NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SAtiiTiZED
Jop-Secret-
5
6
r
u
WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEUIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation ot the Estimate:
Ihe Control Intelligence Agency, lhc intelligence orgontiolions ol the Oeponmenii ol Stole ond Defense, ihe Nolionol Security Agency, ond th* Energy Reseoreh ond Development Admini.trolk>"
Concurring:
The Deputy Direclor of Central Intelligence rcprcitnfing the Control Intelligence Agency
The Director of Inlelligence and Research representing ihc Department ol Stole The Oiredor. Defeme Inlelligence Agency Iho Director, National Security Agency
Ihe Deputy Aniiianl Administrator to* National Security, Energy Research ond Oevelopmenl Administration
Abstaining:
Ihe Special AsiiitonI lo the Secretory fo' Nolionol Security, Oepartment of Ihe Treo wry
Ihe Aniiianl Direclor, Federal Bureau of
Also Participating;
Ihe AsiiitonI Chief of Slafl for Intelligence. Oeporlmenl ol ihe Army
The Oiredor of No-al Intelligence, Department of the Novy
The Aniiianl Chief of Siolf, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
CONTENTS
NOTE
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
SOVIET VIEWS OF THE ROLES OF THEATERNATO
lc
ol Soviet Interests Within the Warsaw Pact
Roles ol Warsaw Pact
II- EVOLUTION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE NATURE OFIN EUROPE
A. The Khrushchev Era B- Since
10
MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND WAR-1'TCHTINC
u
A. Possible Theaters ol War With NATO15
oviet Strategies and Objectivesar in Central16
C The Strategic Backdropar in Europe 19
PACT PLANN1NC FOR INITIAL OPERATIONS IN
CENTRAL EUROPEn
A.
Crouiid Forcei20
Air Forces22
Theater Nuclear Forces23
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare
Naval 24
Strengths and Weaknesses24
It fact Conceptsncliinjt an Olfcmivc in Central Euiopc
n
V. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING SVCCESS OK WARSAW PACT STRATECY
A. Capability ol I'acI Croiirulo llrnik-Tliiongh.
If. Warsaw Fact Air
C- Control ol Mullinattunal Forcesarsaw Fact Offensive
gktualPoici
Air Form
Relialiililyt Cunipvaii Foues
VI. CURRENT TRENDS IN" WARSAW "ACT THEATER FORCES A. Background
B Crow th anil Improvement ol Nm nl Tinnier Forces Sinceof Existing Foicvit/.il ion
New Aircralt
- Atr2 Medium Tanks APCs and Comlwt Vehicles Sell-Propclletl Artillery Strategic Attach Fnrte*
C- The Eartimi East Cieimany Cii-chosrovakia Poland
Hungary. llommiM olid
26
27
28
IS
29
1
32
32
4
u
34
S3 36
S 3S
Trends'
for Further Ciowlli in llie Late
ScarJ^.
WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
NOTE
This Estimate is concerned with the Warsaw Pactground and tactical airin the European USSR and Eastern Europe opposite NATO. Soviet naval, bomber, and missile forces are treated only insofar as they bear directly on potentialland campaigns. Soviet theater forces opposite China are discussed inhe Sino-Soviet Relationship: Thc Military Aspects. Details on Soviet general purpose naval forces arc contained inoviei Natxd Policy and Programs. Comprehensive estimates on Soviet strategic attack and defense forces axe contained inot>tW Force* For JntcrcontinerxUil Conflictetails of ordcr-of-battle and equipment characteristics which are outside the scope of this Estimate may be found in joint CIA/DIA memorandums and in Defense Intelligence Agency reports and estimates.
i
PRINCIPAL. JUDGMENTS
The USSR considers ils military strength in Europe to beto the protection of its national interests, to the maintenance of its strategic postureis thc West, and to its management ofpolicy. The Soviets appear committed to maintaining anumerical edge over NATO in some key elements of theater forces such as divisions, tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. Theyhowever, separate Europe from the larger context of the overall theater and strategic resources available to the USSR and the West We believe that thc Soviets, given this larger view of the existing balance, consider both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to be deterred fromwar.
Soviet thinking on the nuclear aspectsar in Europe has changed in the past decade and may still be changing. The Sovietsno longer expect that any NATO use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be answered with massive Pact nuclear strikes throughout NATO Europe. We estimate that thc foUcVing considerationscurrent Soviet concepts of the initial stagesar in Europe:
The Soviets believear in Europe probably would begin with both sides using only non-nuclear weapons.
They also believe that the Pact would quicklyon-nuclear NATO attack, go on the offensive, and achieve earlyin penetrating NATO's defenses.
The Soviets would continue to use only non-nuclear weapons as long as possible.
NATO would initiate the use of nuclear weapons to compel Pact forces to halt their offensive. .
If NATO's initial use of theater nuclear weapons were selective and limited, wc could not confidently predict the Soviets' response. But they have been broadening the range of options available to them for responding. They might continue purely non-nuclearOr they mightassive theater nuclear
wc cannot exclude the possibility that they would it-spona with
limited nuclear strikes of theirhave considered this alternative.
The Soviets reckon, however, that once nuclear weapons areby either side, the risk of escalation is very great because the side Uiat struck first massively would have the advantage. The likelihood of an attempted preemption by one side or the other with massive, theater-wide strikes would increase greatly. Available classified Soviet writings are vague with regard to thc issue of nuclear escalation from thc European theaterS-USSR intercontinental exchange. Unclassified writingssuch escalation as likely.
- Recent evidence does not reveal Soviet intentions toward carry-
act offensive into France. The Soviets might prefer not to involve the French in the conflict because the independent French nuclear capability would increase the risk of nuclear escalation.
Recause of the uncertain ties in our appreciation of current Soviet nuclear doctrine and our lack of information by which to judge how Soviet political authorities would respondroposal by the Soviet military to use nuclear weapons, we cannot confidently predict bow the Warsaw Pact would reactATO initiation of nuclear war. Dut wc judge that the odds still favor rapid escalation once nuclear war began in Europe.
The Warsaw Pact hasivisions in varying states of strength and combal readiness nndactical aircraft, in Easternand the portion of the USSR opposite NATO. Anotherivisionsactical aircraft in the central USSR probably constitute areserve for use against either NATO or China. Elements of the Pact's navies and strategic attack and defense forces would also be useduropean war. The Soviets evidently plan for military operations against NATO in three separate theaters:
In the northwestern USSR and Scandinavia, to defend Murmansk and Northern Fleet installations, lo neutralize or seize NATOin northern Norway, and to aitack NATO naval forces and merchant shipping in the Norwegian Sea.
In central and western Europe, to destroy NATO forces in West Cermany and the Benelux countries, and. using airborne andforces against key Danish islands fn conjunction with ground attacks through Jutland, to assist the Pact navies in gaining control of the Baltic Sea and assuring passage from the Baltic to thc open ocean.
In southern Europe, against Greece and Turkey to secure thc Turkish Straits and support naval operations in the easternAlso, operations against northern Italy, intended to
3
Scwt-
secure the southern flank of Pact forces attacking West Cermany, might be launched from Hungary through Yugoslavia or Austria.
The Soviets would expect Central Europe to be the decisive theaterarge-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Whether they would launch offensives all along NATO's flanks concurrently with anyaign in Central Europe is uncertain. Wc believe that the Warsaw Pact has the means to conduct limited, but not general, offensive operations in Scandinavia and southern Europe while simultaneously carrying out an offensive against the NATO center. We judge that early Pacttoward thc Turkish Straits and northern Norway are more likely than in (he other flank areas such as Italy and the rest of Scandinavia.
The Soviels consider it likely that, in the caseATO-Pactmajorbegin priorcarryingarge-scale reinforcement with ground forcesUSSR. Until about the, the Soviets expected loa reinforcement in advance of war. This change, which hasthe,
may have occurred because the Soviets no longer count on having the time for prior reinforcement, and also because of the danger that such action could bc counterproductive. For example, it might cause NATO touildup of its own that would work against the Pact's initial numerical superiority of forces in Central Europe. Thc Soviets may also believe that the reinforcement process is not as severely threatened by NATO nuclear attack as it was in earlier years. This change in doctrine does not necessarilyhange in Soviet preferences butwhat is. from their point ofrudent planning assumption. This appreciation of Pact offensive concepts has important warning implications for NATO. In particular, we no longer can be confident that thc movementivision force from the USSR into Central Europe would take place before an attack.1
The Soviet military evidently believes thai Pact ground forces are superior to NATO's. They also believe that Pact theater forces now in Central Europe are not only capable ofATO attack in (he early daysonflict, but are also capable ofon-nuclear offensive into West Germany. This rapidly advancing offensive would depend on theforces in Central Europe havehe Soviet ground forces are more dependent upon the tank than any army in history. If the Soviets were ever forced to conclude
I Tlx Director of Nival Intelligence. Department of the Navy, believes that thu Inadequately (late* Uio attack warninge bclk*ca that (lie Sovie.ii actively coruider attack plini which do not Involve (he movementivtikon force from lhc USSR to Central Europe before an attack.
that (heir tanks were unable to penetrate NATO forces they would have to rethink their strategy and contemplate radical redesign of their forces.*
Tbc Soviets probably consider that NATO's tactical air forces could blunt or perhaps even halt this Pact ground offensive. Because of this, the Pact evidentlyassive, (healer-wide air offensive during the initial, non-nuclear phasear, aimed at destroying NATO's tactical air forces and other nuclear systems and facilities. This attack is to be conducted by tactical aircraft and by bombers of Soviet Long Range and possibly Naval Aviation. The all-oul nature of (his scheme and deficiencies in thc capabilities of most Pad aircraft would makeighly risky operation, its success depending heavily on surprise tothat NATO's air defenses arc not fully prepared and mobile nuclear syslems not dispersed.
The quantity of Pact tactical nuclear delivery systems has beenin recent years, and this would enable the Soviets to conduct nuclear warfare in Europe at higher intensities before having to use
' The Director ol the Bureau ol Intelligence and ReKirch. Department ol State, bdiem that (he Soviet military leaden would be tar more coruervauve than live Estimate Indicate; In their aisesiment of the balance In Europe and of lhe ability of Wnuw Pact lorea executeio ecruffenaive deep into Weal Cermany.
Soviet military writing! doequeneo of finlATO attac* and thenmaihing countiroffeiuiv* deep into Germany.
Thereumber of icatonc to doubt that Soviel mfl.tirv or political leaden would haw confidence in carrying it out with only the forcei already in Central Europe.
The SovleB havecrody cautioul In reeloning theit requirement! (or any military operation, defensive, or oUentive. Tliii wai -ividly demorutraled In tlie last Soviet military operation inoccupation of Ctechouovifcla
Numerical force ratio* which ttronely favor die SovieU may not appearn Soviet eyes. The Soviet military leaders would be prone to calculateont-caie bails and use asiumpUoos different from live Wert. If the SovieU aawned that West Cermany began to mobilize before thc Pact, they would, tee Pact troops being oukkly outnumbered.
The SovieU. moreover, would be Inclined to credit the West with advantages in ihaiacter. lilies of equipment This appean to be (he case especially with aircraft, and there are indications of Soviet apprehcasiortt over thc air operatton which their itrategyi this El limite poind out.
Soviet behavior In MBFR luggeaUthe SovieU today are far more conservative in calculating their force requirements la Europe dian tliey were ten and IS yean ago.
Thir view of the Soviet aisesiment of the chancel of luceeu In the operation! dooibcd In ihe Estimate tuggesu thil thc Soviet! would much prefer tu reinforce before itarting opcnUoru In Cermanybcy could, and that fauinc such reinforcement they would have substantial doubu over tlicir capability to launch an offensive deep inlo Wat Cermany. Thc reuon for practicing initiation of operations before reinforcement appean tooviet judgment 'Hat there may not in fact be time la bring forcei forward before llie war ilarU.
i
T0P
ihcir USSH-based systems. There is, however, no direct evidence that they are deliberately seeking an alternative to using their USSR-based nuclear forces in large-scale theater nuclear war. Available evidence, although inconclusive, suggests that the Sovicls have nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, but wc can only roughly approximate how many nuclear weapons might be stored in the likely storage facilities.
Soviet miliiary doctrine categoriy.es toxic chemical agents along with nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" and implies that the Pad would use chemical weapons once nudear weapons were in use. We have little dnubt that the Soviets possess substantial slocks of toxic chemical agents bui cannot estimate the size ol their stockpile. We have good evidence, however, that some toxic chemical munitions areto Soviet air forces in Eastern Europe. Pact forces emphasizeand equipment for defense againsi chemical and radiological effects and we judge they could operateBR environment morethan NATO forces.
Since the, the Soviets have carriedajor expansion and renovation of their theater forces:
In thc ground forces, the numbers of tanks and artillery pieces have been substantially increasedariety of other changes in organization and equipment have brought about larger and more modem divisions. Motor transport capability has been added not only to supply ammunition for thc added weapons, but also to improve overall logistic capability. Modern ground-based air defense systems are being assigned to the ground forces tn large numbers. Technical improvements, particularly in air defense and artillery weapons, and the improvements to the APCs alsoto greater theater force capabilities. Despite thesehowever, ground force units stillixture of old and new equipment and some units in thc USSR have substantial shortages.
