Wesi Berliney potential pressure point.
While the Soviets have thus far shown little disposition actively to try to take advantage of ihe recent trouble between Creece and Turkey, they might in the future make more vigorous political efforts lo meddle in ihe troubles of NATO's soutliem flank. Soviet use of force for intervention, however, seemsbut Moscow might provide militaryor resort to some show of military force.
Soviet Union clearly wishes to seeremain an avowedly Communist state, or,inimum, prevent Its alignment with the West. The jaossioulty of Warsaw Pad intervention serves to Inhibit Yugoslav moves toward the West.
II. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE NATURE Of FUTURE WAR IN EUROPE
A. The Khrushchev Ero
oviet military doctrine under Khrushchev stressed the preeminence of nuclear weapons and discounted (he need for large conventional forces toheater war. Khrushchev and hisasserted that any war Involving the Soviet Union and the West wouldecisive global conflid between the superpowers with its outcome largely determined by massive nuclear exchanges during the first hours. Strategic exchanges also would decide any European conflid between NATO and the Warsaw Pad and would occurarge scale at the outset. Most Soviet nuclear strikes against European targets were to beby mi soles and bombers based in the western USSR.
ecause Khrusltchev closely linked war in Europeecisive nuclear exchange he saw little need to allocate resources to conventional forces. Following Khrushchev's lead, the prevailing
tactical air formations of World War II. Tl-Jie forces which appealed lo have limited utilityuclear war. particularly artillery and tactical airuffered nuurive arts. But ground forces proponents argued, with some sueceii, that large armored forces were still necessary to exploitstrikes and successfullyampaign in Europe. Thus, despite the cuts, the armored elements of ground forces survived largely intact.
B. Since Khrushchev
Khrushchev was removed inIn the Soviet view of war in Europeemerge. An immediate impetus to theseprovided by the attitude of the newmilitary force structure and balance.Khrushchev's relianceingleoption, Len nuclear war, thehas supported the expansion offorces to complement the growingarsenal.
views of the conventional forceswere reinforced by changes inand capabilities lhat were alsothis same period. By theheof massive nuclear retaliation to anyIn Europe was being openlytbe West, and throughout theand less drastic options for conductingin Europe were being examined in NATO.
li. Mthough flcaole response* was not made official NATO doctrinehe Soviets5 that NATO was inovsng toward the option of delaying the use of nuclear weapons In aconflict until the Pact was on the verge of overrunning NATO's defenses or had used nudear weapons first. By the, Soviet strategists had incorporated into iheir cVsctrine tbe notion that war in Europe would most likely beginonventional phase and that Pact forces and tactics should be adjusted accordingly.
elatedKhruahdsov development that affected -the Soviets* views oa the likely natureuropean war was their anticipation In tbef achieving rough strategic parity with the US.ar in Europe during the Khrush-
- T1 - |
coruuef, the Soviets could now coarider thethat war in Europe might netlobal exchange. Achievement of strategic parity probably served to reinforce Soviet beliefsar In Europe would begin conventiona ly because of the mutual hesitancy of die USSH to useweaponsheater conflict that could quickly escalate to global war.
n ihe lOCOs, Soviet doctriie held lhatar with NATO developed to th* point that the Introduction of nudear weapons became inevitable, the USSR would conduct massive, theater-wide nuclear strikes to preempt NATO nuclearSoviet cxKfrinal writings indicate that by tbeerious coosideration "as being given tof Soviet lunitcd. rue of nuclearoviet planners were being Instructed to develop concepts and forces forariety of nuclear operations in Europe.
e are uncertain of the full esJeat to vrillch Soviet doctrine oa limited nuclear v> ir has advanced since the. Our evidence on Soviet
tieater .war-fighting concepts duriag ike last few
ycarsQ
ariety of Soviet actions ranging from DOn-ese of nuclear weapons to large-scale, theater-wide audear strikes
r
* For Sovietoo the concurrent use of chemical with nudeM rtrfcex.part^rtjd tM below.
c
e consider It likely that Soviet thinking on theater nuclear war and on the link* between theater nnd intercontinental war it fluid and that further changes may become apparent in the next lew yean. The position at which the Soviets had arrived0 retained some features of the Khrushchevas to the decisive nature of nuclearabo exhibited major differences tliat reflected ihe realities of the current strategic balance and Soviet perceptions of NATO's* military doctrine and capabilities. Thehad shifted away from itsingle catastrophic response to any NATO use of nuclear weapons. Al the same lime, however. If heldittle hope of limiting the intensity of theater nuclear war in Europe once It is begun.
n any case, having once embarked on the search for alternatives to automatic nudearthe Soviets arc unlikely to have abandoned the search. Wc estimate' lhat the following con-siderations characterixe current Soviet concepts of the Initial stagesar in Europe:
Soviets believear in Europe probably would begin with both sides using only non-nuclear weapons.
Soviets also believe that the Waisaw Pact would quicklyon-nuclear NATO attack, go on the offensive, and achieve eaily successes in penetrating NATO's defenses.
Soviets would seek to continue to use only non-nuclear weapons as long as possible.
NATO would Initiate the use of ouclcar wcapons to compel Pact forces to halt their offensive.
If NATO's initial use of nuclear weapons were selective and limited, we could not confidently predict the Soviets' response. They mightpurdy non nuclear operations. Or they mightassive nudear strike^
^JBut we cannot exclude the possi-
bility thai they would respond with limited strikes of theirhave considered this alternative.
The Soviets reckon, however, that onceweapons are introduced by either side, the risk of escalation is very great because the side that struck first massively would have Ihe advantage The likelibood of anpreemption by one side or the other with massive, theater-wide strikes wouldgreatly.
Available classified Soviet writings are vogue vrith regard to the issue of nudear escalation from the European theaterS-USSR intercontinental ea change. Unclassifiedcharacterize such escalation as likely. We cannot now discern current Soviet thinking on the limits of escalation.
Soviet military doctrine has not set any fixed sue for the Warsaw pact's initial nudear strike lis size would depend on military objectives. While doctrine will influence Soviett Is not likely to be Ihe force driving theleadership's decision concerning the actual response.
III. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES ANO WAR-FIGHTING STRATEGIES
taiiii; i
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TABLE 1
Xiai. i TaclMal Alt Forcca'
By Uaii Prlatarr Mlu-o'
Airoall OppoatU NATO CrnUal tt'tt-nEt-apa..
Fou-d
Total Eaai
So rial
CSKOaa,}.
MCF (Polaod)
COFMD
CarpalMaa MD
TeUll
Tola)mi Rfjioa.
Co^ataf-
(10
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il Hi
tfI!iit}*iM jijij
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t *
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major surface: combatantseneral purpose:
A. Possible Theaters of War Withoviet strategists have identified at least three theaters of militaiy operations in which theypotential land conflicts with NATO. These theaters are described below along with briefof the types of military operations which the Soviets appear lo envisage for each. Also, the military forces which probably would be available for early use in each theater arcPact planning is sufficiently flexible to allow for variations in any of these elcrnents^
Northwestern Theater. Information]
"jlrtdicales
that the Sovietsheater of rrulitarybased on the Leningrad Military District which would encompass the ScandinavianTills Information implies contingency plans for the defense of the Murmansk and White Sea areas Including Northern Fleet installations, and forrseutralixauou or seizure of the lightly defended NATO facilitiesorthern Norway. Whether plans exist for early offensive operations into central
regions of Norway ti unknown, but these areas are rugged and considerably mere defensible than those in the north. In any event, the Soviets are constrained by the distances involved fromtheir ground and tactical air forces to bear against most of Norway in the initial phasear. Their large Northern Fleet, includingctive mafor surfaceeneral purposeand someaval combat aircraft,would be used against NATO naval forces, and merchant shipping There are nine Sovietone an airborne division, in the Leningrad Militaryonly district opposite theombatin its Frontal Aviation units. Abo. thereaval Infantry regiment in the Murmansk area with amphibious lift available to it,
crtern Theater. The Western Theater would include East Cermany. Poland, andon the Pact side and the FBC, the Benelux nations. Denmark, and France oa the NATO ride. The bulk of both NATO's and the Pact's theater forces are either located In Central Europe or earmarked for use there. Pact forces currently In Central Europe
includeround divisionsctieal air-crafl. An additionaloviet divisions,irborne5 tactical aircraft arc stationed in the western USSR adjacent to theand are primarily intended to be wedestern Theater. The Soviet Baltic Fleet withctive major surface combatants andombat aircraft and the Polish and East Cerman Navies would likely he used to gain control of the Baltic Sea. to support amphibious operations in the Western Theater and to assure passage to the open ocean. See paragraphs0 for details of possible Warsaw pact operations in this theater.
our Western Theater. Soviet plannersmilitary operations against Greece and west, em Turkey, and possibly northern Italy and Austria.
against Crccoe and Turkey would be launched from Bulgaria and the Odessa region of the USSR to secure the Turkish Straits and support naval in the eastern Mediterranean.against northern Italy intended to secure the .southern flank of the Western Theater might be launched from Hungary through Yugoslavia or Austria. There areact divisionsrigadesctieal aircraft in Hungary, Bo-mania, and Bulgaria. In the Odessa Militarythere are an additional tight Soviet divisions (including one airborne division)actical aircraft primarily for useouthwestern Theater. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, withctive major surface combatants.ubmarines,om-
bat aircraftaval Infantry regiment, and the much smaller Bulgarian Navy would supportera lions to gain the Straits and neutralize NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.
