CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. zos05
IS December 5
The Honorable James T. Lynn Director, Office of Management and Budget Old Executive Office Building
Dear Jim:
The following are my comments on the report prepared by Don Ogilvie and his colleagues. Each of us will have his own personal views and his own problems with the paper. In stating my own,o not want to detract from the effort and expertise that went into it, especially against the deadlines imposed. What follows, however, must necessarily emphasize the problems rather than the strengths -
In responding to the outline that accompanied theiscuss the full range of topics covered by the Study Group (Attachment B) . ish toon organization and management, the most difficult and ultimately the most important of the issues we face.
I believe the future structure for Americanshould rest on the following principles:
DCI should have full, easy, and regular access to the President and National Security Council, but should not actartisan political supporter of the Administration. Two way communication between the DCI and the President is essential.
DEC W
should be able to provide the President and the NSC and, to the extent feasible, the Congress with assessments of foreign events based on analysis under his control and independent of the major government departments.
system that supports hire should be
shaped to provide the best possible intelli- resource allocations,
and organization should be driven by the substantive goals set by national needs for intolligence.
DCI 3hould have an establishedwith the Secretaries of State and Defense that enables them to work efficiently together.
Department of Defense should be assured that the intelligence capabilities it needs in wartime will be avilable.
portion of the Defense budget allotted to national intelligence resources should be clearly identified and segregated from the Defense budget proper.
assessing foreign events competition in analysis should be encouraged. In collection, duplication should be avoided except where it greatly increases the chances of acquiring vital intelligence.
Intelligence Community should be managed with due regard for resource constraints. (This point is put lasteason. Too many studies of intelligence approach itotal focus on economy. Economy is necessary, indeed it is incumbent on all intelligence managers to make hard choices to that end, but it should not be an end in itself. The primary purpose must be to produce good intelligence).
Effective management of an intelligencebuilt on these principles will depend to aextent on the way it structures the relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. My basic difficulty with the Study Group's report is that it dealsumber of separate aspects of this problem, but does not pull them together so as to focus attention
atter of such fundamental importance. In sinalest terms, the OCI is supposedly responsible for "planning and reviewing ail intelligence activities and theof all intelligence resources." of the tocal intelligenc^judcet, however, the Secretary of Defense controls mmmWmW ant* theOn the other hand, the CIAP, MRP, and CC? make up the bulk of theintelligenceet they are equal to less than
of the Dqfer.se budget. These two
reponderant voice in how intelligence money is spent.
facedhoice between primary and secondary goals, warfightingor intelligence capabilities, Defense willo choose war;ightir.g.
money is soart of the total Defense picture that it cannot get thehink it deserves.
Together these facts mean that, under present arrangements,CIecretary of Defense see things the same way, the former is not going to be able to do his job.
There are several other topics which must be addressed in any study of Intelligence Community management that seem to me not fullv treated in this report.
have noted the importance to thean independent analytic capability. This
is crucial to an understanding of the DCI's role. Without it, no matter what the DCI's paperhe is the prisoner of departmental analysis, with it, he can challengedepartmental positions and stimulate new attacks on stubborn problems.
paper gives insufficient emphasis
to the importance of an authoritative and informed focus in the Executive for preparing theprogram and defending the budget before
Congress. Congress is moving aggressively toward assuming what are ucaentially management functions over inteLliger.ee programs. This trend can only be reversed if the congressional members of the oversight committees develop confidence in tbe Executive both with respect to the intelligence program and the execution of its budget.
c. The document does not discuss thaof maintaining an independent and innovative capability for developing technology and applying this technology to technical collection programs.
Against this background, my reaction to the options developed by the Study Group paper is that they get ahead of the problem by boing too specific on complicated issues. The fact is we are not yet ready to ask the President toefinitive choiceuture intelligence structure. There is no "one" solution to the problems that face us, and every change in one function ha3 repercussions in others that may be impossible to foresee. The Study Group's options will be extremely useful in illustrating for the President the range of choice, butt be usedasis for decision. In my view, we should use them to seek from theeneral indication of the direction in which he wants to move. On that basis we can then set in motion detailed studies of the consequences that will ensueiven choice, and can present for him in seme detail the choices he has in reaching that goal.
My comments on the Options themselves are derived by testing them against the principles stated above. By that standard:
--Optionhich centralizes control of national systemsCI, cannot meet Defense's legitimate requirements.
3 effectively destroys the DCI's present limited authority, and thereby makes it impossible for hin to be an effective advocate of independentpositions at the NSC level.