The Soviet tactical air forces opposite NATO have remainedstable in numbers but have begunewof aircraft and weapons that is enabling them to change their traditional air defense orientationroader range ofas well as defensive missions. But thc full realization of these possibilties is still some way off. Despite thc acquisition of some new aircraft with capabilities similar to thc better NATO aircraft, the majority of Soviet and East European tactical aircraft still have short ranges and low payloads and lack the sophisticatedand avionics of US aircraft.
6
-Sew.
-Top-fie
Wc have recentlyiece of evidence (lul suggests the Soviets have, or plan to have, nuclear artillery rounds.
In the East European forces, reorganization, expansion, and force modernization lias allowed them to assume greater responsibilities in Fact military plans. Although improvements in East European ground forces have generally followed the Soviel lead, they have tended lo lagew years and lo proceed rnore gradually.
The momentum of the Sovicl drive to maintain superiority of (healer forces in Europe seems likely lo leadradual expansion and further technological improvements in Soviet theater forces through llie end off (he trend of lhe last two years or so continues,f the Soviel theater forces will increase byen by lhc, when they would thenotal of more (han
O 1
"See fool rule 2.
-Top 6ccc
SOVIET VIEWS OF THE ROIES OF THEATER FORCES OPPOSITE NATO
A. European Security Role
lie Soviet* have maintained large theater ground and tacticalorces since the end of World War II. Even in thefter thc drastic cuts imposed by Khrushchev they never numbered much lest lhan LJt million men.
Wc do not have direct evidence on Soviet force planning objectives, but an important theme of recent Soviet military thought, as evidenced in theoretical writings and in Soviet doctrine fortheater war, argues the necessity for Urge ground forces in peacetime. Thc argument is based, first of all.irm determination not to be caught unprepared again as the USSR was bylearly, thc Soviets intend that any future European conflict would take place Innot Eastern territory and they stress thc need for large combat-ready forces and reserves to be available at the outset of hostilities toudden enemy attack and launch counteroffensives. Soviet analysis of the probable characterar in Eu-rope apparenUy has led them to the conclusion that, even should large-scale nuclear exchangeslarge ground forces would still be neededefeat surviving NATO forces and seize Western Europe.
Tlie Soviet Union considers its military strength in Europe fundamental to the protection
DISCUSSION
of its national interests, to the maintenance of its strategic postureij the West, and to itsof foreign policy. One of the values of Warsaw Pact forceshe USSR lies In their role as an effective deterrenterceived danger from NATO. In effect, the Soviets view Warsaw Pact forces asuffer between NATO and the Soviet heartland. Thb helps to explain the Soviet Unions willingness and determination to maintain force levels in Central Europeong period and at considerable expense, despite pressing demands from the nonmilitary sector of both Soviet and East European economics. However, the size of the Soviet/Pact forces in the forward area, their doctrinc of thc offensive, and the across-the-board efforts to improve the capabilities of their forces cannot fully be explained in terms of protection against perceived threats from NATO, control of Pact allies, or maintenance of the status quo. Rather, theyesire for more ambitious policy options.inimum these would include the goal of clear conventional superiority to support political pressures, as well as to prevail in the event ofaction.
hc Soviets appear committed toemonstrable numerical edge over NATO in some key elements of the theater forces such as divisions, tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. They do not, however, separate Europe from thc larger context of thc overall theater and strategic resourcesto tlie USSR and to thc West. Clven Oils larger view of the balance, the Soviets evidently have
op Seoul-'
confidence that they can either foresee orthc courseonflict with NATO and are Iherefoie inclined to bc very cautious In the use of their military force in Europe.
of Soviet InterestsWarsaw Pact
is clear that the USSB considers aparamount in its defense planningEuropean theater, and thst there must beamong thc Pact members for thatbe effeciivc. Tlie presence of largeforces stationed in East Europeanthc availability of additional Soviettheir borders affords thc Sovietsin exerting conirol over these countries.
Roles of Warsaw Pact Forces
years haverowingof Soviet military forces to advanceobjectives In the Thirdnaval activity around Africa and in theToward Western Europe, however, thcbeen increasingly' circumspect in iu usePact forces for polilical purposes.appear to be three reasons for this:
stakes {and concomitant risks) are much higher in Western Europe, since thesecurity of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies is at issue. Thus, polilical-military behavior which might bc acceptable in the Third World could be considered "adven. turism" in Europe.
is unnecessary. From the perspective of the USSR's primary defenseit* nationalimpact on NATOowerful Warsaw Pact serves that purpose simply by its existence.
is undesirable. Although the Sovietsubstantial military presence as necessary to support their European diplomacy, military bluster or the creation of incidents has proven to be counterproductive, Detente has afforded the USSR many more oppoitunities forand Intensifying bilateral relatioruhips in Western Europe.
here arc, liowever, certain instances when Sovicl use of Warsaw Pact forces for plainlypurposes might be justified by the high stakes involved;
Soviet Union wilt seek to maintain (he status quo in Eastern Europe. West Berliney potential prcssuie poinl.
Ihc Soviets have thus far shown little disposition actively to try to take advantage of thc recent trouble between Creece and Turkey, they might in thc htlure make more vigorous political efforts lo meddle in thc troubles of NATO's southern flank. Soviet use of force for intervention, however, seems re-mole, but Moscow might provide militaryor lesort lo some show of military force.
Soviet Union clearly wishes to seeremain an avowedly Communist state, or.inimum, prevent its alignment with the West. The possibility of Warsaw Pact intervention serves to inhibit Yugoslav moves toward the West.
II. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF FUTURE WAR IN EUROPE
A. The Khrushchev Era
Soviet military doctrine under Khrushchev stressed the preeminence of nuclear weapons and discounted the need for large conventional forces toheater war. Khrushchev and hisasserted that any war involving the Soviet Union and the Wesl wouldecisive global conflict between the superpowers with ils outcome largely determined by massive nuclear exchanges during the first hours. Strategic exchanges also would decide any European conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and would occurarge scale at the outset. Most Soviet nuclear strikes against European targets were to beby missiles and bombers based In the western USSR.
Because Khnishchev closely linked war in Europeecisive nuclear exchange, he saw little need to allocate resources to conventional forces. Following Khrushchev's lead, the prevailing
ittt?5-
Sovici planner! believed (bit strategic anduclear weapons could replace the massed artilleryx and tactical air formation! of World War II. Thore forces which appeared to have limited utilityuclear war, particularly artillery and tactical air forces, suffered massive cuts. Out ground forces proponents argued, with some success, lhal large armored forces were still necessary to exploitstrikes and successfullyampaign in Europe. Thus, despiie lhe cuts, thc armored elements of ground forces survived largely intact.
B. Since Khrushchev
Once Khrushchev was removedhanges in thc Soviet view of war in Europe began to emerge. An immediate impetus to these changes was provided by the altitude of the new leadership toward military force structure and balance. In eschewing Khrushchev'i relianceingle war-fightinguclear war. the collective leadership has supported the expansion offorces to complement the growing Soviet strategic arsenal.
Thc views of lhe conventional forceswere reinforced by changes in NATO doctrine and eapabililies that were also occurring during this same period. By thehe US policy of massive nuclear retaliation lo any Soviet aggression in Europe was being openly questioned in the West, and throughout the early lOOOt more flexible and less drastic options forar in Europe were being examined in NATO.
Although "flexible response" was not made official NATO doctrinehe Soviets knew5 that NATO was moving toward the option of delaying the use of nuclear weapons in aconflict until the Pact was on the verge of overrunning NATO'* defenses or had used nuclear weapons first By the. Soviet strategists had Incorporated into their doctrine the notion that war In Europe would most likely beginonventional phase and lhal Pact forces and tactics should be adjusted accordingly.
A related post-Khrushchev development that affected the Soviets' views on tbe likely natureuropean war was their anticipation in thef achieving rough strategic partly with the US.ar in Europe during lhc Khrush-
* chev period was postulated to be nuclear fromtart, and then only putarger bterconKnental conflict, the SovieU oould now coacidet the(hat war in Europe might milobal exchange. Achievement of Strategic parity probably served to reinforce Soviet belielsar in Europe would begin convention* IIf bemuse of thc mutual hesitancy of tlie US and VSSIl lo useweaponshealer oonfUii that could quickly escalate to global war.
n. Soviet doctrine held thatvar wiih NATO developed to the point that the introduclion of nuclear weapons became Inevitable, (he USSH would conduct massive, theater-wide nudear strikes lo preempt NATO nudearSoviet doctrinal writings indicate (hat by the late lOOOs serious consideration waa being given to tbc possibility of Soviet limited, ate of nudear weapons In Europe.oviet planners were being Instructed to develop concepts and forces forariety of nudear operations ih Europe.
e are uncertain of the fullhich, Sovietdoctiineoab'miled nudear vru has advanced since Ihe. Our evidence on Soviet theater war-fighting concepts during the Last few years!
ariety of Soviet actions ranging from non-use of nuclear weapons to large-scale, (heater-wide nudear strikes.
r
L
For Sovieton the coocunxn* use of chemical weapons withtrifcet, sec pinp-ipi OA below.
l.-ol
c
3
We consider il likely (hat Soviet thinking on theater nuclear wai and on (he links between theater and intercontinental war is fluid nnd that further changes may become apparent in tlic next few years. Thc position at wluch the Soviets had arrived0 retained some features of the Khnishchevas to (he decisive nature of nuclearalso exhibited major differences that reflected the realities of the current strategic balance and Soviet perceptions of NATO's' military doctrine and capabilities. Thchad shifted away from itsingle catastrophic responseny NATO use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, it heldittle hope of limiting thc intensity of theater nuclear war in Europe once it fa begun.
In any case, having once embarked on the search for alternatives to automatic nuclearthe Soviets are unlikely to have abandoned (he search. We estimate lhat thc followingcharacterize current Soviet concepts of the initial stagesar in Euiope:
The Soviets believear In Europe probably would begin with both sides using only non-nuclear weapons.
The Soviets also believe lhal the Warsaw Pad would quicklyon-nuclear NATO atlack, go on the offensive, and achieve early successes in penetrating NATO's defenses.
Tlie Soviels would seek to continue to use only non-nuclear weapons as long as possible.
NATO would initiate thc use of nuclear weapons to compel Pact forces to halt their offensive.
If NATO's initial use of nuclear weapons were selective and limited, we could not confidently predict the Soviets' response. Tliey mightpurely non-nuclear operations. Or they mightassive nuclear strike^
ut wc cannot exclude thc possi-
bility (hat they would respond with limited strikes of theirhave considered (his alternative
Tlic Soviets reckon, however, thai onceweapons aie introduced by either side.risk of escalation is very great because tlic side lhal struck first massively would have the advantage. The likelihood of anpreemption by one side or thc oilier with massive, thcatcr-wlde strikes wouldgreatly.
Available classified Soviet writings arc vague with regard to the issue of nuclear escalation from the European theaterS-USSR intercontinental exchange. Unclassifiedcharacterize such escalation as likely. Wc cannot now discern current Soviet thinking on the limits of escalation.
Soviet military doctrine has not set any fixed size for thc Warsaw pact's initial nuclear strike. Its size would depend on military objectives. While doctrine will influence Soviet decisions, it fa not likely to be the force driving theleadership's decision concerning the actual response.
III. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES ANO WAR-FIGHTING STRATEGIES
c do not have access to the Soviets' war plans but we can infer thc general nature of their military contingency plans from the information available from Warsaw Pact military exercises, front Pact writings on military strategy and tactics for war with NATO, and from thc current disposition of Pact forces. Because of tlie USSR's geographical positionajor continental power In Eurasia and the Soviel perception of the USSR as having potentially hostile neighbors on virtually every side, thc Soviet military apparently have developedplans for military operations on all of their land frontiers. In peacetime, they maintain large ground and air forces in all of the border regions facing these frontiers as well as in Central Europe and the Mongolian Peoples Republic. Altogether, tlie USSR hasivisions at varying strength levels In its peacetime ground forces andircraft in its tactical air forces {seclie Navy hasctive
I
-lop-Seerei
.ami: i
in
Motor
itfmtiir'rE'L'-
Toul Cot*
f l
cara 10 io -
-Uhk
Corp-UkUo
Toulc CoiWl
DivUM* oo NATO**
Toul Bui 3
Mm
North CHmM
Irihkiveu'ii >
Toul oo NATO
i*rn USSR kind Montot.i
So*wiin
Ceouol AoUo
Gtoortoo
ortil
For Eom
Toul tn RuUft USSH ond
E IS
cic*4t
ri<odo*7
xlfod
*iof
liii=llXi
j
Table?
I Tactical5
AircraftKATO'o FWflki
Kopnoni*. *
a*l l r-i'
SOT
Odeaw MD
*ix MD
MD
Toull
hato
Am/aft OppOAt* Ctlltt*
Soviet Force* in Mongolia
CcoveJ am UD
D.*
Toul Oppoait* China
mvt AirceoJt
Mmoo- MD
Turkeatan MD.
Kit- UD
Totoiv.-i
Total Wtrww Pael
Dy Unk Primer*
265
3M
.
4M
tit combat aircraft (eictptilmd cohe Padr air form* for tht Nippofi oft Ictvc* eoroe&ovkiurig Met aircraft thai are act bordi rial* to fJio national air defeoae tvith lh* primaryoietent* over U* tecfiiocle*actn aalimited AuAttfn of iheae aifcraft^pankvUrlfaigned UctKel ai'nilaaUn* Aircraft model* of iK* Soviet iUtuiic airorte* (PVOowever.
ar. different from tXw of it* UctfceJ airnd fo* th* earn panooatUot* ajtUbUpool witAcm apetlaj.