Soviets also probably havefor operations against eastern-Turkey.divisions {including one airborne)aircraft in the North Caucasus andMilitary Districts could bc used in
t .>
Reservei- In addition to theearmarked for early use againstpotential theaters,dditional Sovietone airborne) arert ofMountains in the Kiev, Moscow, Ural,Military Districts. There is littlewhere ot when the Soviets would expectthese divisions. The central location andof readiness of the motorized rifle andsuggest, however, that initially mostmight be heldeneral reserve forany of the theaters opposite NATO. Theybe usedar Eastern theater in thea Sino-Sovtet war,
Rome 4
top^Se
-rc*
ooiX Theater Forca Facing China.3
are an additionalivisions _
aircraft in the Sovier military district, eastATO
Ural Mountains and in the Mongolian Peoples
public. We believe that these forces are
mainly for the contingencyar withMtuJn (iwrhcn)
and lhat.adical improvement inIfll^tl*
j. . , . . , liSHM I . a*
Soviet relations, most ol tnem would be retained
the Far East evenoviet war '
Ranee Aviation Bomberi1
ooict Strategic Attack Forces /orBl^ler . !
Unclear Wat. Elements of all the Soviet
.iitack. Rocket Troops. Long
Range Aviation, and ballistic missile
of the Sovietbe available lo
pate in Warsaw Pact nuclear strikes on
Europe. Mott ofperationalt
theRBMs are targeted on Europe; the
are aimed rnalnly at NATO's Central Regionll/U
the United Kingdom while tbe IRBMs are aimed . .
_, . art Soviet MRBMt aod IRBM Uunchen Laorefire
mostly towardUhe northern and southern European , U,
area*termediate range bombersCM* lor each ocentmal launch erew curiae oot cated west of the Ural Mountains arc mainly In- of. Refire minder auyt IltBM tended for strikes against NATO Europe,atttSsMM Retire ouatua are proUUr lat-HBsUli somef the Soviets older model ballistic missile MM ^
submarines,otal ofunch tubes, are ttichU used acini!
probably earmarked for ute in Europe. We doubt NATO tarpts.
that any oflassIass SSBNs would be -wm, unul deofaswotsBaoWlr.from their deterrent mission for use in urfifed o> pariphmlRs eau-uied(Seeisting of systems chiefly capahfliikei eulu Itpotential toercouttneoul threat.for European
e believe lhatelatively small
lion ofoviet ICBM. would be used
strike targets In NATO Europe.trike- westernSouthwestern Theaters whilelong-range bombers are mainly Intended 'f^rfY2TEintercontinental rtrikes but are capable of strik- ^TO center. The Soviets wouldvtewspecially one agamit the
Turkish Straits, as sir^ujHcantJy wrtoencirig theSoviets Views on the Importance of Central cess of their naval operations. These operations Europe. However hostilities began. Ibe Soviets might also draw NATO ground and air forces away would expect Central Europe to be the decisive from Central Europe. We Judge that early Pact theaterarge-scale conflict. Europe's major offensive operations toward tbe Turkish Straits and population and economic centers are there, as are northern Norway are more likely than In tbe other the bulk of NATO's and tho Pact's theater forces. flank areas such as luly and the rest of Scandinavia, Whether the Soviets would launch offensive, on en.peration, against northern Italy and NATO's flanks concurrently with any campaign Scandinavia aside from tysrtherooukl in Central Europe is uncertain and would depend appear to offer little advantage to tbe Soviets corn-on tbe circumstances at the time. We believe that mensurate with the cost In diversion of Pact forces thp Warsaw Pact has the means to conduct limited. from more urgent objectives. The Soviets are un-
likelynticipate any serious threat from Italyact operation in Central Europe- Neither are they likely to feel seriously threatened from eastern Turkey.
Soviets must view ihe recurringthe eastern Mediterranean area asbut at live same time these events,ugoslav succession crisis afterloom in their eyes as potential sourcesEast-West tensions. In this sense,consider the risk of conflict to bethe Southwestern Theater than elsewltcrc,would still see Central Europe as the
B, Soviet Strategies and Objectivesar in Central Europe
Views on Initiation of Hostilities.the emphasis on NATO aggresslvenessT"
"Jit is likely that the Soviets reckon that both sTdes are effectivelyfrom deliberatelyar between tho two alliances. They probably believe that East-Westthey occurred atarisenowballing of events growing out of internalocalized dispute in Europe sucherlin problem,risis in another area such as the Middle East. The Soviets woulderiod of heightened tensionar, and they might expect both sides to begin making military preparations. They would recognize that once either side began mobilization, tensions would rise sharply and the danger of accident or miscalculation would Increase. Moreover, once military preparations were under way, the Soviets would believe that one side or the other might see advantage in preemption to take advantage of its preparations and to thwart those of the other side
of the Offensive. Soviet militarycenters on the offensive Warsaw Pactwar with NATO derives from that doctrinehow hostilities began,!
ihc military plan for Successful .terttilnationar involves quicklyarge-seale Pact offensive to destroy the main NATO forces and seize, at the least, the territories of the FRC, the Benelux nations, and Denmarkampaign lasting lessonth. Recent evidence docs not reveal Soviet Intentions
toward carryingact offensive into France. The Soviets might prefer not to attack Franco If French forces remained out of the conflict and other NATO forces did not enter French territory. Abo. the independent French nuclear capability could be
because French involvement In the con-fh'ct would increase the risk of nuclear escalation.
he Strategic Initiative.orollary to the doctrine of the offensive. Soviet strategists empha-site tlie critical importance of seizing andthe strategic initiative. The principle applies not
to tlie gtound campaign but also to Pactto achieve air superiority and. ultimately,use of nuclear weapons in the theater. It Isfactor leading to the Soviets' greatwith combat readiness andtrongtoward preemption that recurs in theirwriuogJ, It also Is consistent witheffortsrapid rnobilizationdeployment capability, and withexpectations of accompusJung somebefore Its general rnobOizauoa isIt is manifested la Pact ground forcesand tactics, with their emphasis onforces, surprise, and blitzkrieg.
onflict with NATO, the Soviets would hope that, by seizure of the imnative, they could interrupt NATO's rnobilization and forestall USBut they recognize that this would be complicatederiod of political crisis andthat almost certainly wouldax and provide Impetus to NATO preparations. If their offensive Is begun suffideotiy early, however, they might even hope to overrun NATO territory so rapidly as to limit the prospects that NATO tactical nuclear weapons could be used to retrieve the
Tint Dilemma of the Nuclear Transition.military writings confirm that Warsaw Pact planners are facedileouna In the prospectar with NATO could begin non-nudear and escalate rapidly to large-seale nudear war. On the one hand they would wish to mass Urgeof forces where they chose to attempt breakthroughs. On the other hand they fear that NATO might take advantage of their vulnerability while mossing for an attack and launch anudear strike.
he dilemma has anoflier aspect It has driven (he So vied toisky, massive, non-nuclearattack on NATO's air and nuclearwhich they would commit the bulk of the Warsaw Fact tactical air force and much of the Sovietbomberlarge part in the hope of eliminating most of NATO's theater nuclearat the vety outset of hostilities. (Seeor further discussion of Pact air operations.)
act planners hope to reduce theirwhile massing for attack, by doing so as much as possible during darkness and by conducting the operation with great speed, thereby denying NATO the opportunity, to use nuclear weapons before Pact forces have closed with and, theoretically, penetrated NATO's defenses. Also, they place much stress on efforts to divine NATO's intent to useweaponsarge scale in time toact preemptive attack. To this end, they expect to keep their own nudear delivery systemsigh state of readiness and toigorous reconnaissance and intelligence collecting programNATO's nuclear units and facilities as well as Its communications networks on which imminent use of nuclear weapons might be presaged. Despite iheir efforts, the Soviets are not confident that they could solve the problems of transition from non-nudear to nuclear war in Europe.
C The 5trorecjic Backdropar in Europe
he Soviets perceive great danger of escaU-tiontrategic exchange In tlie eventir with NATO.eriod of high tension they would take measures to improve the readiness of their strategic nudear forces and enhance their warcapabilities. They would, for example, probably alert the Strategic Rocket Forces and heighten their efforts to acquire early warningS decision to launch an attack on the USSR. In addition they might wish to demonstrate their strategic readiness despite the inherent risks of causing NATO to ready itself or Initiate hostditjes. Overt measures might Indude massive dvil defense activities, theof fleet elernents, the movement of aircraft, or relocation of key government and military
f
urthermore, during any military involvement in Europe, the Soviets would feel themselvesIo Chinese exploitation. They wouldtake steps loaximum deterrent posture with their forces opposile China.
IV. WARSAW PACT PLANNING FOR INITIAL OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE A. forces
he Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO in Central Europe, and those primarilyfor use Ihere, are on tlie whole larger, better equipped, and more rigorously trained than other Pact forces. Also, these forces ate generallyigher level of peacetime manning and are more cornbst-restdy than the others. (Sec Table 4
Tab ix 4
Warsaw Pact TWaicr Porce* Opptnitc KATO In Central Europe and In Weetrra USSR
Men:
Cround
Tactical Ale Forcea
Tank,
DtVKiasi
Tank
Motorized tuTk
Aatault Landing
Airborne
Tarxical Aircraft*'
Ccnaaanalr
rtaek
rXece-inainance/lXM ,.
15
In
tbe
Includes only Pact forcea In Eastoland, and Crechenlovakia. Pact forces In Hungary probably would not ba part of an oflenctve against tbe NATO Central KcgSoo.mxayttir. but would en-are likely be used cither to defend the southern flank ol Ihe Pact forcea agaimt poufblc attack (root Amtrtan or Yugoalav lirrlloilea. or lo ceeaSoct offensive operation* through those ceuotrlee.
* IrvJudea forces In the Baltic, BcJorusa-an and Carpathian Military restricts.
'Does not Includetralncn Ofircraft eaaigned lo the Earl Ccrennn, PoUiV. and Czech National Ah Defense Crona-h.
for details on ground and tactical air forces op-posite NATO in Central Europe and the western USSn. Details on the Baltic Fleet are inoiMei Naoal Policy and Prat-rams.)