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2ould appearthe principles stated. Option 2present form has seriousbut goes as farhink we
go in strengthening the DCI relative to Defense. ees not have these problems but, as it stands, leaves the basic problems of management and resource allocation about where they are now.
The first question that the President must decide is whether major change in intelligence organizationoal to be sought this year. Congress appears to be moving in this direction,oubt that the disruption of our effort that would result from majorwould be repaid by the results. ould propose instead to take the initiative by moving to achieve better management of tho Communityay that will not require lengthy Congressional debate.asis forove,elieve it is somewhat too woak for the purpose. For thistronger modification.
This proposal, Attachment A, differs fromore in intent than in substance. It is specifically aimed at reaching the kind of DCI-SecDef relationshipelieve essential, but without the traumatic change in bureaucratic equities required by OptionOn the other hand, it gives no additional muscle to the DCI). Itentral mechanism for managing the Community, and itlearer distinction between resource issues, where the DCI is at best first among equals, and substantive issues, where he is and shouldreat deal more. hink it offers promise for real progressinimum of disruption.
While it is true, as the Study Group emphasizes, that Option 4 (or the attached modification) could be carried out by administrative rather than legislativeelieve that strong confirmatory legislation will eventually be required if the recommended changes are to endure. The authorities and responsibilities of our complex Intelligence Community should not be left to bureaucratic conflict and changes in Administration. Executive action could start us on our way to the changes we think essential, but the ambiguities of the existent statutes must be corrected if there is to be any degree of stability in the new organizational arrangements, and if the Congress is to stand behind them.
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All of the above is predicatedecision by tho President to avoid major change this year. If, however, the President feelsajor reorganization is required,elieve we should look to some form oF Option 2. elieve itentative basis forroposal, primarily because itolution to the central OCI-SecDef problem. Should the President go thatould recommend that he give the departments and agencies time to consider the detailed consequences of thapproach before finally committing himself to it.
Sincerely,
Attachments:ttachment B
ATTACHMENT A
Option A,
RATIONALE
This Option starts from the premise that stronger management of the Intelligence Community is highlybut that the balance of interests reflected in the present structureealistic one and should be maintained. Itoncept foregree of collective management while preserving present organizational relationships. Itinimum of legislative change.
DESCRIPTION
The DCI would continue to be advisor to the President, coordinator of the Community, and Director of CIA. The present structure of Committees and Boards would be consolidated into two, both chaired by the DCI: an Executive Committee of the NSC for Intelligence at the deputy secretary level, responsible for all Community management and policy matters,ational Intelligence Board at the present USIB Principals level, responsible for substantive production. To enable the DCI to give more attention to his Community responsibilities he would be providedecond deputy.
PRIMARYD
The DCI's Responsibilities
The DCI would be the President's chiaf intelligence advisor, and would remain Director of CIA. iew to raising the stature of the job, consideration should be given to granting him Cabinet rank. He would be responsible, under the MSC, for the coordination of national intelligence policy and for the production of national intelligence. lear distinction would be made, however, between his Community and CIA roles.
To this end, he would be provided with an additicna Deputy, appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress. The present Deputybe specifically responsible for managingcy under the DCI; the other Deputy would be responsible under the DCI for coordination of the Community. The DCI would have an Agency office at Langleyommunity office downtown where his Community Deputy would be located.
Coordination of National Intelligence
The present structure of boards and committees would be rationalized, on the basic principle that policy and resource mattersalancing of departmental interests would be considered collectively by the senior officers controlling the assets andconcerned. eparate forum would be provided for substantive intelligence issues, on the grounds that these are inappropriate for policy officers to adjudicate and that departmental interests are protected by the right of dissent.
Policy and Resources
For the first of these purposes the DCI would chair an NSC Executive committee for Intelligence, with Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense as members. The committee would have under control of its members all important intelligence assets, and would actoard of directors for national intelligence. ) would absorb the functions of NSCIC, EXCOM (NRO plus equivalent responsibilities forRAC, and USIB (exceot national intelligence produ
The DCI'3 Community Deputy would be his alternate in EXCOM(I) but would not serve as Chairman in his absence. The IC Staff would be the secretariat of The DCI would carry out his existing responsibilities for the NFIP (less its tactical and departmental components) with the assistance of the Committee. EXCOH(X) would have approval authority for the IIFIP (CIAP, NRF, CCP, and some elements of the CDIP) and its decisions would be binding. The DCI would have administrative and resource authority only over CIA. Present administrativefor the NRP and CCP would be preserved.
Production of ?iational lr.tellicer.ee
DSI3 would be reconstitutedationalBoard, limited by charter to substantive matters, and advisory to the DCI. The NIO's would act as thestaff for the NIB. The Board would be chaired by the DCI, with his Agency Deputy as CIA member. The latter would serve as Chairman in his absence.