Baaaal ooircraftaad roloao vitrcae*art toet <el aJr mm
Ml croa.vtia.aed to oOtorlodcjf* eo*
ftfwaa I* iMa ub* represent iK* mojW ofr aveilaMf (OA) aircraft tkali|*irrf ic active coeabel tialt* ea* Uw Waraav Pact UctlcaJ ur force* In motl taiu ihti would include aaircraft above th*V figurea do not Ib-tlwd*ombat capable traJoeraair uaJu orO aircraft uocnedact (maiaJf In ih* USSR) operational eootecaloo uolU aad fWlol'i peoboblyaarve a* mainUUOcc aad atuitioo rantaofltvrcnta duclnj hoatUtaea. The labiaot Include aircraft la atorafOi
JO aircraft auborr!iaate to lK* PaE<iK KivaL Ait
major luriace pombataritseneral purposeuj
T^
A. Possible Theaters of War Wiih NATO
strategists have identified at leastof military operations in which Iheypotential land conflicts with NATO.are described below along with briefof the types of militarythe Soviets appear lo envisage forthe military forces which probablyavailable for early use in each theater arcPact planning is sufficiently flexiblefor variations fn liny of these elements
Thtaltr. IpforrnatiooT
| indicates
that thc Sovietsheater of rnilftary op-erationi based on the Leningrad Military District which would encompass the ScandinavianThis information implies contingency plans for the defense of the Murmansk and White Sea areas including Northern Fleet installations, and for -the neutralization or seizure of lhe lightly defended NATO facilities in northern Norway. Whether plans exist for early offensive operations into central
regions of Norway is unknown, but ihese areas are rugged and considerably more defensible Ihan those in the north. In any event, the Soviets arc constrained by the distances involved fromtheir ground and tactical air forces to bear against most of Norway in thc initial phasear. Their large Northern Fleet, includingctive major surfaceeneral purposeand some OS naval combat aircraft,would be used against NATO naval forces, and merchant shipping. There are nine Sovietone an airborne division, inninj*rad Miliiaryordy district opposite thcombatin its Frontal Aviation units. Also, thereaval Infantry regiment in the Murmansk area with amphibious lift available to It
vVrfem Thtater. The Western Theater would include East Cermany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on thc Pact side and the FRC, thc Benelux nations, Denmark, aod France on tbe NATO aide. The bulk of both NATO's and tbe Pact's theater forces are either located In Central Europe or earmarked for use there. Pact forces currently in Central Europe
MrChwy
I M*t7
includeround divisionsactical- .ft An additionalovietirborne divisions,actical aircraft arc stationed in ibe western USSR adjacent to theand are primarily intended to be usedestern Theater. The Soviet Baltic Fleet withctive major surface combatants andombat aiicrafl and the Polish and East Cerman Navies would likely be used lo gain conlrol of the Dallic Sea. lo support amphibious operations in the Western Theater and lo assure passage to Ihe open ocean Seenr details of possible Warsaw Pact operations in thb (healer.
oulhivcstcm Theater. Soviet plannersmilitary operations againsi Greece andTurkey, and possibly northern Italy and Austria.
I operations
againsi Crecce and Turkey would be launched from Bulgaria and the Odeisa region of the USSR to secure the Turkish Straits nnd support nivalin the eastern Mediterranean.agiinst northern Italy intended lo secure the .southern flank of lhe Western Theater might be launched from Hungary through Yugoslavia or Austria. There areact divisionsrigadesactical aircraft in Hungary.and Bulgaria. In the Odessa Miliiarythere are an additional eight Soviet divisions (including one airborne division)actical aircraft primarily for useouthwestern Theater. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, wiihctive major surface combatants.ubmarines,om-
o
bat aircraftaval Infantry regiment, and the much smaller Bulgarian Navy would aupportto gain the Straits and neutralize NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.
Thc Soviets also probably have contingency plans forgainst eastern Turkey. Aboutivisions (including one airborne)aircraft In lhe North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus Miliiary Districts could be used In these opera tions.
Ceneral Reservci. In addition to live forces evidently earmarked for early use against NATO in potential theaters,dditional Soviet divisions (including one airborne) are located uxrt of thc Ural Mountains in the Kiev. Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military Districts. There is little evidence on where or when thc Soviets would expect to use these divisions. The central location and low slate of readiness of tbe motorized rifle and tank divisions suggest, however, that Initially most of them might be heldeneral reserve [or use in any of the theaters opposite NATO. They could alio be usedar Eastern theater in lhe caseino-Soviet war.
Theater Forces Facing China.an additionalivision!in thc Soviet military districts earl ofMountains and in the Mongolian PeoplesWe believe that Ihese forces arefor the contingoncyar withthat,adical improvement inrelations, most of them would bethe Far East evenoviet war
Strategic Attack Forces lorWar. Elements ol all lhe SovietKocket Troops.Aviation, and ballistic missilethe Sovietbe available toin Warsaw Pact nuclear strikes onMost ofperationalRBMs are targeted onheaimed mainly at NATO's Central RegionUnited Kingdom wliile the IRBMs aretoward the northern andntermediate range bombenwest of the Ural Mountains are mainlyfor strikes against NATOf the Soviets older modelotal ofaunch tubes,earmarked for use in Europe. Weany oflasslass SSBNs wouldfrom their deterrent mission for use(Seeisting of systemsfor European use.)
e believe thatelatively smallofoviet ICDMs veould be usedtrike targets in NATO Europe-trike-configured long-range bombers are mainly Intended for Intercontinental strikes but arc capable ofEuropean targets.
oviets Views on the Importance of Central Europe. However hostilities began, the Soviets would expect Central Europe lo be tbe decisive theaterarge-scale conflict.a|or population and economic centers arc there, as arc the bulk of NATO's and (he Part's (heater forces. Whether the Soviets would launch offensivei on NATO's flanks concurrently with any campaign in Central Europe is uncertain and would depend on the circumstances at the time. We believe thai the Warsaw Pact has the means to conduct limited,
TABLE 3
Soviet Slrateeic Altack Forces Chiefly Intended For Theater Operation) Against NATO
IS
LanduaJei (launchers)
SS-4
SS-5
Long Ranee Aviation Bomben'
TU-16
TV-It
Til-Backfire
Total
Launched UUOa
S>
SB
H-II SSBN
TotalH/33
Moit Soviet MRBMs and IRBM launchenefire capability. The Soviets may have aa many ai four mUfilei available for (ach operaUonal Launch crew operating oat of soft illea.luQei may beito lau-dwre. Refire aakiOea an probably nee' available it MRBM Ural
'TV Sevarta also have IDSear andype Bison iBtefrenrlaenlal tarnbert which could be ucd againit NATO largeu.
' While InJllal deploymenU suggest lhat the Backfire is laigeted on pertpheial targets, lis cttimiied performance capabilities makeotential inteccontlnenUt threat. See the upcoming NIEor further de tafia.
but not general, offensive operations In theand Southwestern Theaters whilecarrying out an offensive against the NATO center. The Soviets would view tbe outcome of such flank operations, especially one against the Turkish Strain, as rignihcanUy innuenclng theol their naval operations. These operations might alio draw NATO ground and air forces away from Central Europe. We Judge that early Pact offensive operations toward the Turkish Straits and northern Norway are more likely than Iner flank areas such as Italy and the rest of Scandinavia.
arly operatives against northern Italy andfrom northernappear to offer little advantage to Ihc Sovietswith thc cost in diversion of Pact forces from more urgent objectives. The SovieU are tin-
likely lo anticipate any letioui ihreal (rem Italyact operation in Central Europe. Neither are they likely to feel seriously threatened from eastern Turkey.
he Soviets mutt view the recurring crises in the eastern Mediterranean area as weakening NATO, tiul at lhe same lime Ihese events, and the prospectsugoslav succession crisis alter Tilo. probably loom in theii eyes as potential lources of dangerous Easl-Wcst Icniions. In this sense, ihey probably consider the risk of conflict to be higher in ihe Southwestern Tlicalcr lhan elsewhere, but they would still see Central Europe as the decisive arena
B. Soviel Strategies ond Objectivesar in Cenlrol Europe
oviet Views on Initiation of Hoitltities.the emphasisOaftgressi venesif"
"jit is likely that the SovieU reckon that both sloes are effectivelyfrom deliberatelyar between the two alliances. They probably believe that East-Westthey occurred atarisenovrtvalling of events growing out of internalocalized dispute in Europe sucherlin problem,risis in another area such as Ihe Middle East. The Sovieu woulderiod of heightened tensionar. and they might expect both sides to begin making military preparations. They would recognize that once either side began mobilization, tensions would rise sharply and live danger of accident or miscalculation would increase. Moreover, once military preparations were under way. thc SovieU would believe that one side or the other might see advantage in preemption to take advantage of iU preparations and to thwart those of the other side.
octrine of the Offensive. Soviet miliiarycenters on the offensive. Warsaw Pact strategy for war with NATO derives from that doctrine. No matter how hostilities beganJT
Jhe military plan for successful terminationar involves quicklyarge-scale Pact offensive to destroy the main NATO forces ond scire, at the least, thc territories of tlve FRC. the Benelux niiionj. and Denmarkampaign lasting lessonth. Recent evidence docs not reveal Soviet intentions
toward canyingact offensive Into France. Thc Sovieis might prefer not to attack France if French forces remained out of thc conflict and Oliver NATO forces did not enter French territory. Also, the independent French nuclear capability couldeterrent because French involvement in the con-Hid would increase the risk of nuclear escalation.
The Strategic Initiative.oiollary lo the doctrine of tint olfeniive, Soviet strategiststhc critical Importance of seizing andlhe strategic initiative. The principle applies not only lo Ihe ground campaign but also lo Pactio achieve air superiority and, ultimately, to the use of nuclear weapons in the theater. It Is an important factor leading to the Soviets' greatwith combat readiness andtrongtoward preemption that recurs in tlieirwritings. It also is consistent with Warsaw Pact efforts toapid mobilization and emergency deployment capability, and with the Pact's expectations of accomplishing some buildup covertly before Its general mobilization is declared. Finally, it is manifested io Pact ground forcesand tactics, with their emphasis on thc tank-dominated forces, surprise, and blitzkrieg.
Ioconflict with NATO, the SovieU would hope that, by seizure of the Initiative, they could interrupt NATO's mobilizaoon and forestall US R> inforcexnentt. But they recognize that this would be complicatederiod of political crisis andthat almost certainly wouldar and provide impetus to NATO preparations. If their offensive is begun sufficiently early, however, they might even hope to overrun NATO territory so rapidly as to limit tbe prospects that NATO tactical nudear weapons could be used to retrieve the si
Tlie Dilemma of the Nuclear Transition.military writings confirm thai Warsaw Pact planners arc facedilemma in the prospectar with NATO could begin nonnuclear and escalate rapidly to large-scale nuclear war. On the one hand they would wish to mass Urgebons of forces where Ihey chose to attempt breakthroughs. On the other hand they fear that NATO might take advantage of thctr vulnerability while massing for an attack and launch anuclear strike.
eeeoi
dilemma hu*hasSovieU loisky, massive,attack on NATO's air and nuclearthey would commll the hulk ol (hetactical air force and much of the Sovietbomberlarge part in tlic hopemost of NATO's theater nuclearat the very outset of hostilities (Seefor further discussion of Pact air operations.)
planners hope to reduce theirwhile massing for attack, hy doing so aspossible during darkness and by conductingwith great speed, thereby denyingopportunity, to use nuclear weaponsforces have dosed with and,NATO's defenses. Also, they placeon efforts to divine NATO's intent to useweaponsarge scale in time to makepreemptive attack. To this end, theykeep their own nuclear delivery systems instate of readiness and to conduct aand intelligence coUectingNATO's nuclear units and facilities asIts coinmunlcatloni networks on whichof nuclear weapons might be presaged.efforts, the Soviets are not confident lhatsolve the problems of transition fromto nuclear war in Europe.
C. The Strategic Backdropor in Europe
he Soviets perceive great dangertrategic exchange in thc eventar with NATO,eriod of high tension they would take measures to improve the readiness of their strategic nuclear forces and enhance their warcapabilities. They would, for example, probably alert the Strategic Rocket Forces and heighten their efforts to acquire early warningS decision to launch an attack on thc USSR. In addition they might wish to demonstrate Iheir strategic readiness despite the Inherent risks of causing NATO to ready itself or initiate hostilities. Overt measures might include massive civil defense activities. Iheof fleet elements, thc movement of aircraft, or relocation of key government and miliiary
ably
during any militaryEurope, Ihe Soviets would feel themselvesto Chinese exploitation. They would prob-
take steps toaximum deterrent posture with their forces opposite China.