Forces
The ground forces are tlie key clement of Warsaw Pact theater forces, with the bull of the manpower and Ihe primary offensive combat roles. Roughly half of tire Pact ground forces in Central Europe areirt ofivisions) and two thirds of the im.ilvlicvc arefor early use there arc' out.
Peacetime Status. We have previously(hat all Soviet units in Central Europe were at or near intended wartime personnel strength. This judgment was based on observations of high activity in Soviet garrisons and training areas, the emphasis on combat readiness in Soviet writings, and the apparent lack of locally available Soviet reservists that could be called up to ful shortages. During recent yean, however, we have acquired evidence which does not comport with this
Documentary evidence indicates that onemotorized rifle company in East Cermany is authorized onlyen as againsthich we estimate to be the unit's wartime TO. Another document indicatesoviet motor transport company in East Cermany had IS percent of its slots vacant and marked lo be filled from reserves.
figures from
trie TOE of his motorized rifle regiment in East Cermany which indicate that thewas authorizedercent fewer men than we estimate for its wartime TO.
Several sources have reported that discharged Soviet servicemen are retained in Eastas civiliana readyfill Critical technical positions In Soviet unlu.
-c
* Includes Three Soviet airborne dlvblom.
ZJ
Never!ss, Ihc observed high activity levels of Soviet units in Central Europe and the evidence associated with Soviet troop rotations suggest that generally high manning levels ire maintained in those force-*.
ore information and further analysis are needed to determine how many and what kinds of units are affected by ihe above conditions and the eitent to which mobilization might be used. The available evidence suggests, however, that some individual Soviet combat regiments arc manned as much atercent below their intended wartime strength. Some support units may be manned even lower. Wo do not believe, however, that the lower minnlni; levels reflected in available evidence would significantly reduce the combat readiness of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. We continue to believe that these forces arc manned and equipped at levels which would permit them to conduct effective combat operations on short notice.
one of the East European ground forces are fully manned in peacetime. We have good evidenceariety of sources that the East European combat units are at varying reduced strength levels ranging from as high as aroundercent of war strength for East Cerman divisions to as low asercentew Czechoslovak and Polish cadre divisions. East European support units are mainly at low strength levels.
he range of maisning levels of Soviet ground forces in the western USSR resembles that of the East European ground forces: some are at relatively high levels and others are low-strength cadre units. Most of (he East European units and the Soviet units in tfie western USSR do not have their wartime allocation of general purpose trucks but rather would receive civilian Oueks rerjuisi-tioned from the economy. The Soviets, ia particular,ystem In which certain civilian truckare especially selected and maintained
under military supervision with specific mobiliza-lion designations Io reportatter of Sours to combat unils bcinif mobilized.
oailabtiilu for Combat and Moblization Capability. The Warsaw Piict ground forces inEurope are maintainedtatus that would enable them to react defensively- in emergencies with little prior preparation. We believe that the Soviet divisions are capable of vacating thdrin two hours and would be prepared soon thereafter to conduct either defensive or offensive operations. The majority of the East European divisions are sufficiently manned to conduct limited military operations and detailed alerting procedures are maintained and rehearsed frequently.
eforeoordinated. Large-scale offensive, however. Pact ground forces wouldmajor prepata lions Including generalin all the East European countries,of combat forces In assembly areas for attack or In reserve areas, and establishment of field depots and other support bases. Otherwould include establishment ofnetworks, activation of command posts and exchange of staff and liaison personnel,preparation of field fortification! andemplacements, and the preparation and issuance of orders. The Pact would probably attempt initially to conceal or disguise their preparations but, on the whole, the scale of activities would besince World War H.
he entire process of preparation has. of course, never been rehearsedcale approach-ing that required for war. Most of the elernents are practicedartial scale from time to tune, especially those involving the tactical preparations of the troop units. We have little evidential basis for estimating how long the Pact would take to make all of the preparations necessary for aoffensive. We can. however, estimate how long after the forces were alerted certain key actions would take.
ADoviet divisions in Central Europe and the six East Cerman divisions probably could move from their garrisons to theirareas in aboutours.
Seven Czecrsoslovak divisions in western Czechoslovakia could be filled out and moved to their attack locations in about two days.
The nine Polish mechanized aad tank divisions in the Porncrarrian and Suesian Militarycould be filled out and movedorthern East Germany in three to four days. The Polishnd sea landing divisions would be available withinours but Iheir movement would largely depend on theof Soviet transport.
remaining seven Czechoslovak and Polish low-strength divisions could be filled out in about three days and would then be available' to be moved.
oviet divisions in the western USSR could abo be filled out in from one to three days, depending on their peacetime manning levels, and made ready to begin movement westward-Various calculations of Soviet capability to move all of these divisions and their associated headquarters and support units Into their cooceoUatioo areas in Central Europe have been made ia the US and elsewhere. Depending upon the assumptions used as to road, rail, and air capacities, availability of trains, aod org miration and priority of units and supplies to be moved, ihese calculations yield figures ranging roughly betweenoays. No Interference by Western stetsons is assumed in any of these caJculitions. (Seeiscission of Soviet planning with respect to the laming of these forces' inovemeot and their likely role In combat)
irborne Troopt. The Soviets have seven airborneof them located west of thecould be used in anyjhcalet.
ail borne formations would be used la conjunction wiih other forces in operations across major water barriers, for example In an attempt to seize the Danish islands and the Turkish Straits. In smaller rep mental- or battalion-sized units, they could be used to seize bridgeheads In dose prorimify to advancing ground forces in land campaigns, or to
* Eidddes nne airborne traininE diWiaan.
conduct raids on imili but critical enemySufficient military airvailable IO lift the assault elementj of about two airborne divisions simultaneously, but conflictingfor relocating tactical air forces andhigh priority movement of personneland supplies could reduce the number of transports available for airborne operations in the early stagesar.
Air forces
here arcactical aircraftSS Sovietast European) based in East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia.re located in the three western militaryof the USSR and could reinforce thosein Eastern Europe on short notice (seehe largest concentration of Pact tactical air power opposite NATO is the Soviet air army in East Cermany which hasombatonases. The Soviets also have smaller tactical air forces in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Poles and Czechs have sizableforces of their own and. with the Soviets,would have major responsibilities foroperations in the northern and southernthe Western Theater, East Cermany hastwo tactical airitnational air defense units.
ercent of Paet tactical and NATO Central Region are fighters inthat have the mission of destroying NATO'sthrough aerial engagements or attacksAnotherercent arc groundhe mission of destroying NATOeither in support of the ground forcespart of tbe initial theater-wide strikes. Theof tho force consists of reconnaissancespecialized support aircraft that providelocation and electronic warfare support toand ground attack units. InareCM -equippedssignedTransport Aviation which wouldsupport of the tactical air forces.
side from their tactical air forces the Soviets haventerrrtetL'ate-range bombers of Long Range Aviation based in (he western USSR.
These bombers, possibly augmented by Soviet naval aircraft, would be used for strikes against targets in the NATO rear area that require large conventional or nuclear payloads.
oviet Military Transport Aviation wouldthe main airlift capability for Pact forces opposite NATO. Equipped withedium assault andndeavy cargo transports, one of its primary missions would be to lift airborne troops. Military Transportwould also be oieruively used to support tactical air deployments and for logistic and re-supply tasks, such as the transport of nuclear weapons. The Soviet civil air transportAeroflot. can substantially augment Military Transport Aviation. Il could potentially double the Soviet capability to airlift passengers and bashat could be used to transport bulk
ight, medium, and heavyare assigned to Soviet Frontal Aviation ia East Cermany. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the three western military districts.are in the East Cerman. Polish, and Czech air forces. Most Pact helicopter units would be responsible for airlifting combat troops and logistic and liaison tasks. As new models are introduced and new equipment is retmfittcd to existing models, these forces are increasingly capable of conducting air assault, ground attack,il-helicopter
eacetime Status and Buildup Capability. Pact air forces are generally maintained at or near their wartime personnel and equipment levels and would require little preparation before combaL Redeployment of tactical air iinlts. possiblyreinforcements from the USSR, would likely occur prior to an attack. Many units in Central Europe, particularly some equipped with older, short-range aircraft, are currently located where they cannot reach critical NATO targets without staging to forward bases. In general, most tactical air units with air-defense responsibilities are located where they can provide coverage fromea ce time bases.
f the Soviets considered air reinforcement to be necessaryar with NATO, we estimate lhat several hundred taoital aircraft, alonginimum required amount of ground personnel
and equipment, could be moved from the western USSR to bases in Central Europe in from one to three days. The actual time involved would depend upon the amount of air transport support allocated to the reinforcement effort. This docs not take into consideration, however, the potential effects of incalcutables such as adverse weather or military counteractions by NATO.