Covert Action
The DCI wouldember of theommittee, but not its Chairman, with hi3 Agency Deputy as alternate. Clandestine collection and covert action would remain assigned to CIA, without change in present arrangements.
Oversight
..Without administrative authority over the Ccmmunitv, it would bo inappropriate for the DCI to have an IG responsibility except over CIA. This Option assumes Executive oversight at the NSC or white House level.
Congress
The DCI would continue to be the Community spokesman to Congress.
National/Tactical Problems
EXCOM(Z) would handle matters relating to the relationship between tactical and national intelligence. The DCI would have no responsibility for the tactical intelligence budgets of the military services.
Attachment B
A. "Abuses"
on Propriety
An Executive Order whichode of standards for the conduct of intelligence activities, as proposed, ccuid serve constructive purposes, both internally and publicly.
3ranch Oversicht
have already taken steps toCIA Inspector-General, in accordance withCommission recommendations. As to
a Community-wide IG, this should depend on the degree of authority vested in the DCI. Undere could exercise this responsibility. Under Option 2, e clearly could not.
believe that the current effortsCongress and the changed attitudes ofwill provide more than enoughthe Community. The problem of thebe to protect the Community from beingas to be hamstrung. If,President fools that an additionalould only urge that this beresponsibility of the National SecurityCommittee or of tho PFIA3. Myisodified, which wouldthe character of NSCIC. Moreover,of preventing abuses and improvingnot mix well. As to PFIAS,ave theof nixing imcompatible functions. Despite
tho findings of the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions, it is doubtfulart-time Board, evenreatly expanded permanent staff, could effectively engage this problem.
3. lntf?Hiql icy CQOE^nfrtiQn
Intelligence policy coordination should follow the sane lines as Executive oversight, in view of the NSC's statutory duty of integrating domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. This suggests that whatever new coordination arrangements are nocessary should be made through the NSC structure, expanding it when and if needed. econd Intelligence Advisor to the President for this purpose does not appear politic or advisable. On the other hand, the DCI should not be involved in matters concerning domestic affairs. It is unfortunate that the Study Group's charter did not extend tobecause it is here that the problem of intelligence policy coordination is thorniest.
4- Theommittee
I believe theommittee should be continued and strengthened to provide policy approval for covert action.
B. Intelligence Community Leadership
My position on these matters is contained in my basic letter and the Modifiedppended thereto. The only otherave istrongly support the Study Group's recommendation that the DCI be relieved of the responsibility for the tactical intelligence budget assigned to hin by the Presidential Letter This is an unworkable arrangement. elieve the DCI should be responsible for ensuring the integration of tactical and national systems* but that the armed services should propose, defend, and execute their own budgets for their own tactical intelligence requirements.
Including the responsibility to avoid duplication of national capabilities in tactical systems.
C. Covert Action
I believe it essential that responsibility for covert, action rexain in CIA and remain an integral function of CIA's Clandestine Service. For the reasons stated in the Study Group report, separation cf clandestine collection and covert actionecipe for operational disaster.
D. Management Improvements
1. Budgetary and Fiscal Controls
I have stated on numerous occasions, Ito the publication ofigures. ecognize, however, there isimprove the flow of budget information tothe Congress selects to review thebudget, under appropriate security safeguards.
believe that additional controls byon reprogramming, would serve noin preventing "abuses" or reassuring Rather, they would further reduce theUS intelligence to respond to new challenges. purpose is better intelligence, we arein the wrong direction. In the pastintelligence budget execution has beenthrough informal understandings between
the Executive and key congressmen and senators. Changes in Congress have largely negated this flexibility and no adequate alternatives have been developed. It is particularly important that the intelligence budget not be subjected to all Defense appropriation expenditure rules. Theppropriation Bill contains language moving strongly in that direction. elieve what is needed is legislation establishing rules uniquely tailored to intelligence programs.
2. Miscellaneous
a. In regard toould note that there is no barrier to provision of anyto the senior consumer who really needs to know. The problem is somewhat more complicated,tudy in progress on how to simplify and rationalize the present system.
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COHR
Study's comments on consumerwith the Intelligence Community andare valid.
respecterformancewe are continuing to develop such athe advice and cooperation of USIB andthe mechanisms of the KeyEvaluation Program.
would put rather more stronglyfor the NSC to address the problemfor CIA abroad. Without adequateaffirmations of the value ofhave no meaning.
although it does not fallstrict definition of the Study Group'sI would note yet again the necessitylegislation to protect intelligencemethods.
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Original document.
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