IV. WARSAW PACT PLANNING FOR INIIIAL OPERATIONS IN CENTRAl EUROPE
A. Forces
Warsaw Pact theater forcesin Central Europe, and those primarilyfor use iherc, are on the wholeequipped, and more rigorously trainedPact forces, Also, Ihese forces area higher level of peacetime manning andcombat-ready than the others. (See Table 4
TABLE 4
W.iitw Pact Theater Forces Opposite NATO in Central Europe and In Western USSR
I5
the
Forces
Air Forcea
Landing
-
Aircraft,'
Includes only Pact forcei In Eait Cerniny. Poland, and CaechosIovaVla Pact forcea In Hungary probably would not be part of an offensive against the NATO Central Regan, although ao-capablo, but would ovarc likely be used either lo rJefcad the acuthera flank of the Pact forceipMsble atlack fiom Austrian ot Tugoals* territories, oc lo conduct offenaix operations through those couaUie*.
ataJaaSea forcea In the Baltic. Bclorusaian aadry Districts.
tXxa notmbat-capable Ualnen oisit asatpml to thr (ait Cerman.nd Czech National Air Defense Commands.
I?
fiereel-
*op-&
dctaili on ground ond ltrtic.nl alt forcesNATO in Cenurope nnd lhc western USSR. Details on1 lie Fleet arc inoviet Naval Policy and Programi.)
Ground forces
The ground forces are 'he ley clement ol Warsaw Pact theater forces, *nth the bulk of the manpower and the primary offensive combal roles. Roughly half oi the Tact ground lorces in Central Europe areul ofivisions) and Iwo thirds of the total wliiili >vc believe arcfor early me (here arc Sovietut.
Peacetime Stilus. Wc have previouslythai all Soviet units in Central Europe were at or near intended wartime personnel strength. This judgment was based on observations of high activity in Soviet garrisons and training areas, the emphasis on combat readiness in Soviet writings, and the apparent lack of locally available Soviet reservists that could be called up to fill shortages During recent yean, however, we have accruired evidence which does not comport with this
evidence indicates that onemotorized rifle company in East Cermany is authorized onlyen as againsthich we estimate to be thc unit's wartime TO. Another document indicatesoviet motor transport company in East Cermany hadercent of Ils slots vacant and marked to be filled from reserves.
^
^provided figures from Tie TOE of his motorized rifle regiment in East Germany which indicate that thewas authorizedercent fewer men lhan wc estimate for ils wartime TO-
sources have reported thai discharged Soviet servicemen are retained in Eastas civilianin readyfill critical technical positions in Soviet units.
' Include! lliiec Soviet aiibornc divisions.
1
Nevertheless, the observed high activity levels of Soviet units in Central Europe and the evidence associated with Soviet uoop rotations suggest that generally high manning levels are maintained in
ihose forces.
More information and further analysis are needed to cetermiae: bow many and whit kinds of units are affected by the above conditions and the eitent lo which mobilization might be used. The available evidenceowever, that some individual Soviet combat regiments are manned as much asercent below their intended wartime strength. Some support units may be manned even lower. We do not believe, however, that the lower manning levels reflectedail able evidence would significantly reduce the combat readiness of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe We continue to believe thai these forces are manned and equipped it levels which would permit them to conduct effective combat operations on short notice.
None of the East European ground forces arc fully manned In peacetime. We have good -evidenceariety of sources thai the East European combal units ire at varying reduced strength levels ranging from as high as aroundercent of war strength for East Cerman divisions
to as low asercentew Crechoslovak and Polish cadre divisions. East European support units are mainly at low strength levels.
range of manning levels offorces in ihe western USSR resembles(he East European giound forces: somerelatively high levels and others areunits. Most of the Eail European unitsSoviet uniu in the western USSR do notwartime allocation of general purposerather would receive civilian trucksfrom thc economy. Thc Sovicls, ina system In which certain civilian truckare especially selected and maintained
under military Supervision wilii specificdesignations to reportailer of hours to combal units being mobilized.
vailability for Combat and MobHiiation Capability. The Warsaw Pact ground forces inKuropc are maintainedtatus that would enable them lo react defensively in emergencies with little prior prepaiation. Wc believe that the Soviet divisions are capable of vacating theirin two hours and would be prepared soon thereafter to conduct cither defensive or offensive operations. The majority of the East European divisions arc sufficiently manned to conduct limited military operations and detailed alerting procedures are maintained and rehearsed frequently.
eforearge-scale offensive, however. Pact ground forces wouldmajor preparations including generalin all the East European countries,of combat forces In assembly areas for attack or in reserve areas, and establishment of field depots and other aupport bases. Otherwould include establishment ofnetworks, activation of command posts and exchange of staff and liaison personnel,preparation of field fortifications andemplacements, and the preparation and issuance of orders. Tlie Pact would probably attempt initially to conceal or disguise their preparations but, on the whole, the scale of activities would besince World War II.
lse entire process of preparation has. of course, never been rehearsedcalethat required for war. Most of thc elements arc practicedartial scale from time to time, especially those involving the tactical preparations of the troop units. We have little evidential basis for estimating how long the Pact would lake to make all of the preparations necessary for aoffensive. We can, however, estimate how long after the forces were alerted certain key actions would take.
Alloviet divisions in Central Europe and lhe six East Cerman divisions probably could move from their garrisons to theirareas in aboulours.
Czechoslovak divisions in western Czechoslovakia could be filled oul and moved lo their attack locations in about two days.
The nine Polish mechanized and tank divisions in thc Pomeranian and Silcsian Militarycould be filled out and moved inio northern East Germany in three lo foui days. Ihe Polish airborne and Sea landing divisions would be available withinours but their movement would largely depend on lheof Soviet transport.
Hie remaining seven Czechoslovak and Polish low-strength divisions could be Idled out in about three days and would then be available to be moved.
Tlieoviel divisions in the weslern USSR could abo be filled out in from one to three days, dertending on their peacetime manning levels, and made ready to begin movement westward.
Various calculi lions of Soviet capability to move all of these divisions and their associated headquarters and support units' Into their concentration areas In Central Europe have been made In the US and elsewhere. Depending upon the assumptions used as to road, rail, and air capacities, availability of trains, and organization and priority of units and supplies to be moved, these calculations yield figures ranging roughly betweenoays. No interference by Weslern actions is assumed iu any of these calculations. (Seeiscussion of Soviet pUnrtctg with respect to the timing of these forces" movement and their likely role in combat.)
irborne Troops. The Soviets have seven airborneof them located west of thecould be used ineater.
airborne formations would be used ia conjunction with other forces in opcratioiis across major water barriers, for example in an attempt to seize the Danish islands and the Turkish Straits. In smaller regimental- or battalion-si zed units, they could be used to seize bridgeheads ia close proximity to advancing ground forces in land campaigns, or to
l-'irliipt'i on* airborne Uilnlnfl ili-iiton.
conclnet raids on small bul critical enemySufficient military air transport is available to lift thc assault elements of about two airborne divisions simultaneously, bul con Hidingfor relocating tactical air forces andhigh priority movement of personneland supplies could reduce (he number of transports available for airborne operations in the early stagesar.
Air forces
There areactical aircraftoviclast European) based in East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia.rc located in thc three western militaryof Ihe USSR and could reinforce thosein Eastern Europe on short notice (seehe largest concentration of Pact tactical air power opposite NATO is thc Soviet air army in East Cermany which hasombatraft onases. Thc Soviets also have smaller tactical air fotces in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Thc Poles and Czechs have sizable tactical air forces of their own and. with the Soviets, (hese units would have major responsibilities for offensive air operations in the northern and southern sectors of (he Western Theater. East Cermany hastwo tactical airit had only national air defense units.
Aboutercent of Pact tacticalprimarilyndIhe the NATO Central Region are fighters in countcrair units that have the mission of destroying NATO's air forces through aerial engagements or attacks on bases, Anotherercent are groundndhe mission of destroying NATO ground targets either in support of the ground forces or as part of (he initial theater-wide strikes. Tlie re-maindcr of the force consists of reconnaissance and
other specialized support aircraft thai providelocation and electronic warfare support lo the
counlerair and ground attack units. In addition.
there areCM-cquippedssigned to
Military Transport Aviation which would operate
in support of thc tactical air forces.
from tlicir tactical air forcesntermediate-range bombersRange Aviation based in thc western USSR.
These bombers, pnssibly augmented by Soviet naval aircraft, would be used for strikes against largets in thc NATO rear area that require large conventional or nuclear payloads.
Soviet Military Transport Aviation wouldIhc main airlift capability for Pact forces opposite NATO. Equipped withN-I2 medium assault andndeavy cargo transports, one of its primary missions would be to lifl airborne troops. Military Transportwould also bc eilcnsivcly used to support tactical aii deployments and for logistic and re-supply tasks, such as the transport of nuclear weapons. The Soviet civil air transportAeroflot, can substantially augment Military Transport Avialion. Il could potentially double (he Soviet capability to airlift passengers and hashat could be usedransport bulk cargoes.
ight, medium, and heavyore assigned to Soviet Frontal Aviation in East Germany. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the three western military districts.ark in (he East Cerman. Polish, and Czech air forces. Most Pact helicopter units would be responsible for airlifting combat troops and logistic and liaison tasks. As new models are introduced and new equipment is retrofitted to existing models, these forces are increasingly capable of conducting air assault, ground attack, and anti-helicopter
Peacetime Status and Buildup Capabilily. Pact air forces arc generally maintained at or near their wartime personnel and equipment levels and would require little preparation before combat. Redeployment of tactical air units, possiblyreinforcements from thc USSR, would likely occur prior to an attack. Many units in Central Europe, particularly some equipped with older, short-range aircraft, are currently located where they cannot reach critical NATO targets witlrout staging to forward bases. In general, most tactical air units with air-defense responsibilities arc located where they can provide coverage from their peacetime bases.
If thc Soviets considered air reinforcement to bc necessaryar with NATO, we estimate tliat several hundred tacital aircraft, alonginimum required amount of ground personnel
al-
nd equipment,oved Irom tlte western USSK to bases in Central Europe in from one to three days. The actual lime involved would depend upon the amount ol air transport support allocated to thc reinloccement effort. This does not lake into consideration, however, tho potential effects of Incalculables such as adverse weather oi miliiary counteractions by NATO.
Theater Nuclear forces
addition to the USSR-based strategiclhat could be used for massive nudearNATO Europe, lhe Soviets have atactical nudear delivery systems in theirair forces. The quantity of delivery systemsincreasing in recent years, and thisthe Soviets to conduct nudear warfareat higher intensities before having (oUSSR-based systems. There is. however,evidence that thc Soviets arcto provide themselves with anusing their USSR-based nuclear forces Intheater nuclear war.
the most importantsystems in Eastern Europe areaircraft We have identified some SOair units in East Cermany. Poland,on their trainingbelieved to have adelivering nudear bombs. There are aboutaircraft assigned to these units. Thereevidence, however, lhat onlypilots, ibe most experienced, in these unitsto Sovietbombs. We expect (hat the number ofaircraft in Eastern Europe withwill continuerow as they trainair crews and re-equip units withaircraft such as theloggerFitter. There areircraft InPolish units that train in nudear
round forces nuclear delivery syslemsIhe FROC, Scud, and Scaleboard missiles. Thc Pact is estimated to haveROC battalions withaunchen andcud brigadesautvdieis in East Cermany, PoIai>d. andTlse Scud has an dfective range ofm and the FHOC aboutm. None ofm Scaleboard launchers is believed to
be localcd in Central Europe but wc estimate that three Scaleboard unilsotal of up toaunchers ore part of the forces in the western USSR earmarked for Central Europe.
ii We have recently acquired evidence lhat.
suggests that
the Soviels either have now. or expect to have, nuclear artillery rounds.
o hive identifiedacilities In EastPoland, and Czechoslovakia that we believe are for the storage of tactical nuclear weapons' Availablethat nuclear weapons are stored In these Soviet-contrdled sites inack of information on Soviet storage practices makesmpossible to determine precisely bow many nudear weapons might bc stored in these sites, but It Is estimated that they could holdo 2JO0 warheads and bombs. We do not believe that tbe Soviets have placed nuclear weapons in the hands of their East European allies. We do not know the earcurnstarices under which non-Soviet forces might receiveweaponi. but wc judge that they would be provided weaponsuropeanuclear stage. We estimate that, even in wartime, Ihc SovieU would retain conirol over all warheads.
he Soviets have widdy equippedforcesariety of good quality radiological and chemical defensivea par with thc better US equipment The Soviets have devoted more resources than tbe US to radiological and chemical defense, reflecting tlie high level ofthe Soviets have for tlie survivability of their forces In war when nuclear and chemical weapons are being used.'