Theoler Nuclearn addition to the USSR-based strategicthat could be used Ior massive nuclear striken against NATO Europe, the Sovietsariety of tactical nuclear delivery systems in their ground and air forces. The quantify of delivery systems has been increasing in recent years, and this would enable the Soviets to conduct nudear warfare in Europe at higher intensities before having to use their USSR-based systems. There is, however, no direct evidence that the Soviets are deliberately seeking to provide themselves with an alternative to using their USSR-based nuclear forces In large-scale theater nuclear war.
umerically, the most Important nuclear delivery systems in Eastern Europe arc Soviet tactical aircraft. Wc have identified someoviet tactical air units In East Cermany. Poland, and Crechoslovakiaon their training and exercisebelieved toission of delivering nudear bombs. There areombat aircraft assigned to these units. There Is good evidence, however, that onlyf the pilots, the most experienced. In these units areto Sovietdrop nuclear bombs. We expect that the number of Soviet tactical aircraft in Eastern Europe with nuclear missions will continue to grow as they trainair crews and re-equip units with nudear-capable aircraft such as3 Ftogger anditter. There areircraft in Ciecls and Polish units that train in nuclear delivery techniques.
round forces nuclear delivery systems in-dude, tbe FROG, Scud, and Scaleboard missiles. The Pact Is estimated to haveROG battalions with somelaundiers andcud brigadesaunchers ia East Germany, Poland, andThe Scud has an effective range of about 1G0 run and the FROG aboutm. None . ofm Scaleboard launchers is believed to
be located in Central Europe but wc estimate that ttirceJxalcboard unitsotal of up toaunchers are part of the forces In theSR earmarked for Central Europe.
e have recently acquired ovidence that
^suggests lhat the Soviets either have now. or expect to have, nuclear artillery rounds.
e have identifiedacilities in EastPoland, and Crechoslovakia that we believe are for the storage of tactical nuclearvailablethat nuclear weapons are stored in these Soviet-controlled sites inack of Information oo Soviet storage practices makes it Impossible to determine precisely how many nuclear weapons might be stored In these sites, but it ll estimated that they could boldarheads and bombs. We do not believe that the Soviets have placed nuclear weapons in the hands of their East European allies. We do not know the circumstances under which non-Soviet forces might receiveweapons, but we Judge that they would be provided weaponsuropeanuclear stage. We estimate that, even in wartime, tbe Soviets would retain control over all warheads.
he Soviets have widdy equipped their forcesariety of good quality radiological and chemical defensivea par with the better US equipmenL The Soviets have devoted more resources than the US to radiological and chemical defense, reflecting the high level oftbe Soviets have for the survivability of their forces in war when nuclear and chemical weapons are being used.1
' AaetberLUea In1 tire* Id Bolpria
1 'Hie Director. Defensertcy, believe! thati parafrapliey aspecti ofpentlnr.adiolotrkal awl/or chemical environment. AliliougS the best Soviet equlpnteat t>evel which doe* not eaoted USfaiunea. rbe Soviets have produced and deplored In quantity tome typei ofrumple, (heeeooUintrutioabe BRDWCB eheaiea]-Wet. US and ADied force* do not panel..
Bioloo'co/, and Radhlogicot
(CBR) Warfareoviet military doctrine categorizes toxic chemical agents along with nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" and it implies that the Warsaw Pact would use chemical weapons once nuclear weapons were introducedATO-Pact war. Furthermore, chemical weapons, likeweapons, are controlled by the Soviets and their use almost certainly would require Moscow's approval. We do not believe 'he Pact intends to use chemicnl weapons ircept in concert withweapons. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets might use chemical weapons independently.
Pact forcesariety ofof delivering diemical agents. Theseartillery (indoding multiple rocketmortars. FTtOCs, Scuds, aerial bombs,sptay tanks. We have tittle doubtSoviets possess substantial stocks of toxicagents but cannot estimate the size ofWe have good evidence, however,todc chemical muri lions are availableair forces In Eastern Europe
Warsaw Pact forces emphasizemore than NATO. They have developedCBR organization with specializedto the division level for technicaland decontamination and haveforcesariety of good qualityIn recent years Soviet forces havenewer models of equipment designedtheir effectivenessBRAPCs and perhaps new tanks and somewell as various types of support equipmentwiih advanced filtration andCBR training for the forces isfrequent; training of chemical defenseuse of toxic chemical agents. Allenable the Pact forces lo operate Inenvironment more effectively than
ll the Warsaw Pact countries hare signed the International agreement prohibiting thestorage, and use of biological weapons. There is good evidence lhat, in the past, the Soviets conducted extensive research on biological agents and protective techniques and they piobably have
fadlilira that could be used to make biological agentsr
1
Naval forces
East Cerman. and Polish navalthe Dallic Seaj-rould support Pact operationsindicate that amphibious Operationsthe Polish assault landing division, anassault trained East Cermandivision, and the Soviet naval infantryin the Baltic area are planned inairborne troop landings to seize keyand link up with Pact ground forcesthrough Jutland. Tlie purpose would bethe Danish Straits, deny the Baltic tonaval units, and Interdict NATO supplythe North Sea.
Pact surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft would have the mission of sweeping the Baltic Sea and its approadies of hostile naval forces 'early in the war. Large mine-laying operations to prevent later penetrations by NATO forceswould also occur.
oviet Nooof Policy end Pro-grams,etailed treatment of theforces, and capabilities of Pact naval forcesar with NATO.
Slrenglbt and Weaknesses
Ground Forcer. Pact ground forces* doctrine and organization are centered around the medium lank. The rapidly advancing offensive that the Pact intends to conduct depends on the shock, firepower, and mobility of their tanks. Compared to Western forces. Pact units have more tanksn Central Europe) andmuch higher proportion of tanks to men.
round offensive the Pact would seek lo attain favorable force ratios in local areas over NATO forces and use Its mechanized Infantry, tanks, and supporting artillery to break through NATO's defenses. Pact tank columns would then commence -high speed drives toward (heir major objectives
on the Rhine River and beyond. Ooce committed to deep penetrations, the tank forces would have to rely largely on their own firepower, air defenses.
armies.
ignificant shortcomings In the Pact's ground forces remain, however. Although large quantitiesariety of modern weapons have beeninto the ground forces in recentew types of equipment are still In short supply. For example, there still are fewer APCs available than Pact doctrine and organization require. For APCs. as well as for other items of equipment, the Pact hasixture of different types of old and new equipment to fill outsupply and maintenance operations. Soviet improvonents In non-nuclear artillery and tank ammunition effectiveness have not kept pace wiih those of the US. although the Pact greatlyNATO In quantities of artillery pieces and tanks.
7fl. On balance, however, developments since theave largely erased the formerof'Pact armiesorde armed with masses of simple, rugged, easily maintained weapons. The Pact ground forces are now maturing as modern forcesophistication comparable to that of Western armies.
irtrong feature of the Warsaw Pact's air forces Is the large number of versatile
aircraft available and the extensive, hardened sir base system. The Pact has sufficient airfields and logistic supplies located In Eastern Europe toa variety of deployments, reinforcements, and air attack operations over extended periods. Pact air units are well versed in deployment andtechnique. Moreover, Pact pilot training now provides the force with scaler missionthan in.
olt Pact ground attack aircraft stillhort range, small payload, and poor all-weather capabilities when compared to NATO's aircraft. This has resulted in Pact reliance on theand vulnerable Soviet intenisediate-range bomber force for deep strikes when using con-vctitional bombs. Pact tactical air forces also lag considerably behind NATO's in the availability of sophisticated air-to-ground munitions such asair-to-surface missiles and laser-guided bombs.
eficiencies also exist ta the air defenseof Pact tactical air units. Almost all Pact air intercept training is coc-ducted under strict ground control within the -range of Ihe friendly air surveillance network. .There is evidently littleplaced on free air combat outside thesystem. This could limit tlie Pad's wartime ability to seek out and destroy airborne enemy air-craft over NATO territory.
he Soviets have developed chaff and active jammers to cover virtually all of NATO's radarA through Jthcir forces exercise frequently In an electronic warfare environment. We do not know, however, howthese systems would be against NATO air defense systems.
he development and deployment since Ihef improved aircraft andact recognition of the shortcomings of its air forces, especially for rsoo-noelear war. As the proportion of the force equipped with new systems Increases and its capabilities expand, we expect toontinuing evolution of Pact air doctrine away from Its traditional preoccupation with air clef ease, andider range ofand defensive missions. Current Pactto Improve the air forces are discussed in more detail beginning at.
B. Pad Concept* for Lounching an Offensive in Central Europe
e have heretofore estimated that, before launching offensive operations against NATO in Centra] Europe, the Soviets probably woulda large reinforcement of ground forces from the western USSR. This judgment was based on
Jbe early
nd on our then-current assessment of the forces. At that time the East European forces were relatively ineffective and could have madeinor contributionact offensive. Also, at that time, the Soviets believed that nuclear weapons would be used massively at the outsetonflict and, therefore, that it was imperativeringthe additional Soviet forces deemedfor an offensive before NATO could destroy or interdict them. Although this offered NATO more lucrative nudear targets, the Soviets seemed willing to accept the increased vulnerability that r^ forcing units massed In the forward area would entail.
*C
I intelligence information acquired since the late BtJOs indicates that thenow consider Jt likely that theirindudihg majorbegin prior to their carryingarge-scale rdnforccmcnt
? "r
he information available to uil
3rinc- 'he late^jfeatures;
NATO is always portrayed as the aggressor but the Pact is never caught unpreparedthe NATO attackeriod of greatly increased tension.
During the days or weeks of crisis thathostilities the Pact takes steps toIts military posture but Pact general mobilization does not occur until hostilities are clearlymoreew day* before war begins.
The initial ground reiru*orceoients fromCentral Europe consist of from one to three Soviet armies which are committed
by the end of the first week of combat, but these do not begin moving westward from the USSR until war has begun.
Follow-on rrinforcernents from the USSR are usually not brought into play for yet another week, and even then their role is ambiguous. They could be used for an invasion of Fiance, serve a* replacement* for first-lineparticularly if tbe war had gotsebe used to diminate pockets of NATO forces bypassed earlier in the offensive.
8S. In our view, these recurring themes indicate that Pact planners no longer see war with NATO as necessarily preceded by large-scaleof their ground forces prior to hostilities In Europe. This change docs not necessarilyoviet preference for initiating hostilities prior to large-scale reinforcement but rather, from their point of view,rudent planningThey may simply calculate that there will not be sufficient timeassive groundbefore any likely crisis escalates to openThey may also reckon that,ariety of reasons, large-scale ground reinforcement prioronflict could be counterproductive. It could, for example. Invite preemptive action by NATO,the early use of nuclear weapons. It might also cause NATO touildup of its own that would work against the Pact's initial numerical superiority cf forces In the area.
n any event, the Soviet military evidently believe that Pact ground forces are superior to NATO's. They also believe that Pact forces now In Central Europe are not only capable ofATO attack in the early daysonflict, but are also capable ofon-nuclear of* tensive into West Germany before the first Soviet ground reinforcements reach the combathe Pact, of course,ariety of optionswith regard to the use of its sizable ground rdnforcemeots in the USSR. The evidence clearly indicates to us, however, that Soviet planningcurrently bold the above scenario to be the most realistic.
here arc several possible reasons wby Soviet planner* evidently do longer consider a ground
fesQKMe X-
forces' buildup before an offensive against NATO toealistic planning assumption. One is that the organization, equipment, and training of the East Europeans lias increased to the point where they canajor role in initial operations against NATO.Q
3
factor has been tbe addition tostrength of the Soviet Central Croupin Czechoslovakia.