'Another two lacfllflea In Kuntiry and three tn flulxaria
have beenV Director. Defense uilalllfenoo Agency, believes that
liiii Kirafraph misstates lha key aspects of Soviet abilities
foradtologUnl ai-Vor chemical envtcoameraL AJthouch the beat Soviet eoulreaeot Isevel which does not (iceed US technical capabilities, the Sevtrta have produced and deployed In quanUty some type, ol -for caample, theeoootarnlnalion apparatus
lhc IHlDM.tbiR chemical reconnaissance
US and Allied forces do not poetm
- lop-Sccic'--
Biological, and Radiological
(CBR) Warfareoviet miliiary doelrine categorizes toxic chemical agenli along with nudear weapons as "weaponi of mass destruction" and il implies that lhe Warsaw Pact would use chemical weapons once nuclear weapons were introducedATO-Pact war. Furthermore, chemical weapons, likeweapons, are controlled by lhc Soviets and theii use almost certainly would require Moscow's approval. We do not believe tlse Pact intends lo use chemicnl weapons except in concert willsweapons. However, wc cannoi eaelude the possibility that tlie Soviets might use chemical weapons independently.
he Pact forcesariety of systems capable of delivering chemical agents. Theseartillery (Including multiple rocletmortars, FROGs. Scuds, aerial bombs, and, possibly, iptay tanks. Wc have Hltle doubt that lhe Soviets possess substantial stocks of tosicagents but cannot eslimatc the size of their stockpile We have good evidence, however, that some toxic chemical murilions are available to Soviet air forces in Eastern Europe.
he Warsaw Pact forces emphasize CBR defense more than NATO. They have developed an extensive CBR organization with spccialited uniis down to the division level for technicaland doconon and have furnished ihcir forcesariety of good quality CBR equipment. In recent years Soviet forces have been receiving newer models of equipment designed to improve their effectivenessBR environment. New APCs and perhaps new tanks and tome trucks as well ai various types of support equipment arc equipped with advanced filtration and protective systems. CUR training for lhe forces is extensive and frequent; training of chemical defense units includes use of toxic chemical agents. AH these measures enable the Pact forces to operateBR environment more effectively than NATO forces.
ll the Warsaw Pact countries have signed the international agreement prohibiting thestorage, and use of biological weapons. There is good evidence that, in the past, the Sovieis conducted extensive research on biological agents and protective techniques and ihey probably have
fadlities trial could be used to make biological agcotsfZ
1
NovofSoviet. East Cerman, and Polish navalihc Baltic Seajvould support Pact operationsEurope.
writings Indicate thai amphibious operationsthe Polish assauli landing division, anassault (rained Easi Ccrmnn motorized rifle division, and llie Soviet naval infantryiu (he Baltic area are planned in conjunction svith airborne troop landings to seize key Danish islands and link up wiih Pact ground forcesIhrough Jutland. The purpose would be to secure Die Danish Straits, deny the Baltic to West-em naval units, and interdict NATO supply lines in the North Sea.
Pad surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft would have the mission of sweeping thc Baltic Sea and its approaches of hostile naval forces early in lhc war. Large mine-laying operations to prevent later penetrations by NATO forceswould also occur.
oviet Naoal Policyetailed treatment of theforces, and capabilities of Pact naval forcesar with NATO.
Strengths ond Weaknesses
C round Forces. Pact ground forces' doctrine and organization arc centered around the medium tank. Tlie rapidly odvancing offensive that the Pact intends lo conduct depends on the shock, firepower, and mobility of their tanks. Compared to Western forces. Pact units have more tanksn Central Europe)uch higher proportion of tanks to men.
round offensive the Pact would seek to atlain favorable force ratios in local areas over NATO forces and use its mechanized Infantry, tanks, and supporting artillery to break through NATO's defenses. Pact tank columns would then commence -high speed drives toward their majorihe Rhine River and beyond. Once committed to deep penetrations, lhc tank forces would have to rely largely on their own firepower, air defenses.
ul. -
nnd logistic suppcut to avoid being cutv
Soviet ground forces. In recent years, have acquired more tanks and more and better divisional artillery. Also, Pact ground forces have acquired an extensive, integral alr-defcnse capability that is without parallel in NATO. The variety ofguns and surface-to-air missUes currently in the ground forces can provide mulri-weapon air-defense coverage at all altitudes likely to be used by NATO tactical aircraft Most of Ihese lyitems arc mobile and capable of sccompanying other rapidly maneuvering combal formations.
The Pact also benefits from 'the logistic and command advantages that accrue from having ground forces that arc more homogeneous than NATO's In terms of organixstioQ and equipment. Almost all combat equipment in tbe non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces is of Soviet design and thc units are generally organized after tbe Soviet model. Toil should facilitate the cooxdination of support and operation of East European forces with Soviet armies,
Significant shortcomings in the Pact's ground forces remain, however. Although large quantitiesariety of modern weapons have beenInto the ground forces in recentew types of equipment are still in short supply. For example, there still are fewer APCs available lhan Pact doctrine and organization require. For APCs, as well as for other items of equipment, (he Paci hasixture of different types of old and new equipment to fill outsupply and maintenance operations. Soviet improvements in non-nuclear artillery and tank ammunition effectiveness have not kept pace with those of the US, although Ihe Pact greatlyNATO in quantities of artillery pieces and tanks.
Oo balance, however, developments since theave largely erased the formerof Pact armiesorde armed with masses of simple, rugged, easily maintained weapons. Thc Pact ground forces arc now maturing as modern forcesophistication comparable to thai of Western armies.
Atrtrong feature of the Warsaw Pact's air forces is thc large number of versatile
aircraft available and the extensive, hardened air base system. The Pact has sufficient airfields and logistic supplies located in Eastern Eixrope toa variety of deployments, reirdofcements. and aii allack operations over extended periods. Pact nir units are well versed in deployment andtechniques. Moreover. Pact pilot training now provides the force with greater missionthan in.
Most Pact ground attack aircraft stillhoil range, small payload, and poor all-weather capabilities when compared lo NATO's aiicraft. This has resulted in Pact reliance on theand wlnerable Soviel intermediate-range bomber force for deep strikes when usingbombs. Pact tactical air forces also lag considerably behind NATO's ia the availability of sophisticated air-to-ground munitions such asilr-to-iurfic* missiles and laser-guided bombs.
Deficiencies also exist in the air defenseof Pact tactical air units. Almost all Pact air intercept training is conducted under strict ground control within the-range of Ibe friendly alr surveillancc network. .There Is evidently littleplaced on free air combat outside thesystem. This could limit the Pact's wartime abilily to seek out and destroy airborne enemyover NATO territory.
he Soviets have developed chaff and active (amruers to cover virtually all of NATO's radarA through 1their forces exercise frequently in an electronic warfare environment. We do not know, however, howthese syrtcmj would be against NATO air defense sysiems.
he development and deployment (lace thef improved aircraft sndad recognition of the shortcomings of iu air forces, especially for non-nuclear war. As the propoitlou of the force equipped with new sysiems Increases and its capabilities expand, wu expect toontinuing evolution of Pact air doctrine away from its traditional preoccupation with air defense, andider range ofand defensive missions. Current Pactlo improve thc air forces are discussed in more detail beginning at paragraph.
B. Pad Concej.li for Launching an Offensive in Central Europe
c hive heretofore estimate) that,offensive operations againit NATOEurope, the .Soviets probably woulda large reinforcement of ground forceswestern USSR. This judgment was basedearly
nd on our then-current assessment of the forces. At that time the East European forces were relatively ineffective and could have madeinor contributionart offensive. Also, at that time, the Soviets believed that nuclear weapons would be used massively at the outsetonflict and. therefore, that it was imperative to bringthe additional Soviet forces deemedfor an offensive before NATO could destroy or interdict them. Although thii offered NATO rnore lucrative nudear targets, the Soviets seemed willing to accept the increased vulnerability that reinforcing units massed in the forward area would entail.
] intelligence irJortnalion acquired since the late lWJOs indicates that thenow consider it likely that theirinduding majorbegin prior to their carryingarge-scale rrinlorccrncnt.
3
fH. The information, available to usI
Jsince 'heeatures:
is always portrayed as the aggressor but the Pact Ls never caught unpreparedthe NATO attackeriod of greatly increased tension.
the days or weeks of crisis thathostilities the Pact takes steps toits military posture but Pact general mobilisation does not occur until hostilities arc clearlymoreew days before war begins.
initial ground reinforcements fiomCentral Europe consist of from ooe to three Soviet armies which are committed
by tlie end of the first week of combat, but these do not begin moving westward from the USSR until war has begun.
Follow-on reinforcements from tlie USSR ate usually not brought into play for yet another week, and even then their role it ambiguous. They could be used for an invasion of France, serve as replacements for first-tineparticularly if the war had gonebe used to eliminate pockets of NATO forces bypassed earlier in the offensive.
n our view, these recurring themes indicate lhat Pact planners no longer sec war with NATOas necessarily preceded by large-scaleof their ground forces prior to hostilities in Europe. This change does not necessarilyoviet preference for initialing hostilities prior to large-scale tdnforcernent but rather, from iheir point of view, reflectsprudent planningThey may (imply calculate that there will not be sufficient timeassive groundbefore any Ukdy crisis escalates lo openThey may abo reckon that,ariety of reasons, large-scale ground reinforcement prioronflict could be counterproductive. It could, for example, invite preemptive action by NATO,the early use of nuclear weapons. It might also cause NATO touildup of its own that would work against the Pact's Initial numerical superiority of forces tn the area.
n any event, the Soviet military evidently believe that Pact ground forces are superior to NATO's. They also believe lhat Pact forces now In Central Europe are not only capable ofATO attack in the early daysonflict, but arc also capable ofon-nuclearinlo West Cermany before the first Soviet ground reinforcements reach the combathe Pact, of course,ariety of optionswiih regard to the use of its livable ground reinforcements in the USSR. The evidence dearly indicates to us. however, that Soviet planningcurrently hold the above scenario to be the most realistic.
here arc several possible reasons why Sovietue* evidently no longerround
Sec loolnotr fi.
lorces' buildup before ait offensive against NATO roealistic planning assumption. One is that the organization, equipment, and training of the East Europeans lias increased to the point where ihey canajor role in initial operations against NATOT"
3
factor has been the addition tostrength of thc Soviet CeiVral Croupin Czechoslovakia. I
3
SovieU may also believe lhat theprocess is not as severelyNATO nuclear attack as it was in earlierthat ienforcements massed in thewould still be critically vulnerable toattack. Pact doctrine now holds thatof nuclear weapons is less probable atarecade ago.
inal consideration that probably hasthe Soviets' thinking regarding groundr cement derives from the Importance theirplaces on seizing the initiative.reater chance of success if thc Pact could launch iu offensive before NATO could fully build up iU forces and prepare iu defenses. They may. therefore, wish to avoid any provocative actions, suchajor ground reinforcement, that couldATO buildup.
his appreciation of Pact offensive concepts has important warning implications for NATO. In particular, the movementdivision force from tlie USSR into Central Europe, which perhaps was thc dearest indicator, may not lake place, before an attack.
C, Worlime Organization
or initial wartime operalions against NATO in Central Europe the Pactgiven time-to organize its forces in East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia into three fronts. Although lhc composition and internal organization of the forces in each front could vary, their general zones ofwould be as follows:
Central Front. The main Pact effort would clearly fall to this front. It would be primarily composed of forces operating from southern East Cermany and would have the task of destroying NATO forces in West Cermany roughly between Hanover in the north and Mannheim in the south. This front couldforces from asir of NATO's eight corps areas. It would be the largest Pact force in llie Western Theater with as many aiivisions, including most of the Soviet forces in East Cram any and Poland andthree of die East Cerman Army's si* divisions.
Northern From. Pact forces in the north would be responsible for engaging NATO forces in Denmark as well as those in the twoNATO corps areas of West Cermany.^
"^fhis front could include some IS toivisions.
Soufhuierlern From. The majority of the forces comprising this front would be Czechoslovak, with the addition of the five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia. This front, wiih someivisions, would have tlie responsibility ofai far as tlie Rhine in an area roughly between Mannheim and lhe Swiss border.
lie organization of Pact forces is flexible ind operalions subsequent lo the initial days ol a
may lake several fotras.Q
(ourlhor* to ihiec ol* tKc initialarmies from theprobablyormedeek or so as (hehreadlh of (lie campaign area expanded.
nitial Air Operations, fact ilortriiH.'that the successround campaign in Europe is highly dependent on the properol air power. The Soviets probably consider that, despite the Pact's superiority on the ground. NATO's tactical nil fortes could enable NATO forces to blunt or perhaps evenact giound offensive. Because of this ihe Pad evidently has determined that the most effective application of its air forces in lhe early conventional phasear would be in the form of massive, theater-wide strikes aimed at destroying NATO's tactical air forces nnd other nuclear systems and facilities. These attacks are to commence immediately at the onset of hostilities and be conduded by Padaircraft and bombers of Soviet Long Range and possibly Naval Aviation.
Those thealcr-wlde strikes probably would be centrally controlled. Some allocation of airlo thc fronts can be expeded during (he initial air operations phase, but control of lhe lactical air forces probably would revert to thc frontonly when the objectives of ihese attacks had been met.
Wc lack direct information concerning lhc Pad's view of its own aircraft requirements for sustained conventional or nuclear air operalions in Central Europe. Given present Soviet capabilities to reinforce ihcir forward-based tadical air forces and the Urge numbers of aircraft already in place, however, wo believe that Ihe Pad would haveforces to conduct conventional operalions while initiallyizable portion for nuclear contingencies.
V. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING SUCCESS OF WARSAW PACT STRATEGY
A. Capability of Poet Ground Forces lo Brcok-Thfovgh NATO's Defenses
act strategyuccessful offensive in Central Europe is heavily dependent on rapid
breakthroughs of NATO's defenses, preferablyihey arc fully organized. Thc achievementreakthrough would dependumber of factors such as surprise, rapid movement, and the massing of lorces. Thearsaw Pact divisions in Central Europe give the Pact the capability to initiate offensive actionelatively brief period of inobilizalion and without major reinforce, men I. Even If their forward disposition and rapid mobilization allowed them lo achieve tadicaland deprive NATOrolonged warning of impending war. they would still have lo mass iIkii attacking forces ia order to achieve sufficient local superiority in numbers to overwhelm the NATO forces at the points at which they chose lo attack. Tliis would make them vulnerable to attack by nuclear weapons.
he Pad's strategy calls for sharply limiting the period of time in which forces are massed in order to reduce vulrserability to NATO nuclear aitack. Aller the forces moved out of dispersed assembly areas, they would hope to move directly into initial contact with lhe enemy, deploying directly into combat from the march. This is an extremely complicated maneuver requiring well-trained, highly mobile forces, reliableand effective command, control, andni cat ions. II calls for an audacity and dash which is in sharp contrast lo lhc deliberate and-ponderous style which generally characterized Soviet offensive preparations in Wo/Id War II. Soviet training does, however, emphasize many of the tidies and techniques that would need to be carried oul with high effectiveness ifaneuver were lo succeed.
3
oviet forces are provided withance support at all tadical and strategic levels, Fronts and armies have signals intelligence and long-range rocoiinalssancc units, while divisions have organic reconnaissance battalions. In addition, there
it airborne visual, photo, and electronicas well ns numerous agents in West Cermany. Tim tuppori should provide the Warsaw Pact forces with extensive Information concerning NATOand battlefield conditions, but the Soviets have not solved the problem of locating NATO's mobile nuclear delivery systems once ihey have been deployed
B. Worsaw Poet Air Operation*
aced with lhc threat from NATO's ait and nuclear capabilities, lhc Soviets have evidently decided thai ihc initial Pact air campaign in lhc non-nuclear phaseentral European war should focus on reducing NATO's tactical air and nuclear strength. Massive counteiaii operations using Pact tactical air forcea and USSR-based bombers piobably would be mounted earlyar to destroyir forces through aerialand attacks on airfields. At the same time. Fact air attacks would be directed against command and control centers, nuclear depots, and mobile nuclear delivery systems. During these initial air operations. Pact ground commanders probably could count on little direct air support.
oviet planners recognize that these initial air operations are likely to result in high aircraft losses, and they may attempt to minimize such losses by creating breaches io NATO's air defenses to provide access routes for strikes in NATO's rear area by Pact aiicraft- Despite lhe risks, the SovieU probably would consider high aircraft lossesin the perspective ofshort, intensive(a) NATO's air forces were sufficiently preoccupied with repelling ihese attacks to permit Pact ground forces to achieve theirgoals relatively unimpeded by air attack, andizable portion of NATO's tacticaldelivery assets were destroyed. The success of air operations depends heavily on surprise tothai NATO's mobile nuclear systems are not dispersed, and that NATO's air defenses are not fully prepaied priorhe initiation of hostilities
he current re-equipment program fortactical air forces is still far from completeigh proportion of the Pact fighter-bomber force isof older model- aircraft. These aircraft have relatively small fuel and weapons loads. They also have little or no all-weather and
night capabilities, although the use of marker beacons could provide some fighter-bombers with lhe required guidance lo target areas. Even so. most of lhen lhe present Pactcould not reach NATO airfields eacept by flying at the relatively vulnerable medium to high altitudes. The Soviet bomber force, eacept lor lhc new Backfire, would alio be forced to uie lhe more vulnerable altitudes due to aircraftlimitations.
IW Thc Pact's limited ability to provide timely target data lo attack forces cmud hinder theol Pact air operations, particularly inNATO's mobile missile forces. This problem it eom|iouiided by the relatively limited navigationri weapons avionicsarge percentage of Pact tactical aircraft, and by Pact trainingwhich stress tbc use of CCI and rigidof assignments. Once engagedeavy ECM environment and facing active defenses. Pact pilots are likely to experience difficulty in finding tlicir targets. Alto, although lhe Soviets are developing precision-guided munitions for aircraft, theyhave not yet made these weapons available to Pact air forces. Use of ihe older, less accuratecurrently available would require more sorties pe* target and consequent high exposure to NATO air defenses.
i Considering the multinational, mu Inature of initial Pact air operations, thefor dote and coordinated timing, and live Urge numbers of aircraft Involved, the Pad would be facedomplicated command and control situation. We have little basis on which to fudge whether current Pact command and control arnmgc-menli would be adequate to thisgenerally rehearse only portions of theair campaign.
C. Control of Mullinotionol forcesor-inw Pad Offensive
lte Warsaw Pact's ability lo coordinate thc actions of large, multinational forces would bc critical to lhc success of an offensive. Pact strategy with its emphasis on speed, both in concentration oi force before an attack and in theampaign to its objectives once begun,ey factor contributing to lhc difficulty of Ihe
ei
problem. In Cenlral Europe this strategy calls for (he concurrent movement to operational locations, within about three days, of S3 divisions with the support necessary toarge-scale offensive. Not only must this movement occur promptly to buildtrang initial combat echelon but it must also clear thc lines of communication th.ough Poland and eastern Czechoslovakia in timeegin thc early westward movement from the USSR of up to aboutore divisions and support plus the first surge of large-scale resupply
problemouthwesternbe similar.'Fewer forces would bethc projected military operation is moreinvolving combined land, sea, air.airborne operations against the mainall of the participating Soviet groundbe brought forward from the USSR and.Hungary.
key questions are:
What means exist to plan, control, andthese highly complex operations?
How effective would (hose meant bc?
In World War II. Soviet operations against the German coalition were planned and coordinated by the Soviet Ceneral Staff in Moscow and directed by thc Supreme High Command headed by Stalin. This method served well enough because of tlse deliberate pace of operations and because nonon-Soviet units were involved. Even so. there were shortcomings and the span of control of the Moscow authorities was stretched thin at times.
In thc. when noti-Sovict forces began to assume major, critical roles in planned Warsaw Pact operations, Ihe problem of control became acute. Unlike NATO's, thc Pact's command structure was not integrated and, exceptro fotma Warsaw Pact headquarters in Moscow, no combined planning staffs existed, That the Soviets were highly concerned about the problem became obvious, but the full extent of their efforts to solve it have remained rather obscure.
developments are known, however:
Warsaw Pact headquarters has grown and more senior East European officers have
joined il. (lit wartime function is tlillItowevcr.)
Major steps have been taken to improve both Soviet and East European high-levelfacilities and to make ihem less
Through training and improvedsystems the Warsaw Pact forces have become more proficient in combinedthc East German forces, in particular, arc integral I'd into the npcr.it Joi.il scheme of ihc CSFC
Tlie Warsaw Pact members aremilorm command post system to Soviet
C
1
Whether it is the reluctance of the East Europeans to accept more Integration (hat hasthe developmentore rational system, or the misgivings of (lie Sovietff (hat would have to relinquish much of its control over operations, is not clear. Piobably it is both. In any case, (he available evidence suggests strongly that in any NATO-Pact war in the next few years Moscow would control the operations of eachand East European front separatelyariety ofdirectly and some through (he national command authorities of its allies.
Such an arrangement might work well enough if operations went generally according to the contingencyunlikely event ui war. But it would seem to be particularly unsulted for managing unexpected large diversions from planned, military opcradons such as enemy counterattacks or the need lo make unanticipated major force ta-groupments. It would he particularly vulnerableisruption in nuclear wai.
expect the Warsaw Pact toefforts to solve the critical and complexof coordinating operations of largeforces in wartime. These efforts arcinclude:
inlegration and standardization of Soviet and East European commandand communications systems;
Greater automation of troop control systems; and
development ol an intermediate theater-level control of combined operations.
arsaw Pact Logistical Capability
thee have acquiredinformation on Warsaw Pact logisticalplanning concepts from Pact militaryseveral former Pact logisticians. Sovietis the model for Warsawts evidently derived from SovietII experience modified to take account ofof postwar changes In militaryhave no information on whether Pacthas beendified to reflectsupply expenditure rates experienced byin Vietnam and by both sides in thewar.
Ground Forces
to Soviet logistical doctrine,should maintain enough supplies in itsin the mobile stocks in its armiesays of combat. Altogether,heatermight containSoviets prescribe stockage of fromthree months of supplies. In addition tostocks, the doctrine calls for nationalof materiel, supplies, and rawIs no information on the magnitude ofreserves.
US. We have calculated thc theoretical capacities of thc identified Pact ground force ammunition and POL depots. Ammunition and POL make up the physical bulk of logistical stocks, Based on these calculations and assuming lhat prescribed mobile slocks arc maintained in combalinfor-
mation suggests that theyavailable stocks in Central Euiopc would be as follows:
l Ciuurxl I ot-Ink Drpot Capacities (Metric Tom)
CxeehoslovjYii
East
Totuid
We hive little information on the actual contents of Pact depots, but, assuming ihey are optimally stocicd and using Soviet consumption planning factors for ammunition and US factors for POL. we have calculated that these stocks could represent someoays* worth of supplies for theivisions located there in intensive ison-nuclear offensive combat These figures are. atough approximation of Pact supply status but they do suggesl lhat Pact stocks in Central Europe accord with ihe doctrinal requirement to stock forays.tockpile would also accord with Soviet strategic planning whichentral Europe campaign Wing completed In lessonth.
Presumably the ground force logistic stocks in Ihe Baltic, Belorussian. and Carpathian Military Districts would also be usedestern Theater of Operations. The capacities of Identifieddepots in these districts areetric tons which would represent0 day supply for lheivisions that we estimate are earmarked ior early useestern Theater of Operations. Identified POL depots In these districts could holdday supply. These figures suggest lhat although POL stocks currently available In tbe potential Western Theater of Operations could meet thcrequirement of two IO three months' supply, the ammunition stocks would evidently fallshort.
Calculations further show lhat the identified ground force ammunition depots in Ihe central part of thcMoscow, Ural, and Volga Militaryholdillion metric tons and POL depots some 3fl million metric torts. Presumably, these stocks are Intendedotential war with China as well as NATO.
Air forces
have little information on Pactfor air forces. The following estimatescapabilities to sustain air operations arcfrom calculations of air force depotcalculations are susceptible fohowever, and wc have recently acquiredindicating that the current ammunitionit several Soviet airfields in Centralfar lower than their estimated storage capacities.
Warsaw Pacf Air Force Storage Capneitln (MiIk Tom)
East Onrar -
Poland
Assuming that these commodities would be used by all Pact air forces (including National Air Ocfense) currently based in East Germany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as Soviet tactical air units deployed forward from the nearby western military districts, the ammunition stocks implied by tbe above figures probably could supportair operations for aboutoays. There probably would be enough aviation POL available for someoays."
We also have Identified depots in the Baltic. Belorussian. end Carpathian Military Districts which could hold an0 metric tons of air ordnanceillion metric Ions ofPOL. These supplies could also be madeto Pact air units operating againtt live NATO Central Region.
The above figures imply that the Warsaw Pact ground and air forces could have on hand, in Central Europe and In lhe USSR west of thc Urals, sufficient ammunition and POLast through several months of war, assuming none was destroyed by enemy action. If stocks of this sire are in fact available, they would probably beto sustain Wanaw Pact forces in combat until production of new slocks in lhe USSR could lake up the load.
I* Calculation) of amoiuriM'On and POL conuanpaoaan lalllal ikiee-day miff period during wfcjrti lij^fct
Odiea(hii
penod aortln are reduced lo aboutortiesitj.
nalysis of the Warsaw Pact's lines of(LOCs) capacities in the light of our estimates of Pact supplyndin Central Europe suggests that the Pact would be likely loassive effort lo replenishfrom tlic USSR at the outset of hostilities. At ihe same time, the Soviets would probablyarge-scale movement of troop reinforcements from lhe USSR. During lhe first Iwo weeks afterbegan, when these troop and supply movements were straining the capacity of the LOCs,of thc Pact's LOCs could have particularly critical effects. After this initial surge, (hewould probably subsideevel which probably could be sustained despite some damage lo thc LOCs.
E. The Reliability of Easi European Forces
ajor question mark for Soviet military and polilical leaders would be the reliability of East European forces. Soviet-East Europeanhaveheckered history. The USSR used force lo suppress popular demonstrations in Berlino Invade Hungarynd to occupy CzechoslovakiaB. The Pact hasthc open break with Albania andfriction with Romania. While Soviel leaders may have private doubts of whether lhe Pact co-hesivencss would withstand the strains of war, they have committed themselves to relying on East European forces lo cany out wartime functionscritical to (he Pact's proipects for successar with NATO. In Central Europe, East Europeans make important contributions:
They provide over half the combat divisions.
They permit the achievement of advantageous force ratios without reinforcement from the USSR.
Polish forces In the north and Czech forces in thc south allow for concentration of Soviet forces In the critical center.
Primary Pad logistic routes tun through Poland, Eatt Cermany, and Czechoslovakia and the East Europeans commit heavyto their protection
East European air defenses provide proteetion for logistic and rear area operations.
S-
n Southern Europe. national loroa inHungary, and Bulgaria have less critical but nonetheless important combat roles on the flank of Ihe Fact:
and Hungarian forces protect againsi NATO operation* through Austria or
Bulgarian forces would be essential lo Part operations against thc Turkish Strails.
Romania and Bulgaria provide and protect Pact logistics routes for loutheiu operation*
any aspects of thc Pact, dominated as ilby Soviet officers, seek to assure lheof the East European allies.
Major Soviet forces are stationed in four key coun tries.
Allegiance is sought by thc integration of East European officers into the Pact command structure where they participate on abasis.
Promising East European officers ate schooled in the Soviet Union and indoctrinated with Soviet views and attitudes.
officers and aboul half lheofficers are members of Communist parties or organizations; unreliable officers are dismissed.
missions assigned lo the Earl European foices arc intended to insure thrirar.