3
The Soviets may also believe that theprocess it not as severely threatened by NATO nuclear attack as it was in earlier years, but that reinforcements massed in the forward area would still be critically vulnerable to NATO air attack. Pact doctrine now holds that NATO use of nuclear weapons is less probable atarecade ago.
A final consideration that probably hasthe Soviets' thinking regarding groundderives from the importance theirplacet oo seizing the initiative.reater chance of suocess If the Pact could launch Its offensive before NATO could fully build up its forces and prepare its defenses. They may. therefore, wish to avoid any provocative actions, suchajor ground reinforcement, that couldATO buildup.
This appreciation of Pact offensive concepts has important warning implications for NATO. In particular, the movement ofdivisioo force from the USSR info Central Europe, which perhaps was the clearest indicator, may not take place, before an attack.
C. Wartime Organization
or initial wartime operations against NATO in Central Europe the Pactgivento organize Its forces in Easl Cermany. Poland, and Crechoslovakia into three fronts. Although the composition and internal organization of the forces in each front could vary, their general zones ofwould be as follows:
Central Front. Ihe main Pact effort would clearly fall to this front. It would be primarily composed of forces operating from southern Easl Cermany and would have the (ask of destroying NATO forces in West Cctmany roughly between Hanover in the north and Mannheim in the south. This front couldforces from as many as sir of NATO's eight corps areas, lt would be the largest Pact force In the Western Theater with as many asivisions. Including most of the Soviet forces In East Cermany and Poland andthree of the East Cerman Army's six divisions.
Northern Front. Pact forces In the north would be responsible for engaging NATO forces in Denmark as well as those In the twoNATO corps areas of West Cermany.{_
JThis front could include some- IS to'vSons.
Southtoettern Front. The majority of the forces comprising this front would be Czechoslovak, with the addition of the five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia. This front, with someivisions, would have the rcsportnbtnty ofas far as tlse Rhine In an area roughly between Mannheim and the Swiss border.
be org miration of Pact forces is flexible and operations subsequent to the Initial days of a
conflict may take several forms. (_
fourthone to three of the initialinforcing armies from theprobably would be formedeek or so as thebreadth of the campaign area expanded.
IM. Initial Ait Operations. Pact doctrine cm-phasiies that the successround campaign in Europe is highly dcnenelcnt on the properof air power. Tlie Soviets piobably consider that, despite the Pact's suporiorily on the ground. NATO's lattical air forces could enable NATO forces lo blunt or perhaps evenact ground offensive. Because of this the Pact evidently has determined that the most effective application of its air forces in the early conventional phasear would be in the form of massive, theater-wide strikes aimed at destroying NATO's tactical air forces and other nuclear systems and facilities. These attacks are to commence immediately at the onset of hostilities and be conducted by Pactaircraft and bombers of Soviet Long Range and possibly Naval Aviation,
These theater-wide strikes probably would be centrally controlled. Some allocation of air sup-port to the fronts can be expected during the Initial air operations phase, but control of the tactical air force* probably would revert to the frontonly when the objectives of these attacks had been met.
We lack direct information concerning tlie Pact's view of its own aircraft requirements for sustained conventional or nudear air operations In Central Europe. Given present Soviet capabilities to reinforce iheir forward based tactical air forces and the large numbers of aircraft already in place, however, we bdieve that the Pact would haveforces to conduct conventional operations while initiallyizalle portion for nudear contingencies.
V. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS OF WARSAW PACT STRATEGY
A. Capability of Poet Ground forces Io Brcni..Through NATO's Defenses
strategyuccessful offensiveEurope is heavily dependent on rapid
breakthroughs of NATO's defenses, preferablythey are fully organized. The achievementreakthrough would dependumber of factors such as surprise, rapid movement, and the massing of forces. Thearsaw Pact divisions in Central Europe give ihe Pact the capability to initiate offensive actionelatively brief period of mobilization and without major reinforce-ment. Even if their forward disposition and rapid mobilization allowed them to achieve tacticaland deprive NATOrolonged warning of impending war. they would still have lo mass their attacking forces in order to achieve sufficient local superiority in numbers to overwhelm the NATO forces at the points at which they chose to attack. Tliis would make them vulnerable to attack by nuclear weapons.
he Pact's strategy calls lor sharply limiting the period of time In which forces are massed In order lo reduce vulnerability to NATO nuclear attack. After the forces moved out of dispersed assembly areas, Ihey would hope to rnove directly into Initial contact with the enemy, deploying directly Into combat from the march. This is an extremely complicated maneuver requiring well-trained, highly mobile forces, reliableand effective corrinsand, control, andIt calls for an audacity and dash which is in sharp contrast to tho deliberate and ponderous style which generally characterized Soviet offensive preparations in World War II. Soviet training does, however, emphasize many of the tactics and techniques that would need to be carried out with high effectiveness ifaneuver were to succeed.
3
oviet forces sue provided with reconnais--sance support at all tactical and strategic levels. Fronts and armies have signals intdligence and long-range reconnaissance units, while divisions have organic reconnaissance battalions. In addition, there
M
it ai/lsorne visual, photo, and electronic reoonnxis-sance, as veil as numerous agents In West Cermany. This support should provide the Warsaw Pact forces with extensive information concerning NATOand battlefield conditions, but the Soviets nave not solved the problem of locating NATO's mobile nuclear delivery systems once they have been deployed.
B. Warsaw Pact Air. Faced with the threat from NATO's air and nuclear capabilities, the Soviets liave evidently decided that the initial Pact air campaign in the non-nuclear phaseentral European war should focus on reducing NATO's tactical air and nuclear strength. Massive counterair operations using Pact tactical air forces and USSR-based bombers probably would be mounted earlyar to destroy NATO's air forces througa aerialand attacks on airfields. At the same time. Pact air attacks would be directed against command and control centers, nuclear depots, and mobile nuclear delivery systems. During these initial sir operations. Pact ground commanders probably could count on little direct air support.
oviet planners recognize that these initial air operations aro likely to result in highlosses, and they may attempt to minimi re such losses by creating breaches in NATO's air defenses to provide access routes for strikes in NATO's rear area by Pact aircraft. Despite the risks, the Soviets probably would consider high aircraft lossesIn the perspectivehort, intensive(aj NATO's air forces were sufficiently preoccupied with repelling these attacks lo permit Pact ground forces lo achieve theirgoals relatively unimpeded by air attack, andizable portion of NATO's tacticaldelivery assets were destroyed. The success of air operations depends heavily on surprise tothat NATO's mobile nuclear systems arc not dispersed, and that NATO's air defenses are not fully prepared prior to the initiation of hostilities.
he current re-equipment program fortactical air forces is still far from completeigh proportion of the Pact fighter-bomberomposed of older model- aircraft. These
loads. They also have httle or no all-weather and
night capabilities, although the use of marker heacons could provide some fighter .bombers with the required guidancearget areas. Even: of the fighter-bombers in the present Pactcould not reach NATO airfields except by flying at the relatively vulnerable medium to high altitudes. The Soviet bomber force, except for the new Backfire, would also be forced to use the more vulnerable altitudes due to aircraft perform, ance UmitaUons.
he Pact's limited ability to provide timely target data lo attack forces could hinder theof Pact air operations, particularly inNATO's mobile missile forces. This problem is compounded by the relatively limited navigation and weapons avionicsarge percentage of Pact tactical aircraft, and by Pact trainingwhich stress the use of CCI and rigidof assignments- Once engagedeavy ECM environment and facing active defenses. Pact pilots are likely to experience difficulty in finding their targets. Also, although the Soviets are developing preession-gu'ded munitions for aircraft, "theyhave not yet made these weapons available to Pact air forces. Use of the older, less accuratecurrently available would require more sorties per target and consequent high exposure to NATO air defenses.
onsidering the multinational, mula'com* mand nature of Initial Pact air operations, tbefor dose and coordinated timing, and the large numbers of aircraft involved, Ibe Pact would be facedomplicated command and control situation. We have little basis on which to judge whether current Pact command and controlwould be adequate to this lark Pactgenerally rehearse only portions of theair campaign.
C Control of Multinational Forces In aPad Offensive
ive Warsaw Pad's ability to coordinate the actions of large, multinational forces would be critical to the success of an offensive. Pact strategy with its emphasis on speed, both in concentration of force before an attack and in the rapid proscculionampaign to its objectives ooce begun,ey factor contributing lo the difficulty of the
control problem. In Central Europe this strategy call) for the concurrent movement to operationalithin about three days, ofivisions with (he support rteccsiary toarge-scale offensive- Not only must this movement occur promptly to buildtrong initial combat echelon but it mull also clear the lines of communication th.ough Poland and eastern CicchoiIovaVia in time lo begin the early westward movement from the USSR of up to aboutore divisions and support plus the first surge of large scale lesupply
problemouthwesternbe similar. Fewer forces would beihc projected military operation Is moreinvolving combined land, sea, air.airborne operations agains( the mainall of the participating Soviet groundbe brought forward from the USSR and.Hungary.
key questions are:
What means exist to plan, control, andthese highly complex operations?
How effective would these means be?
World War II, Soviet operationsCerman coalition were planned andthe Soviet General Staff in Moscow andthe Supreme High Command headed bymethod served well enough because ofpace of operations and because nonon-Soviet units were involved- Evenwere shortcomings and the span of controlMoscow authorities was stretched thin at times.
the, when non-Sovietto assume major, critical roles InPact operations, the problem ofacute UnliVe NATO*s. the Pact'swas not integrated and, except for aWarsaw Pact headquarters In Moscow,planning staffs existed. That thehighly concerned about the problembut Use full extent of their efforts tohave remained rather obscure.
developments are known, however:
Tbe Warsaw Pact headquarters has grown and more senior East European ofHcers have
Joined it. (Its wartime function is stClI un-known, however.)
Major steps have been taken to improve both Soviet and East European high-lcvelfacilities and lo make them less vul-nerable-
Through training and improvedsystems the Warsaw Pact forces have become more proficient in combined opera-tions; the East Cerman forces, in particular, me integrated into the operational scheme of ihe CSFC.
The Warsaw Pact members aieniform command port system to Soviet speci-licationc,
n2.r
1
It is (he reluctance of theto accept more integration (hat hasthe developmentore rationalthe misgivings of the Soviet Central Staffhave to relinquish much of its controlis not clear. Probably it is both.case, tbe available evidence suggestsin any NATO-Pact war In the next fewwould control the operations of eachand East European front separately throughofdirectly and somenational command authorities of Its allies.
aa arrangement might workif operations went generally accordingcontingencyunlikely event inIt would seem to be particularly urssultedunexpected large diversions fromoperations such as enemythe need to make unanticipated major forceIt would be particularlydisruption In nuclear war.
e expert the Warsaw plct to continueefforts to solve the critical and complexof coordinating operations of largeforces in wartime. These efforts are liVcly to include:
Increased integration aod siarnlardilation of Soviet and East European commandand communications systems;
Greater automation of troop control systems; and
Possibly, development of an intermediate theater-level control of combined operations.
D. Worsow Poet Logistical. Since thee have acquiredinformation on Warsaw Pact logistical doctrine and planning concepts from Pact military writings and several former Pactoviet logisticalis the model for Warsaw Pactevidently derived from Soviet World War II experience modified to take account of the implications of postwar changes In military strategy. We have no information on whether Pact logistical doctrine has been further modified to reflect the high supply expenditure rates experienced by the US in Vietnam and by both sides in3 Arab-Israeli war.
Ground forces
ccording to Soviet logistical doctrine, each front should maintain enough supplies in its depots, and in the mobile stocks in its armies and divisions, forays of combat. Altogether,heater of militarymight contain severalSoviets prescribe itockage of from two to three months of supplies. In addition to the theater stocks, the doctrine calls for nationalof materiel, supplies, and raw materials. There it no information on the magnitude of.reserves.
US. We have calculated the theoretical capacities of the Identified Pact ground force ammunition and POL depots, Ammunitioo and POL make up the physical bulk of logistical stocks. Based on these calculations and assuming that prescribed mobile stocks are maintained in combatinfor-
Air Forces
hive little infocrwtion oo Pactfor air forces. The following estimatescapabilities to sustain air operations arefrom calculations of air force depotcalculations are susceptible tohowever, and we have recently acquiredind listing that the current ammunitionat several Soviet airfields in Centralfar lower than their estimated storage capacities.
waruw Pad Air Fo.se Slorare Capndlies {Metric TooiJ
Eait
Poland
Assuming that these commodities would be used by all Pact air forces (Including National Air Defense) currently based ln East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as Soviet tactical air units deployed forward from the nearby western military districts, the ammunition stocks implied by the above figures probably could supportair operations for aboutoays. There probably would be enough aviation POL available for someoay*."
We also have Identified depots in the Baltic, Bclorussian. and Carpathian Militaiy Districts which could hold an0 metric tons of air ordnanceillion metric tons ofPOL. These supplies could also be madeto Pact air units operating against the NATO Central Region.
Tbe above figures imply that the Warsaw Pact ground and air forces could have on hand, in Central Europe and in the USSR west of the Urals, sufficient ammunition and POL to last through several months of war. as turning none was destroyed by enemy action. If stocks of this size are in fact available, they would probably be adc-
"quate to sustain Warsaw Pact forces In combat until production of new stocks in the USSR could take up the load.
Caleolattoni of amitiiicJuon aod POL (ooiumpOoo as-lume an Initial ihree-day Bilge period during whieli fighter aircraft achieveocOe* per day. Alter tl.ii period aoeiiea are redwevd lo abortocHea per dir.
of the Warsaw Pact's lines of(LOCs) capacities in Use light ofof Pact supply requirements andin Central Europe suggests that the Pactbkely toassive effort to replenishfrom the USSR at the outset of hostilities.same time, the Soviets would probably beginmovement of troop reinforcementsUSSR- During the first two weeks afterbegan, when these troop and supplystraining the capacity of the LOCs,of the Pact's LOCs could haveeffects. After this initial surge, thewould probably subsideevelcould be sustained despite somethe LOCs.
E. The Pel,ability of East European Forces
major question mark for Sovietpolitical leaders would be tbe reliabilityEuropean forces. Soviet-East Europeanliaveicckered history. Theforce to suppress popularo invade HungaryndCzechoslovakiahe Pact hasthe open break with Albania andfriction with Romania. Whilerivate doubt* of whether the Pactwould withstand the strain* of war,oommllted themselves to relying onforces to cany out wartime functionscritical to the Pacts prospect* fora war with NATO. In Central Europe,make important contributions:
provide over half the combat divisions.
permit the achievement of advantageous force ratios without reinforcement from tlie USSR.
Polish forces in the north and Czech forces in the south allow for concentration of Soviet forces In the critical center.
Primary Pact logistic route* run through Poland, East Cermany, and Czechoslovakia and the East Europeans commit heavyto their prTXrxsaoii.
East European air defenses provide protection for logistic and rear area operations
.
n Southern Europe. national forces InHungary, and Bulgaria have less critical but nonetheless important combat role* on the flank of Ihe Pact:
Soviet and Hungarian forces protect against NATO operations through Austria or
Bulgarian forces would be essential to Pact operations against the Turkish Straits.
Romania and Bulgaria provide and protect Pact logistics routes for southern operations.
aspects of the Pact, dominated isby Soviet officers, seek lo assure theof the East European allies.
Major Soviet forces arc stationed in four key countries.
Allegiance is sought by the integration of East European officers into the Pact command structure where they participateoo-trolled basis.
Promising East European officers are schooled in the Soviet Union and indoctrinated with Soviet views and attitudes.
Most officers and about half theofficers are members of Communist parties or organizations; unrdiable officers are dismissed.
The missions assigned to the East European forces arc intended to insure theirar.
East Cerman forces arc interleaved with the Soviets, to insure their reliability even against other Ccrmans.
missions assigned the Polish and Czech forces arc initially against their traditional enemies, the Cermans.
that the armed forces ofare loyal to their national regimes.question of reliability Is whether or notEuropean regime will commit Itself tooperations. This decision will beby the perceptions of the nationalthe political circumstances leading to war.
We judge that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact would initiate an unprovoked invasion of the other side.
a gcneial war erupt, however,that ihe East Europeans would fight.
The period of tension ptior lo hostilities would allow the Soviets to manipulate popularand political leaders.
Tlie Pact's mobilization structure would be' let in motion and its momentum would carry military prrpatationi forward.
East European refusal to participate at this stage could be dealt with by force.
Eastern Europeans would feel they had no choice but to participate.
have no basis for making the morejudgment with regard to the Eastcommitment to their allies in the courseThat is to say. we cannot judge thewith which East Europeans willconflict. Neither can wc foresee how theyiheir own national interests in the courseconflict nor Ihe inducements thai would beto make them quit the war.
VI CURRENT TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES
the, the Soviets havea major expansion and renovation offorces. We estimate that the manpowertheater ground and tactical air forcesbeen Increased by about one third, frommillion men In theo. more thanat present. Procurement expendituresequipment have gone up aboutercentsame periodide range of newlysystems of increased sophistication hasto theater forces, and the highobsolescent equipment that formerlybeen considerably reduced. Overall, thethe past decade have not only significantlythe size of Soviet forces but have alsomore balanced and operationallyimproved capabilities for both nuclearwarfare. Changes in the Eastdices have been less dramatic.
33
Toe- Sac.
thii section we summarize thehave taken place in theater forces andthe prospects for further change.
A. Bock ground
strategic choices dictated byin thenduclear missiles and submarinesconventional forces, forced largeSoviet ground and tactical air forcestheater forces which Survived theeriod of doctrinal stagnationobsolescence. Then, begiruung iaevents created an cntiiely new(or Soviet theater forces planners:
removal from office4 permitted the views of Soviet conventional force advocates to gain official acceptance.
adoption by NATOore flexible nuclear response strategy persuaded thethat at least the initial stagesact offensive against NATO could be prosecuted without nuclear weapons.
Sino-Soviet split became more severe and Khrushchev's successorsajor buildup of Soviet theater forcesChinaonsequent step-up In conventional arms production in the USSR.
he Soviets' invasion ofresulted in the establishment thereoviet garrison where no Soviet forces had been stationed since the early post-World-War II period.
rowth ond Improvement of Soviet Theater Forces Since theOs
he growth and improvement of Soviet theater forces opposite NATO has been chiefly the result of the creation of new forces, theof existing units, and (he modernization of equipment. Of these, the establishment, oftcr8 invasion, of the Soviet Central Croup of Forces (CCF) In Czechoslovakia had the greatest single Impact. Currently numberingofetCCF added five divisionsmall air force to the first-line
Soviet
forces in Central Europe.
pdditional divisions may be forming
too of the five CCF divisions in their former western USSB garrisons. The Soviet buildup opposite China, which addeden to Soviet ground and tactical air force personnel strength, is described inhe Sino-Soviet Relationship: The Military Aspects.
Expansion of Exisitng Force Elements
of the increase in Soviet theaterNATO has come from enlargement ofprimaiy ground combat units, thedivision and the tank division. Wesince thehe wartime TO ofmotorized rifle division haso moreCOO men. whiledivision has increased fromuring the same period thenumber of vehicles and majorin the motorized rifleo. and in thevision0.
principal changes that produceddivisions were made to increase theirand mobility. Field artillery weapons tank and motorized rifle divisionsaround SO percentully equippedrifle division APCs went upo morend, concurrently,of divisions that had formerlyor no APCs received their fullIn many motorized rifle divisionsstrength was raisedo aboutwere also made to divisional airantitank organizations and, at the samemotor transport capability wasto supply ammunition for the addedapparently also to give the divisionlogistic capacity.
ot all Soviet divisions have attained these equipment standards, but most, if not all, of those-in Central Europe probably have.umber of the divisions in the western USSR stillarge proportion of older equipment and someshortages such as fn APCs and trucks.
* - 5
THE SOVIET TANK45
M
IN
Mediumof
THE SOVIET MOTORIZED R'FIE45
i
in
riff* a*
em
*
Artillery Pieces-
saw un
number of OhHslon*
Although of leiier magnitude than (heIn diviiions, organizational changes have also increased the strength of Soviet non-divisional ground force units. In East Cermany, for example, eight retfmental-sized combat training unit* and some smaller support-type training units have been established to train noncommissioned officers and specialists such as tank drivers for the CSFOTn wartime, these units, along with four separate tank regiments and one battalion that also have been formed by the Soviets in East Cermany, could be available for use as reserves. Together they containanks. The Soviets have also enlarged their nondivisional motor transport uAlts In Central Europe, In part to meet the in-
creased supply requirements of non-nuclear war and also because of the larger ammunitionbrought about by more tanks and artillery. There have also been increases In the numbers of Scud bunch en. and each field army hasrigade of mobileissiles.
Equipment. By theoviet equipmenthad languished to the point wherewas overtaking the theater forces. Not only wasarge proportion of oldia the forces but also the failure to introduce many newof
further retarding the Soviets* efforts to maintain effective forcea facing NATO. More than half the combat aircraft were old-mode!ndighten andight bombers. The newer models were JtJll significantly inferior in range and ftayioad to Western aircraft of comparable age. The ground forces still had Urge numbers ofevenbsoletePCs. Many divisions had few or even no APCs. There were widespread shortages of motor transport and many ground forces units in the USSR were completely dependent on mobdiia tion of civilian trucks even to enable them to move from their garrisons in an emergency. Similarapplied to communications equipment. Field artillery, even after its strength was increased in the, had no armored, self-propelled guns of the type most suitable to the Soviets' tank-oriented blitzkrieg tactics.
The large upswing in production of theater forces equipment that began in tbend still continues cannot be precisely charted with the information available. It seems reasonablyhowever, that much jf its initial impetus came from the buildup opposite China which required the outfitting of someivisions and provision of moredditional combat aircraft. Modernization and filling out of the forces facing NATO was evidently constrained by the priority going to the Far East forces until0 when that buildup tapered off. Most of what wasin this period was of older, proven designs.
Since tbehe pace ofof forces facing NATO has surged strongly andarger number of newly designed types and models of equipment has gone into full-scale production.
New Aire toll
all Pact theater forceaking its greatest impact on theair defense forces- Although tbe Pact airNATO have been relatively stable Inover the past decade, they have beguna new generation of aircraft andis enabling tlie Pact to change theorientation of the tactical aira broader spectrum of offensive asdefensive missions.
Soviet planners, increasingly concerned with Ihe possibility of non-nuclear war in Europe, have undertaken sizable equipment modernizationto eliminate the main weaknesses of thcir tactical airrange, low payload, and lack of modern ground attack ordnance. By the Soviets* own calculations, their tactical aircraft have lacked tlie range to conduct effective strikes on most of NATO's airfields and other long-range targeis. This apparently did not concern themIn theecauseuclear war these targets could be reached with USSR-based strategic systems.
In theevelopmental work on new, more capable fighter-bombers began. Initially, new versions of theishbed fighter were produced with improved payload and range, making them more effective for offensive roles. Then,about thehe newilter C,loggcr andencer became op erarioosL Compared to earlier Soviet tactical fighters, these new aircraft have substantiallyrange, payload. avionics, and EGMAlthough still available only ia limited numbers, these aircraft already have Improved tbe orreratsonal flexibility and efficiency of the tactical air force. Fencer. FVogger. andreof striking targets in NATO Europe from bases in Ihc western USSR, especially if theyto bases in Centra] Europe. We believe that during sustained conventional operations, Floggcr andircraft currently In the western USSR would deploy to forward bases in order to make maximum use of their payload and rangeThe Introduction of Backfire bombers Into Long Range and Naval Aviation is Improving the ability of Ihese forces to survive NATO's airparticularly at lowbeoxbat has substantially improved thecapability of Soviet lactical air forces and may alsoigh altitude nuclear weaponcapability.
To complement iheir growing inventory of modem multi-mission aircraft, the Soviets area variety of new air weapons. Theseimproved air-to-airamily ofair-to-surface missiles (Indudiog an eleetro-ooticaOy guidednd duster ard retarded bombs. When combined with the improved pene-
rHHn?5-
B-i
ration capabilities of the now aircraft, (hcsc wcap-om shouldncrease the potentialof cadi tactical air sortie, particularly against hardened ground targets. In addition, there has been increased emphasis on ground attack training.
Ground-So led1 Air Defense Syifems
tlic, ground basedsystems such as Ihehich were first introduced innumbers in tlse. eORlimied to beAt the same lime, trvrraj near SAMI lie SAG, thend,ogether these weapons form aand highly mobile air defensein the effective range and mobilitysystems and in the total number ofreduce the vulnerability of groundmuch larger areas of the battlefield. One ofimportant improvement trends hasgreater mobility which will adaptto the fluidity of modem battlefieldDevelopment of extensive air defenseto the ground forces has also onabledair forces to direct more of theiroffensive missions.
? Medium Tanks
after at leastears ofeffort, the Soviets beganew-model medium tank,0 of2 production model areProduction should increase markedlynot year or two. Currently, at least halfSoviet medium tanks in Central Europethe rest.been identified outside the USSR but atfew are likely to be in Central Europe. Wepresent, no reliable technical description of
APCs and Combat Vehicles
BMP combat vehicle was firstut did not appear inIn Soviet motorized rifle units untilthree years. Although its mobility andmakeC, it costs aboutas much as theother late-
nsodelC being prodiKCsl. This high cost along with operational considciations probably will prevent the BMP from totally rqslacmg the earCs0 BMPs would be required if all Soviet motorized rifle units were to bereequipped with them.
urrently, both the RTR OOPS and the BMP arc being delivered as replacements lor older-model BTR-OOs and APCs of the still earliernderies. We estimateixture of APCs probably will emerge in the Soviet ground loroi. with only about one ihiiil to one half of Ihcir APC requirements being met by BMPs. The Soviets are aboew airborne assault vehicle, the BMD. which is currently being added to the airborne divisions. It will significantly im-prove the anli-tank capabilities ol these forces.
StU-Piopelled Artillery
4 self-propelled fieldm andwere first identified In the Sovietelf-propelled artillery piece costs fromercent moreowed gun and its prime mover, and is more difficult toThis may have deterred the Soviets from adopting them earlier. But their superiormobility and reduced vulnerability, as compared with towed cannons, make them far more capable of supporting fast-moving armored attacks. These advantages have become morewith the Soviets' renewed emphasis on non-nuclear combat capability.
he new self-propelled guns are beingreplacements for tosvedin batteries of six guns each to the motorized rifle regiments of Soviet divisions andgunto division artillery regiments. Eventually, as more are produced, we expect that many Soviet division artillery rejriments will be completely re-equipped with self-propelled guns.f each type of self-propelled gun had been producedercent of the inventory of medium-caliber artillery in Soviet units.
Strategic Attack forces
c believe that, for at least the next five years, the missiles and bombers of the Sovietattack forces will provide the bulk of the
38
New Air Defense Weapons
Thearget nocking ,jda,con. junction -vith itsm gum. Il was introduced inor improvedprotection from tactical aircraft and
Theobile. mcrJiunvtn-high altitudeusile system which entered service in the
y flnd0
SA-G
Theew mobile SAM system which it just entering service.,Il is expected to ofier air defense coverage belowoverage and beyond the range of (het may be in. tioduced in some divisions as an alternative to the SA-6.
heobile, low-to-medium altitude surface-to. ir missile system introduced in (he. It is re-^cirlgSJmm antiaircraft gum at Ihe division level.
Thconsistscout vehicle modified to carry smallimi|a, to thentroduced in the,perates in conjurKiionwim theo provide low-altitude protection (or regiments.
op
New Ground Forces Equipment
rn SP Gun
l22mmmm self-propelled anillery pieces were developed in the. probablyp Pact ariilltry uniti keep pace with rapidly advancing armoredhey alio provide greater prottciioci (or their crews in bom conventional and rnjCka' envronmenli.
B
B fl an eight .wheeled, amphibious armored personnel carrier which carriti in infantry tQuad ami mountsm andGmm machine gun in iu turret.
ank
medium tank is oneumber ol developmental tanks referred to collectively in me Weil. The new2 probably will bc similar in appear-nce
BMP
The BMP combat vehiclehere-man crew and is armedm smoothbore,co! gun with automaticagger ATGM buricher, aod agun The eightman infantry squad ii provided with individual firing ports and CBft protection.
40
Warsaw Pact'i theater nuclear strike capability, although the numbers of Pact tactical nuclearsystems located in Central Europe willsubstantially. The deployment of new ICBMs equipped with MIPVs will substantially augment the potential coverage of European targets. We believe, however, thatelatively smallofCBMs would be used to strike targets in NATO Europe.
We expect that theRBM. now being tested with MIRVi. will be deployed with mobile launchers.issile could be available for deployment in mid to6 and would bc more survivablc than the existingndystems. We do not know whether it will replace any of these older systems. Its mobility may allow the Soviets to launch interrnediate-range missiles from cither the USSR or Eastern Europe.
The numberlass submarines in the Soviet Navy Is expected to decrease as new SSBNs are produced because the launcherslass units would be counted in the total number of SLBM launchers allowed tu the SovietsAL agreement based on the Vladivostok accords.
C The East Europeans
thehe East Europeans,urging, began to improve their armedexpansion, and force modeover the past decade have enabled theto assume responsibilities in Pactplans. Although Improvements in Eastground and air forces have generallythe Soviet lead, they have tended toa few years and to proceed more gradually.
Eosf Germemy
in the East Cermanproceeded slowly over the past decadegradual mtroduction of new APCs andtowed artillery, some increases instrength, and the recent appearancetanks. The number of East Cerman tanksfromue to anof the tank battalions In motorizedand increases in the Ministryecond Scud brigade and an
nit have recently been formed. The SA-9
has been introducedimited scale. The levels of equipment and manpower in East Cerman Army units have grown rnoderately in recent years. Wc estimate that the intended wartime strength of motorized rifle divisions has increased fromenS0 currently, tankhave increased. Overall. East Cerman ground forces manpovrer0 to
East Cerman Air Force is theof all the East European air forces.of iu fighter aircraft arcare late-model Fishbedtheof new models continues lo rise. The sizeAir Force has increased by2 due to the formationeconnaissance unit.
Crrrchos/ovolficr
Force improvements In Czechoslovakia have been minimal since8 Soviet Irrvasioa. Cround and air manpower has actually decreaseddue to the Soviet occupation of several former Czech installations and political purges of theAlthough Use estimated wartime manning of motorized rifle divisions has increased005 and that of tank divisionso aboutthe number of divisions has decreased and overall ground strength has dropped fromo. The equipment levels of Czech ground units have also been increased since theeriod and new force elements, such as FROG, Scud, and airunits, have been added. One significant area of Improvement has been the development ot new ground forces weapons. Io addition to the domestic manufacture of Soviet-designed equipment such as trucks. APCs. and tanks, the Czechs have developed new equipment of noteworthyheir oew automatic reloading multiple rocket bunches.
The Czech Air Force is still primarily equipped with older-model Soviet aircraft, although some late-model MIG-2Is have been acquired. The size of the force probably will remain stable over the next several years.
Poland
in Polish forces since thehave been extensive in terms of both equlp-
merit modernization and unit expansion. Thewartime manning of the Polish mechanized division has increased from5 tond the lank divisions fromo. The number of tanks. APCs. artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and FBOCs in divisions has increased as well as the size and number of many combat service and support units. Electronic warfare regiments have also been formed andA-7s. andre now beinginto the forces. Overall, the strength of the Polish Army has increased by0 men
has the latgest of the Eastforces. It is mainly equipped wiihaircraft although someitter Cs, have been acquired inThe size of the force is espectcd toover the next few years.
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria
ground and air forces In thecountries ore the least modern of all theHe-equipment programs in these threehave generally been less extensive than inthe northern three and most of the othermeasures seen in Soviet forces,the expanded tank battalion, have notall. New aircraft, air defense systems, andvehicles are gradually being acquired.
D. Recent Trends
he rate of growth of manpower andin Soviet ground and tactical air forces appear lo have slowed appreciably in the last two years or so, particularly in comparison with thethat occurred earlier In connection with the Sino-Soviet and Czech problems. There is some recent evidence, however, of ongoing organizational changes that could lead to further gradualin the next few years. Further Increases in divisional artillery have been observed Ln some units in the western USSRecent defector has said that similar increases are Intended for units in Central Europe. Also, some small, previously unidentified Infantry elements which have recently been observed with some Soviet tank reguneriU In Eastern Europe, may portend yet another addition to divisional manpower.
roduction of new. sophisticated equipment is continuingigh rata and this trend is likely to continue through the end of theumber of recently introducedsystems such as ihe new series of tactical aircraft and the new air defense missile systems is Still far from complete. Olher expensive weapons systems such as the self-propelled artillery and2 medium tank have just entered full-scaleand output of these weapons almostwill increase over Ihc next few years.
esearch and development on theater force equipment is continuingumber of new systems now being tested probably will appear over the next few years.now undergoing developmental testingew lactical aircraft and two new tactical surface-to-iurface missiles.
16S. Whether, and to what extent, acquisition of new equipment will cause further increases in the overall size of the theater forces Is difficult to assess. The Soviets now have enough of most types of weapons to fill the eristiag active units.ew major items, such as APCs and helicopters, are still in short supply. This may lead to astable weapons inventory over the next few years. Recently, most new equipment appears to have been used lo modernize the force byrather than adding to the equipment in active units.
n Ihe past, however, the replacement of old items with new equipment has sometimesIn overall growth because the Soviets formed new units or expanded existing units using the older but still useful equipment. For example, outmoded heavy tanks and World War.ll vintage assault guns were eliminated from divisions in Central Europe moreecade ago but some of these are still retained in separate regiments and battalions in the CSFC. Similarly, some of the antiaircraft guns recently replaced byissilesumber of CSFC divisions have been transferred to otheryet equipped withenlarge-their AAA units. Tills tendency to hoard older equipment In active unitsotential for further gradual increases which cannot beestimated.
S-rS -
Heavy Artillery. In ihc put thiee years we have identified heavy artillery pieces al iheArtillery Test Facility and at several missile-associated ground force installations, all in the .USSB. The weapons were in battalion- orgroupingsmm gun-howitzersmm mortars.mmis an obsolete weapon developed1nim mortar is also an older weapon, which firston parade
We do not know what iheseortend, but willl (he Soviets" renewed interest in field artillery we would expect them toequirement for heavy artillery. Heretofore, they have had nothing heaviermm cannons in die active forces. Some association of these weapons with Scaleboard and Scud units could be viewedign that they will have nudear capabilities. The range ofmm mortar is so0 meters) that its useuclear artillery piece is unlikely. We therefore believe il more likely that the association simply implies that heavy artilleryIhey become generally available In Sovietbe administratively grouped at front level or In the High Command Reserve, as are Scale-boards and some Scuds.
Soviet Response to Western AntitankThe Soviet ground forces are more dependent upon the tank than any army in history. If the time should come when the Soviets were forced to condude that their tanks were unable lo penetrate NATO forces. Moscow would face an eriorrnous problem. The Soviets would have to rethink their strategyar in Europe andadical redesign of their ground forces. At present, however, the Soviets seem to be far from drawing any such epochal conclusions. The Soviets have reacted to NATO's acquisition of new antitank weapons with relatively minor adjustrncnts in their forces. Moscow has deployed more tanks in Eastern Europe and possibly added some infantry to its tank units.
E. Outlook for Further Growth in the
Sectionbove, we noted afactors that have motivated the Soviets to expand
1 and modernize their theater forces over the past
j
decade. Much of the expansion has been motivated by tensions with China and by Czechoslovakunreliability. Changes in Soviet military doc-trine alsoajor impact. Certain majordevelopment programs probably rcprescnl Soviet attempts to counter specific areas of NATO ilrcngth such as superior combat aircraft; tech. nological advances have undoubtedly prompted other equipment changes.
All of ihese factois together, however; do not seem to us to explain the overall magnitude nnd broad scope of the changes which haveAs we suggested at the beginning of this Estimate, the Soviet altitude toward theater lorce goals is powerfully influenced by historicalof the catastrophic consequences ofunreadiness. This outlook, reinforcedraditional xenophobiaenerally conserva-live approach to military planning, appears to lead the Soviets to aim at achieving andemonstrably superior conventional force poiture in Europe.
This perception of Soviet goals does not. however, make it possible to ddine the point al which Soviet military planners would consider them satisfied. There is little basis In evidence on which to measure what they wouldemonstrably superior conventional force.
l is clear, al any rale, that the Sovietare extremely conservative in defining what islikely to continue forceprograms beyond the point of numerical parity. Also, Soviet military leaders have aninterest in continuing the jircccss of expansion and modernization. They havetrong tendency in the past to seize upon any improvement in NATO forces as ariotherfor Soviet force programs. Indeed, bystandards they seem to overreact to changes in NATO forces. At the same lime they present their own programs as strictly dderuave and deny that NATO might reasonably consider them threatening.
his expansionary momentum hasou'tical leadership that has been generous with manpower and budgetarySometime in thehe amount of
manpower used by the military could begin Io conflict seriously with the demands of Ihe civilian economy, but tills probably will notroblem for the immediate future. Also, the growingof the Soviet weapons inventory Is creating an increasing need for highly skilled manpower which probably conflicts with the needs of the economy, but this has not yet appeared to constrain the military programs.
Similarly, the current share of CNPto tho military and the division of thesewithin the various institutional elements of the military is .acceptable to the SovietAlthough hard budgetary decisions aremade each year at the highest level, the absence of the parliamentary constraints and public scrutiny that exist In the West seems toowerful bureaucratic institution such as the Soviet military considerable latitude to pursue programs which It considers necessary.
Barring some ma for new developmentto the Slncf^oviet rift oft is unlikely that this continuing theater force growth will be as rapid or as large as that which occurred between thend. If the more gradual expansion of the last two years or so continues, the size of the theater forces will increase by about one percent annually over Ihe next few years. By theven this relatively small annual increase woulden to the Soviet theaterwould then have moreillion men.
inn.
n sum, the momentum of the Soviet drive to maintain suraeriority of forces in Central Europe seems likely to lead to gradual eapansioo and further teduwlogfcal improvements in Soviet theater forces through the end ofo reverse this trend would likely require.the ascendancy of newleadership with different priorities and the power base to overcome current institutional
" V- loMrtAr X.
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