East Cerman foices arc interleaved wiih the Soviets, lo Insure their reliability even against other Germans
The missions assigned the Polish and Czech forces are initially against their traditional enemies, the Cemvans.
e judge lhal the aimed forces of Eastern Euiope are loyal to their national regimes, lhe basic question of reliability is whelhcr or not an East European regime will commit itself lo Pact wartime operations. This decision will be heavily influenced by lhe perceptions of the national leaders and ihe political ciicumsiances leading lo war.
We judg* thai neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pad would initiate an unprovoked invasion of lhe
other side.
eneral war erupt, however, wc judge that the Eait Europeans would fight.
Thc period of tension prior to hostilities would allow lhc Soviets to manipulate popularand political leaders.
The Pad's mobilization itrudure would be' set in motion and its momentum would cany military preparation* forward.
East European refusal to participate at Ihis stage could be dealt wiih by foice.
Eastern Europeans would feel they had no choice but In participate.
e have no basis for making the morejudgment wiih regaid to the Eastaru' commitment lo their allies in the course of hostilities. That is to say. wc cannot fudge thewith which East Europeans will support the conflict. Neither can we foresee how they would view their own national interests io the courseonflid nor thc inducements that would belo make them quit the war.
VI. CURRENT TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES
ince themid-lOOOs, Ihe Soviets have-carriedajor expansion and renovation of Iheir theater forces. We estimate thai the manpower in Soviet theater ground and tactical air forces overall has been increased by about one third. Irom someillion men in lheo moreillion at present. Procurement expenditures for new equipment have gone up aboutercent in the same periodide range of newly developed weapon systems of increased sophistication has been assigned to theater forces, and tlse high rxroportion of obsolescent equipment that formerly prevailed hat been cuntidcrably reduced. Overall the changes of the pail decade have not only significantlythe size of Soviet forces but have also made them more balanced and operationally flexible, with improved capabilities for both nuclear and non-nuclear warfare. Changes in tbc East European lorces have beendramatic
fie-eiG-nhrs-
-Secret-
tliiic summarize (ltehtVd taken place in theater (meet andthe prospects (or furthci change
A. Background
strategic choices dictated byin ihenduclear missiles and submarinesconventional lorces, lotted UrgeSoviet ground and tnctical air fotcesthenlct forces which survived Iheeriod ol doctrinal stagnationobsolescence. Then, beginning inevents created an entirely newfor Soviet theater forces planners:
emoval from office4 permitted the views of Soviet conventional force advocates to gain official acceptance.
The adoption by NATOore flexible nuclear response strategy persuaded thethat at least the initial stagesact offensive against NATO could be prosecuted without nuclear weapons.
Sino-Soviet split became more severe and Khrushchev's successorsajor buildup of Soviet theater forcesChinaonsequent step-up in conventional arms pioduction in the USSR.
he Soviets* invasion of Crechoslo-vakia resulted in the establishment thereoviet garrison where no Soviet forces had been stationed since the early post-World-War II period.
B. Growth and Improvement of Soviet Theater Forces Since Ihe
he growth and improvement of Soviet theater forces opposite NATO has been chiefly the result ol the creation of new fotces. the eapan-sion of eiisring units, and the modernisation of equipment. Of these, tbe establishment, after8 Invasion, of the Soviet Central Croup of Forces (CCF) in Czechoslovakia had lhe greatest single impact. Currently numberingfetCCF added five divisionsmall air force to thc first-line
Soviet forces in Central Europe. L.
""Additional divisions may be forming too of the live CCF divisions in their former western USSR garrisons. The Soviet buildup opposite China, which added0 men to Soviet ground and tactical air force personnel strength, is described in. The Sino-Soviet Reloflonrhip; The MUiuny Arpecti.
Export! ionii'rni; force tlemcnfs
Much ol thc increase in Soviet theater forces opposite NATO hat come from enlargement of the two primary ground combat units, the motorized rifle division and lhe tank division. We estimate that since thclte wartime TOoviet motorized rifle division has increased from0 to more0 men. while the tank division has increased fromo. During the lame period thenumber of vehicles and mafor weapons systems in the motorized rifle division increased fromo, and in the tank oivision.
The principal changes that produced the larger divisions were made to increase iheiraad mobility. Field artillery weapons in both tank and motorized rifle divisions increased by aroundercent.ully equippedrifle division APCs went up from slightlyo morend.umber of divisions that had formerly possessed few or no APCs received their full allocations. Also, in many motorized rifle divisions medium tank strength was raisedo, Additions were abo made to divisional air defense and antitank organizations and. at the same time, more motor transport capability wasonly to supply ammunition fot the added weapons, bet apparently also to give Ihe division better overall logistic capacity.
Not all Soviet divisions have attained these equipment standards, but most, if not ail. of those-in Ceneral Europe piobably have.umber of the divisions in Ihe western USSR stillarge proportion of older equipment and someshortages tuch in in APCs and trucks.
-Jop -Sotret
THE SOVIET TANK45
SO
S
Medium Tanks
lent s Artillery Pieces
S
Of Divisions
THEIZE0 fl'FLE45
S
Men
5
Number ol Onrlsloris
S
MediumPieces'
HQ
Although of lesser magnitude than thein divisions, organizational changes have alio increased Ihe strength of Soviet non-divisional ground force units. In East Cermany, for example. eight regimental-sized combat training units and some smaller support-type training units have been established to train noncommissioned officers ond specialists such as tank drivers for the CSFC. In wartime, tlmic units, along with four separate tank regiments and one battalion that also have been formed by lhe Soviets in East Germany, could be available for use as reserves. Togctlacr ihey containanks. Thc Soviets have alto enlarged their nondivisional motor transport uniti in Central Europe, in part to meet the in-
creased supply requirements of non-nuclear war and alto because of the larger ammunitionbrought aboul by more tanks and artillery. There have also been Increases in (lie numbers of Scud launchers, and each field army hatrigade of mobileissiles.
Cquipment Modrtnuolion Ul lly the mid-lSCOs Soviet equipment'had languished to thc point wherewas overtaking the theater fotces. Not only wasarge pro portion of old oquip-ns-jnt in the fotces but also the failure to introduce tmny new designs cqiccially ol
- top-Sec c
retarding ihc Soviets' rIIo.liaintain effective forces (acini; NATO. More than half the combat aircraft wero old-mode!ndighten andight bombers. The newer models were Still significantly tnferioi in range nnd payload tu Western aircraft of comparable age. The ground forces if ill had large numbersvenbsolete BTR-1S2 APCs. Many divisions had few or even no APCs. There were widespread shortages of motor transport and many ground forces units in tlie USSR wereil on mohiHra-(iou of civilian trucks even to enable them to ovon-from their garrisons in an emergency. Similarapplied to communications equipment. Field artillery, even after its slrenglh was increased in the, had no armored, self-propelled guns of (he type most suitable to thc Soviets' tank-oriented blitzkrieg tactics.
The large upswing in production of theater forces equipment that began in thend still continues cannot be precisely charted with the information available. It seems reasonablyhowever, that much uf its Initial impetus came from the buildup opposite China which required the outfitting of someivisions and provision of moredditional combat aircraft. Modernization and filling out ol the forces facing NATO was evidently constrained by the priority going to tbc Far East forces until0 when that buildup tapered off. Most of what wasin this period was of older, proven designs.
Since thehe pace ofof forces facing NATO has surged strongly andarger number of newly designed type* and models of equipment has gone into full-scale production.
New Aircrafl
ail Pact theater force elements,is making Its greatest impact on theair defense forces Although the Pact airNATO have boon lelatlvely stable inover the past decade, they have beguna new generation of aircrafl andis enabling tlie Pact to change (heorientation of Ihe tactical aira broader spectrum of offensive asdefensive missions.
Soviet planners, increasingly concerned with (lie possibility of non-nuclear war in Europe, have undertaken sizable equipment modennzalionto eliminate the main weaknesses of ihcir tactical airrange, low payload, and lack of modern ground attack ordnance. By thc Soviets' own calculations, tlieir tactical aircraft have lacked the range to conduct effective strikes on most of NATO's airfields and otber long-range targets. This apparently did not concern themin lhcecauseuclear war these targets could be reached with USSR-based strategic systems.
In (he mid-lOGOs developmental work on new, more capable fighter-bombers began, Initially, new versions of thcishbed fighter were produced wiih improved payload and range, making (hem more effective for offensive roles. Then,about thche new SU-I7 Fitter C.logger andcrjcer becameCompared to earlier Soviet tactical fighters, these new aircraft have substantiallyrange, payload, avionics, and EGMAlthough still available only in limited numbers, these aircraft already have improved the operational flexibility and efficiency of the tactical air force. Fencer, Flogger. andreof striking targets in NATO Europe from bases in the western USSR, especially if theyto bases in Central Europe. We believe that during sustained conventional operations, Flogger andircraft currently in the western USSR would deploy to forward bases in order to make maximum use of their payload and rangeTlie introduction of Backfire bombers into Long Range and Naval Aviation is improving the ability of these forces to survive NATO's airparticularly at low altitudes. Theoxbat has substantially improved thecapability of Soviet tactical air forces and may aboigh altitude nuclear weaponcapability.
o complement iheir growing inventory of modem multi-mission aucraft, thc Soviets area variety of new air weapons. Theseimproved air-to-airamily ofair-to-surface missiles (including an electro-opticalty guidednd cluster and retarded bombs. When combined with thc improved penc-
New Tactical Aircraft
Iho fiihCiednd Loriami of iht MiGnwdiifcounitrair un.it io recanthav* imj*rnulit eaoion
P Older modrli Trey ewia pivfoad of
J.MO Itn outadii of 4QQ nm.
Feie-C
ihighly modified renewingof ihe SU?ightffbombei. Ii hai much oeeitn radnii and payload caoabllliio ihin inbt of om
nance cm Mtoradiui ofm.
iound anacthe.ep'Kdto older, liehloombert in tha Soviet air force anoll at uted for cWea nrikei aoaiml NATO urosu thai are beyond the range of oilw. Pact tacticalIhean, tnk# urlaee0 Ibtlm.
wing-wng fljrtu. Cai( i, ojrtenHyn both tir detenuune anack vou'ont. Ii on carry tomeOn ol emmrxr to'adlut ol iMiai
vn.
w -s-
capabilities of thc new aircraft, tlieseihould greatly increase the potential effective ncii of cacti tactical air sortie, particularly againit hardened groundn addition, there has been increnied emphasis on ground attack ttaining.
Ground-Bated Air De'ente System*
uring the, ground-based air defense systems such a* thehendhich were first introduced innumbers in the, continued to beAtsunn1 time, several new SAM Bysttwi appeared: thehend. nunt recently, tlieogether those weaponsutually supportive and highly mobile air defense system. Inctcascs in thc effective tangc and mobility of these systems and in the total number of weapons deployed reduce the vulnerability of ground forces on much larger areas of the battlefield. One of the moit important improvement trends has been toward greater mobility which will adapt these weapons to the fluidity of modem battlefieldDevelopment of extensive air defenseto the ground forces bas also enabled the lactical air forces to direct more of their resources to offensive missions.
2 Medium Tank,
ecently, after at leastean ofeffort, the Soviets beganew-model medium lank,0 of2 production model areProduction should increase markedly over the nest year or two. Currently, at least half of thc Soviet medium tanks in Central Europe; (he rest.ave yet been identified outside thc USSR but at least aare likely to be in Central Europe. We have, at present, no reliable technical description of the tank.
APCs ond Combo/. The BMP combal vehicle was first seen in theui did not appear in substantial numbers in Soviet motorized rifle units until the last three years. Although its mobility andmakeC. it cosls about three limes as much as theOther lalc-
rnodelC being produced This high cost along wiih operational considerations probably will prevent ihe BMP Irom totally replacing ihc earlier APCs.0 BMPs would be required if all Soviel motorized riO units woe to bereequippodem.
ISI. Currently, both lheROOP I) and Ihc BMP ore being delivered as replacemcnls for older-model UTH-CCh and APCs of the still earlier BTR-SO anderies. We estimateixture of APCs probably will emerge in lhe Soviel ground 'mo i. with only about one third lo one half ofC requirements being met by BMPs. The Soviets are alsoew airborne assault vehicle, lhe HMD. which is currently being added lo the airbornet will significantlyIhe anti-tank eapabililies of ihese forces
Sell Propelled Artillery
elf-propelled field artilleryandfirst identifiedelf-propelled artilleryercent moreowedits prime mover, and Is more difficult toThis may have deterred the Sovietsthem earlier. Bui their superiormobility and reduced vulnerability,with towed cannons, make themcapable of supporting fast-movingThese advantage! have become morewith theenewed emphasiscombat capa bi lily.
new self-propelled guns aie beingreplacements for lowedbatteries of ili guns each to lhe motorizedof Soviet divisions andgunto division artillery regiments.more are produced, we expect lhat manyartillery regiments will be completelywiih self-propel led guns.type of self-propelled gun hadercent of lhe inventoryartillery tn Soviet units.
St'otegie Aitacke believe lhat. for at least the next five years, the missiles and bombers of thc Sovietatuck forces will provide the bull of the
<
-Secret-'
New Air Defense Weapons
argct tracking radar inwiih id ou ad-moonm guns, ll wai .nlrotfueedheor improvedprotection from tactical aircratt and helicopters'1
Theobile, medium-to high altitude surface-to-an misiile sysiem which entered service in Uieji vein assigned at army and Front level to replace
the SA 7.
SA-8
ew mot-le SAM lyticm which is full MrataaaJ servsce Ii rs expected toe'ente coverage belowoverage and beyond the range of Ihei may bt in-UoduCvdtome divisions at an alternative to the SA 6
ohilc. low in-medium altitude surface-to-air missile system introduced in ihe. It is57mm antlairCra't quits at (rie division level.
lheonsistscout vehicle modified lo ut'iy small SAM s- similar io lhentroduced in the lan-perates in conjunction with then provide lowo'niiide iiroieciion lot regimen is.
- SG-OHHS-fS -
Seen*
New Ground Forces Equipment
m SP Gun
mmm tell propel led artillery pieces were developedhe, probably lo help Paci artillery units keep pace with rapidly advancing armoredoy also provwfe greater proitciion lorrews In boi'ind nuclear environments.
BTR-GOPft
Bo eight-wheeled, amphibiousersonnel carrier which carries an mljniry squad and mountsm andm machine gun in ils turret.
ink
Ihii mediumneumber ol developmental tanks referred toin the West. The newoiMve similar in appearance.
BMP
The BMP combat vehiclehree-man crew and is aimed withm smoothbore, short-recoil gun with automaticanger AT'CM laurioher. and agun. Th*nfantry squad Is provided with Individual firing ports and CBR protection.
top
Setter-
Pad* theater nuclear strike capability, although the numbers ot Pact tactical nuclearsystems located in Central Europe willsubstantially. The deployment of new ICBMs equipped with MIRVs will substantially augment the potential coverage of European targets. Wc believe, however, thatelatively smallofCBMs would be used to strike target* in NATO Europe.
We expect that thcRBM. now being tested with MIRVs, will bo deployed with mobile launchers.issile could be available for deployment in mid to6 and would be more survivable than the existingndystems. We do not know whether it will replace any of these older systems. Its mobility may allow the Soviets to launch intermediate-range missiles from either the USSR or Eastern Europe.
The numberlass submarines in.the Soviet Navy is expected to decrease as new SSBNs are produced because the launcherslass units would be counted Sn the total number of SLBM launcliers allowed to thc SovietsAL agreement based on thc Vladivostok accords.
C. The East Europeans
thehc East Europeans,urging, began to improve their armedexpansion, and forceover the past decade have enabled theto assume responsibilities in Pactplans. Although improvements in Eastground and air forces have generallythe Soviet lead, they have tended toa few years and to proceed more gradually.
Eail Germany
in thc East Cermanproceeded slowly over the past decadegradual introduction of new APCs andtowed artillery, some increases instrength, and thc recent appearancetanks. The number of East Cerman tanksfromue to anof the tank battalions in motorizedand increases in the Ministryecond Scud brigade andunit have recently been formed. Tlie SA-9
has been introducedimited scale. The levels of equipment and manpower in East Cerman Army units have grown moderately in recent years. We estimate that thc intended wartime strength of motorized rifle divisions has increased fromen50 currently; tankions have Increased. Overall. East Cerman ground forces manpower0 to
East Cerman Air Force is (lieof all the East European air forces.of its fighter aircraft areare late-model Fishbedtlieof new models continues to rise. The sizeAir Force has increased by2 due to the formationeconnaissance unit.
Czecho sloa
Force improvements in Czechoslovakia have been minimal since8 Soviet invasion. Ground and air manpower has actually decreaseddue to the Soviet occupation of several former Czech installations and political purges of tbcAlthough the estimated wartime manning of motorized rifle divisions has increased005 and that of tank divisionso, the number of divisions has decreased and overall ground strengthropped fromo. The equipment levels of Czech ground units have also been increased since theeriod and new force elements, such as FROG. Scud, and airunits, have been added. One significant area of improvement has been the development of new ground forces weapons. In addition to thc domestic manufacture of Soviet-designed equipment such as trucks, APCs, and tanks, thc Creehs have developed new equipment of noteworthy value,heir new automatic reloading multiple rocket launcher.
Thc Czech Air Force is still primarily equipped with older-model Soviet aircralt, although some late-model MIG-2Is have been acquired. Thc size of the force probably will remain stable over the next several years.
Poland
in Polish forces since thehave been extensive in terms of both cquip-
merit modcml/Atlon and unit expansion. Thu au (homed wartime manning of the Polish mechantacd division has increased fromn IOCS tond the tank division; fromo, The number of tanks. APCs. artillery pieces, rocket launchers, and FROCl in divisions has increased as well as Ihc site and number of many combat service and support units. Eleclronic warfare regiments have also been formed and SA-6s. SA-7s. andre now beinginto thc forcei. Overall, the strength of the Polish Army hai Increased by0 men
has the largest of the Eastlorces. It is mainly ecjuippid withaircraft although someilter Cs, have been acquired inTlie site of the force Is eipectcd toover the next few years.
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgario
ground und air forces in thecountries arc the least modem of all theRe-equipment programs in these threehave generally been less extensive than inthc northern three and moil of thc othermeasures seen in Soviel forces,the expanded tank battalion, have notall. New aircraft, air defense syslems. andvehicles lie gradually being acquired
eceni Ironds
rate of growth of manpower andin Soviet ground and tactical air forceshave slowed appreciably in (he last iwoso, particularly in comparison with thethat occurred earlier in connection withand Cxoch problems. There isevidence, however, of ongoingthat could lead to further gradualin the next few years. Further increasesartillery have been observed inin thc western USSRecenisaid that similar increases are intended forCentral Europe. Also, some small,infantry elements which haveobserved with some Soviet tank regimentsEurope, may portend yet anotherdivisional manpower.
Production of new, sophisticated equipment ii continuingigh iate and this (rend Is likely to continue through the end of theumber of recently introduced weapons systems such as lhe new series of tactical aircraft and the new air defense missile systems is still far from complete. Other expensive weapons systems iuch as the self-propelled artillery and2 medium lank have fust entered full-scaleand output of these weapons almosiwill increase over the neat few years
Research and development on theater force equipment is continuingumber of new systems now being tested probably will appear over live next few years.now undergoing developmental testingew tactical aircraft and two new tactical surface-to-surface missiles.
Whether, and to what extent, acquisition of new equipment will cause further increases in the overall size of the theater forces is difficult to assess Tlie Soviets now have enough of most types of weapont to fill the eilst'ng active units.ew maior items, such as APCs and helicopters, arc still in short supply. This may lead to astable weapons Inventory over the nest few years. Recently, roost new equipment appears to have been used to modernize the force byrather than adding to the equipment in active unils.
n the past, however, the replacement of old items with new equipment has sometimesin overall growth because the Soviets formed new uniti or expanded existing units using the older but itill useful equipment. For example, outmoded heavy tanks and World War II vintage asiault guns were eliminated from divisions in Central Europe moreecade ago but some of ihese are still retained in separate regiments and battalions in the CSFC. Similarly, some of the antiaircraft guns recently replaced byissilesumber of CSFC divisions have been transferred to otheryet equipped withenlirge-theuT AAA units. This tendency to hoard older equipment in active unitsotential for further gradual increases which cannot beestimated.
Heavy Artillery. In the part three ycarj wc have identified heavy artillery pieces at theArtillery Test Facility and at several missile-associated ground force installations, all in the .USSlt. The weapons were in battalion- or regi-mental-sized groupingsmm gun-howitzersmm mortars.mm gun-howitzer is an obsolete weapon developedmm mortar is also an older weapon, which firston parade
We do not know what tliese developments portend, but with the Soviets' renewed interest in field artillery we would expect them toequirement for heavy artillery. Heretofore, (hey have had nothing heaviermm cannons in the active forces. Some association of these weapons with Scaleboard and Scud units could be viewedign that they will have nuclear capabilities. The range ofmm mortar is so0 meters) that its useuclear artillery piece is unlikely. We therefore believe it more likely that the association simply implies that heavy artillerythey become generally available in Sovietbe administratively grouped at fronl level or in thc High Command Reserve, as are Scale-boards and some Scuds.
Response to Western AnlttonfcThe Soviet ground forces areupon the tank than any army inIhe time should come when the Sovietsto conclude that their tanks werepenetrate NATO forces. Moscow wouldenormous problem. The Soviets would havetheir strategyar In Europea radical redesign of theirAt present, however, the Soviets seemfar from drawing any such epochalSoviets liave reacted to NATO'snew antitank weapons with relativelyin their forces. Moscow hastanks in Eastern Europe and possiblyinfantry to its tank units.
F. Outlook for Furlhcr Growth in thc
Section VI. A. above, wc noted afactors that have motivated the Soviets tomodernize their theater forces over (he past
decade. Much of thc crpansion bas been motivated by tensions with China and by Czedsoxlovakunreliability. Changes in Soviet miliiaryalioajor impact. Certain majordevelopment programs probably represent Soviet attempts to counter specific areas of NATO strength such as superior combal aircraft;advances have undoubtedly prompted other equipment changes.
All of these factors together, however; do not seem lo us to explain tlse overall magnitude ,ind broad scope ol the changes which haveAs wc suggested at the beginning of this Estimate, the Soviet attitude toward theater (orce goals is powerfully Influenced by historicalof lhe catastrophic consequences ofunreadiness. This outlook, reinforcedraditional xenoplwbiaenerallyapproach to military planning, appears to lead thc Soviets to aim at achieving andemonstrably superior conventional force posture in Europe.
This perception of Soviet goals docs not, however, make it possible to define thc point at which Soviet military planners would consider them satisfied. There is little basis in evidence on which lo measure what they wouldemonstrably superior conventional force.
It ts clear, al any rale, that the Sovietarc extremely conservative in defining what islikelyontinue forceprograms beyond thc point of numerical parity. Also, Soviet military leaders have aninterest in continuing Ihe process of expansion and modernization. They havetrong tendency in the past to seize upon any iinprovcmcni in NATO forces as anotherfor Soviet force programs. Indeed, by West-em standards ihey seem to overreact to changes in NATO forces. Al the same time ihey present their own programs as strictly defensive and deny (hat NATO might reasonably consider them threatening.
This expansionary momentum hasolitical leadership thai has been generous with manpower and budgetarySometime in lhehe amount of
used by (he miliiary could begin Io conflict seriously with (be demands of the civilian economy, but this probably will notroblem for Ihe immediate future. Also, thc growingof thc Soviet weapons inventory is creating an increasing need for highly skilled manpower which probably conflicts with the need* of Ihc economy, but this has noi ye( appearedonstrain Ihc military programs.
Similarly, thc current share of GNPlo lhe military and thc division of thesewithin thc various institutional elcmenis of lhe military is .acceptable to the SovietAlthough hard budgetary decisions aremade each year at Ihe highest level, tbc absence of the parliamentary constraints and public scrutiny that exist fn the West seems toowerful bureaucratic institution such as the Soviet miliiary considerable latitude to pursue programs which it considers necessary.
Barring some major new developmentto the Sino-Soviet rift oft is unlikely that this continuing theater force growth will be as rapid or as large as that which occurred between thcnd. If lhe more gradual expansion of the last two years or so continues, the sire of (he (heater forces will increase by about one percent annually aver thc nexl few years. By thcven (his relatively small annual increase woulden to the Soviet theaterwould then have moreillion men.
Figura 0
SilVlll GROUND ANO IACIICAICES MANPOWOT
I'l
i.
n sum, the momentum of the Soviet drive to maintain superiority of forces la Central Europe. seems likely lo lead to gradual expansion and furtlier technological improvements in Soviet theater forces through (he end ofo reverse this trend would likely require rhe ascendancy of newleadership with different priorities and the power base to overcome current Institutional
" See footnote 2.
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
I. Ihii document woi diueminotcd by the Genual Intelligence Agency. Thii copy ii for in* Information ond use ol the recipient ond of persons uncle* hii jurisdictioneed-fo-lnow boiii. Additional eisenriat dil semination moy be aulho'tied by lhe lollow. ing ollkioli wiihin theit respective deportment!*
o. Director o( Intelligence ond Research, for lhe Oeportmenl of Slote
Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of lhe Secretary of
Defanse and lhe organiialion of Ihe Joint Chiefs of Staff
nil to nt Chief ot Staff for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army, for the
Deportment of iho Army
af Naval Intelligence, fo- Iho Department of iho Navy
o. Aitlitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for lhe Oeportmenl ol the Alt Force
f. Deputy Assislonl Adminliirator for Nalional Security, Energy Research and Developmenl Administration
Director, FBI, for lhe.Federol Bureau of Investigation
of NSA, for Ihe Nolionol Security Agency
i. Special Astfilant lo the Secretory for Notional Securily, lor the Department of lhe Treasury
j. The OCTs Deputy fo' Nolionol Inielligence Officers, for ony otheror Agency
This document may be retained, or deitroyed by burning In occordonce with applicable security regulations, cr returned lo the Central intelligence Agency by orrongement with lhe DCI'i Deputy for Nolionol Intelligence Officers.
When this document is disseminated overseas,ecipienli moy retain iteriod noi In excess of one year. Al tho end of thfi period, the document should either be deitroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or per* mission should bo reouesied ol the forwarding ogency to retoin ll In occordonce with2
he titlel doevmee^-vfhon-vseo^-sepejoiely- fromI-be
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: